The Babylonian Talmud

Chullin

 

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 21a

But after all does not the original objection stand?1 - Raba answered: Read [in the text]. 'This is what he does: He [the priest] cuts [with his finger-nail] the spinal cord and the neckbone without cutting through the major portion of the surrounding flesh'.2 When R. Zera went up [to palestine] he found R. Ammi sitting and reciting the above statement [of Ze'iri], and at once put to him the question: Why proceed with the nipping if it is already dead? He was astounded for a moment,3 but then replied. Read [in the text]. This is what he does: He cuts [with his finger-nail] the spinal cord and the neckbone without cutting through the major portion of the surrounding flesh. The same is taught [in the following Baraitha]: How must he [the priest] nip off [the head] of the sin-offering of a bird? He cuts [with his finger-nail] the spinal cord and the neckbone without cutting through the major portion of the surrounding flesh, until he reaches the gullet or the windpipe. On reaching the gullet or the windpipe he cuts through one of them or the major portion of one of them, and then cuts through the major portion of the surrounding flesh. In the case of a burnt-offering he cuts through both, or the major portion of both, of these organs. Who is the author of this [Baraitha]? Is it the Rabbis?4 Surely they hold that both organs must be severed! Is it R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon?4 Surely he holds that the major portion only of both organs [shall be cut through]! - Interpret it thus: 'Both organs' - that is, according to the view of the Rabbis; 'or the major portion of both organs' - that is, according to the view of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon. If you wish, however, I can say that the whole [Baraitha] is in accordance with the view of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, and as to the term 'both organs' it means that both organs appear to be severed.5

Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: If [in a human being] the neckbone and the major portion of the surrounding flesh was broken, the body immediately defiles6 [men and vessels that are] in the tent. And if you will contend: But was not the incident of Eli a case where the neckbone was broken without the major portion of the surrounding flesh having been cut?7 [I reply that] in the case of old age it is different, for it is written: And it came to pass when he made mention of the ark of God, that he fell off his seat backward by the side of the gate, and his neck broke and he died; for he was an old man and heavy.8

R. Samuel b. Nahmani said in the name of R. Johanan. If one ripped up a human being as one does a fish, the body immediately defiles [men and vessels that are] in the tent. R. Samuel b. Isaac added: provided [he was ripped up] along the back.

Samuel said: If one split an animal into two, it is immediately nebelah.

R. Eleazar said: If the thigh was removed and the cavity was noticeable, the animal is [immediately] nebelah. What is the meaning of 'And the cavity was not8 ceable'? - Raba replied: It means that when the animal is crouching there appears to be something missing.

We have learnt elsewhere:9 If their10 heads have been cut off, even though their limbs move convulsively, they are unclean[the convulsions being] but similar to the convulsive movements of the lizard's tail [after it has been cut off].11 What is meant by 'Have been cut off'? - Resh Lakish said, [It means] actually cut off; R. Assi said in the name of R. Mani, [It means severed in the sense] as the head of the burnt-offering of a bird is severed. Whereupon R. Jeremiah asked R. Assi: Do you mean 'as the head of the burnt-offering of a bird is severed' according to the view of the Rabbis,12 and so you do not disagree at all; or do you mean 'as the head of the burnt-offering of a bird is severed' according to the view of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon,13 and so you do disagree? - He replied: I mean, 'as the head of the burnt-offering of a bird is severed' according to the view of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, and so we disagree. Some there are who read [the above passage thus]: Resh Lakish said: It means actually cut off; R. Assi said in the name of R. Mani, [It means severed in the sense] as the head of the burnt-offering of a bird is severed according to the view of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, [and that is.] cut off to the extent of the greater portion of both organs.

What is [this dispute between] the Rabbis and R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon? - It was taught: It is written: And he shall prepare the second for a burnt-offering, according to the ordinance.14 This means, according to the ordinance prescribed for the sin-offering of an animal. You say it means, 'according to the ordinance prescribed for the sin-offering of an animal'; but perhaps it is not so, but rather, according to the ordinance prescribed for the sin-offering of a bird! [This cannot be], for when it says. And he shall bring it near,15 the verse thereby draws a distinction between the sin-offering of a bird and the burnt-offering of a bird. How then must I interpret the verse: 'According to the ordinance'? [It must mean,] according to the ordinance of the sin-offering of an animal. Thus, as the sin-offering of an animal must be brought

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(1) Raba's original objection against Ze'iri's statement viz., Why proceed with the nipping if the bird is already dead? V. supra n. 1.
(2) And as long as the major Portion of the surrounding flesh has not been cut the bird is not regarded as dead.
(3) Dan. IV, 16.
(4) V. infra.
(5) I.e., according to R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon a substantial portion of the organs must be cut so that it would appear as though both organs were severed, although in reality only the major portion of each has been actually cut through.
(6) For the meaning of 'defilement in the tent' v. supra p. 62, n. 2.
(7) There is no mention in the verse of the flesh of the neck being torn, and nevertheless he is referred to as dead.
(8) I Sam. IV, 28.
(9) Ohol. I, 6.
(10) Either the heads of those reptiles that convey uncleanness (Rashi and R. Gershom); or the heads of cattle and birds (Tosaf.).
(11) These movements are clearly no signs of life, since the tail is here absolutely severed from the body.
(12) I.e., that both organs of the throat must be severed. Accordingly, this view is substantially the same as that of Resh Lakish.
(13) I.e., that only the greater portion of the organs must he severed.
(14) Lev. V, 10.
(15) Ibid. I, 15. This verse deals with a freewill burnt-offering of a bird, and the fact that the pronoun 'it' is expressly stated serves to indicate that this sacrifice must be dealt with differently from others of the same class.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 21b

only from unconsecrated animals,1 [must be sacrificed] by day, and [all the services in connection therewith must be performed] with the [priest's] right hand, so, too, the burnt-offering of a bird must be brought only from unconsecrated birds, must be sacrificed by day, and, [all the services in connection therewith must be performed] with the [priest's] right hand. But then it should follow that just as in the former case [one has only to cut] the greater portion of both organs,2 so in the latter case [one has only to nip off] the greater portion of both organs? There is, therefore, another text which reads: And he shall nip off . . . and he shall burn it,3 from which one can draw the following conclusion: as for the purposes of burning the head must be separate from the body,4 so, too, in nipping the head shall be made separate from the body.5 R. Ishmael says: 'According to the ordinance' means, according to the ordinance prescribed for the sin-offering of a bird; thus, as the nipping of the head of the sin-offering of a bird must be done close to the back of the neck, so, too' the nipping of the head of the burnt-offering of a bird must be done close to the back of the neck.6 But then it should follow, should it not, that as in the former case one must nip through only one organ without severing the other,7 so in the latter case one must nip through only one organ without severing the other? It is, therefore, written: And he shall bring it near.8 R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon says: 'According to the ordinance' means, according to the ordinance of the sin-offering of a bird; thus, as in the latter case

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(1) I.e., from the common herd but not from those animals that had been purchased with Second Tithe money.
(2) For slaughtering does not require more than this, v. infra 27a.
(3) Lev. I, 15.
(4) For the expression, 'And he shall burn it' is repeated in this passage (vv. 15 and 27), indicating that there must be two separate burnings, one of the head of the bird and the other of the body.
(5) I.e., both organs must be absolutely severed. It is this opinion expressed here anonymously which has been repeatedly referred to previously as the view of the Rabbis.
(6) This inference is necessary, since the Law does not specify in the case of a freewill burnt-offering of a bird the place where the nipping must be done.
(7) For in connection with the sin-offering of a bird the Torah adds: And he shall not divide it asunder (Lev. I, 17). Therefore the priest is not allowed to nip off any more than is necessary to render the bird valid i.e., one organ.
(8) The pronoun it specifically distinguishes the freewill burnt-offering of a bird from other similar sacrifices.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 22a

the priest sprinkles the blood whilst holding the head and the body in his hand, so in this case, too, he sprinkles the blood whilst holding the head and the body in his hand. (What can this mean?1 - It means this: Just as in the latter case he sprinkles the blood whilst the head is still attached to the body,2 so, too, in the case of the burnt-offering of a bird he sprinkles the blood whilst the head is still attached to the body.) But then it should follow, should it not, that just as in the former case only one organ shall be severed, so here, too, only one organ shall be severed? It is, therefore, written: 'And he shall bring it near'.3 Now it may be asked against the first Tanna: since he derives the rule4 from the verse: 'And he shall nip off . . . and he shall burn it', what need is there for the verse: 'And he shall bring it near'?5 - Without the verse: 'And he shall bring it near', he would have interpreted, 'According to the ordinance', to mean, according to the ordinance of the sin-offering of a bird;6 and as to the verse: 'And he shall nip off . . . and he shall burn it', he would have explained it thus: as the burning [of the sacrifice is performed] upon the top of the altar, so shall [the draining of the blood following] the nipping be performed upon the upper part of the altar wall.7 But now that the Divine Law states: 'And he shall bring it near', [this verse therefore serves to distinguish in every respect the burnt-offering of a bird from the sin-offering of a bird, and from the verse: 'And he shall nip off . . . and he shall burn it'] he can derive this too.8

Whence do we know that the sin-offering of an animal must be brought only from unconsecrated animals?9 - R. Hisda answered: From the verse: And Aaron shall offer the bullock of the sin-offering which is his;10 [that is to say], it must come from his own means and not from the money of the community nor from Second Tithe.

Is not [the rule that sacrifices may only be offered] by day inferred from the verse: In the day that he commanded?11 - It is indeed stated [above] to no purpose.

Is not [the rule that all the services in connection therewith must be performed] with the right hand derived from the following dictum of Rabbah b. Bar Hannah; for Rabbah b. Bar Hannah declared in the name of R. Simeon b. Lakish. Wherever the word 'finger' or 'priest' is employed it signifies that the right hand only [shall be Used].12 - And the other?13 [He is of the opinion that the word] 'priest' requires [with it the word] 'finger' [in order that the above rule may apply], though [the word] 'finger' does not require [with it the word] 'priest'.14

Whence do the first Tanna and R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon15 derive the Jaw [that the nipping in the case of the burnt-offering of a bird shall be] close to the back of the neck?16 - They derive it from the fact that nipping is prescribed in both cases.17

MISHNAH. [THE AGE] WHICH QUALIFIES TURTLE DOVES [FOR SACRIFICE] DISQUALIFIES PIGEONS, AND [THE AGE] WHICH QUALIFIES PIGEONS [FOR SACRIFICE] DISQUALIFIES TURTLE DOVES. AT THE PERIOD WHEN THE NECK FEATHERS BEGIN TO GLISTEN IN EITHER KIND THEY ARE DISQUALIFIED.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: Turtle doves are qualified [for sacrifice] when fully grown, but not when small; pigeons are qualified [for sacrifice] when small, but not when fully grown. It follows, therefore, that the age which qualifies turtle doves for sacrifice disqualifies pigeons, and the age which qualifies pigeons for sacrifice disqualifies turtle doves.

Our Rabbis taught: The expression, turtle doves,18 implies fully grown birds, but not small. For [without the Biblical direction] I would have argued by an a fortiori argument thus:

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(1) This conclusion cannot be accepted, for there is no authority which insists that the priest shall hold the head and body of the bird in his hand whilst sprinkling the blood.
(2) For it is written: And he shall not divide it asunder (Lev. I,17).
(3) Lev. I, 25. The term 'it' implies a distinction, with the result that in the case of the burnt-offering of a bird the second organ must also be cut, though not severed, in order to conform with the rule that the head be attached to the body. Hence the view of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, frequently mentioned previously, that the greater portion of both organs must be cut, but no more.
(4) That both organs of the throat shall be severed in the case of the burnt-offering of a bird.
(5) Which also serves to prove the same rule, v. p. 108, n. 8.
(6) Which was dealt with in the preceding passage in Scripture. The result would then be that even in the case of the burnt.offering of a bird only one organ shall be severed.
(7) On the other hand, the draining of the blood following the nipping of the sin-offering of a bird must be carried out upon the lower half of the altar wall. V, Zeb. 64b. In all other respects, however, the burnt-offering of a bird shall be like unto the sin.offering of a bird.
(8) (a) That the blood of the bur1it.offering shall be drained upon the upper part of the altar wall; and (b) that both organs of the throat in the case of the burnt-offering shall be absolutely severed.
(9) V. supra p. 107.
(10) Lev. XVI, 6.
(11) Lev. VII, 38. The rule contained in this verse, namely, that sacrifices may only be offered by day, applies to all the sacrifices enumerated in the preceding verse. Wherefore is it necessary to derive the burnt-offering of a bird from the sin-offering of an animal?
(12) V. Men. 10a. And in the passage dealing with the burnt-offering of a bird there is written: And the 'priest' shall bring it near, Lev. I, 17.
(13) The first Tanna of the foregoing Baraitha. What was his opinion?
(14) Cf. Men. 10a. The first Tanna in our Baraitha is in agreement with this view, and since in connection with the burnt.offering of a bird the word 'finger' is not found, he is obliged to derive the rule of 'right hand' from the analogy.
(15) The first Tanna utilizes the analogy for comparing the burnt-offering of a bird with the sin-offering of an animal; and R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, although comparing the burnt.offering of a bird with the sin-offering of a bird, utilizes the analogy in order to obtain the result that the head of the bird must remain attached to the body.
(16) Which R. Ishmael (supra) derives from the above mentioned analogy.
(17) The inference being that the place for nipping is the same in all cases.
(18) Lev. I, 14.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 22b

If pigeons which are disqualified for sacrifice when fully grown are nevertheless qualified when small, turtle doves which are qualified when fully grown should surely be qualified when small! It is, therefore, written: 'turtle doves', to indicate that only the fully grown are qualified for sacrifice, but not the small. Young pigeons implies small birds, but not fully grown. For [without the Biblical direction] I would have argued by an a fortiori argument thus: If turtle doves which are disqualified for sacrifice when small are nevertheless qualified when fully grown, pigeons which are qualified for sacrifice when small should surely be qualified when fully grown! It is, therefore, written, young pigeons, to indicate that only the small are qualified for sacrifice, but not the fully grown. Where is this indicated in the verse? - Raba explained: Because Scripture should not have omitted to state at least once [the expression], 'Of young turtle doves or of pigeons'.1 But I will now say that pigeons, inasmuch as in the Divine Law they are always preceded by the epithet 'young', are qualified for sacrifice only when small, and not when fully grown; whereas turtle doves [I submit] may be offered either when fully grown or even when small! - [Turtle doves must be placed under conditions] similar to pigeons; thus, just as pigeons are qualified [for sacrifice] only when small and not when fully grown, so turtle doves are qualified [for sacrifice] only when fully grown and not when small.2 Our Rabbis taught: One might conclude that all turtle doves [that are not small] and all pigeons [that are not fully grown] are qualified for sacrifice; it is, therefore, written: Of the turtle doves,3 implying that some, but not all, turtle doves are qualified. [Similarly, it is written.] Of the young pigeons,3 implying that some, but not all, pigeons are qualified. Hence, there is excluded [from either kind] those whose neck feathers begin to glisten.4 When do turtle doves first become qualified for sacrifice?5 When their wing plumage becomes golden. And when do pigeons become disqualified?6 When their neck feathers begin to glisten. Jacob Karha learnt: When do pigeons first become qualified?7 As soon as the limbs have absorbed [ye'ale'u]8 the blood. He reported this passage and also explained [the word ye'ale'u by reference to the verse.] Her young ones also suck up [ye'ale'u] blood.9 When is this?10 - Abaye answered: If when a feather is plucked out there flows blood [it is an indication that the limbs have absorbed the blood].

R. Zera put the following question: What is the law if a man said: 'Behold, I undertake to offer for a burnt-offering either [a pair] of turtle doves or [a pair] of pigeons', and he brought a pair of each kind, both pairs, however, being at the stage when the neck feathers were beginning to glisten?11 If this stage is a period of doubt,12 then in this case he at all events fulfils his obligation; but if it is a distinct intermediate stage,13 then he does not fulfil his obligation. - Raba said: Come and hear: 'Hence there is excluded14 from either kind those whose neck feathers begin to glisten?' Now if you say that it is an intermediate stage, it is well.15 But if you say that it is a period of doubt, [it will be asked]: Surely a verse cannot serve to exclude a condition of doubt!16 -

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(1) The fact that 'young' always precedes 'pigeons' establishes the proposition that pigeons are qualified for sacrifice only when small.
(2) The conditions are that in each kind there shall obtain a qualifying as well as a disqualifying age.
(3) Lev. I, 14. 'Of', Hebrew מן has a partitive significance.
(4) At this stage turtle doves would be regarded as too small, and pigeons as already fully grown.
(5) I.e., when are they regarded as fully grown?
(6) That they are no longer regarded as small.
(7) It surely cannot be that as soon as they are hatched they are fit to be sacrificed!
(8) Heb. יעלעו.
(9) Job XXXIX, 30.
(10) I.e., how can one ascertain whether the limbs have already absorbed the blood?
(11) The translation here is based upon the interpretation of Maharam, q.v.
(12) I.e., whether a bird at this period is to be regarded as small or fully grown. If the former, then he has fulfilled his obligation by offering the pair of pigeons; and if the latter, by offering the pair of turtle doves. Therefore, by offering a pair of each kind he certainly fulfils his obligation.
(13) Lit., 'a (special) species'. I.e., a period in which the bird is neither regarded as small nor fully grown.
(14) By the verse in Lev. I, 14: Of the turtle doves or of the young pistons. V. supra.
(15) To say that the verse expressly excludes this intermediate stage in each kind.
(16) The Divine Law could not have been in doubt as to the exact stages in the development of birds.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 23a

The verse is required to exclude birds that have suffered an unnatural crime or that have been worshipped.1 For since it is written: For their corruption is in them, there is a blemish in them,2 and a Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael taught: Wherever 'corruption' is mentioned it means either sexual perversion or idolatry - sexual perversion: for it is written: For all flesh had corrupted his way upon earth;3 idolatry: for it is written: Lest ye corrupt yourselves and make you a graven image4 - it might well be argued that whatever is rendered unfit for sacrifice by reason of a blemish will similarly be rendered unfit by reason of sexual perversion or idolatry, and, on the other hand, whatever is not rendered unfit for sacrifice by reason of a blemish will not be rendered unfit by reason of sexual perversion or idolatry, with the result that birds, inasmuch as they are not rendered unfit for sacrifice by reason of a blemish5 - for a Master said:6 The unblemished state and the male sex are prerequisites only to sacrifices of cattle but not of birds - will likewise not be rendered unfit by reason of sexual perversion or idolatry! The verse therefore teaches us [that they are excluded].

R. Zera put the following question: What is the law if a man said: 'Behold, I undertake to offer for a burnt-offering either a ram or a lamb', and he brought a pallax?7 Of course according to R. Johanan the question does not arise, since he holds that it is a distinct species.8 For we have learnt:9 If a man [under an obligation to bring a lamb or a ram as a sacrifice] offered a pallax, he must bring for it libations as for a ram,10 but he does not thereby discharge the obligation of his sacrifice. And R. Johanan said that the verse. Or a ram,11 included a pallax. The question, however, does arise according to the view of Bar Padda,

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(1) These birds may not be offered as sacrifices. The suggestion, therefore, that the verse Purports to exclude such birds whose neck feathers begin to glisten, is now abandoned.
(2) Lev. XXII, 25. From which is derived the rule that animals 'corrupt' or blemished are not acceptable for sacrifice.
(3) Gen. VI, 12. This verse refers to the sexual perversion of the generation.
(4) Deut. IV, 16.
(5) Minor blemishes do not disqualify a bird for sacrifice though a major blemish e.g., the loss of a limb, does.
(6) V. Kid. 24b.
(7) A sheep in its first twelve months is called a 'lamb', after thirteen months it is termed a 'ram', in its thirteenth month it is known as a pallax. Heb. פלגס, from Greek **, specifically a youth not yet arrived at adolescence, below the age of eighteen years.
(8) Consequently he will not have discharged his obligation.
(9) Par. I, 3; Men. 91b.
(10) The wine libations and offerings of meal which were brought with the sacrifice varied in quantity according to the animal offered. For a bullock it was necessary to bring three tenths of an ephah meal and one half of a hin wine; for a ram two tenths meal and one third of a hin wine; for a lamb one tenth meal and one quarter of a hin wine.
(11) Num. XV, 6 which prescribes the libations for a ram. The word 'or', Heb. או, being superfluous, is employed to extend the rule contained in this verse so as to include the pallax. Now it is evident that R. Johanan, by his interpretation that the verse purports to include the pallax, holds that it is a distinct species; for were it indeed a case of doubt he surely would not have explained the verse as purporting to include a condition of doubt! Cf. supra. p. 113, n. 3.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 23b

who holds that he must bring [for it libations as for a ram] and account for the possibilities.1 The question therefore is: must he account only for the possibility of it being either a ram or a lamb but not of it being a distinct species.2 or must he also account for the possibility of it being a distinct species and declare that if it is a distinct species all the libations shall be regarded as a freewill-offering?3 The question remains undecided. R. Zera put the following question: What is the law if a man said: 'Behold, I undertake to bring [ten] cakes of a Thankoffering4 either leavened or unleavened', and he brought siur?5 According to whose definition of siur does the question arise? If [he brought] that siur as defined by R. Meir, and [the question is asked] according to R. Judah's ruling about it, then it is undoubtedly unleavened! And if [he brought that siur] as defined by R. Judah and [the question is asked] according to R. Meir's ruling about it, then it is clearly leavened! Again if [he brought that siur] as defined by R. Meir and [the question is asked] according to R. Meir's ruling about it, then it is evidently leavened, since one is liable to stripes [for eating it on the Passover]! Indeed, the question arises on R. Judah's definition [of siur] and according to R. Judah's ruling about it; thus, is it a condition of doubt, then in our case he at all events fulfils his obligation;6 or is it a distinct state,7 then he does not fulfil his obligation? But has not R. Huna said that if a man said: 'Behold, I undertake to offer the cakes of a Thank-offering', he must bring a Thank-offering as well as the cakes? Now in our case, since there is imposed upon this person the duty of bringing a Thank-offering as well as the cakes, he does not know whether he must regard these [cakes of siur] as leavened and so bring for the rest unleavened cakes, or as Unleavened and so bring leavened cakes [among the others]!8 - The question could only arise where a man said: 'Behold, I undertake to bring [ten] cakes, [either leavened or unleavened] in order to release So-and-so from this obligation in his Thank-offering'.9 Even so, that other person does not know whether to regard these [cakes of siur] as leavened and bring the unleavened himself, or to regard these as unleavened and bring the leavened himself!10 - The question only arises in the case where he did not say. 'In order to release', and the point is this: Has this person fulfilled his obligation or not?11 - The question remains undecided.

MISHNAH. [THE METHOD OF KILLING] WHICH RENDERS THE RED COW12 VALID RENDERS THE HEIFER13 INVALID, AND THE METHOD WHICH RENDERS THE HEIFER VALID RENDERS THE RED COW INVALID.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: The Red Cow is rendered valid by slaughtering and invalid by breaking its neck; the Heifer is rendered valid by breaking its neck and invalid by slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that [the method of killing] which renders the Red Cow valid renders the Heifer invalid, and the method which renders the Heifer valid renders the Red Cow invalid. But should not the Red Cow be rendered valid by breaking its neck by the following a fortiori argument? Thus, if the Heifer which is not rendered valid by slaughtering is nevertheless rendered valid by breaking its neck, the Red Cow which is rendered valid by slaughtering should surely be rendered valid by breaking its neck!

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(1) Lit., 'and stipulates'. By declaring: (a) if it is a ram then the quantity of libations offered is correct; (b) if it is a lamb then such amount as is required for a lamb shall be taken from this quantity, and the remainder shall be treated as a freewill libation offering. A third possibility would have to be accounted for if one were to take into consideration the possibility of it being a distinct species, in which case the declaration would be in addition to the two possibilities already stated; (c) if it is a distinct species and therefore no libations are necessary, then the whole of the libations offered shall be treated as a freewill-offering.
(2) Consequently in the circumstances of R. Zera's case the person will have discharged his obligation.
(3) With the result that in R. Zera's case the person will not have discharged his obligation.
(4) V. Lev. VII, 12 and 13, where it is prescribed that with a thank-offering one had to bring four kinds of cakes, viz., unleavened cakes mingled with oil, unleavened cakes smeared with oil, unleavened cakes of fine flour saturated in oil and leavened cakes. At present it is assumed that the man's obligation was merely to bring ten cakes, and by bringing cakes made from siur (v. next note), the question arises whether or not he has fulfilled his obligation.
(5) V. Pes. 48b. In the matter of siur there are two disputes between R. Meir and R. Judah. (a) As to the definition of siur: R. Meir says. It is dough the surface of which has already become pale (which indicates that fermentation has already begun); R. Judah says. It is dough the surface of which has become wrinkled (which is some time after it has turned pale). (b) As to the law of siur: R. Meir says that whosoever eats siur (as defined by him) on the Passover is liable to stripes; R. Judah says that whosoever eats siur (as defined by him) on the Passover is not liable to any punishment. Moreover, siur as defined by R. Judah is regarded by R. Meir as leavened, and whosoever eats of it on the Passover is liable to the punishment of Kareth; and on the other hand, siur, as defined by R. Meir is regarded by R. Judah as unleavened, and one may eat it on the Passover:
(6) For it is either leavened or unleavened.
(7) I.e., a definite stage in the process of fermentation, at which time the dough is neither leavened or unleavened.
(8) The difficulty that is raised by R. Huna's statement is this. The original assumption that this man's obligation ended with the bringing of the cakes cannot stand, for according to the law as stated by R. Huna he must bring all the forty cakes that accompany the thank-offering as well as the thank-offering itself. Consequently this man is in a dilemma, for even if it were accepted that siur is a condition of doubt, his position is no better, since he does not know what other cakes he must now bring.
(9) In this case the man has no other obligation than to bring ten cakes and therefore he would be fulfilling his obligation if it were held that siur was a condition of doubt.
(10) The purpose of this man's promise is to release that other person from part of his obligation; but since the other cannot avail himself of these cakes, for he does not know what other cakes he must bring, this man's purpose has not been achieved and consequently his obligation has not been discharged.
(11) Here the man undertakes to add ten cakes to his friend's thank-offering. The other person is in no way affected by this promise, for he must bring the full complement of cakes with his thank-offering, and the only Point that has to be considered is whether this man has fulfilled his own obligation by bringing these cakes of siur or not.
(12) V. Num. XIX.
(13) V. Deut. XXI.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 24a

The verse, therefore, says: And he shall slaughter it,1 and in addition [the law is stated to be] a statute,2 in order to indicate that it is rendered valid only by slaughtering and not by breaking its neck.

But is it established that whenever 'statute' is written [in connection with a law] one may not apply to it an a fortiori argument? But what of the Day of Atonement ln connection wherewith statute' is written,3 nevertheless, it was taught: [Upon which the lot fell for the Lord,] and it shall determine it for the sin-offering,4 implies that only the lot can determine it for the sin-offering, but designation5 cannot determine it for the sin-offering. For [without this Biblical direction] I would have argued by an a fortiori argument thus: If offerings which are not consecrated by lot are nevertheless consecrated by designation,6 an offering which is consecrated by lot should surely be consecrated by designation! It is therefore written: 'And it shall determine it for the sin-offering', to indicate that the lot only can determine it for a sin-offering, but designation will not determine it for a sin-offering. Now this is so, only because it is written in the Divine Law, 'And it shall determine it for the sin-offering', but without this verse one would have applied the a fortiori argument!7 - The Divine Law excluded all others when it stated in connection with the Heifer, 'Whose neck was broken',8 indicating that only this shall have its neck broken, but no other.

