Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 51a
'After all, however, [it may be objected] is not all that is ripe1 for cutting2 regarded as already cut?'3 - 'I mean [dates] that are still dependent4 on the palm-tree'.5 A boy orphan and girl orphan6 once came before Raba.7 'Grant a bigger [maintenance allowance] to the boy', said Raba, 'for the sake of the girl'.8 Said the Rabbis to Raba: Did not the Master himself lay down [that payment may be exacted] from landed property but not from movable property whether in respect of [a daughter's] maintenance, [a wife's] kethubah or [a daughter's] marriage outfit?9 - He answered them: Had he desired to have a handmaid to attend on him would we not have granted him [an Increased allowance for the purpose]?10 How much more then [should the allowance be increased] here11 where it serves12 two [purposes].13 Our Rabbis taught: Both landed property14 and movable property may be seized15 for the maintenance of a wife16 or daughters;16 so Rabbi.17 R. Simeon b. Eleazar ruled: Landed property may be seized for daughters18 from sons, for daughters from daughters,19 and for sons from Sons;19 for sons from daughters where the estate is large20 but not where it is small.21 Movable property22 may be seized for sons from sons,23 for daughters from daughters23 and for sons from daughters, but not for daughters from sons.24 Although we have an established rule that the halachah is in agreement with Rabbi [where he differs] from his colleague, the halachah here is in agreement with R. Simeon b. Eleazar; for Raba stated: The law is [that payment may be exacted] from landed property but not from movable property whether in respect of a kethubah, maintenance or marriage outfit.25
MISHNAH. [IF A HUSBAND] DID NOT WRITE A KETHUBAH FOR HIS WIFE26 SHE MAY RECOVER TWO HUNDRED ZUZ27 [IF AT MARRIAGE SHE WAS] A VIRGIN, AND ONE MANEH27 [IF SHE WAS THEN] A WIDOW, BECAUSE [THE STATUTORY KETHUBAH] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. IF HE ASSIGNED TO HER IN WRITING A FIELD THAT WAS WORTH ONE MANE H INSTEAD OF THE TWO HUNDRED ZUZ,28 AND DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR,26 'ALL PROPERTY THAT I POSSESS IS SURETY FOR YOUR KETHUBAH',29 HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE [FOR THE FULL AMOUNT]30 BECAUSE [THE CLAUSE MENTIONED] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. IF HE DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR31 [THE CLAUSE], IF YOU ARE TAKEN CAPTIVE I WILL RANSOM YOU AND TAKE YOU AGAIN AS MY WIFE,'29 OR, IN THE CASE OF A PRIEST'S WIFE,32 '29 WILL RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME',33 HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE [To CARRY OUT THESE OBLIGATIONS], BECAUSE [THE CLAUSE] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. IF SHE IS TAKEN CAPTIVE IT IS HIS DUTY TO RANSOM HER; AND IF HE SAID, 'HERE34 IS HER LETTER OF DIVORCE AND HER KETHUBAH LET HER RANSOM HERSELF', HE IS NOT ALLOWED [TO ACT ACCORDlngly].35 IF SHE SUSTAINED AN INJURY IT IS HIS DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR HER MEDICAL TREATMENT,36 BUT IF HE SAID, HERE34 IS HER LETTER OF DIVORCE AND HER KETHUBAH, LET HER HEAL HERSELF', HE IS ALLOWED [TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS DESIRE].
GEMARA. Whose [view is represented in our Mishnah]? It is [obviously that of] R. Meir who ruled [that the intercourse of] any man who undertakes to give a virgin less than two hundred zuz37 or a widow less than 'a Maneh37 is38 an act of prostitution;39 for if [it be suggested that it is the view of] R. Judah, he surely, [it can be objected] ruled, [that if a husband] wished he may write out for a virgin40 a deed for two hundred zuz and she writes [a quittance]41 'I have received from you a maneh,' and for a widow [he may write out a deed for] a maneh and she writes [a quittance], 'I received from you fifty zuz'.42 Read, however, the final clause: IF HE ASSIGNED TO HER IN WRITING A FIELD THAT WAS WORTH ONE MANEH INSTEAD OF THE TWO HUNDRED ZUZ, AND DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR, ALL PROPERTY THAT I POSSESS43 IS SURETY FOR YOUR KETHUBAH' HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE [FOR THE FULL AMOUNT], BECAUSE [THE CLAUSE MENTIONED] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. Does not this obviously represent the view44 of R. Judah who laid down that [the omission from a bond of the clause] pledging property45 [is regarded as] the scribe's error?46 for if [It be suggested that it represents the view of] R. Meir, he, surely, [it can be objected] ruled that [the omission of the clause] pledging property is not [regarded as] the scribe's error. For we have learned: If a man found notes of indebtedness
(1) Lit., 'that stands'.
(2) לגדוד, so MS. M., Aruk, Tosaf. B.B. 42b (s.v. שבה). Cur. edd., לגזוז 'to shear', is also the reading of Tosaf. a.l. (s.v. סוף).
(3) כגדוד. This is the reading of the authorities who adopt לגדוד (cf. supra n. 9). The others read כגזוז.
(4) Lit., 'require'.
(5) Not being sufficiently ripe they are deemed to he part of the tree (cf. supra note 7).
(6) Brother and sister whose deceased father's movable property had been entrusted to a guardian.
(7) Claiming an allowance out of their father's estate.
(8) Sc. an allowance that shall suffice for the two.
(9) Infra 69b; how then did Raba allow the exaction of maintenance out of movable assets (v. supra n. 13)?
(10) As heir the boy is entitled to have all his needs supplied from the estate.
(11) Where the sister attends on her brother.
(12) Lit., 'there is'.
(13) Attendance and maintenance.
(14) Lit., 'property which has surety', sc. to which a claimant may resort in case of non-payment by the defendant.
(15) From orphans.
(16) Of their deceased father.
(17) Infra 68b.
(18) For their maintenance or marriage outfit.
(19) Sc. the younger are given equal shares with the elder though the latter had taken earlier possession of their father's estate.
(20) V. next note.
(21) I. e., if it does not suffice for the maintenance of the sons and the daughters until they reach adolescence (Rashi. Cf. B.B. 139b). In such a case the estate belongs to the daughters while the sons may go begging (B.B. loc. cit.).
(22) Cf. supra n. 1 mutatis mutandis.
(23) V. supra note 6.
(24) Movable assets of the deceased in the possession of his sons are regarded, as far as his daughters are concerned, as non-existent.
(25) Supra p. 292 and infra 69b.
(26) Lit., 'for her'.
(27) V. Glos.
(28) The statutory amount of a virgin's kethubah.
(29) This is one of the statutory clauses that a kethubah must contain.
(30) V. p. 293. n. 15.
(31) Lit., 'for her'.
(32) With whom her husband (the priest) may not live again after she had been a captive and in whose favour the clause 'and take you again as wife' cannot be written.
(33) Lit., 'country', 'district'.
(34) Lit., 'behold'.
(35) Since the obligation to ransom her is incurred as soon as she is taken captive.
(36) Lit., 'to heal her'.
(37) V. Glos.
(38) Lit., 'behold this'.
(39) Infra 54b.
(40) As her kethubah.
(41) Though she has received nothing.
(42) Infra 54b. Now since our Mishnah insists on the payment of the full amount of the kethubah, presumably even if the woman had surrendered her claim (corresponding to a quittance), it can only represent the view of R. Meir who disallows such a surrender and not that of R. Judah who allows it.
(43) This is assumed to include even property which he disposed of subsequent to the writing of the kethubah.
(44) Lit , 'it comes'.
(45) E.g that of the debtor to the creditor.
(46) And not as the considered consent of the creditor. Despite its error the pledging clause is deemed to have been entered.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 51b
he must not restore them1 if they contain a clause pledging property, because the court would exact payment from such property,2 but if they do not contain the clause pledging property, he must return them, because the court will not exact payment from the property;3 so R. Meir. The Sages,4 however, ruled: In either case he must not return them, because the court will exact payment from the property5 [in any case].6 Would then the first clause [represent the view of] R. Meir and the final clause that of R. Judah? And should you suggest that both clauses7 [represent the view of] R. Meir and that he draws a distinction between a kethubah and notes of indebtedness,8 [it could be retorted] does he, indeed, draw such a distinction? Has it not been taught: For five [classes of claims] may distraint be made only on free assets;9 they are as follows. [A claim for] produce,10 for amelioration shewing profits,11 for an undertaking12 to maintain the wife's son or the wife's daughter, for a note of indebtedness wherein no lien on property had been entered, and for a woman's kethubah from which the clause pledging security was omitted.13 Now what authority have you heard laying down that [the omission from a deed of a record of] a lien on property is not regarded as the scribe's error?14 [Obviously it is] R. Meir;15 and yet it was stated, was it not, 'a woman's kethubah'?16 - If you wish, I might reply: [Our Mishnah represents the view of] R. Meir; and if you prefer I might reply: [It represents the View of] R. Judah. 'If you prefer I might reply: [It represents the view of] R. Judah',for there17 she specifically wrote in the man's favour18 [in a quittance]: 'I received'19 but here20 she did not write in his favour,18 'I received'.21 'If you wish I might reply: [Our Mishnah represents the view of] R. Meir',for by the expression22 'HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE' [was meant liability to pay] out of his free assets.23 IF HE DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR etc. Samuel's father ruled: The wife of an Israelite who had been outraged is forbidden to her husband, since it may be apprehended that the act begun24 under compulsion may have terminated25 with her consent.26 Rab raised an objection against Samuel's father: [Have we not learned,] IF YOU ARE TAKEN CAPTIVE I WILL RANSOM YOU AND TAKE YOU AGAIN AS MY WIFE?27 The other remained silent. Rab thereupon applied to Samuel's father the Scriptural text, The princes refrained talking and laid their hand on their mouth.28 What, however, could he have replied?29 - [That the law]30 was relaxed in the case of a captive.31 According to Samuel's father's ruling how is it possible to conceive a case of outrage which the All-Merciful deemed to be genuine?32 - Where, for instance, witnesses testified that she cried from the commencement to the end. [This ruling],33 however, differs from that of Raba; for Raba laid down: Any woman, the outrage against whom began34 under compulsion, though it terminated with her consent, and even if she said, 'Leave him alone', and that if he had not made the attack upon her she would have hired him to do it,is permitted [to her husband]. What is the reason? - He plunged35 her into an uncontrollable passion.36 It was taught in agreement with Raba: And she be not seized37 [only then]38 is she forbidden,39 [from which it follows] that if she was seized40 she is permitted.39 But there is another class of woman who is permitted39 even if she was not seized.41 And who is that? Any woman who began42 under compulsion and ended43 with her consent. Another Baraitha taught: 'And she be not seized' [only then] is she forbidden44 [from which it follows] that if she was seized45 she is permitted.44 But there is another class of woman who is forbidden44 even though she was seized. And who is that? The wife of a priest.46 Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel who had it from R. Ishmael: 'And she be not seized', [then only]47 is she forbidden,44 but if she was seized she is permitted. There is, however, another class of woman who is permitted even if she was not seized. And who is that? A woman whose betrothal was a mistaken one,48 and who may, even if her son sits riding on her shoulder, make a declaration of refusal49 [against her husband] and go away. Rab Judah ruled: Women who are kidnapped50 are permitted to their husbands.51 'But', said the Rabbis to Rab Judah, 'do they52 not bring bread to them?'53 - [They do this] out of fear. 'Do they52 not, however, hand them53 their arrows?'54 - [They do this also] out of fear. It is certain, however, that they52 are forbidden if [the kidnappers] release then, and they go to them of their own free will. Our Rabbis taught: Royal captives55 have the status of ordinary captives56 but those that are kidnapped by highwaymen are not regarded as ordinary captives. Was not, the reverse, however, taught? - There is no contradiction between the rulings concerning royal captives57 since the former refers58 [for example] to the kingdom of Ahasuerus59 while the latter refers60 to the kingdom of [one like] Ben Nezer.61 There is also no contradiction between the two rulings concerning captives of highwaymen62 since the former refers60 to [a highwayman like] Ben Nezer61 while the latter refers60 to an ordinary highwayman.63 As to Ben Nezer, could he be called there64 'king' and here is 'highwayman'? - Yes; in comparison with Ahasuerus he was a highwayman but in comparison with an ordinary robber he was a king. OR, IN THE CASE OF A PRIEST'S WIFE, 'I WILL RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME' etc. Abaye ruled: If a widow was married to a High Priest65 it is the latter's duty to ransom66 her, since one may apply to her: OR IN THE CASE OF A PRIEST'S WIFE, I WILL RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME',67
(1) Either to the creditor or to the debtor.
(2) Lit 'from them', sc. the nekasim (assets). Aliter: 'Exact payment on the strength of them', sc. the notes. Such exaction would be an injustice to the debtor if he has paid his liabilities and it was he who had lost the paid notes. But even where the creditor admits liability collusion with the object of robbing purchasers may be suspected (v. B.M. 12b).
(3) Ff. supra n. 7, ab. init.
(4) One of whom was R. Judah, a contemporary of R. Meir.
(5) Ff. supra note 7.
(6) Mishnah, B.M. 12b.
(7) Lit., 'all of it'.
(8) While in the case of the latter he does not regard the omission as a scribe's error, he does so in the case of the former since the terms of a kethubah are governed by statutory regulations laid down by Beth din.
(9) Of the defendant; but not on his sold or mortgaged property.
(10) In the case, for instance, where a field with its produce was taken away from a buyer by the man from whom the seller had robbed it. The buyer who may recover the cost of the field itself from the seller's sold or mortgaged property may not recover the cost of the produce except from his free assets. Cf. Git. 48b, B.M. 14b.
(11) Where the buyer (cf. supra n. 3) incurred expense in effecting the improvements of the land.
(12) Lit., 'and he who undertakes'.
(13) B.K. 95a.
(14) And that the holder of such a deed may only distrain on free assets.
(15) Who most consequently be the author of the last cited Baraitha which states that 'a note of indebtedness wherein no lien on property had been entered' entitles the holder to distrain 'only on free assets'.
(16) 'May be distrained only on free assets' if the clause pledging security was omitted from it. The section of our Mishnah, therefore, which states that, despite the omission of such a clause the husband is 'NEVERTHELESS LIABLE' and the kethubah may presumably be distrained on sold and mortgaged property also (v. supra p. 295. n. 2). cannot represent the view of R. Meir. How then could it be suggested that both clauses of our Mishnah (cf. supra p. 295, n. 12 and text) represent the view of R. Meir?
(17) In the Mishnah (infra 54b) cited supra 51a, according to which the statutory sum of a kethubah may be reduced.
(18) Lit., 'for him'.
(19) And she has the right to renounce a portion of her claim.
(20) In our Mishnah which allows the woman the full amount of her kethubah even if her husband had written none.
(21) And the object of our Mishnah is to point out that a woman's consent to dispense with the written document of her kethubah is no evidence that she has surrendered her right to recover the statutory amount to which she is entitled. It is assumed rather that her indifference to the written document is due to her reliance on her statutory rights.
(22) Lit., 'what . . . that was taught'.
(23) His sold or mortgaged property, however, may not be distrained on, in agreement with R. Meir, since no lien on property had been recorded in the kethubah.
(24) Lit., 'her beginning'.
