Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 2a
MISHNAH. THERE ARE IN THE TORAH THIRTY-SIX [TRANSGRESSIONS WHICH ARE PUNISHABLE1 WITH] EXTINCTION:2 WHEN ONE HAS INTERCOURSE WITH HIS MOTHER,3 HIS FATHER'S WIFE OR HIS DAUGHTER-IN-LAW; WHEN A MAN HAS CONNECTION WITH A MALE, OR COVERS A BEAST, OR WHEN A WOMAN ALLOWS HERSELF TO BE COVERED BY A BEAST; WHEN ONE HAS INTERCOURSE WITH A WOMAN AND HER DAUGHTER,4 WITH A MARRIED WOMAN, WITH HIS SISTER, WITH HIS FATHER'S SISTER, HIS MOTHER'S SISTER, HIS WIFE'S SISTER,5 HIS BROTHER'S WIFE,6 THE WIFE OF HIS FATHER'S BROTHER,7 OR WITH A MENSTRUOUS WOMAN; WHEN ONE BLASPHEMES [THE LORD].8 SERVES IDOLS,9 DEDICATES OF HIS CHILDREN TO MOLECH10 OR HAS A FAMILIAR SPIRIT,11 OR DESECRATES THE SABBATH;12 . WHEN AN UNCLEAN PERSON EATS OF SACRIFICIAL FOOD,13 OR WHEN ONE ENTERS THE PRECINCTS OF THE TEMPLE IN AN UNCLEAN STATE;14 WHEN ONE EATS HELEB,15 BLOOD,16 NOTHAR17 OR PIGGUL;18 WHEN ONE SLAUGHTERS OR OFFERS UP19 [A CONSECRATED ANIMAL] OUTSIDE [THE TEMPLE PRECINCTS]; WHEN ONE EATS ANYTHING LEAVENED ON PASSOVER;20 WHEN ONE EATS OR WORKS ON THE DAY OF ATONEMENT;21 WHEN ONE COMPOUNDS OIL [OF ANOINTING]22 OR COMPOUNDS INCENSE,23 OR USES [UNLAWFULLY] OIL OF ANOINTING;24 AND [WHEN ONE TRANSGRESSES THE LAWS OF] THE PASCHAL OFFERING25 , AND CIRCUMCISION26 - FROM AMONG POSITIVE COMMANDMENTS. FOR THESE [TRANSGRESSIONS] ONE IS LIABLE TO EXTINCTION IF COMMITTED WILFULLY,27 AND IF IN ERROR TO A SIN-OFFERING,28 AND IF THERE IS A DOUBT WHETHER HE HAD COMMITTED THE TRANSGRESSION TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF ONE WHO DEFILED THE TEMPLE OR ITS CONSECRATED THINGS,29 SINCE ONE IS LIABLE IN THIS CASE TO A SLIDING-SCALE SACRIFICE.30 THUS R. MEIR, WHILE THE SAGES SAY: ALSO THE BLASPHEMER [IS AN EXCEPTION],31 FOR IT SAYS: YE SHALL HAVE ONE LAW FOR HIM THAT DOETH AUGHT IN ERROR;32 THIS IS TO EXCLUDE THE BLASPHEMER33 WHO PERFORMS NO ACTION.34 [
(1) If committed wilfully, but without due warning by two witnesses of the punishments they involve. If committed after such warning, the penalties vary between flagellation and the death sentence.
(2) Heb. kareth, 'cutting off'; i.e., the perpetrator's life is cut short by Providence (v. Glos.): M.K. 28a.
(3) This law as well as the other laws in the Mishnah relating to incestuous or other immoral connections are enumerated in Lev. XVIII. A notable omission from the list of incestuous relations is a daughter, both legitimate and illegitimate. The prohibition relating to her is taken to be self-evident from the explicit prohibition of intercourse with a woman and her daughter, or implied in the law regarding a grand-daughter. Cf. Yeb. 3a; Rashi ad loc.
(4) Or for that purpose also a grand-daughter.
(5) This prohibition holds good only while his wife is alive even though divorced.
(6) An exception is the case of levirate marriage, Deut. XXV, 5f.
(7) In some edd. 'the wife of his mother's brother' is added here.
(8) Num. XV, 30.
(9) Ibid. 31, which is understood to refer to idolatry.
(10) Lev. XVIII, 21.
(11) Ibid. XX, 6; cf. Sanh. VII, 6.
(12) Ex. XXXI, 14.
(13) Lev. XXII, 3.
(14) Num. XIX, 20.
(15) Certain portions of the abdomial fat of cattle which may not be eaten, Lev. VII, 25.
(16) Ibid. XVII, 14.
(17) Sacrificial portions left over beyond the prescribed time; these have to be burnt, ibid. XIX, 6-8. V. Glos.
(18) The flesh of an offering which became unfit by reason of an improper intention in the mind of those officiating. ibid. VII, 18; XIX, 7-8; v. Glos.
(19) Ibid. XVII, 9.
(20) Ex. XII, 19.
(21) Lev. XXIII, 29-30.
(22) In the exact quantities prescribed in Ex. XXX, 23-33.
(23) In the proportions prescribed in ibid. 34-38.
(24) Ibid. 32.
(25) Num. IX, 13.
(26) Gen. XVII, 14.
(27) But without legal warning; v.n. 1 p. 1.
(28) Referring to the prohibitory laws only. No sin-offering is required for sins of omission. 'Error' denotes ignorance of the nature of the object at the time of transgression; but in case of complete ignorance of the law, no offering is brought; thus Rashi against Maim. Shegagoth II, 6.
(29) I.e., one is exempt from an offering in case of doubt.
(30) I.e., the sacrifice varies according to the means of the transgressor, Lev. V, 6, 7, 11. The rule is that a suspensive guilt-offering is brought only in cases where, if in error, one is liable to a fixed sin-offering and not to one that varied according to circumstances, cf. infra 25a.
(31) V. Gemara.
(32) Num. XV, 29.
(33) The verse deals with those who must bring a sin-offering; v. ibid. 27.
(34) I.e., whose offence consists of words.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 2b
GEMARA. Why has a number been mentioned [in the Mishnah]? - Said R. Johanan: [To tell you] that if one commits all [these transgressions] in one spell of unawareness he is liable [to a sacrifice] for each of them.1 Again, as to that which we have learnt: 'There are thirty-nine principal categories of work prohibited on the Sabbath',2 why has a number been mentioned there? [To tell you] that if one does them all in one spell of unawareness he is liable to a sacrifice for each of them. Again, as to that which we have learnt: 'There are four who require an act of atonement',3 - why has a number been mentioned there? - To exclude the view of R. Eliezer b. Jacob, who holds that there are five, as we have learnt: 'R. Eliezer b. Jacob says: A proselyte [too] requires atonement [and may not eat of sacred things] until the blood [of the sacrifice] has been sprinkled'. This is why the number 'four' has been mentioned. Again, as to that which we have learnt: 'In four instances one brings the same sacrifice for wilful transgression as for transgression in error',4 - why has a number been mentioned there? - To exclude the view of R. Simeon. For it has been taught: 'R. Simeon holds, that in the case of a false oath concerning a deposit5 wilful transgression is not expiable by a sacrifice'.6 This is why the number 'four' has been mentioned there. Again, as to that which we have learnt: 'There are five Instances where one sacrifice is brought for several transgressions',7 - why has a number been mentioned? - Because it wishes to state in the sequel, 'And a nazirite who became unclean several times'. Now this is rendered possible if he became defiled on the seventh [clean] day8 and then again on the seventh day,9 and in accordance with the view of R. Jose son of R. Judah, who maintains that the 'Naziriteship of Cleanness'10 begins to operate from the seventh day.11 For according to Rabbi, who holds that the 'Naziriteship of Cleanness' does not become operative before the eighth day, how is this rendered possible? If he was defiled on the seventh day and then again on the seventh, the whole is one protracted period of uncleanness;12 and if he was defiled on the eighth day and then again on the eighth, since he had passed the time when the sacrifice became due, he should be liable to a separate offering for each defilement? It is thus proved that that [Mishnah] is in accordance with R. Jose son of R. Judah.13 Where is the dispute between Rabbi and R. Jose son of R. Judah? - As it has been taught: 'And he shall hallow his head the same day14 refers to the day of the bringing of the sacrifice, says Rabbi; R. Jose son of R. Judah says: To the day of the cutting of his hair',15 Again, as to that which we have learnt: 'Five must bring a sliding-scale offering' - why has a number been mentioned there?16 - Because it says in the sequel:17 'The same applies to the ruler'.18 He thus mentions the number 'five' to exclude the view of R. Eliezer who holds19 that a ruler brings a goat as an offering.20 Again, as to that which we have learnt: 'There are four principal categories of damage',21 - why has a number been mentioned there? - To exclude the view of R. Oshaia, who holds there are thirteen such categories.22 But then why has R. Oshaia mentioned a number? - To exclude the view of R. Hiyya, who holds that there are twenty-four such categories.23 But then why has R. Hiyya mentioned a number? - To exclude an informer and one who renders a sacrifice piggul.24
The Master said: 'If one commits all these transgressions in one spell of unawareness, one is liable [to a sacrifice] for each of them'. It is well that you could not declare him exempted altogether, for it is written: For whosoever shall do any of these abominations [even the souls that do them] shall be cut off.25 But why not say, if he commits one transgression of these he is liable to one sacrifice, if he transgresses them all in one spell of unawareness he is still liable only to one offering? - Replied R. Johanan: It is for this reason that [the penalty of] kareth has been specially mentioned in connection with 'his sister',26 to intimate that each of them requires a separate atonement.27 R. Bibi b. Abaye demurred to this: Why not say, in the case of 'his sister', which Scripture has singled out, a separate offering is required, but as to the other transgressions there should be but one sacrifice [for them all] since they have been committed under one spell of unawareness?28 But as to R. Bibi b. Abaye, does he not accept [the general principle] which has been taught: 'If a law has been included in a class and has then been singled out for some specification, this specification applies not only to that law but to the whole class';29 for instance [Scripture reads]: And the soul that eateth of the flesh [of the sacrifice of peace-offering. . .'].30 Now, was not the peace-offering included in the general class of consecrated things,31 why has it been singled out? To make [consecrated things]32 analogous [for the purpose of this law] to the peace-offerings: As the peace-offerings are dedications to the altar, and for this reason one is liable on their account to kareth, so also whatever are dedications to the altar, one is liable on account thereof to kareth; this excludes dedications for the Temple Repair [Fund]!33 - R. Bibi might reply: From this very [Baraitha one can prove the contrary]. Did you not say that dedications for the Temple Repair [Fund] were to be excluded? Likewise here [argue in a similar manner]: Just as 'his sister' is distinguished in that it is a relation which can never be permitted in the lifetime of the man who renders her forbidden,34 so must the others35 be such relatives as cannot be permitted in the lifetime of those who render them forbidden; this excludes the married woman, who can be permitted during the lifetime of him who renders her forbidden!36 - Said R. Jonah, or as some say, R. Huna the son of R. Joshua, Scripture says: For whosoever shall do any of these abominations etc.;37 all other forbidden relations are thus made analogous to 'his sister': Just as in the case of 'his sister' one is liable on her account to a separate offering, so also in all other cases one is liable to a separate offering for each [transgression]. But according to R. Isaac who holds,38 All transgressions39 liable to kareth have been comprised in a general statement,40 and the reason that kareth has been singled out in the case of 'his sister' is to render [the offence] subject to the penalty of kareth and not lashes,41 - wherefrom does he then derive that separate offerings have to be brought for each transgression? - He derives it from: And thou shalt not approach unto a woman while she is a niddah42 by her uncleanness;43 a separate offering is brought for each woman.44 But as to the Rabbis,45 let them derive the law [relating to separate offerings] from: 'Unto a woman while she is a niddah by her uncleanness'? - Indeed they do. And for which purpose then has the penalty of kareth been mentioned in the case of 'his sister'? - [To teach] that separate sacrifices be brought for intercourse with 'his sister', 'his father's sister' and 'his mother's sister'. But is [a text] necessary to separate these [various offences],46 are these [transgressions] not of different denominations and [committed with] different persons? - Rather, say that [three] separate sacrifices be required in the case of intercourse with 'his sister' who is at the same time his father's sister and his mother's sister.47 And whence will R. Isaac derive this? - He will derive it from the latter part of the verse: He hath uncovered his sister's nakedness.48 And for which purpose do the Rabbis apply 'his sister' in the latter part of the verse? - They apply it
(1) The mention of the number indicates that each transgression preserves its identity even if committed in conjunction with other transgressions.
(2) Shab. VII, 2.
(3) Before they may partake of sacred things.
(4) V. infra 9a where no number is mentioned.
(5) Which is one of the four instances mentioned in that Mishnah. According to him there are, then, only three such instances.
(6) Sheb. 34b.
(7) V. infra 9a.
(8) A nazirite who is defiled during the period of his naziriteship has to count seven clean days and bring an offering on the eighth day. He has then to observe again his vow of naziriteship for the period stipulated, v. Num. VI, 9f. If he is defiled on the seventh of the clean days, he has to start again this period of cleanness, etc.
(9) Viz., after the new defilement which interrupted the resumed count of naziriteship.
(10) I.e., the new count of naziriteship.
(11) His new defilement on the seventh day is therefore to be considered independent of that which preceded it.
(12) Its inclusion as a case where one is liable to one offering for several transgressions is then not justified.
(13) The number has thus been mentioned to include the nazirite and thus to teach that the Mishnah is in accordance with R. Jose and not Rabbi.
(14) Num. VI, 11. The continuation of this text prescribes the resumption of his naziriteship.
(15) I.e., the seventh day (ibid. g); v. infra 9b.
(16) V. infra 9a.
(17) Viz., of the Mishnah in Hor. 8b.
(18) I.e., he too is exempted altogether from any sacrifice in all cases where an ordinary person would have to bring a sliding-scale offering.
(19) Ibid. 9a.
(20) I.e., the number has been mentioned to stress that in the instances of these five transgressions enumerated in the Mishnah, infra 9a, none but a sliding-scale sacrifice can be brought and consequently a ruler brings in such cases no offering at all, in accordance with the general rule that a ruler is altogether exempt whenever the prescribed offering is not fixed.
(21) B.K. 2a.
(22) B. K 4b.
(24) V. Glos. I.e., these two are exempted from paying indemnity; v. B.K. 5a.
(25) Lev. XVIII, 29.
(26) Ibid. XX, 17; although this penalty is already implied in the collective statement in Lev. XVIII, 29. The superfluous mention of kareth in a single instance is to indicate that this penalty is prescribed for each transgression separately even when committed in conjunction with others.
(27) Lit., 'to divide'.
(28) I.e., one sacrifice should be offered for incestuous relations with a sister and one for the rest of transgressions collectively.
(29) One of the famous thirteen hermeneutic rules of R. Ishmael.
(30) Ibid. VII, 20 dealing with the prohibition for an unclean person to eat sacred food.
(31) Ibid. XXII, 3.
(32) To which the statement in Lev. XXII, 3 is meant to apply.
(33) And here likewise all cases of incestuous relationships ought to be derived from 'his sister'.
(34) I.e., she always remains forbidden to the brother.
(35) For the purpose of liability to a separate offering.
(36) I.e., she may remarry on divorce even in the lifetime of him who had hitherto rendered her forbidden, i.e., her husband. One might thus argue that one should not be liable to a separate offering for having relations with a married woman, if the transgression was committed together with other transgressions relating to forbidden relations, in one spell of unawareness.
(37) Lev. XVIII, 29.
(38) V. Mak. 13b, 23b. R. Isaac employs the previously mentioned analogy for a different purpose.
(39) Referring to forbidden marriages.
(40) Lev. ibid.
(41) I.e., his sin is not expiated by the infliction of lashes upon him.
(42) I.e., a menstruant woman.
(43) Lev. XVIII, 19.
(44) The word 'woman' is considered superfluous; it should read, 'not approach a niddah'.
(45) I.e., the opponents of R. Isaac, who hold that lashes effect expiation where kareth is predicated. The law referring to separate offerings seems according to them to be derived from 'his sister'.
(46) To teach that each must be atoned for separately.
(47) V. infra 25a.
(48) Ibid. XX, 17. The word 'sister' is considered superfluous. It should read 'her nakedness'.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 3a
to 'his sister' who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter,1 and to teach you that the trespass of a law deduced ad majus is not punishable. R. Isaac on the other hand holds that it is punishable. Or, if you will, I can say he will derive [the inclusion of the full sister in the pronouncement of] punishment from [its inclusion in the pronouncement of] prohibition.2
Said R. Eleazar in the name of R. Hoshaia: Wherever two negative commands are combined in one [collective pronouncement of the penalty of] kareth, separate sin-offerings are to be brought for each of them.3 Where is this exemplified? - In the instances of one who compounds or uses the sacred oil of anointment, for it is written: Upon the flesh of man shall it not be poured [neither shall ye make any like it], according to the composition thereof;4 whilst as to the one [pronouncement of] kareth, it is written: Whosoever compoundeth any like it, or whosoever putteth any of it upon a stranger, he shall be cut off from his people.5 Now, [according to this rule] since there is a separate negative command for each of the forbidden relations, why was it necessary [to single out in the Torah the] kareth [penalty] in the case of 'his sister'?6 - According to R. Isaac it is as we have explained above; whilst as to the Rabbis, [they employ the text] to let us know that a law derived by the conclusion ad majus is not punishable.7 Said R. Nahman son of Isaac: We have also learnt to this effect: WHEN ONE COMPOUNDS OIL [OF ANOINTING] OR COMPOUNDS INCENSE, OR USES OIL OF ANOINTING. Why has [the law concerning] one who compounds incense been placed between [the other two laws]8 if not to let us know: As [the law concerning] incense is a separate prohibition and one is liable on account thereof to a separate sin-offering, so also where one compounds oil of anointing and uses it, since they are the subject of separate prohibitions, one is liable on account of them to separate sin-offerings.3 And if you argue [that the reason of this order in the Mishnah is] because the instances concerning compounding had to be stated together, [then I would argue] that [the Tanna] should have reversed the order and stated as follows: When one compounds incense, or compounds the oil, or uses the oil [of anointing]; wherefore has he separated [the laws relating to] oil one from the other, if not to let us know that separate sin-offerings are to be brought for them? This proves it.
WHEN A MAN HAS CONNECTION WITH A MALE. Whom has the Tanna in mind?9 If a male, then you must omit the instance of the woman that is covered by a beast, and you are one short;10 if a woman, you must omit the instances of the man who has connection with a male or covers a beast, and you are short of two. - Said R. Johanan: Indeed the Tanna refers to a male, but read thus: When a male has connection with a male or causes a male to have connection with him; and [the Mishnah] is in accordance with R. Ishmael, who holds11 that one is liable to two sin-offerings.12 But since the case of the blasphemer is stated in the latter clause of the Mishnah and has been explained in accordance with R. Akiba,13 have we not to assume that also the earlier clause is in accordance with R. Akiba? And if you should argue that [the Mishnah] is indeed according to R. Akiba, but that he himself agrees with R. Ishmael's view in the case dealt with in the earlier clause, [I would retort,] did not R. Abbahu say: If a man has connection with a man or causes a man to have connection with him, on the view of R. Ishmael, who derives these [prohibitions] from two different texts, viz., Thou shalt not lie with mankind,14 and Neither shall there be a sodomite of the sons of Israel,15 he is liable to two sin-offerings; but according to R. Akiba he is liable to one sin-offering, since he derives both [prohibitions] from one and the same text, viz., 'Thou shalt not lie with mankind', Interpreting this: Thou shalt not cause [mankind] to lie [with thee]?16 Rather [you must say]: The first clause is according to R. Ishmael, but in the case of the blasphemer he agrees with R. Akiba. If so, the Mishnah should have also stated: When a man covers a beast or causes a beast to cover him? - Surely Abaye said: If a man covers a beast and causes a beast to cover him, even according to R. Ishmael, he is liable to one offering only, because the Scriptural text refers to human males only! R. Eleazar in the name of Rab said:17 The Tanna of our Mishnah meant to imply the possibility of one person18 bringing thirty-three sin-offerings,19 and he mentions the other three instances20 in order to complete the list of sins punishable with kareth. For it reads in the concluding clause: [WHEN ONE TRANSGRESSES THE LAWS OF] THE PASCHAL OFFERING AND CIRCUMCISION - FROM AMONG POSITIVE COMMANDMENTS. Now, wherefore have [the laws concerning the] paschal lamb and circumcision been enumerated? Should you say to intimate that one has to offer a sacrifice on their account?21 But does one bring a sacrifice on their account? Has it not been taught: All the laws of the Torah have been brought into analogy with idolatry,22 viz., Ye shall have one law for him that doeth ought in error,23 and But the person that doeth aught with a high hand:24 Just as the law concerning idolatry is the subject of a prohibition, so have all other transgressions to be the subjects of a prohibition?25 This, therefore, proves that the Tanna speaks of thirty-three transgressions committed in error, and that the other three cases have been mentioned only for the purpose of completing the list of sins punishable with kareth. This proves it.
WHEN ONE DESECRATES THE SABBATH. It was remarked: Are there not thirty-nine different classes of work on Sabbath?26 - Said R. Johanan: Our Tanna speaks of the case [where one was] in error in respect of the Sabbath, but aware of [the prohibition of the various kinds] of work [thereon],27 in which case one is liable to one sacrifice only. For it has been taught:28 How is 'these' resulting in 'one':29 If one is in error in respect of the Sabbath but aware of the prohibition of [various kinds of] work! But why does not the Tanna speak of the case where one was aware of the Sabbath and in error in respect to the prohibition of the various kinds of labour, making him then liable to thirty-nine [sin-offerings]? For has it not been taught:30 . . . and shall do any one of these [transgressions]? Sometimes one is liable to one offering for all transgressions and sometimes to an offering for each of them? [How is] 'one' resulting in 'these': If he was aware of the Sabbath and in error in respect of the work? - Our Tanna prefers to state the instance of the error in respect of the Sabbath and awareness [of the prohibition] of the various kinds of work to let us know that one is not altogether exempted from a sin-offering in such a case.31 And you must likewise explain the instance of idolatry of which our Mishnah speaks as referring to an error in respect of the idol but with an awareness of the prohibition of the forms of [idolatrous] worship. How is error in respect of the idol' to be understood? Shall I say that he stood in a house of idolatry and, thinking it was a synagogue, prostrated himself? But then his heart was directed towards Heaven. Again, if he saw a statue and prostrated himself to it, then if he accepted it as a deity, he is subject to stoning; on the other hand, if he did not acknowledge it as a deity, what has he done? Rather he served idols out of love or fear [of a fellow-man].32 That is right according to Abaye who holds33 one is liable [in such a case!, but according to Raba who says that one Is exempted, how is it to be understood?
(1) The text, Lev. XVIII, 9, mentions his father's daughter or his mother's daughter. The full sister, though not explicitly stated, can be derived by the conclusion ad majus. On the basis of this conclusion, however, no penalty is imposed according to the Rabbis. In Lev. XX, 17, however, the full sister is taken to be implied because sister is mentioned there without qualification.
(2) For the latter part she is assumed to be implied in the general term, 'she is thy sister' of Lev. XVIII, 11. Cf. Mak. 5b.
(3) Viz., in case of their transgression in one spell of unawareness.
(4) Ex. XXX, 32.
(5) Ibid. 33.
(6) V. the preceding discussion. R. Isaac employs this special mention of kareth for the derivation of the rule that separate offerings are to be brought for each transgression, whilst the Rabbis derive this rule from another text. According to the Rabbis, the question here will similarly be that that other text is now superfluous.
(7) In cur. edd. the following text is inserted here: 'According to R. Isaac, he derives from this that one is liable in the case of "his sister" who is at the same time his father's sister and his mother's sister. The Rabbis, however, will derive this from "his sister" of the former text; while R. Isaac holds that "his sister" in the former text is essential in the context and derives the rule of separate offerings from the word "his sister" in the latter text: that separate offerings be brought in the case of' "his sister" who is at the same time his father's sister and his mother's sister'. This insertion is struck out by Rashi and others.
(8) Which refer to oil and should therefore be stated together.
(9) Viz., with his implication expounded above by R. Johanan that if a person transgresses them all in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to an offering for each trespass.
(10) Of the full total of thirty-four sin-offerings involved for all the transgressions enumerated in the Mishnah. The transgressions relating to the paschal lamb and circumcision involve no sin-offering.
(11) V. Sanh. 54b.
(12) If committing these two offences in one spell of unawareness.
(13) V. infra 7a.
(14) Lev. XVIII, 22.
(15) Deut. XXIII, 18. This refers to the passive agent.
(16) The kal תשכב is read as the hiphil תשכיב.
(17) In answer to the original query as to whether the Tanna refers to a man or woman.
(18) Viz., a male.
(19) And not thirty-four as hitherto assumed.
(20) I.e., the one which does not apply equally to man and woman and those transgressions relating to the paschal lamb and circumcision.
(21) I.e.,that they be included in the statement of the Mishnah regarding the bringing of a sin-offering in the case of transgression in error.
(22) Mak. 13b.
(23) Num. XV, 29.
(24) Ibid. 30. The latter text refers to idolatry. The juxtaposition of the texts effects the analogy.
(25) In order to involve a sin-offering.
(26) V. Shab. VII, 1. Our Mishnah should therefore, on the view of R. Johanan, have enumerated seventy-four transgressions for the commission of which one would be liable to many sin-offerings.
(27) I.e., he did not know that the day was Sabbath, though he knew that work was prohibited on the Sabbath Day.
(28) Shab. 70b.
(29) The twofold partitive prefix in מאחת מהנה, Lev. IV, 2 is an unusual construction. Both prefixes are regarded as significant, to be used separately: firstly as מהנה אחת one out of these', indicating that several prohibited acts may be counted as one transgression, namely when they result from one error; secondly as מאחת הנה 'these out of one',implying that one law e.g., Sabbath, may lead to several transgressions, namely when the various acts originate in different errors. The former implication is expressed in the Gemara in the terms that 'these' results in 'one', and the latter that 'one' results in 'these'.
(30) Sanh. 62a.
(31) Contrary to the possible assumption that since he was aware that the work was prohibited he is to be regarded as having sinned with presumption.
(32) Thinking that with this motive worship was not forbidden.
(33) V. Sanh. 61b.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 3b
- Rather [it is to be understood] where he thought that the worship of idols was permitted. For Raba's question to R. Nahman1 was whether one is liable to one offering or to two;2 that one should be exempted altogether was never suggested by him.3 R. Papa said: It is possible4 where one had been captured as a child by heathens, he would know that idolatry was forbidden,5 but not that these particular idols were forbidden. Or if you wish, I may say that they can occur also with an adult,6 where e.g., he erred in the interpretation of the verse, Ye shall not make with the gods of silver or gods of gold, etc.7 and assumed that only the prostration before idols of gold or silver was forbidden, but not of any other material. This would then be a case of error in respect of the idol and awareness of the prohibition of the forms of worship. R. Aha the son of R. Ika said in the name of R. Bibi:8 Our Tanna enumerates Sabbath as a class and idolatry as a class.9 Whence [do we know this]? - It says, WITH A WOMAN AND HER DAUGHTER, OR WITH A MARRIED WOMAN. Now there is still the case of his daughter from a woman outraged by him, which is not mentioned in the Mishnah.10 [But] I might retort [the reason of this omission is that] the laws written in the Torah are mentioned, the laws not written in the Torah are not mentioned!11 - Surely there are still the instances of his wife's daughter, her daughter's daughter and her son's daughter, which are written in the Torah12 and yet not mentioned in our Mishnah. You are thus obliged to say that the whole class of woman and daughter is meant to be implied in the Mishnah; similarly interpret the Mishnah as referring to the class of Sabbath and the class of idolatry. R. Aha the son of R. Ika found that he [R. Bibi] contradicted himself. For how could R. Bibi b. Abaye say here, 'Our Tanna enumerates the Sabbath as a class and idolatry as a class'; was it not stated: 'If one offered up [the sacrificial] limbs [of an offering] slaughtered inside the Temple precincts outside the Temple court, one is liable; similarly, if he offered up outside limbs [of an offering that was slaughtered] outside [the Temple precincts] he is liable'?13 And in connection with this R. Bibi b. Abaye himself raised the difficulty: If so, how does the Mishnah state, THERE ARE IN THE TORAH THIRTY-SIX TRANSGRESSIONS PUNISHABLE WITH EXTINCTION? Are there not thirty-seven such transgressions, since there are the two cases of one offering up [outside] sacrificial portions. Now, what is his difficulty, since one can retort that the Tanna states the offering up as a class? What comparison is there? The laws of Sabbath and of idolatry are stated [elsewhere] in their proper place [in a Mishnah];14 when being mentioned here again in connection with kareth, it suffices to enumerate Sabbath and idolatry as types. But as to the laws of offering up, where is the place [in a Mishnah] that they have been stated,15 that you could reply in the same manner?
R. Jeremiah put the following query before R. Zera: What is the ruling when two separate pronouncements of kareth are attended by only one negative command?16 - He replied: You refer, I suppose, to 'slaughtering' and 'offering up' [outside the Temple precincts],17 but are there not in this case two negative commands?18 For according to him who derives 'slaughtering' from a gezerah shawah19 based upon the common term haba'ah20 mentioned [in connection with 'slaughtering' and 'offering up'], just as in the latter [the text] did not pronounce punishment without having expressed a warning,21 so also in the former it has not pronounced punishment without an attended [implicit] warning; and according to him who derives it from a hekkesh,19 the verse says: There thou shalt offer [thy burnt-offerings] and there thou shalt do [all that I command thee];22 Scripture has thus compared 'slaughtering' and 'offering up', just as in the case of 'offering up' it has not pronounced punishment without having expressed a warning, so also with 'slaughtering' it did not pronounce punishment without an attended [implicit] warning. Your query is, perhaps, in regard to two separate pronouncements of the death penalty attended by only one negative command, as is the case with the ob and yidde'oni.23 - He replied: On this there is a dispute between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish. For among the transgressions punishable by stoning we find enumerated24 both the ba'al ob and yidde'oni, and the question was raised: Why was yidde'oni mentioned in connection with 'stoning' but omitted in connection with kareth? Whereupon R. Johanan replied: Because they were both under one negative command,25 and the reason why ba'al ob and not yidde'oni was chosen, is that in Scripture ba'al ob is mentioned first; while Resh Lakish said that it is because [the offence of] yidde'oni involves no action.26 Why did not Resh Lakish say as R. Johanan - Said R. Papa: Because he holds these two laws are after all stated separately in respect of the pronouncement of the death penalty,27 while R. Johanan maintains that only where there are separate negative commands are there separate offerings, but separate pronouncements in respect of the death penalty do not involve separate offerings. And why does not R. Johanan say as Resh Lakish? - Because he holds that the Mishnah relating to kareth is according to R. Akiba,28 who holds that action is not essential [for the liability to a sin-offering]. And Resh Lakish? [He maintains that] although R. Akiba does not require a weighty action, he still considers it essential that some slight action be performed. What action is there in connection with ob? - The clapping of the arms29 is regarded as an action. What action is performed by the blasphemer? - The curving of the lips30 is considered an action.