And should not the Heifer be rendered valid by slaughtering by the following a fortiori argument? Thus, if the Red Cow which is not rendered valid by breaking its neck is nevertheless rendered valid by slaughtering, the Heifer which is rendered valid by breaking its neck should surely be rendered valid by slaughtering! The verse states: And they shall break the neck,9 and also, 'Whose neck was broken', thus emphasizing that the Heifer is rendered valid only by breaking its neck and not by slaughtering.10

MISHNAH. [THE DISABILITY] WHICH DOES NOT DISQUALIFY11 PRIESTS DISQUALIFIES LEVITES, AND [THE DISABILITY] WHICH DOES NOT DISQUALIFY LEVITES DISQUALIFIES PRIESTS.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: priests are disqualified by reason of a bodily blemish,12 and not by reason of age; Levites are disqualified by age13 and not by bodily blemish. It follows, therefore, that [the disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. Whence do we know this? - From the following Baraitha. Our Rabbis taught: It is written: This is that which pertaineth unto the Levites.14 Now what does this teach us? From the verse: And from the age of fifty years they shall return [from the service of the work],15 we know that Levites are disqualified by age. Now I might have argued [by an a fortiori argument] that they are disqualified by bodily blemish too; thus, if priests who are not disqualified by age are nevertheless disqualified by bodily blemish, Levites who are disqualified by age should surely be disqualified by bodily blemish! It is therefore written: 'This is that which pertaineth unto the Levites', that is to say, this16 only disqualifies Levites, but nothing else disqualifies them. Now I might also have argued [by an a fortiori argument] that priests are disqualified by age too; thus, if Levites who are not disqualified by bodily blemish are nevertheless disqualified by age, priests who are disqualified by bodily blemish should surely be disqualified by age! It is therefore written: 'Which pertaineth unto the Levites', and not 'unto the priests'. I might further have supposed that this rule17 [as regards Levites] obtains even at Shiloh and at the permanent House;18 It is, therefore, written: To do the work of service and the work of bearing burdens,19 that is to say: 'I ordained this rule only when the work was that of bearing burdens upon the shoulder'.20

One verse says: From twenty and five years old and upward;14 and another verse says: From thirty years old and upward.21 Now one cannot accept the age of thirty22 because of the verse which mentions twenty-five, and one cannot accept the age of twenty-five because of the verse which mentions thirty. How are these verses to be reconciled? Thus: at the age of twenty-five [the Levite enters the service] for training, and at the age of thirty he performs service. Hence the dictum: If a student does not see a sign of blessing [progress] in his studies after five years, he never will. R. Jose says, [After] three years, for it is written: That they be trained three years.23 And that they be taught the learning and the tongue of the Chaldeans.24 And the other, [how does he explain these latter verses]? - He would say that the Chaldean language is an exception, for It is easy [to master].25 And the other, [R. Jose]? - He would say that the Temple service is an exception, for its rules are difficult.26

Our Rabbis taught: A priest, from the time that he has grown two hairs27 until he grows old, is qualified for service; a bodily blemish, however, disqualifies him. A Levite, from thirty years old until fifty years old, is qualified for service; and becomes disqualified by age. This law [of the Levite], however, applied only at the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness; but at Shiloh or at the Permanent House they were only disqualified because of their voices.28 Said R. Jose: Where is this indicated in any verse? -

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(1) Sc. the Red Cow; Num. XIX, 3.
(2) Ibid. 2: This is the statute of the law.
(3) Cf. Lev. XVI, 29: And it shall be a statute for ever unto you.
(4) Ibid. 9. The usual translation is. And he (sc. the priest) shall offer it for a sin-offering. The Rabbis, however, take 'the lot' as the subject of this sentence, and so derive from this verse the rule that it is the lot which decides the animal for the sacrifice.
(5) I.e., merely naming or specifying by word of mouth which goat shall be for the sacrifice and which shall be sent away.
(6) E.g., when a Pair of doves is offered, one of them for a sin-offering and the other for a burnt-offering (cf. Lev. XII, 8; XIV, 22), it is not the lot that determines them for their respective offerings, for even after the casting of lots they can be changed over; but it is the express designation of the owner that determines them.
(7) Although the law in connection with the Day of Atonement is stated to be a statute. This being so, the a fortiori argument should be applied in our Mishnah, with the result that the Red Cow be also rendered valid by breaking its neck.
(8) Deut. XXI, 6.
(9) Ibid. 4.
(10) This is the reading of MS.M.; v. Rashi. In cur. edd. only one verse is quoted in this final answer; v. Rashal. The injunction 'to break the neck' is repeated to indicate that this is the only method of killing the Heifer and no other is admissible. This answer is therefore in accordance with the accepted Rabbinic dictum: Wherever Scripture repeats an injunction it is meant to be indispensable.
(11) From taking part in the Temple service.
(12) V. Lev. XXI, 17.
(13) For they are qualified for service only from the age of thirty to fifty.
(14) Num. VIII, 24.
(15) Ibid, 25.
(16) Sc. age.
(17) That Levites are disqualified by age.
(18) I.e., the Temple at Jerusalem where the service of the Levites was to sing in the choir and to guard the doors of the Temple.
(19) Ibid. IV, 47.
(20) The disqualification of Levites by age was, therefore, effective only from the service of the Tabernacle in the wilderness, where their duties consisted of dismantling the entire Tabernacle and bearing the various parts on their shoulders.
(21) Ibid. IV, 23.
(22) I.e., as the proper age for commencing service.
(23) Dan. I, 5.
(24) Ibid. 4.
(25) Therefore in three years one ought to expect good results.
(26) Because of the numerous details that had to be mastered; and, therefore, in such a case even R. Jose admits that five years are necessary.
(27) These refer to the pubic hairs which indicate maturity and generally appear in males at the age of thirteen years and one day, and in females at the age of twelve years and one day.
(28) I.e., when they lost their voices and thus could no longer sing in the Temple choir.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 24b

It is written: And it came to pass when the trumpeters and singers were as one to make one loud sound.1

'Until he grows old'. Until when is this? - R. Ila'a said in the name of R. Hanina: Until he begins to tremble.2

We have learnt elsewhere:3 If a man [who was unclean] by reason of a seminal emission, immersed himself [in a mikweh] but did not first urinate, when he does urinate he [again] becomes unclean.4 R. Jose says: If he was ill or elderly he [again] becomes unclean, but if he was young and healthy he is clean.5 How long [is one regarded as young and healthy]? - R. Ila'a said in the name of R. Hanina: As long as one is able to stand on one foot and put on and take off one's shoe. It was said of R. Hanina that at the age of eighty years he was able to stand on one foot and put on and take off his shoe. R. Hanina said: The warm baths and the oil with which my mother anointed me in my youth have stood me in good stead in my old age.

Our Rabbis taught: He whose beard is fully grown is qualified to act as the representative of a community,6 to descend before the Ark7 and to pronounce the priestly benediction.8 When does he [the priest] become qualified for Temple service? When he produces two hairs. Rabbi says: I say, only when he is twenty years old. R. Hisda asked: What is Rabbi's reason? - Because it is written: And they appointed the Levites from twenty years old and upward to have oversight of the work of the house of the Lord.9 And the other Tanna? He maintains that 'to have oversight' is quite a different matter.10 But is not this verse stated in connection with the Levites?11 - One must accept the statement of R. Joshua b. Levi. For R. Joshua b. Levi said: In twenty-four passages the priests are referred to as Levites, and the following is an example: And the priests the Levites the sons of Zadok.12

Our Rabbis taught: It is written: Any man of thy seed throughout their generations . . . [let him not approach to offer];13 hence R. Eliezer derived the rule that a minor is not qualified for service even though he is without bodily blemish. When does he become qualified for service? When he has grown two hairs. His brother priests, however, would not permit him to take part in the service until he was twenty years old. Some say that this [Baraitha] agrees with the view of Rabbi, for he maintains that [under the age of twenty years] there is no legal disqualification whatsoever, not even by Rabbinic enactment.14 Others say that Rabbi's view is that [under the age of twenty years] one is disqualified by Rabbinic enactment, and that this [Baraitha], however, agrees with the view of the Sages; for they maintain that [under the age of twenty years] there is a restriction only in the first instance, but if he did serve, the service would be valid.15

MISHNAH. THAT WHICH CANNOT BE RENDERED UNCLEAN IN EARTHENWARE VESSELS CAN BE RENDERED UNCLEAN IN ALL OTHER VESSELS, AND THAT WHICH CANNOT BE RENDERED UNCLEAN IN ALL OTHER VESSELS CAN BE RENDERED UNCLEAN IN EARTHENWARE VESSELS.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: The air-space of an earthenware vessel can be rendered unclean, but the outside of it cannot. The air-space of all other vessels cannot be rendered unclean, but the outside of them can. It follows, therefore, that that which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. Whence do we know this? - From [the following Baraitha] which our Rabbis taught: It is written: And every earthen vessel into which [toko] any of them falleth,16 that is to say, even though it does not actually touch the vessel.17 You say: 'Even though it does not actually touch', but perhaps it is not so but only if it actually touches the vessel! R. Jonathan b. Abtolmos said: There is used the word 'toko'18 in connection with the vessel conveying uncleanness, and also the word 'toko'19 in connection with the vessel receiving uncleanness; therefore, just as 'toko', used in connection with the vessel conveying uncleanness, means, 'even though it does not actually touch', so, too, 'toko', used in connection with the vessel receiving uncleanness, means, 'even though it does not actually touch'.20 But whence do we know this in the former case? - R. Jonathan said: The Torah has declared the contents of an earthenware vessel [to be unclean]

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(1) II Chron. V, 13. This verse shows that the singers in the Temple were chosen because they were able to sing 'as one' and could 'make one loud sound'. Such voices as would introduce a discordant note in the choir were eliminated.
(2) I.e., his hands and feet shake because of old age.
(3) Mik. VIII, 4.
(4) For it is possible that when he suffered the emission not all the semen was ejaculated, but there might have remained some drops in the passage of his organ, which, when he urinates after his immersion, would pass out with the urine and make him unclean again. Cf. Lev. XV, 16.
(5) These would have ejaculated the semen completely, whereas a sick or elderly person would not; only the latter, therefore, would again become unclean after urinating.
(6) Heb. שליח ציבור, lit., 'messenger of the congregation'. This usually connotes the person who acts as the reader of the congregation in conducting the prayers. Since, however, the subsequent words, 'descend before the Ark', clearly refer to the function of the reader, the representative of the community would mean, therefore, the warden or person appointed to attend to the affairs of the community. Cf. R. Gershom and Rashi.
(7) V. preceding note.
(8) Lit., 'to lift up his hands'. Of course, provided he is a priest. V. Num. VI, 22-27.
(9) Ezra III, 8.
(10) It is conceded that a Levite under the age of twenty years would not be appointed to supervise the work.
(11) How, then, can this verse be adduced in support of the rule concerning the priests?
(12) Ezek. XLIV, 15. The term 'Levites' in this verse means descendants of the tribe of Levi, or it might mean 'attendants' (Rashi).
(13) Lev. XXI, 17. The Heb., איש, 'a man', excludes a minor.
(14) The statement of Rabbi, supra, 'I say, only when he is twenty years old', is therefore to be interpreted to correspond with this Baraitha; i.e., under the age of twenty years he is not legally disqualified, hut, as the Baraitha states: 'His brother priests would not permit him to take part in the service'.
(15) Accordingly, the view of the Sages, supra, is to be qualified in the light of this Baraitha. 'From the time that he produces two hairs he is qualified', i.e., if he did serve the service would he valid, but he would not be allowed to serve in the first instance, as the Baraitha continues, 'His brother priests would not permit him to take part in the service.'
(16) Lev. XI, 33. Heb. תוכו, 'in it', i.e., in its air-space.
(17) I.e., even though the reptile does not come into contact with the vessel, but is merely suspended in the air-space, the vessel becomes unclean.
(18) Ibid. Whatsoever is in it (toko) shall be unclean, i.e., foodstuffs in the air-space of the earthen vessel become unclean from the vessel.
(19) Ibid. And every earthen vessel into which (toko) any of them falleth.
(20) So that an earthenware vessel will receive uncleanness from a reptile which is suspended in its air-space, even though there has been no contact; and will also convey uncleanness, if itself unclean, to foodstuffs that are in its air-space.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 25a

even though it is filled with mustard seed.1 R. Ada b. Ahabah asked Raba: Should not an earthenware vessel be rendered unclean [by contact] from the outside by the following a fortiori argument: If all other vessels which are not rendered unclean through their air-space are nevertheless rendered unclean from the outside, an earthenware vessel which is rendered unclean through its air-space should surely be rendered unclean from the outside? - He replied: The verse reads: And every open vessel, which has no covering close-bound upon it, is unclean.2 Now what kind of vessel is it to which uncleanness comes first through its opening? You must say: It is an earthenware vessel.3 And [the verse teaches that] if it has no covering close-bound upon it is unclean, but if it has a covering close-bound upon it it is clean.4

And should not all other vessels be rendered unclean through their air-space by the following a fortiori argument: If an earthenware vessel which is not rendered unclean from the outside is nevertheless rendered unclean through its air-space, all other vessels which are rendered unclean from the outside should surely be rendered unclean through their air-space? - The verse says: In it5 [toko], meaning the air-space of this6 [can suffer uncleanness] but the air-space of no other [can suffer uncleanness]. But have we not already interpreted these [terms] toko for other purposes?7 Indeed, four expositions may be derived from 'toko', by reason of 'toko-tok', 'toko-tok':8 one [is required] for [the rule of] the text itself;9 another for the analogy;10 and again another for [the rule that] the air-space of this [vessel can suffer uncleanness], and not the air-space of any other [vessel]; and again another for [the rule that] the air-space of this [vessel can suffer uncleanness], and not the air-space [of another vessel] which is within the air-space [of this vessel];11 hence even a rinsable vessel12 is a protection [against uncleanness].

[One might argue that] all other vessels should not be rendered unclean [by contact] from the outside, but only by contact from the inside, by the following a fortiori argument: If an earthenware vessel which is rendered unclean through its air-space is nevertheless not rendered unclean from the outside, all other vessels which are not rendered unclean through their air-space should surely not be rendered unclean from the outside! - The verse therefore reads: And every open vessel, which has no covering close-bound upon it, is unclean,13 that is to say, only with regard to this14 [is the distinction made, namely,] if it has no covering close-bound upon it it is unclean, and if it has a covering close-bound upon it it is clean; whereas all other vessels, whether they have or have not a covering close-bound upon them, are unclean.15

MISHNAH. THAT WHICH CANNOT BE RENDERED UNCLEAN IN WOODEN ARTICLES CAN BE RENDERED UNCLEAN IN METAL ARTICLES, AND THAT WHICH CANNOT BE RENDERED UNCLEAN IN METAL ARTICLES CAN BE RENDERED UNCLEAN IN WOODEN ARTICLES.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: Unfinished wooden articles can be rendered unclean, but flat wooden articles cannot;16 unfinished metal articles cannot be rendered unclean, but flat metal articles can. It follows, therefore, that that which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden articles can be rendered unclean in metal articles, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal articles can be rendered unclean in wooden articles. The following wooden articles are regarded as unfinished: whatever still requires to be smoothed, or adorned with designs, or planed, or trimmed round, or polished with [the skin of a] tunny-fish. Whatever still lacks the base or the rim or the handle can be rendered unclean, but whatever still requires to be hollowed out cannot be rendered unclean. 'Whatever still requires to be hollowed out'! But this is obvious!17 - It is necessary to be mentioned for the following case: where one hollowed out of [a block which was intended to hold] a Kab only as much as would hold a Kapiza.18 The following metal articles are regarded as unfinished: whatever still requires

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(1) All the mustard seeds in the vessel are rendered unclean, even those which are in the center of the vessel. Now these latter become unclean only because they are in the air-space of an unclean earthenware vessel. It cannot be suggested that the seeds which touch the side of vessel convey uncleanness to those next to them, one seed conveying uncleanness to the other, and so on as far as the seeds in the center of the vessel, for the following reasons: (a) no foodstuff less than the size of an egg can convey uncleanness; (b) one foodstuff cannot convey uncleanness to another foodstuff; and (c) with unconsecrated food uncleanness can at the most be extended to the second degree, but no further. In our case, therefore, the vessel, being unclean in the first degree, would convey uncleanness by contact to the seeds next to it, and these would be unclean in the second degree and could not pass on the uncleanness to others even by contact.
(2) Num. XIX, 15.
(3) The fact that the verse specifically mentions 'open' suggests immediately that it is dealing with an earthen vessel which has a special rule concerning its 'opening' i.e., its air-space, for no other vessel can be rendered unclean or can convey uncleanness through its air-space.
(4) Hence it is proved that an earthenware vessel cannot be rendered unclean from the outside.
(5) Lev. XI, 33. Heb. תוכו, the air-space.
(6) Sc. an earthenware vessel.
(7) For the purposes of the analogy, v. supra 24b ad fin, p. 123.
(8) Actually the word 'toko' is mentioned twice in Lev. XI, 33, but it would have served the purpose of the text if in each case the word 'tok' was used. The addition to each word indicates further exposition.
(9) Viz., that the air-space of un unclean earthenware vessel should render unclean foodstuffs or liquids which are within it.
(10) V. supra p. 123, n.5.
(11) I.e., if a vessel containing foodstuffs or liquids is suspended in the airspace of an earthenware vessel in such a way that the rim of the inner vessel is above the rim of the outer vessel, and a reptile is suspended in the airspace between the two vessels, then the contents of the inner vessel are not unclean, for they are not regarded as being within the air-space of the earthenware vessel, but only within the air-space of a vessel which is itself within the air-space of the earthenware vessel. The inner vessel, in other words, is a protection against the uncleanness reaching its contents, and for this reason, viz., since a vessel-even one which can be rendered unclean by contact from the outside - cannot be rendered unclean if it comes within the air-space of an unclean earthenware vessel (v. Pes. 20a), its contents will be protected from uncleanness.
(12) I.e., all vessels except earthenware vessels. The former are called rinsable because, if unclean, they can be rendered clean by being rinsed in the waters of a mikweh.
(13) Num. XIX, 15.
(14) I.e., an earthenware vessel.
(15) It follows therefore that all other vessels can be rendered unclean from the outside, seeing that the fact that these vessels have a covering close-bound upon them is no protection.
(16) For wooden vessels do not contract uncleanness unless they contain a cavity.
(17) For it is merely a flat piece of wood.
(18) A small measure equal to three logs; a Kab is a measure that holds four logs. In this case, since the wood was to be hollowed out in order to hold a Kab it is regarded as unfinished as long as this had not been done.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 25b

to be smoothed, or adorned with designs, or planed, or trimmed round,1 or hammered out. Whatever still lacks the base or the rim or the handle, cannot be rendered unclean, but whatever only requires the lid can be rendered unclean.

Why is there a difference between the one and the other?2 - R. Johanan said: Because these [metal vessels] are made for occasions of honour.3 R. Nahman said: Because they are expensive,4 What practical difference is there between them? - Bone vessels.5 And indeed R. Nahman is consistent in his view, for R. Nahman said: Bone vessels are regarded on the same footing as metal vessels. It appears then that bone vessels can be rendered unclean!6 - It is so; for it was taught: R. Ishmael, the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka says. What does the following verse teach us: And everything made from goats . . . ye shall purify?7 To include anything made from goats, either from the horns or from the hoofs. And whence do we know [that articles made from the horns or the hoofs] of other animals or beasts [are included]? From the words, 'And everything made'. Why, then, is it written: 'From goats'? To exclude [articles made from] birds.8

MISHNAH. WHEN BITTER ALMONDS ARE SUBJECT TO TITHING SWEET ALMONDS ARE EXEMPT, AND WHEN SWEET ALMONDS ARE SUBJECT TO TITHING BITTER ALMONDS ARE EXEMPT.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: Small bitter almonds are subject to tithing, but the large are exempt;9 large sweet almonds are subject to tithing, but the small are exempt.10 R. Ishmael b. R. Jose says in the name of his father: Both11 are exempt. Others have the reading: Both12 are subject to tithing. R. Ila'a said that R. Hanina ruled in Sepphoris in accordance with the view of him who maintains that both are exempt. But according to him who maintains that both are subject to tithing [it will be asked]: What use can be made of large bitter almonds? - R. Johanan answered: They can surely be sweetened by [roasting in] the fire!

MISHNAH. TAMAD13 BEFORE IT HAS FERMENTED MAY NOT BE BOUGHT WITH SECOND TITHE MONEY14 AND RENDERS A MIKWEH INVALID;15 AFTER IT HAS FERMENTED IT MAY BE BOUGHT WITH SECOND TITHE MONEY AND DOES NOT RENDER A MIKWEH INVALID.16

BROTHERS WHO ARE PARTNERS [IN THEIR INHERITANCE], WHEN THEY ARE LIABLE TO PAY THE AGIO,17 ARE EXEMPT FROM THE CATTLE TITHE,18 AND WHEN THEY ARE LIABLE TO THE CATTLE TITHE,19 THEY ARE EXEMPT FROM THE AGIO.20

GEMARA. Who is the author of our Mishnah? It is neither R. Judah nor the Rabbis! For we have learnt: If a man made Tamad putting in a certain measure of water, and he subsequently found the same measure of liquid, he is exempt from tithing it.21 R. Judah however, makes him liable.22 Now who is the author [of our Mishnah]?23 If the Rabbis, then even though it has fermented [it should not be purchasable with Second Tithe money], and if R. Judah, then even though it has not fermented at all [it should be purchasable with Second Tithe money]! - R. Nahman said, in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha,

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(1) Reading לכרכב; so MS.M. and also the 'Aruch. In cur. edd. לכרכר, which, according to Rashi, means 'to adorn with figures'.
(2) Why is it that unfinished metal articles cannot be rendered unclean whereas unfinished wooden articles can?
(3) Since metal vessels are reserved for use on special occasions they would not serve the purpose unless they were absolutely finished in all detail and decoration.
(4) And they would not realize their price unless they were finished in every detail.
(5) These are expensive but are not used on special occasions of honour; consequently, according to R. Johanan unfinished bone vessels can be rendered unclean, but according to R. Nahman they cannot.
(6) Where is it indicated in the Torah?
(7) Num. XXXI, 20.
(8) E.g., articles made from the claws of birds. These cannot be rendered unclean and therefore the law of purification does not apply.
(9) The test is edibility; therefore, large hitter almonds are exempt from tithing because they are not edible, whereas the small bitter ones before they are fully ripened are edible and so subject to tithing.
(10) In the case of sweet almonds, the small ones are exempt from tithing for they are not yet fully ripe.
(11) I.e., both sweet and bitter almonds when small are exempt from tithing (Rashi). According to R. Gershom and Tosaf the meaning is: Bitter almonds both large and small are exempt from tithing.
(12) I.e., both sweet and bitter almonds when large are subject to tithing (Rashi). According to A. Gershom and Tosaf. the meaning is: Bitter almonds both large and small are subject to tithing.
(13) תמד. An inferior wine made by steeping the kernels and skins of grapes in water, or by pouring water on to the lees of wine.
(14) Before fermentation has taken place it is merely water, and water may not be bought with Second Tithe money, v. 'Er. 27b.
(15) A mikweh (i.e., a ritual bath) must be filled with waters which flow directly from a river or a stream or with rainwater, but not with waters which have been drawn from the rlver into vessels. An admixture of three logs or more of drawn water into a mikweh which does not contain the requisite amount of water (i.e., 40 se'ah) renders the mikweh invalid for all time. But an admixture of wine into a mikweh does not render it invalid.
(16) For it is regarded as wine.
(17) Heb. קלבון from Greek **. This was a small coin which every person had to add to his annual contribution of a half-shekel to the Temple in order to compensate the Temple Treasury for the loss it might sustain on exchanging the half-shekel for other coinage. It was not permissible for two people to evade this additional payment by combining and paying one shekel between them. On the other hand, this law of agio was relaxed in favour of a person who paid the half-shekel on behalf of another by way of gift to that other person; and therefore, if a father paid a whole shekel on behalf of his two sons by way of gift to them, he was not liable to pay any agio at all. In the case of our Mishnah the circumstances are that the brothers had divided the inheritance on the death of their father and subsequently entered into partnership; consequently each one must pay the agio when contributing his half-shekel even though they pay one whole shekel jointly, in the same way as when two people pay together one whole shekel.
(18) Cf. Lev. XXVII, 32. In Bek. 56b it is laid down that cattle born to partnership stock is exempt from the tithe.
(19) I.e., if they had never divided the inheritance. In this case it is held that cattle born to the partnership stock is subject to the tithe, for it is deemed in law to be the deceased father's stock.
(20) Since the inheritance had never been divided the combined contribution of one shekel which they make is regarded as a payment made by a father by way of gift in respect of his two sons, and in these circumstances they are exempt from the agio. V. p. 128, n. 7.
(21) For it is regarded as water, even though its taste may be that of wine, since there is here no increase in the mixture. V. Ma'as. V, 6. It is assumed for the present that such considerations, as to whether the mixture has fermented or not, are of no consequence.
(22) For it is regarded as fruit juice.
(23) It is assumed that the Tamad of our Mishnah had not 1ncreased at all but the whole of it measured exactly the same as the quantity of water that was put in.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 26a

Their dispute1 referred only to the case where it had fermented; and our Mishnah, therefore, is in accordance with R. Judah's view.2 R. Jose b. Huna also reported that their dispute referred only to the case where it had fermented. R. Nahman further said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: If a man bought Tamad with Second Tithe money and it subsequently fermented, that which he has purchased is Second Tithe.3 Why is this? - Because it now appears that from the outset it was fruit [juice].4 But [cannot the same argument be applied to] our Mishnah, which teaches that only if it had fermented [is it purchasable with Second Tithe money] but that if it had not fermented it is not [purchasable with Second Tithe money]? For it might be argued that had he let it stand it would have fermented?5 - Rabbah answered [that our Mishnah deals with the case] where he let some of it stand in a glass and it did not ferment. Raba, however, said that the author of our Mishnah was R. Johanan b. Nuri. For we have learnt: If a Kortob6 of wine fell into three logs less a Kortob of water, the mixture having the colour of wine, and the whole of this mixture fell into a [deficient] mikweh, it does not render the mikweh invalid.7 If a Kortob of milk fell into three logs less a Kortob of water, the mixture having the colour of water, and the whole of this mixture fell into a [deficient] mikweh, it does not render it invalid.7 But R. Johanan b. Nuri says: It all depends upon the colour.8 Now did not R. Johanan b. Nuri lay down the rule that we must determine every mixture by its colour? Then in the case of our Mishnah, too, one ought to determine the mixture by its colour, and the taste9 and colour of the mixture is that of water.10

The above view11 differs from that of R. Eleazar. For R. Eleazar said: All12 agree that one may not set aside other [Tamad] as tithe for this [Tamad], unless this had already fermented. It is clear, then, that he [R. Eleazar] is of the opinion that the dispute [between R. Judah and the Rabbis] refers only to the case where it has not fermented; and when R. Judah said that he was liable to tithe it, he only meant [that he must set aside] some of it [as tithe] for the whole, but not that he may set aside other [Tamad as tithe for this], for then13 he might be setting aside that which is subject to tithing [as tithe] for that which is exempt, or that which is exempt [as tithe] for that which is subject to tithing.14

Our Rabbis taught: Tamad before it has fermented

____________________
(1) Between R. Judah and the Rabbis.
(2) For only R. Judah holds the view that fermented Tamad is regarded as wine juice, consequently it may be purchased with Second Tithe money. Unfermented Tamad, however, even R. Judah admits is but water. It should be noted that there is an alternative answer possible, namely, that the dispute between the Rabbis and R. Judah concerned unfermented Tamad, and accordingly our Mishnah would follow the view of the Rabbis. R. Nahman, however, did not suggest this, for then R. Judah's view would be unintelligible as it is inconceivable that he would bold that unfermented Tamad should be regarded as wine juice (Rashi).
(3) I.e., a valid substitution has been effected, so that now the Tamad must be treated with the sanctity due to Second Tithe, and the original Second Tithe money, now in the hands of the vendor, has no sanctity whatsoever.
(4) Even though at the time of purchase there was no semblance of wine juice in the Tamad.
(5) It should therefore be regarded at all times as wine juice, even before it has actually fermented, and consequently it should not render a mikweh invalid.
(6) A small liquid measure equal to 1/64 of a log.
(7) For there is not here the minimum quantity of drawn water (three logs) necessary to render the mikweh invalid.
(8) So that in the first case the mixture would not render the mikweh invalid, but in the second case it would. V. Mik. VII, 5; Mak. 3b.
(9) In some MSS. this word is omitted and it is apparently superfluous, but v. Tosaf. ad loc.
(10) Before fermentation. Consequently it is not purchasable with Second Tithe money and it also renders a mikweh invalid. R. Nahman, however, who does not decide the mixture by its colour but by its potency to ferment in the future, follows the view of the first Tanna.
(11) Of R. Nahman which he reported in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha concerning the dispute between R. Judah and the Rabbis.
(12) Even R. Judah agrees with the Rabbis.
(13) Since the one kind of Tamad might ferment later on and the other might not.
(14) And in either case the act is of no effect in law, with the result that in the former instance the priest, and in the latter the owner, will be eating tebel i.e., untithed produce.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 26b

can be rendered clean by bringing it into contact with the water [of a mikweh];1 after it has fermented it cannot be rendered clean by bringing it into contact with the water [of a mikweh]. Raba remarked: This rule applies only if the Tamad was made with water that was clean and it subsequently became unclean, but not if the water was unclean from the outset. R. Gabiha of Be-Kathil2 went and reported this statement to R. Ashi and raised this question: Why does not the rule apply if the water was unclean from the outset? Is not the reason because we say that the water, being heavy, will sink to the bottom of the vessel, whilst the fruit [skins] being light will float on the surface of the water, and consequently the contact made with the waters [of the mikweh] will be of no effect? If so, is not the same reasoning to be applied to the case where the water was first clean and subsequently became unclean? You must, therefore, say that in this case they mix well together;3 then in the former case, too, we should say that they mix well together.4

MISHNAH. WHEN THERE IS A POWER TO SELL5 THE FINE IS NOT PAYABLE,6 AND WHEN THE FINE IS PAYABLE THERE IS NO POWER TO SELL.

GEMARA. Rab Judah said in the name of Rab. This is R. Meir's opinion, but the Rabbis say that the fine is payable even when there is a power to sell.7 For it has been taught: The power to sell applies to a minor from the age of one day until the time she has grown two hairs,8 but the fine is not payable; from the time that she has grown two hairs until maturity9 the fine is payable but there is no power to sell. Thus R. Meir; for R. Meir used to say. 'When there is a power to sell the fine is not payable, and when the fine is payable there is no power to sell'. But the Rabbis say: In the case of a minor, from the age of three years and one day until maturity, the fine is payable. 'The fine is payable!' [you say]; but is there not also a power to sell? - Render: The fine is payable and there is also a power to sell.

MISHNAH. WHEN THERE IS THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL10 THERE CAN BE NO HALIZAH,11 AND WHEN THERE CAN BE HALIZAH THERE IS NO LONGER THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL.