(25) Lit., 'and her end'.
(26) And a wife who willingly played the harlot is forbidden to her husband.
(27) Though a woman in captivity is usually assumed to have been outraged.
(28) Job XXIX, 9.
(29) Lit., 'what has he to say'.
(30) Prohibiting an outraged woman to her husband.
(31) Since her violation is only a suspicion.
(32) Lit., 'permitted'. sc. the woman is exempt from punishment. Cf. Deut. XXII, 26.
(33) Samuel's father's.
(34) Lit., 'her beginning'.
(35) Lit., 'clothed'.
(36) Being a victim of her passions she is deemed to have acted under compulsion even when she professed acquiescence.
(37) Num. V, 13. E.V., neither she be taken in the act.
(38) Sc. if she was not seized, i.e., if she did not act under compulsion but willingly.
(39) To her husband.
(40) Sc. if she acted under compulsion.
(41) But acted willingly.
(42) Lit., 'her beginning'.
(43) Lit., 'and her end'.
(44) To her husband.
(45) Sc. if she acted under compulsion.
(46) Yeb. 56b.
(47) V. supra note 4.
(48) When a condition which remained unfulfilled was attached to it. In such a case the woman may leave her husband without a letter of divorce and she has the status of a feme sole who had never before been married.
(49) V. Glos. s.v. mi'un. [Isaiah Trani: This is not to be taken literally. It means simply that she is permitted to marry another man without a bill of divorce].
(50) Lit., 'whom thieves steal'.
(51) Any intercourse between the kidnappers and the women is regarded as outrage since the latter would not willingly consent to intimate relations with the men they detest.
(52) The kidnapped women.
(53) The thieves, which shows that they live on amicable terms with the kidnappers.
(54) When their camp is attacked.
(55) Sc. women forcibly taken into the royal harem (v. Rashi). Aliter. Captives of the government; 'forced by (Roman) officials' (Jast.).
(56) And are permitted to their husbands, in agreement with the terms of the kethubah (cf. our Mishnah).
(57) Lit., 'kingdom on kingdom'.
(58) Lit., 'that'.
(59) Sc. one taken captive by a royal personage. Not expecting ever to be married by such a person a captive would strenuously resist intimate relations.
(60) Lit., 'that'.
(61) בן נצר who was a robber and self-made ruler (cf. Rashi). A woman might well entertain the hope that such a man would consent to marry her and she might consequently allow intimate relations. Ben Nezer is identified by some authorities with Odenathos of Palmyra, who was first a robber chief and ultimately the founder of a dynasty (v. fast.). [V. Graetz, Geschichte, IV p. 453ff.].
(62) Lit., 'robbery on robbery'.
(63) With whom no decent woman would desire to be associated even in marriage. Intercourse with such a man must, therefore, he regarded as outrage.
(64) In the second Baraitha cited. (15) The Baraitha first mentioned.
(65) Though such a marriage is forbidden (cf. Lev. XXI, 14).
(66) If she is taken captive.
(67) The clause in her kethubah as the wife of a priest. Since her ransom would not lead to a re-union with the High Priest but only to her restoration to her parental home, he is obliged to ransom her.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 52a
but if a bastard or a nethinah1 was married to an Israelite the latter is under no obligation to ransom her, since one cannot apply to her:2 AND TAKE YOU AGAIN AS MY WIFE.3 Raba ruled: Wherever the captivity causes the woman to be forbidden4 [to her husband] it is his duty to ransom her5 but where some other circumstance causes her to be forbidden to him6 it is not his duty to ransom her.7 Must it be assumed [that they8 differ on the same principles] as the following Tannaim? [For it was taught:] If a man forbade his wife by a vow [from deriving any benefit from him] and she was taken captive, he must, said R. Eliezer, ransom her9 and give her also her kethubah. R. Joshua said: He must give her her kethubah but need not ransom her. Said R. Nathan: I asked Symmachus, 'When R. Joshua said, "He must give her her kethubah but need not ransom her" [did he refer to a case] where her husband first made his vow against her and she was then taken captive or even to a case where she was first taken captive and he made his vow against her subsequently?'10 And he told me, 'I did not hear [what he exactly said] but it seems [that he referred to] a case where [the husband] made the vow against her first and the woman was taken captive afterwards; for, should you suggest [that the ruling applied also to a woman who] was taken captive first and the man made his vow against her afterwards [the objection could be raised that in such a case] he might make use of a trick'.11 Do not they12 then differ13 in [the case of one] who made a vow against the wife of a priest,14 Abaye upholding the view of R. Eliezer15 while Raba IS maintaining that of R. Joshua?16 - No;17 here18 we are dealing [with the case of a woman] who, for instance, made the vow herself and her husband19 confirmed it,20 R. Eliezer being of the opinion that it was he21 who put his finger between her teeth22 while R. Joshua maintains that it was she herself who put her finger between her teeth.23 [But] If she herself put her finger between her teeth what claim can she have to her24 kethubah? And, furthermore, [it was stated]: Said R. Nathan: I asked Symmachus, 'When R. Joshua said, "He must give her her kethubah but need not ransom her [did he refer to a case] where her husband first made his vow against her and she was then taken captive or even to a case where she was first taken captive and he made his vow against her subsequently?' and he told me: 'I did not hear [what he exactly said]'. Now if [this is a case] where she herself had made the vow, what difference is there [it may be asked] whether he made the vow first against her25 and she was taken captive afterwards or whether she was first taken captive and he then made the vow?26 - The fact is that [here27 it is a case where] the husband made the vow against her, but Abaye explains [the dispute]28 on the lines of his view while Raba explains it on the lines of his view. 'Abaye explains the dispute on the lines of his view', thus: If a widow [was married] to a High Priest no one29 disputes [the ruling] that it is the husband's duty to ransom her;30 if a bastard or a nethinah [was married] to an Israelite no one29 disputes the ruling that it is not his duty to ransom her,31 if also one made a vow against the wife of a priest32 no one29 disputes the ruling that it is his duty to ransom her, since [the principle in this case] is identical with that of a widow [who was married] to a High Priest.33 They34 differ only in [respect of him who] made a vow against the wife of an Israelite,35 R. Eliezer being guided by the woman's original status36 while R. Joshua is guided by her subsequent status.37 'Raba explains it on the lines of his view', thus: If a widow [was married] to a High Priest, or a bastard or a nethinah to an Israelite no one38 disputes the ruling that it is not the husband's duty to ransom her.39 They40 differ only in [the case where one] made a vow against either the wife of a priest or the wife of an Israelite,41 R. Eliezer being guided by the woman's original status36 while R. Joshua is guided by her subsequent status.37 IF SHE IS TAKEN CAPTIVE IT IS HIS DUTY TO RANSOM HER etc. Our Rabbis taught: If she was taken captive during the lifetime of her husband, and he died afterwards, and her husband was aware of her [captivity],42 it is the duty of his heirs to ransom her, but if her husband was not aware of her captivity it is not the duty of his heirs to ransom her. Levi proposed to give a practical decision43 in agreement with this Baraitha. Said Rab to him, Thus said my uncle:44 The law is not in agreement with that Baraitha but with the following45 wherein it was taught: [If a woman] was taken captive after the death of her husband it is not the duty of his orphans to ransom her, and, furthermore,46 even if she was taken captive during the lifetime of her husband, but he died subsequently, the orphans are under no obligation to ransom her, since one cannot apply to her [the clause in her kethubah:] AND I WILL TAKE YOU AGAIN AS MY WIFE.47 Our Rabbis taught: [If a woman] was taken captive and a demand was made upon her husband for as much as ten times her value, he must ransom her the first time. Subsequently, however, he ransoms her only if he desired to do so but need not ransom her48 if he does not wish to do so. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled:
(1) Fem. of nathin (v. Glos.).
(2) As the Israelite is forbidden to live with her.
(3) Which is the appropriate clause entered in a kethubah given to the wife of an Israelite, and which cannot apply (v. supra n. 5) where she is one forbidden to him.
(4) Lit., 'the prohibition of captivity causes her'.
(5) Contrary to the opinion of Abaye, the clause entered in a kethubah of a priest's wife obliges the priest to ransom his wife though she becomes forbidden to him through her captivity, only if she was permitted to him before she had been taken captive.
(6) As, for instance, a widow to a High Priest.
(7) Because, in the case of a forbidden marriage, as the clause 'AND TAKE YOU AGAIN AS WIFE' was originally invalid (cf. supra n. 6) the clause 'RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME' also has no validity. Thus, contrary to the ruling of Abaye, Raba maintains that a High Priest is under no obligation to ransom a widow whom he married in contravention of the laws of the High Priesthood. In the case of a bastard and a nethinah Raba is, of course, of the same opinion as Abaye.
(8) Abaye and Raba.
(9) Although, owing to his vow, he would subsequently be compelled to divorce her.
(10) Though there is good reason to suspect that the object of his vow was to escape his responsibility of ransoming her.
(11) Cf. supra n. 1.
(12) R. Eliezer and R. Joshua.
(13) Lit., 'what, not?'
(14) I. e., the man who made the vow was himself a priest. It is his duty to ransom his wife, though her being prohibited to him is not due to her captivity, because the clause, 'I WILL RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME' may well be applied. Their dispute could not refer to an Israelite who made such a vow, since in that case, the clause 'AND TAKE YOU AGAIN AS MY WIFE' being inapplicable. R. Eliezer could not have imposed upon the man the duty of ransoming his wife.
(15) Cf. supra n. 5.
(16) That the husband is exempt from ransoming his wife because her prohibition to him was not caused by her captivity but by some other circumstance, viz. his vow.
(17) R. Eliezer and R. Joshua do not differ on the same principles on which Abaye and Raba differed, both of them agreeing either with Abaye or with Raba.
(18) Lit., 'here in what?'
(19) An Israelite.
(20) Explicitly or implicity.
(21) By his confirmation of the vow.
(22) Metaph. It is his fault that the vow remained valid. Had he desired to annul it he had the full power to do so (v. Num. XXX, 7ff). As he is thus the cause of the woman's prohibition to him and of rendering the clause in the kethubah inapplicable, he must pay the penalty by retaining the responsibility of ransoming her.
(23) She should not have made her vow. Having made it her prohibition to her husband is her own fault. Cf. supra n. 13 mutatis mutandis.
(24) Lit., 'what is its doing'.
(25) I. e., by confirming it.
(26) In either case, since it was she who made the vow, no trick on the part of the husband can be suspected.
(27) In the dispute between R. Eliezer and R. Joshua.
(28) Between R. Eliezer and R. Joshua.
(29) Neither R. Eliezer nor R. Joshua. Lit., 'all the world'.
(30) Cf. supra p. 300. n. 3. The fact that she is forbidden to him for come reason other than that of her captivity being of no consequence.
(31) Cf. supra p. 300, n. 2, and text.
(32) Sc. a Priest against his own wife.
(33) In either case the clause, 'I WILL RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME' (cf. supra p. 300, n. 3) may well be applied after, as well as before, the woman had been taken captive.
(34) St. Eliezer and R. Joshua.
(35) Cf. supra note9 mutatis mutandis. To the wife of an Israelite it was originally possible to apply the clause, 'I WILL TAKE YOU AGAIN AS MY WIFE' but now, owing to the vow, it can no longer be applied.
(36) Lit., 'goes after (the status) of the beginning'. When the clause was applicable and therefore the obligation stands.
(37) Lit.,'in the end'.
(38) V. supra p. 302, n. 6.
(39) In the case of the widow to a High Priest, as her prohibition is due to a cause other than captivity, neither the clause relating to 'remarriage' nor that of 'restoring her to her parental home' is valid (cf. supra p. 300. n. 10); and in the case of the last mentioned because the clause, 'I WILL TAKE You AGAIN AS MY WIFE could not be applied originally and cannot be applied now.
(40) R. Eliezer and R. Joshua.
(41) To either of whom the relevant clauses of her kethubah that were originally applicable now, on account of the vow which is a cause of prohibition 'other than that of captivity'.
(42) And thus incurred the liability to ransom her before he died.
(43) Lit., 'to do a deed'.
(44) R. Hiyya who was Rab's father's brother.
(45) Lit., 'as that'.
(46) Lit., 'and no more but'.
(47) Since her husband is dead. V. Tosef. Keth. IV.
(48) At all. It is his duty to ransom her no more than once (Rashi). Aliter: For an exorbitant price (v. R. Han. Tosaf. s.v. רצה a. l.). If, however, the ransom demanded is not higher than her value he must pay it.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 52b
Captives must not be ransomed for more than their value, in the interests of the public.1 [This then implies] that they must be ransomed for their actual value even though the cost of a captive's ransom2 exceeds the amount of her kethubah. Has not, however, the contrary been taught: [If a woman] was taken captive, and a demand was made upon her husband for as much as ten times the amount of her kethubah3 he must ransom her the first time. Subsequently, however, he ransoms her only if he desires to do so but need not ransom her if he does not wish to do so. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: If the price of her ransom corresponded to the amount of her kethubah, he must ransom her; if not, he4 need not ransom her?5 - R. Simeon b. Gamaliel upholds two lenient rules.6 IF SHE SUSTAINED AN INJURY IT IS HIS DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR HER MEDICAL TREATMENT. Our Rabbis taught: A widow is to be maintained from [her husband's] orphans' estate; and if she requires medical treatment, it is regarded7 as maintenance. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: Medical treatment of a limited liability may be deducted8 from her kethubah but one which has no limited liability9 is regarded10 as maintenance. Said R. Johanan: Blood letting in the Land of Israel11 was regarded as medical treatment of no limited liability.12 R. Johanan's relatives had [to maintain] their father's wife who required daily medical treatment. When they came to R. Johanan13 he told them: Proceed to arrange with a medical man an inclusive fee.14 [Later, however], R. Johanan remarked: 'We have put ourselves [in the unenviable position] of15 legal advisers'.16 What, however, was his opinion at first,17 and why did he change it in the end!18 At first he thought [of the Scriptural text,] And that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh,19 but ultimately he realized [that the position of] a noted personality is different [from that of the general public].20
MISHNAH. [A HUSBAND WHO] DID NOT GIVE HIS WIFE IN WRITING21 [THE FOLLOWING UNDERTAKING:] 'THE MALE CHILDREN THAT WILL BE BORN FROM OUR MARRIAGE22 SHALL INHERIT THE MONEY OF THY KETHUBAH IN ADDITION TO THEIR SHARES WITH THEIR BROTHERS',23 IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE, BECAUSE [THIS CLAUSE] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. [THOUGH HE DID NOT GIVE HIS WIFE IN WRITING24 THE UNDERTAKING:] 'THE FEMALE CHILDREN THAT WILL BE BORN FROM OUR MARRIAGE25 SHALL DWELL IN MY HOUSE AND BE MAINTAINED OUT OF MY ESTATE UNTIL THEY SHALL BE TAKEN IN MAKRIAGE'26 HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE, BECAUSE [THIS CLAUSE] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. [SIMILARLY IF HE DID NOT GIVE HIS WIFE THE WRITTEN UNDERTAKING:]27 'YOU SHALL DWELL IN MY HOUSE AND BE MAINTAINED THEREIN OUT OF MY ESTATE THROUGHOUT THE DURATION OF YOUR WIDOWHOOD', HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE, BECAUSE [THIS CLAUSE ALSO] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. SO DID THE MEN OF JERUSALEM WRITE. THE MEN OF GALILEE WROTE IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE MEN OF JERUSALEM. THE MEN OF JUDAEA, HOWEVER, USED TO WRITE:28 'UNTIL THE HEIRS MAY CONSENT TO PAY YOU YOUR KETHUBAH'. THE HEIRS, CONSEQUENTLY, MAY, IF THEY WISH TO DO IT, PAY HER HER KETHUBAH AND DISMISS HER.