On the assumption that the clapping of the arms is considered a slight action even according to the Rabbis,31 the following ob jection was raised: It was taught: In the case of idolatry one is liable only for an action such as sacrificing, the offering of incense or libation, or prostration;32 and when the difficulty was pointed out that prostration was not an action, Resh Lakish replied that this ruling was in accordance with R. Akiba who held that [weighty] action was not essential; while R. Johanan said: The ruling might conform even to the view of the Rabbis, for the bending of stature33 was to be considered as an action. It thus appears that in the opinion of Resh Lakish34 the Rabbis do not consider the 'bending of stature' an action. How then can the clapping of the arms35 be regarded as an action? - What, then, will you maintain that when Resh Lakish stated that the clapping of the arms is considered an action it was made on the view of R. Akiba, but that according to the Rabbis it was not to be considered an action;36 why in this case [does the Mishnah] state, THIS IS TO EXCLUDE THE BLASPHEMER WHO PERFORMS NO ACTION? It should have stated, This is to exclude the blasphemer and the ba'al ob! - [The Mishnah mentions] one of two [as an example].37 But then let it mention ba'al ob38 instead of the blasphemer? - [The explicit exclusion of] the blasphemer was necessary, for I might otherwise have thought that, since the pronouncement of kareth in his case is in juxtaposition to laws relating to offerings,39 the Rabbis agreed with R. Akiba with regard to the blasphemer. Therefore [the Mishnah] teaches us that this is not so. 'Ulla said: Ba'al ob mentioned in the Mishnah means the offering of incense40 to the Prince of the Demons.41 Raba demurred to this: If this is so, is not this idolatry?42 Rather Raba explained: [It means,] He offers incense to a demon in order to exorcise him.43 Abaye demurred to this: If so, is this not identical with 'one who charms'?44 - He replied: The Torah has said that one who charms after this manner [is liable to death] by stoning. And what kind of charm, then, is subject to a mere negative command?45 - He replied: As has been taught:46 And one who indeed charms,47 implies both the charmer of large and of small animals; even the charmer of a snake or scorpion is guilty.
Said Abaye: It is prohibited to cast a spell over a wasp and a scorpion,48 but if they follow him, it is permitted. According to R. Johanan, who holds that the bending of stature is regarded as an action, why should not also the curving
(1) Ibid. 70b.
(2) Where one was unmindful of the main offence as well as of its applications.
(3) And likewise here, although by thinking that idolatry is permitted the error would be alike in respect of the idol and the forms of worship, there is still liability to one sin-offering.
(4) To find a case where one was in error in respect of the idol but not in respect of the prohibition of the forms of worship.
(5) I.e., knowing which forms of worship were forbidden.
(6) Should read 'one who was not captured by heathens as a child'.
(7) Ex. XX, 20.
(8) With reference to the question at the beginning of this discussion, 'are there not thirty-nine classes of work on Sabbath?'
(9) Even though there are several transgressions under the heading of Sabbath or of idolatry, since the penalties are inflicted under the order of the one law they count as one.
(10) The reason of this omission is assumed to be that this case is included in the denomination of 'woman and daughter'. This would prove that a whole category count as one.
(11) Cf. Hag. 11b as to the source of the law concerning the daughter of an outraged woman. It is at all events not explicitly mentioned in the Torah.
(12) Lev. XVIII, 17.
(13) Zeb. 107a.
(14) Viz., in Shab. 73a and Sanh. 60b.
(15) The law relating to the two types of offering up mentioned above is nowhere mentioned in a Mishnah but emanates from the School of Amoraim.
(16) I.e., how many offerings are to be brought if such two laws are broken in one spell of unawareness?
(17) Kareth is mentioned in Lev. XVII, 4 and 9 and the negative command in Deut. XII, 13.
(18) Though one of them is not explicit.
(19) V. Glos.
(20) Lit., 'bringing' mentioned in connection with 'slaughtering', Lev. XVII, 4 and in connection with 'offering up' ibid. v. 9.
(21) I.e., a negative command. The negative command in connection with offering up is in Deut. XII, 13.
(22) Ibid, 14.
(23) 'One that divineth by a ghost or a familiar spirit', v. Lev. XX,27, where the death penalty is laid down for these offences, and for the attendant negative command, ibid. XIX, 31. The disjunctive particle 'or' in Lev. XX, 27 in connection with the death penalty serves to attach the death penalty to each of these two offences and it is regarded as if two separate pronouncements of the death penalty were made, whereas the negative command ibid. XIX, 31 is general in its implication, serving as a single warning for all the offences enumerated there, and thus the query is whether the fact that there are two pronouncements of death, although there is only one attendant warning, makes one liable to two sin-offerings for committing these two offences in one spell of unawareness?
(24) Sanh. 53a, 65a. In the latter place the whole discussion that follows is to be found.
(25) And are subject accordingly to one sacrifice if committed under the one spell of unawareness. Only one could therefore be mentioned in our Mishnah, on the explanation given by R. Johanan for the number stated, as the representative of the class of necromancy.
(26) It consists of a mere sound made by means of a certain bone put in the mouth, v. Sanh. 65b. There is accordingly no sin-offering, whereas ob involved an action; v. infra.
(27) And but for the fact that yidde'oni involves no action it would be in his opinion subject to a separate offering when committed together with ob.
(28) Who holds that, though his act involves no action, the blasphemer is liable to an offering; v. infra 7a.
(29) One of the movements of this form of divination, v. Sanh. 65a.
(30) When uttering the blasphemies.
(31) Who differ in our Mishnah from R. Akiba with regard to the blasphemer and hold that he brings no offering because blasphemy involves no action. As they do not seem to disagree in the law relating to ob, it may be assumed that they consider this involving an action.
(32) Tosef. Sanh. X.
(33) When prostrating.
(34) Whose deviation from R. Johanan is traced back to his disagreement on this point. In Resh Lakish's view the bending of stature is sufficient action only according to R. Akiba.
(35) Whereby the body remains unmoved.
(36) Ba'al ob should accordingly not be subject to an offering.
(37) From the exclusion of one we can derive the exclusion of the other since the reason is the same in both.
(38) Which is mentioned first in the Mishnah.
(39) The law concerning the blasphemer is contained in Num. XV, 30 in conjunction with prescriptions relating to offerings. I might have thought that this juxtaposition was to indicate that there is to be an offering in the case of blasphemy even against the otherwise valid rule that no sacrifice is offered except for a sin which involves an action.
(40) Which is undoubtedly an action.
(41) This is Rashi's version; while cur. edd. read only 'demon'.
(42) Already mentioned in the Mishnah.
(43) I.e., that he should help him in his witchcraft, and not an act of worship.
(44) Which comes under a different prohibition, viz., Deut XVIII, 12 and does not involve kareth.
(45) I.e , to flagellation only.
(46) Sanh. 65a. It is these instances as enumerated in Sanh. that are the subject of a negative command only, while the exorcising of a demon is subject also to kareth.
(47) Deut. ibid. Lit. 'and he who charms a charm'. The repetition of the term is to indicate that there are two kinds of charm.
(48) Although they are a source of danger to the public. When they follow him it is permitted by reason of the danger to his person.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 4a
of the lips be considered an action?1 - Said Raba: Different it is with the blasphemer, for it is the disposition of his heart2 [that effects the sin]. But elsewhere the curving of the lips would be considered an action. R. Zera demurred to this: [We have learnt:] Zomemim3 witnesses are exempt [from an offering] because they have done no action,4 Why is this so? Is it not written in connection with them: By the mouth of two witnesses?5 - Said Raba: Zomemim witness, too, are an exception, because the basis of evidence is seeing.6
WHEN ONE EATS HELEB. Our Rabbis taught: The text, Ye shall eat no heleb of ox, or sheep or goat,7 [intimates] that one is liable [to a separate flagellation] for each kind [of heleb].8 Thus R. Ishmael. But the Sages say: One is liable only once. Shall we say that this difference of opinion is based on the following principle: R. Ishmael holds one is liable to [a separate] flagellation for [each specification of] a collective prohibition,9 while the Rabbis hold that one is not liable to [a separate] flagellation? - No, R. Ishmael indeed holds that one is ordinarily not liable [separately] for [each specification of] a collective prohibition, but our case is an exception, because the text is superfluous; for it should read, 'Ye shall not eat any heleb', why specify 'of ox, or sheep or goat', if not for the purpose of establishing a separate [prohibition for each of them]? And the Rabbis? - [They argue,] If 'ox, or sheep or goat' were not mentioned, I might have said that also the heleb of a beast of chase is included. It is for this reason that 'ox, or sheep or goat' was written, to tell us that only the heleb of ox, sheep or goat is forbidden, but that of the beast of chase is permitted. The Rabbis thus argue well, do they not? - Rather, this is the reason of R. Ishmael: He holds that if it were [as the Rabbis say] Scripture should have written: 'Ye shall eat no heleb of an ox', why have 'sheep' and 'goat' been mentioned, if not for the purpose of establishing a separate prohibition [for each of them]? The Rabbis, on the other hand, argue that if the Divine Law wrote, 'no heleb of an ox', I might have thought that the term 'ox' here was to be analogous to ox mentioned in connection with Sabbath:10 As in the case of Sabbath the beast of chase and the fowl were included, so also in connection with the eating of heleb the beast of chase and fowl are included. It is for this reason that 'ox, or sheep or goat' were enumerated, to teach us that only the heleb of these is forbidden, but that of the beast of chase and the fowl is permitted. The Rabbis thus argue well? Rather, this is the reason [of R. Ishmael]: He holds [Scripture] should have written: 'Ye shall eat no heleb of sheep' or 'Ye shall eat no heleb of goat'; why enumerate 'ox, or sheep or goat', if not in order to establish a separate [prohibition for each of them]. The Rabbis, on the other hand, argue: Had [Scripture] mentioned only 'no heleb of sheep',11 might have assumed that only the heleb of sheep was forbidden, but that of ox and goat was permitted. And if you were to ask, why should sheep be an exception, [the retort would be] because it was singled out in that its fat-tail is offered upon the altar, even as R. Hanania taught:11 Why has [Scripture] enumerated separately the emurim12 of the ox, and the emurim of the sheep and the emurim of the goat, as it is written:13 But the firstling of an ox, etc.?14 It is necessary; for if 'ox' alone was written, I would not have derived 'sheep' and 'goat' from it, for I might object that 'ox' was an exception, since it is singled out with regard to libations.15 Had the Divine Law written only 'sheep', so that 'ox' and 'goat' should be derived from it, I might object that 'sheep' was an exception,since it was singled out in that its fat-tail [is offered upon the altar].16 Had the Divine Law written only 'goat', so that 'ox' and 'sheep' should be derived from it, I might object that 'goat' was an exception, since it was singled out [as the offering] for idolatry.17 We thus cannot derive from any single one the other two. But why did not Scripture mention two and we might have derived the third from them? - Which one? Shall we derive 'ox' from 'sheep' and 'goat'? I might object that 'sheep' and 'goat' were an exception, since they were both singled out to be offered as a paschal sacrifice.18 If [Scripture] would not have written 'sheep', leaving us to derive it from 'ox' and 'goat', [I would have objected] that 'ox' and 'goat' were an exception, since they were both singled out as offerings for idolatry.19 If it would not have written 'goat', leaving us to derive it from 'ox' and 'sheep' [I would have objected] that 'ox' and 'sheep' were exceptions in that they were both singled out in some aspect [regarding the altar].20 Hence they cannot be derived one from the other. Did not then the Rabbis argue well? - Rather, the reason of R. Ishmael is indeed as has been said at the outset: [viz.,] that if it were so [Scripture] should have written: '[Ye shall eat] no heleb', and no more; and as to your objection that the mention of 'ox', 'sheep' and 'goat' was necessary to teach that the heleb of the beast of chase was permitted, surely the text [in question] occurs in connection with a similar text which relates to consecrated animals,21 and a law is always illuminated by its context.22 This implies [does it not] that the Rabbis do not hold that a law is illuminated by its context?23 - No, all agree that a law is illuminated by its context but here they differ in the following: R. Ishmael holds that such [a law which is the subject of] a mere negative command is illuminated [by its context] whether [the latter is likewise the subject] of a mere negative command or of one involving kareth;24 while the Rabbis hold that [a law which is the subject of] a mere negative command is illuminated [by its context] which is [the subject of a mere] negative command, but a law which is [the subject of] a mere negative command is not illuminated by [a context which is] the subject of [a negative command involving] kareth.25 Or, if you wish, I can say that the reason of the Rabbis is [that the enumeration of the various kinds of fat was necessary to teach] that which is intimated in a question of R. Mari to R. Zebid: 'If so, why should not the fat-tail of non-consecrated animals be altogether forbidden'?26 He replied: 'It is to provide against an argument such as yours that Scripture specifies, All heleb of ox, sheep or goat, to teach us that only those portions of fat which these three animals have in common are forbidden, to the exclusion [of the fat-tail].'27 The enumeration of 'ox', 'sheep' and 'goat' is thus for the purpose of permitting for use the fat-tail of unconsecrated animals. R. Ishmael, on the other hand, will argue: If for this reason, Scripture should have said: 'No heleb of ox and sheep'. Therefore when 'goat' was added, it was for the purpose of establishing a separate prohibition for each of them.
Said R. Hanina: R. Ishmael, however, agrees that with regard to offerings only one sin-offering is brought [for the several kinds of heleb]. What is the reason? Because this prohibition is not like that relating to incestuous relations.28
Our Sages have taught: [It is written:] And [he] shall do any one [sin], and also, And shall do these;29 this is to render one liable for each transgression separately, so that if one ate [e.g.,] two portions of heleb of the same designation under two separate spells of unawareness, he is liable to two offerings; [similarly] if the portions were of two different designations,30 though they were consumed under one spell of unawareness, one is liable to two offerings. Said Rami son of Hama to R. Hisda: It is right that where the portions were of one designation but consumed under two spells of unawareness one should be liable to two offerings, because [the break in] the spell of unawareness effected a division [between the two meals], but why should one be liable to two offerings in the case where the portions were of different designations and consumed under one spell of unawareness? Surely we need a break in the spell of unawareness to effect a division, which is not the case here? - He replied: Here we deal with the case where he ate heleb of nothar,31 when he is liable on account of nothar and on account of heleb. Said he to him: If so, he should be liable also on account of the consecrated flesh?32 - Rather, said R. Shesheth: It refers to one who ate the heleb of a consecrated animal and it is in accordance with R. Judah.33 For it has been taught: If one eats heleb of nebelah,34 or heleb of consecrated animals, one is liable on two counts. R. Judah holds, in the case of heleb of a consecrated animal, one is liable on three counts.35 In Palestine36 this answer was ridiculed; [for they argued] why did we not explain it as referring to portions of heleb from an ox, sheep and goat, and in accordance with R. Ishmael who maintained that one was then liable on three counts?
(1) Why then is blasphemy excluded by the Sages?
(2) His utterance is only proof of his disposition, while in the case of idolatry worship, I.e., action is an integral part of the transgression.
(3) V. Glos.
(4) Sanh. ibid.
(5) Deut. XVII, 6 implying that the speech is the essence of evidence.
(6) The knowledge of facts makes them into witnesses; the utterance of the evidence is only a means of conveying their knowledge to others. Perception by the senses is considered no action.
(7) Lev. VII, 23.
(8) When eaten after one collective warning.
(9) The term לאו שבכללות which occurs also in Pes. 41b, Naz. 35b, B.M. 115b, Sanh. 63a and Tem. 7a seems to have a double connotation. Firstly, a prohibition which is not explicit but implied in the text, such as in Num. VI, 4 as expounded in Pes. 41b; secondly, as it is used here, a law which is joined in the text with others in one prohibitory commandment. In the first instance the question is whether one is liable to flagellation at all, in the second whether one is liable separately for each specification, if several of them were perpetrated together.
(10) Ex. XXIII, 22; cf. B.K. 54b. Thus Rashi's version and MSS. Cur. edd. read Mount Sinai instead of Sabbath.
(11) Bek. 5b. There the author of this dictum is given as R. Jose son of R. Hanina.
(12) I.e., those sacrificial portions offered upon the altar; v. Glos.
(13) Num. XVIII, 17. This question is not precisely formulated; not the term emurim is repeated, but the term 'firstling': 'The firstling of an ox, or the firstling of a sheep, or the firstling of a goat'; v. Bek. ibid.
(14) The end of this passage is: Thou shalt make their fat smoke for an offering made by fire.
(15) With the sacrifice of an ox half a hin of wine is offered up on the altar, with a sheep and goat only a quarter of a hin; cf. Num. XXVIII, 14.
(16) V. Lev. III, 9.
(17) Cf. Ibid. IV, 27-28. This is explained with reference to idolatry by an individual, v. Hor. 8a.
(18) Cf. Ex. XII, 5.
(19) The ox for idolatry committed by the public, cf. Lev. IV. 13f.
(20) V. Bek. 5b. The respective distinctions of 'ox' and of 'sheep' as mentioned above are in reference to the altar.
(21) Lev. VII, 25. Which must of necessity exclude beasts of chase, since no such animals may be consecrated for the altar.
(22) Viz., that also the prohibition of heleb does not apply to beasts of chase.
(23) Surely they cannot disregard this hermeneutic principle.
(24) In cur. edd. the following text, which is obviously out of place here and is also considered by Rashi as a faulty version, is inserted here: (For the negative command,) any heleb of ox, sheep or goat, you shall not eat, (Lev. VII, 23) is illuminated by the negative command, It shall be a statute throughout your generations in all your dwellings that ye shall eat neither heleb nor blood (Lev. III, 17) which is written in connection with consecrated animals; and since the beast of chase is excluded from the category of consecrated animals, there would be no doubt as to the exclusion of beasts of chase, even if heleb unqualified was mentioned in the text. The enumeration of 'ox', 'sheep' and 'goat' is thus for the purpose of establishing a separate offering for each of them. Then, the mere negative command, 'Ye shall eat no heleb 'and the one contained in the verse of 'it shall he a perpetual statute' may be derived from one to which kareth is attached, in the text, For whosoever eateth the heleb of the beast of which men present an offering (Lev. VII, 25). As the latter intimates a division of the offerings, so also the former.
(25) V. Lev. VII, 25. The penalty of kareth is mentioned in connection with heleb of consecrated animals.
(26) Since it is called heleb in Scripture, v. Lev. III, 9.
(27) V. Hul. 117a.
(28) Where a separate negative command is attached to each offence.
(29) Referring to Lev. IV, 2: If any one shall sin through error, in any of the things which the Lord hath commanded not to be done, and shall do any one of them. The construction in Heb. מאחת מהנה is unusual. The juxtaposition of 'one' and 'these' is therefore taken to indicate that there is a plurality which bears the character of oneness, and a oneness which bears the character of a plurality, v. Sanh. 62a. This exposition is expressed here in the terminology of the Gemara, that the predicate shall do relates on the one hand to 'one' and on the other to 'these'. V. p. 11, n. 3.
(30) E.g., the heleb of the kidneys and that of the bowels.
(31) I.e., sacrificial portions left over beyond the prescribed time. V. Glos.
(32) As a non-priest.
(33) I.e., the second instance of the dictum of the Sages refers in fact to the eating of one portion of heleb, and 'of two designations' means of a kind that is subject to a twofold prohibition, for according to R. Judah, there are two prohibitory laws in the case of sacred heleb.
(34) I.e., an animal not slaughtered in the prescribed manner. V. Glos.
(35) Because eating heleb of consecrated animals, as will be shown later, involves a twofold transgression, and as a non-priest eating sacred flesh, he is guilty of a third prohibition.
(36) Lit., 'in the West'; v. Sanh. 17b.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 4b
Why then was it not explained in accordance with R. Ishmael? Obviously because R. Hanina said that R. Ishmael admitted that in so far as offerings were concerned one was liable only to one1 - for the same reason you cannot explain it in accordance with R. Judah; for R. Eleazar said: R. Judah, too, agreed that with regard to offerings one is liable only to one. Therefore, said Resh Lakish on behalf of Bar Tutani: It deals with one who ate two portions of heleb in two different dishes, and is in accordance with R. Joshua, who holds that the separation of dishes effects a division with regard to offerings.
[Stated] the text [above]: 'If one eats heleb of nebelah, one is liable on two counts, [similarly] if one eats heleb of consecrated animals one is liable on two counts. R. Judah holds, in the case of heleb of consecrated animals, one is liable on three counts'. Said R. Shizbi to Raba: It is well on the view of R. Judah; for this reason are written three verses: It shall be a perpetual statute etc., Ye shall eat no heleb of an ox, or sheep or goat, and There shall no common man eat of the holy things;2 constituting three negative commands. But what is the reason of the Rabbis? - They hold, The negative command, 'It shall be a perpetual statute [etc.]' deals with consecrated animals, and the negative command, '[No] heleb of an ox . . . 'deals with unconsecrated animals. And both texts were necessary, for if the Divine Law had written only that of consecrated animals, I might have said that only the heleb of consecrated animals was forbidden by reason of their stringency, but that of unconsecrated animals was not [included in the prohibition]. Therefore the Divine Law wrote: 'No heleb of an ox . . .'. And if only 'no heleb of an ox' was written, I might have thought that only the heleb of unconsecrated animals was forbidden, because it has not been excluded from the general prohibition; but as to the heleb of consecrated animals, since it has been excluded from the general prohibition,3 I might have thought that since it is thus excluded, their fat is permitted;4 therefore both texts are necessary. R. Judah, on the other hand, holds that when 'no heleb of an ox' is written5 it relates also to consecrated animals.6 This implies [does it not] that the Rabbis hold that a law is not illuminated by its context? - No, all agree that a law is illuminated by its context, but they differ in the following: R. Judah holds that a law which is the subject of a mere negative command is illuminated by its context, whether the latter is likewise the subject of a mere negative command or of one involving kareth; while the Rabbis hold that a law which is the subject of a mere negative command is illuminated by its context which is also the subject of a mere negative command, but a law which is the subject of a mere negative command is not illuminated by its context which is the subject of a native command involving kareth.7
It has been taught: [From the text,] 'Ye shall eat neither heleb nor blood', [we learn:] Just as for heleb one is liable to a twofold flagellation' so also for blood. Thus the view of R. Judah; while the Sages say: There is only one prohibition.8 But why is heleb different in that one is liable for it to a twofold flagellation, even though there is no hekkesh9 [to support it]? Obviously because there is written in Scripture concerning it two texts: 'Ye shall eat neither heleb nor blood', and '[Ye shall eat no] heleb of an ox or sheep'; then similarly in the case of blood even without the hekkesh,10 one should be liable to a twofold flagellation,11 since Scripture has written in connection therewith two texts: 'Ye shall eat neither heleb nor blood' and 'Ye shall eat no manner of blood, whether it be of fowl or of beast, in any of your dwellings'?12 - Rather read thus: Just as for heleb13 one is liable to a threefold flagellation, so also for blood13 one is liable to a threefold flagellation. But why is heleb different in that one is liable for it to a threefold flagellation? Obviously because there is written in connection therewith the two negative commands mentioned above, and because of the negative command [relating to the eating of holy things by] a non-priest,14 making altogether three; then the same applies to blood!15 - [The hekkesh] is necessary, for I might otherwise have thought, since blood is excluded from the law of sacrilege,16 it is also excluded from the law concerning the [eating of holy things by a] non-priest. It is for this reason that the hekkesh is necessary. And as to the Rabbis,17 what is the purpose of the hekkesh? - It is required for what has been taught: 'Ye shall eat neither heleb nor blood'; just as heleb is singled out in that it is distinct from its flesh,18 and thus does not combine with the latter,19 so also with blood, [it does not combine with the flesh] whenever it is distinct from its flesh,20 to the exclusion of the blood of a reptile:21 since the blood of the reptile is not distinct from its flesh,the two combine.22 But is this law23 derived from here, is it not rather derived from the following: The text, And these are they which are unclean unto you,24 teaches that the blood of a reptile and its flesh combine with one another?25 - If it were not for the hekkesh I might have thought [the law referred] to defilement,26 but not to eating; the hekkesh therefore informs us that [the law refers] also to eating. Said Rabina: Consequently the blood of a snake27 and its flesh28 combine one with the other. Is this not obvious; it is just [the conclusion drawn from] the hekkesh? I might have thought that with the case of other reptiles,29 since the law applies in respect of uncleanness, it applies also in respect of eating; but in the case of a snake, since it does not apply in respect of defilement,it does not apply also in respect of eating; therefore he30 lets us know that the hekkesh is to comprise everything in which the blood is not distinct from its flesh.
Said Raba: Wherefore has kareth been pronounced three times31 in connection with blood? One [pronouncement] refers to blood of unconsecrated animals, the other to blood of consecrated animals, and the third to the dripping blood.32 This is right according to R. Judah, for it has been taught: The dripping blood is the subject of a mere prohibition; R. Judah says it involves kareth. But according to the Rabbis,33 what is the purpose [of the third pronouncement]? And even according to R. Judah, is not the application of kareth34 rather derived from the term 'all blood'? For it has been taught: 'R. Judah said, [The word] 'blood' [would suffice in the text],35 why does it read 'all blood'? I might have thought that only the blood of consecrated animals, and that only with which life departs, was meant, because this blood brings about atonement;36 whence do we know then blood of unconsecrated animals and dripping blood? It is for this reason that 'all blood' was written'! - Rather say thus: One [pronouncement] refers to blood of unconsecrated animals, the other to blood of consecrated animals, and the third to blood that has been covered.37
Raba also said, Wherefore have five negative commandments been mentioned in connection with blood?38 One for blood of unconsecrated animals, the other for blood of consecrated animals, the third for covered blood, the fourth for blood left in the limbs and the fifth for the dripping blood.
R. Ela said: If one eats39 of the [second] tithe of corn, of wine and of oil, one is liable to a threefold flagellation. But are [separate] lashes administered for [each specification of] a collective prohibition? This case is an exception for the text is redundant. Consider: The Divine Law states, And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God [in the place which He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there], the tithe of thy corn, of thy wine and of thine oil,40 [from which we may infer that these shall be consumed] within [the precincts of Jerusalem] and not without; wherefore does the Divine Law repeat: Thou mayest not eat within thy gates the tithe of thy corn, of thy wine and of thine oil,41 if not for the purpose of establishing separate [prohibitions for each specification]? But [it may be retorted], if [I had] the first text [only to go by], I would say it is the subject only of a positive command, but not of a negative command.42 It was thus essential
(1) I.e., though several negative commandments are transgressed, and the administration of lashes is therefore accordingly repeated, with reference to expiation by sacrifice they are regarded as one.
(2) Lev. III, 17; VII, 23 and XXII, 10.
(3) It is permissible to the altar.
(4) V. Sh. Mek. for this reading.
(5) V. Lev. VII, 23-25.
(6) So that there are two negative commands concerning heleb of consecrated animals.
(7) For notes v. supra 4a. In cur. edd. the following faulty text (v. Rashi) is inserted here: 'But according to R. Judah for what purpose does Scripture mention the passage, Ye shall eat neither heleb nor blood (Lev. III, 17)? - To establish an analogy'.
(8) And consequently there can be only one administration of lashes.
(9) v. Glos.
(10) The textual analogy comparing blood to heleb.
(11) I.e., the mere repetition of the negative command is sufficient to establish a twofold flagellation. The fact of the juxtaposition of heleb and blood in the text is thus unaccounted for.
(12) Lev. VII, 26.
(13) Viz., of a consecrated animal.
(14) Ibid. XXII, 10. comprising apparently heleb as well as blood.
(15) What need is there then for the analogy.
(16) Thus the version of Rashi. Cur. edd. read 'uncleanness'. Cf. Hul. 117a.
(17) According to whom blood of a consecrated animal is excluded from the law concerning the non-priest.
(18) The law of heleb singles out a certain portion of the animal and forbids it for use, while the rest of the body is permitted.
(19) Viz., to make up the requisite quantity sc. of an olive-size. I.e.,if one eats a fraction of an olive of heleb and the supplementary fraction of flesh, one is not liable to lashes, for the flesh is not forbidden.
(20) Whereas the penalty of kareth attaches to the blood, the flesh of an unclean animal does not carry such a penalty, and consequently blood and flesh do not combine not even with regard to uncleanness.
(21) Which is not prohibited as blood but as part of the reptile, cf. infra 21b.
(22) Viz., with reference to uncleanness and eating.
(23) Viz., the one relating to reptiles.
(24) Lev. XI, 29.
(25) V. Me'il. 17a.
(26) I.e., the combination of blood and flesh is adopted only with reference to defilement which is more stringent, in so far as the standard quantity is a lentil, while for eating an olive-size is required.
(27) Which does not cause defilement, but is forbidden for eating.
(28) I.e., now that we know that the rule concerning the combination of flesh and blood applies also to eating.
(29) Viz., the eight reptiles that are unclean.
(30) Viz., Rabina.
(31) Lev. VII, 27; XVII, 10 and 14.
(32) I.e.,the blood which, after a while, flows gently from the cut artery, in opposition to the blood which gushes forth immediately after the cut has been made, and with which life is considered to depart; cf. infra 22a.
(33) Those who dispute with R. Judah.
(34) Viz., to dripping blood.
(35) Lev. XVII, 10, which deals with the prohibition of blood.
(36) This gushing blood alone may be used for sprinkling, cf. Pes. 65a. This restriction of the law to blood suitable for atonement might have found a support in the following passage: And I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement far your souls (ibid. 11).
(37) The blood of fowls and beasts has to be covered, cf. Lev. XVII, 13. This blood is prohibited even though it has been mixed with dust. This answer complies with the view of the Rabbis, for according to R. Judah blood of unconsecrated animals is derived by implication from 'all blood'.
(38) Viz., Ibid. III, 17; VII, 26; XVII, 14; Deut. XII, 16 and 23.