GEMARA. Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: This is R. Meir's opinion, but the Rabbis say that there is a right of refusal even when there can be halizah.12 For it has been taught: Until what age can a daughter refuse? Until she has grown two hairs. Thus R. Meir, but R. Judah says. Until the dark hairs appear in abundance over the white [skin].13

MISHNAH. WHEN THE SHOFAR IS BLOWN14 THERE IS NO HABDALAH15 SERVICE, AND WHEN THERE IS THE HABDALAH SERVICE THE SHOFAR IS NOT BLOWN. THUS, IF A FESTIVAL FALLS ON THE DAY BEFORE THE SABBATH THE SHOFAR IS BLOWN16 BUT THERE IS NO HABDALAH SERVICE;17 IF IT FALLS ON THE DAY FOLLOWING THE SABBATH THERE IS HABDALAH SERVICE18 BUT THE SHOFAR IS NOT BLOWN.19 WHAT IS THE FORM OF THE HABDALAH BENEDICTION?20 'WHO MAKEST A DISTINCTION BETWEEN HOLY AND HOLY'.21 R. DOSA SAYS, 'WHO MAKEST A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MORE HOLY AND LESS HOLY DAY'.22

GEMARA. How was the shofar blown then?23 - Rab Judah said: A teki'ah24 was blown, which in the end was converted into a teru'ah.25 R. Assi said: A teki'ah was blown, and then a teru'ah all in one breath. R. Assi instituted the custom in Huzal26 in accordance with his view.

An objection was raised from the following Baraitha: If a festival fell on the day before the Sabbath, a teki'ah was blown but no teru'ah. Now does not this mean that no teru'ah was blown at all? - It is not so; but Rab Judah interprets [this Baraitha] in accordance with his view, and R. Assi interprets it in accordance with his view. Rab Judah interprets it in accordance with his view thus, 'But no teru'ah', that is to say, not separately, but the teki'ah was converted into a teru'ah. R. Assi interprets it in accordance with his view thus, 'But no teru'ah', that is to say, not with a second breath, but all in one breath.

IF IT FALLS ON THE DAY FOLLOWING THE SABBATH . . . ['WHO MAKEST A DISTINCTION BETWEEN HOLY AND HOLY']. At what part [of the Habdalah service] is this [formula] said? - Rab Judah said: At the conclusion.27 R. Nahman also said: At the conclusion. R. Shesheth the son of R. Idi said: Even at the beginning. The law, however, is not in accordance with his view.

R. DOSA SAYS, 'WHO MAKEST A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MORE HOLY AND THE LESS HOLY DAY'. The law, however, is not in accordance with his view.

R. Zera said: If a festival falls in the middle of the week one must say [in the Habdalah service]: 'Who makest a distinction between holy and profane, between light and darkness, between Israel and other nations, between the seventh day and the six working days'. Why is this?28 - He is merely enumerating the 'distinctions'.29

CHAPTER 2

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(1) V. Bezah 17b and Pes. 34a. Water that has become unclean can be rendered clean by pouring it into a stone vessel and lowering it into a mikweh, so that the water in the vessel touches (lit., 'kisses') the water of the mikweh and becomes one with the latter. Now Tamad before fermentation is regarded as water and therefore can be rendered clean in this way. Other liquids, however, once unclean, can never be rendered clean, and therefore fermented Tamad, being regarded as wine, cannot be rendered clean in this way.
(2) V. A.Z. 22a (Sonc. ed.) p. 112, n. 1.
(3) I.e., the water and the grape skins; so that there is nothing actually interposing when the contact is made between the waters of the mikweh and the Tamad.
(4) The result is that no distinction can be drawn between the cases; accordingly Tamad before fermentation can always be rendered clean, whether it was made originally with unclean water or originally with clean water and it subsequently became unclean.
(5) A father, according to Ex. XXI, 7, has the power to sell his daughter as a maidservant during her minority, i.e., until she attains the age of twelve years and one day.
(6) V. Ex. XXI, 15-16, and Deut. XXII, 28-29. A fine of 50 shekels was payable by the person who seduced or violated a na'arah, technically a girl between the ages of twelve years and one day and twelve years and six months.
(7) I.e., the fine is payable even though the girl was a minor. V. Keth. 40b.
(8) These refer to the pubic hairs which generally appear on a girl at the age of twelve years and one day, whereupon she becomes a na'arah.
(9) Or, adolescence. This is reached by a girl when she has attained the age of twelve years and six months.
(10) A fatherless girl whose mother or brother gave her away in marriage, even with her consent, can at any time during minority 'refuse' the continuance of the marriage, and in this way break the marriage bond without the necessity of a bill of divorce.
(11) A girl who, during her minority, has become a widow even though she is childless cannot be subject to the ceremony of Halizah (v. Glos.) with regard to her brother-in-law. V. Deut. XXV, 5-10.
(12) I.e., there is a right of refusal even after the age of twelve years.
(13) V. Nid. 52a.
(14) It was the custom in Talmudic times to blow the shofar on the eve of the Sabbath or of the festival before the sacred day commenced, so that the community might cease work and prepare for the sacred day.
(15) Heb. הבדלה, 'distinction', 'separation'. A benediction recited over a cup of wine at the termination of the Sabbath or of the festival.
(16) Before the commencement of the Sabbath, in order to make known to the public that all work must cease, even such as was permitted on the festival e.g. cooking.
(17) The rule is that no Habdalah service is recited at the termination of a sacred day, if that day is immediately followed by a day more sacred. Thus, there will be no Habdalah service at the termination of a festival if it is immediately followed by the Sabbath.
(18) In order to distinguish between the greater sanctity of the Sabbath and the lesser sanctity of the festival.
(19) Since there is no need to warn people to abstain from work for they have been at rest the whole of the Sabbath day.
(20) At the termination of the Sabbath that is immediately followed by a festival.
(21) V. P.B., p. 231.
(22) The Sabbath being referred to as the more holy and the festival as the less holy day.
(23) Sc. at the conclusion of a festival that is immediately followed by the Sabbath. There must have been some slight difference on this occasion, when the purpose of the shofar was to warn People to abstain from such work as was permitted on the festival, in order to distinguish it from the blowing of the shofar at every Sabbath eve which served to warn people to cease work absolutely.
(24) Heb. תקיעה, a blast on the shofar of one prolonged note.
(25) Heb. תרועה, a series of rapid short blasts.
(26) Near Nehardea.
(27) Whereas at the beginning of the Habdalah prayer of formula used is: 'who makest a distinction between holy and profane'. V. P.B. loc. cit.
(28) I.e., why should one include in the benediction the distinction 'between the seventh day' etc., seeing that the occasion is a midweek festival and not the Sabbath?
(29) Which are to be found in the Torah; cf. Lev. X, 10 Gen. I, 4; and Lev. XX, 26.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 27a

MISHNAH. IF A MAN CUT1 ONE [OF THE ORGANS OF THE THROAT]2 IN THE CASE OF A BIRD, OR BOTH ORGANS IN THE CASE OF CATTLE, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. THE GREATER PART OF AN ORGAN IS EQUIVALENT TO [THE WHOLE OF] IT. R. JUDAH SAYS, HE MUST CUT THROUGH THE JUGULAR VEINS. [IF ONE CUT] HALF OF ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD, OR ONE AND A HALF ORGANS IN THE CASE OF CATTLE, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID. [IF A MAN CUT] THE GREATER PART OF ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD, OR THE GREATER PART OF EACH ORGAN IN THE CASE OF CATTLE, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID.

GEMARA. 'IF A MAN CUT' implies that the slaughtering is valid only after the act but that one is not permitted to do so in the first instance. [This would mean that] to cut both organs in the case of cattle is not sufficient in the first instance. Indeed, how much further can one go on cutting? - If you wish I can say that the expression 'IF ONE CUT' refers to the clause, ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD; alternatively it refers to the clause, THE GREATER PART OF AN ORGAN IS EQUIVALENT TO [THE WHOLE OF] IT.3

(Kemash)4 R. Kahana said: Whence do we know that slaughtering must be performed at the neck? From the verse: And he shall slaughter [we-shahat] the bullock,5 that is to say, he shall cleanse [hat] it [from blood] in the place where it bends down [shah].6 And whence do we know that hat means to cleanse? - From the verse: And he shall cleanse [we-hitte] the house;7 or, if you wish, from the verse: Cleanse me [tehatte'eni] with hyssop and I shall be clean.8 perhaps [it should be performed] at the tail? - the word shah, we say, implies, bent down, of something that is usually erect,9 but that [sc. the tail] is always bent down. Perhaps [it should be performed] at the ear?10 - It is necessary to obtain the life blood. Perhaps one should keep on cutting [the ear] until one reaches the life blood!

Moreover,11 whence would we know the rules against pausing, pressing, thrusting, deflecting, and tearing? [We must therefore say that] we know them by tradition; then the rule that slaughtering must be performed at the neck is also derived from tradition. What then does this verse teach us? - That one may not cut the animal into two.12

R. Yemar said: We can derive it from the verse: And thou shalt slaughter [we-zabahta]13 that is to say, one must break [hat] it in the place where [the blood] flows [zab].14 And whence do we know that hat means to break? - From the verse: Fear not neither be dismayed [tehath].15 perhaps [it should be performed] at the nose?16 - The word zab implies to flow by reason of a cut, but that [sc. the nose] flows of its own. Perhaps [it should be performed] at the heart! Moreover, whence would we know the rules against pausing, pressing, thrusting, deflecting, and tearing? [We must therefore say that] we know them by tradition; then the rule that slaughtering must be performed at the neck is also derived from tradition. What then does this verse teach us? - That one may not cut the animal into two.

The school of R. Ishmael taught: It is written: And he shall slaughter [we-shahat];17 read not we-shahat but we-sahat, meaning, one shall cleanse [hat] it [from blood] in the place where it utters Sound [sah].18 Perhaps [one should perform it] at the tongue? - It is necessary to obtain the life blood. Perhaps one should keep on cutting until one reaches the life blood! Moreover, whence would we know the rules against pausing, pressing, thrusting, deflecting, and tearing? [We must say] therefore [that] we know them by tradition; then the rule that slaughtering must be performed at the neck is also derived from tradition. What then does this verse teach us? - That One may not cut the animal into two.

A Tanna derives it from the following Baraitha: R. Hiyya said: Whence do we know that slaughtering must be performed at the neck? From the verse: And Aaron's sons, the priests, shall lay in order the pieces, [the head and the fat].19 Now it was quite unnecessary for the verse to add 'the head and the fat'. Why is it written: 'the head and the fat'? Are not the head and the fat included in 'the pieces'? Why are they mentioned separately? [For this reason]; since it is written: And he shall flay the burnt-offering and cut it [into its pieces].20 I would have thought that only such limbs as must be flayed are included [in the pieces];21 whence would I learn to include also the head which is already severed?22 It is therefore written explicitly. [And he shall cut it into its pieces,] with its head and its fat and he shall lay them in order.23 Now since the Tanna speaks of the head as severed, it is evident that slaughtering must be performed at the neck. Why does the Tanna open his argument with, 'And the head and the fat',24 and conclude with, 'Its head and its fat'?25 - This is what he means. Whence would I learn to include the head which is already severed? From the verse: 'And the head and the fat'. Then for what purpose do I require the verse,26 'Its head and its fat'? - For the purpose shown in the following Baraitha: Whence do I know that the head and the fat precede all limbs [on the altar]? From the verse: Its head and its fat, and he shall lay them in order.27

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(1) Lit., 'slaughtered'.
(2) There are two main organs in the throat which are considered for the purpose of slaughtering and they are (i) the windpipe or the trachea, and (ii) the foodpipe or the gullet or oesophagus.
(3) Thereby suggesting that in such cases the slaughtering is valid only after the act.
(4) A mnemonic (probably with the meaning 'to wither') consisting of the characteristic letters of the names of the Rabbis whose statements follow.
(5) Lev. I, 5. Heb. ושחט.
(6) I.e., the neck. The Hebrew word שחט is divided into component parts thus: שח, to bend, and חט, to cleanse.
(7) Lev. XIV, 52. Heb. וחטא.
(8) Ps. LI, 9. Heb. תחטאני.
(9) E.g. the neck.
(10) The ear is sometimes bent down and sometimes erect.
(11) I.e., even if it were accepted that the rule that to slaughter one must cut the neck is derived from the verse adduced, this further question confronts us: Whence would we derive the rules . . .? V. Tosaf. s.v. ותו.
(12) Heb. גיסטרא. This prohibition is implicit in the word ושחט i.e., cleanse the animal from its blood by cutting the main organs of the throat and no more. Others interpret גיסטרא. to mean, 'to cut with force'; the verse is therefore taken as a direct prohibition against chopping the neck or pressing the knife downwards while slaughtering, on this interpretation the rule against pressing has a Biblical basis, v. Rashi.
(13) Deut. XII 21. Heb. וזבחת.
(14) I.e., at the neck. The Heb. זבחת is divided into component parts thus: זב, to flow, and חת, to break.
(15) Deut. 1, 21. Heb. תחת, be broken in spirit, be dismayed.
(16) From which there flows mucus.
(17) Lev. I, 5.
(18) I.e., at the neck. The word ושחט is interpreted as וסחט which being divided into component parts would give: סח, to talk, to utter sound, and חט, to cleanse.
(19) Ibid. 8.
(20) Ibid. 6.
(21) To which the ordinance 'And he shall lay them in order' applies.
(22) For as soon as the two or throat have been cut the head is to all intents and purposes ed, and therefore the ordinance of flaying the animal does head (cf. Zeb. 85b); consequently as the head is not flayed the the pieces in order would not apply to it.
(23) Lev. I, 12.
(24) From verse 8.
(25) From verse 12.
(26) Var. lec., (v. Rashi) 'and as to the verse' etc., all this being the continuation of R. Hiyya's Baraitha.
(27) Indicating by the order of the words in this verse that the head and the fat ate offered before all other things upon the altar.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 27b

And why did the Divine Law mention the fat in the first verse?1 - For the purpose shown in the following Baraitha: How does he offer it? He covers the throat with the fat and thus offers it upon the altar; and in this way there is glory given to the Most High.

Another Tanna derives it from the following Baraitha: It is written: This is the law of cattle and of birds.2 Now in which law [of the laws of uncleanness] are birds and cattle treated alike. On the one hand the carcass of cattle conveys uncleanness by contact or by carrying whereas the carcass of a bird does not. On the other hand the carcass of a bird whilst in the gullet renders clothes unclean3 whereas the carcass of cattle does not. In which respect then are birds and cattle alike? In this respect: As cattle [are rendered clean] by slaughtering, so birds [are rendered clean] by slaughtering. But it should follow, should it not, that as in the case of cattle the greater part of both organs must be cut, so in the case of birds the greater part of both organs must be cut? The verse therefore reads: This [is the law].4 R. Eliezer says: In which respect are birds and cattle alike? In this: As birds are rendered fit at the neck,5 so cattle are rendered fit at the neck.6 But then it should follow, should it not, that as in the case of birds [the nipping is done] close to the back of the neck, so in the case of cattle [the slaughtering should be done] close to the back of the neck? The verse therefore reads. And he shall nip off its head close to the back of its neck but shall not divide it asunder,7 that is to say, its head shall be [nipped off] close to the back of its neck but the head of no other shall be [cut] close to the back of its neck.8 And how does R. Eliezer interpret the word 'this'? - Without 'this', I would have argued that as in the case of birds only one organ [is severed], so in the case of cattle only one organ [shall be cut]; the Divine Law therefore states. This [is the law].9

Bar Kappara taught: It is written: This is the law of cattle and of birds [and of every living creature that moveth in the waters].9 This verse has interposed birds between cattle and fishes. Now one cannot say that [in the case of birds] both organs of the throat must be cut, for they are, on the one hand, grouped with fishes. And one cannot say that none of the organs are to be cut, for they are, on the other hand, grouped with cattle. How is this to be explained? - They are rendered fit by the cutting of one organ.10

Whence do we know that fish do not require to be ritually slaughtered? Shall I say from the verse: If flocks and birds be slain for them, will they suffice them? or if all the fish of the sea be gathered together for them, will it suffice them?11 which implies that the mere gathering [of fishes] is sufficient?12 But if so, with regard to quails, of which it is written: And they gathered the quails,13 can it similarly be said [that the mere gathering is sufficient and] that no slaughtering is necessary? Have you not said [above], 'And one cannot say that none of the organs are to be cut for they are grouped with cattle'? - In the latter verse 'gathering' is not written in the same verse which mentions slaughtering for others, but in the former verse 'gathering' [in the case of fishes] is written in the same verse which mentions slaughtering for others.14

A Galilean travelling lecturer expounded: Cattle were created out of the dry earth and are rendered fit by the cutting of both organs; fish were created out of the water and are rendered fit without any ritual slaughtering; birds were created out of the alluvial mud and are therefore rendered fit by the cutting of one organ. R. Samuel of Cappadocia said: You can prove this from the fact that birds have scales on their legs like the scales of fishes.

He15 put to him this further question: One verse says. And God said: Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and let birds fly above the earth,16 from which it would appear that birds were created out of the water; but another verse says. And the Lord God formed out of the ground every beast of the field and every bird of the air,17 from which it would appear that they were created out of the earth? - He replied: They were created out of the alluvial mud. He thereupon noticed his disciples looking at each other with surprise. 'You are no doubt displeased', said he, 'because I brushed aside my opponent with a straw. The truth is that they were created out of the water but they were brought before Adam only in order that he might name them'.18 Others say that he replied to the [Roman] general in accordance with the latter view, but to his disciples he gave the first explanation.19 since they [birds] are mentioned in connection with the expression: And He formed.20

Rab Judah said in the name of R. Isaac b. Phinehas: Birds do not require to be slaughtered ritually by the law of the Torah, for it is written: And he shall pour out the blood thereof,21 that is to say, the mere pouring out of the blood is sufficient [to render the bird fit]. But if so, should not the same be said of wild beasts too?22 - No, for wild beasts have been compared [by Biblical analogy] with consecrated animals that have become unfit [for sacrifice].23 Well, then, birds have also been compared with cattle in the following verse: This is the law of cattle and of birds.24 - Surely there is also the verse: He shall pour out the blood thereof!25 But why do you choose to apply the latter verse to birds rather than to wild animals? - It is more reasonable to do so since [birds] are mentioned last.26

(Mnemonic: 'It became nebelah'. 'Blood'. 'Nipping'.)27 An objection was raised: If a man slaughtered [a wild animal or a bird] and it became nebelah under his hand, or if he stabbed, or if he tore away the organs of the throat [of a wild animal or a bird], he is exempt from covering the blood. Now if you were right in holding that birds do not require to be ritually slaughtered by the law of the Torah, then stabbing is all the slaughtering that is required for them, consequently there is surely an obligation to cover the blood! - You are assuming that the above [Mishnah] deals with a bird; in fact it deals with the case of a wild animal only.28

Come and hear: If a man slaughtered, even though he requires the blood for use, he must nevertheless cover it. But what should he do [so that he may use the blood]? He should either stab it or tear away the organs.

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(1) I.e., in verse 8. For 'the pieces' generally include all the limbs; now the head had to be specifically mentioned for the reason given in the text, but why was it necessary to mention the fat?
(2) Lev. XI. 46. The passage deals with the laws of uncleanness of the carcasses of animals.
(3) V. supra p. 103, n. 1.
(4) I.e., only with regard to the general principle of shechitah are cattle and birds alike, but not with regard to all the detailed rules of slaughtering.
(5) I.e., a consecrated bird is rendered fit for sacrifice by nipping off its head at the neck.
(6) By slaughtering there. This Tanna accordingly proves from this verse that to slaughter one must cut the neck.
(7) Lev. V, 8.
(8) But only at the front of the neck.
(9) Ibid. XI, 46. 'This' suggests limitation, I.e., not all the laws of this case shall apply to others.
(10) Compromising between the requirements of cattle and of fish.
(11) Num. XI, 22.
(12) To render them fit without any ritual slaughtering.
(13) Ibid. 32.
(14) Since this verse mentions slaughtering with regard to cattle and gathering with regard to fishes it is apparent that the Torah refers to the practice that is proper in each case.
(15) A Roman general put the following question, amongst others, to R. Johanan b. Zakkai (according to Rashi, to Rabban Gamaliel). V. Bek. 5a.
(16) Gen. I, 20.
(17) Ibid. II, 19.
(18) The answer is that the former verse (I. 20) refers to the substance out of which birds were created, whereas the latter verse (II, 19) merely informs us that birds as well as all other creatures were brought to Adam that he might name them.
(19) That the verses are reconciled by the suggestion that birds were created out of the alluvial mud.
(20) Consequently this verse (Gen. II, 19), also deals with the substance out of which birds were created and not merely with the subject of naming the creatures. Therefore, to reconcile these verses the correct answer is, as originally suggested, that they were created out of the alluvial mud. V. Rashi.
(21) Lev. XVII, 13.
(22) For in the verse quoted are mentioned birds and wild beasts.
(23) V. infra 285, whence it is concluded that wild animals must be ritually slaughtered.
(24) Lev. XI, 46. And therefore on the strength of this analogy it should be held that birds should be ritually slaughtered like cattle.
(25) Which clearly indicates that no particular form of slaughtering is necessary.
(26) The law derived from the words: And he shall pour out the blood thereof, would most likely refer to that which immediately precedes these words in the verse, i.e., birds.
(27) A mnemonic indicating the subject matter of the three statements which follow.
(28) Which is rendered fit only by slaughtering, and therefore if one stabbed the beast to death there is no obligation to cover the blood.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 28a

Now presumably this statement refers to [the slaughtering of] a bird whose blood he would require for [destroying] the flax worm?1 - No, it refers to [the slaughtering of] a wild animal whose blood he would require for dyeing purposes.2

Come and hear: If one nipped off [the head of a consecrated bird] with a knife, the carcass, whilst in the gullet, renders clothes unclean.3 Now if you were right in holding that birds do not require to be ritually slaughtered by the law of the Torah, then, granting that as soon as its neckbone and spinal cord have been sundered the bird is trefah,[the subsequent cutting of the organs with] the knife should at least have the effect of rendering the carcass free from the uncleanness of nebelah?4 - He [R. Isaac b. Phinehas] accepts the view of the Tanna in the following Baraitha: R. Eleazar ha-Kappar Beribbi5 says: What does the verse: Howbeit as the gazelle and as the hart is eaten [so shalt thou eat there of]6 teach us? What do we learn from the gazelle and the hart? Indeed, 'it comes as a teacher but turns out to be a pupil';7 we must put the gazelle and the hart on the same footing as consecrated animals which have been rendered unfit for sacrifice. Thus, as the latter must be ritually slaughtered so the gazelle and the hart must also be ritually slaughtered. Birds, however, need not be ritually slaughtered by the law of the Torah, but only by Rabbinic enactment. Who is the Tanna who disagrees with this view of R. Eleazar ha.Kappar? - It is Rabbi. For it has been taught: Rabbi says. The verse: And thou shalt slaughter . . . as I have commanded thee,8 teaches us that Moses was instructed concerning the gullet and the windpipe; concerning the greater part of one of these organs [that must be cut] in the case of a bird, and the greater part of each in the case of cattle.

ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD. It was stated: R. Nahman says. Either the gullet or the windpipe; whilst R. Adda b. Ahabah says. Only the gullet and not the windpipe. 'R. Nahman says. Either the gullet or the windpipe', for the Mishnah says ONE ORGAN, that is, any one. R. Adda b. Ahabah says: Only the gullet and not the windpipe', for 'ONE ORGAN' means the vital one.9

(Mnemonic: He cut. Half of each. The windpipe. Mutilated. The sin-offering of a bird.) An objection was raised: If a man cut the gullet [of a bird] and afterwards the windpipe was torn away.10 the slaughtering is valid. If the windpipe was torn away and he then cut the gullet, the slaughtering is invalid. If he cut the gullet and the windpipe was found to be torn away, and it is not known whether it was torn away before or after the slaughtering - this was an actual case [which came before the Rabbis] and they ruled: Any doubt whatsoever arising about the slaughtering makes it invalid. Now there is no mention here at all of the cutting of the windpipe!11 - It is because the windpipe is more liable to be torn away.12 Come and hear: If a man cut half of each organ in the case of a bird, the slaughtering is invalid; needless to say this is so in the case of cattle. R. Judah says. In a bird he must cut through the gullet and the jugular veins.13 - It is because the gullet lies close to the jugular veins.14

Come and hear: If a man cut half of the windpipe and paused for the length of time required for another slaughtering, and then finished it, the slaughtering is valid,15 presumably this passage deals with a bird, and 'finished it' means, finished cutting the windpipe?16 - No, it deals with cattle, and 'finished it' means, finished the entire slaughtering.17

Come and hear: If half of the windpipe was mutilated and a man cut a fraction more and finished it, the slaughtering is valid. Presumably this deals with a bird, and 'finished it' means, finished cutting the windpipe? - No, it deals with cattle, and 'finished it' means, finished cutting the gullet.

Come and hear: How must he [the priest] nip off the head of the sin-offering of birds? He must cut [with his finger.nail] the spinal cord and the neckbone, but must not cut the major portion of the surrounding flesh before he reaches the gullet or the windpipe. On reaching the gullet or the windpipe he cuts one, or the greater portion of one, organ and then the major portion of the surrounding flesh; and in the case of a burnt-offering both, or the greater portion of both, organs and then the major portion of the surrounding flesh.18 This is a refutation of R. Adda b. Ahaba's view!19 It is a refutation.

What has been decided about the matter? 'What has been decided' [you ask]! Surely it is as you have stated.20 - [No] but it might be said that in that case the law is different, since there is [the breaking] of the spinal cord and neckbone.21 What then is the law? - Come and hear: A duck belonging to Raba's house was found with its neck smeared with blood.22 Said Raba: How shall we deal with it?

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(1) This clearly proves that birds must be ritually slaughtered by the law of the Torah; hence where they were not ritually slaughtered there would be no obligation to cover the blood and so it might be used for any purpose.
(2) Heb. לכא. Probably 'lac', a red resinous substance used as a dye.
(3) V. supra 20b.
(4) In accordance with the Rabbinic dictum: The carcass of a trefah animal when ritually slaughtered does not render anything unclean. V. supra p. 103.
(5) V. supra p. 52, n. 4.
(6) Deut. XII, 22. This verse deals with consecrated animals that have become unfit for a sacrifice by reason of a blemish.
(7) A proverbial saying. The suggestion here is that the gazelle and the hart were apparently mentioned in the verse in order to elucidate the law with regard to consecrated animals that have become unfit (i.e., to act the teacher), but in reality it is the law with regard to The latter which throws light on the position concerning the gazelle and the hart (i.e., it is now the pupil).
(8) Deut. XII. 22.
(9) Lit., 'the distinct one' i.e., the gullet. It is the vital organ because the slightest perforation in it will render the animal trefah, but this is not so with regard to the windpipe.
(10) I.e., it had become detached from its articulation in the larynx.
(11) In any clause such as this: If he cut the windpipe and afterwards the gullet was torn away, the slaughtering is valid; presumably because the cutting of the windpipe alone would not render the animal valid, contra R. Nahman.
(12) And therefore the case quoted refers to the tearing away of the windpipe, as this is most usual.
(13) In order to let the blood run out, since a bird is often roasted whole without being cut up. The first Tanna only disagrees with R. Judah on this point about the jugular veins, but apparently all hold that it is only the cutting of the gullet that renders the bird fit, contra R. Nahman.
(14) Hence it is usual when cutting the jugular veins to cut the gullet too. The law, however, would be the same if the windpipe were cut with the jugular veins.
(15) For the cutting of the first half of the windpipe is not reckoned as part of the slaughtering, since even if half of the windpipe was mutilated by an accident the subsequent cutting of the remainder of the windpipe would be valid; therefore whatever fault occurs at this stage of the cutting is of no consequence.
(16) Hence by the cutting of the windpipe only the slaughtering is valid, contra R. Adda b. Ahaba.
(17) By cutting both organs.
(18) V. supra 21a.
(19) For the Baraitha expressly states that for nipping one may cut either organ. Presumably this is so in the case of slaughtering too.
(20) That the rule as stated with regard to nipping will apply likewise to slaughtering.
(21) I.e., in the case of nipping, where the spinal cord and neckbone are broken, it is admitted that one may cut any one organ and it would be sufficient, but with regard to slaughtering it might be held that the cutting of the windpipe only would not be sufficient.
(22) It was therefore necessary to examine the organs of the throat against any perforation of the gullet or laceration of the windpipe.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 28b

If we first slaughter it and then examine the organs [it is of no avail, for] it might have been slaughtered in the very place where there was a perforation [in the gullet]. If we first examine it and then slaughter it [it is also of no avail, for] has not Rabbah taught that the gullet cannot be examined from the outside but only from the inside?1 His son, R. Joseph, said to him: We could first examine the windpipe and then cut it,2 and thereafter the gullet can be turned inside out and examined.3 Raba exclaimed. My son Joseph is as versed in the laws concerning what is trefah as R. Johanan!4 This proves that [the Mishnah] when it says ONE ORGAN, means either the one or the other.

R. JUDAH SAYS, HE MUST CUT THROUGH THE JUGULAR VEINS. R. Hisda said that R. Judah deals with the case of a bird only, [and his reason is] because it is often roasted whole,5 but in the case of cattle, since the animal is usually cut up into limbs, it is not necessary [to cut the jugular veins]. Shall we say that the reason for R. Judah's ruling is on account of the blood? Surely we have learnt: R. JUDAH SAYS: HE MUST CUT6 THROUGH THE JUGULAR VEINS? - Say: He must pierce7 the jugular veins. Why then does it say: HE MUST CUT? - Because he must pierce them at the time of the ritual cutting. Come and hear: The jugular veins must be ritually cut; so R. Judah. - Say: 'The jugular veins must be pierced at the time of the ritual cutting; so R. Judah'.