GEMARA. R. Johanan stated in the name of R. Simeon b. Yohai: Why was the kethubah for MALE CHILDREN29 instituted?30 In order that any man might thereby31 be encouraged32 to give33 to his daughter as much as to his son. But is such a regulation found anywhere else?34 Seeing that the All-Merciful ordained that a son shall be heir; a daughter shall not',35 would the Rabbis proceed to make a provision36 whereby a daughter shall be the heir? - This37 also has Scriptural sanction, for it is written, Take ye wives, and beget sons and daughters,' and take wives far your sans, and give your daughters to husbands;38 [now the advice to take wives for one's] sons is quite intelligible [since such marriages are] within a father's power39 but [as to the giving of] one's daughters [the difficulty arises:] Is [such giving] within his power?39 [Consequently40 it must be] this that we were taught: That a father must provide for his daughter clothing and covering and must also give her a dowry41 so that people may be anxious to woo42 her and so proceed to marry her. And to what extent?43 Both Abaye and Raba ruled: Up to a tenth of his wealth. But might it not be suggested44 [that the sons] should inherit [what their mother received] from her father45 but not [that which was due to her] from her husband?46 - If that were so, a father also would abstain from assigning47 [a liberal dowry for his daughter].48 May it then be suggested44 that where her father had assigned a dowry49 her husband must also enter the clause50 but where her father did not assign any dowry51 her husband also need not enter the clause?52 - The Rabbis drew no distinction.53 But should not then54 a daughter55 among sons56 also be heir?57 - The Rabbis have treated [the kethubah]58 like an inheritance.59 But should not then a daughter55 among the other daughters56 be heir?60 - The Rabbis made no distinction.61 Why then62 is not [the kethubah] recoverable63 from movables also?64 - The Rabbis treated it like the [statutory] kethubah.65 Why then should not distraint be made on sold or mortgaged property?66 - [The expression] we learned [was] SHALL INHERIT.67 May it then62 be suggested [that It Is recoverable] even if there was no surplus68 of a denar?69 - The Rabbis have made no enactment where the Pentateuchal law of inheritance would thereby be uprooted. R. Papa was making arrangements for his son to be married into the house of Abba of Sura.70 He went there to write the kethubah for the bride.71 When Judah b. Meremar heard [of his arrival] he went out to welcome him.72 When, however, they reached the door [of the bride's father's house] he asked leave to depart, when [R. Papa] said to him, 'Will the Master come in with me?'
(1) מפני תיקון העולם 'for the sake of the social order' (Jast.), lit., 'for the establishment of the world', that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive.
(2) Lit., 'her ransom'.
(3) Sc. did not exceed R.
(4) Since one cannot be expected to be liable for a single clause of a kethubah more than for the total amount of the kethubah. [Isaiah Trani: The amount of the kethubah here denotes the extra jointure in addition to the statutory two hundred and one hundred zuz].
(5) A ruling which contradicts the implication of the first Baraitha that he must ransom her 'even though the cost of a captive's ransom exceeds the amount of her kethubah'.
(6) The price of the ransom need not exceed either (a) the actual value of the woman or (b) the amount of her kethubah, whichever is the less.
(7) Lit., 'behold it'.
(8) Lit., 'she is healed'.
(9) If. for instance, the woman is always ailing.
(10) Lit., 'behold it'.
(12) Tosef. Keth. IV.
(13) Seeking advice on how to escape the constant drain on their resources.
(14) Lit.,'go fix something for him, for a healer'. Since their liability would thereby become limited they would be entitled to deduct it from the woman's kethubah.
(15) Lit., 'as'.
(16) עורכי הדײנין lit., 'those who arrange (the pleas) before the judges'. It is forbidden for a judge to act, even indirectly, as legal adviser to one of the litigants, v. Aboth (Sonc. ed.) p. 6, n. 1.
(17) When he gave his advice to his relatives.
(18) Lit., 'and in the end what did he think?'
(19) Isa. LVIII, 7, teaching the obligation of assisting one's relatives.
(20) A judge must subject himself to greater restrictions in order to be free from all possible suspicion of partiality.
(21) As one of the clauses of her kethubah.
(22) Lit., 'that you will have from me'.
(23) Who may be born from another wife. The effect of such a clause is that, if the woman predeceases her husband, her sons, on the death of their father (her husband), would inherit her kethubah, and they would recover it from their deceased father's estate, irrespective of the amount or size of the shares to which they are entitled like any of the other sons of the deceased. This clause is designated, as 'kethubath benin dikrin' (kethubah of male children).
(24) V. p. 305, n. 13.
(25) V. p. 305, n. 14.
(26) Lit., 'to men'. This clause is designated as 'kethubath benan nukban' (kethubah of female children).
(27) As one of the clauses of her kethubah.
(28) Immediately after the last mentioned clause.
(29) Cf. supra p. 305, n. is and text.
(30) Sc. why should not the kethubah, which on the death of his wife is legally inherited by the husband, be regarded as a part of his general estate and so be equally divided between all his sons?
(31) By being assured that whatever dowry he may give to his daughter will remain the property of her own children and will not pass through her husband to the children of his other wives.
(32) Lit., 'that a man may leap'.
(33) So MS.M. Cur. edd. 'and he will write'.
(34) Lit., 'is there a thing?'
(35) Cf. Num. XXVII, 8: If a man die, and have no son, then ye shall cause his inheritance to pass unto his daughter, from which it follows that if a man has a son his inheritance shall not pass unto his daughter.
(36) Encouraging a father (cf. supra p. 306. n. 8) to give his daughter a liberal dowry and thus deprive his sons of property which Pentateuchally should in due course be inherited by them.
(37) A father's duty to make liberal provision for his daughter.
(38) Jer. XXIX, 6.
(39) Lit., 'stand in his hand'. It is the man who approaches the woman, not the woman the man.
(40) Since Scripture nevertheless advises fathers to give their daughters to husbands.
(41) Lit., 'something'.
(42) Lit., 'jump', 'leap'.
(43) Must a father go on assigning a dowry for his daughter.
(44) Since the kethubah for the male children was instituted in order to encourage a father to provide a liberal dowry for his daughter.
(45) Sc. the dowry he gave her, which was included in her kethubah.
(46) The statutory kethubah and any additional jointure her husband may have settled upon her.
(47) Lit., 'and will not write'.
(48) No father would be prepared to give a liberal dowry to a husband of his daughter who does not himself also allow the sons of that daughter to inherit what he had promised their mother.
(49) Lit., 'wrote'.
(50) Relating to the MALE CHILDREN. Lit., 'should write'.
(51) Lit., 'did not write'.
(52) Cf. supra p. 307, n. 16 mutatis mutandis.
(53) Between the two kinds of kethubahs, since most kethubahs contain records of dowries (Rashi). All kethubahs must consequently include the MALE CHILDREN clause also.
(54) V. supra p. 307, n. 10.
(55) Of one wife who had no sons'
(56) Of another wife.
(57) To her mother, as far as her kethubah is concerned. The same reason that applies to male children should equally apply to a daughter in the absence of sons. Why then was a 'male children' and not a similar 'female children' clause instituted?
(58) In which the term 'INHERIT' was used (cf. our Mishnah).
(59) No daughter may 'inherit' among sons.
(60) Though she cannot be heir among sons (v. supra n. 8) she is well entitled, in the case of an ordinary inheritance, to be heir among daughters. Why then should she be deprived of her mother's kethubah (cf. supra n. 6. final clause)?
(61) Cf. supra note 2.
(62) V. supra p. 307, n. 10.
(63) By the sons.
(64) As stated supra 50a.
(65) Which cannot be recovered from the movables of a deceased husband.
(66) Just as the woman can collect her kethubah from mortgaged or sold property, so should the sons be able to recover it from such property, v. infra 55a.
(67) And no sold or mortgaged property may be seized for an inheritance.
(68) After the two 'male children' kethubahs had been paid (v. Mishnah infra 91a).
(69) Whereby the Pentateuchal law of inheritance could be carried out. Why then was it stated (l.c.) that the male children kethubahs are not recoverable in such a case?
(70) Who was his father-in-law (cf. supra 39b and Sanh. 14b). R. Papa's son married the sister of his father's wife.
(71) Lit., 'for her'. This would include the fixing of the amount for the dowry she was to receive from her father.
(72) Lit., 'he came; shewed himself to him'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 53a
Observing, however, that it was distasteful to him [to enter], he addressed him thus: 'What is it that you have on your mind? [Are you reluctant to enter] because Samuel said to Rab Judah, "Shinena,1 keep away from2 transfers of inheritance3 even though they be from a bad son to a good son, because one never knows what issue will come forth from him,4 and much more so [when the transfer is] from a son to a daughter",5 this6 also [I may point out] is an enactment of the Rabbis; as R. Johanan stated in the name of R. Simeon b. Yohai',7 The other replied, 'This enactment applies only [to one who acts] willingly;8 does it also imply that one should be compelled so to act?' - 'Did I tell you' said [R. Papa] to him, 'to come in and coerce him? What I meant was: Come in but exercise no pressure upon him'. 'My entrance', the other replied, 'would amount to compulsion'.9 [As R. Papa, however,] urged him, he entered but, having sat down, remained silent.10 [Abba] thought that he11 was vexed12 and consequently assigned13 [to his daughter as dowry] all that he possessed. Finally, however, he said to him,11 'Will not the Master speak even now? By the life of the Master, I have left nothing for myself!' - 'As far as I am concerned',14 the other replied, 'even the amount you have assigned15 has given me no pleasure'. 'This being the case',16 the first said, 'I will withdraw'. 'l did not suggest', the other said, 'that you should make a rogue17 of yourself'. R. Yemar the Elder enquired of R. Nahman: Does a woman who sold her kethubah to her husband retain the right to the kethubah for her male children18 or not?19 - Said Raba to him: Why do you not raise the same question in the case of a woman who surrendered her claim [to her kethubah]?20 'Now', the other replied, 'that I [found it necessary to] enquire [concerning a woman] who sold [her kethubah],21 though [in that case] it might well be assumed [that her need for] money compelled her [to the sale; and, furthermore,] it might be said [that she is] like a person who was struck a hundred blows with a hammer,22 was it then necessary [to raise the same question in respect of] a woman who [voluntarily] surrendered her claim [to her kethubah]?23 Raba stated: I have no doubt24 that a woman who sells25 her kethubah to strangers26 retains the right to the male children's kethubah.' What is the reason? [It is her need for] money that has compelled her [to sell].27 A woman [on the other hand] who surrenders her claim [to her kethubah] in favour of her husband does not retain the right to the male children's kethubah. What is the reason? She has lightheartedly surrendered her claims.28 [Is, however, a woman,] Raba enquired, who sells her kethubah to her husband treated as one who sells it to strangers,29 or as one who renounces it in favour of her husband?30 After he raised the question he himself solved it: [The law concerning] a Woman who sells her kethubah to her husband is the same as that of one who sells it to strangers.29 R. Idi b. Abin raised an objection: [We learned]: If she31 died, neither the heirs of the one husband nor the heirs of the other are entitled to inherit her kethubah.32 And in considering the difficulty, 'How does the question of a kethubah at all arise?'33 R. Papa replied, 'The kethubah of the male children [was meant]'.34 But why?35 Could not one36 argue here also:37 'Her passion has overpowered her'?38 - There39 [the loss of her kethubah] is a penalty that the Rabbis have imposed upon her.40 Rabin b. Hanina once sat [at his studies] before R. Hisda and in the course of the session he laid down in the name of R. Eleazar: A woman who surrenders her kethubah to her husband is not entitled to maintenance.41 The other42 said to him: Had you not spoken to me in the name of a great man I would have told you: Whoso rewardeth evil for good, evil shall not depart from his house.43 R. Nahman and 'Ulla and Abimi son of R. Papi once sat at their studies, and R. Hiyya b. Ammi was sitting with them when there came before them a man whose betrothed wife had died.44 'Go and bury her', they said to him, 'or pay her kethubah on her account',45 Said R. Hiyya to them, We have a teaching:46 In the case of a betrothed wife47 [the husband] is subject neither to the laws of onan,48 nor may he defile himself for her;49 and she likewise50 is not subject to the laws of onan,51 nor may she defile herself for him;52 if she dies he is not her heir,53 but if he dies she collects her kethubah.54 Now the reason [why she collects her kethubah is] because it was he who died; had she, however, died she would not have been entitled to any kethubah.55 What is the reason?56 - R. Hoshaia replied: Because one cannot apply to her: 'If you will be married to another man you will receive what is prescribed for you'.57 When Rabin came58 he stated in the name of Resh Lakish: If a betrothed woman died, she is not entitled to a kethubah. Said Abaye to them:59 Go and tell him:
(1) שיננא (rt. שנן 'to sharpen'); (i) 'keen witted', (ii) 'man of iron endurance', (iii) 'long toothed' (cf. שן 'tooth') V. B.B. Sonc. ed. vol. II, p. 561, n. 14.
(2) Lit., 'be not among'.
(3) From persons who are legally entitled to be heirs.
(4) Though the son himself is wicked his children may be righteous.
(5) By giving his daughter a dowry he deprives his sons from a portion of their inheritance. (Cf. supra p. 307, n. 2).
(6) Allowing one's daughter a dowry.
(7) Supra 52b.
(8) Lit., 'from his (own) mind'.
(9) The father of the bride would be ashamed to offer a small dowry in the presence of a distinguished guest.
(10) While R. Papa was discussing the amount of the dowry with the bride's father.
(11) Judah b. Meremar who looked on in silence.
(12) At the smallness of the dowry he was offering.
(13) Lit., 'wrote it'.
(14) Lit., 'if from me'.
(15) Lit., 'that also that you wrote'.
(16) Lit., 'now also'.
(17) הדרנא (rt. הדר 'to return') a retractor.
(18) V. our Mishnah and supra p. 305, n. 15.
(19) Sc. are her sons still entitled to inherit her kethubah as they are entitled to inherit their share in the estate of their father, or do they lose the former right on account of their mother's sale which had transferred her rights to their father from whose estate they can inherit no bigger shares than those to which his other sons are entitled?
(20) Which is a more common occurrence than a sale.
(21) Believing that even in such a case it is possible that the woman irrevocably loses her rights.
(22) V. Golds. who compares עוכלא with Syr. אכלא 'a hammer', and renders עוכלי, 'hammer blows'. Aliter. They inflicted upon her a hundred strokes with a lash to which a small weight named 'ukla was attached (Rashi). Aliter: I may adopt the opinion of him who said, they struck (defeated) that opinion with a hundred measures against one (a hundred arguments against, for one in favour of it). 'Ukla (cf. אוכלא) is a small measure of capacity and also of a weight (Jast.).