(39) Viz., outside Jerusalem. Second tithe or its equivalent has to be consumed in Jerusalem; cf. Deut. XIV, 22f. In v. 23 corn, wine and oil are enumerated as specifications of the general law.
(40) Deut. XIV, 23.
(41) Ibid. XII, 17.
(42) Lashes are inflicted only for the transgression of a prohibitory law and not for the omission of a positive injunction. The prohibition derived by implication from a positive commandment bears in this respect the status of a positive commandment.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 5a
that the Divine Law should write, 'Thou mayest not [eat] . . .' in order to make it the subject of a negative command. [The question thus] still [stands]. Is it not a collective prohibition? - If it were so, Scripture should have said, 'Thou mayest not eat them within thy gates', why specify, 'the tithe of thy corn, thy wine and thine oil', if not in order to establish separate prohibitions for each of them?
Said R. Isaac: if one eats of the bread, of the parched corn and of the fresh ears,1 one is liable to a threefold flagellation. But are [separate] lashes administered for [each specification of] a collective prohibition? - This is an exception, as the text is redundant; for Scripture should have stated only 'bread', and 'parched corn' and 'fresh ears' would have been derived therefrom. But one might in this case have objected: 'Bread' is different because it is subject to hallah?2 - Then 'parched corn' alone should have been written omitting 'bread',3 and we would derive the others therefrom! - But 'bread' could not be derived from 'parched corn', because 'parched corn' is a produce in its natural state, while 'bread' is not in its natural state; similarly 'fresh ears' could not be derived from 'parched corn', because 'parched corn' is distinguished in that it is fit for meal-offerings,4 while 'fresh ears' are not fit for meal-offerings? - Then 'fresh ears' alone should have been written, and we could derive 'bread' and 'parched corn' therefrom! But,then, I would object, 'fresh ears' were different in that they retain their original character. It is thus established that from any single one the other two cannot be derived; but let us derive one from two? - Now, if 'bread' was not written, leaving it to be derived from 'parched corn' and 'fresh ears', I might object, these two were distinguished in that they are in their natural form. If 'fresh ears' was not written, leaving them to be derived from 'bread' and 'parched corn', I might object that these two were distinguished in that they are included in the law of meal-offering?5 - R. Isaac will tell you: [Scripture] should not have written 'parched corn', leaving it to be derived from 'bread' and 'fresh ears. For what objection could then be raised? If you argued: 'Bread' was exceptional in that it is subject to hallah, 'fresh ears' will prove the contrary; and if that 'fresh ears' were exceptional because they retain their original character, 'bread' will prove the contrary. It is from this superfluous text that we learn that separate lashes are inflicted [for each specification]. But why not say then, that 'parched corn', the mention of which is superfluous, is singled out for flagellation,6 but if one eats them all, one is still liable only once to flagellation? - If this were so, Scripture should read in this order: 'Bread!, 'fresh ears' and 'parched corn', or 'parched corn', 'bread' and 'fresh ears'; why is 'parched corn' placed between the other two, apparently that we may understand it thus: For 'bread' just as for parched corn' one is liable [to a separate flagellation], and for 'fresh ears just as for 'parched corn' one is liable [to a separate flagellation].
Said R. Jannai: Never treat a gezerah shawah7 lightly, for behold the law of piggul,7 which is one of the essential precepts of the Torah,8 has been derived through a gezerah shawah; even as R. Johanan said: Zabda son of Levi taught: Elsewhere we read, Everyone that eateth it shall bear his iniquity,9 and here we read, And the soul that eateth of it shall bear his iniquity;10 as there11 the penalty prescribed is kareth, so also here it is kareth.
Said R. Simai: Never treat a gezerah shawah lightly, for behold the law concerning nothar,12 which is one of the essential precepts of the Torah,13 has only been derived through a gezerah shawah. What is [the gezerah shawah]? - The derivation of kodesh [holy] from kodesh [in the following texts]: Everyone that eateth it shall bear his iniquity, because he hath profaned the holy thing of the Lord,14 and Thou shalt burn the nothar with fire, [it shall not be eaten] because it is holy.15
Said Abaye: Never treat a gezerah shawah lightly, for behold the law concerning a man's daughter from an outraged woman is one of the essential precepts16 of the Torah, and yet it has been derived only through a gezerah shawah,' as Raba said: R. Isaac son of Abdimi told me: As to the prohibition, this law is derived from the similarity of the expression hennah,17 and with regard to the penalty of burning from the similarity of the expression zimmah.18
Said R. Ashi: Never treat a gezerah shawah lightly, for death by stoning [as a penalty for many transgressions] is an essential regulation of the Torah, and yet [in several cases] it has been derived only through a gezerah shawah, as it has been taught:19 We find here20 the expression demehem bam21 and we find the same expression in connection with ob and yidde'oni:22 As in the latter case the penalty prescribed is stoning, so also in the former case it is stoning.
WHEN ONE COMPOUNDS OIL [OF ANOINTING] . . . Our Rabbis have taught: If one compounds oil [of anointing] for experimenting or with the intention to hand it over to the community, he is not culpable; if for anointment he is culpable, though the person that anoints himself therewith is exempt, because the transgression concerning the use of the oil is limited to the oil of anointment which Moses himself compounded.23 The Master said: 'If for experimenting or with the intention to hand it over to the community, he is not culpable'. Whence do we know this? - It is derived by means of the common expression mathkunto24 mentioned here and in connection with incense. And with reference to incense it is written, Ye shall not make unto yourselves,25 which implies that one is culpable only if compounded for oneself, but not with the intention to hand it over to the community; similarly with regard to the oil, if it is compounded with the intention to hand it over to the community, one is exempted. But why not then again derive incense from the oil: Just as in the case of the oil one is exempted if one compounded half the prescribed quantity, so also with incense, he should be exempted if he compounded half the prescribed quantity; why then did Raba say:26 If one compounds incense in half the quantity prescribed, he is culpable, but if one compounds oil in half the quantity, he is exempt? - Raba will reply: In connection with oil it is written, Ye shall not make any like it according to the composition thereof' 'Like it' it is prohibited, but in half the prescribed quantity it is permitted; but in connection with incense, it is written, And the incense which thou shalt make:27 All compounding of incense [is forbidden], for one can offer up half the quantity in the morning and half in the evening.28
Our Rabbis have taught: [The composition of the] oil of anointment is [as follows]: Five hundred shekels of flowing myrrh, five hundred of cassia, five hundred of sweet cinnamon and two hundred and fifty of sweet calamus, together one thousand seven hundred and fifty shekels. Was it necessary for the Tanna to state the sum total? - To obviate the following assumption,29 for one might say, Sweet calamus was like sweet cinnamon: as with sweet cinnamon the figure two hundred and fifty [mentioned in the text] is half the prescribed quantity, so also with reference to sweet calamus,30 in which case the total weight would be two thousand. And indeed why not say so? Then it should have written: 'Sweet cinnamon and sweet calamus, half so much of each, even two hundred and fifty shekels'.
R. Papa asked Abaye: When one weighs [the incense],31 does one weigh it with' overweight or exactly? - He replied: The Divine Law has written, 'Of each shall there be a like weight',32 and you say that there shall be an overweight. But did not Rab Judah say, The Holy One, blessed be He, takes note of overweight [in incense],33 which obviously implies that it had an overweight? - Rather, said R. Judah: Why are the five hundred shekels of sweet cinnamon taken in two portions of two hundred and fifty each? Since the total quantity is five hundred, why not bring the whole at a time?34 From the fact that sweet cinnamon is brought in two portions we may infer that there was an overweight each time,35 and [to be sure] the Holy One, blessed be He, takes note of overweight. And what is the meaning of, 'Of each shall there be a like weight'? - Said Rabina: That one should not weigh first with the weight and use afterwards the weighed amount as a weight for the others.
The Rabbis have taught: The oil [of anointment] which Moses compounded in the wilderness was boiled with the roots [of the spices];36 thus the view of R. Judah. Said to him R. Jose: Surely the oil37 would not suffice even for smearing the roots;38 what then did he do? He boiled39 the roots in water,40 poured over them the oil, which thus absorbed the scent, and wiped off [the oil from the roots].41 R. Judah said to him:
(1) Viz., of the new crop, prior to the offering of the 'Omer sacrifice, Lev. XXIII, 10f.
(2) V. Glos.
(3) As well as 'fresh ears'.
(4) Viz., the 'Omer meal-offering, cf. Lev. II, 14 and Men. 66b. Rashi indeed reads here: 'the meal-offering of the 'Omer'.
(5) Bread is offered on Pentecost. Since then all the three specifications are necessary, whence does R. Isaac derive his ruling?
(6) I.e., that one is liable to lashes if one has eaten parched corn alone. The redundant text is to teach us that the flagellation is not conditional in every case upon the eating of the three enumerated products together.
(7) V. Glos.
(8) Viz., the fact that kareth is attached to it. Although the penalty of kareth is mentioned in the text relating to piggul, Lev. XIX, 8, the Gemara's exposition in Zeb. 28a of this passage is that the pronouncement of kareth refers to an offering disqualified by the improper intention to offer it outside the Temple precincts, and not to piggul in the narrower sense, viz., a sacrifice disqualified by the thought of eating its flesh beyond the prescribed time.
(9) Ibid. Lev.
(10) Ibid. VII, 18, understood to relate to piggul in the narrower sense.
(11) Which deals with disqualification by an improper intention relating to the place of offering, and where kareth is explicitly mentioned.
(12) V. Glos.
(13) Viz., the fact that kareth is attached to it.
(14) Lev. XIX, 8; the penalty of kareth follows.
(15) Ex. XXIX, 34.
(16) Viz., that this form of incest is subject to death by burning.
(17) Lit., 'they are', an expression used twice in connection with incest; firstly in Lev. XVIII, 17 dealing with the prohibition of intercourse with a woman and her daughter, both married unto him or not; and then in v. 10 relating to the prohibition of intercourse with one's grand-daughter. The latter text is interpreted in Yeb. 97a as referring to the grand-daughter from an outraged woman, and not of one legally married to him. We thus find explicitly that one's grand-daughter from an outraged woman is forbidden. The daughter of an outraged woman is not explicitly mentioned, but the gezerah shawah establishes an analogy between a married woman (v. 17) and an outraged woman (v. 20): as in the first instance daughter and grand-daughter are on the same footing, so also in the latter.
(18) Lit., 'lewdness', mentioned in Lev. XVIII, 17 and XX, 14 where the prescribed penalty is burning, v. Sanh. 51a.
(19) Sanh. 54a.
(20) Referring to the four laws where this term is found: Lev. XX, 11, 12, 13, 16.
(21) Tr. 'Their blood shall be upon them'.
(22) V. Glos.; v. ibid. 27.
(23) Tosef. Mak. III, 1.
(24) 'According to its composition' mentioned in Ex. XXX, 32 in correction with oil of anointing, and in v. 37 relating to incense.
(25) Ibid. 'Unto yourselves' is taken in a restrictive sense.
(26) V. infra 6b.
(27) Ibid. vv. 32 and 37.
(28) V. Lev. VI, 13ff.
(29) Lit., 'this is his difficulty'.
(30) I.e., that the qualification 'half' in the text referred both to sweet cinnamon and to sweet calamus.
(31) I.e., its components.
(32) Ex. XXX, 34.
(33) And rewards accordingly. V. Sh. Mek.
(34) As with the first two species.
(35) The division was for the purpose of adding a greater overweight of cinnamon.
(36) Hor. 11b.
(37) Altogether there were only twelve logs.
(38) How much less to have the species boiled therein!
(39) The version in Hor. and of Rashi here is 'soaked'.
(40) So that they were saturated with liquid and did not absorb much of the oil when it was poured over them.
(41) And placed it in the flask.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 5b
Is this the only miracle that occurred in connection with the oil of anointment? Was it not attended by many miracles from beginning to end! There were only twelve logs of oil and yet with it were anointed the Tabernacle and its vessels, Aaron and his sons throughout the seven days of the consecration, and the high priest and kings, and yet it remained whole for the days to come, as it is written: This shall be a holy anointing oil unto Me throughout your generations.1 [The numerical value of] Zeh [this] is twelve, meaning that this quantity was preserved.
Our Rabbis taught: And Moses took the anointing oil and anointed the tabernacle.2 R. Judah said: Many miracles attended from the beginning to the end the anointing oil which Moses made in the wilderness. There were originally only twelve logs; [consider] how much of it must have been absorbed in the boiler, how much in the roots of the spices, and how much of it was burnt by the fire, and yet with it were anointed the Tabernacle and its vessels, Aaron and his sons throughout the seven days of the consecration, and the high priests and kings. Even a high priest who is the son of a high priest requires anointing, though a king who is the son of a king does not require anointing. And if you ask, Why then was Solomon anointed?3 Because Adoniah disputed his right of succession; similarly Jehoash [was anointed]4 by reason of Athaliah's [claim to the throne], and Jehoahaz5 by reason [of the claim to the throne] of his brother Jehoiakim who was two years6 his senior.7
The Master said: 'Even the high priest who is the son of a high priest requires anointing'. Whence do we know this? - It is written: And the anointed priest that shall be in his stead from among his sons.8 The text should have stated: 'And the priest that shall be in his stead from among his sons', why [add] 'anointed', if not to let us know that even from among his sons only the one that is anointed can be high priest, but he who is not anointed cannot be high priest.
The Master said: 'A king who is the son of a king does not require anointing'. Whence do we know this? - Said R. Abba b. Jacob: It is written, That he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he and his children, for all days;9 it is an inheritance.
'Why then was Solomon anointed? Because Adoniah disputed his right of succession'. 'Whence do we know that in a case of dispute anointing is required, and that it does not suffice that the king entrusts his kingdom to whomsoever he chooses? - Said R. Papa: It is written there, In the midst of Israel; only if there is peace in Israel [is it an inheritance].10
A Tanna taught: Also Jehu son of Nimshi was anointed only by reason of the claim to the throne by Joram son of Ahab. Was it indeed for this reason? 'Was he not the first king of the dynasty? - The text is incomplete and should read thus: Kings from the House of David were anointed but not the kings of Israel. And if you ask: 'Why then was Jehu son of Nimshi anointed? Because of the dispute of Joram son of Ahab.
The Master said: 'Kings from the House of David were anointed, but not the kings of Israel'. 'Whence do we know this? - It is written: Arise, about him, for this is he:11 This one12 requires anointing but not others.
The Master said: 'By reason of the claim to the throne by Joram'. Were we indeed justified to commit sacrilege13 with the oil of anointing solely by reason of the claim to the throne by Joram son of Ahab? - As R. Papa replied elsewhere: It was done with pure balm; so here too: It was done with pure balm.14
'And Jehoahaz by reason of the claim to the throne by his brother Jehoiakim who was two years his senior'. 'Was he indeed older, is it not written: And the sons of Josiah: the first-born Johanan, the second Johoiakim, the third Zedekiah and the fourth Shallum;15 upon which R. Johanan remarked that Johanan was identical with Jehoahaz and Zedekiah with Shallum!16 - Jehoiakim was indeed older, and [the other] was called first-born, because he was first in succession. But is it permitted to install the younger son in preference to the older? Is it not written: And the kingdom he gave to Jehorom for he was the first-born?17 - That one followed in his forefather's footsteps.18
The Master said: 'Shallum is identical with Zedekiah'. But are not the sons enumerated in numerical order?19 - He [Zedekiah] is called 'the third', because he was the third among the sons, and he is called 'the fourth', because he was the fourth to reign, for Jeconiah reigned before him: Jehoahaz was the first successor, then followed Jehoiakim, then Jeconiah and then Zedekiah.
Our Rabbis taught: Shallum is identical with Zedekiah; and why was he called Shallum? Because he was perfect ['shalem'] in his deeds; or according to another explanation, because the kingdom of the House of David ended [shalem]20 in his days. 'What was his real name? - Mattaniah, as it is written, And the king of Babylon made Mattaniah his father's brother king in his stead, and changed his name to Zedekiah,21 for the king [Nebuchadnezzar] said to him, God may deal severely22 with thee, if thou wilt rebel against me, as it is written, And he brought him to Babylon,23 and also, And He also rebelled against king Nebuchadnezzar who had made him swear by the Lord.24 But was there any oil of anointing at that time?25 Has it not been taught: 'When the holy ark was hidden there disappeared with it the jar of manna,26 the flask of the oil of anointing, the rod of Aaron together with its almonds and blossoms,27 and the coffer which the Philistines had sent as a present to the God of Israel, as it is written: And put the jewels of gold, which ye return Him for a guilt-offering, in a coffer by the side thereof.28 'Who hid it? Josiah, king of Judah, hid it, as it is written: And he said, put the holy ark [in the house which Solomon the son of David did build: there shall no more be a burden upon your shoulders].29 [As to the other articles:] R. Eleazar said: [Their disappearance is] inferred by the common expressions of sham, doroth and mishmereth.30 Replied R. Papa: It was done with pure balm.
Our Rabbis have taught: In anointing kings one draws the figure of a crown,31 and with priests in the shape of the letter chi. Said R. Menashia: The Greek-[letter] chi is meant. One [Tanna] teaches: The oil was first poured over the head and then smeared between the eye-lids; whereas another [Tanna] teaches: The oil was first smeared between the eye-lids and then poured over the head.32 [On this point there is] a dispute of Tannaim: One holds that the anointing33 has preference; the other holds that the pouring has preference. What is the reason of him who holds that the pouring has preference? He derives it from: And he poured from the anointing oil upon Aaron's head [and anointed him to sanctify him].34 And he who maintains anointing has preference holds [his view] because this was the method employed in connection with the vessels of ministry.35 But is it not written first: 'And he poured', and then, 'and anointed'? - This is what it means: 'Wherefore did he pour the oil, because he had already anointed him to sanctify him.
Our Rabbis have taught: It is like the precious oil upon the head [coming down upon the beard, even Aaron's beard].36 Two drops of the oil were hanging down like pearls from Aaron's beard. Said R. Kahana; It was taught, 'When he [Aaron] spoke, the drops moved upwards and rested by the roots of his beard. This caused anxiety to Moses. Perhaps, Heaven forfend, [he said] I have committed sacrilege with the oil of anointing!37 But a heavenly voice was heard, saying: Like the dew of the Hermon, that cometh down upon the mountains of Zion;38 as the dew is not subject to sacrilege, so the oil that cometh down upon the beard of Aaron is not subject to sacrilege. Yet Aaron was still worried: 'Although Moses did not commit sacrilege, I myself am guilty of sacrilege'. Thereupon the heavenly voice pronounced: Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity:39 As Moses is not guilty of sacrilege, so thou too art not guilty of sacrilege.
Our Rabbis have taught: Kings are anointed only by the side of a spring, so that their rule be prolonged,40 as it is written: And the king said unto them . . . and bring him down to Gihon . . . and anoint him there.41 Said R. Ammi: 'When one wishes to know whether he will survive the coming year or not, let him take a burning lamp during the ten days between New Year and the Day of Atonement and place it in a house where there is no draught; if the lamp burns out to the end, he will know that he will survive the year. And if one is about to engage in business and wishes to know whether he will succeed or not,let him get a cock and feed it; if it grows fat and handsome, he will know that he will succeed. When one is about to go on a journey and wishes to know whether he will return home, let him enter a darkened room;42 if he can perceive
(1) Ex. XXX, 31.
(2) Lev. VIII, 10.
(3) V. I Kings I, 39.
(4) V. II Kings XI, 12.
(5) V. ibid. XXIII, 30.
(6) V. II Chron. XXIII, 31 and 36.
(7) In Hor. the text continues: And yet that oil remained whole for the days to come.
(8) Lev. VI, 15.
(9) Deut. XVII, 20 where instead of the last three words, it reads: In the midst of Israel. In Hor. this copyist's error is not to be found.
(10) But if there is dissension concerning the throne, the successor has to be specially sanctified and anointed.
(11) I Sam. XVI, 12.
(12) Or such a one i.e., one belonging to this dynasty.
(13) In using the oil for the anointing of a king, who does not require this according to the Torah, we transgressed the law of sacrilege.
(14) And not with the proper oil of anointing.
(15) I Chron. III, 15.
(16) Thus the version of Rashi. The text thus states that Jehoahaz was the firstborn.
(17) II Chron. XXI, 3.
(18) I.e., he (Jehoram) was like his father a pious man, at the time of succession. He became corrupted later on. Jehoiakim, on the other hand, did not follow, in his father's ways and could not therefore exercise his right as firstborn.
(19) Obviously implying that they were not identical.
(20) Both 'perfect' and 'ended' may be conveyed by the term 'shalem'.
(21) 11 Kings XXIV, 17.
(22) From the root zedek', strict justice.
(23) II Chron. XXXVI, 10. This phrase actually refers to Jehoiakim. The latter part of the verse is meant: And he appointed Zedekiah his brother king over Judah and Jerusalem.
(24) Ibid. v. 13.
(25) Viz., the time of Jehoahaz, whose anointment is mentioned above.
(26) Cf. Ex. XVI, 33.
(27) Num. XVII, 23.
(28) I Sam. VI, 8. This implies that the coffer had to be by the side of the ark. With the disappearance of the ark also the coffer had gone
(29) II Chron. XXXV, 3. Cf. J. Shek. I, 1 where the latter part of the passage is understood to imply that after the removal of the ark from the Temple at the time of the exile, it shall not be restored again to its place.
(30) Sham ('there') is mentioned in connection with the ark in Ex. XXX, 36 and with the manna in XVI, 33. Doroth ('generations') in connection with the manna ibid. and with the sacred oil, ibid. XXX, 31. Mishmereth ('guard') in connection with the manna ibid, and with Aaron's rod in Num. XVII, 25. Manna is thus derived from the ark; and the other two articles from manna. At all events, we learn therefrom that there was no oil of anointing at the time of Jehoahaz.
(31) I.e., a circle round the head.
(32) These two centres of oil are joined with one another and extended to the neck, Rashi.
(33) I.e., the smearing of the forehead.
(34) Lev. VIII, 12. Pouring is mentioned first.
(35) Lev. VIII vv. 10-11.
(36) Ps. CXXXIII, 2.
(37) By using too much of it.
(38) Ibid. v. 3.
(39) Ibid. v. 1.
(40) Like the spring of water.
(41) I Kings 1, 32-34.
(42) Some versions here and in Hor. 12a read 'house of his neighbour' instead of 'darkened room.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 6a
the reflection of his shadow, he will know that he will return home. But it is not the proper thing [to make these tests], for one might be discouraged and mar his fortune. Said Abaye: Since you hold that symbols are meaningful, every man should make it a habit to eat on New Year pumpkin, fenugreek, leek, beet and dates.1
R. Mesharsheya said to his sons: 'When you wish to come before your teacher to learn, revise at first your Mishnah and then go to your teacher; and when you are sitting before your teacher look at the mouth of your teacher, as it is written: But thine eyes shall see thy teacher;2 and when you study any teaching, do so by the side of water, for as the water is drawn out, so your learning may be prolonged. Be on the dustheaps of Matha Mehasia rather than in the palaces of Pumpeditha.3 Eat a stinking fish rather than cutha4 that breaks rocks.
And Hannah prayed and said: my heart exulteth in the Lord, my horn is exalted.5 It says, 'my horn is exalted', but not 'my jar is exalted'. David and Solomon were anointed from a horn,6 and therefore their rule was prolonged; Saul and Jehu, however, were anointed from a jar,7 and their rule8 was not prolonged.
WHEN ONE COMPOUNDS INCENSE. Our Rabbis have taught: 'When one compounds incense for experimenting or in order to hand it over to the community, he is culpable; if in order to smell of it, he is guilty. He who smells it9 is not culpable,10 but he is guilty of sacrilege.11 But is smelling subject to the law of sacrilege? Has not R. Simeon son of Pazzi stated in the name of R. Joshua son of Levi on behalf of Bar Kappara: Hearing, seeing and smelling12 are not subject to the law of sacrilege?13 - The reference to smelling means, after the pillar of the [incense] smoke has ascended,14 in which case it is not subject to the law of sacrilege, for nothing is subject to the law of sacrilege, after the prescribed command has been performed therewith. Is this indeed so? Behold the separation of the ashes15 is subject to the law of sacrilege, although the prescribed, command has been performed therewith. - The law concerning the separation of the ashes and that of the garments of the High Priest16 are two texts teaching the same thing, and where two texts teach the same thing no inference may be made [from them].17 This is right according to the Rabbis, but what is to be said according to R. Dosa? For it has been taught: And he shall place them [the garments] there,18 [means] that they have to be hidden.19 R. Dosa holds: They may be used by an ordinary priest, and 'he shall place them there' means that he [the high priest] shall not use it again on another Day of Atonement.20 - The law concerning the separation of the ashes and that of the heifer whose neck is broken are two texts teaching the same thing, and where two texts teach the same thing no inference may be made [from them for other instances]. 'What is the case of the separation of the ashes? - It has been taught: He shall place it by the side of the altar;21 this teaches that it has to be hidden. 'What is the case of the heifer whose neck is broken? - It has been taught: And shall break the heifer's neck there in the valley,22 this teaches that it has to be buried. And even according to him who holds, one may infer for other instances where two texts teach the same thing, here indeed no inference can be made because there are two limitations. In connection with the separation of the ashes, it is written: 'He shall place it': It, and not anything else; in connection with the heifer whose neck is broken, it is written: Whose neck is broken;23 only the one whose neck is broken and not anything else.
Our Rabbis have taught: The compound of incense consisted of balm, onycha, galbanum and frankincense, each in the quantity of seventy manehs;24 of myrrh, cassia, spikenard and saffron, each sixteen manehs by weight; of costus twelve, of aromatic rind three, and of cinnamon nine manehs; of lye obtained from leek nine kabs;24 of Cyprus wine three se'ahs24 and three kabs, though if Cyprus wine is not available, old white wine may be used instead; of salt of Sodom25 the fourth of a kab, and of ma'aleh 'ashan26 a minute quantity. R. Nathan says: Also of Jordan resin a minute quantity. If, however, honey is added, the incense is rendered unfit; while if one omits one of the ingredients,27 he is liable to the penalty of death.28 R. Simeon son of Gamaliel said: Balm is nothing but a resin which exudes from the wood of the balsam-tree; the lye obtained from leek was rubbed over the onycha in order to render it beautiful, and in the Cyprus wine the onycha was steeped that its odour might be intensified. In fact urine might well serve this purpose, but urine may not be brought within the precincts of the Temple. This29 supports R. Jose son of R. Hanina, who says: It is holy and it shall be holy unto you,30 implies that all work in connection therewith must be performed within the sacred precincts.
An objection was raised: If one dedicates his possessions to the Temple31 and there are among them things fit for communal offerings, they shall be given to the [Temple] craftsmen as wages.32 Now what is meant by 'things fit [for communal offerings]'? If cattle or beast,33 this has already been taught;34 if wine, oil or fine flour, this has already been taught; hence It must refer to incense.35 - Said R. Oshaia: [It refers to] that which is given to the craftsmen as their wages;36 for we learnt: 'What was done with the remnant of the frankincense? They set apart [an amount equivalent to the craftsmen's] wages [from the Temple Treasury], the remnant was then exchanged against this money, handed over to the craftsmen as their wages and then bought back again from them with the money of the new levy.37 To this R. Joseph demurred: Surely in connection with all remnants it teaches: 'And then it is bought back again from the new levy'; whereas in connection with this teaching,38 this is not stated.39 - Rather, said R. Joseph: It refers to one of the ingredients of the frankincense.40
Our Rabbis have taught: The frankincense consisted of three hundred and sixty-eight manehs;41 three hundred and sixty-five42 corresponding to the days of the solar year, and of the three remaining manehs the high priest took his hands full [into the holy of holies] on the Day of Atonement,43 while the remnant was given to the craftsmen for their wages, as we have learnt: What was done with the remnant of the frankincense? They set apart an amount equivalent to the craftsmen's wages [from the Temple Treasury], the remnant was then exchanged against this money, handed over to the craftsmen as their wages and then bought back again from then, with the money of the Temple Chamber.44
(1) These are regarded as symbols of fertility, abundance and quick growth.
(2) Isa. XXX, 20.
(3) A town which was reputed for violence and dishonesty; v. Hor. 12a (Sonc. ed.) for further notes on this passage.
(4) Cutha is a dish containing milk, breadcrumbs and salt. It is described in Pes. 42a as one which is harmful alike to body and spirit. Even when it is as hot and as hard so as to break rocks, one should not eat it.
(5) I Sam. II, 1.
(6) Cf. ibid. XVI, 13 and I Kings 1, 39. משך 'to blow', used with the 'horn' connotes at the same time to prolong.
(7) Cf. I Sam. X, 1 and II Kings IX, 1, 3.
(8) I.e., their dynasty.
(9) I.e., the incense of the community.
(10) I.e.,is not subject to kareth. Kareth is only prescribed for the manufacture of incense with the purpose to smell of it.
(11) Tosef. Mak. III, 1.
(12) Viz., of things belonging to Temple property, e.g., the smelling of incense.
(13) Because these are considered immaterial forms of use. V. pes. 26a.
(14) I.e., after it had been burnt.
(15) I.e., the ashes separated from the altar and placed by the side of it. Cf. Lev. VI, 3 and Me'il. 11b.
(16) Used on the Day of Atonement, cf. Lev. XVI, 23f.
(17) Or rather, the fact that the same law is applied in the text to two instances is taken to exclude its application to others.
(19) Viz., so as not to be used again. They are thus subject to sacrilege even after their use.
(20) Hul. 117a.
(21) Lev. VI, 3.
(22) Deut. XXI, 4. 'There' is superfluous, and is taken to imply that it shall remain there for ever and must not be used.
(23) Deut. XXI, 6. The article in the word הערופה is superfluous and is understood in a restrictive sense.
(24) V. Glos.
(25) Or sea-salt. Cf. B.B. 20b.
(26) Lit., 'smoke-raiser', i.e., a herb which makes the smoke of the frankincense rise.
(27) Viz., the high priest who enters the Holy of Holies with the unfit incense (Rashi). It may also refer to the manufacturer of the incense.
(28) By the hand of heaven.
(29) The last passage.
(30) Ex. XXX, 32.
(31) Without specification, in which case the possessions go to the Temple repair fund; but the things suitable for the altar must not be used for the repair fund. Objects fit for communal offerings cannot be offered, however, for the community, because such offerings must be brought out of communal funds.
(32) Shek. IV, 6.
(33) This is a standing phrase, not precise in this instance, as a beast of chase is not fit for the altar.
(34) Shek. IV, 6.
(35) We thus find that the frankincense may be compounded as profane goods and then dedicated to the Temple.