Come and hear: They said to R. Judah: 'Since the jugular veins were referred to only for the purpose of drawing out the blood, what does it matter whether they are cut ritually or not?' It is evident,is it not, that R. Judah is of the opinion that they must be cut ritually? - This is what they said to him, 'What does it matter whether one pierces them at the time of the ritual cutting or not?' He, however, is of the opinion that if [the jugular veins are] pierced at the time of the ritual cutting, the blood, being warm, will flow freely, but after the ritual cutting the blood will not flow so freely, for it is already cold.

R. Jeremiah raised the question: According to R. Judah, what would be the law if one paused or pressed downwards whilst cutting the jugular veins?8 - A certain old man answered him: This is what R. Eleazar has said (others read: A certain old man said to R. Eleazar: This is what R. Johanan has said): They may be pierced with a thorn and are thus rendered valid.9

[A Baraitha] was taught in accordance with R. Hisda's view, viz., If a man cut ritually half of each organ in a bird the slaughtering is invalid; it is needless to say so in the case of cattle. R. Judah says. In a bird he must cut through ritually the gullet and the jugular veins.

HALF OF ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD etc. It was stated: Rab said: An exact half10 is equivalent to the greater portion; R. Kahana said: An exact half is not equivalent to the greater portion. 'Rab said: An exact half is equivalent to the greater portion', because what the Divine Law instructed Moses was: 'Thou shalt not leave the greater portion [uncut]'. 'R. Kahana said: An exact half is not equivalent to the greater portion', because what the Divine Law instructed Moses was: 'Thou shalt cut the greater portion'.

(Mnemonic: A half. Kattina. The windpipe. Mutilated.) We have learnt: [IF A MAN CUT] HALF OF ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD. OR ONE AND A HALF ORGANS IN THE CASE OF CATTLE. THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID. Now if you say that an exact half is equivalent to the greater portion, why is the slaughtering invalid? Has he not cut here the greater portion? - [It is invalid only] by Rabbinic ruling as a precaution lest he should cut less than an exact half.11

R. Kattina said: Come and hear: If he divided it12 into two equal parts, both parts are unclean, because it is impossible to make an exactly equal division.13 It follows, however, that if it were possible to make an exactly equal division both parts would be clean. Now if you say that an exact half is equivalent to the greater portion, why would both parts be clean? When you turn to one part you must regard it as the greater portion [and therefore unclean], and when you turn to the other part you must regard it as the greater portion [and therefore also unclean]? - R. Papa answered: There cannot be two greater portions in one vessel!14

Come and hear: If a man cut half of the windpipe and paused

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(1) The gullet or oesophagus has two principal coats, the outer or muscular coat being red and the inner or mucous coat pale or whitish. A perforation would not be noticeable in the outer coat but only in the inner coat.
(2) And this in itself would be sufficient to render the slaughtering valid.
(3) I.e., the inner coat of the gullet can be examined.
(4) v. infra 50a and 95b.
(5) It is therefore necessary to cut these veins in order to allow the blood to flow out.
(6) Lit., 'slaughter'. I.e., ritually, since they are an intrinsic part of the slaughtering, and not merely cut for the purpose of allowing the blood to run out.
(7) With any instrument and not necessarily the slaughtering knife; the sole purpose being to allow the blood to flow.
(8) I.e., do they require ritual cutting? It is quite apparent that R. Jeremiah had not heard of R. Hisda's statement supra, for otherwise this question would not arise.
(9) For the piercing of these veins does not form part of the slaughtering and therefore it is of no consequence if one paused or pressed whilst cutting them.
(10) Lit., 'half on half'.
(11) By the law of the Torah the slaughtering in this case would be valid; the carcass therefore is not regarded as nebelah and will not render anything unclean.
(12) Sc. an unclean earthenware stove. An earthenware vessel, once unclean, can in no wise be rendered clean and must be broken (V. Lev. XI, 35). There must not remain one whole piece larger than half of the original vessel, for then the greater Part of the vessel is whole and would retain the uncleanness.
(13) Since one must necessarily be larger than the other, and it is not known which is the larger piece, both pieces remain unclean.
(14) In this case therefore, since each half must clearly be treated on the same footing, each must be considered as a half and no more, with the result that each half is clean. In the case of shechitah however, the two parts of the organ are not treated on the same footing, for we are only concerned with the part that is cut; hence we may regard the exact half which is cut as equivalent to the greater portion, with the result that the slaughtering is valid.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 29a

for the length of time required for another slaughtering and then finished it, the slaughtering is valid. Now if you say that an exact half is equivalent to the greater portion then here the animal is already trefah!1 - You are assuming, are you not, that the Baraitha is dealing with cattle? Indeed it deals with a bird, and whichever view you take the result is the same. For if an exact half is equivalent to the greater portion then he has cut here the greater portion;2 and if an exact half is not equivalent to the greater portion then he has done nothing at all [which would render the slaughtering invalid].3

Come and hear: If half of the windpipe [of a bird] was mutilated and a man cut a fraction more and finished it, the slaughtering is valid. Now if you say that an exact half is equivalent to the greater portion, then was it not already trefah [before the slaughtering]? - Raba answered: With regard to the law of trefah it is different, for there [all agree that] we require such a greater portion as is perceptible to the eye.4 Thereupon Abaye said to him: But is there not here an a fortiori argument: If in the law concerning trefah, notwithstanding that [in certain cases] the slightest defect will render an animal trefah, nevertheless whenever we do require a greater portion we insist upon a greater portion that is perceptible to the eye, how much more in the law concerning shechitah, where no slaughtering is valid without the greater portion having been cut, should we insist upon a greater portion which is perceptible to the eye? - Rather say [thus]: All are of the opinion that an exact half is not equivalent to the greater portion, and when the dispute between Rab and R. Kahana was reported it was only in connection with the passover sacrifice. Thus: If the community of Israel was exactly equally divided, half being clean and half unclean, Rab said that an exact half was equivalent to the greater portion;5 R. Kahana said that an exact half was not equivalent to the greater portion.6 And what is the reason for Rab's view in that case?7 - For it is written: If any man of you shall be unclean by reason of a dead body,8 signifying that only an individual is obliged to postpone [his passover sacrifice on account of uncleanness] but not a community.9

THE GREATER PART OF ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD. Has not the Tanna already taught this: THE GREATER PART OF AN ORGAN IS EQUIVALENT TO [THE WHOLE OF] IT? - (Mnemonic: Hakesh; Pashah.)10 R. Hoshaia answered: One clause refers to unconsecrated animals, the other clause to consecrated animals. And they are both necessary. For had he taught the rule only in connection with unconsecrated animals I should have said that only there is the greater portion of the organ sufficient since the blood is not required for any purpose, but in the case of consecrated animals, since the blood is required for a special purpose.11 I should have said that the greater portion of the organ was not sufficient but that the whole organ must be cut? - [Hence the rule had to be stated in connection with consecrated animals.] And if he taught the rule only in connection with consecrated animals I should have said that only there [is the greater portion of the organ necessary], since the blood is required for a special purpose, but in the case of unconsecrated animals, since the blood is not required for any purpose. I should have said that half of the organ was sufficient. Hence both are necessary.

Which clause refers to unconsecrated animals and which to consecrated animals? - R. Kahana said: It is reasonable to say that the first clause refers to unconsecrated animals and the second to consecrated animals. Why? Because the Mishnah opens with, IF A MAN CUT [ ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD]'; now if you were to say that the first clause refers to consecrated animals it should open with, 'If one nipped'.12 You say, therefore, that the second clause refers to consecrated animals! but then why does it state, 'THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID'; it should state, 'The nipping is valid'? This is no real difficulty, for one can say that because the Tanna mentioned 'cattle' last, he therefore stated: THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. But [this argument is conclusive:] for since it,13 the first clause, clearly refers to the case of a bird, if you were to say that it refers to consecrated birds, the Tanna ought to have stated: 'If one nipped'.14

R. Shimi b. Ashi said: It can be proved that the first portion [of the Mishnah] deals with unconsecrated animals from this clause, viz., ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD. For if you were to say that the first portion deals with consecrated animals.[the question would be raised:] What about the burnt-offering of a bird which requires both organs [to be cut]?15 You therefore say that the second portion of the Mishnah deals with consecrated animals; but then [the same question will be raised upon the clause which reads]. THE GREATER PART OF ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD, viz., What about the burnt-offering of a bird which requires both organs [to be cut]? - THE GREATER PART OF ONE ORGAN really means the greater part of each organ, and strictly the Mishnah should have stated: 'The greater part of both'; since, however, there is the case of the sin-offering of a bird, for which one organ is sufficient, the Tanna stated the clause ambiguously.16

R. Papa said: It can be proved that the first portion [of our Mishnah] deals with unconsecrated animals from this clause: R. JUDAH SAYS, HE MUST CUT THROUGH THE JUGULAR VEINS. The Rabbis, however, disagree. Now if you say that the first portion deals with unconsecrated animals it is well, but if you were to say that it deals with consecrated animals, why do the Rabbis disagree [with the view of R. Judah]? Is not the whole purpose of the slaughtering [of consecrated animals] for the sake of obtaining the blood?17

R. Ashi said: It can be proved that the latter portion18 [of the Mishnah] deals with consecrated animals from the following statement: If one slaughtered two animals19 Simultaneously, the slaughtering is valid. And this expression, 'If one slaughtered', clearly implies that the slaughtering is valid only after the act, but that there is no right to slaughter thus in the first instance. Now if you say that this latter portion [of the Mishnah] deals with consecrated animals, then it is evident why there is no right to slaughter thus in the first instance. For R. Joseph learnt: It is written: Thou shalt slaughter,20 [to teach] that two persons shall not slaughter one sacrifice; and also, 'Thou shalt slaughter it', [to teach] that one person shall not slaughter two sacrifices [simultaneously]. And R. Kahana said that this exposition was based upon the Kethib which is: Thou shalt slaughter it. Now if you were to say that the latter portion [of the Mishnah] deals with unconsecrated animals, then surely there is a right to slaughter thus even in the first instance!

Resh Lakish is also of the opinion that the first clause [of our Mishnah] deals with unconsecrated animals whilst the second deals with consecrated animals. For Resh Lakish said: Since our Mishnah teaches us, THE GREATER PART OF AN ORGAN IS EQUIVALENT TO [THE WHOLE OF] IT, what need is there for the further statement, THE GREATER PART OF ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD. OR THE GREATER PART OF EACH ORGAN IN THE CASE OF CATTLE? It is necessary because we have learnt elsewhere:21 When they brought unto him [sc. the High priest on the Day of Atonement] the Daily Sacrifice, he made an incision22 but another [priest] completed the slaughtering for him. Now from this Mishnah I might have thought that if another had not completed the slaughtering it would have been invalid; our Mishnah therefore teaches us. [IF A MAN CUT] THE GREATER PART OF ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD, OR THE GREATER PART OF EACH ORGAN IN THE CASE OF CATTLE. THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID.23

The Master said: 'I might have thought that if another had not completed the slaughtering it would have been invalid.'

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(1) For it is assumed for the present that an animal which requires the cutting of both organs was being slaughtered, and the pause, occurring as it does after the greater portion of the windpipe has been cut (for that is the equivalent of an exact half according to Rab), renders it trefah, and no subsequent slaughtering could render it valid.
(2) And this in the case of a bird is sufficient to render the slaughtering valid.
(3) And his having cut half of the windpipe is of no consequence for the bird would not be rendered trefah thereby; v. infra 44a-b.
(4) So that an exact half even though equivalent in law to the greater portion, would not be sufficient to render trefah.
(5) Therefore those members of the community who are unclean, regarded i11 law as a majority, will sacrifice the paschal offering in its due season, even though they are all in a state of uncleanness.
(6) So that those who are unclean must postpone their paschal offering until the following month in accordance with Num. IX, 2-14; v. Pes. 79a.
(7) Seeing that elsewhere the exact half is not considered equivalent to the greater portion.
(8) Ibid. 10.
(9) Half of the community cannot be regarded as individuals and are therefore not obliged to postpone their sacrifice.
(10) A mnemonic (meaning perhaps 'Strike', 'Pull out') consisting of the characteristic letters of the names of the Rabbis whose dicta follow.
(11) For sprinkling upon the altar.
(12) Nipping is the only method prescribed by the Torah for slaying a consecrated bird.
(13) Which opens with השוחט, 'IF A MAN CUT'.
(14) Thus proving that the first clause deals with unconsecrated birds.
(15) So that it would not be correct for the Mishnah to state generally that one organ in the case of a bird was sufficient, for this would not be taking into account the case of a burnt-offering of a bird, where both organs must be severed. V. supra 21a.
(16) The expression may mean either the greater portion of one organ, to meet the case of the sin-offering of a bird, or the greater portion of each organ, to meet the case of the burnt-offering of a bird.
(17) Even the Rabbis would concede that in the case of consecrated animals one should cut the jugular veins in order to obtain as much blood as possible for sprinkling upon the altar.
(18) I.e., the Mishnah which follows infra 30b, which is the continuation of the last clause of our Mishnah.
(19) Lit., 'two heads'.
(20) Lev. XIX, 5. The traditional reading (קרי Kere) of the Hebrew is תזבחהו] תזבחוהו] 'Ye shall slaughter it', but the traditional spelling (כתיב, Kethib) is תזבחהו, 'Thou shalt slaughter it'. R. Joseph's exposition is based upon the Kethib, laying special emphasis upon the subject 'thou' and upon the object 'it', each of which excludes the plural.
(21) Yoma 31b.
(22) I.e., he cut the greater part of each organ and no more.
(23) This latter clause was therefore stated with regard to consecrated animals.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 29b

But if this were so, then a [vital] service would have been performed by another, and it has been taught: The entire service of the Day of Atonement must be performed by the High Priest alone! - This is rather what he meant: I might have thought that [if another had not completed the slaughtering] it would have been invalid by decree of the Rabbis, (for it might have been argued that the Rabbis declared [the slaughtering] invalid);1 our Mishnah therefore teaches us. [IF A MAN CUT] THE GREATER PART OF ONE ORGAN IN THE CASE OF A BIRD, OR THE GREATER PART OF EACH ORGAN IN THE CASE OF CATTLE, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. But now that it is established that there is not even a Rabbinic decree against it, wherefore is it necessary [for another] to complete the slaughtering? - It is meritorious to complete it.2

Resh Lakish said in the name of Levi the Elder: The term shechitah applies only to the last stage of the slaughtering. R. Johanan said: The term shechitah applies to the entire process of slaughtering from beginning to end. Raba remarked: All agree that where a gentile cut the first organ of the throat and an Israelite the second, the slaughtering is invalid, for the animal has already been rendered trefah by the hand of the gentile.3 Furthermore all agree that in the case of a burnt-offering of a bird, where the priest nipped the first organ below4 [the red line] and the second organ above it, the nipping is invalid,5 for by nipping the first organ below he has already done to this offering all that is prescribed for a sin-offering of a bird. The dispute arises only where a person cut the first organ6 outside [the Sanctuary] and the second inside [the Sanctuary]. According to the one who says that the term shechitah applies to the entire process of slaughtering from beginning to end, he would in this case be liable.7 But according to the one who says that the term shechitah applies only to the last stage of the slaughtering, he would not be liable. Rabbah b. Shimi said to him: But the Master (that is R. Joseph) did not say so. For [he said that] even where a person cut the first organ8 outside the Sanctuary and the second inside he would also be liable,9 because he has done to this offering outside the Sanctuary such an extent of service as would render the sin-offering of a bird valid [if performed inside the Sanctuary]. Rather [the dispute arises only] where a person cut the lesser portion of the organ outside [the Sanctuary] and completed it inside. According to the one who says that the term shechitah applies to the entire process of slaughtering from beginning to end, he would in this case be liable. But according to the one who says that the term shechitah applies only to the last stage of the slaughtering, he would not be liable.

R. Zera raised this objection: All who take part in the service of the Red Cow, either at the beginning or at the end, render their garments unclean.10 And if they do any other work at the same time,11 they render it [the Red Cow] invalid. If any invalidating defect befell it during the slaughtering it does not render unclean the garments worn by those who, either before or after the [occurrence of] the defect, took part in any service in connection with it.12 If the defect occurred during the sprinkling [of the blood], the Red Cow renders unclean the clothes worn by those who took part in any service before the defect, but it does not render unclean the clothes worn by those who took part in any service after the defect. Now if you say that the term shechitah applies to the entire process of slaughtering from beginning to end, then the Tanna should have drawn a distinction even in the slaughtering; thus: If any invalidating defect befell it during the slaughtering, it renders unclean the clothes worn by those who took part in any service before the defect,13 but not the clothes worn by those who took part in any service after the defect! - Raba replied: You are alluding, are you not, to a defect which invalidated the slaughtering? But that is quite a different matter! For it is now apparent that there never was a valid slaughtering!14 But, said Raba, if I have any difficulty [about this Mishnah] it is this: According to the one who says that the term shechitah applies only to the last stage of the slaughtering, the Tanna might have drawn a distinction even where the slaughtering of the Red Cow was entirely according to ritual, as in the case where two persons slaughtered it;15 in which case, the first does not render his clothes unclean but the second does! - R. Joseph thereupon interposed. You are suggesting, are you not, the case of two persons slaughtering one sacrifice? Away with this suggestion! For I have learnt: It is written: Thou shalt slaughter, [to teach] that two persons shall not slaughter one sacrifice; also: Thou shalt slaughter it, [to teach] that one person shall not slaughter two sacrifices [simultaneously].16 And R. Kahana had said that this exposition was based upon the Kethib which is: Thou shalt slaughter it. Whereupon Abaye said to him: Was there not reported in conjunction with this exposition the dictum of Rabbah b. Bar Hana in the name of R. Johanan, namely, that the opinion expressed was that of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon

____________________
(1) MS.M. omits bracketed words.
(2) In order to obtain as much blood as possible.
(3) For if the cutting of the first organ is considered an act of shechitah the slaughtering here is invalid because it has been done by a gentile (v. supra 13a); and if it is not considered an act of shechitah then it can only be regarded as a mutilation of the organ, a defect which renders the animal trefah and any subsequent slaughtering invalid.
(4) There was a red line running horizontally along the wall of the altar and the blood had to be sprinkled either above or below this line according to the particular sacrifice offered. With regard to a consecrated bird the priest, immediately after the nipping, (which in the case of a burnt-offering had to be performed whilst the priest was standing on the circuit round the altar which was above the red line) had to allow the blood to drain by pressing the neck of the bird against the wall of the altar, below the red line in the case of a sin-offering, and above it in the case of a burnt-offering. V. Zeb. 64b-65a.
(5) And even according to Resh Lakish who holds that the term 'nipping' does not apply to the nipping of the first organ it is invalid here, for he has done to a burnt-offering all that is prescribed for the sin-offering, namely, the nipping of one organ above the red line.
(6) Of a consecrated bird (Rashi); of a consecrated beast (Tosaf.).
(7) To the punishment of Kareth for slaughtering unconsecrated animals outside the Temple court, v. Lev. XVII, 4.
(8) V. p. 154, n. 6.
(9) Even according to Resh Lakish.
(10) I.e., the garments worn by them whilst performing the service, in accordance with Num. XIX. 7, 8, and 10.
(11) E.g., if he cut a cabbage whilst he was slaughtering the Red Cow.
(12) The reason being that so long as it has not been validly slaughtered it can in no wise be regarded as the Red Cow, and therefore all the rules of uncleanness stated in connection with it do not apply.
(13) For up to the moment of the occurrence of the defect there was a valid shechitah, since this term, according to R. Johanan, applies even to the first stage of the slaughtering, so that the Red Cow should render unclean the clothes worn by those who took part in any service before the occurrence of the defect.
(14) Not even before the occurrence of the defect.
(15) One commenced the slaughtering and the other finished it.
(16) V. supra p. 152, n. 6.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 30a

[who was often] quoted anonymously, whereas the Rabbis are of the opinion that two persons may slaughter one sacrifice?1 Moreover, even adopting the view of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, the Tanna might have drawn a distinction in the case where only one person slaughtered it but he wore two different garments while slaughtering;2 in which case the first garment is clean and the second unclean. The truth of the matter3 is that the Tanna dealt only with those circumstances where the Red Cow was in fact rendered invalid, but not where everything was done entirely according to ritual.

R. Idi b. Abin raised this objection: [We have learnt: If a man slaughtered the paschal lamb whilst having leaven in his possession] during the festival4 under its own name,5 he has not incurred guilt; under the name of another,6 he has incurred guilt. And we argued upon it as follows:7 'This is so only because it was slaughtered under the name of another, but if it were slaughtered under no specific name [it follows that] no guilt would have been incurred. But why is no guilt incurred? Is not the paschal lamb at any time of the year [save on the eve of Passover] regarded as a peace-offering?8 Will not then this [Mishnah] prove the rule9 that for a paschal lamb [to become valid as a peace-offering] at any other time of the year its name must first be repealed. R. Hiyya b. Gamada said: It was suggested by the whole assembly10 that the circumstances of the case were these: The owners of this paschal lamb were rendered unclean by a corpse, so that they had to postpone the offering of the paschal lamb until the Second Passover;11 hence [if this lamb was slaughtered during the first Passover] under no specific name it would certainly be regarded [as slaughtered] under its own name'.12 Now, only in this particular case must [the name of the paschal lamb] be repealed [before it is valid as a peace-offering], but in no other case is repeal necessary.13 This is right if you were to say that the term shechitah applies to the entire process of the slaughtering from beginning to end, for then the paschal lamb is rendered invalid at the beginning of the slaughtering,14 [and therefore no guilt is incurred]. But if you say that the term shechitah applies only to the last stage of the slaughtering, then as soon as the person commenced to slaughter it, it can no longer be intended to serve as15 the paschal lamb.16 and as he continues to slaughter he is really slaughtering a peaceoffering17 [consequently, he should incur guilt!] Thereupon Abaye answered him, Granted that this lamb can no longer serve as a paschal lamb, but its price can serve this purpose!18 And should you say that [in order to sell a consecrated animal] it must be placed19 [before the priest] and appraised. [I reply that] we have learnt:20 If one cut both, or the greater portion of both organs, and the animal still moves convulsively, it is regarded as alive for all purposes.

Rab Judah said in the name of Rab, 'If one cut the throat in two or three places the slaughtering is valid. But when I reported this statement to Samuel he said to me, "We must have a wide open cut21 and it is not so here."' Resh Lakish is also of the opinion that there must be a wide open cut. For Resh Lakish taught. Whence do we know that shechitah implies a wide open cut? From the verse: Their tongue is a sharpened arrow, it speaketh deceit.22

R. Eleazar raised an objection. [We have learnt,] If two persons held a knife and slaughtered, even if one cut higher up and the other cut lower down [in the neck], the slaughtering is valid.23 Now why is this so? There is not here a wide open cut! - R. Jeremiah answered: Our Mishnah deals with the case of two persons holding one knife.24 Thereupon R. Abba said to him: If so, let us consider the comment upon this Mishnah, viz.: 'And there is no fear that one will render the animal trefah on account of the other.' Now if you say that it deals with the case of two knives and two persons [each holding a knife], then [the comment is] most proper. For you might have said that we must apprehend lest they come to rely one upon the other, and neither the one nor the other will cut the required greater Portion [of the organs]; we are therefore informed that there is no fear of this. But if you say that it deals with the case of two persons holding one knife, then why the comment, 'And there is no fear that one will render the animal trefah on account of the other'? It should rather read: 'And there is no fear that one will cause the other to press upon the throat!25 - R. Abin said: Then read: 'And there is no fear

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(1) So that, according to the view of the Rabbis, Raba's original objection stands, viz., 'The Tanna should have drawn a distinction in the case where two persons slaughtered it'. V. supra p. 256 and notes.
(2) E.g., while he was slaughtering the Red Cow another person came, removed the slaughterer's coat and placed another coat on him. If therefore we were to say that the term shechitah applies only to the last stage of the slaughtering then the coat which was removed before the end of the slaughtering would not be unclean.
(3) To meet the difficulty raised by Raba.
(4) The proper time for slaughtering the paschal lamb was on the eve of the Passover festival and it is enjoined in Ex. XXIII, 18, that at the time of slaughtering the paschal lamb - and indeed at the time of slaughtering any sacrifice during the Passover festival (v. Pes. 63a) there must be no leaven in one's possession. In our case the circumstances were these: A lamb was originally set apart for the paschal offering but was lost, and another was offered as a sacrifice in its place. Subsequently, the original lamb was found and is now being offered on the festival as a sacrifice.
(5) I.e., as a paschal lamb. As such it is invalid, since it is not being offered in its proper time, and therefore the prohibition of Ex. XXIII, 18, will not apply.
(6) E.g., as a peace-offering. As such it is a valid sacrifice, except that guilt will be incurred under Ex. XXIII, 18.
(7) v. Pes. 64a.
(8) Ibid. 70b and Zeb. 9a.
(9) Although in Pes. 73b this rule is a subject of dispute among the scholars.
(10) חבורה, 'fellow', 'associate', v. Glos.
(11) On the fourteenth day of the second month (Iyar) in accordance with Num. IX. 11.
(12) I.e., as a paschal lamb, since it was intended to serve as the paschal lamb to be offered on the Second Passover.
(13) So that in ordinary circumstances the slaughtering of the paschal lamb during the Passover Festival would be regarded as a valid peace.offering.
(14) For although it is not slaughtered under the specific name of the paschal lamb it is nevertheless considered as such, and inasmuch as the first act of the slaughtering renders it invalid, since it is not being slaughtered at the proper time, no guilt is incurred.
(15) Lit., 'it has been rejected from',
(16) I.e., as the paschal lamb for the Second Passover, for it could not be kept till then as it is partly slaughtered.
(17) In accordance with the rule now established that whatever cannot, or is not, intended to serve as a paschal lamb is regarded as a peace-offering. And the fact that when the slaughtering was commenced the lamb was still intended for the paschal-offering is of no consequence, for according to Resh Lakish it is only the last stage of the slaughtering which is the decisive factor.
(18) For the animal can be sold even now before the slaughtering has been completed, and the money it fetched could be used for purchasing the paschal lamb for the Second Passover, so that the first lamb at no time ceases to serve as a paschal lamb.
(19) This rule is derived from Lev. XXVII, 11 and 12. The implication is that the animal must be able to stand, i.e., living, when it is being valued by the priest.
(20) This teaching is not found in any Mishnah but it might be inferred from the Mishnah, infra, 117b. V. Tosaf s.v. והתנן.
(21) Since the organs of the throat are tightened in preparation for the slaughtering, if they are cut in one place there will be a wide open cut, but if cut in several places none of the cuts will open wide; hence the slaughtering is invalid (Rashi). Accordingly a wide open cut is synonymous with a single cut. V. however Tosaf ad loc. for other interpretations.
(22) Jer. IX. 7. Heb. חץ שחוט, lit., 'an arrow thrust as in a slaughtering'. i.e., the cut in slaughtering should be wide open like the thrust of an arrow.
(23) V. infra, 30b. It is assumed for the present that there were two knives in use and each person held a knife and cut in a different part of the throat.
(24) They hold the knife in a slanting direction, one holding the handle and the other the head of the knife, and in this way one would be cutting the organs high up towards the head and the other lower down towards the body of the animal. There is, however, only one cut made.
(25) When two persons hold one knife the only danger is that they might not pull simultaneously, and therefore undue pressure would be exerted upon the organs.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 30b

that one will cause the other to press upon the throat'.

R. Abin raised an objection. It was taught: If a man cut the gullet low down and the windpipe high up or the gullet high up and the windpipe low down, the slaughtering is valid. But why? There is not here a wide open cut?1 - He raised the objection but answered it himself thus: The cutting in this instance was slanting,2 like the cut of a writing reed.

An ox was once slaughtered, its throat having been cut in several places, and R. Nahman b. Samuel b. Martha came and obtained some of the choicest meat of this animal. Whereupon R. Zera said to him, You have [by your action] taught us. Master, that our Mishnah deals with the case of two knives and two persons.

Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: If a man thrust the knife between the two organs and cut them,3 the slaughtering is invalid. If he thrust it underneath the skin, the slaughtering is valid. [What does he teach us?] Have we not learnt this already: 'Or, if he thrust the knife underneath the second organ and cut it,4 R. Jeshebab says: The animal is nebelah; R. Akiba says: It is trefah'?5 - From that Mishnah, I might have argued that only there [is the slaughtering invalid] because he cut the organs from below upwards, which is not the usual way of slaughtering, but where he cut the organs from above downwards, which is the usual way of slaughtering. I might have said that the slaughtering was proper; he therefore teaches us [that it is not valid].

'Underneath the skin the slaughtering is valid'. 'In the school of Rab it was said that underneath the skin it was doubtful [whether the slaughtering was valid or not]. The question was raised: According to the view of the school of Rab that 'underneath the skin' was a doubtful case, what would be the law if a man thrust the knife underneath a rag,6 or underneath the entangled wool?7 The question is undecided. R. Papa put the question: What is the law if he placed the knife under cover [on cutting] the lesser portions of the organs?8 This question too is undecided.