(23) Obviously not. If she might lose her rights even when she acted under the stress of circumstances, there can be no question that she loses them when she willingly surrenders them.
(24) Lit.,'it is plain to me'.
(25) For a mere trifle, since, to the buyers the transaction is of a highly speculative and doubtful value. v. infra n. 10.
(26) Who recover it only if she is divorced or if she survives her husband, but lose it completely if she predeceases him and he inherits it.
(27) Not her indifference to the welfare of her sons. On this account, therefore (v. infra n. 1), she does not lose her rights on behalf of her sons.
(28) And, having thereby shewn her complete indifference to the interests of her sons, her surrender is deemed to be final and irrevocable.
(29) Since in both cases she sells it for a mere trifle, the husband's purchase being no less of a speculation than that of strangers (cf. p. 310, nn. 9-10). For should she predecease him, her kethubah would in any case be inherited by him; and the only advantage he might possibly derive from his purchase is the knowledge that his sons would benefit from it if he predeceased his wife. As, in fact, he did not predecease her his purchase fully assumes the same nature as that of strangers, and her male children inherit her kethubah.
(30) Since the kethubah is actually in his possession (which is not the case with strangers) and she consented to sell him all her rights.
(31) A woman whose husband went to a country beyond the sea and who, on being told by one witness that her husband was dead, contracted a marriage, and her first husband subsequently returned.
(32) Yeb. 87b.
(33) Lit. , 'what is its doing?' How could her children submit any claim to her kethubah when she herself, as stated earlier in the Mishnah cited (Yeb. l.c.), is not entitled to one?
(34) Yeb. 91a; sc. if the woman predeceased her two husbands, who in consequence inherited her estate, her children have no claim to her kethubah and receive shares equal to those of their paternal brothers.
(35) Should her children be deprived of the kethubah of their mothers
(36) Since it has been said above that the reason why the woman does not lose her right to the kethubah for her male children is because it was her need that compelled her to sell it.
(37) In the case of the woman who married a second husband on the evidence of one witness.
(38) And this compelled her to marry again. Now since she acted under compulsion her children should not be deprived of her kethubah.
(39) V. p. 311, n. 10.
(40) For marrying again on insufficient evidence (that of one witness) before instituting further inquiries to verify his evidence.
(41) During her widowhood. As she surrendered her kethubah she surrendered thereby all her rights, including that of maintenance, that are contained therein.
(42) R. Hisda.
(43) Prov. XVII, 13.
(44) Before her marriage.
(45) [The reference is to the statutory amount of the kethubah, these Rabbis being of the opinion that the husband has been allowed to retain the kethubah of his deceased wife for the expenses he incurred in the burial.]
(46) A Baraitha. Cf. infra p. 313, n. 1.
(47) Before her marriage.
(48) V. Glos. Unlike an onan whose married wife died, he may Partake of holy food.
(49) If he is a priest (cf. Lev. XXI, 1f).
(50) If he died.
(51) She also is permitted to partake of holy food.
(52) During a festival when not only priests but also Israelites and women are forbidden to attend on the corpses of those who are not their near relatives (v. R.H. 16b). Aliter: Nor is she under an obligation to defile herself for him. (Cf. Rashi a.l. and Yeb. 29b. s.v. ולא מיטמאת; and Tosaf. loc. cit. s.v. ולא).
(53) To the dowry her father gave her.
(54) Yeb. 29b, 43b, infra 89b. Both the statutory amount and any additional jointure, if he provided her with a kethubah on betrothal (cf. infra 89b.
(55) Contrary to the ruling supra that the man must either bury his betrothed wife or pay to her account the amount of her kethubah.
(56) For the man's exemption from the duty of burying his wife despite the statutory amount of her kethubah which he inherits.
(57) This is one of the clauses of a kethubah (v. Yeb. 117a). Since this clause can obviously have no effect except when a husband predeceases his wife or when she is divorced by him, the kethubah cannot be regarded as the wife's property whenever she predeceases her husband, and he, consequently, cannot be regarded as inheriting it from her. [As to the teaching supra 47b that the husband inherits the kethubah in return for her burial, the reference is to the dowry, v. supra p. 272, n. 7 and cf. p. 312, n. 8.
(58) From Palestine to Babylon.
(59) Those present at the college.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 53b
'You are deprived of your benefaction;1 it is cast upon the thorns',2 for R. Hoshaia has already expounded his traditional teachings3 in Babylon.4 THE FEMALE CHILDREN THAT WILL BE BORN FROM OUR MARRIAGE etc. Rab5 taught: Until they shall be taken in marriage;6 but Levi taught: Until they shall attain adolescence.7 [Would daughters then be maintained] according to Rab although they attained adolescence, and according8 to Levi even though they married?9 - The fact, however, [is that where a daughter] attained adolescence though she was not married or where she was married though she did not attain adolescence no one10 disputes [the ruling that she is not entitled to maintenance]. They11 differ only on the question of a [daughter who was] betrothed but did not attain adolescence.12 So also did Levi teach in his Baraitha:13 Until they shall attain adolescence and the time for their marriages arrives. Both?14 - What was meant is this:15 Either they shall attain adolescence or16 the time for their marriage17 shall arrive. [They18 differ on the same principles] as the following Tannaim: How long is a daughter to be maintained? Until she is betrothed. In the name of R. Eleazar it was stated: Until she attains adolescence. R. Joseph learnt: [Daughters must be maintained] until they become [wives]. The question was raised: Does this19 mean becoming [wives] at marriage or becoming [wives] at betrothal? - The question must stand unanswered.20 Said R. Hisda to R. Joseph: Did you ever hear from Rab Judah whether a betrothed [orphan] is entitled to maintenance21 or not?22 The other replied: I have not actually heard it, but it may logically be concluded that she is not entitled, because [her future husband], having betrothed her, would not allow23 her to be degraded.24 'If you have not actually heard this', [R. Hisda] retorted 'it may logically be concluded that she is entitled, for [her intended husband], not being sure of her,25 would not throw his money away for nothing'.26 Another reading:27 He28 replied: I have not actually heard it, but it may logically be concluded that she is entitled [to maintenance]; for [her intended husband], not being sure of her, would not throw his money away for nothing. The other29 retorted: If you have not actually heard this it may logically be concluded that she is not entitled to maintenance; because [her future husband], having betrothed her, would not allow her to be degraded. (Mnemonic of the men:30 SHak Zarap.31 [Subjects:] She refused and a sister-in-law of the second degree is betrothed and he outraged her.) R. Shesheth was asked: Is a minor who exercised her right of refusal32 entitled to maintenance33 or not?34 - You, replied R. Shesheth, have learned this: A widow35 in her father's house, a divorced woman35 in her father's house or a woman35 who was awaiting the decision of a levir36 in her father's house is entitled to maintenance. R. Judah ruled: [Only a woman who] is still in her father's house is entitled to maintenance but [a woman who] is no longer in her father's house is not entitled to maintenance. [Now is not] R. Judah's ruling exactly the same as that of the first Tanna?37 Consequently it may be concluded that38 the difference between them is the case of a minor who had exercised her right of refusal,39 the first Tanna being of the opinion that she is entitled [to maintenance]40 while R. Judah upholds the view that she is not entitled to it.41 Resh Lakish enquired: Is the daughter of a sister-in-law42 entitled to maintenance43 or not? Has she no claim to it, since the Master said,44 Her kethubah is a charge on the estate of her first husband45 or is it possible that she is entitled to it since the Rabbis have enacted that whenever she46 is unable to collect her kethubah from [the estate of] the first, she may recover it from that of the second?47 - The question must remain unanswered.48 R. Eleazar enquired: Is the daughter of a forbidden relative of the second degree of incest49 entitled to maintenance50 or not?
(1) Or 'recognition' (v. Rashi).
(2) שקילא טיבותך שדיא אהיזרי, a proverb. The information whereby he intended to benefit the students was of no use to them. Aliter: Your good-natured information is taken and thrown over the hedge (slight adaptation from fast.). Aliter: Take your favours and throw them in the bush, v. B.M. Sonc. ed. p. 377.
(3) Which included the one reported by Rabin.
(4) They were in no need, therefore, to wait for the Palestinian report of Rabin.
(5) In dealing with this clause in the kethubah.
(6) Lit., 'to men'. Cf. our Mishnah which agrees with Rab's ruling.
(7) V. Glos. s.v. bogereth.
(8) So MS.M. Fur. edd., 'and Levi'.
(9) Surely not; since either of these conditions liberates a daughter from her father's control and she must in consequence lose her claim to maintenance (cf. infra 68b).
(10) Lit., 'all the world'. V. infra n. 2.
(11) Rab and Levi.
(12) According to Rab she is maintained only until betrothal though by that time she may still be under age, and according to Levi, either adolescence or marriage deprives her of her rights to maintenance.
(13) Levi, like R. Hiyya and R. Oshaia, was the compiler of six orders of Baraithoth corresponding to the six orders of the Mishnah compiled by R. Judah the Patriarch.
(14) Cf. p. 313, n. 14.
(15) Lit., 'but'.
(16) The 'Waw' in וימטי may be rendered, 'and' as well as 'or'.
(17) A period of twelve months from the time her intended husband had claimed her, in the case of a virgin, and one of thirty days in the case of a widow (v. Mishnah infra 57a).
(18) Rab and Levi.
(19) The expression 'become (wives)' in R. Joseph's statement.
(20) Teku, v. Glos.
(21) By her brothers, out of their deceased father's estate.
(22) [He wished to know according to which of the two Tannaim, whose views have just been cited, was the law to be fixed (Tosaf.)]
(23) Lit., 'it would not be pleasing to him'.
(24) As the maintenance of an orphan daughter by her brothers was ordained in order to prevent her degradation (v. supra 49a) it cannot be enforced in this case where no degradation is to be expected.
(25) A betrothal does not always lead to marriage.
(26) As he would not maintain her, the duty (for the reason stated supra p. 314, n. 15) devolves upon her brothers.
(27) Reversing the respective views of R. Joseph and R. Hisda.
(28) R. Joseph.
(29) R. Hisda.
(30) Who raised the following questions.
(31) SHesheth, Lakish, Elazar, Baba, Papa.
(32) V. Glos. s.v. mi'un.
(33) By her brothers, out of their deceased father's estate.
(34) The point of the question is whether (a) the declaration of refusal to live with her husband dissolved her marriage retrospectively and she resumes in consequence the status of one who was never married and is, therefore, entitled to maintenance until she reaches her adolescence; or (b) since her marriage had once removed her from her father's control, in consequence of which she has lost her right to maintenance, her subsequent declaration of refusal cannot again restore to her the right she had once lost.
(35) Who had been only betrothed but had never married.
(36) Shomereth yabam. v. Glos.
(37) Who also spoke only of a woman 'in her father's house'. Wherein, then, do they differ?
(38) Lit., 'what, not?'
(39) V. Glos. s.v. mi'un.
(40) Cf. p. 315, n. 10. By mentioning a 'widow (cf. supra n. 11) in her father's house' the first Tanna meant to include also the minor who exercised her right of refusal who is thereby restored to the status of one who had never been married and had always been 'in her father's house'.
(41) V. supra p. 315. n. 10. He ruled, 'who is still in her father's house', sc. who has never left it to be married, is entitled to maintenance; not, however, one who had once been married though that marriage bad taken place during minority.
(42) Whom the levir married in fulfilment of the law of the levirate marriage (v. Deut. XXV, 5).
(43) By her brothers, out of their deceased father's estate.
(44) Yeb. 85a.
(45) This refers to the sister-in-law. That is to say the mother of the daughter in question. As her kethubah cannot be made a charge upon the estate of her second husband (her original brother-in-law), so cannot the maintenance of her daughter, which is one of the obligations undertaken in the same document.
(46) The sister-in-law.
(47) Cf. supra n. 8 mutatis mutandis.
(48) Teku, v. Glos.
(49) V. Yeb. 20a, 213.
(50) Out of the estate of her deceased father.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 54a
Has she no claim to maintenance1 since [her mother] is not entitled to a kethubah, or is it likely that the Rabbis have imposed a penalty only upon her mother who had committed a transgression but not upon her who had committed no transgression? - This remains unanswered. Raba asked: Is the daughter of a betrothed wife entitled to maintenance2 or not? Is she entitled to maintenance3 since [her mother] is entitled to a kethubah4 or is it possible that she is not entitled [to maintenance],3 since the Rabbis have not ordained [the writing of] the kethubah until the time of the marriage?5 - The question must stand unanswered. R. Papa asked: Is the daughter of an outraged woman6 entitled to maintenance2 or not? According to the ruling of R. Jose the son of R. Judah, who has laid down7 that [her mother] is entitled to recover8 a kethubah for one maneh,9 the question does not arise.10 It arises only according to the ruling of the Rabbis who have laid down that the fine11 is regarded as a quittance for her kethubah. What, [it may be asked, is the decision]?12 Has she no claim to maintenance13 since [her mother] is not entitled to a kethubah,14 or might it possibly [be argued thus:] What is the reason why a kethubah [has been instituted for a wife]? In order that the man might not find it easy15 to divorce her;16 but [this man],17 surely, cannot18 divorce her?19 - This must stand unanswered. YOU SHALL DWELL IN MY HOUSE etc. R. Joseph learnt: IN MY HOUSE20 but not in my hovel.21 She is entitled, however, to maintenance.22 Mar son of R. Ashi ruled: She is not entitled even to maintenance.23 The law, however, is not in agreement with Mar son of R. Ashi. R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: If marriage was proposed to her24 and she accepted, she is no longer entitled to maintenance.25 [This is to imply that] if she did not accept,26 she would not be entitled to maintenance! - R. Anan replied: This was explained to me by Mar Samuel: If she said, '[l cannot accept the proposal] out of respect for the memory of27 So-and-so, my husband', she is entitled to maintenance; [but if she said], 'Because the men are not suitable for me,' she is not entitled to maintenance.28 R. Hisda ruled: If she29 played the harlot she is not entitled to maintenance. R. Joseph ruled: If she painted her eyes30 or dyed her hair31 she is not entitled to maintenance.32 He who ruled: 'If she played the harlot'33 would even more so deprive her of maintenance if she paints her eyes or dyes her hair. He, however, who ruled: 'If she painted her eyes or dyed her hair'33 would allow her maintenance34 if she played the harlot. What is the reason? - Her passions have overpowered her. The law, however, is not in agreement with any of these reported rulings but with that which Rab Judah laid down in the name of Samuel: She35 who claims her kethubah at court is not entitled to maintenance. But is she not entitled? Surely it was taught: If she sold her kethubah, pledged it, or mortgaged [the land that was pledged36 for] her kethubah to a stranger, she is not entitled to maintenance. [Does not this imply] that only such37 [acts deprive a widow of her maintenance] but not [the act of] claiming [her kethubah at court]? - These [acts38 deprive her of her maintenance] whether she appeared at court or not, but the act of claiming [her kethubah deprives her of maintenance] only if she appeared39 in court but does not [deprive her of it] if she did not appear at court. SO DID THE MEN OF JERUSALEM etc. It was stated: Rab ruled, 'The halachah is in agreement with [the practice of] the MEN OF JUDAEA', but Samuel ruled, 'The halachah agrees with [the practice of] the MEN OF GALILEE'. Babylon40 and all its neighbouring towns41 followed a usage in agreement with the ruling of Rab; Nehardea42 and all its neighbouring towns41 followed a usage agreeing with the ruling of Samuel. A woman of Mahuza43 was once married to [a man of] Nehardea. When they came to R. Nahman,44 and he observed from her voice that she was a native of Mahuza, he said to them, '[The decision must be in agreement with Rab, for] Babylon and all its neighbouring towns have adopted a usage in agreement with the ruling of Rab'. When, however, they pointed out to him, 'But, surely, she is married to [a man of] Nehardea,' he said to them, 'If that is the case, [the decision will be in agreement with Samuel for] Nehardea and all its neighbouring towns followed a usage agreeing with the ruling of Samuel. How far does [the usage of] Nehardea extend? - As far afield as the Nehardean kab45 is in use.46 It was stated: [When a kethubah is being paid to] a widow, said Rab, assessment is made of what she wears,47 but Samuel said: That which she wears is not assessed. Said R. Hiyya b. Abin: [Their opinions48 are] reversed49 in the case off retainer.50 R. Kahana taught: And so51 [are their opinions]48 in the case of a retainer;50 and [Rab] had laid down this mnemonic, 'Strip the widow and the orphan52 and go out'. R. Nahman said: Although we have learned in a Mishnah in agreement with the view of Samuel53 the law is in agreement with that of Rab. For we learned: Whether a man has consecrated his estate, or whether he has consecrated the valuation of himself54 [the Temple treasurer]55 has no claim either upon the clothes of that man's wife,56 or upon the clothes of his children, or the coloured articles that were dyed for them,57 or any new sandals that [their father] may have bought57 for them.58 Said Raba to R. Nahman: Since, however, we have learned in a Mishnah in agreement with the view of Samuel, why does the law agree with that of Rab? The other replied: At first sight it might appear59 to run parallel to the principle of Samuel, but if you examine it carefully [you will find that] the law, in fact, must be in agreement with [the view of] Rab. For this60 is the reason:61 When he62 bought63 [the clothes] for her [he did so] on the assumption that she would live with him.64 He did not, however, buy63 them for her on the assumption that she should take them65 and depart.66 A daughter-in-law of the house of Bar Eliashib was claiming her kethubah from orphans. When she summoned them to court and they said, 'It is degrading for us that you should come with us in such [clothes]', she went home and dressed and wrapped herself in all her garments. When they came before Rabina he told them: The law is in agreement with the ruling of Rab who laid down [that when a kethubah is being paid to] a widow, assessment is made of what she wears. A man67 once said, 'Let a bride's outfit68 be provided for my daughter', and the price of an outfit was subsequently reduced. 'The benefit',69 ruled R. Idi b. Abin, 'belongs to the orphans'.70 A man67 once said,
(1) Which is only one of the obligations a man undertakes in the kethubah he gives to his wife.