(36) I.e., the remnant of frankincense, left over from the past year; cf. R. H. 7a. At the beginning of Nisan the taxes for communal offerings were collected. The frankincense bought with the money of the previous levy was not allowed to be used in the new year. It was therefore necessary to resort to the device mentioned below, in order to make the use of the remnant in the new year possible.
(37) Ibid. IV, 5; cf. also Me'il. 14b where this Baraitha is expounded.
(38) Sc. Shek. IV, 6.
(39) It accordingly cannot refer to a remnant.
(40) Before the mixing, and not to the prepared incense.
(41) This is the total weight of the ingredients of incense, as expounded above.
(42) This is the average length also of the Jewish year, if the leap years are taken into consideration.
(43) V. Lev. XVI, 12.
(44) The version above of the same Mishnah reads 'new levy' instead of 'Temple Chamber' which is the same thing.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 6b
Our Rabbis have taught: [By reason of] the remnants of frankincense once in sixty or seventy years only half the quantity was manufactured.1 Therefore, if a stranger compounds half the quantity, he is culpable.2 Thus the view of Rabban Simeon son of Gamaliel, who said this in the name of the Segan;3 while there is no tradition that a third or a fourth of the quantity was ever compounded.4 The Sages hold: He prepared frankincense each day5 according to its composition and offered it up. This supports Raba; for Raba said: If one compounds half the quantity of frankincense,6 he is capable, for it is written: And the incense which thou shalt make etc.7 ; whatever [quantity] you make, and it is possible for one to prepare half [a maneh] in the morning and half in the evening.
Our Rabbis have taught: Twice in the course of the year is the incense put back into the mortar.8 During the summer it is scattered, so that it does not rot away; during the winter it is heaped together, so that its fragrance may not escape. While it is being beaten, he9 calls out: 'Pound well, well pound'. These are the words of Abba Jose b. Johanan. The three remaining manehs of which the high priest on the Day of Atonement separates his handfuls, are put back in the mortar on the eve of the Day of Atonement and pounded very thoroughly, so that the incense is of the very finest, as it has been taught:10 'Wherefore is beaten small11 stated, since it is written already: And thou shalt beat some of it very small?12 That it has to be the very finest.
The Master said: "While it is being beaten, he calls out: "Pound well, well pound".' This supports R. Johanan; for R. Johanan said: Just as speech13 is harmful to wine, so it is beneficial to spices.
Said R. Johanan: Eleven kinds of spices14 were named to Moses at Sinai. Said R. Huna: 'Where is the text? Take unto thee sweet spices, at least two; stacte, and onycha, and galbanum, that makes together five; 'sweet spices' means another five, that makes together ten; 'with pure frankincense', which is one, that is together eleven. 'Why not say, 'sweet spices' [at the beginning] is a general statement, stacte, and onycha, and galbanum' a specification, and 'sweet spices' [at the end] is again a general statement! ['We have thus, a generalization followed by a specification and then by a generalisation, [in which case] only things sharing the qualities of the specification may be derived. Just as the [items of the] specification are things whose smoke ascends upwards and whose fragrance spreads, so include all things whose smoke ascends upwards and whose fragrance spreads. And should you say in this case only one [item of] specification should have been mentioned, [I would answer] No, all are necessary; for if 'stacte' alone was written, I might have said: Only things from the tree [are to be taken], but not things growing on the ground. It was thus necessary to state 'onycha'. And if 'onycha' alone was written, I might have said: Only things from the ground, but not from the tree. It was thus necessary to state 'stacte'. As to 'galbanum', its mention is necessary for its own sake, for its odour is unpleasant15 if so,16 it could have been derived from: Take unto thee.17 But perhaps say: 'The sweet spices' in the latter part [of the verse] mean two, as 'the sweet spices' in the former part?18 Then it should have written the two expressions 'sweet spices' next to one another, and then write 'stacte, and onycha, and galbanum'. In the School of R. Ishmael it was taught thus: 'Sweet spices' is a generalisation, 'stacte, and onycha, and galbanum' is a specification, sweet spices' again is a generalisation, and from a generalisation followed by a specification and then by another generalisation one can derive only things sharing the qualities of the specification. As the [items in the] specification are things whose smoke ascends upwards and whose fragrance spreads, so all things whose smoke ascends upwards and whose fragrance spreads.19 Perhaps this is not so; but take the generalisation with the first generalisation, the specification with the first specification?20 - Say: This cannot be; hence you must not expound according to the latter version but according to the former.
The Master said: 'Perhaps this is not so, but take the generalisation with the first generalisation and the specification with the first specification? - Say: This cannot be, hence you cannot expound . . . ' 'What is the question? - This is his difficulty: Let the sweet spices' in the latter part [of the verse] mean two like 'sweet spices' in the former.21 'Whereupon he replied as was answered before: Then it should have written, 'Sweet spices, sweet spices, stacte, onycha and galbanum'. What is the meaning of 'and the specification with the first specification'? - This is his difficulty: Things of the tree are derived from 'stacte', and things of the ground from 'onycha'; why not then derive from 'pure frankincense' all things which have one quality in common with it [viz.,] that their fragrance spreads, though their smoke does not ascend upwards?22 Whereupon he replied: If this was so, 'pure frankincense' should have been written among the others,23 so that you could derive therefrom. But if 'pure frankincense' was written among the others, we would have twelve spices.24 - 'Pure frankincense' should have been written among the others and 'galbanum' at the end. Resh Lakish says: From the word itself it can be inferred; for ketoreth25 [frankincense] means something whose smoke ascends upwards.
Said R. Hana b. Bizna in the name of R. Hisda the pious:A fast in which none of the sinners of Israel participate is no fast;26 for behold the odour of galbanum is unpleasant and yet it was included among the spices for the incense. Abaye says: 'We learn this from the text: And hath founded his vault upon the earth.27
OR USES OIL OF ANOINTING. Our Rabbis have taught: He who pours the oil of anointing over cattle or vessels is not guilty; if over heathens or the dead, he is not guilty. The law relating to cattle and vessels is right, for it is written: Upon the flesh of man [adam] shall it not be poured;28 and cattle and vessels are not man. Also with regard to the dead, [it is plausible] that he is exempt, since after death one is called corpse and not man. But why is one exempt in the case of heathens; are they not in the category of adam? - No, it is written: And ye my sheep, the sheep of my pasture, are adam [man]:29 Ye are called adam but heathens are not called 'adam. But is it not written: And the persons [adam] were sixteen thousand?30 - Because it is used in opposition to cattle.31 But is it not written: And should I not have pity on Nineveh [that great city, wherein are more than six score thousand persons [adam]?32 - This too is used in opposition to cattle.33 Or, if you wish, I might explain it in the light of what a Tanna recited before R. Eleazar: Whosoever is subject to the prohibition 'he shall not pour' is subject to [the law] 'it shall not be poured [over him]'; but he who is not subject to 'he shall not pour' is not subject to 'it shall not be poured [over him]'.34
Another [Baraitha] taught: If one anoints with the oil of anointing cattle, vessels, heathens and the dead, he is not culpable; if kings and priests, R. Meir holds he is culpable and R. Judah that he is exempt. How much has one to put in order to be culpable? R. Meir says: Any quantity; R. Judah says: As much as that of the bulk of an olive. But did not R. Judah say that one is exempt? - R. Judah exempts only in the case of kings and priests,35 but in the case of laymen he declares one culpable. What is the ground of dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah? - Said R. Joseph: They dispute in this: R. Meir holds, It is written: Upon the flesh of man shall it not be poured;36 and it is also written: Or whosoever putteth of it upon a stranger:37 As the [prohibition of] anointing applies to any quantity,38 so also the [prohibition of] putting [upon a stranger];39 while R. Judah holds, The [implication of] 'putting upon a stranger' is derived from 'giving' elsewhere: as 'giving' implies at least an olive size,40 so also the 'putting upon a stranger at least an olive size; but with regard to the pouring for the anointing of kings and priests both agree that any quantity suffices. Then said R. Joseph: 'Whereupon rests the dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah with reference to kings and priests?41 R. Meir holds: It is written: 'Or whosoever putteth of it upon a stranger', and king and priest are now to be regarded as strangers;42 while R. Judah maintains [to involve culpability] it is essential that one is a 'stranger' from beginning to end; but kings and priests were not considered [always] strangers.43 Said R. Ika the son of R. Ammi: They44 follow their own reasoning elsewhere; for we have learnt:45
(1) As the handfuls of the high priest on the Day of Atonement amounted approximately to half a maneh, the remnant each year was about two and a half manehs. During a period of between sixty and seventy years the remnants accumulated to half the yearly quantity. When this was reached only a supplementary half was newly manufactured.
(2) This transgression applies only to quantities otherwise manufactured for the Temple.
(3) The deputy high priest.
(4) I.e., that two-thirds or three-quarters were allowed to be accumulated.
(5) Viz., one maneh. A stranger is accordingly guilty for the manufacture of one maneh.
(6) Or even less, as is proved from the text. In cur. edd. oil of anointing stands in place of frankincense, but in supra 5a whence this quotation is taken, frankincense is the version.
(7) Ex. XXX, 37.
(8) To induce fragrance.
(9) The superintendent calls to him who pounds the incense.
(10) Yoma 45a.
(11) Lev. XVI, 12 referring to the handfuls on the Day of Atonement.
(12) Ex. XXX, 36.
(13) I.e., speaking while it is being prepared.
(14) Only four are mentioned in Ex. XXX, 34.
(15) Had it not been explicitly mentioned, I would not have included it.
(16) If the purpose of the numeration of the items is for the sake of expounding the verse by the principle of generalisation and specification etc. and not to indicate the precise number.
(17) Which would have served as a generalisation without the addition of 'spices'.
(18) And not five.
(19) R. Ishmael's School resorts both to the principle of generalisation etc. and to the exposition of R. Huna, the former teaching that it must be of a kind whose smoke ascends and fragrance spreads, and the latter indicating the number.
(20) This last question and the answer are obscure, and will be explained immediately.
(21) This then is the meaning: perhaps the second generalisation (sweet spices) has the same connotation as the first and implies no more than 'two'; whence then is the number eleven derived?
(22) And thus the question is, perhaps the last specification is to be taken in conjunction with the first and the others that precede the second generalisation?
(23) I.e.,among the specifications enclosed by the two generalisations, 'sweet spices'.
(24) For the latter expression 'sweet spices' doubles the number of spices enumerated before, which in this case would be six.
(25) The root קטר means 'to rise in circles'.
(26) The sinners should not be excluded as unworthy of joining their fellow-Jews in prayer.
(27) Amos IX, 6. The root אגד of ואגודתו 'his vault' means to bind together. Only when all his creatures are bound together is this creation on earth founded.
(28) Ex. XXX, 32.
(29) Ezek. XXXIV, 31. The passage continues: And I am your God, saith the Lord God. It is thus clear that the term אדם in this sentence does not denote 'man' but Israelite. The term adam is used to denote man made in the image of God (v. Gen. IX, 6, for in the image of God He made adam) and heathens by their idolatry and idolatrous conduct mar this divine image and forfeit the designation adam (v. B.M. Sonc. ed. p. 651, n. 7). There is therefore a possibility that also oil used in Ex. XXX, 32 is to be understood in this restrictive sense, particularly as the distinction between holy and profane made in the text (it reads there, 'it is holy and it shall be holy unto you') is meaningful only to one who believes in the ideal of the holy.
(30) Num. XXXI, 40 referring to the heathen Midianites.
(31) V. the context.
(32) Jonah IV, 11.
(33) V. the end of the passage.
(34) The prohibition of using sacred oil for profane purposes is thus binding for the Israelites only.
(35) After they had been anointed. Rashi reads, high priests.
(36) Ex. XXX, 32.
(37) Ibid. v. 33. Lit., 'whosoever giveth'. The analogy later between putting and giving is based upon this literal translation.
(38) Since there the term 'anointing' implies any quantity however small.
(39) Although elsewhere 'putting' (lit., 'giving') implies at least the bulk of an olive.
(40) Cf. Pes. 32b where this fact is derived from Lev. XXII, 14.
(41) Viz., when unlawfully anointed.
(42) For anointing after their first anointment is no longer prescribed for them.
(43) For there was a time when they were required to be anointed, and were not strangers.
(44) I.e., R. Meir and R. Judah.
(45) Ter. VII, 2.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 7a
If the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite has eaten terumah,1 she has to pay the principal but not the additional fifth, and her punishment2 is death by burning. If she is married to one of those disqualified [for priesthood], she has to pay the principal as well as the additional fifth, and her punishment is death by strangulation.3 Thus the view of R. Meir; but the Sages hold: In either case she has to pay the principal but not the fifth, and is punished by burning.4
Said R. Joseph: The dispute [between R. Meir and R. Judah] is only with reference to the putting of the oil of anointing, and as we have explained above;5 but elsewhere6 all agree that 'giving' implies at least an olive size.
[To turn to] the main text: A Tanna recited before R. Eleazar: Whosoever is subject to [the prohibition] 'he shall not pour' is subject to [the law] 'it shall not be poured [over him]'; but he who is not subject to 'he shall not pour' is not subject to 'it shall not be poured [over him]'. The latter said to him: You speak well: it is written, 'It shall not be poured' [yisak], read 'he shall not pour' [yasik].7
R. Hananiah recited before Raba: If a high priest has taken from the oil of anointing that is upon his head and rubbed it upon his stomach, whence do we know that he is culpable? It says: Upon the flesh of man shall it not be poured'.8 Said R. Aha the son of Raba to R. Ashi: 'Why is this different from that which has been taught:9 A priest who is anointed with oil of terumah may without scruple allow [e.g.,] his Israelite grandson10 to roll against him?11 - He replied: In that connection it is written: And die therein, if they profane it;12 once it is profaned13 it remains profane; but in connection with the oil of anointing it says: For the consecration of the anointing oil of his God is upon him;14 the Divine Law [still] calls it oil of anointing, so that even when it is 'upon him' it does not become profane.
FOR THESE [TRANSGRESSIONS] ONE IS LIABLE TO EXTINCTION IF COMMITTED WILFULLY etc. It states EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF ONE WHO DEFILED THE TEMPLE OR ITS CONSECRATED THINGS. Excluded from what? - Read thus: Excluded is he who defiles the sanctuary or sacred things in that he does not bring a suspensive guilt-offering.15 Why not also state: Excluded is one from a suspensive guilt-offering where the Day of Atonement has passed by in the meantime?16 - Replied Resh Lakish: He mentions only cases where a sin-offering is [prescribed],17 but the Divine Law has pronounced exemption [from a suspensive guilt-offering in case of a doubt]; but where the Day of Atonement had passed by, there is no sin-offering prescribed, for [the sin] had already been atoned. R. Johanan said: [The Mishnah] refers to a rebellious person,18 [that is] who says that the Day of Atonement brings no forgiveness; if then he repents after the Day of Atonement, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering.19 But Resh Lakish holds that the Day of Atonement effects forgiveness even to a rebellious person. Their dispute is similar to the following: If one says, My sin-offering shall effect no atonement for me, Abaye says: It does not effect atonement; Raba says: It does effect atonement. If he said, It shall not be offered, all agree that it does not effect atonement,for it is written: He shall bring it with the consent;20 where they differ is when he said: It should be offered but should not effect atonement. Abaye holds that it does not effect atonement,for he said: It should not atone. Raba holds that it does effect atonement, since he ordered that it should be offered, atonement comes as a matter of course. Raba, however, has retracted his view, as it has been taught: I might assume that the Day of Atonement atones alike for them who repent and them who do not repent.21 But is there not an argument [to the contrary]: Sin- and guilt-offerings effect atonement, and the Day of Atonement effects atonement. Just as sin- and guilt-offerings atone only for them that repent, so shall also the Day of Atonement atone only for them that repent? No, [this is not conclusive]. You can rightly say that such is the case of sin- and guilt-offerings, since they do not atone for wilful sins as they do for those in error; will you apply the same to the Day of Atonement which atones alike for wilful sins as well as for those in error? I might therefore have thought since the Day of Atonement atones for wilful sins as well as those in error, so it would atone for them that repent as well as them that do not repent, therefore it is written, 'howbeit',22 to establish a distinction [between them that repent and them that do not repent]. 'What is meant by 'them that repent' and 'them that do not repent'?23 Does 'them that repent' mean that the sin has been committed in error, and 'them that do not repent' that the sin has been committed wilfully? But then, does it not state: No, you can rightly say that such is the case of sin- and guilt-offerings, since they do not atone for wilful sins, etc.?24 - Rather [explain in the light of] what 'Ulla said in the name of R. Johanan:25 If a man ate heleb26 and separated a sacrifice, and then he apostatized but retracted afterwards, [the sacrifice may not be offered] for since it has once been rejected it remains rejected.27 But although this [particular] sacrifice is rejected, the person, however, is fit for atonement?28 - Hence [you must say] that 'them that repent' refers to one who says: My sin-offering shall effect atonement for me; and 'them that do not repent' to one who says: My sin-offering shall effect no atonement for me. This proves it.29
The following contradiction was raised: I might think that the Day of Atonement atoned only for him who afflicted himself and did no work on it, and called it a holy convocation;30 but if one did not afflict himself or did work on it or did not call it a holy convocation, I might think that the Day of Atonement does not atone for him; therefore it is stated: It is the Day of Atonement:31 in all circumstances [does it atone]. Now, these two statements32 are both given anonymously33 in the Sifra34 and so they contradict each other! - Replied Abaye: There is no difficulty; the former teaching is that of Rabbi on the view of R. Judah, the latter that of Rabbi himself; as it has been taught: Rabbi says, For all the sins of the Torah, whether one has repented or not, the Day of Atonement atones, except for throwing off the yoke,35 interpreting the Torah in opposition to the halachah,36 and making void the convenant of the flesh,37 where if one has repented the Day of Atonement effects atonement, but if not, the Day of Atonement effects no atonement.
Raba said: Both teachings represent Rabbi's own view, but Rabbi agrees that the transgressions against the sanctity of the Day of Atonement itself are not atoned for.38 For if this was not so, how could, according to Rabbi, the penalty of kareth for offending against the laws of the Day of Atonement ever take effect, since there is on that day continuous atonement. This would offer no difficulty; [it might take effect] when one did work during the night and died at dawn, so that he had no day39 to atone for him. This is right only as far as sins committed by night are concerned, how can kareth take effect for sins committed by day?40 - This is no difficulty. [It might take effect] when one while partaking of a meal41 was choked by a lump of meat and died, so that there was no time during the day for the atonement to atone for him;42 or when he was working just before sunset; or when while working he cut off his thigh with the axe and died, so that there was no time during the day to atone for him.
THE SAGES SAY: ALSO ONE WHO BLASPHEMES etc. What is the meaning of 'also one who blasphemes'?43 - The Rabbis heard that R. Akiba44 included45 ob but not yidde'oni;46 so they said to him: The reason why there is no offering in the latter instance is because it involves no action;46 the blasphemer, too, performs no action.
Our Rabbis have taught: He who blasphemes is liable to an offering, for kareth is written in connection with him; thus the view of R. Akiba. And it further says: He will bear his iniquity.47 But is it a rule that wherever kareth is written, one has to bring an offering [in case of error]? Surely there are the cases of Passover and circumcision in connection with which kareth is written, and yet these Involve no offerings? -
(1) V. Glos. By marrying an Israelite she becomes disqualified from eating terumah. She is, however, exempted from the payment of the fine of an extra fifth of the value (cf. Lev. V, 16), because she might return to her original status of priesthood on her husband's childless death.
(2) In case of infidelity; cf. Lev. XXI, 9.
(3) Like any other unfaithful wife. By this marriage she herself has become disqualified for priesthood. Even after her husband's death she is not fit to eat terumah.
(4) R. Meir does not take into consideration the fact that she was once fit for priesthood; while the Sages, identified with R. Judah, hold she has still the status of a priest's daughter by reason of her former inclusion in the tribe. The arguments are thus similar to those underlying the previous dispute.
(5) Viz., that the term 'putting' (i.e., giving) of oil is to be compared with that of 'pouring'.
(6) E.g., when frankincense is put upon the meal-offering, cf. Men. 59b.
(7) The fact that the word ײסך is understood, by reason of the two yods, both in the active and in the passive voice is taken to imply that there is an interdependence between him who uses the oil and him upon whom it is used.
(8) This is all inclusive.
(9) Tosef. Ter. IX, 8, with slight variants.
(10) The son of his daughter who married an Israelite.
(11) Although his body may be smeared with the oil of terumah, which is prohibited to an Israelite.
(12) Lev. XXII, 9.
(13) I.e., once it has been used.
(14) Ibid. XXI, 12. It is called a 'consecration' even after it is poured over his head.
(15) V. Mishnah. The reason given is that such a guilt-offering is offered only in cases where by certain yet unwitting transgression a fixed sin-offering is prescribed. For the defilement, however, of the sanctuary or sacred things, a sacrifice of higher or lesser value is prescribed.
(16) In which case the Day of Atonement effects atonement for the doubtful sins.
(17) Viz., when the transgression is certain though committed in error.
(18) Lit., 'one who kicks'.
(19) And for this reason the Mishnah doss not exclude this case.
(20) Lev. I, 3.
(21) Shebu. 13a.
(22) Lev. XXIII, 27 which is a restrictive expression.
(23) Mentioned above in connection with sin- and guilt-offerings.
(24) This passage would then be a repetition of the previous.
(25) Sanh. 47a.
(26) V. Glos. The eating was in error, in which case he is liable to a sin-offering.
(27) An apostate's sacrifice may not be offered upon the altar. In accordance with this dictum 'them that do not repent' signifies people who have apostatized between the separation of the sacrifice and its offering up.
(28) After the revocation of his apostasy such a person is regarded as a full Israelite and surely participates in the forgiveness of the Day of Atonement.
(29) That where one says, 'My sin-offering shall effect no atonement for me' it does not atone.
(30) I.e., participated in the service of the day (Rashi).
(31) Lev. XXIII, 27. The article is considered superfluous and is understood as an amplification.
(32) Viz., this one and the one above stating that the Day of Atonement atones only for them that repent and comply with the laws concerning the Day of Atonement.
(33) Being anonymous both teachings emanate from the same authority.
(34) Halachic Midrash on Leviticus.
(35) I.e., unbelief in God.
(36) Rejecting thereby the oral law.
(37) I.e., circumcision. On these phrases v. Sanh. (Sonc. ed.) p. 672 and notes.
(38) I.e., that if one does not afflict himself on the Day of Atonement that day does not atone for this sin except after repentance, while other sins perpetrated throughout the year are atoned for even without repentance. The former statement is thus confined to sins against the holiness of the Day of Atonement itself.
(39) Atonement is granted during day-time, although the sanctity of the festival commences on the previous evening as is the case of all Jewish festivals. Although the sinner is now dead, kareth can still take effect thereafter. V. Glos on kareth.
(40) The text Lev. XXIII, 28 explicitly mentions the day: Ye shall do no manner of work in that same day.
(41) Lit., 'eating bread'. The parallel passage in Shebu. 13b reads: While eating a lump of meat.
(42) Sin and death were simultaneous.
(43) It can have no reference to the immediately preceding passage, which deals with suspensive guilt-offerings for doubtful sins.
(44) As is later on explained, the anonymous view in our Mishnah, to whom the Sages retort, represents R. Akiba's opinion.
(45) Viz., in the category of sins enumerated in the Mishnah liable to a sin-offering where committed in error.
(46) V. supra 3b.
(47) Lev. XXIV, 15.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 7b
This is the meaning: One who blasphemes brings an offering,1 because [the penalty of] kareth stands in this case in conjunction with offerings.2 This is the view of R. Akiba. He holds that since kareth in this instance could have been mentioned independently, but is in fact mentioned in conjunction with offerings, this proves that [he who blasphemes] brings an offering. And it further says, 'he shall bear his iniquity'; this is quoted on the view of the Sages. And thus did the Rabbis say to R. Akiba: You maintain that the blasphemer [megaddef] is liable to an offering because kareth in this instance is mentioned in conjunction with offerings. You thus assume that the term 'megaddef' of the Holy Writ3 denotes one who blasphemes the Name of the Lord. [This is not so;] 'Megaddef' denotes one who worships idols.4 And as to the text of the Mishnah: AND THE SAGES SAY, ALSO ONE WHO BLASPHEMES [megaddef],5 it is to be understood thus: Also he who blasphemes the Name which you designate as megaddef6 etc. . . And whence do you know that kareth applies to one who blasphemes the Name?7 - In connection with blasphemy we read: 'He shall bear his iniquity',8 and also in connection with the second Passover we read: 'He shall bear his iniquity':9 As in the latter instance kareth is the penalty, so also in the former the penalty is kareth.10
Our Rabbis taught: The same blasphemeth [megaddef] the Lord;11 Issi b. Judah explains [the term gadaf] in the sense of a man who says to his neighbour: Thou hast scraped [garef]12 the dish and impaired it;13 he holds 'megaddef' denotes one who blasphemes the Name. R. Eleazar b. Azariah explains it in the sense of a man who says to his neighbour: Thou hast scraped the dish but hast not impaired it; he holds 'megaddef' denotes one who worships idols. Another [Baraitha] teaches: 'The same blasphemeth the Lord': R. Eleazar b. Azariah says: The text speaks of one who worships idols; while the Sages say: The text intends only to pronounce kareth for him who blasphemes the Name.14
MISHNAH. SOME [WOMEN AFTER CONFINEMENT] BRING AN OFFERING15 WHICH IS EATEN; SOME BRING ONE WHICH IS NOT EATEN, AND SOME BRING NO OFFERING AT ALL. SOME BRING AN OFFERING WHICH IS EATEN: IF A WOMAN BEARS AN ABORTION WHICH IS IN THE SHAPE OF CATTLE, OR A BEAST OF CHASE OR A BIRD - [THUS THE VIEW OF R. MEIR; WHILE THE SAGES HOLD: ONLY IF IT HAS A HUMAN SHAPE], OR IF A WOMAN DISCHARGES A SANDAL-LIKE FOETUS OR A PLACENTA OR A DEVELOPED FOETUS,16 OR A YOUNG THAT CAME OUT IN PIECES; SIMILARLY, IF A WOMAN-SLAVE17 MISCARRIES, SHE BRINGS AN OFFERING WHICH IS EATEN. THE FOLLOWING BRING AN OFFERING WHICH IS NOT EATEN: A WOMAN WHO BEARS AN ABORTION BUT DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE ABORTION WAS,18 OR IF OF TWO WOMEN THE ONE HAD AN ABORTION OF A KIND WHICH DID NOT RENDER HER LIABLE [TO AN OFFERING], AND THE OTHER OF A KIND TO MAKE HER LIABLE [TO AN OFFERING].19 R. JOSE SAID: THIS APPLIES ONLY IF THE ONE WENT TOWARDS THE EAST AND THE OTHER TOWARDS THE WEST,20 BUT IF BOTH REMAINED TOGETHER THEY BRING [TOGETHER] ONE OFFERING WHICH IS EATEN. THE FOLLOWING BRING NO OFFERING AT ALL: THE WOMAN WHO DISCHARGES A FOETUS FILLED WITH WATER OR WITH BLOOD OR WITH A MANY-COLOURED SUBSTANCE; OR IF THE ABORTION WAS IN THE SHAPE OF FISH, LOCUST, UNCLEAN ANIMALS OR REPTILES; OR IF THE MISCARRIAGE TO OK PLACE ON THE FORTIETH DAY [AFTER THE CONCEPTION],21 OR IF IT WAS EXTRACTED BY MEANS OF A CAESAREAN SECTION. R. SIMEON DECLARES HER LIABLE [TO AN OFFERING] IN THE CASE OF A CAESAREAN SECTION.
GEMARA. 'Whence do we know [the law concerning] the woman-slave? - For our Rabbis taught: [Speak unto] the children of Israel;22 from this I only know that [the law] applies to the children of Israel, whence do we know [its application to] a woman-proselyte and to a woman-slave? The text therefore states: [If] a woman.23 Why state, SIMILARLY IF A WOMAN-SLAVE?24 - I might have thought that the rule that all commandments which are binding upon a woman apply also to a slave holds good only in respect of laws which are applicable both to men and woman; but as to the laws concerning the woman after confinement, which are applicable to women only and not to men, I might have thought that the woman-slave is not included. Therefore a woman-slave is mentioned [in the Mishnah].
THE FOLLOWING BRING AN OFFERING etc. How shall they proceed?25 They bring [each] a certain [burnt-]offering and [together] a doubtful sin-offering of a bird and stipulate.26 But does R. Jose indeed admit that one can stipulate? Have we not learnt: R. Simeon holds, They together bring one sin-offering; R. Jose holds, Two persons cannot bring one sin-offering?27 Does this not prove that R. Jose does not agree with the principle of making a stipu lation?28 - Said Raba: R. Jose agrees in the case of one who requires atonement.29 Also when Rabin came [from Palestine], he said in the name of R. Johanan: R. Jose agrees in the case of one who requires atonement. 'What is the difference? - There,30 it is essential that the offender be conscious of his sin, as it is written: If his sin be known to him;31 therefore the offering cannot be brought conditionally. But here, the women bring offerings only in order to be permitted to partake of holy things, even as we have learnt in the concluding clause of that [same Mishnah], R. Jose says: No sin-offering that is brought for the expiation of sin can be offered by two persons.