MISHNAH. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED TWO ANIMALS9 SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. IF TWO PERSONS HELD THE KNIFE AND SLAUGHTERED. EVEN IF ONE CUT HIGHER UP AND THE OTHER CUT LOWER DOWN [IN THE NECK]. THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID.10 IF HE CHOPPED OFF THE HEAD WITH ONE STROKE, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID.11 IF, WHILST CUTTING.12 HE CUT THROUGH THE NECK WITH ONE STROKE. THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID PROVIDED THE KNIFE EXTENDED THE WIDTH OF A NECK.13 IF. WHILST CUTTING, HE CUT THROUGH TWO NECKS14 WITH ONE STROKE, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. PROVIDED THE KNIFE EXTENDED THE WIDTH OF A NECK.13 THESE PROVISIONS APPLY ONLY TO THE CASE WHERE THE SLAUGHTERER MOVED THE KNIFE FORWARD AND NOT BACKWARD, OR BACKWARD AND NOT FORWARD; BUT IF HE MOVED THE KNIFE TO AND FRO, HOWEVER SMALL IT WAS, EVEN IF IT WAS A LANCET, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID.

GEMARA. [IF HE CHOPPED OFF THE HEAD WITH ONE STROKE THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID]. Whence do we know this? - Said Samuel: From the verse: Their tongue is a sharpened arrow. It speaketh deceit.15 A Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael taught: It is written: And he shall slaughter [we-shahat].16 and 'we-shahat' means nothing else than 'And he shall draw', as in the verse: Beaten [shahut] gold,17 and as it is also written: 'Their tongue is a sharpened [shahut] arrow, it speaketh deceit'. Why the second verse? You might have said that 'gold shahut' really means 'gold woven in threads';18 therefore, come and hear: It is written: 'Their tongue is a sharpened [shahut] arrow'.19

Raba examined20 [the head of] an arrow for R. Jonah b. Tahlifa, and the latter slaughtered with it a bird in its flight. Perhaps there was a thrust?21 - We saw

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(1) It being assumed that there were two separate cuts.
(2) There was, however, only one cut.
(3) He first cut the lower organ under cover of the upper one, and then cut the upper one.
(4) After having cut the first organ in the ordinary way he placed the knife underneath the second organ and cut it from below upwards.
(5) At all events whether the animal is nebelah or trefah the slaughtering is invalid. V. infra 32a.
(6) Which was wrapped round the neck of the animal.
(7) Which covers the necks of sheep.
(8) I.e., he had already cut the greater portion of each organ in the ordinary way, and had he stopped at this, the slaughtering would certainly be valid; but he now placed the knife under cover on cutting the remaining portion of each organ. So Rashi, but v. Tosaf. s.v. החליד.
(9) Lit., 'heads'.
(10) It might also mean: One held the top end of the knife and the other the bottom end, v. supra 30a.
(11) This is the classic example of דרסה, 'pressing'. i.e., cutting with a downward thrust of the knife, and not moving it horizontally to and fro.
(12) I.e., whilst drawing the knife horizontally across the neck.
(13) V. Gemara.
(14) Of two animals lying side by side.
(15) Jer. IX, 7. Heb. חץ שחוט. As the arrow moves horizontally in its flight, so in slaughtering one must move the knife horizontally to and fro.
(16) Lev. I, 5. ושחט.
(17) I Kings X, 16. שחוט, lit., 'drawn out', 'thinned out', 'beaten'.
(18) From חוט. 'a thread'.
(19) In this verse שחוט can only be explained in the sense of 'drawn along'. 'moved horizontally'.
(20) To see that it was absolutely free from notches.
(21) ' The arrow might have entered the side of the neck and cut the organs whilst the external skin was intact; this would be a case of חלדה, ('thrusting'), and would render the slaughtering invalid.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 31a

that the feathers on the front of the neck were also cut. But what about covering the blood? And should you say that he covered the blood [where it fell on the ground, this is not sufficient], for R. Zera taught in the name of Rab: He who slaughters [a bird or a wild beast] must place dust underneath [the blood] and dust above it, for it is written. And he shall cover it with dust [be-'afar];1 it does not say 'afar' but 'be-'afar'.2 in order to teach that he who slaughters [a bird' or a wild beast] must place dust underneath [the blood] and dust above it. - He prepared the soil of the entire valley [for this purpose].3

IF, WHILST CUTTING, HE CUT THROUGH THE NECK WITH ONE STROKE . . . [PROVIDED THE KNIFE EXTENDED THE WIDTH OF A NECK]. R. Zera said: The width of a neck and also beyond the neck. The question was raised: [Does he mean] the width of a neck and another width of a neck beyond the neck, so that the knife is two necks long, or [does he mean to say] the width of a neck and also a little beyond the neck? - Come and hear: IF, WHILST CUTTING, HE CUT THROUGH TWO NECKS WITH ONE STROKE, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID PROVIDED THE KNIFE EXTENDED THE WIDTH OF A NECK. Now what is the meaning of THE WIDTH OF A NECK? Can it mean the width of a neck and no more? But if when slaughtering one animal we require the knife to be the width of a neck and also beyond the neck, can it possibly be said that when slaughtering two animals the width of a neck by itself is sufficient? Obviously, it must mean, the width of a neck beyond the two necks4 [which are being slaughtered]. This, therefore, proves that [R. Zera means] there must be the width of a neck beyond the neck.

THESE PROVISIONS APPLY ONLY TO THE CASE WHERE HE MOVED THE KNIFE FORWARD AND NOT BACKWARD . . . HOWEVER SMALL IT WAS, EVEN IF IT WAS A LANCET, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. R. Manasseh said: The Mishnah refers to a lancet which has no projections.5 R. Aha, the son of R. Awia, asked R. Manasseh: What is the law if one used a needle [for slaughtering]? - He replied: A needle rends6 [the flesh]. What if one used a shoemakers' awl? - He replied: We have learnt it in our Mishnah: HOWEVER SMALL IT WAS. Surely this includes the shoemakers' awl! - No, it refers to a lancet. But a lancet is expressly mentioned later? - No; it is merely explanatory; thus: HOWEVER SMALL IT WAS, namely: A LANCET. And this is logical too. For if you say that it includes a shoemakers' awl, then [it will be asked]. If a shoemakers' awl is allowed, what need is there to mention a lancet? [But this indeed would be no difficulty, because] it is necessary to mention a lancet; for you might have thought that the Rabbis would prohibit the use of a lancet even without projections as a precaution lest one use a lancet with projections. [The Mishnah] therefore teaches us [that this is not prohibited].

MISHNAH. IF A KNIFE FELL DOWN AND SLAUGHTERED [AN ANIMAL], EVEN THOUGH IT SLAUGHTERED IT IN THE PROPER WAY. THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID, FOR IT IS WRITTEN, AND THOU SHALT SLAUGHTER . . . AND THOU SHALT EAT.7 THAT IS TO SAY, THAT WHICH THOU DOST SLAUGHTER MAYEST THOU EAT.

GEMARA. Now this is so only because it fell down [of itself], but if one threw it [and it slaughtered an animal], the slaughtering would be valid, notwithstanding there was no intention [to slaughter according to ritual]. Who is the Tanna that holds that the intention to slaughter [according to ritual] is not essential? - Raba said: It is R. Nathan. For Oshaia, junior of the collegiate school,8 learnt: If one threw a knife intending to thrust it into a wall and in its flight it slaughtered an animal in the proper way. R. Nathan declares the slaughtering valid; the Sages declare it invalid. Having reported this, he added that the halachah was in accordance with R. Nathan's view. But has not Raba stated this before [in connection with the following Mishnah]? For we have learnt: 'And if any of these slaughtered while others were standing over them, their slaughtering is valid'.9 And it was asked: Who was the Tanna that held that the intention to slaughter [according to ritual] was not essential? And Raba answered: It was R. Nathan! - [Both statements] are necessary. For if he only stated it there [I should have said that only there the slaughtering was valid] because they10 at least intended to cut, but here since there was no intention to cut [at all] I should have said that it was not valid. And if he only stated it here [I should have said that only here the slaughtering was valid] because it [the act] emanated from a person of sound mind, but there, since it emanated from a person of unsound mind, I should have said that it was not valid. [Both statements] are therefore necessary.

It was stated: If a menstruous woman11 accidentally immersed herself,12 Rab Judah says in the name of Rab: She is permitted to have intimate relations with her husband,13 but is forbidden to eat terumah; R. Johanan says: She is not even permitted to have intimate relations with her husband. Raba said to R. Nahman, against Rab's view that she is allowed intimacy with her husband, but is forbidden to eat terumah, [I would put the question:] If you have permitted her that which entails the penalty of kareth,14 surely you will permit her that which entails only the penalty of death at the hands of Heaven!15 - He replied: Intimacy with her husband is a 'common'16 thing, and in the case of common things the intention is not essential.17 Whence do you know this? - From the following Mishnah which we learnt: If a wave containing forty se'ah [of water] was detached [from the sea] and fell upon a man or upon vessels [that were unclean], they are now clean.18 Presumably a man is on the same footing as vessels, and as vessels have no intention so a man need have no intention.19 But is this so? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man who was sitting and waiting for the wave to become detached!

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(1) Lev. XVII. 23. Heb. בעפר, lit., 'in dust'.
(2) The preposition ב, 'in', signifies that the blood shall he in earth, i.e., entirely covered with earth above and below, or between two layers of earth.
(3) He broke up the soil in the whole valley in readiness for receiving the blood or he found the soil already broken up and expressed his intention of using the soil for this purpose (Rashi).
(4) I.e.,the knife must be three necks long.
(5) Lit., 'horns'. The projection or point would pierce the organs during the slaughtering thus rendering it invalid.
(6) A needle, even when moved to and fro, tears the organs and does not cut them; hence the slaughtering is invalid.
(7) Deut. XII, 21.
(8) V. supra p. 56.
(9) Supra 2a. This passage refers (inter alia) to the slaughtering by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, who are incapable of forming an intention to slaughter according to ritual.
(10) The deaf-mute, the imbecile or the minor.
(11) In this case whose period of uncleanness had passed and she but required ritual immersion in a mikweh or in the sea in order to be allowed to resume intimate relations with her husband.
(12) E.g., she fell from a bridge into the sea. V. infra.
(13) Lit., 'she is clean, to her home', a euphemistic expression.
(14) The penalty for having sexual intercourse with a menstruous woman is Kareth, i.e., excision, being cut off. V. Lev. XX. 18.
(15) This being the penalty for eating terumah in an unclean state. Death at the hands of Heaven is less severe than Kareth, for the latter is a punishment to the offender and to his seed as well, whereas the former only affects the offender himself.
(16) Heb. חולין. i.e., common, ordinary, unconsecrated matter, as opposed to terumah and consecrated matter.
(17) I.e., the intention to perform a particular act which renders it permitted is not essential.
(18) They have thus received a ritual immersion. Forty se'ah is the minimum amount of water to constitute a mikweh. V. Mik. V, 6.
(19) He need not immerse himself for the specific purpose of being rendered clean.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 31b

And [on the contrary] vessels are to be on the same footing as a man, and as a man is capable of forming an intention so in the case of vessels a man must form an intention for them.1 But should you ask: If we are dealing with the case of a man who was sitting and waiting, why is it at all necessary to be taught?2 [I reply that] you might have disallowed [this immersion] as a precautionary measure lest he immerse himself in a torrent of rainwater;3 or you might have disallowed immersion at the edge4 [of the wave] as a precaution, lest it be thought that immersion is also allowed in the arch4 of the wave. We are therefore taught that no precautionary measures are necessary. And whence do we know that immersion is not allowed in the arch of the wave? - From [the following Baraitha] which was taught: Immersion is allowed at the edge [of the wave] but not in the arch of the wave, for immersion is not allowed in mid-air.

Whence then do we derive the rule that in the case of common things the intention is not essential? - From [the following Mishnah] which we learnt: If fruits had fallen into a channel of water and a person whose hands were unclean stretched out his hands and took them, his hands have become clean,5 and the rule of 'if water be put'6 does not apply to the fruits. But if his purpose was to wash his hands, his hands have become clean and the rule of 'if water be put' applies to the fruits.7

Raba raised an objection against R. Nahman. [We have learnt:] If a man immersed himself to render himself fit to partake of common food and had this purpose in view, he is forbidden to partake of the Second Tithe.8 Now this is so only because he had this purpose in view, but if he did not have this purpose in view he may not [partake even of common food]!9 - [He replied,] This is what it means: Even though he had the purpose in view to render himself fit to partake of common food he is forbidden to eat Second Tithe. He raised this further objection: If he immersed himself but did not have any purpose in view, it is as if he had not immersed himself.8 Presumably it means: It is as if he had not immersed himself at all?9 - No, it means: It is as if he had not immersed himself for Second Tithe but he has certainly immersed himself for common food. Now he [Raba] thought that R. Nahman merely intended to point out a possible refutation; he accordingly went and searched, and found [the following Baraitha]: If he immersed himself and had no purpose in view, he is fit to eat common food but not Second Tithe.

Abaye said to R. Joseph. Shall we say that this [last Baraitha] is a refutation of R. Johanan's view?10 - He replied. R. Johanan will concur with the view expressed by R. Jonathan b. Joseph. For it was taught: R. Jonathan b. Joseph says: It is written: And it shall be washed [the second time].11 Now what does 'the second time' teach us? We must compare the washing on the second occasion with the washing on the first occasion; as the latter must be intentional12 so the washing on the second occasion shall be intentional.13 But then it should follow, should it not, that as the washing on the first occasion must be by order of the priest, so shall the washing on the second occasion be by order of the priest? It is therefore written: 'And it shall be clean', in all circumstances.14

But did R. Johanan really say this? Surely R. Johanan has stated that the halachah is always in accordance with the view of an anonymous Mishnah. And we have learnt: IF A KNIFE FELL DOWN AND SLAUGHTERED [AN ANIMAL]. EVEN THOUGH IT SLAUGHTERED IT IN THE PROPER WAY, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID. And we argued the point thus: 'This is so only because it fell down [of itself], but if one threw it [and it slaughtered an animal], the slaughtering would be valid, notwithstanding there was no intention [to slaughter according to ritual]'. And we asked: 'Who is the Tanna that holds that the intention to slaughter [according to ritual] is not essential?' And Raba said: 'It is R. Nathan'!15 - With regard to shechitah even R. Jonathan b. Joseph16 would concede [that the intention is not essential]; for inasmuch as the Divine Law has expressly laid down that an act performed incidentally in connection with consecrated animals is invalid,17 it follows that with regard to 'common' things the intention is not essential. And the Rabbis?18 - [They will say:] Granted that with regard to 'common' animals It is not essential to have the intention to slaughter [according to ritual], but it is essential to have an intention to cut. In this matter, said Raba, R. Nathan triumphed over the Rabbis. For is there ever written: 'And thou shalt cut?' It is written: 'And thou shalt slaughter'.19 Therefore, if it is essential to have the intention to cut, it is also essential to have the intention to slaughter [according to ritual], and if it is not essential to have the intention to slaughter [according to ritual], then it is not even essential to have the intention to cut.

How did it happen that the menstruous woman accidentally immersed herself? Shall we say that another woman pushed her [into a mikweh] and she thus immersed herself? But surely the intention of the other woman is a perfect intention! Moreover, [in such a case] she would even be allowed to eat terumah! For we have learnt:20 If a woman was a deaf-mute or an imbecile or blind or not conscious [and she immersed herself], provided there were present women of sound mind to prepare everything for her, she may eat terumah! - R. Papa said: According to R. Nathan [it happened thus:] She fell from a bridge;21 according to the Rabbis [it happened thus:] She went down [into the sea] to cool herself.22

Raba said: If a person while slaughtering the Red Cow, slaughtered at the same time another animal, according to all views the Red Cow is invalid.23

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(1) So that the result would be that for all matters, animate or inanimate, even for 'common' matters, a specific intention is essential.
(2) It is obvious that he is rendered clean, for he had the requisite intention, since he was looking forward to being immersed by the wave!
(3) Running down the mountain side. Immersion in such torrent is unlawful, v. Mik. V. 5 and Toh. VIII, 9.
(4) Where a wave breaks over land it is established (Tosef. Mik. IV) that one may immerse a vessel at the extreme end of the wave where it touches the ground, but not in the middle of the wave where it is arched above the ground; for it is essential that at the time of immersion the water must be touching the ground, and not suspended in mid-air.
(5) Even though he had no intention of washing his hands. This Mishnah clearly proves that with regard to 'common' food the intention is not essential.
(6) Lev. XI, 38. The application of the rule 'if water be put' means that the food has been rendered susceptible to uncleanness. Since the fruits became wet accidentally they are not thereby rendered susceptible to uncleanness; v. supra p. 77, n. 5.
(7) Since the water affords pleasure to this man for washing his hands, it will render the fruits susceptible to uncleanness. V. supra, loc. cit.
(8) Hag. 18b.
(9) Presumably because the intention was wanting. Hence it is essential to have the proper intention even with regard to common food.
(10) Who stated above that the accidental immersion of a menstruous woman will not render her clean even for 'common' matters, whereas the above mentioned Baraitha states that an immersion without any special intention is valid with regard to 'common' food.
(11) Lev. XIII, 58. It is laid down that a garment containing a leprous spot must be locked away for seven days, and on the seventh day must be examined by a priest. If it is then found that the spot has remained stationary and has not spread over a greater surface, the garment must then be washed and locked away for a further seven days, at the end of which period it must be examined again by the priest. If it is now found that the infection has left, the garment must be washed a second time (here meaning: the ritual immersion in a mikweh) and it is then declared to be clean.
(12) For it is written, ibid. 54. Then the priest shall command that they wash etc. The washing must be done at the express command of the priest.
(13) Hence this Tanna holds that the immersion must be intentional, even in respect of common matters, and so is in agreement with R. Johanan.
(14) I.e., even though the immersion was not carried out by the order of the priest, provided it was intentional, the garment becomes clean.
(15) The halachah, therefore, should be in accordance with this anonymous Mishnah, namely, that the intention to slaughter according to ritual is not essential; but this is contrary to R. Johanan's view.
(16) And likewise R. Johanan.
(17) V. supra p. 59.
(18) Who declared the slaughtering invalid where a person threw a knife and it happened to slaughter an animal, supra p. 165.
(19) Deut. XII, 21.
(20) Nid. 13b.
(21) Into the sea and thus immersed herself. This corresponds with R. Nathan's view that with regard to shechitah there is not even required the intention to cut or to deal with the animal at all. Here the woman did not even have the intention to be in the water.
(22) She intended to be in the water but not to immerse herself ritually; corresponding to the view of the Rabbis that with regard to shechitah there must be the intention to cut, but not necessarily the intention to slaughter according to ritual.
(23) V. supra p. 155: 'If they do any other work at the same time, they render it invalid.'

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 32a

If another animal was [accidentally] slaughtered with it, according to R. Nathan, the Red Cow is invalid1 and the other animal valid;2 according to the Rabbis, the Red Cow is valid3 and the other animal invalid.4 This is surely obvious! - It was necessary to state the clause, 'If another animal was [accidentally] slaughtered with it' in order to set forth R. Nathan's view. For I might have said that the Divine Law [when it] said: And he shall slaughter it,5 implying 'it' but not it and another, referred to the slaughtering of two Red Cows simultaneously; but to slaughter a 'common' animal with it, I might have said, would not render it invalid. We are therefore taught [otherwise]. If, while slaughtering the Red Cow, he cut at the same time a pumpkin, according to all views the Red Cow is invalid. If a pumpkin was [accidentally] cut whilst the Red Cow was being slaughtered, according to all views the Red Cow is valid.

MISHNAH. IF THE KNIFE FELL6 AND HE PAUSED [IN THE SLAUGHTERING IN ORDER] TO LIFT IT UP, IF HIS COAT FELL DOWN6 AND HE PAUSED TO LIFT IT UP, IF HE SHARPENED THE KNIFE AND GREW TIRED6 AND ANOTHER CAME AND SLAUGHTERED - [IN EACH CASE] IF THE PAUSE WAS FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED FOR SLAUGHTERING, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID. R. SIMEON SAID, [IT IS INVALID] IF THE PAUSE WAS FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED FOR EXAMINING7 [THE KNIFE].

GEMARA. What is meant by THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED FOR SLAUGHTERING? - It means, said Rab, the of time required for slaughtering another animal.8 R. Kahana and R. Assi asked Rab: Is the test in the case of a beast to be the length of time required for slaughtering another beast, and in the case of a bird the length of time required for slaughtering another bird; or is the test always the length of time required for slaughtering a beast even in the case of a bird? - Rab answered: 'I was not on such intimate terms with my uncle9 as to ask him this'.

It was stated: Rab said: In the case of a beast the test is the length of time required for slaughtering a beast, and in the case of a bird the length of time required for slaughtering a bird. Samuel said: The test even in the case of a bird is the length of time required for slaughtering a beast. So, too, when R. Abin came [from Palestine] he reported R. Johanan's opinion that the test even in the case of a bird is the length of time required for slaughtering a beast. R. Hanina said, [The Mishnah means] the length of time required for fetching another animal and slaughtering it. Fetching! Why he might fetch an animal from anywhere! Then you have made the test to vary [with the circumstances of each case]!10 - R. Papa explained. The difference between them11 is as regards an animal that is ready for casting.12 In the West it was reported in the name of R. Jose son of R. Hanina: [The Mishnah means] the length of time required to lift up, lay on the ground and slaughter, in the case of small animals,13 a small animal, and in the case of large animals,14 a large animal.

Raba said: If one spent the whole day slaughtering [one animal] with a blunt knife, the slaughtering is valid. Raba raised the question: Are several [short] pauses to be combined?15 But surely this can be solved from his preceding statement!16 - No, for there he did not pause at all. R. Huna the son of R. Nathan raised this question: What if he paused whilst cutting the lesser portion of the organs?17 - This remains undecided.

R. SIMEON SAID, [IT IS INVALID] IF THE PAUSE WAS FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED FOR EXAMINING [THE KNIFE]. What is the meaning of THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED FOR EXAMINING? - R. Johanan said: It means the length of time required for a Sage to examine [the knife]. But this test would vary with the circumstances of each case!18 - It means the length of time required for the slaughterer, himself a Sage, to examine [the knife].

MISHNAH. IF A MAN FIRST CUT THE GULLET AND THEN TORE AWAY19 THE WINDPIPE, OR FIRST TORE AWAY THE WINDPIPE AND THEN CUT THE GULLET; OR IF HE CUT ONE OF THESE ORGANS AND PAUSED20 UNTIL THE ANIMAL DIED; OR IF HE THRUST THE KNIFE UNDERNEATH THE SECOND ORGAN AND CUT IT21 - [IN ALL THESE CASES] R. JESHEBAB SAYS, THE ANIMAL IS NEBELAH; R. AKIBA SAYS, IT IS TREFAH. R. JESHEBAB LAID DOWN THIS RULE IN THE NAME OF R. JOSHUA: WHENEVER AN ANIMAL IS RENDERED INVALID BY A FAULT IN THE SLAUGHTERING IT IS NEBELAH; WHENEVER AN ANIMAL HAS BEEN DULY SLAUGHTERED BUT IS RENDERED INVALID BY SOME OTHER DEFECT IT IS TREFAH. R. AKIBA [ULTIMATELY] AGREED WITH HIM.

GEMARA. IF A MAN FIRST CUT THE GULLET etc. AND R. AKIBA AGREED WITH HIM. A contradiction was pointed out. We have learnt: The following defects render cattle trefah:

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(1) Even though his mind was not taken away from the slaughtering of the Red Cow it is invalid; because it is written: Num. XIX, 3. And he shall slaughter it, which means, 'it by itself', and not another animal with it.
(2) For according to R. Nathan no intention whatsoever is required in order to render the slaughtering of an unconsecrated animal valid.
(3) The Rabbis hold that whatever is done unintentionally or accidentally whilst slaughtering the Red Cow will not affect the validity of the Red Cow, for the slaughterer's mind will not have been taken away from the Red Cow.
(4) Because according to the Rabbis the intention is essential even when slaughtering an unconsecrated animal.
(5) Num. XIX, 3.
(6) I.e., after he had commenced slaughtering.
(7) Or, according to Maim., for examining the organs to see whether they have been cut sufficiently.
(8) And not, as might have been thought, merely the length of time required for completing the slaughtering of the animal on which he had started.
(9) I.e., R. Hiyya, who was the uncle and teacher of Rab.
(10) For a longer pause would be allowed where the animal had to be fetched from a long distance than if it had to be fetched from a place nearby; so that the pause which would render invalid one animal would not render invalid another animal.
(11) I.e., between R. Hanina and R. Johanan (Rashi). According to Rambam the words, 'The difference between them is', are to be omitted; R. Papa then merely interprets R. Hanina's view.
(12) Lit., 'one which stands to be cast'. According to R. Johanan the pause which renders invalid is the length of time required for slaughtering, but according to R. Hanina it is the length of time required for casting the animal on the ground Plus the time required for slaughtering it.
(13) I.e., sheep and goats.
(14) I.e., oxen.
(15) If while slaughtering an animal he paused several times, but on each individual occasion the time was not of the length required to invalidate the slaughtering, are the times of the various pauses to be reckoned together so as to constitute a pause long enough to invalidate the slaughtering?
(16) For it is presumed that in the course of a day's slaughtering there must have been many short pauses.
(17) I.e., he paused after he had cut through the greater portion of each organ. Had he ceased slaughtering at this stage and gone away there is no doubt that the slaughtering would be valid; it is only the continuation of the slaughtering after a long pause that gives rise to the difficulty.
(18) For it is dependent upon whether or not a Sage is available.
(19) This is a case of עיקור, 'tearing away' the organ from the larynx. V. supra 9a, p. 37, n. 11.
(20) This is a case of שהײה, 'pausing', discussed fully in the preceding Mishnah and Gemara.
(21) This is a case of חלדה, 'thrusting', discussed fully supra, 30b.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 32b

If the gullet was pierced, or the windpipe severed!1 - Raba answered: There is no contradiction. In the one case he first cut [the gullet] and then tore away [the windpipe]; in the other case he first tore away [the windpipe] and then cut the gullet. Where he first cut [the gullet] and then tore away [the windpipe] we regard it as a fault in the slaughtering,2 but where he first tore away [the windpipe] and then cut [the gullet] we regard it as invalidated by some other defect.3 R. Aha b. Huna raised the following objection against Raba: [It was taught:] If he first cut the gullet and then tore away the windpipe, or first tore away the windpipe and then cut the gullet, the animal is nebelah! - Render [the second clause] thus: [Or if he tore away the windpipe] having already cut the gullet. He retorted. There are two arguments against this. First, it is now identical with the first clause; and secondly, it expressly says. 'And he then cut'. - Rather, said Raba: It4 must be interpreted thus: The following defects render the animal prohibited, some as nebelah and some as trefah. Then why does it not include also the case of Hezekiah? For Hezekiah taught: If one cut an animal into two it is nebelah [forthwith].5 And also the case of R. Eleazar? For R. Eleazar taught: If the thigh of an animal was removed and the cavity was noticeable it is nebelah [forthwith].5 - It includes such nebelah only as does not convey uncleanness whilst alive, but not such nebelah as conveys uncleanness whilst alive.6 R. Simeon b.) Lakish suggested.7 In the one case he cut [the windpipe] in the place where it was already lacerated; in the other case he did not cut [the windpipe] in the place where it was already lacerated. Where he cut it in the place where it was already lacerated we regard the animal as invalidated by a defect in the slaughtering;8 but where he did not cut it in the place where it was already lacerated we regard the animal as invalidated by some other defect. But did R. Simeon b. Lakish really say this? Surely R. Simeon b. Lakish has said that if the lung was pierced after he had cut the windpipe [but before he had cut the gullet], the slaughtering was valid.9 This proves, does it not, that [once the windpipe has been cut] the lung is regarded as though placed in a basket?10 Here also we should say, should we not, that [once the windpipe has been lacerated] it is regarded as though placed in a basket?11 - Rather, said R. Hiyya b. Abba in the name of R. Johanan. There is no contradiction. There12 [the Mishnah represents the view of R. Akiba] before he retracted, here after he retracted; that Mishnah,12 however, was allowed to stand.13

The text above stated: 'R. Simeon b. Lakish said: If the lung was pierced after he had cut the windpipe [but before he had cut the gullet], the slaughtering is valid'. Raba said: This decision of Resh Lakish applies only to the lung because the vitality of the lung is entirely dependent upon the windpipe, but it does not apply to the intestines.14 R. Zera demurred. Saying Since you declare [the animal] permissible wherever a defect occurred [after cutting one organ], what difference does it make whether the defect was in the lung or in the intestines? R. Zera, however, must have withdrawn his objection. For R. Zera had put the following question: What is the law if the intestines were perforated after the first organ but before the second organ [was cut]?15 Is the first organ to be reckoned together with the second in order to render the animal clean, and not nebelah, or not?16 And we replied: Was not this question similar to that put by Ilfa, viz., What is the law if a foetus put forth its foreleg [out of the womb of its dam] after the first organ but before the second organ [was cut]?17

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(1) This is the opening Mishnah of Chap. III, infra 42a. It is there stated that if the windpipe was severed the animal is merely trefah, whereas in our Mishnah, if the slaughterer tore away (i.e., severed) the windpipe, the animal is stated to be nebelah by R. Jeshebab, and R. Akiba ultimately also concurred.
(2) This is the case of our Mishnah, and the animal is nebelah.
(3) This is the case of the Mishnah in Chap. III, and the animal is merely trefah, since it was rendered invalid actually before the commencement of the slaughtering.
(4) The Mishnah infra 42a.
(5) V. supra 21a.
(6) In the cases of Hezekiah and R. Eleazar the animal is at once regarded as nebelah for all purposes even though the animal still shows signs of life by the convulsive movements of its limbs.
(7) To reconcile the contradiction pointed out at the beginning of the discussion between our Mishnah and the Mishnah in Chap. III.
(8) The animal is therefore nebelah.
(9) For as soon as the windpipe has been cut the slaughtering has been completed with regard to it; hence any defect which occurs subsequently in any organ which is directly connected with or attached to the windpipe is of no consequence.
(10) And any lesion of the lung now will not affect the validity of the animal.
(11) With the result that the animal has virtually only one organ fit to be slaughtered and it must therefore be nebelah.
(12) Chap. III Mishnah I. Infra 42a.
(13) Even though its decision had been overruled.
(14) I.e., if the intestines had been pierced after the windpipe, but before the gullet had been cut, the animal would be forbidden to be eaten, for the intestines are dependent upon and connected with the gullet and this has not yet been cut.
(15) After the windpipe, for that is always the first organ to be cut, but before the gullet had been cut (Rashi); v. however Tosaf. ad loc.
(16) The effect of slaughtering, it must be remembered, is twofold: (a) the animal is permitted to be eaten, and (b) it is not nebelah; and, it is suggested, in order that the slaughtering be valid each organ must serve this twofold purpose. In our case, however, whereas the cutting of the first organ tends to produce this twofold effect the cutting of the second organ does not, for the defect that has occurred in the intestines before the cutting of the second organ has already precluded (a); the slaughtering therefore should be invalid absolutely. On the other hand, it might be argued that the slaughtering should be effective at least with regard to (b), since this purpose is common to both organs.
(17) It is established law (v. infra 68ff.) that the embryo within the womb of its dam is rendered fit for food by the valid slaughtering of the dam; if, however, part of the embryo protruded out of the womb before the slaughtering, such part will not be rendered fit for food by the valid slaughtering of the dam, although it will be rendered clean by such slaughtering. The question here raised is whether or not the slaughtering of the dam will render clean that part which protruded out of the womb after the first organ had been cut. The argument is similar to that in the preceding note. For the slaughtering of the first organ serves a twofold purpose, namely, to render the limb which protruded later clean and also fit for food, whereas the slaughtering of the second organ serves only the single purpose of rendering the limb clean. The question therefore is. Can the first organ be reckoned together with the second in order to effect the purpose common to both, namely, to render the limb clean?