(2) Out of her deceased father's estate if he had sons from another wife.
(3) V. supra p. 316, n. 13.
(4) If her father had written one for her on betrothal. As he is responsible for the kethubah of his wife so should he be responsible for the maintenance of his daughter (v. supra p. 316, n. 13).
(5) As the obligation of the kethubah does not begin before marriage, that of maintenance also does not begin earlier.
(6) Whom the offender has subsequently married (v. Deut. XXII, 28f).
(7) Supra 39b.
(8) Out of the man's estate, though he had already paid to her father the fine prescribed in Deut. XXII, 29. v. supra 39b.
(9) V. Glos.
(10) As the kethubah is recoverable from the man's estate so is the daughter's maintenance (v. supra p. 316, n. 13).
(11) That is paid to her father (Deut. XXII, 29).
(12) As regards the daughter's maintenance.
(13) V. supra p. 316, n. 13).
(14) As the kethubah cannot be recovered so cannot the daughter's maintenance.
(15) Lit., 'that she shall not be easy in his eyes'.
(16) He cannot easily divorce her if his act involves him in the payment of the amount specified in the kethubah.
(17) Who committed outrage.
(18) V. Deut. XXII, 29.
(19) Hence the ruling that the woman is not entitled to a kethubah. As this argument, however, does not apply to her daughter the latter may well be entitled to maintenance.
(20) Sc. only if the deceased left a proper house must his sons provide living accommodation for his widow. (Cf. however, fast. infra n. 20.)
(21) בביקתי M.S.M בי עקתא=ביקתא .בבית עקתי (v. Shab. 77b), 'a house of distress', 'a poor man's house' (Rashi). If the house is too small the orphans may ask her to live elsewhere. Aliter. בקעתא=ביקתא, 'valley', 'group of fields', estate'; the widow 'must be 'content to live in her late husband's house with his heirs, hut she cannot claim a separate residence' (Jast.).
(22) Though she is in residence in her paternal home, she does not forfeit her claim to maintenance from her late husband's estate. Though the first part of the clause of her kethubah, DWELL IN MY HOUSE, is not carried out, the second part, BE MAINTAINED OUT OF MY ESTATE, nevertheless remains valid.
(23) As one part of the clause is inapplicable the other part also becomes void.
(24) The widow.
(25) Her WIDOWHOOD is deemed to have terminated thereby, and in consequence she loses the rights attached to it.
(26) Whatever the reason.
(27) Lit., 'on account of'.
(28) The heirs cannot be compelled to continue her maintenance once she has had an offer from a man who is willing to provide for her.
(29) The widow.
(30) Rt. כחל, (denom. of כוחל, stibium, a powder applied to the eyelids), 'to paint the eyelids', cosmetically or medically (v. Jast.).
(31) Rt. פרכם (denom. of פיקם with inserted ר 'to adorn with paint or dye' (v. Levy). Jast. derives it from פרך, 'to rub', 'to rub with paint' (s.v. פרכם); 'dyeing the hair' (Jast. s.v. פירכום).
(32) Since it is apparent that she is not much concerned for the memory of her late husband.
(33) 'She is not entitled to maintenance'.
(34) Lit., 'she has'.
(35) The widow.
(36) V. Rashi.
(37) Lit., 'these, yes'.
(38) Whereby the widow actually recovers her kethubah.
(39) Lit., 'yes'.
(40) [Stands here for Sura which was in the neighbourhood of the old great city of Babylon, v. Git. Sonc. ed. p. 17, n. 3.]
(41) So Rashi, 'her dependencies', sc. places following her usages (Jast.); 'seine Nachbarorte' (Golds).
(42) V. supra p. 222. n. 8.
(43) A Jewish trading centre. One of the 'neighbouring towns' or 'dependencies' of Babylon.
(44) In connection with a dispute concerning the fulfilment of the terms of the kethubah (v. the final clauses of our Mishnah).
(45) V. Glos. Here a term for a dry measure in general, not the specific kab (Obermeyer p. 242).
(46) Lit., 'spreads'.
(47) Sc. the value of her clothes is deducted from the amount of her kethubah.
(48) Those of Rab and Samuel.
(49) Samuel ruling that the value of clothes is, and Rab maintaining that it is not to be deducted from the man's wages.
(50) Or 'client' (v. Jast.), when he leaves the employ of his master who, during the period of his service, had been supplying him with his clothes. לקיט (rt. לקט 'to gather') 'gleaner', 'field labourer'.
(51) As in the case of a widow.
(52) Sc. the retainer or client.
(53) Viz. that a wife's clothes are the property of her husband.
(54) V. Lev. XXVII, 1ff.
(55) Who comes to collect such offerings.
(56) Cf. supra note 9.
(57) Though they have not yet used them (cf. Rashi). This shews that the raiments are the property of the wife.
(58) 'Ar. 24a, B.K. 102b.
(59) לכאורה adv., Lamed and Kaf. prefixed to the noun אורה, 'light'.
(60) Lit., 'what'.
(61) Why the Temple treasurer has no claim upon a wife's clothes though their value is rightly to be deducted from the amount she is paid in settlement of her kethubah.
(62) The husband.
(63) Or, 'transferred possession'.
(64) Consequently, so long as she lives with him, they are her absolute property and no one can take them away from her. Hence the ruling of the Mishnah of 'Ar. that the Temple treasurer cannot claim them.
(65) When he died.
(66) Hence the ruling of Rab that their value is to be deducted from her kethubah.
(67) On his death bed. The instructions of a person in such a condition have the force of a legally written document.
(68) The cost of which was well known, all brides being similarly provided for (Rashi).
(69) פורנא (rt. פרן 'to cut', hence 'to endow') 'endowment', hence 'good luck' (v. fast.); 'surplus' (Colds.).
(70) It is their duty to provide the outfit, and since they can obtain it at a reduced price the balance is theirs.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 54b
'Four hundred zuz1 [of the value of this] wine shall be given to my daughter', and the price of wine rose. 'The profit', ruled R. Joseph, 'belongs to the orphans'.2 Relatives of R. Johanan had [the responsibility of maintaining their] father's wife who was in the habit of consuming much3 food. When4 they came to R. Johanan she told them, 'Go and ask your father that he should assign a plot of land for her maintenance'.5 When they subsequently came before Resh Lakish, he said to them, '[By such an assignment] he has increased all the more [the allowance for] her maintenance'.6 'But', they said to him, 'R. Johanan did not say so?' - 'Go',he told them, 'and give her [proper maintenance], otherwise7 I shall pull R. Johanan out of your ears'. R. Johanan, when they came to him again, said to them, 'What can I do when one of equal standing8 differs from me?' R. Abbahu stated: This was explained to me by R. Johanan: [If the husband] said,9 'towards maintenance' he has thereby increased [the allowance for] her maintenance;10 but if he said,9 'for maintenance' he has thereby limited the allowance for her maintenance.11
MISHNAH. ALTHOUGH [THE SAGES] HAVE ENACTED THAT A VIRGIN COLLECTS12 TWO HUNDRED ZUZ13 AND A WIDOW ONE MANEH,13 IF HE [THE HUSBAND] WISHES TO ADD, EVEN A HUNDRED MANEH, HE MAY DO SO. [A WOMAN] WHO WAS WIDOWED OR DIVORCED, EITHER AFTER BETROTHAL OR AFTER MARRIAGE, IS ENTITLED TO COLLECT ALL [THAT IS DUE TO HER].14 R. ELEAZAR B. AZARIAH RULED: [ONLY A WOMAN WIDOWED] AFTER HER MARRIAGE RECEIVES ALL [THAT IS DUE TO HER], BUT IF AFTER A BETROTHAL, A VIRGIN RECOVERS ONLY TWO HUNDRED ZUZ13 AND A WIDOW ONLY ONE MANEH,13 FOR THE MAN PROMISED15 HER [THE ADDITIONAL JOINTURE] WITH THE SOLE OBJECT OF MARRYING HER.16 R. JUDAH RULED: IF [A HUSBAND] WISHES HE MAY WRITE OUT FOR A VIRGIN12 A DEED FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ AND SHE WRITES [A QUITTANCE],17 'I HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU A MANEH', AND FOR A WIDOW [HE MAY WRITE OUT A DEED FOR] A MANEH AND SHE WRITES [A QUITTANCE]. 'I HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU FIFTY ZUZ'. R. MEIR RULED: [THE INTERCOURSE OF] ANY MAN WHO UNDERTAKES TO GIVE A VIRGIN LESS THAN TWO HUNDRED ZUZ13 OR A WIDOW LESS THAN A MANEH13 IS18 AN ACT OF PROSTITUTION.
GEMARA. [Is not this]19 obvious? - It might have been presumed that the Rabbis have fixed a limit in order that the man who has no means might not be put to shame; hence we were taught [that there was no limit]. IF HE WISHES TO ADD etc. It was not stated, 'If he wishes to write',20 but 'WISHES TO ADD'.21 This then provides support for [a ruling which] R. Aibu stated in the name of R. Jannai. For R. Aibu stated in the name of R. Jannai: The supplementary provisions22 [that are included] in a kethubah are subject to the same regulations as the statutory kethubah.23 [In what respect] can this24 matter?25 - In respect of a woman who sells or surrenders [her kethubah],26 or one who rebels,27 one who impairs,28 or claims [her kethubah],29 or one who transgresses the Law;30
(1) V. Glos.
(2) Since the bequest was not a quantity of wine but a specified sum of money.
(3) Lit., 'spoilt', or 'caused to diminish, (Af. of פסד).
(4) During their father's lifetime. He was on the point of dying and disposing of his property (cf. p. 322, n. i). (15) To consult him as to how they could reduce their liability.
(5) So that the liability of the heirs would thereby be limited to the value of that plot of land only. Such an assignment, of course, is valid only if it was made on one's death bed and is subject in addition to the woman s consent (V. Pe'ah, III, 7 and Rashi a.l.). The efficacy of R. Johanan's advice being dependent on the consent of the woman explains also why R. Johanan, despite his regrets for giving advice to relatives (supra 52b), proceeded to advise them again (v. Tosaf. a.l. s.v. דנײהד). In the other case his advice was effective despite the woman's wish.
(6) His assignment of the land cannot deprive the widow of her right to proper maintenance, and can only be regarded as the provision of an additional source of income from which she might draw in case the maintenance the heirs provided was not on a liberal scale.
(7) Lit., 'and if not'.
(8) Lit., 'who is corresponding to me'.
(9) When he assigned a particular plot of land for his wife's maintenance.
(10) 'Towards' implying an addition to what is already due to her.
(11) 'For maintenance' implying 'in return' or compensation for the maintenance to which she is entitled.
(12) As her statutory kethubah.
(13) V. Glos.
(14) Sc. her statutory kethubah as well as any additional jointure her husband may have settled upon her.
(15) Lit., 'wrote'.
(16) And since he died before marrying her she can have no claim to it.
(17) Though she has received nothing.
(18) Lit., 'behold this'.
(19) That A HUSBAND MAY ADD, IF HE WISHES etc.
(20) Which might have implied a mere gift.
(21) Sc. to the kethubah, implying that the additional jointure assumes the same designation as the statutory kethubah itself.
(22) Such as additional jointure, maintenance, or any other of the terms mentioned in the previous chapter.
(23) Infra 104b.
(24) The treatment of the additional jointure as the statutory kethuhah.
(25) Lit., 'it goes out (results) from it'.
(26) By such an act she sells her additional jointure as well as her statutory kethubah though only 'kethubah' was mentioned when the transaction took place.
(27) Against her husband, by refusing conjugal rights or work (v. infra 63a). If, in consequence, reductions are made from her kethubah (v. loc. cit.) her additional jointure, like her statutory kethubah, is subject to these deductions.
(28) By admitting that she had already been paid a part of her kethubah (infra 87a). In such a case she cannot recover the balance of the additional jointure even though that part of the kethubah had been left unimpaired. (v. Tosaf. s.v. ולפוגמת).
(29) V. supra 54a. As she loses her maintenance by claiming her statutory kethubah so she loses it by claiming only her additional jointures (Rashi).