THE FOLLOWING BRING NO OFFERING . . . R. SIMEON DECLARES HER LIABLE IN THE CASE OF A CAESAREAN SECTION. What is the reason of R. Simeon? - Said Resh Lakish: It is written, And if she bear a maid-child,32 to include another kind of bearing, namely by means of a caesarean section. And what is the reason of the Rabbis? - Said R. Mani b. Pattish: It is written, If a woman conceive seed and bear;33 only when the birth takes place through the seat of conception.34
MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN BRINGS FORTH AN ABORTION ON THE EVE OF THE EIGHTY-FIRST DAY,35 BETH SHAMMAI SAY: SHE IS EXEMPTED FROM AN OFFERING, 36 WHILE BETH HILLEL SAY: SHE IS LIABLE. SAID BETH HILLEL TO BETH SHAMMAI: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EVE OF THE EIGHTY-FIRST DAY AND THE EIGHTY-FIRST DAY ITSELF? SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED EQUAL WITH REGARD TO UNCLEANNESS,37 WHY SHOULD THEY NOT BE CONSIDERED EQUAL ALSO WITH REFERENCE TO THE OFFERINGS? ANSWERED BETH SHAMMAI TO THEM: NO; IF YOU WILL MAINTAIN THIS38 IN THE CASE WHERE SHE BEARS AN ABORTION ON THE EIGHTY-FIRST DAY WHERE IT39 OCCURRED AT A TIME WHEN SHE WAS FIT TO BRING AN OFFERING, CAN YOU MAINTAIN THIS WHERE SHE BEARS AN ABORTION ON THE EVE OF THE EIGHTY-FIRST DAY, SEEING THAT IT DID NOT OCCUR AT A TIME WHEN SHE WAS FIT TO BRING AN OFFERING?40 SAID BETH HILLEL AGAIN TO THEM: THE CASE OF AN ABORTION ON THE EIGHTY-FIRST DAY WHICH FELL ON A SABBATH SHALL PROVE IT, WHERE THE ABORTION TOOK PLACE AT A TIME WHEN SHE WAS UNFIT TO BRING AN OFFERING AND YET SHE IS LIABLE TO BRING A [NEW] OFFERING. REPLIED BETH SHAMMAI TO THEM: NO; IF YOU WILL MAINTAIN THIS OF THE EIGHTY-FIRST DAY WHICH FELL ON A SABBATH WHICH, THOUGH INDEED NOT FIT FOR OFFERINGS OF AN INDIVIDUAL, IS AT LEAST FIT FOR COMMUNAL OFFERINGS, WOULD YOU MAINTAIN THIS OF AN ABORTION ON THE EVE OF THE EIGHTY-FIRST DAY, SEEING THAT THE NIGHT IS FIT NEITHER FOR OFFERINGS OF THE INDIVIDUAL NOR FOR COMMUNAL OFFERINGS? AS TO [YOUR ARGUMENT OF THE UNCLEANNESS OF] THE BLOOD,41 IT PROVES NOTHING, FOR ALSO WHEN THE ABORTION TOOK PLACE WITHIN THE PERIOD OF CLEANNESS IS THE BLOOD42 UNCLEAN, AND YET SHE IS EXEMPTED FROM AN OFFERING.43
(1) Although he performs no action.
(2) Cf. Num. XV, 30 and the context.
(3) Viz., of Num. XV, 30.
(4) So that blasphemy which is accordingly mentioned only in Lev. XXIV, 15-16 does not stand in conjunction with offerings. R. Akiba's view is thus robbed of its foundation.
(5) Thus admitting that 'megaddef' denotes the blasphemer.
(6) I.e., the Sages use here the term 'megaddef' in the language of R. Akiba to whom they address themselves.
(7) Since the text in Num. XV, 30 where kareth is mentioned refers to idolatry.
(8) Lev. XXIV, 15.
(9) Num. IX, 13.
(10) Thus Rashi's version. Cur. edd., whose text is not quite clear, read thus: . . . on the view of the Rabbis. R. Akiba argues thus with the Rabbis: You maintain the blasphemer (megaddef) performs no action; but in fact 'megaddef' is one who blasphemes the Name. And for what purpose has kareth been mentioned? They said to him: He who curses the Lord is liable to kareth, for it is written in connection with cursing, 'That man shall bear his iniquity' and it is written in conjunction with the second passover, 'He shall bear his iniquity': as in the latter instance there is kareth, so also in the former there is kareth.
(11) Num. XV, 30.
(12) מגדף is thus turned into מגרף by reason of the similarity of the two letters ד and ר.
(13) I.e., not only hast thou robbed the vessel of its contents, thou hast also damaged the vessel itself. The allusion is as follows: Though worshipping idols, the work of God's creation, one may still believe and recognise the supremacy of the Creator Himself, however unsound this attitude may be. With blasphemy one turns against the Creator Himself.
(14) In Lev. XXIV, 14 the death penalty is pronounced for the blasphemer of the Name. This text of Num. XV, 30 pronounces the penalty of kareth in case of wilful transgression in the absence of two witnesses or without due warning.
(15) Or rather offerings, cf. Lev. XII, 6-8.
(16) I.e., with the articulate parts of the body.
(17) Viz.,an heathen bondwoman.
(18) I.e., she is in doubt whether it was of a human shape making her liable to offerings, or not. Of the two offerings she has to bring (viz., the burnt-offering and the sin-offering) the first is brought with the stipulation that should she be exempted from offerings, it should be regarded as a freewill burnt-offering. With the latter this stipulation cannot be made, since there is no freewill sin-offering.
(19) It is not known which of the two is liable and which is exempted, therefore each of them brings a set of offerings.
(20) I.e., they have separated one from the other so that they cannot make the stipulation expounded in the Gemara.
(21) The development of the embryo begins to take shape after the fortieth day.
(22) Lev. XII, 2f., where the offerings of a woman after confinement are mentioned.
(23) Ibid. implying any woman.
(24) Is it not obvious, since slaves are subject to all laws to which women are subject?
(25) The question refers to R. Jose who holds that both women bring together one offering.
(26) The law prescribes two offerings, a burnt-offering and a sin-offering. A burnt-offering can also be brought in a doubtful case with the stipulation that the offering should be a freewill burnt-offering should the person in fact be exempted from the offerings. In this instance of the two women, each of them brings therefore a burnt-offering and stipulates that her burnt-offering should be a freewill sacrifice should the other woman be the one that is liable to the offering by law. This method cannot be used in connection with the sin-offering, for there is no freewill sin-offering. The women are therefore asked to bring together one sin-offering and each stipulates that her portion of the offering should belong to her friend, should the latter be the one that is liable by law to the offering.
(27) Infra 23a. The case in question is that two pieces of fat, one forbidden and the other permitted, were eaten by two people, and it is not known who ate the forbidden and who the permitted fat.
(28) Or else he would suggest a solution similar to that of our Mishnah.
(29) I.e., the instance of our Mishnah where the object of the offerings is to complete the atonement; v. infra 8b.
(30) In the Mishnah infra 23a.
(31) Lev. IV, 28. The offering is to expiate a certain sin of a certain person.
(32) Lev. XII, 5. It sufficed to state, 'and if it be a maid-child'.
(33) Ibid. 2.
(34) . I.e., only in the case of a normal birth are offerings prescribed.
(35) After the birth of a girl, cf. Lev. XII, 5. These eighty days are a period of cleanness, during which the woman does not become unclean through the discharge of blood. On the eighty-first day special offerings are to be offered. If another birth takes place before the expiration of this period, no new offerings are required; if on or after the eighty-first day, she is liable. The query arises, if the second birth was on the eve of the eighty-first day. Although the night is generally reckoned as part of the following day, as the sacrifices may not be offered until day-time of the eighty-first day, it is doubtful whether the abortion is to be covered by these sacrifices or not.
(36) For the second birth.
(37) The period of cleanness undoubtedly ends with sunset. It is assumed by Beth Hillel that the exemption from new offerings in the case of abortion within the period of cleanness is based upon the fact that the blood discharged thereby is clean. If accordingly the abortion took place after this period has passed, new offerings are required.
(38) Viz., the law that if the second birth takes place on or after the eighty-first day, a new set of offerings is required.
(39) Viz., the abortion.
(40) Sacrifices may not be offered during the night. Although the period of cleanness is over, since the sacrifices may not be offered until the following morning, the birth on the eve of the eighty-first day is to be covered by these offerings.
(41) Viz., the first objection of Beth Hillel: 'SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED EQUAL WITH REGARD TO UNCLEANNESS etc.'.
(42) Discharged at the abortion.
(43) I.e., according to Beth Shammai the exemption from offering in the case of abortion within the period of cleanness is not the outcome of the fact that the blood discharged thereby is clean, which in fact it is not, but because it is covered by the first set of offerings.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 8a
GEMARA. It has been taught: Beth Hillel said to Beth Shammai: Lo, it says, 'or for a daughter',1 to include the eve of the eighty-first day.
R. Hoshaia was a frequent visitor to Bar Kappara; he then left him and joined R. Hiyya. One day he met [Bar Kappara] and asked him: If a zab had three [new] issues during the night of the eighth day,2 what would be the view of Beth Hillel in this case?3 Is the reason of Beth Hillel in the case of an abortion on the night [of the eighty-first day] because it is written, 'or for a daughter', but in the case of a zab there will be no sacrifice, since there is no superfluous text in connection therewith; or perhaps there is no difference [between these two cases]? - Replied to him Bar Kappara: What did the Babylonian4 say in this matter? R. Hoshaia was silent and said nothing. Then Bar Kappara said to him: 'We have still to depend upon the words of Iyya!5
Let us return to that which has been said before. 'Lo, it says, or for a daughter, to include the eve of the eighty-first day'. Are we to say that this is a point of dispute between Tannaim? If a zab had three issues in the night of the eighth day, one [Baraitha] teaches, He has to bring an offering, whereas another [Baraitha] teaches, He is exempted. Now, do they not differ in the following: The one which teaches that he is liable holds that the night does not render a period wanting in time;6 and the one which teaches that he is exempt holds that the night renders a period wanting in time!7 - Said R. Huna b. Aha in the name of R. Eleazar: These Tannaim [indeed] hold that the night renders a period wanting in time, but the one which teaches that he is liable, deals with a zab of two issues,8 and the one which teaches that he is exempt deals with a zab of three issues.9 But need the case of a zab of two issues be stated?10 - This is what we are informed: Only when he perceives [three issues] on the night of the eighth day; but if on the day of the seventh,he is not liable; for he holds that an issue which disturbs [the period of cleanness]11 does not render one liable to an offering.
Said Raba: You have explained the teaching that one is exempted from an offering as referring to a zab of three issues; why then has this law not been stated in conjunction with the [Mishnah]: 'Five who bring one sacrifice for many transgressions'?12 - Because this law is not absolute;13 for R. Johanan said: If he perceived one issue in the night14 and two during the day,15 he is liable; two in the night and one during the day, he is not liable. Said R. Joseph: You can prove that one is liable if one [was perceived] by night and two during the day, for the first issue is regarded as a mere discharge of semen,16 and yet if two more issues are perceived, they combine one with the other. [Against this] said R. Shesheth son of R. Idi: What argument is this? The first issue of a zab took place at a time fit for offerings, but in the instance of 'one by night', where the issue was at a time not fit for offerings, had not R. Johanan taught us that they combine with one another, I would have thought that they do not combine. But does R. Johanan hold that the night renders a period wanting in time?17 Did not Hezekiah say:18 If he [the nazirite] became unclean during the eighth day,19 he has to bring a [second] offering; if on the night [of the eighth day], he does not bring [an offering]; while R. Johanan holds, Even on the night [of the eighth day] he has to bring?20 - When R. Johanan said if [he perceived] two by night and one during the day he has to bring [an offering], it was according to him who holds [that the night] renders a period wanting in time. But according to him is not this obvious? - [The case] of one by night and two during the day was necessary [to be mentioned]; for I might have thought, since the one issue was not at a time fit for offerings, there is no combination. Therefore we are told [that this is not so].
MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN HAD FIVE DOUBTFUL BIRTHS21 OR FIVE DOUBTFUL ISSUES,22 SHE NEED BRING BUT ONE OFFERING,23 AND MAY THEN PARTAKE OF SACRIFICIAL FLESH, AND SHE IS NOT BOUND TO BRING THE OTHER [OFFERINGS]. IF SHE HAD FIVE CERTAIN ISSUES, OR FIVE CERTAIN BIRTHS, SHE BRINGS ONE OFFERING AND MAY THEN PARTAKE OF SACRIFICIAL FLESH; BUT IT IS STILL HER DUTY TO BRING THE OTHER OFFERINGS. IT ONCE HAPPENED IN JERUSALEM THAT THE PRICE OF A PAIR OF DOVES24 ROSE TO A GOLDEN DENAR. SAID R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL, BY THIS SANCTUARY, I SHALL NOT GO TO SLEEP TO-NIGHT BEFORE THEY COST BUT A [SILVER] DENAR! THEN HE ENTERED THE BETH DIN AND TAUGHT: IF A WOMAN HAD FIVE CERTAIN BIRTHS OR FIVE CERTAIN ISSUES SHE NEED BRING BUT ONE OFFERING, AND MAY THEN PARTAKE OF SACRIFICIAL FLESH, AND SHE IS NOT BOUND TO BRING THE OTHER [OFFERINGS]. THEREUPON THE PRICE OF A PAIR OF BIRDS STOOD AT A QUARTER OF A [SILVER] DENAR EACH.
GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: If she had five certain births and five doubtful ones, or five certain issues and five doubtful ones, she brings two pairs of birds, one for the certain and one for the doubtful cases. The one offered for the certain cases may be eaten, and it is still incumbent upon her to bring the remaining offerings; that offered for the doubtful cases is not eaten,25 and the woman is not bound to bring any more offerings. R. Johanan b. Nuri said: For the certain cases she shall say, The offering is for the last occurrence,26 and she will be exempted; but for the doubtful cases, if there is a certain one among them,27 she shall say that the offering is for the one that is not in doubt, and she is exempted; if not, she says that the offering is for any one of the occurrences and she is exempted. R. Akiba said: Both in the instance of the certain cases and in that of the doubtful ones she shall say that the offering is for any one of the occurrences and she is exempted. Said R. Nahman b. Isaac to R. Papa: I shall tell you in the name of Raba in which point these Tannaim differ: R. Johanan b. Nuri compares these instances to those of sin-offerings: Just as when one is liable to five sin-offerings, he is not atoned for before all have been offered, the same is the ruling in our case. R. Akiba on the other hand compares them to immersions;28 for if one requires five immersions, as soon as he has immersed once he is clean; the same is the ruling in our case. Said R. Papa to him: If it was to be assumed that R. Johanan b. Nuri compared our instances to those of sin-offerings, why does he maintain that for doubtful cases she shall say the offering is for any one of them, and she is exempted? Suppose one was liable
(1) Lev. XII, 6. The whole phrase 'for a son or for a daughter' is superfluous.
(2) Cf. Lev. XV, 14. After three issues he is unclean so as to require seven clean days, and an offering on the eighth.
(3) I.e., is he liable to another offering for the second set of issues?
(4) Viz., R. Hiyya, cf. Suk. 20a.
(5) Derisive pronunciation of Hiyya, who as a Babylonian could not utter gutturals; v. M.K. 16a. The text, however, is not clear.
(6) I.e., whenever a certain period has been fixed after the elapse of which one is liable to a certain duty, e.g., the offering of a sacrifice, and there is only a night intervening, the period may be regarded as accomplished. The new issues therefore involve a new offering.
(7) The new issues are regarded as falling within the period of seven days resulting from the former uncleanness. No new offering is therefore required. Yet in the case of the abortions dealt with in our Mishnah there is liability in the view of Beth Hillel to a new set of offerings, on account of the text, 'or for a daughter'.
(8) Such a person is unclean and must count seven days, but is not liable to a sacrifice. If on the night of the eighth day he perceives three issues, these render him liable to an offering.
(9) For which he was already liable to a sacrifice; and the subsequent issues do not render him liable to bring a second offering.
(10) It is self-evident that he is liable to an offering.
(11) The issue on the seventh day destroys the period of cleanness of seven days, and they must be started again.
(12) Infra 9a. Here, too, one is liable to one offering although more than three issues were perceived.
(13) I.e., there are instances when one is liable even for issues on the night of the eighth day. viz., if two issues were perceived on the eighth day, the issue of the previous night combines with these, and he is liable to a new offering.
(14) Viz., the night of the eighth day.
(15) Viz., the eighth day.
(16) Rendering one unclean only for one day, and not liable to an offering.
(17) For he holds, for two issues during the night and one during the day, he is exempted.
(18) Hag. 9b.
(19) A nazirite who becomes unclean has to count seven clean days, bring an offering on the eighth day and begin to count again his period of naziriteship.
(20) Obviously this opinion cannot agree with the principle that the night renders the period wanting in time.
(21) Such as enumerated in the last but one Mishnah.
(22) I.e., it was doubtful whether the issues took place during the period of menstruation, in which case the uncleanness does not require offerings, or outside that period; v. Lev. XV, 25.
(23) For all the five cases. The sacrifice is offered out of doubt in order to enable the woman to partake afterwards of sacrificial flesh.
(24) A pair of pigeons or a pair of doves was the prescribed offering in the instances of the Mishnah. Rashi: two pairs, i.e. four birds, cost two golden denars, thus one golden denar (i.e. twenty-five silver denars) the pair.
(25) It is brought only in order to enable her to partake of sacrificial flesh.
(26) For if it was offered for one of the previous occurrences, those following would appear unatoned for, and this could lead to misunderstanding in that on future similar occasions the woman would assume that offerings were not essential.
(27) V. Rashi.
(28) E.g., if one contracted uncleanness five times.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 8b
to five suspensive guilt-offerings, would he indeed be exempted if he offered only one? Has it not been taught: This is the general rule: Whenever there is a division1 with regard to sin-offerings, there is also a division with reference to guilt-offerings?2 - In fact, both compare our instances to that of immersion, and they differ as to whether we apprehend negligence. R. Johanan b. Nuri holds, It might lead to negligence;3 R. Akiba holds, We do not apprehend negligence.
MISHNAH. THERE ARE FOUR PERSONS WHO REQUIRE A CEREMONY OF ATONEMENT,4 AND FOUR WHO BRING A SACRIFICE FOR WILFUL AS WELL AS FOR INADVERTENT TRANSGRESSION.5 THE FOLLOWING ARE THOSE WHO REQUIRE A CEREMONY OF ATONEMENT: THE ZAB,6 THE ZABAH,6 THE WOMAN AFTER CONFINEMENT7 AND THE LEPER.8 R. ELIEZER B. JACOB SAID, ALSO A PROSELYTE IS REGARDED AS A PERSON WHO STILL REQUIRES A CEREMONY OF ATONEMENT UNTIL THE BLOOD HAS BEEN SPRINKLED FOR HIM;9 THE SAME APPLIES TO THE NAZIRITE WITH REFERENCE TO WINE, HAIRCUTTING AND UNCLEANNESS.10
GEMARA. Why are zab and zabah enumerated as two separate instances? Apparently because they differ as to their uncleanness: for the zab is not unclean through discharge by accident,11 and the zabah is not rendered unclean through issues but through days;12 for it has been taught: Out of his flesh,13 but not by accident. A man is also unclean through issues as well as through days, as it has been taught: The text14 has made the uncleanness of the male dependent upon discharge and that of the female upon days. A zabah on the other hand is unclean through issue by accident and is not unclean through issue as through days. Now are not the leprous man and the leprous woman also different with regard to their uncleanness? For the leprous man is required to rend his clothes and to let his hair grow loose, as it is written: His clothes shall be rent and the hair of his head shall go loose,15 and he is forbidden marital intercourse; while the leprous woman is not required to rend her clothes and to let her hair grow loose, as it has been taught: I know only the law concerning a man,16 whence do I know its application to a woman? When the text reads, and the leper,17 both are included. Wherefore then is 'man' mentioned? The Writ removed him from the [application of the] earlier passage to the latter one,18 to teach us that only a man is required to rend his clothes and to let his hair grow loose, but not a woman. Also the woman is permitted marital intercourse, as it is written: And he shall dwell outside his tent seven days,19 but not [she] outside her tent. Why then have they20 not been enumerated as two separate instances? - The zab and the zabah are essentially different with regard to the source of uncleanness;21 whereas the leprous man and the leprous woman are not essentially different in their source of uncleanness, for the standard size of both is a bean.
R. ELIEZER B. JACOB SAID, ALSO A PROSELYTE IS REGARDED AS A PERSON WHO STILL REQUIRES etc. And why has the first Tanna not mentioned the proselyte? - He mentions only instances where the offering is to effect the permission of eating consecrated things, while in the case of the proselyte the offering is brought in order to qualify him to enter the congregation.22 And why has he not mentioned the nazirite? After all, when the nazirite brings an offering it is in order that he may be permitted to drink unconsecrated wine.23 And R. Eliezer, who has mentioned the nazirite in reference to his qualification,24 why has he not stated also the instance of the unclean nazirite?25 - The latter offers his sacrifice only to qualify for naziriteship in cleanness.
Our Rabbis have taught: A proselyte is prevented from partaking of consecrated things before he has offered his sacrificial birds. If he has offered one single pigeon in the morning, he is permitted to partake of consecrated things in the evening.26 All sacrifices of birds consist of one sin-offering and one burnt-offering; in this case27 both are burnt-offerings. If he has offered his obligatory sacrifice28 from the cattle, he has done his duty; if he has offered a burnt-offering and a peace-offering, he has done his duty; if a meal - and a peace-offering he has not fulfilled his duty. The prescription of birds as sacrifices is, as it were, to be regarded only as a rule towards greater leniency.29 Now, why do not a meal- and a peace-offering exempt him from his duty? Apparently because it is written: As ye do, so he shall do;30 As ye [Israelites] offer a burnt-offering and a peace-offering, so shall also the proselyte offer a burnt-offering and a peace-offering. Similarly then it should not suffice for him to offer his obligatory sacrifice from the cattle, because it is written: 'As ye do, so he shall do'? - Said R. papa. Argue thus: As he is included regarding the offering of a bird,31 should he not the more so be included regarding the burnt-offering of the cattle? If so, a meal-offering should also exempt him! - The text has excluded it by the word 'so'.32 And whence do we know that he is included regarding the offering of a bird? - For our Rabbis taught: [It is written.] 'As ye do, so shall he do': As ye offer a burnt- and a peace-offering, so shall also he offer a burnt- and a peace-offering, as it is indeed confirmed in the text, As ye are, so shall the stranger be.33 Whence do we know that he is included concerning the offering of a bird? It is written, An offering made by fire, of a sweet savour unto the Lord,34 which is the offering that is wholly unto the Lord? You must say, This is the burnt-offering of the bird.35
(1) I.e., that separate sacrifices are to be offered.
(2) Infra 15b.
(3) The stipulation that the sacrifice is for the last of the occurrences is essential in order to make it clear that all the occurrences are to be covered by this one offering. Were this stipulation omitted so that the sacrifice might be assumed to refer to one of the early occurrences, it would lead to the misunderstanding that it is not necessary to bring a sacrifice for every birth or issue. The sacrifice might then be omitted altogether on future occasions.
(4) I.e., a sacrifice. This sacrifice is not offered for the expiation of a sin, but in order to enable its owner to partake of consecrated things.
(5) These are exceptions, for the rule is that offerings are brought only for inadvertent transgression. The enumeration is found in the following Mishnah.
(6) Lev. XV, 2-33; v. Glos.
(7) Ibid XII, 2-8.
(8) Ibid XIV, 2-32.
(9) The first, anonymous Tanna holds that a proselyte may partake of sacred things even before the offering has been brought.
(10) I.e., he may not drink wine, cut his hair and render himself unclean by contact with the dead before the requisite offerings have been brought. The first Tanna also agrees on this point, but has omitted it because he has confined himself to the instances referring to the eating of sacred things.
(11) He is unclean only if the discharge was natural.
(12) Only when the three discharges were on three consecutive days is she unclean so as to require an offering.
(13) Lev. XV, 2. I.e., by reason of his flesh's lust.
(14) Cf. Lev. XV, 2-3 dealing with a man, and XV, 25 which deals with a woman.
(15) Lev. XIII, 45.
(16) It refers to Lev. XIII, 44 where it says that the priest shall declare the leprous man unclean.
(17) Lev. XIII, 45. 'The lever' is taken to include the woman though the word והצרוע is in the masculine, because it is altogether superfluous.
(18) I.e., from verse 44 to 45.
(19) Lev. XIV, 8. 'Tent' is a symbolic expression of matrimonial life.
(20) Viz., the leprous man and the leprous woman.
(21) In that in the case of a woman uncleanness is effected only through three issues on three consecutive days.
(22) I.e., to permit his marriage to a Jewess.
(23) And his offering is not particularly for the purpose of partaking of consecrated things.
(24) Viz., for secular things.
(25) I.e., a nazirite whose naziriteship has been interrupted by defilement. He is then required to bring an offering and to commence anew the period of naziriteship he originally vowed.
(26) Although it is still incumbent upon him to bring the other.
(27) I.e., in the instance of the proselyte.
(28) I.e., one burnt-offering of the cattle can take the place of two birds.
(29) I.e., as a concession to the poor who cannot afford a sacrifice of cattle, which of course is permissible.
(30) Num. XV, 14. Of the Israelites it reads (Ex. XXIV, 5) that when they consecrated themselves to the service of God they offered burnt- and peace-offerings.
(31) I.e., since we have learnt that sacrifices of the bird suffice for the proselyte as for the Israelite (as is soon shown), is it not logical that a sacrifice of the cattle should the more so suffice?
(32) Num. XV, 14. So and not otherwise.
(33) Ibid. XV, 15.
(34) Ibid v. 13.
(35) Of the burnt-offerings of the cattle the skin is left for the priests; while the burnt-offering of the bird is wholly burnt.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 9a
I might then include also the meal-offering; therefore it reads 'so'.
Another [Baraitha] teaches: [From the text,] 'and will offer an offering made by fire, of a sweet savour unto the Lord', I might derive everything that is offered up by fire, including a meal-offering; therefore it is written, 'As ye do, so shall he do': As ye offer blood sacrifices, so they1 too blood sacrifices. I might then conclude: As ye offer a burnt- and a peace-offering, so shall they also offer a burnt-offering and a peace-offering;2 it is therefore written, 'As ye are, so shall the stranger be': He is compared to you, but not wholly concerning your offerings.3 Rabbi says: 'As ye' means as your forefathers: As your forefathers entered into the covenant only by circumcision, immersion and the sprinkling of the blood,4 so shall they enter the Covenant only by circumcision, immersion and the sprinkling of the blood.
The offering of one pigeon does not suffice, for we do not find anywhere in the Torah [such an offering]; and the prescription of birds as sacrifices is only a rule towards greater leniency. Is this indeed so?5 Has it not been taught: What is the meaning of, and he shall offer it?6 It reads concerning turtle-doves, 'he shall offer',7 and I might argue therefrom that if a man vows to offer a burnt-offering of a bird he shall offer no less than two pigeons,8 therefore it is written, 'and he shall offer it'.9 Even one pigeon! - After all, we do not find an obligatory offering of this kind. But is there not the case of the woman after confinement who offers one young pigeon or one turtle-dove as a sin-offering? There a lamb is offered in addition. The Master said: 'As your forefathers entered into the Covenant only etc.'. It is right concerning circumcision, for it is written, For all the people that came out were circumcised,10 alternatively. And when I passed by thee, and saw thee wallowing in thy blood, I said unto thee: In thy blood, live, etc.;11 as to the sprinkling of the blood, it is mentioned in the text, And he sent the young men of the children of Israel [who offered burnt-offerings and sacrificed peace offerings];12 but whence do we know the immersion? - It is written, And Moses took the blood, and sprinkled it on the people,13 and there can be no sprinkling without immersion.14 If so, we should nowadays not receive any proselytes, since there are no sacrifices to-day? - Said R. Aha son of Jacob: It is written, And if a stranger sojourn with you, or whosoever may be among you, etc.15
Our Rabbis taught: A proselyte in these days has to put aside a fourth [of a denar]16 for his sacrifice of birds.17 Said R. Simeon: R. Johanan b. Zakkai held a vote on this rule and abolished it for fear of misuse.18 Said R. Idi b. Gershom in the name of R.Adda son of Ahaba, The decision is according to R. Simeon. Some report the latter statement with reference to that which has been taught: A resident alien19 may do work for himself on the Sabbath in the same measure as an Israelite may do on the intermediate days of the festivals.20 R. Akiba says as an Israelite on the festival.21 R. Jose says: A resident alien may do work for himself on the Sabbath in the same measure as an Israelite on week-days.22 R. Simeon says: Both a resident alien and a male or female sojourning heathen slave may do work for themselves in the same measure as an Israelite may do on week-days.
MISHNAH. THE FOLLOWING OFFER A SACRIFICE FOR WILFUL AS WELL AS FOR INADVERTENT TRANSGRESSION: ONE WHO HAS INTERCOURSE WITH A HANDMAID,23 A NAZIRITE WHO HAS BECOME UNCLEAN,24 [ONE WHO SWORE FALSELY] THE OATH CONCERNING EVIDENCE25 OR THE OATH CONCERNING A DEPOSIT.26 THERE ARE FIVE PERSONS WHO BRING ONE SACRIFICE FOR SEVERAL TRANSGRESSIONS, AND FIVE WHO BRING A SACRIFICE OF HIGHER OR LESSER VALUE.27 THE FOLLOWING BRING ONE SACRIFICE FOR SEVERAL TRANSGRESSIONS: ONE WHO HAS INTERCOURSE WITH A HANDMAID23 SEVERAL TIMES, AND A NAZIRITE WHO BECAME UNCLEAN SEVERAL TIMES.28
GEMARA. Whence do we know the law concerning the handmaid? - Our Rabbis taught: And the priest shall make atonement for him with the ram of the guilt-offering for his sin which he hath sinned;29 this teaches that one may bring one offering for several sins; and he shall be forgiven for his sin which he hath sinned:30 that wilful transgression is equal to transgression in error. A NAZIRITE WHO HAS BECOME UNCLEAN. Whence do we know this? - It is written, And if any man die in sudden [be-fetha'] unawareness [pithe'om] beside him:31 fetha' means unintentionally, for thus it is written: But if he thrust him unintentionally [be-fetha'] without enmity;32 pithe'om means unexpectedly, and thus it is written: And the Lord spoke suddenly [pithe'om] unto Moses.33 Another [Baraitha] taught: Pithe'om means intentionally, and thus it is written: A prudent man seeth the evil, and hideth himself; but the simple [petha'im] pass on, and are punished.34 Why has the text not written just pithe'om, which denotes error, intention and accident at the same time: intention and accident as has been explained before; it denotes, however, also error, as it is written: The thoughtless [pethi] believeth every word?35 Why then mention befetha'? - If pithe'om alone was mentioned, which denotes both error and intention and accident, I might have thought that an offering nevertheless was brought only for transgression in error, as is the case with all the laws of the Torah, but not in the case of accidental or wilful transgression; therefore the Divine Law mentions also befetha', which denotes error only, to indicate that pithe'om shall denote accident and wilfulness, so that also in these circumstances the Divine Law enjoins an offering.
THE OATH CONCERNING EVIDENCE. Whence do we know this? - Our Rabbis have taught:36 In connection with the other laws37 the term it being hidden [from him] is used;38 in connection with this law39 this term is not used, to indicate that he is liable to an offering for wilful as well as for inadvertent transgression.