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 33a

Is the first organ to be reckoned together with the second in order to render [the foreleg] clean, and not nebelah, or not? Now the question put [by R. Zera] was only as to whether or not the animal was to be regarded as clean, and not nebelah, but [admittedly] it is forbidden to be eaten.1 R. Aha b. Rab said to Rabina: It may very well be that R. Zera did not withdraw his objection at all,2 but he merely formulated his question from the point of view of Raba,3 though he himself did not agree with it.

R. Aha b. Jacob said: One may conclude from the ruling of R. Simeon b. Lakish that an Israelite may be invited to partake of the intestines, but not a gentile. Why is this? - Because to an Israelite everything depends upon the slaughtering;4 therefore, since here the animal has been properly slaughtered he may partake of the intestines. To the gentile, however, everything depends upon the death of the animal4 [and not upon the slaughtering], for even stabbing would be sufficient; therefore the intestines [of an animal slaughtered by an Israelite] would be regarded as a limb [cut off] from a living animal.5

R. Papa said: 'As I was Sitting before R. Aha b. Jacob I thought of putting the question to him: Is there anything which is permitted to an Israelite and forbidden to a gentile? But I did not ask him this, for I said to myself: "He has himself suggested the reason for it"'.

There was taught [a Baraitha] which contradicts the view of R. Aha b. Jacob: 'If a person desires to eat the meat of an animal before it has actually died, he may cut off an olive's bulk of flesh from around the throat, salt it well, rinse it well, wait until the animal expires,6 and then eat it. Both Israelite and gentile may eat it in this way'. This [Baraitha] on the other hand Supports the view of R. Idi b. Abin. For R. Idi b. Abin said in the name of R. Isaac b. Ashian: If a person wishes to be in good health he should cut off an olive's bulk of flesh from around the throat, salt it well, rinse it well, wait until the animal expires, and then eat it. Both Israelite and gentile may eat it in this way.

MISHNAH. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED CATTLE OR A WILD BEAST OR A BIRD AND NO BLOOD CAME FORTH, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID AND IT MAY BE EATEN BY HIM WHOSE HANDS HAVE NOT BEEN WASHED,7 FOR IT HAS NOT BEEN RENDERED SUSCEPTIBLE TO UNCLEANNESS BY BLOOD. R. SIMEON SAYS, IT HAS BEEN RENDERED SUSCEPTIBLE TO UNCLEANNESS BY THE SLAUGHTERING.8

GEMARA. Now this is so only because no blood came forth, but if blood did come forth [it follows that] it may not be eaten by one with unwashed hands. But why? Are not [unwashed] hands unclean in the second degree and that which is unclean in the second degree cannot render 'common' food unclean in the third degree? - But whence do you gather that we are dealing with common food? - For it reads [in the Mishnah]. OR A WILD BEAST, and if it is dealing with consecrated animals [it is unintelligible, for] is there such a thing as a consecrated wild beast?9 Furthermore, if it is dealing with consecrated animals, can it be said that the slaughtering is valid where no blood came forth? The whole purpose [of the slaughtering] is to obtain the blood!10 Furthermore, if [it is dealing] with consecrated animals, can it be said that in the case where blood did come forth it would render [the animal] susceptible to uncleanness? Surely R. Hiyya b. Abba has said in the name of R. Johanan: 'Whence do we know that the blood of consecrated animals cannot render anything susceptible to uncleanness? From the verse: Thou shalt poor it out upon the earth as water,11 which implies that blood which is poured out as water can render susceptible to uncleanness, but blood which is not poured Out as water cannot'. Furthermore, if [it is dealing] with consecrated animals, can it be said that where no blood came forth the animal would not be rendered susceptible to uncleanness? Surely it would be susceptible to uncleanness because of its sacred esteem, for it is established that sacred esteem will render [consecrated] matter susceptible to uncleanness!12 R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: Here [in our Mishnah] we are dealing with unconsecrated animals that were bought [in Jerusalem] with Second Tithe money, and the ruling is not in accordance with R. Meir's view. For we have learnt,13

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(1) But this cannot be reconciled with the objection he raised against Raba. It is therefore right to say that R. Zera withdrew his objection.
(2) For he is of the opinion that any defect that occurs to any limb in the course of the slaughtering will not affect the validity of the slaughtering, and the animal would even be fit for food.
(3) According to Raba's view who stated above that Resh Lakish's ruling did not apply to the case where the intestines were pierced after the cutting of the first organ, the question arises: Would the animal be free from the uncleanness of nebelah or not?
(4) In order that the animal may be fit for food.
(5) For by the cutting of the organs only the animal is not absolutely dead, and at this stage the intestines are regarded, according to R. Simeon b. Lakish, as having been taken out from the living(!) animal and placed in a basket; hence they are forbidden to a gentile as a limb cut off from a living animal.
(6) V. Sanh. 63a. Sonc. ed., p. 430.
(7) Lit., 'with unclean hands'. Hands that have not been washed are regarded by the Rabbis as unclean in the second degree. There is no fear here of the hands defiling the meat for the reason stated in the Mishnah, namely, that the flesh of the animal has not been made wet by water or blood or any other liquid, in conformity with the rule laid down in Lev. XI, 38.
(8) Since the slaughtering renders the animal fit for food it will likewise render it, as a food, susceptible to uncleanness without the necessity of water or other liquid to moisten it.
(9) Wild beasts, like the gazelle and the hart, were not permitted to be offered as sacrifices.
(10) For it must be sprinkled upon the altar, v. supra 29a.
(11) Deut. XII, 24.
(12) V. Pes. 35a. The very sanctity of consecrated things renders them susceptible to uncleanness without the necessity of any moistening by water.
(13) V. Par. XI, 5.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 33b

Whatsoever requires immersion in the waters [of a mikweh] by decree of the Scribes1 will [through contact] render consecrated food unclean,2 and terumah invalid,3 but will leave common food or Second Tithe unaffected: so R. Meir. The Sages however regard Second Tithe to be affected.4 R. Shimi b. Ashi demurred: Is it really so? Perhaps the Sages differ with R. Meir only on the question of eating5 this Second Tithe, but there is no dispute between them on the question of coming into contact with the Second Tithe or of eating common food!6 And here [in our Mishnah] it is a question of coming into contact, for it reads: AND MAY BE EATEN BY HIM WHOSE HANDS HAVE NOT BEEN WASHED, and this might very well mean that we are dealing with the case of one person feeding another?7 - Rather, said R. Papa, here [in the Mishnah] we are dealing with hands that were unclean in the first degree, and the ruling is in accordance with the view of R. Simeon b. Eleazar. For it was taught: Hands which are unclean in the first degree can in no wise affect common food.8 R. Simeon b. Eleazar says in the name of R. Meir, Hands which are unclean in the first degree can affect common food, and hands which are unclean in the second degree can affect terumah.9 Does this mean to say that hands which are unclean in the first degree can affect common food only and not terumah? - Indeed no; it means, hands which are unclean in the first degree can affect even common food, but hands which are unclean in the second degree can affect terumah only but not common food. But is it possible for hands to be unclean in the first degree? - Yes. For we have learnt: If a person put his hands into a house stricken with leprosy, his hands become unclean in the first degree: so R. Akiba. The Sages however say, His hands become unclean in the second degree.10 Now all accept the principle that an entry by part of the person only is no entry,11 and the dispute between them is the extent of uncleanness imposed by the Rabbis upon the hands as a precaution against the entry of the whole person. One [R. Akiba] says that the Rabbis imposed upon the hands the same degree of uncleanness as upon the person himself;12 but the Sages say that they imposed upon the hands the usual degree of uncleanness attached to hands.13

But why do we not say that the ruling [in our Mishnah] accords with R. Akiba,14 who also holds that hands can be unclean in the first degree? - Because it may be that R. Akiba says so15 only with regard to terumah or consecrated food, since these are to be treated with strictness, but with regard to common food [he would agree that] they are unclean only in the second degree. But even so, be they unclean only in the second degree, have we not learnt that according to R. Akiba, whatever is unclean in the second degree can render common food unclean in the third degree?16 For we have learnt:17 On that same day18 R. Akiba expounded: It is written: And every earthen vessel, [whereinto any of them falleth, whatsoever is in it] shall be unclean [yitma].19 Now there is not written tame20 but yitma,21 which signifies that it will make others unclean. This teaches that a loaf which is unclean in the second degree will [by contact] render common food22 unclean in the third degree? - Perhaps this is the law only with regard to such uncleanness as declared by the Torah but not with regard to such uncleanness as decreed by the Rabbis.23 R. Eleazar said in the name of R. Hoshaia, Here [in our Mishnah] we are dealing with unconsecrated animals that were kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated things,24 and the ruling is not in accordance with R. Joshua's view. For we have learnt:25 R. Eliezer says. He who eats [food unclean in] the first [degree becomes unclean in the] first degree; [if it was unclean] in the second degree, [he becomes unclean in] the second degree; and [if it was unclean in] the third degree, [he becomes unclean in] the third degree. R. Joshua says, [He who eats food unclean in] the first or second degree [becomes unclean in] the second degree; [if it was unclean in] the third degree. [he becomes unclean in] the second degree with regard to consecrated things only,26 but not with regard to terumah.27 This28 applies only to common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah. And so only in the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah [is there a third degree of uncleanness], but not in the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated things, for he [R. Joshua] is of the opinion that in that latter case there cannot be a third degree of uncleanness.29

Why should we not say that our Mishnah deals

____________________
(1) Those cases enumerated in Shab. 13b for which the Rabbis decreed uncleanness in the second degree.
(2) The general principle is that unclean matter defiles anything which comes in contact with it and that the thing so defiled becomes unclean in a lesser degree than that which defiled it. Further it has been laid down that uncleanness in common food extends to the second degree, in terumah (v. Glos.) to the third degree, and in consecrated food to the fourth degree. The last degree of uncleanness in each category is itself unclean but cannot impart uncleanness and is called פסול, 'invalid'. As we are dealing with uncleanness in the second degree it will naturally render consecrated food unclean in the third degree.
(3) As the terumah is unclean in the third degree it cannot impart further uncleanness, and is therefore termed פסול
(4) Lit., 'they forbid in the case of Second Tithe'. Presumably the Second Tithe becomes unclean in the third degree by contact with that which was unclean in the second degree. On this assumption our Mishnah can be interpreted as dealing with animals bought with Second Tithe money.
(5) I.e., the Sages forbid a person whose hands are unwashed to eat Second Tithe.
(6) For all agree that a person with unwashed hands may eat common food and touch Second Tithe.
(7) Since the Mishnah does not say 'And one whose hands have not been washed may eat it', it is to be inferred that even a person with unwashed hands may feed another. And on the other hand, where the animal has been moistened by the blood, it may not be eaten by one whose hands are unwashed and similarly one with unwashed hands may not feed another. Hence the Mishnah forbids the touching of Second Tithe by one who is unclean in the second degree, which is contrary to all views.
(8) To render it unclean in the second degree.
(9) And make the terumah unclean in the third degree.
(10) Yad. III, I.
(11) Therefore the person himself is not rendered unclean, and on the same principle his hands too should not be rendered unclcan. The Rabbis, however, decreed that the latter be unclean as a precautionary measure against it being said: If hands when brought into a house stricken with leprosy remain clean, the body too should be clean!
(12) A person who enters a house afflicted with leprosy is rendered unclean in the first degree; v. Lev. Xlv, 46.
(13) I.e., uncleanness in the second degree.
(14) The Talmud endeavours to establish wherever possible the ruling of an anonymous Mishnah in accordance with the view of R. Akiba for it was by his direction and on his authority that the Tannaitic teachings were collected.
(15) That hands can be unclean in the first degree.
(16) Our Mishnah therefore would be in ent1re accord with R. Akiba.
(17) Sot. 27b, and Pes. 182.
(18) The day on which R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah was appointed head of the College. V. Ber. 28b.
(19) Lev. XI, 33. Heb. יטמא.
(20) טמא, meaning, 'it is unclean'.
(21) יטמא And R. Akiba argued that this word should not be read as yitma, for then it has the same meaning as tame, but should be read as yetamme, meaning, 'it shall render others unclean'. R. Akiba accordingly interprets the verse thus: If a dead reptile is suspended in the air-space of an earthenware vessel, the latter is thereby rendered unclean in the first degree, and whatever foodstuffs are in the vessel are unclean in the second degree; and since the text states יטמא in connection, with the latter it means that they will render others unclean in the third degree.
(22) For the verse contemplates every sort of food, common or consecrated.
(23) The uncleanness attached to unwashed hands is a Rabbinic enactment. It is suggested that, being merely Rabbinic in origin, the law with regard thereto is not so rigid, and so would not render others unclean in the third degree.
(24) It was not unusual for many to eat their ordinary food in the same strictness regarding the laws of uncleanness as applied to consecrated food, in order that whenever partaking of consecrated food they would be accustomed to the rules of cleanness appertaining thereto.
(25) Toh. II, 2.
(26) I.e., he would render consecrated food unclean in the third degree and the latter in turn could render other consecrated food unclean in the fourth degree.
(27) I.e., he would not by contact render terumah unclean in the third degree (i.e., invalid); he is nevertheless forbidden in his condition of uncleanness to eat terumah, v. infra.
(28) That with common food there can be a third degree of uncleanness.
(29) For he holds that the determ1nat1on to treat common food with the cleanness proper to consecrated food is of no effect; our Mishnah, therefore, which deals with an animal kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated animals, will agree with R. Eliezer but not with R. Joshua.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 34a

with unconsecrated animals kept in the cleanness proper to terumah and so it will be in accord with R. Joshua? - This cannot be, for our Mishnah speaks of the meat [of the animal], and if you say that it deals with [an animal kept in the cleanness proper to] terumah [it is unintelligible, for] is there such a thing as meat of terumah?1 You therefore say it deals with [an animal kept in the cleanness proper to] consecrated animals; [but it is likewise difficult, for] is there such a thing as a consecrated wild beast?2 - One might m1 stake meat for meat,3 but one could not mistake meat for produce.4

Ulla said: 'My colleagues say that the Mishnah deals with unconsecrated animals kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated animals, and the ruling is not in accordance with R. Joshua's view. But I say that it is in accordance with R. Joshua's view, for he merely states the stronger case:5 not only in the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated food, which is of greater sanctity, is there a third degree of uncleanness, but even in the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah there is also a third degree of uncleanness'.

Who is meant by 'my colleagues'? - It is Rabbah b. Bar Hana. For Rabbah b. Bar Hana said in the name of R. Johanan, On what lines did the discussion between R. Eliezer and R. Joshua run? Thus: R. Eliezer said to R. Joshua. We find [in one instance] that the eater is more unclean than the unclean food [he has eaten], for the carcass of a clean bird does not defile by ordinary contact6 and yet whilst in the gullet it renders the clothes unclean. Should we not then generally regard the eater at least in the same degree of uncleanness as the unclean food [that he has eaten]? And R. Joshua, [what would he reply to this]? - We must not draw any conclusions from the case of the carcass of a clean bird, for it is an anomaly. But argue thus: We find that the unclean food is more unclean than the eater thereof, for foodstuffs [can become unclean] from an egg's bulk [of unclean food], whereas the eater [of unclean food does not become unclean] unless he has eaten the size of two eggs thereof.7 Surely, then, we cannot generally regard the eater as unclean as the food? And R. Eliezer? - We must not draw any conclusions as to the degree of uncleanness from the specific quantities [required in each case]. Furthermore, according to your own argument, you are consistent when you say that he who eats food unclean in the first degree becomes unclean in the second degree; but why should he who eats that which is unclean in the second degree become likewise unclean in the second degree? - Said R. Joshua to him, Do we not find that foodstuffs unclean in the second degree can render other foodstuffs unclean in the second degree through the medium of a liquid?8 He [R. Eliezer] retorted, [Yes] but that liquid also becomes unclean in the first degree.9 For we have learnt: The [degree of uncleanness] which renders terumah invalid10 will [by contact] render liquids unclean in the first degree, with the exception of a tebul yom.11 Furthermore, why should he who eats that which is unclean in the third degree become unclean in the second degree? To this R. Joshua replied: I, too, only said so in the case of [common food kept in the cleanness proper to] terumah since [it has been taught that] whatsoever is considered clean for terumah

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(1) Certainly not. Hence our Mishnah cannot refer to food kept in the cleanness of terumah.
(2) Of which the Mishnah also speaks.
(3) Therefore, as a proper precaution against the time when he must eat consecrated meat (i.e., the flesh of a sacrifice) a person would keep all the meat in his house, even the meat of a wild beast, in the cleanness proper to consecrated meat.
(4) Terumah is an offering of produce and not of meat, so that a priest would eat his ordinary produce in a state of cleanness in order to be so accustomed for terumah, but not his meat. The latter therefore cannot be regarded in law as anything else than ordinary meat even though the owner actually keeps it in the cleanness proper to terumah.
(5) Lit., 'it is not necessary', 'it goes without saying'.
(6) Lit., 'externally'. For the unique law with regard to the uncleanness of a clean bird v. supra p. 103, n. 1.
(7) Lit., 'the quantity of half of half a loaf', equivalent to the size of two eggs. V. 'Er. 82b.
(8) If food unclean in the second degree comes into contact with other food which has moisture or a liquid upon it, the latter food will be rendered unclean in the second degree. Strictly the process is this: the unclean food renders the liquid or moisture unclean in the first degree (v. infra) and the latter renders the second food unclean in the second degree.
(9) So that according to your argument one who eats that which is unclean in the second degree should become unclean in the first degree! Of course R. Joshua never intended to make any inference from the liquid in that case, for he concedes that liquids are exceptional as they so readily contract uncleanness, but only from the foodstuff. (Rashi). V. however Tosaf. ad loc.
(10) I.e., the second degree of uncleanness.
(11) I.e., one who immersed himself in a mikweh in the daytime but technically does not become clean until after sunset. He is regarded in the condition of unclean in the second degree and therefore renders terumah invalid, but unlike others which are unclean in the second degree, he does not by his contact render liquids unclean in the first degree. V. Par. VIII, 7.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 34b

is considered unclean for consecrated things.1

R. Zera said in the name of R. Assi who reported it in the name of R. Johanan who reported it in the name of R. Jannai: He who eats common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated food which was unclean in the third degree, becomes himself unclean in the second degree with regard to consecrated things [only]. R. Zera now raised this objection before R. Assi: [It was taught above].2 '[If it was unclean in] the third degree. [he becomes unclean] in the second degree with regard to consecrated things only, but not with regard to terumah. This applies only to common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah'. And so only in the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah [is there a third degree of uncleanness], but not in the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated things.3 - He replied: He merely stated the stronger case.4 But has it not been stated [above in the name of R. Johanan]: 'I, too, only said so in the case of [common food kept in the cleanness proper to] terumah'?5 - Amoraim disagree as to R. Johanan's view.

Ulla said: He who eats common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah which was unclean in the third degree becomes unfit to eat terumah. What does he teach us? We have already been taught above: '[If it was unclean in] the third degree, [he becomes unclean] in the second degree with regard to consecrated things only but does not become unclean in the second degree with regard to terumah. This applies only to common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah'. Now it says that [with regard to terumah] he does not become unclean in the second degree, but presumably [he becomes unclean] in the third degree.6 - From this passage I might have thought that he neither becomes unclean in the second degree nor in the third degree, but merely on account of the fact that with regard to consecrated things he becomes unclean in the second degree does it also say with regard to terumah he does not become unclean in the second degree; he [Ulla] therefore teaches us [that he does become unclean in the third degree].

R. Hamnuna raised this objection against Ulla: [We have learnt]:7 Common food, unclean in the first degree, is itself unclean and renders unclean;8 that which is unclean in the second degree renders invalid8 but not unclean; and that which is unclean in the third degree may be eaten [even if it is] a pottage containing ingredients of terumah.9 Now if you are right in saying that [he who eats common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah which was unclean in the third degree] becomes unfit to eat terumah, would we then allow [a priest] to eat that which renders him unfit [for eating terumah]?10 - He replied. Drop the question of the pottage containing ingredients of terumah

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(1) V. infra 35a and Hag. 18b. Accordingly common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah that was unclean in the third degree is deemed to be unclean in the second degree with regard to consecrated things; hence whosoever eats it becomes unclean in the second degree with regard to consecrated things. And this is nothing strange, as we find that foodstuffs unclean in the second degree can render others, too, unclean in the second degree through the medium of a liquid. Now it is evident from these final words of R. Joshua that when he stated above in the original Baraitha, 'This applies only to common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah', he thereby definitely intended to deny the existence of a third degree of uncleanness in common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated things; for if he stated it merely as his explanation for the ruling he gave, namely, that he who ate common food unclean in the third degree became unclean in the second degree (which would be identical with the final words of R. Joshua as given here), then R. Eliezer's final question 'Furthermore, why etc.' is unintelligible, as he already knew R. Joshua's reason. It is therefore established that Rabbah b. Bar Hana, who reported this discussion, was of the opinion that according to R. Joshua there could be no third degree of uncleanness in the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated things; and this view corresponds with that attributed by Ulla to 'My colleagues'. See Rashi and Tosaf. ad loc.
(2) Supra 33b, p. 182.
(3) This statement clearly contradicts R. Assi's view as reported by R. Zera.
(4) V. p. 183, i.e., it is so obvious that there is a third degree of uncleanness in the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated things that it need not even be mentioned.
(5) So that we have contradictory statements each reported in the name of R. Johanan as to the true view of R. Joshua.
(6) And being unclean in the third degree he surely is unfit to eat terumah, hence what is the point of Ulla's teaching?
(7) Toh. II, 3.
(8) The terms 'unclean' and 'invalid' are here used in a specific and technical sense; the former signifying, 'that which is itself unclean and will also by contact defile other food', the latter signifying, 'that which is itself unclean but will not defile other food'.
(9) This common food, since it contains ingredients of terumah, must have been kept in the cleanness proper to terumah (v. Rashi and Tosaf. ad loc.), and although unclean in the third degree may nevertheless be eaten by a priest.
(10) In the first place it is wrong for a priest at any time to render himself unclean, v. Yoma 80b; and in the second place the priest is definitely forbidden to eat the terumah contained in the pottage, for as soon as he partakes of the pottage he is rendered unfit for terumah.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 35a

because in the time it takes to eat half a loaf there is not consumed an olive's bulk [of terumah].1

R. Jonathan said in the name of Rabbi, He who eats terumah which is unclean in the third degree is forbidden to eat terumah,2 but is permitted to touch it. It is truly necessary to have this statement of R. Jonathan as well as Ulla's. For from Ulla's statement above I should have thought that the ruling applied only to the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah, but in the case of real terumah [I might have said that] he is even forbidden to touch it; it is therefore necessary to have R. Jonathan's statement. And from R. Jonathan's statement alone I should have thought that the ruling applied only to the case of real terumah, but in the case of common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah [I might have said that] he is even permitted to eat it; therefore both statements are necessary.

R. Isaac b. Samuel b. Martha was sitting before R. Nahman and said: He who eats common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated things which was unclean in the third degree is clean, and he may eat consecrated food, for the only thing which will render consecrated food unclean in the fourth degree is real consecrated food3 [which was unclean in the third degree].

Rami b. Hama raised an objection. [It has been taught above]: '[If it was unclean in] the third degree, [he becomes unclean] in the second degree with regard to consecrated things only, but does not become unclean in the second degree with regard to terumah. This applies only to common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah'. Now why should this be so? This [food which is unclean in the third degree] is not real consecrated food?4 - He replied. Drop the question of terumah, since what is considered clean for terumah may yet be considered unclean for consecrated things.5 Whence do you gather this? - From [the following Mishnah] which we learnt: The clothes of an 'am ha-arez6 are regarded as midras7 for the pharisees;8 the clothes of the pharisees are regarded as midras for those who eat terumah; the clothes of those who eat terumah are regarded as midras for those who partake of consecrated food. Thereupon Raba raised this point: You are dealing, are you not, with midras uncleanness? But the law as to midras uncleanness is quite exceptional,

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(1) A person is liable for eating an olive's bulk of terumah whilst being in a state of uncleanness only if it has been consumed within the time normally taken to eat half a loaf of the size of four eggs. In this pottage, however, the admixture of terumah is of so small a quantity that in the above-mentioned time he will certainly not have consumed an olive's bulk of terumah. This being the case, this pottage would not be kept in the cleanness proper to terumah; it is simply common food, hence it cannot be rendered unclean in the third degree.
(2) Until he will have rendered himself clean by immersion in a mikweh. The statements of R. Jonathan and Ulla really amount to the same thing, save that the former deals with actual terumah and the latter with common food kept in the cleanness of terumah.
(3) E.g., sacrificial meat or the loaves of a Thank-offering, but not common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated things and most certainly not common food kept in the cleanness proper to terumah.
(4) Nevertheless, it is said, that one who eats it is not only unfit for eating consecrated food but is even unclean in the second degree!
(5) So that terumah which is unclean in the third degree is considered unclean in the second degree with regard to consecrated food, and therefore he who eats it is certainly unfit to eat consecrated food.
(6) V. Glos.
(7) Heb. מדרס. The degree of uncleanness arising when an unclean person of those mentioned in Lev. XV, 4 and 25 sits or treads upon or leans with the body against an object, provided that it is usual to treat the object in such a way. The object then suffers midras uncleanness and can through contact render men and vessels unclean.
(8) Here meaning those who eat their ordinary food in a state of levitical cleanness.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 35b

for it is feared that his wife when in a menstruous condition sat upon these clothes;1 with regard to produce, however, the rule2 does not apply.3 - R. Isaac on the other hand says that the rule2 applies to the case of produce too.

R. Jeremiah of Difti raised this objection: Do you say that the rule applies to the case of produce too? Surely we have learnt: If [an 'am ha-arez] said: 'I have set aside in this [barrel of terumah w1 ne] one quarter log for a consecrated purpose', he is believed, and the terumah does not render the consecrated wine unclean.4 Now if you are right in saying that [the rule that] what is considered clean for terumah may yet be considered unclean for consecrated things [applies to the case of produce too], should not the terumah [in this barrel] render the consecrated wine unclean? - He replied: You are dealing, are you not, where the unclean is together [with the clean]? But in such cases the law is exceptional, for since he is believed with regard to the consecrated portion he is to be believed also with regard to the terumah portion.

R. Huna b. Nathan raised this objection: [We have learnt:] Common food which is unclean in the second degree renders [by contact] common liquids unclean [in the first degree], and renders those who eat terumah unfit. If it is unclean in the third degree. It renders consecrated liquids unclean [in the first degree], and renders those who eat consecrated food unfit. This applies only to common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated things!5 - This is a subject of dispute between Tannaim.6 For it was taught: Common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated food is treated as common food.7 R. Eleazar son of R. Zadok says. It is treated as terumah, that is, two stages are unclean and one stage invalid.8

R. SIMEON SAYS, IT HAS BEEN RENDERED SUSCEPTIBLE TO UNCLEANNESS BY THE SLAUGHTERING. R. Assi said that R. Simeon was of the opinion that only the slaughtering renders an animal susceptible to uncleanness but not the blood.9 Shall we say that the following interpretation supports his view? [We have learnt:] R. SIMEON SAYS. IT HAS BEEN RENDERED SUSCEPTIBLE TO UNCLEANNESS BY THE SLAUGHTERING. It means, does it not, by the slaughtering and not by the blood? - No, it means, even by the slaughtering. Come and hear: R. Simeon said to the Rabbis, 'Is it the blood that renders the animal susceptible to uncleanness? Surely it is the slaughtering'! - This is what he said to them: 'Is it only the blood which renders the animal susceptible to uncleanness? Surely the slaughtering also renders it susceptible to uncleanness!'