(30) A woman who transgresses the Mosaic law or traditional Jewish practice may be divorced without receiving her kethuhah (infra 72a). This applies to her additional jointure also.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 55a
in respect of amelioration,1 an oath,2 and the Sabbatical year,3 in respect of him who assigned all his property to his sons,4 or the recovery of payment out of real estate and from the worst part of it,5 also in respect of [the law of a widow] while in her father's house,6 and of the kethubah for male children.7 It was stated: The kethubah for the male children,8 [the scholars of] Pumbeditha9 ruled, may not be collected from sold or mortgaged property,10 for we have learned,8 'They shall inherit';11 and the scholars of12 Matha Mehasia13 ruled: It may be collected from sold or mortgaged property, for we have learned,8 'They shall take'.14 The law, however, is that it may not be collected from sold or mortgaged property, since we have learned ,8 'They shall inherit'.11 Movables15 which are available16 [may be collected]17 without an oath;18 but if they are not available,19 [the kethubah may, the scholars of] Pumbeditha ruled, [be collected]20 without an oath18 and the scholars21 of Matha Mehasia ruled: Only with an oath. The law [is that they may be collected] without an oath. If [her husband] has set aside for her a plot of land [defining it] by its four boundaries22 [she23 may collect from it] without an oath;24 but if [he only defined it] by one boundary, [the scholars of] Pumbeditha ruled [that collection25 may be made from it] without an oath,24 but the scholars of Matha Mehasia ruled: Only with an oath.26 The law, however, is that collection25 may be effected without an oath.22 If a man said to witnesses, 'Write out [a deed],27 sign it and give it to a certain person',28 and they took from him symbolic possession there is no need29 to consult him.30 [If, however,] no symbolic possession was taken, [the scholars of] Pumbeditha ruled, there is no need29 to consult him,30 but the scholars of Matha Mehasia ruled: It is necessary to consult him. The law is that it is necessary to consult him. R. ELEAZAR B. AZARIAH etc. It was stated: Rab and R. Nathan [differed]. One maintained that the halachah was in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah and the other maintained that the halachah was not in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah. You may conclude that it was R. Nathan who maintained that the halachah was in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah31 since R. Nathan was heard [elsewhere] to follow [the rule of] assumption,32 he33 having stated that the halachah was in agreement with R. Simeon Shezuri in the case of a man dangerously ill34
(1) Of the estate of the husband after his death. As the statutory kethubah cannot be recovered from such amelioration (v. Bek. 5lb) so cannot the additional jointure either.
(2) A woman must take an oath in respect of her additional jointure in all cases where she takes an oath in respect of her statutory kethubah (infra 87a).
(3) In which all debts must be released (v. Deut. XV. Iff) but not the obligation of a kethubah (v. Git. 48b). The exemption applies to both the statutory kethubah and the additional jointure.
(4) And left any fraction of land for his wife. Thereby she loses her kethubah (v. B.B. 132a) and her additional jointure also.
(5) These restriction apply to the additional jointure as well as to the statutory kethubah (v. Git. 48b).
(6) She may claim her kethubah within twenty-five years only (v. infra 104a). This applies also to her additional jointure. There is no time limit in the case of a widow who lives in her late husband's house.
(7) The children are entitled to their mother's additional jointure just as they are entitled to her statutory kethubah and to the dowry, which her father gave to her husband on the occasion of their marriage, and which also forms a part of the kethubah obligations of a husband.
(8) V. Mishnah supra 52b.
(9) פומבדיתא (lit., 'mouth of Beditha', one of the canals of the Euphrates), was a Babylonian town famous as a Jewish centre of learning.
(10) Of the widow's late husband.
(11) One inherits free assets only.
(12) Lit., 'sons of'.
(13) מתא מחסיא is a suburb of Sura in Babylonia.
(14) Instead of they shall inherit'. This implies that the children are entitled to the kethubah as a gift made to them by their father at the time of his marriage with the right to seize his property wherever it may be found.
(15) Pledged by a husband for the kethubah of his wife.
(16) At the time of the man's death.
(17) By the widow who, in other circumstances, is required to take an oath to the effect that her late husband had not given her some money or objects of value as a security for her kethubah.
(18) Since it is definitely known what objects of value had been set aside for her kethuhah there is no reason to suspect that any other objects or money also had been secretly deposited with her.
(19) If, e.g., they were lost.
(20) From the landed property of the deceased, since all of it is legally pledged for the kethubah of one's wife.
(21) Lit., 'sons'.
(22) As a special security for her kethubah.
(23) When her husband dies.
(24) Cf. supra p. 325, n. 14, mutatis mutandis.
(25) V. loc. cit. n. 13.
(26) As only one of the four boundaries had been indicated the plot of land cannot be regarded as a definite security, and the suspicion may be entertained that her husband may have given her some private deposit as a security for her kethubah (cf. supra p. 325, n. 13).
(27) E.g., of a gift of land.
(28) Lit., 'to him'.
(29) Before the deed is written
(30) Whether his instructions were seriously meant or whether he has not since changed his mind (cf. Rashi). According to some authorities the consultation relates to the question of entering a clause pledging the donor's property (cf. Tosaf. s.v. כתובו).
(31) Whose opinion in our Mishnah is based on the assumption that THE MAN PROMISED . . . WITH THE SOLE OBJECT etc.
(32) Wherever a man did not specify his intention or motive.
(33) Cur. edd. read 'R. Nathan'. In Hul. 75b the reading is 'R. Jonathan', and in Men. 30b 'R. Johanan'.
(34) Who gave instructions for a letter of divorce to be written for his wife. The document may be delivered to the woman, even though its delivery was not mentioned in the instructions, because it is assumed that the dying man intended it for this purpose (v. Git. 65b).
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 55b
and in that of terumah1 of the tithe of demai2 produce.3 But does not Rab, however, follow [the rule of] assumption? Surely it was stated: As to the gift of a dying man4 [in the deed of] which was recorded [symbolic] acquisition, the school of Rab in the name of Rab reported [that the testator] has [thereby] made him5 ride on two harnessed horses;6 but Samuel said: I do not know what decision to give on the matter. 'The school of Rab in the name of Rab reported [that the testator] has [thereby] made him ride on two harnessed horses', for it is like the gift of a man in good health,7 and it is also like the gift of a dying man.8 'It is like the gift of a man in good health', in that, if he recovered, he cannot retract,7 and 'it is like the gift of a dying man' in that, if he said that his loan9 [shall be given] to X, his loan [is to he given] to X.10 'But Samuel said: I do not know what decision to give on the matter', since it is possible that he11 decided not to transfer possession to him12 except through the deed,13 and no [possession by means of a] deed [may be acquired] after [the testator's] death!14
(1) V. Glos.
(2) V. Glos.
(3) V. Dem. IV, 1. In this as in the previous case the rule of assumption is followed. Cf. p. 326, n. 10.
(4) Who distributed all his estate. V. B.B. Sonc. ed. p. 658. n. 2. The verbal assignment of a dying man is valid and requires no deed or formal acquisition.
(5) The recipient.
(6) I.e., his claim has a double force: That of the gift of a dying man and that of legal acquisition. רכשי, pl. of ריכשא 'a harnessed or galloping horse'.
(7) Owing to the symbolic acquisition that took place.
(8) Cf. supra note 3.
(9) Lit., 'my loan', a debt which someone owes him.
(10) Although the money was not at that time in his possession and the gift was not made in the presence of the three parties concerned (v. B.B. 144a).
(11) By the unnecessary symbolic acquisition. V. infra n. 12.
(12) The donee.
(13) Not merely by virtue of the legal validity of his instructions (v. supra note 3).
(14) Hence it was difficult for Samuel to give a decision on the matter (v. B.B. Sonc. ed. p. 658, n. 11). As Rab, however, definitely ruled in favour of the donee on the assumption that the donor 'made him ride on two harnessed horses', it follows that Rab is guided by the rule of assumption. How then could it be implied supra that it was Rab who held that the halachah was not in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah!.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 56a
- The fact, however, is that both1 follow [the rule of] assumption; and he who stated that the halachah [was so]2 was well justified, [while in respect of] him who stated that the halachah was not [so],3 [it may be explained that] here4 also [the ruling is based on] an assumption, that the man's object5 [it is assumed] was the formation of a mutual attachment,6 and such attachment has indeed been formed.7 R. Hanina8 once sat in the presence of R. Jannai when he stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah. [The Master] said to him, 'Go Out' read your Biblical verses outside;9 the halachah is not in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah'. R. Isaac b. Abdimi stated in the name of our Master:10 The halachah is in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah. R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah. R. Nahman in his own name, however, stated that the halachah was not in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah, while the Nehardeans stated in the name of R. Nahman that the halachah was in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah. And though R. Nahman uttered a curse, proclaiming, 'Such and such a fate shall befall every judge who gives a ruling in agreement with the opinion of R. Eleazar b. Azariah', the halachah is nevertheless in agreement with R. Eleazar b.Azariah. And the halachah in practice is In accordance with the Opinion of R. Eleazar b. Azariah. Rabin enquired: What is the law11 where the bride only entered the bridal chamber but there was no intercourse? Is the kinyan12 effected by the affectionate attachment in the bridal chamber13 or is the kinyan effected by the affectionate attachment of the intercourse?14 - Come and hear what R. Joseph learnt: 'Because he assigned15 it to her only on account of the affectionate attachment of the first night'. Now, if you grant that it is the affectionate attachment in the bridal chamber that effects the kinyan it was correct for him to state 'the first night'. If, however, you contend that it is the affectionate attachment of the intercourse that effects the kinyan, does this [it may be objected, first] take place on the first night only and not subsequently? - What then [do you suggest]? The [affectionate attachment in the] bridal chamber? Is the bridal chamber [it may be retorted] entered16 in the night only and not in the day time!17 - But according to your argument does intercourse take place at night and not in the day time? Surely Raba stated: If one was in a dark room [intercourse] is permitted!18 - This is no difficulty. He19 may have taught us that it is proper conduct20 that intercourse should be at night; but [if it is maintained that it is the affectionate attachment in the] bridal chamber [that effects the kinyan] the difficulty arises!21 - [The assumption that kinyan is effected in the] bridal chamber also presents no difficulty. Since, usually, the bridal chamber is a prelude to22 intercourse he taught us that it was proper that [it should be entered] at night. R. Ashi enquired: What is the law23 where [a bride] entering the bridal chamber became menstruous?24 If you should find [some reason] for saying that it is the affectionate attachment in the bridal chamber that effects the kinyanl15 [the question still remains whether this applies only to] a bridal chamber that is a prelude25 to intercourse but not to a bridal chamber that is no prelude to intercourse,26 or is there perhaps no difference?27 - This remains unanswered. R. JUDAH SAID: IF [A HUSBAND] WISHES HE MAY WRITE OUT FOR A VIRGIN etc. Does R. Judah hold the opinion that a quittance is written?28 Surely we learned: If a person repaid part of his debt, R. Judah said, he29 must exchange [the bond for another].30 R. Jose said: He31 must write a quittance for him!32 - R. Jeremiah replied: [Here it is a case] where the quittance is [written] within.33 Abaye replied: You may even say [that here it is a case] where the quittance is not written within.34 There35 it is quite correct36 [to disallow the use of a quittance, since the debtor] had undoubtedly repaid him37 and it is possible that the quittance might be lost and that he37 would produce the bond and thus collect [the paid portion of the debt] a second time. Here,38 however, did he indeed give her anything?39 It is a mere statement that she addressed to him.40 If, then, he preserved [the quittance] well and good;41 and if he did not preserve it, well, it is he himself who is the cause of his own loss. One can well understand why Abaye did not give the explanation as R. Jeremiah, since it was not stated42 that the quittance was entered within,43 but why did not R. Jeremiah give the same explanation as Abaye? - The quittance here44 is forbidden as a preventive measure against the [erroneous permitting of] a quittance elsewhere.45 The reason [for the husband's exemption46 is apparently] because she gave him a quittance in writing.47 If, however, [she had surrendered a portion of her kethubah] by word of mouth only [he would] not [have been exempt];48 but why? This,44 surely, is a monetary matter, and R. Judah was heard to rule that in a monetary matter one's stipulation49 is valid. For was it not taught: If a man said to a woman, 'Behold thou art consecrated unto me50 on condition that thou shalt have no [claim] upon me [for] food, raiment or conjugal rights', she is consecrated,51 but the stipulation is null;52 so R. Meir. R. Judah, however, said: In respect of monetary matters his stipulation is valid?53 - R. Judah is of the opinion that the kethubah is a Rabbinical enactment,54 and the Sages55 have applied to their enactments56 higher restrictions than to those of the Torah.57 But what of the case of usufruct58 which is a Rabbinical law and the Rabbis nevertheless did not apply any restriction to it;59 for we learned: R. Judah said, He60 may for all time eat the fruit of the fruit61 unless he wrote out for her [the undertaking], 'I have no claim whatsoever62 upon your estates and their produce and the produce of their produce forever';63
(1) Rah and R. Nathan.
(2) l.e., that it was in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah.
(3) Cf. preceding note, mutatis mutandis.
(4) The statement supra against R. Eleazar b. Azariah.
(5) In promising his bride an additional sum in her kethubah.
(6) Between him and his bride.
(7) Even though no marriage has taken place. The woman is, therefore, entitled to the full sum she had been promised. Hence the statement (which has been ascribed to Rab) against the ruling of R. Eleazar b. Azariah.
(8) Following the reading of Ber. 30b Bah adds 'the Bible teacher'.
(9) [I.e., Go teach the Bible to children instead of venturing into the realms of the halachah. Bible instructions were given in a place 'outside' the academy].
(10) Rab (v. Rashi) or Rabbi, i.e., R. Judah the Patriarch (v. Tosaf. a.l. s.v. אמר). According to Tosaf, the speaker here was the first R. Isaac b. Abdimi who was a disciple of Rabbi (cf. Shab. 4ob) and a teacher of Rab (cf. B.B. 87a and Hul. 110a).
(11) According to R. Eleazar b. Azariah's views in our Mishnah.
(12) V. Glos. The legal and final union that may be regarded as marriage.
(13) Huppah v. Glos. And the bride is consequently entitled to the full amount of the statutory, and the additional kethuhah.
(14) And since this has not taken place the bride can only claim the statutory minimum.
(15) Lit., 'wrote'.
(16) Lit., 'there is'.
(17) Why then did R. Joseph mention 'night'?
(18) In the day time. V. infra 65b, Shab. 86a.
(19) R. Joseph. V. supra n. 5.
(20) Lit., 'the way of the earth'.
(21) V. supra n. 5.
(22) Lit., 'stands for'.
(23) Is the bride entitled to the additional jointure of her kethubah? Cf. supra p. 328, n. 9.
(24) The bridegroom dying before intercourse had taken place. Intercourse with a menstruant is Pentateuchally forbidden. (Cf. Lev. XVIII, 19). (13) Cf. supra p. 328, n. 10.
(25) Lit., 'suitable'.
(26) Cf. p. 329, n. 12. The bride would consequently have no claim upon the additional sum she was promised.
(27) The bride being entitled in either case to the full amount.
(28) By a creditor to whom part of a debt was repaid; and consequently there is no need to exchange the bond for one in which the balance only is entered.
(29) The creditor.
(30) In which only the balance of the original debt is entered while the first bond is destroyed. The debtor cannot be compelled to accept a quittance which he would have 'to guard from mice' and the loss of which might involve him in a claim for the repayment of the full loan. It is more equitable that the creditor should change the bond.
(31) The creditor.