THE OATH CONCERNING A DEPOSIT. Whence do we know this? - It is derived from the oath concerning evidence through the common term sinneth [teheta].40
THERE ARE FIVE PERSONS WHO BRING ONE SACRIFICE FOR SEVERAL TRANSGRESSIONS. It is stated ONE WHO HAS INTERCOURSE WITH A HANDMAID SEVERAL TIMES; whence do we know this? - Our Rabbis have taught: And the priest shall make atonement for him with the ram of the guilt-offering for his sin which he hath sinned':41 this teaches that one may bring one offering for several sins; 'and he shall be forgiven for his sin which he hath sinned': that wilful transgression is equal to transgression in error. But does not the text deal with the wilful transgression? - Rather say: that transgression in error be equal to wilful transgression.
R. Hanina of Tirna'ah42 put the following query to R. Johanan: If one had intercourse with five designated handmaids43 in one spell of unawareness,44 is he liable to a sacrifice for each of them or altogether only to one sacrifice? - The latter replied: He is guilty for each of them. And why, the former asked, is this case different from one who had intercourse five times with one handmaid in different spells of unawareness? - He replied: In the case of one handmaid one cannot argue that there were different bodies; in the instance of the five handmaids there were different bodies.45 And whence do we know that the argument of different bodies holds good in the case of the handmaid? - He replied: Did you not say46 with reference to forbidden relations that the word 'and a woman'47 implies that one is guilty for each woman? Also in connection with the handmaid it is written: And whosoever lieth carnally with a woman
(1) Should be, 'he too'.
(2) I.e., he shall not be exempted by burnt-offerings alone.
(3) I.e., he is not to be equal to you in every respect appertaining to offerings: he does not fulfil his duty by a meal-offering.
(4) I.e., the offering of sacrifices, cf. Ex XXIV, 5ff.
(5) Referring to the former part of the passage.
(6) Lev. I, 15 dealing with freewill-offerings.
(7) Ibid v. 14.
(8) I.e., a complete offering.
(9) The singular 'it' implies that also one pigeon may be offered.
(10) Josh. V, 5.
(11) Ezek. XVI, 6. According to the supposition of the Zohar to Lev. XXII, 27 this passage refers to the blood of circumcision.
(12) Ex. XXIV, 5.
(13) Ibid v. 8.
(14) The parallel text in Yeb. 46b reads: 'and there is a tradition that there is no sprinkling . . .'.
(15) Num. XV, 14. The text continues: throughout your generations, i.e., at all times.
(16) This according to the Mishnah on 8a seems to be the minimum one could spend on it.
(17) And keep it ready in case the Temple be re-built.
(18) I.e., that he may not make unlawful use of it.
(19) A stranger who has renounced idolatry and has taken up residence among the Jews.
(20) I.e., he may work on things that would otherwise perish.
(21) I.e., he may do all that is necessary for the preparation of food.
(22) I.e., he may do all kinds of work.
(23) Designated by her master to be the wife of one chosen by him. Cf. Lev. XIX, 20-22.
(24) Num. VI, 2ff. The offering is brought irrespective of whether the uncleanness was in error or wilful.
(25) I.e., he swore falsely that he had no evidence to give, cf. Lev. V, 1.
(26) Ibid v. 21.
(27) Viz., according to their means; cf. Lev. V, 6ff.
(28) The enumerations continue in the following Mishnah.
(29) Lev. XIX, 22 which deals with the designated handmaid. Which he hath sinned is regarded as superfluous, to include a multitude of sins.
(30) Ibid. Here, too, the words 'which he hath sinned' are regarded as superfluous.
(31) Num. VI, 9.
(32) Ibid. XXXV, 22.
(33) Ibid XII, 4.
(34) Prov. XXII, 3. The comparison of these two words פתאם and פתאים is based on their similarity in appearance and sound. The latter word conveys a weakling who cannot control himself, yet commits his follies with intention.
(35) Ibid. XIV, 15.
(36) Shebu. 31b.
(37) Viz., all other laws, whereby an offering of higher or lesser value is prescribed, which are enumerated in that paragraph, Lev. V, 1ff.
(38) Implying that the transgression was committed in error.
(39) Lev. V, 1.
(40) Occurring in Lev. V, 1 and V, 21.
(41) V. p. 68, n. 10.
(42) This place appears in the Talmud (Ned. 57b, 59b) in a variety of forms.
(43) I.e., slaves who have been designated by the master to become the wives of people chosen by him.
(44) I.e., without becoming conscious of the sin between one transgression and the other.
(45) This effects separate offerings for each transgression.
(46) V. supra 2b.
(47) Lev. XVIII, 19. The correct quotation is 'and unto a woman'.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 9b
that is a bondmaid, etc.,1 to enjoin separate offerings for each handmaid.
A NAZIRITE WHO BECAME UNCLEAN SEVERAL TIMES. Whose view does this represent? - Said R. Hisda, That of R. Jose son of R. Judah who holds that the naziriteship of cleanness counts from the seventh day,2 and the instance of our Mishnah is realised if he became unclean on the seventh day and then again on the seventh; since the time for the offering was not reached, he is liable only to one sacrifice. [How can the instance of the Mishnah be realised] according to Rabbi who holds that the naziriteship of cleanness does not count before the eighth day? If he became unclean on the seventh day and again on the [following] seventh day, is this not one long period of uncleanness?3 If he became unclean on the eighth day and again on the [following] eighth day, since the time of the offering has been reached,4 he should be liable to an offering for each uncleanness? It is thus proved that the Mishnah is in accordance with R. Jose son of R. Judah. And where do we find R. Jose's view? - It has been taught: And he shall hallow his head that same day,5 refers to the day on which the sacrifices are offered;6 thus the words of Rabbi. R. Jose son of R. Judah says, On the day of the cutting of his hair.7
MISHNAH. ONE8 WHO WARNS HIS WIFE9 IN REGARD TO SEVERAL MEN,10 AND A LEPER WHO HAS CONTRACTED A LEP ROUS DISEASE SEVERAL TIMES.11 IF HE HAS OFFERED THE BIRDS AND THEN BECOMES LEPROUS AGAIN, THEY DO NOT COUNT FOR HIM UNTIL HE HAS OFFERED HIS SIN-OFFERING.12 R. JUDAH SAYS, UNTIL HE HAS OFFERED HIS GUILT-OFFERING.
GEMARA. Whence do we know the law concerning this?13 - It is written: This is the law concerning jealousies:14 One law for several warnings.
A LEPER WHO HAS CONTRACTED A LEPROUS DISEASE SEVERAL TIMES. Whence do we know this? - It is written: This is the law of the leper:15 one law for several cases of leprosy.
IF HE HAS OFFERED THE BIRDS AND THEN BECOMES LEPROUS AGAIN, THEY DO NOT COUNT FOR HIM UNTIL HE HAS OFFERED HIS SIN-OFFERING. R. JUDAH SAYS: UNTIL HE HAS OFFERED HIS GUILT-OFFERING. But did you not say he offers only one sacrifice?16 - The text is incomplete, and should read thus: If he has offered the birds and then becomes leprous again, he offers but one set of sacrifices. The decision whether the sacrifices be those of the poor person or of the rich person17 is not taken until the sin-offering is brought.18 R. Judah says: Until the guilt-offering is brought.
We have learnt there:19 If a leper became rich after he had offered his guilt-offering, you go by his pecuniary status at the time of the offering of the sin-offering.20 Thus R. Simeon. R. Judah says: At the time of the offering of the guilt-offering.21 It has been taught: R. Eliezer b. Jacob says, At the time of the offering of the birds. Said Rab Judah in the name of Rab: All the three [Rabbis] derive their respective views from the same passage, Whose means suffice not for that which pertaineth to his cleansing.22 R. Simeon holds: The offering that effects atonement [is decisive]; R. Judah holds: That which effects his qualification23 [to partake of holy things]; R. Eliezer b. Jacob holds: That which effects cleanness, namely, the birds.
MISHNAH. A WOMAN24 WHO HAS UNDERGONE SEVERAL CONFINEMENTS, E.G., IF SHE PRODUCED A FEMALE ABORTION WITHIN EIGHTY DAYS OF THE BIRTH OF A GIRL,25 AND THEN SHE PRODUCED AGAIN A FEMALE ABORTION WITHIN EIGHTY DAYS OF THE FIRST; OR IF SHE PRODUCED A MULTIPLE OF ABORTIONS.26 R. JUDAH SAYS: SHE BRINGS AN OFFERING FOR THE FIRST BIRTH AND NOT FOR THE SECOND, FOR THE THIRD AGAIN BUT NOT FOR THE FOURTH.27
GEMARA. Whence do we know this? - A Tanna recited before R. Shesheth: This is the law for her that beareth, whether a male or a female,28 teaches that she offers but one offering for several births. I might perhaps assume then that also for a birth and a discharge of gonorrhea29 only one offering is brought, therefore it is written, 'this'.30 It states, 'I might perhaps assume then that also for a birth and a discharge of gonorrhea only one offering is brought'. If so,31 she should also bring but one offering if she ate blood and gave birth to a child? - Read thus: I might assume that she also brings but one offering [for two births if] one was before the period of cleanness had expired and the other after it had expired;32 therefore it is written, 'this'.
IF SHE PRODUCED WITHIN EIGHTY DAYS etc. If you will assume that according to R. Judah the first birth causes the offering, and the period of uncleanness is counted from the first birth,33 then according to the Rabbis34 the second birth causes the offering and the second, because there is no period of cleanness attached to the latter, since it fell within the period of cleanness of the first. An offering has therefore to be brought for the third birth which covers also the fourth that took place within the former's period of cleanness. period of uncleanness is counted from the second birth. You say, 'If you will assume'; is it not obvious?35 - It has to be stated for the sake of its inclusion of the instance of the 'multiple of abortions'. I might have thought that in the case of the multiple of abortions R. Judah agrees with the Rabbis; therefore we are informed [that it is not so].
The following query was put forward:
(1) Lev. XIX, 20.
(2) A nazirite who becomes unclean has to count seven clean days and bring an offering on the eighth day. He has then to observe again his vow of naziriteship for the period stipulated, which is called the naziriteship of cleanness. According to R. Jose the new period commences on the seventh day. If the nazirite becomes unclean again on this day, it is considered a new state of uncleanness and yet he is liable only to one sacrifice because the offering is due only on the eighth. At the end of another spell of seven days he will then bring one sacrifice for two different occurrences of uncleanness.
(3) The Mishnah would then not be justified in regarding this as a case where one offering is brought for several separate transgressions or occurrences.
(4) I.e., the offering became due for the first uncleanness and thus designated for it.
(5) Num. VI, 11. I.e., he shall commence the new period of naziriteship, as the text continues, And he shall consecrate unto the Lord the days of his naziriteship.
(6) I.e., the eighth day; v. Num. VI, 10.
(7) I.e., the seventh day; v. ibid v. 9.
(8) This is a continuation of the enumeration in the previous Mishnah of laws where one is liable to one sacrifice for several transgressions.
(9) Not to have any relations with certain men; cf. Sot. 2a.
(10) Cf. Num. V, 15f. The jealous husband brings a meal-offering of barley.
(11) A leper when declared healed and clean by the priest, offers two birds, cf. Lev. XIV, 4-7, and after seven days other offerings, cf. v. 10ff. If before the offering of the latter sacrifices he contracts again a leprous disease, he is not liable to new sacrifices.
(12) After the seven days he offers three sacrifices: a sin-, a guilt- and a burnt-offering. For the explanation of this passage v. infra Gemara.
(13) With reference to the first instance in the Mishnah.
(14) Num. V, 29. The use of the plural implies this law.
(15) Lev. XIV, 2. The article is regarded as superfluous, and is taken to have been used for the sake of this implication.
(16) While the text of the Mishnah seems to imply that he has to offer birds again.
(17) The rich person brings three lambs as his sacrifices; the poor person offers a lamb as a guilt-offering and then two pigeons or turtle-doves, one for a sin-offering and one for a burnt-offering.
(18) I.e., it is the pecuniary position of the leper at the time of the offering of the sin-offering that is decisive, and not at the time of the offering of the birds.
(19) Neg. XIV, 11.
(20) The sin- and burnt-offering are offered after the guilt-offering.
(21) I.e., in spite of the fact that he is rich now, he offers but pigeons for the sin- and burnt-offerings, since he was poor at the moment when the guilt-offering was brought.
(22) Lev. XIV, 32. 'To his cleansing' is taken to indicate that the moment of cleansing is decisive, and the three scholars differ as to what is meant by this cleansing: cleansing of sins, cleansing of the impediment to partake of holy things, or that which introduces the ceremony of purification.
(23) Viz., the smearing of the blood of the guilt-offering upon the thumb.
(24) This, too, is a continuation of the enumeration in the second Mishnah of this chapter of laws where one is liable to one sacrifice for several transgressions.
(25) Cf. Lev. XII, 5. After the birth of a girl the woman counts eighty days of cleanness and offers then a sacrifice. The abortion within this period is thus covered by the sacrifice for the first birth.
(26) Lit. 'twins'. Each abortion was brought forth before the period of cleanness for the previous abortion had expired.
(27) An abortion involves a sacrifice only if it takes place at least forty days after the conception. The first abortion took place within eighty days of the proper birth, but the second must of necessity have taken place after that period. It is therefore not covered by the offering brought for the proper birth. The third birth, i.e., the second abortion, cannot be regarded as exempted on account of the fact that it took place within eighty days of the
(28) Lev. XII, 7. The text is taken to suggest that there is one law, i.e., one offering, for several instances.
(29) Which preceded the birth.
(30) 'This' is restrictive: only in the instance of births is the allowance regarding the offering made.
(31) Viz., that according to your assumption, one offering should suffice for two instances that are not connected one with the other. The argument is then led ad absurdum.
(32) Or rather, if the second birth took place after the period of cleanness of the first.
(33) I.e., whenever a birth takes place within the period of cleanness of another, in which case one sacrifice is offered for both, it is the first for which the offering is brought and the second is merely covered by it. The period of cleanness is counted from the first birth, so that there is no such period provided for the second; v. p. 73. n. 8.
(34) I.e., the anonymous view of the Mishnah which maintains that she is liable only to one sacrifice for all the four births, holding that whenever a birth takes place within the period of cleanness of another, it is the second for which the offering is brought while the first becomes exempted owing to the fact that its period of cleanness was interrupted. In the instance of the Mishnah, therefore, the second birth takes the place of the first, the third the place of the second, etc. ad infinitum, and the offering is brought for the last of the sequence of births. cf. also Mishnah 7b.
(35) And therefore superfluous.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 10a
What is R. Judah's view with reference to uncleanness?1 Shall we say, R. Judah holds that the second birth is not taken into account only with regard to offerings, because it took place before the offering for the first birth was due, and consequently the second birth is not taken into account; but with reference to cleanness and uncleanness, I might say that the second birth is taken into account in that the period of impurity2 thereof interrupts [the period of cleanness of the first], and that the latter period is afterwards completed and the period of cleanness of the second birth commences thereafter? Or does R. Judah uphold his view only if it leads to greater stringency;3 but here,4 since it leads to greater leniency,5 he does not uphold his view? - Said R. Huna of Sura, Come and hear: For a woman after confinement, one may slaughter the Paschal Lamb and sprinkle the blood on the fortieth day after the birth of a male, and on the eightieth day after the birth of a girl?6 [Whereon it was asked,] Is she not still unclean?7 and R. Hisda answered: This is in accordance with R. Judah, who holds that the second birth is not taken into account.8 Now, if you assume that with reference to uncleanness R. Judah agrees that the second birth is taken into account, how can the Paschal Sacrifice be slaughtered for her on the fortieth day, seeing that even in the evening she will not be permitted to partake of it? You must, therefore, conclude that also with reference to cleanness and uncleanness does R. Judah hold that the second birth is not taken into account! - No, I may still maintain that with reference to cleanness and uncleanness R. Judah agrees that the second birth is taken into account, but that law refers to a Paschal Lamb that is offered in uncleanness.9 But is she then permitted to partake of it, have we not learnt: A Paschal Lamb that is offered in uncleanness may not be eaten by a :zab or a zabah, or by menstruant women or by a woman after confinement?10 - These may not eat if they have not immersed; the law, however, which states that one may slaughter and sprinkle for her refers to a woman who has immersed.11 If so,12 she is fit for the Paschal Lamb from the eighth day onward!13 - She is not fit from the eighth day onward, for it is held that a zab who immersed by day has still the status of a zab.14 If so, she is unfit even on the fortieth day! - No, on the fortieth day she is regarded fit, for it is held that a zab who lacks but offerings15 is not considered a zab. But what will be your answer according to Raba who holds that a zab who lacks but offerings is still considered a zab? - Said R. Ashi: Raba will interpret the law as referring to the fortieth day of the conception of a male and the eightieth day of the conception of a female,16 and as being in accordance with R. Ishmael who holds17 the limit for a male to be forty-one days and for a female eighty-one days.18 But is she not, after all, unclean as a menstruant woman?19 - It deals with a dry birth.20 If so, is the law not obvious? - I might have thought that the opening of the uterus cannot take place without discharge of blood;21 therefore he lets us know that the uterus can open without a discharge of blood.
R. Shema'iah said, Come and hear: 'Sixty'22 may convey both a connected and a disconnected23 spell of time; therefore it is written 'days':24 as the day is a connected spell of time, so also the sixty days. With whom does this conform? Shall I say with the Rabbis? Surely, according to them, a disconnected spell of time is an impossibility!25 It must thus be in accordance with R. Judah; and since it is stated that the time must be connected, we are led to decide that he upholds his view only if it leads to greater stringency but not if it leads to greater leniency!26 - No,it may conform with the view of the Rabbis, but it refers to a woman who brought forth a male abortion within the eighty days of a female birth.27 But, then, after all, is it not so that the days of the first birth finish before those of the second28 and the Rabbis hold that the second birth is taken into account?29 According to the Rabbis the law can be realised in the case of a birth of twins, a female first and a male afterwards, and where the male was, e.g., born after twenty days of the period of cleanness had passed,30 so that she must keep of the days relating to the female birth seven days of impurity. The discussion, then, is thus: I might think that when twins are born, the female first and the male afterwards, the days of impurity of the latter cause an interruption31 so that the sixty-six days are counted disjointedly; therefore it is written 'days': as the day is a connected spell of time, so also the sixty days must be connected.32 Abaye said: Come and hear, 'Thirty'33 may convey both a connected and a disconnected spell of time,34 therefore it is written, 'days':35 as the day is a connected spell of time, so also the thirty days. With whom does this conform? Shall I say with the Rabbis? Surely, according to the Rabbis
(1) I.e., whether a period of cleanness, during which the discharge of blood does not render unclean, is provided for the second birth or not.
(2) I.e., the first seven days after the birth of a male and fourteen days after the birth of a female, during which she is regarded as unclean; cf. Lev. XII, 2 and 5.
(3) As in the Mishnah where two offerings are imposed.
(4) I.e., with reference to uncleanness.
(5) In that the period of cleanness is extended.
(6) Tosef. Pes. VII, 4.
(7) The offering is not brought until the forty-first or eighty-first day.
(8) I.e, this law refers to a woman who gave birth to twins on two consecutive days. The fortieth day of the second birth is thus the forty-first day of the first. On this day she may join the Passover celebration, because the time is due for the offerings which will effect her purification, although they have not been offered yet. The Paschal Lamb is consumed in the evening and the offerings of purification may still be offered. This holds good only according to R. Judah, who says the second birth is not taken into account, for according to the Sages it being the fortieth day of the second birth she would still be unfit for the Paschal Lamb.
(9) When the majority of the community are unclean the Paschal Lamb may, contrary to the general rule, be offered also for the unclean people. With this reply we depart from R. Hisda's interpretation.
(10) Pes. 95b.
(11) For the immersion takes place after the seven days of impurity that follow the birth.
(12) That the immersion is decisive and not the completion of the period.
(13) Why state 'the fortieth day'?
(14) In order to achieve complete cleanness he must immerse and wait till sunset. If the immersion has taken place, but the required spell of time has not passed, he is, according to this view, still unclean. Similarly, if the woman has immersed after the eighth day and has to wait for the completion of the forty days in order to offer the sacrifice, she is still regarded as unfit for sacred things.
(15) I.e., one who has even completed the requisite time but has not offered his sacrifices. Similarly, the woman is considered fit for the Paschal Lamb on the fortieth day.
(16) The law does not refer, as hitherto assumed, to the forty days of the period of cleanness, but to an abortion which took place forty or eighty days respectively after the conception. She is permitted to join the Passover celebration because the embryo is considered too immature to cause uncleanness.
(17) Nid. 30a.
(18) I.e., the formation of a male embryo lasts forty-one days and that of a female eighty-one days.
(19) The blood discharged at birth renders her a menstruant woman. How then is she permitted to be counted for a Paschal Lamb?
(20) Without any discharge of blood.
(21) So that the woman is unclean even if nobody has actually perceived any blood, for it is assumed that the blood is hidden.
(22) Lev. XII, 5. It refers to the sixty-six days of cleanness which follow the fourteen days of uncleanness after the birth of a female.
(23) Viz., by another birth within the eighty days.
(24) The text reads, sixty days and six days; the repetition of the word 'days' and the fact that the first time it is actually used in the singular implies that the period is to be like one day.
(25) For the Rabbis hold that in the case of an abortion within eighty days of a birth the period of cleanness of the birth is regarded as annulled and a new period is to start. According to R. Judah on the other hand the period of the first birth still holds good.
(26) For according to the first alternative of the query above there is a case of a disconnected spell of time, as described in the query.
(27) So that the forty days of the male, namely seven days of impurity and thirty-three days of cleanness, finish before the eighty days of the female. In this case even the Rabbis admit that the second, shorter period of cleanness does not abolish the first, longer one, which is to be resumed. The text conveys that the seven days of impurity caused by the abortion are not to be made up after the eighty days have passed.
(28) Intercourse could not have taken place before the first fourteen days of impurity have passed, during which she is not allowed to her husband. As the embryo must be at least forty days old, the abortion cannot have taken place before the fifty-fourth day after the birth of the female, so that the forty days of the second birth must of necessity end after the eighty days of the first.
(29) The period of cleanness will continue beyond the eighty days of the first birth. This instance can therefore no longer be regarded as an example of a disjointed period of eighty days, mentioned in the statement quoted.
(30) Even the Rabbis who hold the second birth is decisive agree here that the period of cleanness of the first birth is not abolished by that of the second, since the latter finishes before the former.
(31) I.e., the seven days of impurity caused by the second of the twins were to be made up after the eighty days of the first birth
(32) I.e., the seven days of impurity do not cause an interruption of the period of cleanness of the first birth, though the woman is indeed unclean during these seven days.
(33) Lev. XII, 5. It refers to the thirty-three days of cleanness which follow the seven days of impurity after the birth of a male.
(34) I.e., if two male twins were born one, say, thirty days after the other, so that the seven days of impurity of the second supersede seven of the days of cleanness of the first birth. If we said that these seven days are to be made up, we should find the period of cleanness of the first birth disconnected. The text lets us know that the seven days are not to be made up.
(35) V. p. 77, n.9.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 10b
a disconnected spell of time is an impossibility, for they hold that it is the second birth that is of avail.1 It must, therefore, be in accordance with the view of R. Judah; and it proves that he upholds his view only if it leads to greater stringency, but not if it leads to greater leniency.2 R. Ashi, too, said: Come and hear: 'Six days' may mean both a connected and disconnected spell of time;3 therefore it is written 'sixty': as the sixty days are connected, so also the six. With whom does this conform? Shall I say with the Rabbis? Surely, according to the Rabbis a disconnected spell of time is an impossibility, for they hold it is the second birth that is of avail. It must therefore be according to R. Judah, and this proves that he upholds his view only if it leads to greater stringency but not if it leads to greater leniency. This is indeed proved.
MISHNAH. THE FOLLOWING PERSONS BRING AN OFFERING OF HIGHER OR LESSER VALUE:4 ONE WHO REFUSES TO GIVE EVIDENCE,5 ONE WHO HAS BROKEN THE WORD OF HIS LIPS [SUPPORTED BY AN OATH],6 ONE WHO WHILE UNCLEAN HAS ENTERED THE SANCTUARY OR HAS PARTAKEN OF HOLY THINGS,7 A WOMAN AFTER CONFINEMENT8 AND A LEPER.9
GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: Some bring the offering of the poor and of the rich, some of the poor, and some of the poorest. A woman after confinement brings the offering of the poor and of the rich,10 a leper that of the poor,11 while one who refuses to give evidence, or breaks his word, or defiles the Sanctuary or holy things offers the offering of the poor and of the poorest.12
Another [Baraitha] taught: Sometimes one offering replaces13 one, sometimes two replace two, sometimes two replace one and sometimes one replaces two; this teaches that the tenth of an ephah14 is worth a perutah.15 The woman after confinement offers one instead of one, namely a single bird in the place of the lamb16 ; a leper offers two birds in the place of two lambs; one who refuses to give evidence or one who breaks his word or one who defiles the Sanctuary or holy things offers two birds instead of one lamb, and in the case of direst poverty one tenth of an ephah in the place of two birds.
It says, 'This teaches that the tenth of an ephah is worth a perutah'. Whence do we know this? - Our Rabbis have taught: If one says, I vow an offering for the altar worth a sela', he offers a lamb, for no offering can be offered for a sela' but a lamb. Whence do we know this? - Since the Divine Law stated that the ram of the guilt-offering is valued at two shekels,17 from this we learn that a one-year old lamb is valued at one sela',18 for it is said,A lamb of the first year,19 [from which follows that] a ram is of the second year.20 Then we have learnt:21 'The pair of sacrificial birds on that day stood at a quarter [of a denar]'.22 We thus see that the Divine Law has spared the poor and has fixed their sacrifice at the sixteenth part of that of the rich; we may then assume that the sacrifice of the poorest is to be the sixteenth part of that of the poor. Consequently the offering of the poor is worth a quarter of a denar. Since a quarter of a denar has forty-eight perutahs, a sixteenth thereof would be three perutahs, while it has been stated: 'This teaches that the tenth of an ephah is worth a perutah'. Why a perutah? Did you not say the tenth of an ephah is the offering of the poorest and that this offering is worth one sixteenth part of that of the poor, which we found was three perutahs? - The Tanna derives his proportions from the instance of the woman after confinement, who offers in the place of a lamb one bird, the value of which23 is one thirty-second part of that of a lamb. But is not the offering of the poorest still the sixteenth part of the poor,24 as it is inferred from the comparison of the lamb and the ram?25 The ephah should then be valued at a perutah and a half!26 - Said Raba, All is derived from the instance of the woman after confinement in the following manner: Since the Divine Law has spared the poor and has fixed their sacrifice at one thirty-second part of that of the rich, as we find in the instance of the woman after confinement, so we assume that the Divine Law has spared the poorest in fixing their sacrifice at the thirty-second part of that of the poor. If so, the ephah should be valued at three-quarters of a perutah! - Indeed, so it is, except that it is not becoming to offer to the Lord less than a perutah.
MISHNAH. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HANDMAID27 AND THE FORBIDDEN CONNECTIONS28 FROM WHOM SHE DEVIATES BOTH IN REGARD TO THE PENALTY AND THE OFFERING? IN THE CASE OF ALL OTHER FORBIDDEN CONNECTIONS A SIN-OFFERING IS BROUGHT, IN THAT OF A HANDMAID A GUILT-OFFERING; IN THE CASE OF THE OTHER FORBIDDEN CONNECTIONS A FEMALE ANIMAL IS OFFERED, IN THAT OF THE HANDMAID A MALE; IN THE CASE OF THE OTHER FORBIDDEN CONNECTIONS MAN AND WOMAN ARE ALIKE IN RESPECT OF LASHES AND THE SACRIFICE,29 IN THAT OF THE HANDMAID THE MAN IS UNLIKE THE WOMAN REGARDING THE LASHES, AND THE WOMAN IS UNLIKE THE MAN REGARDING THE SACRIFICE;30 IN THE CASE OF ALL OTHER FORBIDDEN CONNECTIONS SEXUAL CONTACT31 IS PUNISHABLE AS WELL AS CONSUMMATED CONNECTION, AND ONE IS GUILTY FOR EACH CONNECTION SEPARATELY;32 FINALLY THE CASE OF THE HANDMAID IS MORE STRINGENT
(1) She will thus have to count the forty days from the second birth and the period of cleanness of the first is completely abolished.
(2) V. p. 77, n. 11.
(3) I.e., if an abortion took place e.g., on the seventy-seventh day of the birth of a female, so that the days of impurity of the second birth supersede three of the days of the period of cleanness of the first birth. The question is again whether these three days are to be made up or not. The rest of the discussion is similar to that of the two previous ones.
(4) I.e., one which varies according to the pecuniary position of the owners; a rich person offers a lamb or goat, a poor person pigeons or turtle-doves, and a very poor person a meal-offering.
(5) Lit. 'one who heard the call (of an oath).' A person who refuses to give evidence, though called upon to do so by oath, or swearing falsely himself that he does not know the facts; Lev. V, 1.
(6) Lit., 'utterance of lips'; viz., a promise with reference to his own person, such as to fast, or an assurance of facts of the past, also with reference to his own person, e.g., that he fasted; Lev. V, 4.
(7) Ibid. vv. 2-3. The transgression was committed in error. That an offering of higher or lesser value is offered in these three instances is stated in the text, v. 6ff. A rich person offers one lamb, a poor person two doves, a very poor person a meal-offering.
(8) Lev. XII, 6-8. A rich person offers one lamb and one dove, a poor person two doves.
(9) Lev. XIV, 10ff. A rich person offers three lambs, a poor person one lamb and two doves.
(10) Viz., one lamb and one dove.
(11) Viz., two birds, prior to the other sacrifices.
(12) In these three cases the provision is made that the poorest offer but a meal-offering
(13) In case of poverty.
(14) Ephah is a measure. A tenth thereof is the quantity of the meal-offering offered by the poorest; Lev. V, 11.
(15) V. Glos. V. infra.
(16) For her burnt-offering. As for her sin-offering a woman after confinement always brought a dove or a pigeon.
(17) Lev. V, 15. The text uses shekels, plural; i.e., at least two.
(18) A Biblical shekel is identical with a sela'.
(19) Num. VI, 12.
(20) A ram is more mature. It is assumed that the price has doubled with the doubling of the age.
(21) V. supra 8a.
(22) One denar is the fourth of a sela'.
(23) Viz., the eighth of a denar.