Come and hear: [We have learnt:] R. Simeon says: The blood of a dead [animal]10 does not render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness.11 Now it is to be inferred from this, is it not, that the blood of a slaughtered animal will render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness? - No, the inference to be drawn is that the blood of a slain12 animal will render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness. Then what is the law with regard to the blood of a slaughtered animal? [Will you say that] it does not render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness? If so, he [R. Simeon] should rather have stated his view with regard to the blood of a slaughtered animal,13 and it would have been self-evident with regard to the blood of a dead animal! - It was necessary for him to state his view with regard to the blood of a dead animal,13 for I might have argued: What is the difference whether a human being or the angel of death slays it?14 It was therefore necessary to state it.

Come and hear: [It was taught:] R. Simeon says: The blood from a wound [in an animal] does not render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness. Is not the inference from this that the blood of a slaughtered animal renders susceptible? - No, the inference to be drawn is that the blood of a slain animal renders susceptible. Then what is the law with regard to the blood of a slaughtered animal? [Will you say that] it will not render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness? If so, he should rather have stated his view13 with regard to the blood of a slaughtered animal, and it would have been self-evident with regard to the blood from a wound! - It was necessary for him to state his view with regard to the blood from a wound, for I might have argued: What difference can there be [with regard to the blood] whether the animal was slain completely or partially?15

Why is it that the blood of a slain [animal] will render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness? Because it is written: And drink the blood of the slain.16 Then the same should be the case with the blood of a slaughtered animal, for it is written: Thou shalt pour it out upon the earth as water?17 - The latter verse is stated in order to permit for general use the blood of consecrated animals which were rendered unfit [for sacrifice].18

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(1) This being a frequent and common source of uncleanness, greater precaution is therefore necessary with regard to consecrated things, so that clothes which are deemed clean for terumah may yet be deemed unclean for consecrated purposes.
(2) That whatsoever is deemed clean for terumah may yet be deemed unclean for consecrated things.
(3) For otherwise even clean terumah should render consecrated food unclean!
(4) V. Hag. 24b where it is taught that the word of an 'am ha-arez is accepted with regard to the cleanness of consecrated wine at all times of the year, but with regard to the cleanness of terumah wine only at special seasons in the year. Where however consecrated wine is mixed together with terumah wine (as here), the 'am ha-arez is believed with regard to the cleanness of the entire barrel at all times of the year.
(5) Toh. II, 6. This Mishnah clearly teaches that even common food kept in the cleanness proper to consecrated food (and not only real consecrated food) which was unclean in the third degree renders consecrated food unclean in the fourth degree, contra R. Isaac.
(6) R. Isaac will accept the view of R. Eleazar b. R. Zadok of the following Baraitha.
(7) And there does not exist with regard to it a third degree of uncleanness.
(8) I.e., the first and second degrees of uncleanness are each unclean, for each can still pass on its uncleanness, but the third degree is only invalid for it cannot pass on its uncleanness.
(9) I.e., the blood of a slaughtered animal will in no circumstances render any foodstuff susceptible to uncleanness.
(10) Which died a natural death (Rashi). Tosaf. suggests that it refers to the blood of a human corpse.
(11) Maksh. VI, 6.
(12) I.e., killed, but not according to the ritual method of slaughtering.
(13) That it cannot render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness.
(14) And if R. Simeon holds that the blood of an animal killed by a man will render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness then he would surely hold the same with the blood of an animal that died a natural death, in other words, slain by the angel of death.
(15) The law should be the same with regard to the blood whether it comes from an animal completely slain, i.e., dead, or partially slain, i.e., wounded.
(16) Num. XXIII, 24. The use of the verb, 'drink', in connection with blood signifies that it is regarded like other liquids and therefore will render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness.
(17) Deut. XII, 16. This verse suggests that blood is accounted as water.
(18) By reason of a blemish and have been redeemed; they are now regarded as common food, and their blood may be put to general use like water, except that it may not be eaten.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 36a

For I might have argued that since it is forbidden to shear the wool [of these consecrated animals] or to put them to any work,1 the blood would have to be buried [and not be used for any purpose]; we are therefore taught that it is not so.

A Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael taught: The verse: 'And drink the blood of the slain', excludes blood which comes out in a gush2 from rendering seeds susceptible to uncleanness.

Our Rabbis taught: If a man while slaughtering splashed blood on to a pumpkin.3 Rabbi says: It becomes thereby susceptible to uncleanness. R. Hiyya says: It is a matter of doubt. R. Oshaia remarked: Since Rabbi says that it is susceptible to uncleanness and R. Hiyya says that it is a matter of doubt, on whose view should we rely? Let us then rely upon the view of R. Simeon who has stated that only slaughtering will render [an animal] susceptible to uncleanness but not the blood.4

R. Papa said: It is agreed by all that where the blood remained [on the pumpkin] from the beginning [of the slaughtering] unto the end there is no dispute, for all hold it is rendered thereby susceptible to uncleanness.5 The dispute arises only where the blood was wiped off between the cutting of the first and second organs; Rabbi holds that the term shechitah applies to the entire process of slaughtering from beginning to end, so that here the blood [upon the pumpkin] is considered as the blood of a slaughtered animal; R. Hiyya, however, holds that the term shechitah applies to the last act of the slaughtering only, so that here the blood [upon the pumpkin] is considered as blood from a wound. And what did he mean by saying: 'It is a matter of doubt'? He meant, The matter hangs in doubt until the end of the slaughtering, that is to say, if the blood is still upon the pumpkin at the end of the slaughtering it will render it susceptible to uncleanness, otherwise it will not. But then what did R. Oshaia mean by saying: 'Let us then rely upon the view of R. Simeon'? [Are they not at variance, for] according to R. Simeon blood does not render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness and according to R. Hiyya it does? - They are nevertheless in agreement where the blood was wiped off [during the slaughtering] for according to this Master it will not render susceptible to uncleanness and so too according to the other Master. The opinion therefore of Rabbi on this point stands alone, and [it is established that] the opinion of one [authority] does not prevail over the [agreed] opinion of two.

R. Ashi said: The expression, 'It is a matter of doubt', means that it will never be settled; for R. Hiyya was in doubt, in the case where the blood was wiped off during 'the slaughtering, whether the term shechitah applies to the entire process of slaughtering from beginning to end or only to the last act of slaughtering, so that by saying: 'It is a matter of doubt', he meant that it must not be eaten and yet it must not be burnt.6 But then what is meant by the suggestion, 'Let us then rely upon the view of R. Simeon'? [Are they not at variance, for] R. Simeon holds that blood does not render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness, whereas R. Hiyya is in doubt about it? - They are nevertheless in agreement in their views regarding 'burning', for they are both of the opinion that it is not to be burnt. The opinion of Rabbi therefore on this point stands alone, and the opinion of one Rabbi will not prevail over the [agreed] opinion of two.7

R. Simeon b. Lakish raised the following question: [If] the dry portion of a meal-offering8 [were to become unclean], would it transmit uncleanness up to the first and second degrees or not? Is the conception of sacred esteem effectual only to the extent of rendering it invalid but not of enabling it to transmit uncleanness up to the first and second degrees or is there no such distinction? R. Eleazar said: Come and hear: [It is written]. All food therein which may be eaten, [that on which water cometh, shall be unclean],9 that is to say, food which has been moistened by water is susceptible to uncleanness, but food which has not been moistened by water is not. - Are you suggesting then that R. Simeon b. Lakish does not accept the rule that food must first be moistened by water?10 - Indeed the question that R. Simeon b. Lakish raised was as 'follows: Is [food rendered susceptible to uncleanness by] sacred esteem on the same footing as food moistened by water or not? And R. Eleazar suggested an answer on the basis of the superfluous verses, arguing thus: Since it is written: But if water be put upon the seed,11 what need is there for the verse: 'All food therein which may be eaten, [that on which water cometh]'?

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(1) V. Bek. 15a.
(2) I.e., the life-blood which spurts out during the killing of the animal. The phrase, 'blood of the slain', is interpreted as referring only to such blood as flows from the animal after it has been slain, i.e., after the life-blood has been run out, but not to the stream of blood which spurts out during the act of killing, at which time the animal is still alive. So Rashi Ker. 22a, q.v. and Tosaf. here s.v. ודם. But see Rashi here s.v. פרט. This ruling, says Tosaf., does not apply to the case of an animal ritually slaughtered.
(3) Of terumah.
(4) So that R. Simeon and R. Hiyya are more or less of the same view, and this view of the two Rabbis would prevail over the individual view of Rabbi.
(5) For it is the blood of a slaughtered animal.
(6) Where the blood had been wiped away from the terumah foodstuff (v. supra p. 192, n. 4) before the end of the slaughtering and then the foodstuff came into contact with uncleanness, Terumah which has been rendered unclean, may not be eaten, has has to be burnt.
(7) In the ed. are added these words: 'This is what he means: In such a case as this it is a matter of doubt; therefore it must not be eaten nor must it be burnt'. These words are an obvious addition and are unnecessary and Rashi also declares them to be without purpose.
(8) I.e., that part of the flour which was not moistened by the oil. The question raised by R. Simeon h. Lakish is whether or not consecrated food, not moistened by water or any other liquid but rendered susceptible to uncleanness by reason of sacred esteem, is on all fours with ordinary food rendered susceptible to uncleanness by means of water or other liquids.
(9) Lev. XI, 34.
(10) In order to be susceptible to uncleanness. It is specifically so ordained in the Torah.
(11) Ibid. 38.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 36b

It serves, does it not, to exclude sacred esteem?1 - Not at all. One verse2 states the rule with reference to uncleanness emanating from a corpse, the other verse with reference to uncleanness emanating from a dead reptile. And it is necessary to have both verses. For if the rule were stated only with reference to uncleanness emanating from a corpse. [I should have said that] in that case only was it necessary for the food to be first moistened by water, [for the law regarding corpse uncleanness is not so rigorous], inasmuch as a lentil's bulk of a corpse will not convey uncleanness; but with regard to reptile uncleanness, inasmuch as a lentil's bulk of a dead reptile will convey uncleanness,3 might have said that it was not necessary for the food to be first moistened by water. And on the other hand, if the rule were stated only with reference to uncleanness emanating from a reptile. [I should have said that] in that case only was it necessary for the food to be first moistened by water, [for the law regarding reptile uncleanness is not so rigorous], inasmuch as a reptile does not render a person unclean for seven days; but with regard to corpse uncleanness, inasmuch as a corpse will render a person unclean for seven days. I might have said it was not necessary for the food to be moistened by water. Both verses are therefore necessary.

R. Joseph raised this objection: R. SIMEON SAYS, IT HAS BEEN RENDERED SUSCEPTIBLE TO UNCLEANNESS BY THE SLAUGHTERING, presumably SUSCEPTIBLE TO UNCLEANNESS means that [when unclean] it would transmit uncleanness up to the first and second degrees. But why? It is not food moistened by water?3 - Abaye replied: It was ordained by the Rabbis that it [the slaughtering] shall have the same effect [upon the animal] as though it had been moistened by water.4

R. Zera said: Come and hear: [It was taught:] If a man gathered grapes for the wine press. Shammai says, they are susceptible to uncleanness;5 but Hillel says, they are not. Eventually Hillel acquiesced in the view of Shammai.6 But why? It is not food mo6 stened by water?7 - Abaye replied: It was ordained by the Rabbis that it [the grape juice] shall have the same effect [upon the grapes] as though they had been moistened by water. R. Joseph thereupon said to Abaye. 'When I cited our Mishnah, IT HAS BEEN RENDERED SUSCEPTIBLE TO UNCLEANNESS BY THE SLAUGHTERING, you replied that it was ordained that it [the slaughtering] shall have the same effect as though there was a moistening by water, and when R. Zera cited another case you also replied that it was ordained that it [the grape juice] shall have the same effect as though there was a moistening by water. [You might then just as well answer] the question raised by R. Simeon b. Lakish and say that it was ordained that it [sacred esteem] shall have the same effect as though there was a moistening by water!' - He replied: Do you think that R. Simeon b. Lakish raised the question as to whether it8 was to be held in a state of doubt or not? He raised the question as to whether it was to be committed to the flames or not!9

It follows that the conception of sacred esteem is indicated in the Torah;10 where? Shall I say in the verse: And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten?11 Now what rendered this flesh susceptible to uncleanness? Shall I say it was the blood? [But this cannot be] for R. Hiyya b. Abba reported in the name of R. Johanan: Whence do we know that the blood of a consecrated animal does not render food susceptible to uncleanness? From the verse: Thou shalt not eat it, thou shalt pour it out upon the earth as water,12 which teaches that blood which is poured out as water renders food susceptible to uncleanness, but blood which is not poured out as water does not.13 Was it then the other liquid14 found in the slaughter-house that rendered the flesh susceptible to uncleanness? [But this also cannot be the case] for R. Jose b. Hanina taught that the liquids in the slaughterhouse [of the Temple court] are not only clean but will not even render any food susceptible to uncleanness. Moreover you cannot suggest that this passage refers to the blood only, for it speaks of liquids!15 You must therefore say that [this verse proves that] the flesh was rendered susceptible to uncleanness by sacred esteem! But perhaps the verse is to be explained as suggested by Rab Judah in the name of Samuel! For Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: It might refer to the case where a cow consecrated for a peace-offering was passed through a stream16 and slaughtered immediately after, so that the water was still dripping from it!17 Rather it is to be proved from the latter part of the verse: And as for the flesh,18 which serves to include wood and frankincense.19 Now are wood and frankincense edible [so as to be in the same category as foodstuffs]? It must therefore be that sacred esteem puts them in the same category as foodstuffs and renders them susceptible to uncleanness. So in all cases sacred esteem will render foodstuffs susceptible to uncleanness.

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(1) That it does not render consecrated food susceptible to uncleanness to the same extent as water does but only in so far as to render it invalid.
(2) Verse 38. Actually this verse also speaks of the uncleanness of a reptile, but as it is unnecessary for this purpose, in view of v. 34, it is taken to refer to the uncleanness of a corpse.
(3) It is here stated nevertheless that by the mere slaughtering, without moistening by water or other liquid, food can transmit uncleanness to the first and second degrees; the same, it is suggested, is the case with sacred esteem, thus providing the answer to the question raised by R. Simeon b. Lakish.
(4) Consecrated meat, however, in this condition would not be condemned to be burnt, for it is unclean merely by Rabbinic and not by Biblical law.
(5) For the grapes have been moistened by the juice which oozed from them. Strictly this juice should not render anything susceptible to uncleanness, for the owner had no desire nor did he look forward with eagerness for it; Shammai, however, as a precautionary measure, puts this case on a par with the case where the juice was acceptable to the owner, when it is agreed by all that the juice would certainly render food suscept1ble to uncleanness.
(6) V. Shab. 25a.
(7) For the juice since it is undesirable cannot be said to have satisfied the requirement of the law.
(8) Sc. consecrated fond which came into contact with this unclean consecrated food which had been rendered susceptible to uncleanness by sacred esteem.
(9) In other words R. Simeon b. Lakish desired to know whether by biblical law sacred esteem enabled consecrated food to transmit uncleanness, so that the food so rendered unclean would be condemned to be burnt.
(10) For R Simeon b. Lakish has no doubt at all that consecrated food which was unclean, having been rendered susceptible to uncleanness by sacred esteem, must be burnt.
(11) Lev. VII, 19.
(12) Deut, XII, 24.
(13) And the blood of consecrated animals is required for sprinkling upon the altar.
(14) Sc. water,
(15) In the plural, referring to blood and water.
(16) This was usually done in order that the hide of the animal be the more easily flayed.
(17) The flesh was thus rendered susceptible to uncleanness in the ordinary way, i.e., by water.
(18) Lev. VII, 19.
(19) That each is capable of being rendered unclean like ordinary foodstuffs,

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 37a

Now1 the question [to R. Simeon b. Lakish] is this: Is the conception of sacred esteem effectual to the extent only of rendering the matter invalid but not of enabling it to transmit uncleanness up to the first and second degrees, or is there no such distinction? The question remains undecided.

MISHNAH. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED A DYING ANIMAL,2 R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL SAYS. [THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID] UNLESS IT JERKED ITS FORELEG AND ITS HIND LEG. R. ELIEZER SAYS, IT IS SUFFICIENT IF IT SPURTED [THE BLOOD]. R. SIMEON SAID. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED [A DYING ANIMAL] BY NIGHT AND EARLY THE FOLLOWING MORNING FOUND THE SIDES [OF THE THROAT] FULL OF BLOOD, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. FOR THIS PROVES THAT IT SPURTED [THE BLOOD], WHICH IS SUFFICIENT ACCORDING TO R. ELIEZER'S VIEW. THE SAGES SAY, [THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID] UNLESS IT JERKED EITHER ITS FORELEG OR ITS HIND LEG, OR IT MOVED ITS TAIL TO AND FRO; AND THIS IS THE TEST BOTH WITH REGARD TO LARGE AND SMALL ANIMALS.3 IF A SMALL ANIMAL STRETCHED OUT ITS FORELEG [AT THE END OF THE SLAUGHTERING]. BUT DID NOT WITHDRAW IT, [THE SLAUGHTERING] IS INVALID. FOR THIS WAS BUT AN INDICATION OF THE EXPIRATION OF ITS LIFE.4 THESE RULES APPLY ONLY TO THE CASE OF AN ANIMAL WHICH WAS BELIEVED TO BE DYING. BUT IF IT WAS BELIEVED TO BE SOUND, EVEN THOUGH IT DID NOT SHOW ANY OF THESE SIGNS, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID.

GEMARA. How do you know that a dying animal [which was slaughtered]5 is permitted to be eaten? (But why should you assume that it is forbidden? Because it is written: These are the living things which ye may eat,6 that is to say, that which can live you may eat, but that which cannot live you may not eat, and a dying animal cannot live.)7 [We know it from here.] Since the Divine Law ordains that nebelah8 is forbidden to be eaten, it follows that a dying animal is permitted; for if you were to say that a dying animal is forbidden, [then it will be asked:] if it is already forbidden whilst still alive, is there any doubt after death?9 But perhaps the term nebelah includes a dying animal!10 This cannot be, for it is written: And if any beast, of which ye may eat, die, he that touches the carcass [nebelah] thereof shall be unclean until the even,11 that is to say, when it is dead the Divine Law terms it nebelah, but whilst still alive it is not termed nebelah.12 But perhaps [the term] of nebelah, I still maintain, includes the dying animal,13 but whereas the animal is still alive [one who partakes of it transgresses] a positive law,14 after death [one who partakes of it transgresses] a prohibition [as well]!15 Rather we must derive it from here. Since the Divine Law ordains that trefah16 is forbidden to be eaten, it follows that a dying animal is permitted; for if you were to Say that a dying animal is forbidden, [then it will be asked:] if a dying animal which is not physically deficient is forbidden, is there any doubt about a trefah?17 But perhaps the term trefah includes a dying animal, [yet trefah was expressly prohibited] to teach that one [who partakes thereof] transgresses a positive law as well as a prohibition!18 If so, wherefore does the Divine law expressly prohibit nebelah? For if while the animal is yet alive one [who partakes of it] transgresses a positive law as well as a prohibition, is there any doubt after death? But perhaps the term nebelah includes a trefah and also a dying animal, and the law now provides that one [who partakes of a dying trefah animal after its death] transgresses two prohibitions and one positive law!19 - Rather derive it from here. It is written: And the fat of that which dieth of itself [nebelah], and the fat of that which is torn of beasts [trefah], may be used for any other service, but you shall in no wise eat of it.20 And a Master said: For what purpose is this stated?21 The Torah says: Let the prohibition of nebelah come and be superimposed upon the prohibition of fat, and likewise let the prohibition of trefah come and be superimposed upon the prohibition of fat.22

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(1) I.e., having established that the conception of sacred esteem is Biblical to the extent of burning the consecrated foodstuffs that have been rendered unclean on its account.
(2) I.e., an animal which is dangerously sick. It is feared that the animal might have died before the slaughtering was completed, hence it is necessary to ascertain, by means of the tests of vitality suggested, that the animal was still alive up to the end of the slaughtering.
(3) By 'large animals' is meant oxen, by 'small animals' sheep and goats.
(4) And not a sign of vitality. In the case of large animals such a movement would be regarded as a sign of vitality; v. Gemara.
(5) Even though it jerked its limbs after the slaughtering.
(6) Lev. XI, 2.
(7) So there is good reason for holding that a dying animal, even if slaughtered, may not be eaten. The first question therefore remains.
(8) V. Glos. The prohibition is stated in Deut. XIV, 21.
(9) Since generally a nebelah is in a lingering dying condition previous to its death. So that the 'law prohibiting nebelah would be superfluous.
(10) Therefore he who partakes of a dying animal (even if ritually slaughtered) transgresses the implied prohibition of Lev. XI, 2, and also the express prohibition of Deut. XIV, 21.
(11) Lev. XI, 39.
(12) The position now is that it is proved that a dying animal is permitted, for if forbidden then the prohibition of nebelah is superfluous.
(13) I.e., a dying animal is forbidden, and yet the prohibition of nebelah is not superfluous.
(14) For the contravention of a prohibition implied by a positive law is regarded as an infringement of a positive commandment.
(15) I.e., one transgresses the express prohibition of Deut. XIV, 21, and also the positive law (i.e., the implied prohibition) of Lev. XI, 2.
(16) V. Glos. The prohibition is stated in Ex. XXII, 30.
(17) So that the verse prohibiting trefah would be superfluous.
(18) The positive law of Lev. XI, 2, and the prohibition of Ex. XXII, 30.
(19) The positive law (i.e., the implied prohibition) with regard to a dying animal derived from Lev. XI, 2, and the prohibition of trefah from Ex. XXII, 30, and of nebelah from Deut. XIV, 21.
(20) Lev. VII, 24.
(21) I.e., the latter part of the verse: But you shall in no wise eat of it. There is a general prohibition of all fat in Lev. III, 17.
(22) So that one who eats the fat of a trefah transgresses two prohibitions (sc. the prohibition of fat and the prohibition of trefah), and likewise one who eats the fat of a nebelah.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 37b

Now if you were to say that the term trefah includes a dying animal, the Divine Law then should have ordained: 'And the fat of nebelah may be used for any other service1 and the fat of trefah you shall in no wise eat'. And I should have argued that if while the animal is yet alive the prohibition of trefah2 is superimposed upon the prohibition of the fat,is there any question of this after death?3 But since the Divine Law expressly stated nebelah in the verse, it follows that the term trefah does not include a dying animal.4 Mar son of R. Ashi demurred: Perhaps in truth the term trefah does include a dying animal. And if you ask: Why then does the Divine Law expressly state nebelah.? [I reply,] It refers only to a case of nebelah which was not preceded by the animal being in a dying state, as in the case where the animal was [suddenly] cut into two!5 - Even in that case it is impossible for the animal to have died without first being in a dying state for the short while, before the greater portion of the animal had been cut through. Alternatively I can argue thus: If it is so,6 the verse should have stated: 'And the fat of nebelah and of trefah'. Wherefore is the word 'fat' repeated? [To teach you that] in this case [sc. trefah] there is no distinction between the fat and the flesh,7 but there is another in which there is a distinction between the fat and the flesh, and that is the case of a dying animal.8

Alternatively we can derive it9 from the following: [It is written,] Then said I, 'Ah Lord God! behold my soul hath not been polluted for from my youth up even till now have I not eaten of that which dieth of itself [nebelah], or is torn of beasts [trefah]; neither came there abhorred flesh into my mouth'.10 [And it has been interpreted as follows:] 'Behold my soul hath not been polluted', for I did not allow impure thoughts to enter my mind during the day so as to lead to pollution at night. 'For from my youth up even till now have I not eaten of nebelah or trefah', for I have never eaten of the flesh of an animal concerning which it had been exclaimed: 'Slaughter it! Slaughter it'!11 'Neither came there abhorred flesh into my mouth', for I did not eat the flesh of an animal which a Sage pronounced to be permitted.12 In the name of R. Nathan it was reported that this means: I did not eat of an animal from which the priestly dues13 had not been set apart. Now if you say that the flesh of a dying animal [which was slaughtered] is permitted to be eaten, then in this lay the pre-eminence of Ezekiel,14 but if you say that it is forbidden to be eaten, wherein lay the pre-eminence of Ezekiel?

What do you call 'a dying animal'? - Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: If when it is made to stand it does not remain upstanding, [it is a sign that it is dying]. R. Hanina b. Shelemia said in the name of Rab, [And this is so] even if it can bite logs of wood.15 Rami b. Ezekiel said: Even if it can bite tree trunks. This was the version taught in Sura; in Pumbeditha, however, it was taught as follows: What do you call 'a dying animal'? - Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: If when it is made to stand it does not remain upstanding, [it is a sign that it is dying], even though it can bite logs of wood. Rami b. Ezekiel said: Even though it can bite tree trunks.

Samuel once met Rab's disciples and asked them: 'What did Rab teach you with regard to [the signs of] a dying animal'? - They replied: 'This is what Rab said:

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(1) This part of the verse is necessary to teach that the forbidden fat of a nebelah will not render anything unclean. V. Pes. 23a
(2) This means here a dying animal, since it is assumed for the present that the term trefah includes a dying animal.
(3) Thus rendering nebelah in this verse superfluous.
(4) The position therefore is that a dying animal is permitted when slaughtered, and the fat of a trefah animal is forbidden by two prohibitions, and so too the fat of a nebelah (which means here, an animal which died a natural death and not because of some physical defect).
(5) It died instantaneously and was at no time in that state when it could be said to be 'dying'. Cf. supra p. 199, n. 4.
(6) That a dying animal is forbidden when slaughtered.
(7) For both are forbidden to be eaten, and there are two prohibitions since it has been taught that the prohibition of trefah can he superimposed upon the prohibition of fat.
(8) Only the fat is forbidden to be eaten but not the flesh.
(9) That the flesh of a dying animal which was slaughtered may be eaten.
(10) Ezek. IV, 14.
(11) I.e., the flesh of a dying animal, which was slaughtered with all haste before it died. Ezekiel could not have meant ordinary nebelah for this is expressly forbidden in the Torah.
(12) Some doubt arose with regard to the animal and the Rabbi after due consideration declared it to be fit for food.
(13) l.e., the shoulder, the two checks and the maw. V. Deut. XVIII, 3.
(14) In that he abstained from eating it even though it was permitted.
(15) It is still regarded as dying, since it cannot remain standing.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 38a

It is an adequate sign of vitality if it lows or excretes or moves its ear'. He thereupon remarked: 'Does Abba1 really require the moving of the ear?2 I am of the opinion that whatever movement [the animal makes], provided it is not a movement brought about by the expiration of its life, [is a sufficient sign of vitality]'. And what are the movements brought about by the expiration of life? - Said R. 'Anan: Mar Samuel explained it to me thus: If its foreleg was bent and it stretched it out - this is a movement brought about by the expiration of life; if its foreleg was outstretched and it bent it - this is a movement not brought about by the expiration of life. But what does he teach us? We have learnt it [already]: IF A SMALL ANIMAL STRETCHED OUT ITS FORELEG [AT THE END OF THE SLAUGHTERING] BUT DID NOT WITHDRAW IT, IT IS INVALID, FOR THIS WAS BUT AN INDICATION OF THE EXPIRATION OF ITS LIFE. Now it follows from this, does it not, that if it did withdraw it, it is valid? - No. From our Mishnah I might have concluded that only if its foreleg was bent and it stretched it out and then bent it again it is valid, but not if it was first outstretched and it merely bent it; he therefore teaches us [that this latter is a sufficient sign of vitality].

An objection was raised: [It was taught:] R. Jose said: R. Meir used to say that the lowing of an animal while it was being slaughtered was not a sign of vitality. R. Eliezer son of R. Jose reported in the name of R. Jose. Even if it excreted or moved its tail to and fro it is not a sign of vitality. Is there not here a contradiction in regard to lowing and also in regard to excreting? - In regard to lowing there is no contradiction because in the one case3 the noise was loud and in the other case4 the noise was faint. And also in regard to excreting there is no contradiction for in the one case4 the animal discharged excrement feebly and in the other case3 it discharged vigorously.

R. Hisda said: [It has been reported that] the indications of vitality which the Rabbis require must occur at the end of the slaughtering. But 'at the end of the slaughtering', [I say], really means the middle of the slaughtering, and it excludes only the case where the indications occur at the beginning of the slaughtering.5 R. Hisda added: Whence do I know this? From [our Mishnah] which we learnt: IF A SMALL ANIMAL STRETCHED OUT ITS FORELEG BUT DID NOT WITHDRAW IT, IT IS INVALID. Now when did it do so? Shall I say at the end of the slaughtering? How long then must it continue to live?6 We must, therefore, say that it did so in the middle of the slaughtering. Raba thereupon said to him, Indeed [I maintain that] it must do so at the end of the slaughtering, for I am of the opinion that if the animal did not do so at the end of the slaughtering one may be certain that life had expired some time previously.