(32) B.B. 170b. Such a course is advantageous to the creditor, since a bond entitles its holder to seize any real estate which the debtor has sold or mortgaged after, but not before the date of his bond. Were a new bond for the balance to be written, the creditor would lose his right to seize any of the debtor's property that was sold or mortgaged between the date of the original bond and that of the new one. In the opinion of R. Jose the rights of the creditor must not be impaired, while in the opinion of R Judah equity demands that the debtor be not encumbered with the necessity of taking care of the quittance (cf. supra n. 6). How then could it be stated here that R. Judah allowed the writing of a quittance?
(33) I.e., is entered on the kethubah itself, so that the husband, unlike the debtor spoken of in B.B., has no need to preserve any document.
(34) Cf. supra n. 9.
(35) The case of the payment of the part of a debt.
(36) For R. Judah.
(37) The creditor.
(38) In our Mishnah.
(39) So MS.M. reading מידי.
(40) She received no money at all from her husband.
(41) Lit., 'he preserved it'.
(42) In our Mishnah.
(43) V. supra p. 330, n. 9.
(44) The case of the kethubah.
(45) A debt, for instance, where R. Judah does not allow it (cf. supra p. 330, n. 6).
(46) From the payment of the part of the kethubah which his wife has surrendered (v. our Mishnah).
(47) Lit., 'she wrote for him'.
(48) Since our Mishnah speaks of writing.
(49) Even though it deprives a person from a right to which he is Pentateuchally entitled.
(50) The formula of marriage used by the bridegroom is, 'Behold thou art consecrated unto me by this ring according to the law of Moses and Israel'.
(51) Becomes his lawful wife.
(52) Since it is contrary to the law of the Torah. Cf Ex. XXI, 10.
(53) B.M 51a, 94a, B.B. 226b
(54) Not Pentateuchal.
(55) Sc. the Rabbis.
(56) In order to prevent laxity.
(57) The laws of the Torah, being universally respected, required no such additional restrictions.
(58) Melog property (v. Glos.) to the fruit of which a husband is entitled during his lifetime while the property itself remains the possession of his wife.
(59) A husband being allowed to surrender his right to the usufruct.
(60) A husband who renounced his claim to the fruit of melog property.
(61) The fruit produced by lands that were purchased out of the proceeds of the fruit of the original property.
(62) Lit., 'judgment and words'.
(63) Infra 83a.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 56b
and it had been established that by 'writing'1 only saying was meant!2 - Abaye replied: All [married women] have a kethubah; not all, however, have fruit. In respect of what is usual the Rabbis have applied restrictions. In respect of what is not usual, however, the Rabbis have made no restrictions. But what of the case of ass-drivers3 which is a common occurrence and the Rabbis have nevertheless applied no restrictions to it; for we learned: Where ass-drivers entered a town and one of them declared, 'My [produce] is new and that of my fellow is old' or 'Mine is not fit for use4 but that of my fellow is fit', they are not believed; but R. Judah said, They are believed!5 - Abaye replied: To any Rabbinical enactment of an absolute character6 the Rabbis have applied further restrictions, but to any Rabbinical enactment of uncertain origin7 the Rabbis have added no further restrictions. Raba replied: They8 relaxed the law in respect of demai.9 R. MElr RULED . . . ANY MAN WHO . . . GIVE . . . LESS etc. The expression, 'WHO . . . GIVE . . . LESS' [implies]10 even [if the assignment remained a mere] stipulation.11 Thus it follows that he12 is of the opinion that the man's stipulation is void and that the woman receives [her full kethubah];13 yet since14 the man had said to her15 'You will have but a maneh',16 her mind is not at ease17 and his intercourse is regarded as an act of prostitution.18 But, surely, R. Meir was heard to rule that any stipulation19 which is contrary to what is written in the Torah is20 null and void, [from which it may be inferred,21 may it not, that if it is] but against a law of the Rabbis it is20 valid?22 - R. Meir holds the view that the kethubah is a Pentateuchal institution. It was taught: R. Meir ruled, If any man assigns to a virgin23 a sum less than two hundred zuz or to a widow less than a maneh his marriage is regarded as24 an act of prostitution. R. Jose ruled: One is permitted [to contract such a marriage].25 R. Judah ruled: If the man wished he may write out for a virgin a bond for two hundred zuz while she writes26 for him, 'I have received from you a maneh'; and [he may write a bond] for a widow for a maneh while she writes26 for him, 'I have received from you fifty zuz'.27 Is R. Jose then of the opinion that 'one is permitted [to contract such a marriage]'?28 This surely is contrary [to the following:] A woman's kethubah may not be made [a charge on] movable property as a social measure.29 Said R. Jose: What social measure is this?30 Their31 price, surely, is not fixed and they deteriorate in value.32 Now, did not the first Tanna also say that [a kethubah] may not be made [a charge on movable property]?33 Must he34 not, consequently, have meant to say: This35 applies only where he36 accepted no responsibility;37 but where he accepted responsibility37 [the kethubah] may be made [a charge upon them].38 Thereupon came R. Jose to question: Even If he36 did accept responsibility how [could the kethubah be] made [a charge upon them]39 when their price, surely, is not fixed and they deteriorate in value.40 Now, if there,41 where the diminution in value [of the movables] is only a possibility,42 R. Jose provides against it, would he not even more so [adopt a similar course] here43 where the diminution [of the kethubah] is a certainty? - How now! There44 she did not know it45 to think of surrendering her rights;46 but here she was well aware [of the fact]47 and has definitely surrendered her rights. The sister of Rami b. Hama was married to R. Iwia
(1) In R. Judah's statement.
(2) Lit., 'what writes? says'. Which proves that, according to R. Judah no restrictions were made even in the case of a Rabbinical law.
(3) About whose imported produce it is uncertain whether it has been tithed (v. GIos. s.v. Demai). Such produce is only Rabbinically forbidden.
(4) I.e., it had not been duly tithed.
(5) Demai IV, 7, v. supra p. 131 notes. Which shows that, according to R. Judah, no restriction was imposed even on a Rabbinically forbidden produce. (Cf. supra note 8).
(6) Lit., 'a certainty of their words'.
(7) As in the case of demai where the prohibition is due to the uncertainty whether or not the produce had been tithed.
(8) The Rabbis, though they applied restriction even in cases where their prohibition was due merely to an uncertainty.
(9) V. Glos. The uncertainty here is so great, since most people even among the 'amme ha-'arez (v. Glos. s.v. 'Am ha-'arez) do give tithe, that no restrictions were applied to it.
(10) Since the expression used is not 'if the virgin received less'.
(11) While the woman in fact receives the full amount of her kethubah.
(12) R. Meir.
(13) Cf. supra n. 2. Lit., 'and there is to her'.
(14) [Lit., 'and since'. The text is not smooth. MS.M. preserves a better reading 'but since she had (a full kethubah) what is the reason (of R. Meir)?' - Since he said to her etc.].
(15) The virgin who is entitled to two hundred zuz.
(16) One hundred zuz (v. Glos.).
(17) [Lit., 'her mind does not rest, rely upon', i.e., she contracted her marriage on the expectation of a kethubah of a smaller amount than the prescribed minimum.]
(18) [Since the marriage was not performed in accordance with the requirements of the law, it is regarded as an act of prostitution.]
(19) Lit., 'whoever makes a stipulation'.
(20) Lit., 'his stipulatlon'.
(21) Since he mentions the Torah only.
(22) As a kethubah is an enactment of the Rabbis (v. R. Judah's view supra 56a), why is the stipulation void?
(23) As her kethubah.
(24) Lit., 'behold this'.
(25) The stipulation being valid even if the woman's surrender of her right was only verbal.
(26) Contrary to the opinion of R. Jose, R. Judah maintains that a verbal stipulation or undertaking against a Rabbinical measure is of no validity.
(27) Half a maneh.
(28) I.e., one where the kethubah amounts to less than the prescribed minimum.
(29) Lit., 'because of making the world right'. Movable objects may be easily lost and do not provide a reliable security for the kethubah.
(30) Lit., 'there is in this'.
(31) Movable objects.
(32) While a kethubah must always amount to a legally fixed minimum.
(33) Wherein, then, does R. Jose differ from him?
(34) The first Tanna.
(35) That movable property provides no security for a kethubah.
(36) The husband.
(37) For the loss of the movable property.
(38) The possibility of deterioration in value being disregarded by the first Tanna.
(39) Movable objects.
(40) R. Jose is consequently of the opinion that it is not only against loss but also against a diminution in value that provision must be made.
(41) Where movable objects are assigned as a security.
(42) Lit., 'perhaps they diminish'.
(43) Where the husband definitely assigned no more than half of the legal maximum.
(44) V. supra note 14.
(45) That the value would be diminished.
(46) Lit., 'that she shall forgive' or 'surrender'.
(47) That her husband has contracted for a sum less than her due.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 57a
and her kethubah1 was lost. When they came before R. Joseph2 he said to them, Thus said Rab Judah in the name of Samuel: This3 is the opinion of R. Meir,4 but the Sages ruled that a man may live with his wife without a kethubah for two or three years.5 Said Abaye to him:6 But did not R. Nahman state in the name of Samuel that the halachah is in agreement with R. Meir in his preventive measures?7 - If so, [the other replied] go and write one8 for her. When R. Dimi came9 he stated in the name of R. Simeon b. Pazzi in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi who had it from Bar Kappara: The dispute10 refers to the beginning,11 but at the end11 she cannot, according to the opinion of all, surrender12 [any portion of her kethubah].13 R. Johanan, however stated that their dispute extended to both cases.14 Said R. Abbahu: [The following] was explained to me by R. Johanan: 'I and R. Joshua b. Levi do not dispute with one another. The "beginning" of which R. Joshua b. Levi spoke means15 the beginning of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber, and by the "end" was meant15 the termination of the intercourse;16 and when I stated that the dispute extended to both cases [I meant] the beginning [of the meeting in] the bridal chamber and the end of that meeting which is the beginning of the intercourse.'17 When Rabin came18 he stated in the name of R. Simeon b. Pazzi in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi who had it from Bar Kappara. The dispute refers only to the end, but at the beginning she may, so is the opinion of all, renounce19 [any portion of her kethubah].20 R. Johanan, however, stated that their dispute extended to both cases. Said R. Abbahu: This was explained to me by R. Johanan: 'I and R. Joshua b. Levi do not dispute with one another. The "end" of which R. Joshua b. Levi spoke meant the end of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber, and by the "beginning" was meant the beginning of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber; and when I stated that the dispute extended to both cases [I meant] the beginning,21 and the termination of the intercourse.' Said R. Papa: Had not R. Abbahu stated, 'This was explained to me by R. Johanan: "I and R. Joshua b. Levi do not dispute with one another"' I would have submitted that R. Johanan and R. Joshua b. Levi were in dispute while R. Dimi and Rabin22 were not in dispute. The 'end' of which Rabin spoke might mean23 the end of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber, and the 'beginning' of which R. Dimi spoke might mean23 the beginning of the intercourse.21 What does he24 teach us thereby?25 - It is this that he teaches us: [It is preferable to assume]26 that two Amoraim differ in their own opinions27 rather than that two Amoraim should differ as to what was the view of another Amora.28
MISHNAH. A VIRGIN IS ALLOWED TWELVE MONTHS FROM THE [TIME HER INTENDED] HUSBAND CLAIMED HER,29 [IN WHICH] TO PREPARE HER MARRIAGE OUTFIT.30 AND, AS [SUCH A PERIOD] IS ALLOWED FOR THE WOMAN, SO IS IT ALLOWED FOR THE MAN FOR HIS OUTFIT.31 FOR A Wldow32 THIRTY DAYS [ARE ALLOWED]. IF THE RESPECTIVE PERIODS EXPIRED33 AND THEY WERE NOT MARRIED34 THEY35 ARE ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE OUT OF THE MAN'S ESTATE36 AND [IF HE IS A PRIEST] MAY ALSO EAT TERUMAH. R. TARFON SAID: ALL [THE SUSTENANCE] FOR SUCH A WOMAN MAY BE GIVEN OF TERUMAH.37 R. AKIBA SAID: ONE HALF OF UNCONSECRATED FOOD38 AND ONE HALF OF TERUMAH.39 A LEVIR40 [WHO IS A PRIEST] DOES NOT CONFER [UPON HIS SISTER-IN-LAW]41 THE RIGHT OF EATING TERUMAH.42 IF SHE43 HAD SPENT SIX MONTHS44 W29 TH45 HER HUSBAND AND SIX MONTHS W29 TH45 THE LEVlr,46 OR EVEN [IF SHE SPENT] ALL OF THEM47 WITH HER HUSBAND LESS ONE DAY WITH45 THE LEVIR,46 OR ALL OF THEM47 WITH45 THE LEVIR46 LESS ONE DAY WITH HER HUSBAND,48 SHE IS NOT PERMITTED TO EAT TERUMAH.49 THIS50 [WAS THE RULING ACCORDING TO] AN EARLIER51 MISHNAH.52 THE COURT, HOWEVER, THAT SUCCEEDED53 RULED:
(1) I.e., the written marriage contract. V. Glos.
(2) To obtain his ruling on the question whether she may continue to live with her husband without the kethubah.
(3) That living with a wife whose kethubah is less than the prescribed minimum, and much more so with one who has no kethubah at all, is regarded as mere prostitution, even though the woman remained legally entitled to collect the full amount of her kethubah.
(4) Who holds that since the woman is not absolutely certain that she will obtain the full amount of her kethubah (either in the case, supra, because she believes the man's stipulation to be valid or, in this case, because she has no document to prove her claim) it can only be regarded as an act of prostitution (v. supra p. 333, n. 8).
(5) I.e., for any length of time. V. Tosaf. s.v. שתים a.l.
(6) R. Joseph.
(7) The Rabbinical restrictions he added to those of the Torah.
(8) A new marriage contract.
(9) From Palestine to Babylon.
(10) Between R. Judah and R. Jose on the question whether a verbal renouncement of the woman is valid (supra 56b).
(11) This is explained infra.
(12) By a mere verbal statement.
(13) Since she has already acquired it. Only by means of a written quittance may her rights then be surrendered.
(14) I.e., to the 'beginning' and 'end'.
(15) Lit., 'what'.
(16) R. Judah and R. Jose dispute only in respect of the period between the beginning and the conclusion of the meeting in the bridal chamber but agree that after intercourse the man's stipulation is invalid unless the woman has surrendered her rights in writing. It was, therefore, quite correct for R. Joshua b. Levi to state that 'at the end (i.e., of the intercourse), she cannot, according to the opinion of all, surrender (i.e., verbally) any part of her kethubah'.
(17) To which the dispute indeed refers (cf. supra p. 335, n. 14).
(18) From Palestine to Babylon.
(19) V. Supra p. 335, nn. 8-10.
(20) Since she has not yet legally acquired it.
(21) Which corresponds to the termination of the meeting in the bridal chamber.
(22) Whose reports appear contradictory.
(23) Lit., 'what'.
(24) R. Papa.
(25) In view of R. Abbahu's definite statement R. Papa's remark seems pointless.
(26) Unless there is proof to the contrary.
(27) It is natural and legitimate for opinions to differ.
(28) In which case one of the two must be definitely wrong since the view of the Amora which both of them claim to represent could not possibly have agreed with what both of them submit. Had not R. Abbahu's statement been authoritative, coming as it did from R. Johanan himself, R. Papa's submission would have been preferred to his.