(24) The offering of the poorest is not provided in the instance of the woman after confinement but only in the cases of refused evidence, broken promise and defilement of the Sanctuary and holy things. In these instances two birds replace one lamb. The proportion of the offering of the rich and that of the poor is sixteen to one. The same proportion must then hold good with reference to the offering of the poorest towards that of the poor.
(25) From which we learn that a lamb is valued at a sela'.
(26) The offering of the poor being the thirty-second part of that of the rich and sixteen times the value of that of the poorest, is thus worth one and a half perutahs.
(27) A bondwoman who is designated to a man chosen by her master; cf. Lev. XIX, 20.
(28) Enumerated in Lev. XVIII.
(29) I.e., both partners are liable to lashes in the case of wilful transgression and to an offering in the case of transgression in error.
(30) I.e., the man is liable to a guilt-offering and the handmaid to lashes.
(31) I.e., the mere contact of the sexual organs is punishable, even though the connection was not consummated.
(32) While in the case of the handmaid only a consummated connection is subject to the law, and one is not liable for each connection separately.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 11a
IN THAT WILFUL TRANSGRESSION1 IS OF THE SAME STATUS AS TRANSGRESSION IN ERROR. TO WHICH HANDMAID DOES THIS REFER? TO ONE WHO IS HALF A SLAVE AND HALF A FREE PERSON,2 AS IT IS WRITTEN: AND NOT AT ALL REDEEMED.3 THUS THE VIEW OF R. AKIBA. R. ISHMAEL SAYS: TO A SLAVE PROPER. R. ELIEZER B. JACOB4 SAYS: OF ALL OTHER FORBIDDEN CONNECTIONS IT IS EXPLICITLY STATED [THAT THEY ARE WHOLLY FREE PEOPLE], THERE IS THUS LEFT THE INSTANCE OF ONE WHO IS HALF A SLAVE AND HALF A FREE PERSON.5
GEMARA. Whence do we know that she is liable to lashes but not he? - Our Rabbis taught: There shall be inquisition [bikkoreth],6 conveys that she is liable to lashes. I might still think that both are liable to lashes, therefore it is written 'shall be';7 she is liable but not he. And whence do we know that the term bikkoreth implies lashes? - Said R. Isaac: It denotes, it shall be read for her,8 as it has been taught: The head of the judges reads, the second counts and the third says, beat him. R. Ashi says: It denotes, she shall be examined,9 as we have learnt: They do not estimate the number of lashes he can bear except in a multiple of three.10
Our Rabbis taught: Whenever the woman is subject to lashes the man is liable to a sacrifice, and when she is free from lashes,11 he is exempted from a sacrifice. Whence do we know this? - Said Raba: It is written, And if a man lieth carnally with a woman, that is a bondmaid, designated for a man, and not at all redeemed, nor was freedom given her.12 Now consider: the text deals hitherto with the man, it should therefore have proceeded immediately with the words, And he shall bring his guilt-offering unto the Lord, and then continue, There shall be inquisition.13 Why has the text stated first, 'There shall be inquisition' and only afterwards 'And he shall bring his guilt-offering unto the Lord'? This then is meant: If there is an inquisition regarding the woman, he shall bring a guilt-offering unto the Lord, and if there is no inquisition he shall not bring his guilt-offering. But perhaps he has been exempted [from lashes], she however is liable to lashes as well as to a sacrifice?14 - It reads: And he shall bring his guilt-offering unto the Lord.15
R. Isaac said: One is liable only in the case of a possessed handmaid, as it is written, 'That is a bondmaid, designated for a man'. And where do we find that the term 'designated' [neherefeth] implies that a change has taken place?16 - It is written, And strewed groats [harifoth] thereon.17 Or as it is written, Though thou shouldest bray a fool in a mortar with a pestle among groats [harifoth].18
And they gave their hand that they would put away their wives; and being guilty, they offered a ram of the flock for their guilt;19 said R. Hisda: This teaches that they had all had intercourse with designated handmaids.20
TO WHICH HANDMAID DOES THIS REFER etc. Our Rabbis taught: 'Redeemed' might convey altogether free, therefore it continues, 'she is not [redeemed]'. This on the other hand might convey not at all redeemed, therefore it reads 'redeemed'. How is this possible? She is redeemed yet not wholly redeemed, viz., one who is half a slave and half a free person and is betrothed to a Hebrew slave. Thus the view of R. Akiba. R. Ishmael says: The text refers to a heathen bondmaid who is betrothed unto a Hebrew slave; while the phrase 'redeemed, she is not [redeemed]' is used in accordance with the language of men.21 R. Eleazar b. Azariah says: Of all for bidden connections it is explicitly stated [that they are free people], there is thus left the instance of one who is half a slave and half a free person and is betrothed unto a Hebrew slave. Others22 say, 'They shall not be put to death, because she was not free', indicates that the text refers to a heathen bondmaid who is betrothed unto a heathen slave. As to R. Ishmael, it is plausible that 'redeemed, she is not [redeemed]' may be interpreted as a common parlance, but whence do we learn that she was betrothed to a Hebrew slave? - It is written, For she was not free; he, however, was free.23 Is not the view of R. Eleazar b. Azariah identical with that of R. Akiba? - He [R. Eleazar] retorts to R. Ishmael: I agree with you in general that the Torah uses the language of men, but this case is different, for the text states, 'for she was not free', why add 'redeemed, she is not [redeemed]'? To learn therefrom that it refers to one who is half a slave and half a free person. As to others, it is plausible that 'redeemed, she is not [redeemed]' may be interpreted as a common parlance, but whence do we learn that she was betrothed to a heathen slave? - The text reads, 'for she was not free'; since this is superfluous with reference to her,24 it is taken to refer to him.
MISHNAH. IN THE CASE OF ALL FORBIDDEN CONNECTIONS, IF ONE PARTNER WAS A MAJOR AND THE OTHER A MINOR, THE LATTER IS EXEMPTED; IF ONE IS AWAKE AND THE OTHER ASLEEP, THE LATTER IS EXEMPTED; FINALLY, IF ONE IS AN INADVERTENT AND THE OTHER A WILFUL TRANSGRESSOR, THE FORMER IS LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING, THE LATTER TO KARETH.25
GEMARA. Is indeed in our instance26 a minor guilty? - Said Rab Judah: This is meant: In the case of all forbidden connections, if one was a major and the other a minor, the latter is exempted and the former guilty; In our instance also the major is exempted, because both partners depend upon one another.27
IF ONE IS AWAKE AND THE OTHER ASLEEP, THE LATTER IS EXEMPTED. Is indeed In our instance a sleeping person guilty? Said Rab Judah in the name of Rab: This is meant: In the case of all forbidden connections, if one is awake and the other asleep, the latter is exempted and the former guilty, in our instance even the one awake is exempted, because they depend upon one another.
A Tanna recited before R. Shesheth: They have placed on an equal footing a consummated connection with a mere sexual contact, an intentional connection with an unintentional, a natural connection with a perverse one, and one performed while awake with one performed in sleep. He retorted: How is this meant? If it refers to a designated bondmaid, how does a consummated connection equal a mere sexual contact? In fact, a consummated connection is in the case of a designated bondmaid subject to the law, but a mere sexual contact is not. Similarly the statement that intentional connection equals unintentional [is wrong], for one is guilty only in the case of intentional connection but not otherwise. Similarly the statement that natural connection equals perverse [is wrong], for with the designated bondmaid one is guilty only in the case of natural connection but not in the case of perverse connection, because it is written 'carnally'. And then what is the meaning of the statement that a wakeful person equals a sleeping person? If on the other hand this dictum refers to other forbidden connections, how does it state consummated connection equals a mere sexual contact
(1) Viz., of the man. If her trespass, however, was inadvertent there is no offering for the man either.
(2) E.g., a slave belonging to two partners one of whom has set her free. The maid is betrothed to a Hebrew slave; her betrothal is only partly valid by reason of her slavery.
(3) Lev. XIX, 20. Lit., 'redeemed, she is not redeemed', i.e., she is not altogether redeemed.
(4) Gemara infra, 'son of Azariah'.
(5) Therefore interpret the law in Lev. XIX, 20f, as referring to this category.
(7) Shall be, being in the feminine, is referred to the maid.
(8) During the administration of lashes, the text of Deut. XXVIII, 58f; cf. Mak. 22b. בקרת, is thus derived from קרא, to read.
(9) Before the administration of lashes the delinquent is examined as to how many lashes he can stand.
(10) Mak. 22b.
(11) E.g., on account of her minority.
(12) Lev. XIX, 20.
(13) Which has just been interpreted as conveying her penalty of lashes.
(14) Whence does the Mishnah know that only the man is liable to a guilt-offering but not the woman?
(15) 'He' is restrictive. He brings a guilt-offering, but not she.
(16) I.e., that a bodily change has taken place with her in that she is no longer a virgin.
(17) II Sam. XVII, 19. Groats, i.e., grain which has experienced a change through grinding.
(18) Prov. XXVII, 22.
(19) Ezra X, 19.
(20) For which a guilt-offering is brought, as mentioned in the text.
(21) I.e., as a common parlance. The repetition of the verb 'redeem' is only an emphasis, and is not to imply any law.
(22) R. Meir is quoted under this name; cf. Hor. 13b.
(23) The Hebrew was not the perpetual possession of his master; he is to be freed after six years.
(24) For it is already stated that she was not redeemed.
(25) The Gemara enlarges upon it and states what the law would be in the case of a bondmaid.
(26) I.e., in the case of the bondmaid.
(27) As stated supra; whenever she is exempted from lashes he is also free from a guilt-offering.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 11b
; the comparison, should be in the reverse direction! Said the former: Shall I cancel the dictum? - He replied: No, this is meant: A consummated perverse connection with a designated bondmaid equals a natural sexual contact, when one is exempted because it is written, 'carnally'; intentional perverse connection with a bondmaid equals unintentional connection, when one is exempted, because it is written, 'carnally'; perverse connection with a bondmaid while awake equals connection while asleep, when one is exempted because it is written, 'carnally'. We thus find that intentional sexual contact in the case of a bondmaid equals unintentional connection in the case of other forbidden relations; that natural contact in sleep in the case of the bondmaid equals connection in sleep in the case of other forbidden relations; that perverse connection with the bondmaid while awake1 equals connection in sleep in the case of other forbidden relations.
MISHNAH. IF THEY2 SAY TO A PERSON, THOU HAST EATEN3 HELEB,4 HE IS LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING;5 IF ONE WITNESS SAYS, HE HAS EATEN, AND ANOTHER SAYS, HE HAS NOT EATEN, OR IF ONE WOMAN6 SAYS, HE HAS EATEN, AND ANOTHER SAYS, HE HAS NOT EATEN, HE IS LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING; IF ONE WITNESS SAYS, HE HAS EATEN, AND HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN, HE IS EXEMPTED; IF TWO [WITNESSES] SAY, HE HAS EATEN, AND HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN, R. MEIR DECLARES HIM LIABLE [TO AN OFFERING]. SAID R. MEIR: IF TWO WITNESSES ARE CAPABLE OF INFLICTING THE SEVERE PENALTY OF DEATH,7 SHOULD THEY NOT IMPOSE THE LESS SEVERE PUNISHMENT OF A SACRIFICE? THEY8 REPLIED: SUPPOSE HE SAID, I WAS A WILFUL TRANSGRESSOR, WOULD HE NOT BE EXEMPTED?9 IF ONE ATE TWICE HELEB IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, HE IS LIABLE TO BUT ONE OFFERING; IF ONE ATE HELEB, BLOOD, PIGGUL4 AND NOTHAR4 IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, HE IS LIABLE FOR EACH KIND OF FOOD. THIS IS AN INSTANCE WHERE DIFFERENT KINDS [OF FOOD] ARE MORE STRINGENT THAN ONE KIND; IN THE FOLLOWING INSTANCE, HOWEVER, ONE KIND [OF FOOD] IS MORE STRINGENT THAN SEVERAL KINDS: IF ONE ATE HALF AN OLIVE-SIZE10 AND THEN AGAIN HALF AN OLIVE-SIZE, BOTH IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, IF OF ONE KIND HE IS LIABLE, IF OF TWO KINDS, HE IS EXEMPTED.
GEMARA. It is stated, IF THEY SAY TO A PERSON, THOU HAST EATEN HELEB, HE IS LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING. 'THEY SAY' implies [at least] two; and what does he maintain? If you assume that he was silent and did not contradict them, it would then follow that only silence in response to two witnesses evokes a sin-offering, but not in response to one. Now read the middle clause: IF ONE WITNESS SAYS, HE HAS EATEN AND HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN [HE IS EXEMPTED]. Now the reason [that he is exempted] is because he contradicts them, but if he did not deny the charge he would be guilty; and how much more so if there were two witnesses! Rather you must assume that he contradicts the witness, and the law is in accordance with R. Meir, who holds a contradiction of two witnesses is of no avail; but according to the Rabbis, he would indeed be exempted. But, then, why has this clause at all been mentioned, we know the law from the concluding clause?11 - This is what he lets us know, that this is a point of dispute between R. Meir and the Rabbis.12 Some there are who say: 'THEY SAY' may well refer to a single person, as we have learnt: If a man has gone overseas and they come and tell his wife that he is dead, whereupon she marries again. if the husband returns alive she has to leave both men.13 And it has been established that this law refers also to one witness. Whence do we infer this? From that which has been stated in the latter clause: If she has married again without authority, she may return to her husband. Now, what does 'without authority' mean? Without the authority of the court but upon the evidence of witnesses;14 from this we infer that in the former clause it was done with the authority of the court, but upon the evidence of one witness. We thus find that 'they say' is used of one witness; similarly, when it states 'THEY SAY' it refers to one witness. And what does he [the offender] say? If he contradicts, he should be exempted; for we have learnt in the middle clause: IF ONE WITNESS SAYS, HE HAS EATEN AND HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN, HE IS EXEMPTED! Again if you say, he is silent; surely we know this law already from the middle clause, IF ONE WITNESS SAYS etc., from which is inferred that he is exempted only when he contradicts, but when he is silent he is indeed liable to an offering! Indeed, he does not contradict, and understand the Mishnah thus: IF THEY SAY TO A PERSON, THOU HAST EATEN HELEB. HE IS LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING, namely if he is silent, but . . . when HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN, HE IS EXEMPTED.15
Where do we find in the Torah that a person is liable to an offering if he does not contradict the evidence of others? - Our Rabbis taught: If his sin be known to him . . . . he shall bring his offering];16 but not if others make it known to him.17 I might then think he is exempted even if he does not contradict,it is therefore written, 'if it be known to him': in whatever manner.18 Now to which case does this refer? Shall I say to one in which two witnesses gave evidence? Do we in such a case need a text?19
(1) no note.
(2) Viz., two witnesses, v. infra Gemara.
(3) Viz., without being conscious of the transgression.
(4) V. Glos.
(5) Provided the person does not deny the charge. Also one witness would suffice in this case.
(6) A woman is as a rule not qualified to act as a witness.
(7) E.g., if they testify to murder.
(8) Viz., the Sages who hold there is no sacrifice in any case of denial by the perpetrator.
(9) V. infra Gemara as to the interpretation of this passage.
(10) An olive is the standard size of these prohibited foods.
(11) Viz., the one wherein R. Meir and the Rabbis differ.
(12) The latter clause explains the former, that the anonymous view of the former clause declaring him liable to a sin-offering is in fact the opinion of R. Meir only, while the Rabbis disagree.
(13) I.e., she has to be divorced from both her husbands; v. Yeb. 87b.
(14) Since her second marriage was founded upon the evidence of two qualified witnesses, although the court did not give their consent, she is not to be penalised and may therefore return to her first husband. The former clause, where it states that she is punished and has to leave both men, must therefore refer to a case where there were not two witnesses but one only. The court has accepted the evidence of the one witness but with the understanding that she continues her inquiries as to her husband's fate. The fact that her husband has returned alive proves that her inquiries were not satisfactory, and she is therefore penalised.
(15) I.e., the middle clause is the counterpart of the first clause.
(16) Lev. IV, 23.
(17) I.e., if the facts are established by outside evidence.
(18) It should read, 'if he remembers'. The text thus suggests that he is guilty, even if his 'know. ledge' for silence is taken as consent - is provoked from outside.
(19) That he is then liable to an offering is obvious.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 12a
It must thus refer to one witness giving evidence; and yet it says that if there is no contradiction his evidence is valid.1 We have thus proved it.
SAID R. MEIR, etc. The question was asked: What is the reason of the Rabbis? Is it that they hold that regarding oneself2 a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses, or perhaps that we adopt the argument of miggo:3 for if he said, I transgressed willfully, he would certainly have been exempted, so if he says, I did not eat at all, he is to be believed, and is therefore exempted? And in which way is this question of avail? With reference to the application of the law to uncleanness.4 If you say the reason of the Rabbis is that regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses, there will be no difference between the old and fresh uncleanness;5 but if you say the reason of the Rabbis is that we adopt the argument of miggo, they would exempt him in the case of old uncleanness but declare him liable in the case of new uncleanness.6 For what reason? For in the case of old uncleanness, if he wanted, he could have said,I have already immersed ,'and be exempt; he is therefore exempt also when he says, I have not become unclean,7 since it can be said that what he meant [when he said,] 'I have not become unclean' is 'I did not remain unclean, for I have immersed'. In the case of fresh uncleanness, however, he is liable. For what reason? For even if he asserted, I have immersed, he would be guilty,8 since the witnesses maintain that he has just become unclean. How is it? - Come and hear: If one witness says to a person. Thou art unclean, and he himself says, I am not unclean, he is exempted.9 I might assume [this holds good] also in the case of two witnesses, but, says R. Meir, against this there is an a fortiori argument: since two witnesses are capable of inflicting the severe penalty of death, how much more can they impose the less severe punishment of a sacrifice! The Rabbis say: Regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses. It thus seems that the argument of the Rabbis is that regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses! - Said R. Ammi: Indeed the argument of the Rabbis is the conclusion of miggo; and understand their reasoning thus: As he could, if he wanted, have said, I did not remain unclean,10 and would then be exempted, therefore regarding himself he is to be believed more than a hundred witnesses. If so, is not this instance identical with that concerning heleb?11 - I might have thought, in the case of heleb I may assume that he explains his words:12 I did not eat in error, but wilfully. But [when he is told], Thou art unclean, and he replies, I am not unclean, I might think his words are not capable of explanation; therefore he lets us know that also in this instance we interpret his words as conveying, I have not remained unclean for I have immersed.
Come and hear: And he shall confess,13 [implies that] if he confesses he is liable to an offering, if he does not confess he is exempted. If, therefore, a witness says to him, Thou art unclean, and he says, I am not unclean, he is exempted. I might think this holds good even in the case where he contradicts two witnesses, but says R. Meir, since two witnesses are capable of inflicting the severe penalty of death, how much more can they impose the less severe punishment of a sacrifice! R. Judah says: Regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses. The Rabbis, however, agree with R. Judah in regard to heleb and the entering of the Temple precincts.14 but not in regard to uncleanness.15 Now, to which [uncleanness] does this refer? Shall I say
(1) So that he has to bring an offering.
(2) I.e., in matters relating to the salvation of his soul, for the sacrifice is to bring about his propitiation and conciliation with the Lord.
(3) I.e., a logical rule that a man's statement is to be accepted as true whenever another credible and more advantageous assertion could have been made; for it is argued, that had he intended to lie he would have invented the more advantageous statement.
(4) I.e., if two people say e.g., you have entered the Temple precincts while unclean.
(5) Fresh uncleanness is one contracted on the same day; old uncleanness one contracted on previous days. In the first instance the witnesses say the contraction of the uncleanness and the entering of the Temple precincts were both on the same day, in the latter on different days.
(6) In the case of fresh uncleanness there has not yet been an opportunity of becoming clean again, for immersion alone is not sufficient; one has to wait till sunset to be clean. In the instance of old uncleanness one may well assert one's cleanness by saying, I have immersed.
(7) The actual statement is capable of an interpretation similar in sense to the assertion that might have been made.
(8) If he enters the precincts of the Temple before sunset, even after immersion, he is guilty.
(9) Toh. V, 9.
(10) I.e., I immersed.
(11) And therefore superfluous.
(12) I.e., he may give you a wider meaning to his words, so that the assertion he actually makes harmonises with the one he could have made.
(13) Lev. V, 5.
(14) I.e., when the question is whether he has eaten heleb, or whether he has entered the Temple while unclean, for in these two instances the argument is that he might have said the transgression was wilful, and the assertions actually made, viz., 'I did not eat heleb' and 'I did not enter the Temple', may be interpreted as being in harmony with the assertion he could have made thus: 'I did not eat heleb and I did not enter the Temple in a manner which would make me liable to an offering'.
(15) I.e., when the question is whether he has at all become unclean. The miggo that he might have said, I did it wilfully, is no longer valid.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 12b
[it refers] to old uncleanness, why do the Rabbis agree with R. Judah only with regard to heleb and the entering of the Temple precincts because he might have said, I did it wilfully? Also in the instance of old uncleanness he could have interpreted his words and say, if he wanted, I did not remain unclean but immersed!1 - Said Rabina: It refers in fact to old uncleanness,2 but to a case where the witnesses said to him, Thou hast eaten sacred food while thy body was unclean,3 and his reply was, I was not unclean; his words are then not open to an explanation, for we cannot say he meant, I did not remain unclean but immersed, for this would convey, I immersed and indeed did eat, which statement would contradict the first assertion4 at least in respect of the uncleanness through contact.5
Said R. Nahman: The halachah is according to R. Judah. Said R. Joseph: He holds [that he is clean] only in private6 and when appertaining to himself.7
Said Resh Lakish: R. Meir agrees with the Rabbis that if two witnesses say to a person, Thou hast had intercourse with a designated bondmaid,8 and he maintains that he has had no intercourse, he is to be trusted, for he could, if he wishes, have answered them, I did not complete the act of cohabitation.9
Said R. Shesheth: R. Meir agrees with the Rabbis with regard to the uncleanness of a nazirite, that if two witnesses say to him, Thou art unclean, and he replies, I am not unclean, he is exempted,10 because he could, if he wanted, have replied, I am absolved from the vow of naziriteship.11
Said Abaye: R. Meir agrees with the Rabbis that if two witnesses say to a person, Thou knowest evidence against a certain man,12 and he says, I do not know, he is exempted, because he could, if he wanted, have said, I was not intent upon giving evidence.
IF ONE ATE TWICE HELEB IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS etc. To this R. Zera demurred: Why is he liable to only one sin-offering? Has he not eaten two olive-sizes of heleb? - Replied to him Abaye: It is the different spells of unawareness that effect separate offerings, but in our instance there was but one spell of unawareness. Some raise the difficulty in the following version: The reason [that he is liable only to one offering], is that there was only one spell of unawareness; if, however, there were two spells of unawareness he would indeed be liable to two offerings; but why? Were not both meals of the same denomination of heleb? - Replied to him Abaye: Different spells of unawareness effect separate offerings.
IF ONE ATE HELEB, BLOOD, PIGGUL AND NOTHAR etc. [It is stated,] IF OF ONE KIND HE IS LIABLE; is this not obvious? - Said Resh Lakish in the name of Bar Tutini:13 We suppose it was eaten in two different dishes, and this law is in conformity with the view of R. Joshua who [generally] holds that different dishes do not combine with one another.14 Now I might have thought that R. Joshua upholds his opinion no matter whether greater leniency or greater stringency result from it; therefore we are taught that he is liable [to an offering], implying that he upholds his view only when it leads to greater stringency, but not when it leads to greater leniency. Some refer the discussion to the latter part of the passage: IF OF TWO KINDS, HE IS EXEMPTED; is this not obvious? - Said Resh Lakish in the name of Bar Tutini: We suppose they were eaten in two different dishes and this law is in accordance with R. Joshua who holds different dishes do not combine with one another. Now I might have thought that R. Joshua upholds his rule only if it leads to greater stringency but not if greater leniency results from it; therefore we are taught: IF OF TWO KINDS, HE IS EXEMPTED: 'Two kinds' means in fact 'one kind';15 it is called 'two kinds' because the eating was in two different dishes; and as it is stated that he is then exempted, hence we may conclude that R. Joshua upholds his rule both if it leads to greater leniency and if it results in greater stringency. Now, since the latter part of the passage16 deals with one kind consumed in two dishes, the former part must, as its contrast, refer to one kind consumed in one dish. Is not the law then obvious? - Said Rabina: It refers to a case where he became aware [of his sin] in between,17 and the law is in accordance with Rabban Gamaliel, who holds awareness is of no avail with regard to half-sizes;18 as we have learnt:19 If one writes two letters in two different spells of unawareness, one in the morning and the other in the evening, Rabban Gamaliel holds he is guilty, but the Rabbis exempt him. Rabban Gamaliel holds awareness is of no avail with regard to half-sizes, whereas the Rabbis maintain it is of avail.
MISHNAH. WITHIN WHAT TIME MUST HE EAT THEM?20 [THE TIME HE WOULD NEED] IF HE ATE A LIKE BULK OF PARCHED GRAINS OF CORN.21 THUS THE VIEW OF R. MEIR; BUT THE RABBIS SAY, HE MUST TAKE FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END NO MORE TIME THAN IS REQUIRED FOR THE EATING OF A PERAS,22 TO BECOME LIABLE. IF ONE EATS UNCLEAN EDIBLES OR DRINKS UNCLEAN DRINKS,23 OR IF [A PRIEST] DRINKS A QUARTER [OF A LOG] OF WINE AND THEN ENTERS THE TEMPLE,24 IF NO MORE TIME HAS ELAPSED THAN IS REQUIRED FOR THE EATING OF A PERAS, HE IS LIABLE. R. ELEAZAR SAYS: IF THE DRINKING WAS INTERRUPTED OR THE WINE DILUTED WITH WATER OF THE SMALLEST QUANTITY, HE IS EXEMPTED.25
GEMARA. They asked: Is R. Meir's statement in the direction of stringency or of leniency? Is it in the direction of stringency, and this is what he means: [THE TIME HE WOULD NEED] IF HE ATE OF PARCHED GRAINS OF CORN, though lasting the whole day.26 Thus even though the time that elapsed between the beginning and the end of the meal was longer than is required for the eating of a peras, yet since it was one protracted meal, he is liable; while the Rabbis retorted: If no more time has elapsed than is required for the eating of a peras, he is guilty, if more he is exempted? Or is it in the direction of leniency, and this is what he means: [THE TIME HE WOULD NEED] IF HE ATE OF PARCHED GRAINS OF CORN, provided it was without interruption,27 but if with interruption he is exempted even though the time that elapsed between the beginning and the end of the meal is within that required for the eating of a peras; while the Rabbis retorted: Since the time elapsed between the beginning and the end of the meal was within that required for the eating of a peras, he is guilty? - Come and hear: BUT THE SAGES SAY, HE MUST TAKE FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END NO MORE TIME THAN IS REQUIRED FOR THE EATING OF A PERAS.
(1) We must therefore assume that the Baraitha refers to fresh uncleanness, in which case there is no miggo. It seems at all events to be implicitly accepted that the reason of the Sages' view is based upon the conclusion of miggo, while R. Judah who holds that even in the case of fresh uncleanness he is exempted, bases his view obviously upon the rule that regarding oneself a man is at all events believed more than a hundred witnesses. The query set forth at the outset of the discussion is thus resolved: R. Judah, who as the opponent of R. Meir is often quoted anonymously, bases his view upon the first argument of the query, the Sages upon the second.
(2) And both R. Judah and the Sages may base their arguments in the instance of heleb upon the rule of miggo, but this case is such that the Sages hold miggo is not applicable to it.
(3) This statement contains a twofold assertion: That he was unclean and that he ate sacred things. Were his contradiction, I did not eat, we might have understood it in the sense, I did not transgress for I had immersed before. His reply, I am not unclean, is taken to imply, I did not come into contact with an unclean object, and this is in open contradiction to the evidence of the witnesses, wherefore his statement is not accepted and he is liable to an offering.
(4) I.e., the assertion of the witnesses.
(5) For his words imply, he did not come into contact with an unclean object.
(6) He is not permitted to partake of sacred food in the presence of others, for this might be interpreted as neglectful treatment of the laws of purity.
(7) He is not believed with reference to other people. If he has come into contact with sacred things they are regarded as unclean for others. The trust put in him when he says he is not unclean is subjective, because we believe him in matters appertaining to his own conscience and salvation.
(8) I.e., a maidservant designated by her master for marriage to one chosen by him; Lev. XIX, 20.
(9) V. 11b, where the completion of the act is an essential condition of the transgression.
(10) From an offering at the end of seven days; v. Num. VI, 9f.
(11) Absolution can be granted from a vow by a scholar if there are good reasons to assume that the consequences of the vow were not foreseen.
(12) The refusal to give evidence if adjured to do so is punishable with an offering; v. Lev. V, 1.
(13) Supra 4b quoted as Bar Tutani.
(14) Viz., to make up the requisite standard size of an olive. The non-combination of the two half-olives brings about his exemption from an offering. If on the other hand one has, e.g., eaten two full quantities in two dishes the non-combination leads to greater stringency of the law, for he is then liable to two offerings.
(15) I.e., two pieces of heleb, e.g., each of the size of half an olive, eaten in two meals.
(16) Viz., IF OF TWO KINDS etc.
(17) Between the two meals he learnt, e.g., that the first piece of fat was heleb.
(18) I.e., half-sizes may be combined one with the other even if eaten in two spells of unawareness.
(19) Shab. 105a. Only when one writes two letters is a sacrifice prescribed.
(20) We have learnt in the previous Mishnah that if one eats two half-sizes of prohibited food, he is guilty because the two meals combine to make up the requisite size. What time may pass between the two meals to be still considered as one?
(21) I.e., the time it takes to eat an olive-size of food crumbled into small pieces of the size of parched ears, eaten one after the other.
(22) Lit., 'portion' or 'half'; viz., half a loaf; v. also 'Er. 83a.
(23) If one eats unclean food of the size of half a peras, or drinks of an unclean drink the quantity of a fourth of a log, he is regarded as unfit to eat sacred food until he has taken an immersion.
(24) To perform his service.
(25) R. Eliezer refers to the last instance.
(26) The criterion of R. Meir is then to indicate that the meal may be interrupted.
(27) The time required for the eating of an olive-size of parched corn without interruption is less than that required for the eating of a peras.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 13a
Now, if you say that R. Meir's view is in the direction of stringency,1 it is right that it reads: HE MUST TAKE . . . NO MORE, meaning that he is not liable unless he takes no more time than is required for the eating of a peras; but if you say R. Meir's view is in the direction of leniency, it should have read 'But the Rabbis say: If he has taken as much time as is required . . .'. It is thus proved that R. Meir's view is in the direction of stringency. It is indeed proved.