R. Nahman b. Isaac said: The indications of vitality which [the Rabbis] require may occur at the beginning of the slaughtering. R. Nahman b. Isaac added: Whence do I know this? From [our Mishnah] which we have learnt: R. SIMEON SAID, IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED [A DYING ANIMAL] BY NIGHT AND EARLY THE FOLLOWING MORNING FOUND THE SIDES [OF THE THROAT] FULL OF BLOOD, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID, FOR THIS PROVES THAT IT SPURTED [THE BLOOD], WHICH IS SUFFICIENT ACCORDING TO R. ELIEZER'S VIEW. And Samuel explained that the Mishnah referred to the sides of the throat.7 Now if you say that the indication of vitality may occur at the beginning of the slaughtering, it is well; but if you say that it must occur at the end of the slaughtering, [then why is the slaughtering valid?] it might have spurted the blood only at the beginning of the slaughtering!8 But perhaps the spurting of blood indicates a greater measure of vitality!9 - But is it greater? Have we not learnt: R. ELIEZER SAYS, IT IS SUFFICIENT IF IT SPURTED [THE BLOOD]? - It is a measure of vitality less than that required by Rabban Gamaliel10 but greater than that required by the Rabbis. Rabina said: Sama B. Hilkia told me that the father of Bar Abubram (others read: the brother of Bar Abubram) raised this question: But is it [the spurting of blood] greater than that required by the Rabbis? Does it not read in the Mishnah, THE SAGES SAY, [THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID] UNLESS IT JERKED EITHER ITS FORELEG OR ITS HIND LEG? Now with whom do the Sages argue? With R. Simeon b. Gamaliel? Then they should have said: 'If only it jerked'.11 Clearly therefore they are arguing with R. Eliezer. Now if you say that it [the spurting of blood] is a greater measure of vitality [than that required by the Sages], why [do they say] UNLESS?12

Raba said: The indications of vitality which the Rabbis require must occur at the end of the slaughtering.13 Raba added: Whence do I know this? From [the following Baraitha] which was taught: [It is written,] When a bullock,

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(1) I.e., Rab, whose real name was Abba Arika. According to Rashi, however, Abba was a title of honour given to Rab; but see Tosaf. s.v. אצטריך
(2) The jerking of the ear is indeed too great a degree of vitality to expect in a dying animal.
(3) The statement by Rab. Lowing loudly or excreting vigorously is according to Rab a sufficient sign of vitality.
(4) The Baraitha just quoted.
(5) In which case the slaughtering is invalid because the animal had probably expired before the completion of the slaughtering.
(6) Is it then reasonable to say that the stretching out of the foreleg by a small animal after the slaughtering(!) is insufficient?
(7) In the Mishnah 'THE SIDES' might also mean 'the walls of the slaughter-house', and if this were the meaning, then it would not be difficult to ascertain on the following morning at what stage of the slaughtering the spurting of blood occurred; for if it happened at the beginning of the slaughtering when the animal had more vitality the blood would be found higher up on the wall or further away from the animal than if it occurred in the middle of the slaughtering. On the other hand, according to Samuel's interpretation of the Mishnah there are obviously no means of ascertaining at what stage in the slaughtering the animal spurted blood.
(8) And this would not be a sufficient indication of vitality.
(9) It is therefore suggested that spurting even if it occurs at the beginning of the slaughtering is sufficient, whereas all other indications must occur either in the middle or at the end of the slaughtering.
(10) Who requires a movement of both the foreleg and the hind leg. It is to be noted that in our text of the Mishnah the author of this view is R. Simeon b. Gamaliel and not Rabban Gamaliel, though in many MSS. the reading in the Mishnah is also Rabban Gamaliel
(11) The word, 'unless', implies that the requirement or test suggested is stricter than that stated in the preceding passage. Now if the Sages are less stringent than R. Gamaliel they should merely have said: 'If only it jerked' etc.
(12) They should have said: 'If only'.
(13) I.e., even after the slaughtering has been completed the animal must struggle and show signs of vitality.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 38b

[or a sheep, or a goat, is brought forth, then it shall be seven days under the dam].1 'Or a sheep' - this excludes2 a cross-breed. 'Or a goat' - this excludes a goat looking like a lamb. 'Is brought forth' - this excludes that which was extracted from the side.3 'It shall be seven days' - this excludes an animal which is too young. 'Under the dam' - this excludes an orphan. Now what is meant by 'an orphan'? Does it mean that the mother-beast brought forth its young and died immediately after? Must it then continue to live on for ever! Or, again, does it mean that the mother-beast died and immediately after the young was brought forth?4 But this would be excluded from the words, 'Is brought forth'. It can only mean that the one expired at the same moment that the other came into life. Now if you say that the mother-beast must show signs of life after bringing forth,5 it is therefore necessary to employ a verse in order to exclude this case [of an orphan]; but if you say that it need not show signs of life after bringing forth,6 why then is a verse employed to exclude this case? It surely is excluded from the words, 'Is brought forth'!

Raba said: The law is as stated in the following Baraitha: 'If a small animal stretched out its foreleg and did not withdraw it, the slaughtering is invalid; [but if it did withdraw it, it is valid.]7 These rules apply only to the foreleg, but with regard to the hind leg the rule is that whether it stretched it out but did not bend it, or bent it but did not stretch it out, it is valid. Moreover all this applies to a small animal, but with regard to a large animal the rule is that whether it was the foreleg or the hind leg, whether it stretched it out but did not bend it or bent it but did not stretch it out, it is valid. With regard to a bird, even if it merely twitched its wing8 or flapped its tail, it is a sufficient sign of vitality'. What does he [Raba] teach us? Surely these rules are all implied in our Mishnah: IF A SMALL ANIMAL STRETCHED OUT ITS FORELEG BUT DID NOT WITHDRAW IT, IT IS INVALID, FOR THIS WAS BUT AN INDICATION OF THE EXPIRATION OF ITS LIFE. Now it is clear that this applies to the foreleg and not to the hind leg to a small animal and not to a large animal!9 - It was necessary for him to teach it with regard to a bird, which is not stated in our Mishnah.

MISHNAH. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED A BEAST FOR A HEATHEN,10 THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID; R. ELIEZER DECLARES IT INVALID.11 R. ELIEZER SAID, EVEN IF ONE SLAUGHTERED A BEAST WITH THE INTENTION THAT A HEATHEN SHOULD EAT OF THE MIDRIFF12 THEREOF, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID, FOR THE THOUGHTS OF A HEATHEN ARE USUALLY DIRECTED TOWARDS IDOLATRY. R. JOSE EXCLAIMED, IS THERE NOT HERE AN A FORTIORI ARGUMENT? FOR IF IN THE CASE OF CONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CAN RENDER INVALID, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDS SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO PERFORMS THE SERVICE,13 HOW MUCH MORE IN THE CASE OF UNCONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CANNOT RENDER INVALID, DOES EVERYTHING DEPEND SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO SLAUGHTERS!

GEMARA. These Tannaim14 accept the view of R. Eliezer son of R. Jose. For it has been taught: R. Eliezer son of R. Jose says: I am informed that the owners can render the sacrifice piggul.15 The first Tanna, however, is of the opinion that only if we heard him [the heathen] express an [idolatrous] intention [with regard to the animal] does it become invalid but not otherwise, for we do not say that the thoughts of a heathen are usually directed towards idolatry; whereas R. Eliezer is of the opinion that even if we did not hear him express an [idolatrous] intention [it is invalid], for we say that the thoughts of a heathen are usually directed towards idolatry. And R. Jose comes to say that even if we heard him express an [idolatrous] intention [it does not become invalid], for we do not hold that one man's wrongful intention should affect another's acts.16

According to another version they17 differ even in the case where we heard him [the heathen] express an [idolatrous] intention [with regard to the animal]. The first Tanna is of the opinion that the view that one man's wrongful intention may affect another's acts, applies only as regards acts performed inside [the Temple],18 but not outside,19 and we cannot draw any inference as to acts performed outside from acts performed inside;

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(1) Lev. XXII, 27.
(2) As being unfit for a sacrifice. The limitation is implied in the superfluous word, 'or'.
(3) I.e., by means of the Caesarean section.
(4) I.e., extracted from the womb or side of the mother-beast.
(5) And similarly in the case of slaughtering, the slaughtered animal must struggle on and show signs of life at least for one moment after the slaughtering.
(6) Consequently the only possible exclusion by reason of the expression 'under the dam' is the case where the young was brought forth after the mother-beast had died, i.e., extracted out of the womb.
(7) This is added in the tent by Shittah Mekubezeth, v. Marginal Gloss.
(8) According to another reading. 'blinked its eye'.
(9) And it being an anonymous Mishnah, the law is obvious as stated therein!
(10) The gentile being the owner of the beast.
(11) Because it was no doubt intended to be used by the heathen for an idolatrous purpose.
(12) The diaphragm, an insignificant portion of the animal not usually consumed. It is intended that the rest of the animal be consumed by a Jew.
(13) The wrongful intention of the owner or offerer of the sacrifice would not render the sacrifice invalid, provided the person who performed the sacrificial acts had the proper intention with regard thereto. V. Pes. 46a.
(14) Sc. the first Tanna and R. Eliezer, but obviously not R. Jose.
(15) I.e., the owner, on whose behalf the priest performs the sacrificial acts, can by his wrongful intent render the sacrifice invalid, i.e., render it פגול. V. Glos.
(16) In other words, it is the wrongful intention only of the one who performs the service that can affect its validity.
(17) I.e., the first Tanna and R. Eliezer.
(18) I.e., the acts in connection with the offering of a sacrifice.
(19) I.e., the slaughtering of a beast to idolatry.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 39a

whereas R. Eliezer holds that we may draw this inference - outside services from inside services.1 And R. Jose comes to say that even as regards acts performed inside we do not hold that one man's wrongful intention should affect another's acts.

It was reported: If one slaughtered a beast with the intention [expressed during the slaughtering] of sprinkling the blood or burning the fat unto idols, R.Johanan says. The beast is forbidden for all purposes; Resh Lakish says. It is permitted.2 'R. Johanan says it is forbidden', because he accepts the principle: 'a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence [even in connection with idolatry]', for one must draw an analogy between acts performed inside3 and acts performed outside. 'Resh Lakish says: it is permitted', because he does not accept the principle, 'a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence [in the case of idolatry]', for one must not draw any analogy between acts performed inside and acts performed outside. Now they are consistent in their views, for it was also reported: If one slaughtered [a sin-offering] under its own name with the intention [expressed at the time of slaughtering] of sprinkling the blood under the name of another sacrifice, R. Johanan says, it is invalid; Resh Lakish says. It is valid. 'R. Johanan says it is invalid', because he accepts the principle, 'a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence', [even in this case], for we derive it from the case of piggul.4 'Resh Lakish says it is valid', because he does not accept [in this case] the principle, 'a wrongful Intention expressed during one service with regard to another service is of consequence' for we may not derive it from the case of piggul. And it was necessary [for both disputes to be reported]. For if this dispute5 only was reported. I should have said that only here does Resh Lakish maintain his view, because we must not draw an inference as to acts performed outside from acts performed inside, but where each is a service performed inside he would no doubt concur with R. Johanan [that we derive one from the other]. And if the other dispute6 only was reported, I should have said that only there does R. Johanan maintain his view, but in this case he would no doubt concur with Resh Lakish. It was therefore necessary [that both disputes be reported].

R. Shesheth raised an objection. We have learnt: R. JOSE EXCLAIMED, IS THERE NOT HERE AN A FORTIORI ARGUMENT? FOR IF IN THE CASE OF CONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CAN RENDER INVALID, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDS SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO PERFORMS THE SERVICE. HOW MUCH MORE IN THE CASE OF UNCONSECRATED ANIMALS, WHERE A WRONGFUL INTENTION CANNOT RENDER INVALID. DOES EVERYTHING DEPEND SOLELY UPON THE INTENTION OF HIM WHO SLAUGHTERS! Now what is meant by the assertion that in the case of unconsecrated animals a wrongful intention will not render invalid? Shall I say it means that in no wise will it render invalid? Then how is it possible for the prohibition of that which has been slaughtered to idols ever to take effect?7 Obviously it means a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service, and the Mishnah is to be interpreted thus: 'If in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service renders them invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service does not render them invalid, does everything depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters'! Now the assertion with regard to services performed inside [namely, consecrated animals] contradicts Resh Lakish,8 and the assertion with regard to services performed outside [namely, unconsecrated animals] contradicts R. Johanan.9 I grant however, that as far as Resh Lakish is concerned, the assertion with regard to services performed inside presents no real difficulty, for one view10 he expressed before he learnt [the interpretation of the Mishnah] from [his master]. R. Johanan, and the other after he learnt it from R. Johanan. But [the assertion with regard to] services performed outside clearly contradicts R. Johanan! - After raising this objection he [R. Shesheth] answered it thus: [The Mishnah] refers to the four principal services,11 and the passage must be read as follows: If in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention12 expressed in the course of any one of the four principal services renders them invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service,

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(1) So that by analogy, even in the case of acts performed outside the Temple, the owner should be in the position to affect by his wrongful intention the act of another.
(2) Even to be eaten, v. Tosaf. A.Z. 34b s.v. רשב״ל.
(3) I.e., temple service. As to sacrifices it is established that if one, whilst performing one act of the sacrifice, expressed a wrongful intention in relation to another act thereof, the sacrifice would be invalid. E.g., if a person, whilst slaughtering the sacrifice, expressed the intention, of sprinkling the blood after the time prescribed for it, the sacrifice is piggul.
(4) פגול. Strictly a sacrifice is rendered piggul ('abhorred') if the officiating priest expressed an intention during one of the four principal services (v. infra) of performing another principal service, or of eating the sacrificial meat, at the improper time. V. Lev. VII, 18, and Zeb. II, 2. According to R. Johanan any wrongful intention expressed in this manner will have the effect of invalidating the sacrifice.
(5) Concerning the slaughtering of an animal with the intention of sprinkling the blood unto idols.
(6) Concerning the slaughtering of a sin-offering with the intention of sprinkling the blood under the name of another offering.
(7) Since even the expressed intention of slaughtering unto idols is of no consequence. And this prohibition is clearly established, v. A.Z. 32b.
(8) For the Mishnah asserts that any wrongful intention (not only a piggul intention) in connection with the sacrifice renders it invalid; contra Resh Lakish.
(9) For the Mishnah states that in the case of unconsecrated animals a wrongful intention expressed during one service with regard to another service does not render it invalid; contra R. Johanan.
(10) I.e., his own view.
(11) Of every sacrifice, viz., slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying it forward to the altar, and sprinkling it. If in the course of one of these services the priest intended to eat the sacrificial meat at the improper time the sacrifice is piggul (Rashi). According to R. Gershom, Rashba and others, the meaning is: If in the course of the slaughtering he intended to perform one of the following services at the improper time, namely, to receive the blood, or to carry it forward, or to sprinkle it, or to burn the fat, the sacrifice is piggul. V. ראש יוסף ad loc.
(12) Sc. of eating the flesh of the sacrifice beyond the time prescribed.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 39b

how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention renders them invalid only if expressed in the course of any one of two services,1 does everything depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!

[The following Baraitha] was taught in support of the view of R. Johanan: If a person [an Israelite] slaughtered an animal with the intention [expressed during the slaughtering] of sprinkling the blood or burning the fat unto idols, it is regarded as a sacrifice unto the dead.2 If he slaughtered it and afterwards expressed his intention - this was an actual case which occurred in Caesarea and the Rabbis expressed no opinion with regard to it, neither forbidding nor permitting it. R. Hisda explained. They did not, forbid it in deference to the view of the Rabbis,3 and they did not permit it in deference to the view of R. Eliezer.4 But how do you know this? perhaps the Rabbis maintain their view only there [in our Mishnah] because we did not hear him [sc. the idolater] express any intention at all, but here since we heard him express an intention [after the slaughtering, even the Rabbis will admit that it is invalid, for] his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning.5 Or you might argue thus: Perhaps R. Eliezer maintains his view only there [in our Mishnah], because it deals with a heathen, and he is of the opinion that the thoughts of a heathen are usually directed towards idolatry, but here since we are dealing with an Israelite it would not be right to say that his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning.6 - Rather, said R. Shizbi, [explain thus]: They did not permit it in deference to the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.7 Which statement of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel is meant? Shall I say it is his statement on the subject of Divorce? For we have learnt: If a person in good health said: 'Write a bill of divorce to my wife', it is held that he merely intended to tease her.8 And there actually happened a case where a person of good health said: 'Write a bill of divorce to my wife', and he immediately went up to the roof and fell down from it and was killed,9 and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: If he threw himself down, the divorce is valid, but if the wind pushed him over, the divorce is not valid. And the following argument ensued: Does not the case stated contradict [the given ruling]?10 - [And the reply was,] There is an omission [in the text] and it should read thus: If his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning, the divorce will be valid. And there actually happened a case where a person in good health said: 'Write a bill of divorce to my wife', and he immediately went up to the roof and fell down from it and was killed, and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: If he threw himself down, the divorce is valid;11 but if the wind pushed him over, the divorce is not valid!12 - Perhaps this case is different for he actually said: 'Write [the bill of divorce].'13 Rather, said Rabina: It was in deference to the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel in the following case. For it was taught: If a person assigned in writing his estate, which included slaves, to another, and the latter said: 'I do not want them', they [sc. the slaves] may nevertheless eat terumah,14 if their second master15 was a priest. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says. As soon as that person15 has said: 'I do not want them', the heirs at once become the legal owners of them.16 And the following argument ensued: Would the first Tanna regard the assignee as the legal owner even if he stands and objects?17 Whereupon Rabbah (others say: R. Johanan) explained. If he15 objected from the outset, all agree that he has not acquired them; likewise if he remained silent at first,18 but subsequently objected, all agree that he has acquired them. The dispute arises only where the assignor transferred the estate through a third party19 to the assignee, and the latter was silent at first but subsequently objected to it. The first Tanna is of the opinion that by his silence he has acquired them, and his subsequent objection merely signifies that he has changed his mind. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel is of the opinion that his last act proves what he had in mind at the beginning,20 and the reason he did not object at the outset was because he, no doubt, said to himself, 'Why should I object before they came into my possession?'

Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel that the halachah is in accordance with the view of R. Jose.21

Certain Arabs once came to Zikonia22 and gave the Jewish butchers some rams to slaughter, saying: 'The blood and the fat shall be for us,23 while the hide and the flesh shall be yours'. R. Tobi b. R. Mattena sent this case to R. Joseph and asked. 'What is the law in such a case as this?' He sent back saying: 'Thus has Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in accordance with the view of R. Jose'.24

R. Aha the son of R. Awia asked R. Ashi: According to the view of R. Eliezer,25 what would be the law if a heathen gave a zuz26 to a Jewish butcher?27 - He replied: We must consider the case; If he [the idolater] is a powerful man whom the Israelite cannot put off [by returning his zuz], then the animal is forbidden;28 but if he is not [a powerful man], the Israelite would be able to say to him, [Strike] your head against the mountain!29

MISHNAH. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED [AN ANIMAL] AS A SACRIFICE TO MOUNTAINS.30 HILLS, SEAS, RIVERS, OR DESERTS, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID.

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(1) I.e., slaughtering and sprinkling of the blood. These two services are the only services referred to in the Bible in connection with sacrifices to idols; the former in Ex. XXII, 19, the latter in Ps. XVI, 4.
(2) And forbidden for all purposes.
(3) I.e., the first Tanna of our Mishnah, who does not hold the view that the thoughts of an idolater are usually directed towards idolatry. In this case, it is suggested, he will hold that all the acts performed before the actual expression of an intention towards idolatry are not regarded as intended for idolatry.
(4) Who holds that the thoughts of a heathen and, it is suggested here, also of a Jew who slaughters to an idol, are usually directed towards idolatry.
(5) That the slaughtering was, without doubt, intended for idolatry.
(6) For it is not conclusive that because after the slaughtering he expressed an intention for idolatry this intention was present at the time of slaughtering.
(7) Who is of the opinion that a man's subsequent act reveals what he had in mind at the beginning.
(8) And it is no divorce even though the bill was handed to the wife, because no instructions were given to deliver it to the wife; v. Git. 66a. In the case of a person who was dangerously ill, however, the law is that if he merely said: 'Write a bill of divorce to my wife', without adding. 'And deliver it to her', the divorce would be valid.
(9) The bill of divorce however, was written and delivered to the wife before death took place.
(10) For the rule as given does not admit of any such distinction.
(11) For his subsequent suicidal act is a conclusive proof that his mind was unsettled from the outset, and so the divorce is valid as in the case of a person dangerously ill; v. p. 212, n. 4.
(12) This proves that R. Simeon b. Gamaliel is of the opinion that a man's subsequent act is indicative of what was in his mind at the beginning.
(13) And it might well be inferred that he intended the bill to be delivered to his wife, this intention no doubt being present in his mind at the time he gave instructions to write the bill of divorce. But in the case of idolatry, there is no possible inference to be drawn from subsequent conduct as to this man's earlier act.
(14) For the assignment is operative in spite of the protestations of the assignee, so that the slaves being now members of a priest's household may eat terumah (v. Glos.) in accordance with Lev. XXII, 11.
(15) The assignee.
(16) And the slaves may not eat terumah if 'he heirs are not priests.
(17) Surely not!
(18) And accepted the deed of assignment.
(19) The deed was handed to a third party for acceptance on behalf of the assignee, and in the latter's presence.
(20) Viz., that he had no intention of accepting the slaves.
(21) Of our Mishnah, that everything depends solely upon the intention of the slaughterer, and the intention of the owner will not affect the slaughtering.
(22) A place near Pumbeditha. Obermeyer p. 234.
(23) To be used for idolatrous purposes.
(24) The rams are therefore permitted to be eaten, because the intention of the Arab owners cannot affect the slaughtering.
(25) Of our Mishnah, who holds that even if a small portion of the animal belongs to a heathen the entire animal would be forbidden because of the idolatrous thoughts of the heathen.
(26) A coin, v. Glos.
(27) To receive meat for that amount from the animal which was to be slaughtered by the Jew.
(28) For the heathen has an Interest in the animal to the value of a zuz.
(29) Lit., 'behold thy head and the mountain', i.e., 'either take back your zuz or do without it'. This being the case, the animal is permitted to be eaten whether the Israelite actually returns the money to the heathen or provides him with meat.
(30) Lit., 'in the name of'.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 40a

IF TWO PERSONS HELD ONE KNIFE AND SLAUGHTERED [AN ANIMAL], ONE INTENDING IT AS A SACRIFICE TO ONE OF THESE THINGS AND THE OTHER FOR A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID.

GEMARA. It is only invalid but it is not regarded as a sacrifice of the dead.1 I will point out a contradiction. [It was taught:] If a man slaughtered [an animal] as a sacrifice to mountains, hills, seas, rivers, deserts, the sun, the moon, the stars and planets. Michael the Archangel, or a small worm, it is regarded as a sacrifice of the dead!2 - Abaye explained. It is no difficulty. Here [in our Mishnah] he declared it to be a sacrifice to the mountain itself,3 but there he declared it to be a sacrifice to the deity of the mountain.4 There is indeed support for this view, for [in the Baraitha quoted] they are all stated together with 'Michael the Archangel'.5 This is conclusive.

R. Huna stated: If his neighbour's beast was lying in front of an idol, then as soon as he has cut one of the organs of the throat he has thereby rendered it prohibited.6 He is evidently in agreement with the dictum of Ulla reported in the name of R. Johanan viz.. Although the Rabbis have declared that he who bowed down to his neighbour's beast has not rendered it prohibited, nevertheless if he performed on it an act7 [of idolatrous worship], he has thereby rendered it prohibited.

R. Nahman raised this objection against R. Huna, [It was taught:] If a person [inadvertently] slaughtered on the Sabbath a sin-offering outside [the Temple Court] as a sacrifice to an idol, he is liable to three sin-offerings.8 Now if you say that as soon as he has cut one organ only he has rendered it prohibited, then he should not be liable on account of slaughtering outside,

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(1) For then it would not only be invalid but even forbidden for all uses and purposes; v. A.Z. 29b.
(2) V. Ps. CVI, 28.
(3) Mountains and other inanimate things the works of nature cannot, according to Deut. XII, 2, be in law regarded as idols; v. A.Z. 45a. Hence sacrifices unto them are not sacrifices unto idols, and therefore the animal is not forbidden for use; it is however forbidden to be eaten since it has the appearance of idol worship.
(4) I.e., the spirit or angel of the mountain etc. This is real idolatry and the animal which is slaughtered as a sacrifice is absolutely forbidden.
(5) Thus indicating that it is the spirit or godhead of the mountain that is intended to be the object of worship, just as in the case of Michael it is an angel or spirit that is referred to.
(6) The principle is that a person cannot render prohibited that which belongs to another merely by word of mouth but only by an act. It goes without saying that a man's own beast would be prohibited by this act.
(7) As e.g. by pouring wine between its horns. V. A.Z. 54a.
(8) (i) For breaking the Sabbath, (ii) for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple court, and (iii) for slaughtering unto idols.

Talmud - Mas. Chullin 40b

for it is as though he were cutting earth?1 - R. Papa answered: We are dealing here with a sin-offering of a bird, so that all [the prohibitions] arrive simultaneously.2 But let us consider! R. Huna based his statement, did he not, upon Ulla's view? But Ulla refers to any act, however slight!3 - Rather [assume that] he expressly declared that he intended to worship the idol only at the completion of the slaughtering.4 If this is the case, why only 'a sin-offering'? It could have dealt with any offering!5 - Rather, said Mar Zutra in the name of R. Papa: We are dealing here with the case where half of the windpipe [of the sin-offering of a bird] was mutilated, and this person merely added to it the smallest cut,6 thereby completing [the slaughtering]; and now all [the prohibitions] arrive simultaneously.

R. Papa remarked: Had not R. Huna specifically mentioned one organ', [the above Baraitha of the] 'Sin-offering' would never have presented any difficulty, for the expression 'an act' [used by Ulla] could mean a complete act [of idolatrous worship].7 R. Papa further remarked: Had not R. Huna expressly said: 'his neighbour's animal', [the above Baraitha of the] 'Sin-offering' would not have presented any difficulty. Why? Because a man can only render prohibited [even by his slightest act] that which belongs to him, but not that which belongs to others.8 Is not this obvious? - It is not, for I might have said that since he received atonement through it it is regarded as his own; he therefore must state it.

(Mnemonic Na 'A.Z.)9 R. Nahman, R. 'Amram and R. Isaac stated: A person cannot render prohibited10 that which does not belong to him. An objection was raised: [It was taught:] If a person [inadvertently] slaughtered on the Sabbath a sin-offering outside [the Temple court] as a sacrifice to an idol, he is liable to three sin-offerings. And we interpreted this Baraitha as referring to a sin-offering of a bird ,11 half of whose windpipe was mutilated. Now the reason [for the ruling] is because it is a sin-offering of a bird in which case all [the prohibitions] arrive simultaneously.

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(1) For as soon as it becomes prohibited on account of idolatry i.e., after the cutting of the first organ, it is no longer regarded as consecrated, therefore the prohibition against slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple court does not arise. And although it has been taught above (supra 29b), that even where only one organ of a consecrated animal was slaughtered outside the sanctuary there is liability under this head, that is so only where the second organ was cut within, and the animal thus retained its sanctity from beginning to end, so that there was all the time a proper slaughtering. In our case, however, once it is forbidden on account of idolatry it is no longer sacred; it is, as it were, a clod of earth, and there is no proper slaughtering.
(2) For the cutting of one organ outside the sanctuary in the case of a sin-offering of a bird renders one liable (v. supra 29b); therefore all the Prohibitions arrive simultaneously, i.e., after the cutting of the first organ.
(3) And not necessarily the cutting of one whole organ; accordingly the prohibition under the head of idolatry takes effect before the others, consequently the prohibition for slaughtering outside the sanctuary cannot arise.
(4) When all the prohibitions arrive simultaneously. The Baraitha therefore need not be limited to a sin-offering of a bird but can refer to a sin-offering of cattle.
(5) If the slaughterer intended to worship the idol only at the completion of the slaughtering, why did the Tanna of the Baraitha limit his case to a sin-offering, which is distinctive in that it does not belong to the slaughterer (i.e., the offerer) but to the priests? He could have dealt with any offering, even a peace-offering which belongs to the offerer, and yet he would be liable on the three counts, since he intended to worship the idol only at the completion of the slaughtering, when the three prohibitions arise simultaneously. Since the Tanna limited his case to a sin-offering it is clear that the slaughterer intended to worship the idol at the beginning of the slaughtering, and the reason why the three prohibitions are incurred is because he cannot render prohibited by his idolatrous intent another's animal (sc. the sin-offering, which is the priests') with a slight act but only with a complete act. The Baraitha is thus in conflict with R. Huna who ruled that a slight act of idolatry (sc. the cutting of only one organ) renders another's animal prohibited. (Rashi's second interpretation.)
(6) And this small cut, although a slight act, constitutes the complete slaughtering.
(7) I.e.,the complete slaughtering. As R. Huna expressly mentions 'one organ' (which is something incomplete), and he bases his view upon Ulla's statement, it is evident that Ulla refers to the slightest act of idolatrous worship.
(8) And a sin-offering belongs to the priests, save that the owner receives atonement through it.
(9) Lit., 'he stuck in'. The characteristic letters of the names of the three Rabbis, the authors of the following statement.
(10) Even by a complete act.
(11) By reason of the fact that the Baraitha speaks of a sin-offering and not of any other offering; for, granted that it could not have dealt with a peace-offering, as this offering is his, it could have dealt with a burnt-offering.

 

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