Said Rabanai in the name of Samuel: For heleb and nebelah2 he must take from the beginning to the end [of the meal]3 no more time than is required for the eating of a peras; for unclean food, reptiles and unclean drinks,4 he may take even the whole day, as much as is required for the eating of a peras. What does this mean? - Said R. Papa, thus: Even the whole day so long as he ate an olive-size within the time required for the eating of a peras.5
An objection was raised: All kinds of food combine one with the other to half a peras to render the body unfit.6 Now does this not mean that he has to eat the half-peras within the time required for the eating of a peras? - No, he has to eat an olive-size within the time required for a peras.
An objection was raised: All kinds of food combine one with the other to a half-peras, consumed within the time required for a peras, in order to render the body unfit. How is this? If he ate and then ate again, if from the beginning of the first meal to the end of the last no more time has passed than is required for the eating of a peras, they combine with one another; if more they do not combine. It is not permitted to one who ate less than the requisite quantity to immerse;7 if he did immerse and then ate the complementary quantity to the standard size, the meals combine one with the other. A pregnant woman is permitted to eat a quantity8 smaller than the standard size, because of her serious position. All kinds of beverage combine one with the other to a quarter [of a log], consumed within the time required for the eating of a peras, in order to render the body unfit. How is this? If he drank and then drank again, if from the beginning of the first drink to the end of the last no more time has passed than is required for the eating of a peras, they combine with one another; if more they do not. [She] who has been in contact with one unclean by a dead body is permitted to nurse her baby, and the baby remains clean. It states at all events, 'If from the beginning of the first meal to the end of the last no more time has passed than is required for the eating of a peras, they combine with one another'. Is this not in contradiction to Rabanai's statement? - Indeed it is.9
The Master says: 'It is not permitted to one who ate less than the requisite quantity to immerse'. What does this mean?10 - Said Rab Judah: This is what it means: If one ate less than the requisite quantity, he is not permitted to immerse, for if he should eat afterwards the complementary quantity, which combines with the first, he might assume that the preceding immersion is of avail, not knowing that an immersion is valid only at the end.
It is stated, 'A pregnant woman is permitted to eat a quantity smaller than the standard size, because of her serious position'. If by reason of her serious position, she should be permitted to eat even more!11 - Said R. Papa: Read thus, A pregnant woman is permitted to eat even more, yet in quantities smaller than the standard size, because of her serious position.
It says, '[She] who has been in contact with one unclean by a dead body is permitted to nurse her baby, and the baby remains clean.' Why is it clean? Since it has sucked in milk it should be unclean through the milk.12 And should you say it was not prepared,13 [I would reply,] It is prepared by the drop which moistens the nipple!14 - Answered R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: It sucked with great pull so that no drop was formed to moisten the nipple. Said Raba: l have two objections to raise: firstly we see that a child's mouth is filled with milk,15 and then, the milk-source has the status of a 'well',16 as we have learnt: The milk of a woman renders things unclean whether [it was drawn] purposely or unintentionally, while the milk of a cow renders things unclean only when brought forth intentionally.17 Now does not 'unintentionally' mean that the child has no pleasure in it; and yet it says that it renders things unclean!18 - Rather said Raba: The reason why the child remains clean is that it is doubtful whether it has sucked in the requisite quantity or not; and even if it did, it is still doubtful whether it was done within the time required for the eating of a peras or during a longer period. But how can Raba maintain that the milk-source has the status of a 'well'? Have we not learnt: If milk drips from the breast of a [menstruant] woman and falls upon an oven, the oven is unclean?19 Whereupon it was asked, wherewith has the milk become 'prepared' for uncleanness? and R. Johanan replied: By the drop with which the nipple is moistened.20 And if you say that Raba disagrees with R. Johanan, has it not been taught: 'It is thus found that there are nine kinds of liquids of a gonorrhea-ridden person: sweat, ill-smelling discharge21 and secretion, are altogether clean;22 the tears of his eyes, the blood of his wound
(1) I.e., the time-limit suggested by R. Meir is less than that laid down by the Rabbis, so that the Rabbis in their retort to R. Meir demand a prolongation of the time-limit.
(2) V. Glos.
(3) E.g., if he ate two half olive-sizes of heleb.
(4) Half a peras or a quarter of a log respectively renders him who ate it unfit to eat sacred food.
(5) I.e., each olive-size of the standard quantity of half a peras has been eaten within the time required for a peras.
(6) Me'il. 17b.
(7) This is soon explained.
(8) I.e., unclean food; v. Tosaf.
(9) Rabanai's view is thus refuted.
(10) Why should he not be permitted to immerse, even though the immersion is in vain?
(11) For it is permitted to break the law of the Torah in the case of danger to life.
(12) The milk is unclean of the second degree; it is therefore not capable of rendering persons unclean through contact, but he who drinks thereof a half-peras is unfit to partake of sacred food.
(13) All foodstuffs must be 'prepared', i.e., rendered fit for uncleanness, by being moistened with certain liquids. The milk coming from the body is considered foodstuff, and in the absence of such preparation should be clean.
(14) The drop with which the nipple is moistened is not regarded as food, since it is not destined to be consumed, and can therefore act as a liquid to 'prepare' the rest of the milk for uncleanness.
(15) One drop at least must have adhered to the nipple.
(16) The milk has not the status of ordinary food or drink, but that of a secretion from the body, and forms part thereof. When the body is unclean, the milk is ipso facto unclean too. No 'preparation' is thus necessary. 'Well' means here a secreting organ.
(17) Maksh. VI, 8. Things are regarded as 'prepared' for uncleanness by being moistened with a liquid only if the moistening was to the satisfaction of the owner or worker.
(18) As we learn here that the milk of a woman is unclean and conveys its uncleanness to other things even if it came forth not to the satisfaction of the owner or worker (here the child), it cannot bear the status of ordinary food that requires 'preparation'. It must thus possess the character of a secretion from the body.
(19) Kel. VIII, 11.
(20) We thus see that in contradiction to Raba 'preparation' is needed.
(21) Such as pus.
(22) They do not cause uncleanness through contact.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 13b
and the milk of a woman, in the quantity of a fourth of a log contract uncleanness as a liquid;1 saliva, flux and urine contract the more severe uncleanness2 in the smallest quantity'? Now, if it was true, as you say, that the milk-source has the status of a 'well', milk too should contract the more severe uncleanness in the smallest quantity, like flux and saliva. It is thus proved that the milk-source of a woman has not the status of a 'well'. But, then, what of the contradiction between this Baraitha and [the Mishnah quoted by] Raba [that the milk of a woman] 'renders things unclean whether drawn purposely or unintentionally'?3 - Do you indeed think, as has hitherto been assumed, that 'unintentionally' means that the child had no pleasure in it? No, 'unintentionally' means 'generally', for it is accepted that the child has its mind upon the milk; but if the child indicates that he has no pleasure in it, it is indeed clean.
IF ONE EATS UNCLEAN EDIBLES etc. Why is it conditional upon the elapse of a certain time,4 as it reads, IF . . . TIME HAS ELAPSED? - Said Rab Judah: Thus it is to be understood: If one eats unclean edibles or drinks unclean drinks, or if [a priest] drinks a quarter of a log of wine, spending thereon the time required for the eating of a peras, and then enters the Temple precincts, he is guilty.
R. ELEAZAR SAYS etc. Our Rabbis taught: Drink no wine nor strong drink;5 I might think any quantity, and even if taken from the vat,6 therefore the text states 'strong drink'; he is guilty only if the quantity suffices to make him drunk.7 Which is the quantity capable of causing intoxication? A fourth of a log of wine of forty days' standing. Why then has 'wine' been mentioned? To tell you that one is cautioned in regard to the smallest quantity, and one is cautioned also in regard to [wine] drawn from the vat.8 R. Judah says: It reads 'wine'; from here we know only 'wine', whence do we know other intoxicating drinks? It therefore reads 'and strong drink'. If so, why has 'wine' been stated? Wine involves the death penalty, other drinks involve only [the disregard of] a warning. R. Eleazar says: Drink no wine and [drink no] strong drink: Drink it not in the manner which causes intoxication; if, however, he interrupts or dilutes it with any quantity of water, he is not guilty. Wherein do they differ? - The first Tanna holds: We draw an inference from the nazirite by the common expression 'strong drink';9 R. Judah does not hold this inference; while R. Eleazar holds that what 'strong drink' implies is something intoxicating. With whom does the following dictum comply: 'If one eats pressed figs from Keilah,10 or drinks honey or milk, and then enters the Sanctuary and performs the Temple service, he is liable to lashes'? With R. Judah.11 Said R. Judah son of Ahotai: The halachah is in accordance with R. Eleazar. Also Rab spoke of R. Eleazar as the most distinguished of the Sages.
R. Aha of Huzal had a vow in regard to his wife.12 He came before R. Ashi.13 Said the latter to him: Go now and come back to-morrow, for Rab appointed no interpreter14 from the commencement of the festival till the end of the following day,15 on account of intoxication. Replied the former: But did not Rab say, The halachah is according to R. Eleazar,16 while you dilute your wine with water? - Said he, There is no difficulty: his saying refers to a fourth of a log exactly, while I had more than a fourth.
Our Rabbis have taught: And that ye may put difference between the holy and the common,17 refers to vows of worth, or vows of valuation,18 or to things devoted19 or consecrated;20 between the unclean and the clean17 refers to the laws of uncleanness and purity; that ye may teach21 refers to decisions [concerning forbidden things]; all the statutes21 refers to the expositions of the Law; which the Lord hath spoken21 refers to traditions passed on [from Sinai]; by the hand of Moses21 refers to the Gemara. I might include also the Mishnah,therefore it reads 'that ye may teach'.22 R. Jose b. Judah says: I might include also the Gemara,23 therefore it reads, 'that ye may teach'. According to whom is that which has been taught: 'Excluded is the decision that a [dead] reptile is unclean and a [dead] frog clean,24 which may be given also by one who is intoxicated with wine'? May we assume that it conforms with R. Jose b. Judah's view and not with that of the Rabbis? - No, it may conform also with the view of the Rabbis, but this problem is so simple that one may say, go read it at school.25 Said Rab: The halachah is in accordance with R. Jose b. Judah.26 But surely Rab did not appoint an interpreter from the commencement of a festival to the end of the following day on account of intoxication?27 - Different it is with Rab who gave also decisions: But then why not appoint the interpreter and lay down the rule that no decisions be given? - Where Rab sat it was impossible to avoid giving decisions.28
MISHNAH. ONE MAY BY ONE ACT OF EATING BECOME LIABLE TO FOUR SIN-OFFERINGS AND ONE GUILT-OFFERING; VIZ., IF ANY UNCLEAN PERSON EATS HELEB WHICH WAS AT THE SAME TIME THE NOTHAR OF AN OFFERING, AND [IT WAS ON] THE DAY OF ATONEMENT.29 R. MEIR SAYS: IF IT WAS THE SABBATH AND HE CARRIED IT OUT30 [OF PRIVATE POSSESSION], HE IS LIABLE [TO YET ANOTHER SIN-OFFERING].31 BUT THEY SAID TO HIM: THIS IS OF A DIFFERENT DENOMINATION.32
(1) I.e., to convey uncleanness only to food and liquids.
(2) I.e., to defile human beings and vessels.
(3) If we say that the milk is unclean even when brought forth against the child's interest in contradiction to the laws ruling the 'preparation' for uncleanliness of liquids, we are obliged to infer therefrom that the milk has the status of a 'well' and not of a liquid. The right interpretation is, however, that even when the child does not express its pleasure at the bringing forth of the milk, it is unclean, for it is assumed that it is nevertheless done to its satisfaction.
(4) The condition concerning the time is mentioned in the Mishnah text after the entering of the Sanctuary. It is therefore assumed that it implies that it is necessary for the priest to stay in the Temple precincts for a time required for the eating of a peras. This is, of course, against the accepted law.
(5) Lev. X, 9 with reference to priests.
(6) I.e., before the fermentation is completed.
(7) The literal translation of שכר 'strong drink' is 'intoxicating drink'.
(8) But not punishable with death. 'Death' here denotes death at the hands of Heaven.
(9) A textual analogy is drawn on the basis of the word 'strong drink' which occurs in connection with the priest, Lev. X, 9 and the nazirite, Num. VI, 3, where the produce of the vine only is prohibited.
(10) In Judea; v. I Sam. XXIII, 1.
(11) In Naz. 4a this dictum is explicitly mentioned in the name of R. Judah.
(12) He vowed not to derive any benefit from her.
(13) To ask for the absolution of the vow.
(14) The interpreter's task was to expound at length that which the Tanna taught in brief; v. Glos. s.v. Amora.
(15) I.e., from the termination of the first meal on the eve of the festival to the end of the following day. His meals on holy days were accompanied by wine, and Rab therefore refused to give any legal decision. R. Aha appeared before R. Ashi on a festival.
(16) Who holds only pure wine is prohibited.
(17) Lev. X, 10. This passage follows immediately upon the prohibition for the priest to drink wine. It is therefore assumed to imply that to give a decision in a state of intoxication is forbidden.
(18) V. 'Ar. 2a.
(19) Lit., excommunicated'; i.e., a form of renouncing one's rights upon property and assigning it for the use of the Temple or the priests.
(20) I.e., all the valuations in connection therewith must not be undertaken in a state of intoxication.
(21) Ibid. 11.
(22) Or, that ye may decide. As the Mishnah does not always contain the last word of the law, decisions are based upon the discussions in the Gemara rather than the Mishnah.
(23) Viz., the study of the Talmud. Only the actual giving of judgment in a state of intoxication is punishable, but not the mere preoccupation with the law.
(24) These decisions are so obvious, being explicitly mentioned in the Torah, that an error is not feared.
(25) I.e., even youngsters who study only the Pentateuch should know it; v. Sanh. 33b.
(26) Viz., that to study in a state of intoxication is permitted.
(27) This proves that even to lecture on the law is forbidden.
(28) Rab was an authority recognised everywhere, and questions came before him at all times.
(29) He is liable to a sin-offering each for eating sacred food in a state of uncleanness, for eating keleb, for eating nothar and for partaking of food on the Day of Atonement. The guilt-offering is to atone for the sacrilegious use of Temple property. Nothar is the portion of a sacrifice left over beyond the prescribed time, which has to be burnt.
(30) Viz. , in his mouth.
(31) To carry on the Sabbath from private property to the public thoroughfare or vice versa is subject to an offering.
(32) The transgression is not caused by eating.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 14a
GEMARA. May we infer that R. Meir holds that a prohibition may take hold of something already prohibited?1 - [No,] although he may hold that a prohibition cannot take hold where another prohibition exists, he holds that a prohibition that is more comprehensive2 or more extensive3 can take hold [of an already existing prohibition]. To a clean person only heleb is prohibited; when he becomes unclean, since the other parts [of the animal] become forbidden to him, this more comprehensive prohibition embraces also heleb. Then heleb is forbidden for consumption only; when consecrated, since it becomes prohibited for all use, this more extensive prohibition takes hold of heleb. It is still, then, forbidden to laymen only but not for the altar;4 when it becomes nothar, since it becomes forbidden also for the altar, this more extensive prohibition applies also in respect of laymen. Again, if it occurred on the Day of Atonement, since there is added an injunction which is more comprehensive in that it applies also to common food, it applies also to the things dedicated to the altar. But then why not instance five sin-offerings, namely when he ate an olive-size of piggul?5 - He speaks of one animal and not of two, and the meat of one and the same animal cannot be nothar and piggul at the same time.6 But why not? Is it not possible where, e.g., a limb of piggul was [wrongly] offered upon the altar, in which case its disqualification of piggul is lifted,7 and it can thus become nothar, as 'Ulla said: If the fistful of an offering, rendered piggul, has been offered upon the altar its piggul disqualification ceases, and it may then become nothar?8 - He speaks of one limb and not of two limbs, and one and the same limb cannot be nothar and piggul at the same time. But why not? Is it not possible where, e.g., a limb of piggul was offered upon the altar, partly resting upon the altar and partly protruding,9 so that the portion [which rested] upon the altar loses its piggul disqualification and may become nothar, in accordance with 'Ulla, who said: 'If the fistful of an offering, rendered piggul, has been offered upon the altar its disqualification ceases, and it may become nothar?' - He replied: It is not possible, for if the major portion rests upon the altar, the whole is reckoned as being on the altar; if the major portion is protruding, the whole is reckoned as being outside. But then you could decide therefrom10 the query of Rami son of Hama as to whether one goes by the majority in regard to sacrificial limbs or not!11 - He speaks of one olive-size and not of two.12 But is this indeed so? Does he not deal with the Day of Atonement, where the requisite standard quantity is the size of a date, and a date corresponds to two olive-sizes? - Said R. Zera: He ate of a kidney together with the heleb attached thereto.13 R. Papa said: He supplemented the heleb with dates.14 R. Adda son of Aha indeed reads [in the Mishnah] 'five sin-offerings' and explains it [as dealing with the case] where he ate an olive-size of piggul,15 rejecting the other explanations given. But then why not state six sin-offerings', and explain it [as dealing with the case] where he ate in addition an olive-size of blood? - [The Mishnah] speaks of one act of eating and not of two, and the Rabbis have calculated that the gullet cannot hold more than two olive-sizes at a time.
R. MEIR SAYS, etc. Why did he not simply state, 'If he carried it out [of private possession], he is liable16 . . .'; wherefore does he state, IF IT WAS THE SABBATH'? - Said Rafram: This proves that the laws concerning 'erub17 and transport18 apply to the Sabbath and do not apply to the Day of Atonement.19 How is this proved? Maybe the laws concerning 'erub and transport apply also to the Day of Atonement, and the Mishnah text is to be understood thus: If it was the Sabbath and he carried it out [of private possession], he is liable by reason of the Sabbath as well as the Day of Atonement!20 - Rather say, If the statement of Rafram was made, it was with reference to the following: It has been taught, And he shall send him away by the hand of an appointed man;21 'man' implies that also a non-priest is qualified; 'appointed' implies even if he is unclean and even on the Sabbath;22 'appointed' means designated for it. Now it is here stated: '"Appointed" implies even on the Sabbath', whereupon Rafram remarked, This proves that the laws concerning 'erub and transport apply to the Sabbath and do not apply to the Day of Atonement. How is this proved? Maybe the scapegoat is an exception, for its whole validity is bound up with the Day of Atonement!23 - The dictum of Rafram is indeed void.24
MISHNAH. ONE MAY BY ONE ACT OF INCESTUOUS CONNECTION BECOME LIABLE TO SIX SIN-OFFERINGS: VIZ., IF ONE HAD INTERCOURSE WITH HIS DAUGHTER.25 HE IS GUILTY OF INCEST WITH HIS DAUGHTER, HIS SISTER, HIS BROTHER'S WIFE, THE WIFE OF HIS FATHER'S BROTHER, AND OF INTERCOURSE WITH A MARRIED WOMAN AND A MENSTRUOUS WOMAN.
(1) I.e., that a prohibition can apply to something which is forbidden already by reason of another injunction, as exemplified in R. Meir's statement where the law of Sabbath takes hold of prohibited food.
(2) I.e., the range of application of the new prohibition is wider than that of the original. The new prohibition is thus at all events effective with regard to those objects not covered by the original; it is therefore considered of avail also in respect of those articles already prohibited by the original injunction, and an additional offering is prescribed.
(3) I.e., the additional prohibition is more stringent than the original one; e.g., if according to the original law only the eating of the prohibited food is punishable while the superadded prohibition law forbids also any benefit to be derived therefrom. The new prohibition is thus at all events effective where use is made of the food other than eating it; it is therefore regarded of avail also in case of eating, and evokes an additional offering. The following discussion expounds the instance of the Mishnah proving that each additional prohibition thereof is either more comprehensive or more extensive than those already existing.
(4) Or, for that matter, the priests.
(5) V. Glos. I.e., where the meat was, in addition, piggul which, too' is subject to a sin-offering.
(6) The sacrifice is rendered piggul at the beginning of the service, namely during the preparation and performance of the sprinkling of the blood. Once piggul it is disqualified for altar and priest alike and cannot come within the range of nothar.
(7) Even if the limb is removed from the altar, before it is completely burnt, it retains the sanctity re-gained through contact with the altar and may become nothar. If one eats therefore a piece of the limb that has become nothar, under the conditions enumerated in the Mishnah and in addition thereto an olive-size of meat of the rest of the same sacrifice, which has remained piggul, one is liable to five sin-offerings.
(8) V. Zeb. 43a.
(9) And he ate from both portions of the limb.
(10) Viz., from the fact that the instance of five sin-offerings has not been stated for the reasons mentioned.
(11) V. Hul. 70a where this query is put forward by Raba and left unanswered.
(12) And with one olive-size one cannot evoke more than four sin-offerings, as enumerated in the Mishnah.
(13) I.e., he ate one olive-size of the kidney and another olive-size of the heleb. For the latter he is, under the conditions mentioned in the Mishnah, liable to three sin-offerings and a guilt-offering; when followed by an olive-size of the kidney he complements the date-size required for the transgression of the Day of Atonement, which provokes the fourth sin-offering. R. Zera's view is that the Tanna of the Mishnah wishes to confine himself to the eating of one olive-size of heleb, while in the combination of piggul and nothar it would be necessary to assume that two olive-sizes of heleb have been consumed (Rashi).
(14) I.e., his meal consisted of one olive-size of heleb and small dates to make up the requisite standard of a date. There was at any rate but one olive-size of meat.
(15) From a different sacrifice in addition to the olive-size of heleb as instanced in the Mishnah.
(16) For carrying it out on the Day of Atonement.
(17) V. Glos.
(18) I.e.,the transport from private property to a public thoroughfare and vice versa.
(19) Although the Day of Atonement bears otherwise all the stringency of the Sabbath, these two laws may be characteristic of the Sabbath only.
(20) I.e., he is liable twice for the transport: for the transgression of the Sabbath and for the transgression of the Day of Atonement.
(21) Lev. XVI, 21, relating to the scapegoat.
(22) I.e., also on the Sabbath may the scapegoat be transported to its place of offering, thus trespassing the laws regarding 'erub and transport.
(23) I.e., the Torah has explicitly permitted work essential for the service of the day.
(24) V. Yoma 66b.
(25) The multitude of interrelationships between father and daughter is established thus: the daughter was born from his incestuous contact with his own mother. She then married his brother and after the latter's death, his father's brother. She was in addition menstruant at the time of the intercourse. This monstrous and complicated combination has been chosen to exemplify various prohibitions each of which is more comprehensive than the previous.
Talmud - Mas. K'rithoth 14b
GEMARA. But does not R. Meir hold, a prohibition cannot take hold of something already forbidden?1 - Although he generally holds that a prohibition cannot take hold where another prohibition exists, he admits that a prohibition which is more comprehensive or more extensive can take hold [of an already existing prohibition].2 [Our instance is then to be understood thus:] He had intercourse with his mother who bore him a daughter, so that the latter becomes prohibited to him simultaneously as his daughter and his sister. When she marries his brother, since she becomes prohibited also to his other brothers,3 this comprehensive prohibition becomes operative also with reference to himself. When she then4 marries his father's brother, since she becomes prohibited to the other brothers of his father, this comprehensive prohibition becomes operative also with reference to himself. In her capacity now as a married woman, since she becomes prohibited to the whole world, this comprehensive prohibition becomes operative also with regard to himself. Finally as a menstruant woman, since she becomes forbidden even to her own husband, this comprehensive prohibition become operative also with reference to himself.
MISHNAH. IF ONE HAD INTERCOURSE WITH HIS DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER HE MAY THEREBY BECOME GUILTY FOR OFFENDING WITH HIS DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER, HIS DAUGH TER-IN-LAW, HIS BROTHER'S WIFE, THE WIFE OF HIS FATHER'S BROTHER, HIS WIFE'S SISTER, A MARRIED WOMAN, AND FINALLY A MENSTRUANT WOMAN.5 R. JOSE REMARKED: IF THE GRANDFATHER HAD COMMITTED TRANSGRESSION AND MARRIED HER FIRST, HE MAY THEREBY BECOME GUILTY FOR OFFENDING WITH HIS FATHER'S WIFE. SO TOO, IF ONE HAD CONNECTION WITH HIS WIFE'S DAUGHTER OR HER DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER.
GEMARA. It is stated: HE MAY THEREBY BECOME GUILTY FOR OFFENDING WITH HIS FATHER'S WIFE. Was she then permitted to him?6 - Replied R. Johanan: The case is met if she fell unto him in levirite marriage.7 If so, what means: HAD COMMITTED TRANSGRESSION? - He committed transgression In that she was his son's daughter-in-law, which is a forbidden relation in the second degree,8 as has been taught:9 A daughter-in-law is an incestuous relation [by law of the Torah], the daughter-in-law of a son is forbidden [as a relation] in the second degree. The same distinction is made between the daughter of a son and the daughter of a son's son etc. to the end of all generations.10
But does R. Jose indeed hold that a prohibition can take hold of something already forbidden, have we not learnt:11 If one has committed a sin which involves two death penalties,12 he is condemned to the more stringent [of the two forms of execution]. R. Jose, however, maintains he is sentenced for the sin that took hold first. And it was taught: How is R. Jose's ruling, that he is sentenced for the sin that took hold first, to be understood? If, e.g., she was forbidden to him first as his mother-in-law and then as a married woman,13 he is sentenced for intercourse with a mother-in-law; if she was forbidden to him first as a married woman and then as a mother-in-law, he is sentenced for connection with a married woman! - Answered R. Abbahu: R. Jose admits [an exception to the rule] when the new prohibition is more comprehensive.14 Also when Rabin came15 he said in the name of R. Johanan: R. Jose admitted when the new prohibition was more comprehensive. But in which respect is it more comprehensive here?16 - When the grandfather had another son;17 as the new prohibition comprises also the other son, it becomes operative with regard to [the offender] himself.
MISHNAH. IF ONE HAD INTERCOURSE WITH HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW HE MAY THEREBY BECOME GUILTY FOR OFFENDING WITH HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW, HIS DAUGHTER-IN-LAW, HIS BROTHER'S WIFE, THE WIFE OF HIS FATHER'S BROTHER, HIS WIFE'S SISTER, A MARRIED WOMAN, AND FINALLY A MENSTRUANT WOMAN.18 AND SO TOO, IF ONE HAD INTERCOURSE WITH THE MOTHER OF HIS FATHER-IN-LAW OR OF HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW. R. JOHANAN B. NURI REMARKED: IF ONE HAD INTERCOURSE WITH HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW HE MAY THEREBY BECOME GUILTY FOR OFFENDING WITH HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW, THE MOTHER OF HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW, AND THE MOTHER OF HIS FATHER-IN-LAW.19 THEY SAID TO HIM: ALL THESE THREE ARE OF ONE DENOMINATION.20
GEMARA. Said R. Eleazar in the name of R. Hoshaia: R. Johanan b. Nuri and Symmachus adhere to the same rule.21 R. Johanan b. Nuri as stated above.22 As to Symmachus, we have learnt:23
(1) V. supra 14a. I.e., the latter five prohibitions should not become operative and only one sacrifice should be offered. Although the Mishnah is anonymous, it is, according to a general rule, assumed that R. Meir's view is represented therein.
(2) V. p. 104, nn. 6 and 7.
(3) Viz., his half-brothers of a common father. Before her marriage to one of them she was permitted to all of them, except her own father.
(4) I.e., after the brother's death.
(5) The inter-relationships between the man and his grand-daughter were manifold so that seven prohibitions were simultaneously broken in one act, viz., the grand-daughter, now a married woman, had previously wedded one of his sons and after his death the offender's brother and later, after the latter's death, the brother of the offender's father. The offender was at the same time married to his grand-daughter's half-sister, i.e., another daughter of his granddaughter's husband from another wife. The grand-daughter was, in addition, menstruant at the time of contact.
(6) As she was forbidden to the father as his brother's wife the marriage was invalid and she cannot be regarded as 'his father's wife'.
(7) When the offender's uncle died, he left no children behind, so that his father was permitted and even obliged to marry her according to the law of levirate marriage, Deut. XXV, 5f.
(8) I.e., one enacted by rabbinical law.
(9) Yeb. 21b.
(10) I.e., ad infinitum. The daughter of any of his male descendants that stands at the end of a chain of male offsprings is forbidden to him by rabbinical enactment.
(11) Sanh. 81a.
(12) I.e., if the woman was forbidden to him because of their twofold inter-relation. As to the scale of the various forms of execution, cf. Sanh. 49b.
(13) E.g.,if she was a widow or divorced at the time he married her daughter and then married again. The sentence in the case of a married woman is death by strangulation and in that of a mother-in-law death by burning. We learn herefrom, at any rate, that R. Jose holds a new prohibition cannot take hold where another exists.
(14) V. p. 104, nn. 6 and 7. If the new prohibition is more comprehensive it supersedes the first one. The reason why R. Jose, in the quoted Mishnah, nevertheless holds that only the prohibition which is first established is of avail, (although in the first of the examples the second prohibition, viz.,the one concerning a married woman, which applied to all men, is more comprehensive than the first) is because the penalty of the first transgression is more stringent than that of the second (Rashi).
(15) I.e., when he arrived from Palestine to Babylonia.
(16) I.e., the case mentioned by R. Jose in our Mishnah, and with reference to the prohibition concerning the father's wife. This prohibition does not add to those already in existence.
(17) Before the transgressor's father married the grand-daughter she was permitted to his son. Now she is forbidden also to him as his father's wife.
(18) This case is met by the following inter-relations between the transgressor and his mother-in-law: The mother-in-law, now a married woman, had previously married his son and after the latter's death his brother, and then his father's brother. The offender himself had also been married to his mother-in-law's sister. If the mother-in-law was menstruant at the time of the union, we find that in one act he transgressed the seven prohibitions enumerated in the Mishnah.
(19) Viz., if in addition to the above inter-relations he had also been married to her daughter's daughter and her son's daughter, so that she was also his mother-in-law's mother and his father-in-law's mother.
(20) I.e., they are of the same class and intimated in the text (Lev. XVIII, 17) in one single prohibition, so that no separate offering is to be brought for each offence.
(21) Viz., that if a manifold prohibition of the same denomination has been transgressed, several offerings are required.
(22) Viz., in our Mishnah, where he requires a separate offering for the mother-in-law and her mother although both come under the same designation.
(23) Hul. 82b.