(29) After their betrothal.
(30) Jewels and similar ornaments (v. Rashi).
(31) The preparations for the wedding dinner and the bridal chamber (v. ibid.).
(32) Who is presumed to be in the possession of some trinkets and jewellery from her first marriage.
(33) Lit., 'the time arrived'.
(34) Owing to the man's delay (v. supra 2b).
(35) The women.
(36) Lit., 'they eat of his'.
(37) Out of the proceeds of which she may buy unconsecrated food for consumption during the days of her Levitical uncleanness.
(38) For consumption during her period of uncleanness.
(39) For her use in her clean state.
(40) יתם, the brother of a deceased childless husband, whose duty it is to marry the widow.
(41) Who became a widow while still betrothed.
(42) Prior to their marriage (v. supra n. 12).
(43) As a betrothed virgin.
(44) Of the period of twelve months that is granted to her.
(45) Lit., 'in the presence of'.
(46) I.e., in awaiting his marriage.
(47) The twelve months.
(48) [Isaiah Trani preserves a better reading, 'even if (she spent) all of them with the husband, less one day, or all of them with the levir].
(49) By virtue of her husband whose obligation to maintain her does not begin until the end of the twelve months, and even then terminates with his death.
(50) That after THE RESPECTIVE PERIODS EXPIRED . . . THEY ARE ENTITLED . . . EAT TERUMAH.
(51) Lit., 'first'.
(52) Cf. Sanh. Sonc. ed. p. 163, n. 7.
(53) The authors of the earlier Mishnah.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 57b
A WOMAN1 MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH UNTIL SHE HAS ENTERED THE BRIDAL CHAMBER.2
GEMARA. Whence is this3 derived? - R. Hisda replied: From Scripture which states, And her brother and her mother said: 'Let the damsel abide with us yamim,4 at the least ten.5 Now, what could be meant by yamim? If it be suggested 'two days',6 do people, [it might be retorted,] speak in such a manner? [If when] they suggested to him7 two days he said no, would they then suggest ten days? Yamim must consequently mean8 a year, for it is written, yamim9 shall he have the right of redemption.10 But might it not be said [that yamim means] a month,11 for it is written, But a month of yamim?12 - I will tell you: [The meaning of] an undefined [expression of] yamim may well be inferred from another undefined expression of yamim, but no undefined expression of yamim may be inferred from one in connection with which month was specifically mentioned. R. Zera stated that a Tanna taught: In the case of a minor,13 either she herself or her father is empowered to postpone14 [her marriage].15 One can well understand why she is empowered to postpone [the marriage], but [why also her] father? If she is satisfied, what matters it to her father? - He might think this: Now she does not realize [what marriage implies] but to-morrow16 she will rebel [against her husband], leave him and come back to, and fall [a burden] upon me.17 R. Abba b. Levi stated: No arrangements may be made for marrying a minor while she is still in her minority. Arrangements18 may, however, be made while she is a minor for marrying her when she becomes of age. Is not this obvious? - It might have been suggested that [this should not be allowed] as a precaution against the possibility of her beginning to feel anxiety at once19 and so becoming ill. Hence we were taught [that no such possibility need be considered]. R. Huna stated: If on the day she became adolescent20 she was betrothed, she is allowed thirty days21 like a widow.22 An objection was raised: One who has attained adolescence is like one who has been claimed [by her intended husband in marriage]. Does not this imply, 'Like a Virgin who was claimed'?23 - No, like a widow who was claimed. Come and hear: If a woman who is adolescent had waited for twelve months24 her husband, said R. Eliezer, since he is liable for her maintenance, may also annul [her vows]!25 - Read: A woman who is adolescent26 or one27 who waited twelve months.28 Come and hear: If a man betrothed a virgin, whether he29 claimed her and she held back or whether she claimed him and he29 held back, she is allowed twelve months30 from the time of the claim but not from the time of the betrothal; and one who is adolescent is like one who has been claimed. How [is this to be understood]? If she was betrothed on the day she became adolescent,31 she is allowed twelve months; while one betrothed [is sometimes allowed] thirty days.32 Is not this a refutation against R. Huna? - It is a refutation. What [was meant by] 'while one betrothed [is sometimes allowed] thirty days'? - R. Papa replied, It is this that was meant: If an adolescent woman was betrothed after twelve months of her adolescence have elapsed, she is allowed30 thirty days like a widow. IF THE RESPECTIVE PERIODS EXPIRED AND THEY WERE NOT MARRIED. 'Ulla stated: The daughter of an Israelite who is betrothed [to a priest] is, according to Pentateuchal law, permitted to eat terumah, for it is written In Scripture, But if a priest buy any soul, the purchase of his money,33 and that [woman] also is the purchase of his money.34 What then is the reason why [the Rabbis] ruled that she is not permitted to eat [terumah]? Because it might happen that when a cup [of terumah] will be offered35 to her in the house of her father she might give her brother or sister36 to drink [from it]. If so, [the same reason should apply] also where THE RESPECTIVE PERIODS EXPIRED AND THEY WERE NOT MARRIED! - In that case37 he appoints for her a special place.38 Now then, no [hired harvest] gleaner39 [working] for an Israelite should be allowed to eat terumah, since it is possible that [the household of the Israelite] would come to eat with him! If40 they feed him from their own [victuals], Would they eat of his?41 R. Samuel son of Rab42 Judah explained:43 Owing to a bodily defect44 [that might subsequently be detected].45 lf so, [should not the same reason] also [be applicable to a woman who] had entered the bridal chamber, but intercourse with whom did not take place?46 - In that case47 he arranges for her to be first examined and only then takes her in.48 Now then, the slave of a priest,49 bought from an Israelite, should not be allowed to eat terumah on account of a bodily defect44 [that might be discovered]!50 - [The law of cancellation of a sale owing to a subsequent detection of a] bodily defect44 does not apply to slaves. For if the defect is external [the buyer] has presumably seen it;51 and if it is internal, since [the buyer] requires [the slave] for work only he does not mind a private defect.52 Were [the slave] to be found to have been a thief or
(1) Who is not the daughter of a priest.
(2) Huppah, v. Glos.
(3) Lit., 'whence these words', that A VIRGIN IS ALLOWED TWELVE MONTHS.
(4) ימים, E.V., a few days.
(5) Gen. XXIV, 55, referring to the period the relatives of Rebekah wished her to remain with them after consenting to her marriage with Isaac.
(6) The minimum of the plural.
(7) Abraham's servant.
(8) Lit., 'but what'.
(9) E.V., for a full year.
(10) Lev. XXV, 29. As here yamim means 'a year' so it does in Gen. XXIV, 55, while עשור means 'ten months'.
(11) And עשור, 'ten days'.
(12) Num. XI, 20. E.V. a full month.
(13) Who was claimed by the man who betrothed her.
(14) Lit 'prevent'.
(15) Beyond the period given in our Mishnah; until she is of age. V. Tosef. Keth. V.
(16) After the marriage, when she finds her connubial duties distasteful.
(17) He would then have to provide for her a new marriage outfit (v. Rashi). It is the privilege of a minor to leave her husband at any moment by the mere making of a formal declaration that she does not like him (v. Glos. s.v. Mi'un).
(18) Without legal betrothal.
(19) Lit., 'bring in fear from now'.
(20) A bogereth (v. Glos.). Lit., 'she became adolescent one day'.
(21) In which to prepare her marriage outfit.
(22) Not the longer period of twelve months. It is assumed that on approaching adolescence a woman begins to prepare her marriage outfit, and the shorter period of one month is regarded as sufficient for completing it.
(23) Who (v. our Mishnah) is allowed a period of twelve months!
(24) From the time she was claimed by the man who betrothed her.
(25) Ned. 70b, 73b. There is no need for her father to consent to the annulment.
(Cf. Num. XXX, 4ff). From here it follows that even one who is adolescent is not entitled to maintenance until after the expiry of twelve months, which is an objection against R. Huna.
(26) Who waited thirty days.
(27) A na'arah (v. Glos.).
(28) The difference between the two readings is represented in the original by the addition of a mere waw.
(29) Lit, 'the (intended) husband'.
(30) For the preparation of her outfit.
(31) Lit., 'she became of age one day'.
(32) V. infra for further explanation.
(33) Lev. XXII, 11. The conclusion of the verse is he may eat of it, i.e., of terumah.
(34) The money, or the object of value, which the man gives to the woman as her token of betrothal, and whereby she is acquired as his wife.
(35) Rt. מזג lit., 'to mix', sc. wine with water or spices.
(36) Who are Israelites to whom the eating or drinking of terumah is forbidden.
(37) Lit., 'there', where the priest is legally liable to maintain her.
(38) Away from her father's household; thus preventing her from giving away his victuals to her relatives.
(39) Who is a priest.
(40) Lit., 'now'.
(41) Obviously not. Hence the permissibility for the gleaner to eat his terumah.
(42) Wanting in MS.M.
(43) The reason why the daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a priest is not permitted to eat terumah before the time her husband becomes liable to maintain her.
(44) סימפון 'an implied condition the non-fulfilment of which annuls the agreement', whence 'a bodily defect . . . not stated in the contract' (Jast.) Cf. **.
(45) In the woman. This might be discovered before the marriage and, as a result, the betrothal would be annulled retrospectively.
(46) In this case also, should a bodily defect be discovered before the consummation of the marriage the betrothal would be annulled retrospectively. Why then does our Mishnah permit the eating of terumah in such a case?
(47) Lit., there'.
(48) Into the bridal chamber. After entering into the chamber it may be safely assumed that he has satisfied himself that she was not suffering from any bodily defects.
(49) Who eats terumah by virtue of being the slave of a priest.
(50) And that would retrospectively annul the purchase. The slave would consequently retain the status of an Israelite's slave to whom the eating of terumah was all the time forbidden.
(51) And since he nevertheless consented to the purchase he must have been content to overlook it.
(52) The sale, therefore, cannot thereby be annulled.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 58a
a gambler1 the sale is still valid.2 What else is there?3 [Only that the slave might be found to have been] an armed robber or one proscribed by the government;4 but such characters are generally known.5 Consider! Whether according to the [explanation of the one] Master6 or according to that of the other Master7 she8 is not permitted to eat [terumah], what then is the practical difference between them? - The difference between them [is the case where her intended husband] accepted [her defects,9 or where her father] delivered [her to the intended husband's agents]10 or went11 [with them].10 R. TARFON SAID: ALL [THE SUSTENANCE] FOR SUCH A WOMAN MAY BE GIVEN OF TERUMAH etc. Abaye stated: The dispute12 applies only to the daughter of a priest13 who was betrothed to a priest but with respect to the daughter of an Israelite14 who was betrothed to a priest all15 agree [that she is supplied with] one half of unconsecrated food16 and one half of terumah. Abaye further stated: Their dispute12 relates to one who17 was only betrothed,18 but in respect of a married woman19 all15 agree [that she is supplied with] one half of unconsecrated food20 and one half of terumah.20 So it was also taught: R. Tarfon said, All [the sustenance] for such a woman is given of terumah. R. Akiba said, One half of consecrated food and one half of terumah - This21 applies only to the daughter of a priest who was betrothed to a priest, but with respect to the daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a priest all22 agree [that she is supplied with] one half of unconsecrated food and one half of terumah. This,21 furthermore, applies only to one who23 was only betrothed but in respect of a married woman24 all22 agree [that she is supplied with] one half of unconsecrated food25 and one half of terumah.25 R. Judah b. Bathyra said, She is supplied with two thirds26 of terumah and one third of unconsecrated food. R. Judah said, All [her sustenance] is given to her in terumah27 and she sells it and purchases unconsecrated food out of the proceeds.28 R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said, Wherever terumah was mentioned29 [the woman] is to be given [a supply equal to] twice the quantity of unconsecrated victuals.30 What is the practical difference between them?31 - The difference between them [is the question of the woman's] trouble.32 A LEVIR [WHO IS A PRIEST] DOES NOT CONFER [UPON HIS SISTER-IN-LAW] THE RIGHT OF EATING TERUMAH. What is the reason? - The All-Merciful said, The purchase of his money33 while she is the purchase of his brother.34 IF SHE HAD SPENT SIX MONTHS WITH HER HUSBAND. Now that you stated [that even if she spent the full twelve months less one day] WITH THE HUSBAND [she is] not [permitted to eat terumah] is there any need [to mention also] WITH THE LEVIR?35 - This is a case36 [of anti-climax:] 'This, and there is no need to say that'.37 THIS [WAS THE RULING ACCORDING TO] AN EARLIER MISHNAH etc. What is the reason?38 - 'Ulla, or some say R. Samuel b. Judah, replied: Owing to a bodily defect [that might subsequently be detected].39 According to 'Ulla40 one can well understand [the respective rulings of the earlier,41 and the later rulings],42 the former41 being due to the possibility that a cup [of terumah] might be offered43 to her in the house of her father,44 and the latter to [the possibility of] the detection of a bodily defect.45
(1) So Tosaf. s.v. קוביוסטום, and cf. **, 'gambler'; **; 'a crafty person' (contra Rashi's interpretation, 'kidnapper').
(2) Lit., 'he reached him'. Slaves being known to possess such characters a buyer of a slave is presumed to have accepted the inevitable.
(3) That might be given as a reason for the cancellation of the sale.
(4) Sentenced to death.
(5) Lit., 'they have a voice', and the buyer must have known the circumstances before he bought him and must have consented to have him despite his unsavoury character.
(7) R. Samuel.
(8) The daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a priest.
(9) Once he consented to overlook them he cannot again advance them as a reason for the annulment of the betrothal. In such a case R. Samuel's explanation is not applicable while that of 'Ulla is.
(10) Cf. supra 48b. As she does not any longer live with her father's family 'Ulla's reason does not apply while that of R. Samuel does.
(11) Himself or his agents.
(12) That of R. Tarfon and R. Akiba.
(13) Who is familiar with the restrictions of terumah and would, therefore, abstain from eating it during the days of her Levitical uncleanness when consecrated food is forbidden to her.
(14) Who may be ignorant of the restrictions appertaining to terumah.
(15) Even R. Tarfon.
(16) For consumption during the days of her uncleanness.
(17) Being the daughter of a priest.
(18) Her father with whom she lives during the period of her betrothal might well be relied upon that, as a priest, he would duly supervise her observance of the laws of terumah and would, during her uncleanness, himself, or through her brothers, sell her terumah and purchase for her with the proceeds unconsecrated food.
(19) Who does not live with her husband (cf. infra 64b).
(20) Being alone she might not be able to arrange for the sale of her terumah during her uncleanness, and might consequently be apt to consume the consecrated food forbidden to her.
(21) The difference of opinion.
(22) V. p. 342, n. 10.
(23) Being the daughter of a priest.
(24) V. p. 342. n. 14.
(25) V. p. 342, n. 15.
(26) Lit., 'portions'.
(27) But, unlike R. Tarfon who allows only as much terumah as if it were unconsecrated victuals, R. Judah allows a larger quantity of terumah (which is cheaper) so that its proceeds should suffice for the purchase of the required quantity of ordinary food.
(28) Lit., 'money'.
(29) In the subject under discussion.
(30) Tosef. Keth. V. ab. init.
(31) R. Judah and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.
(32) In the selling of her terumah. It is difficult to sell terumah (the buyers of which, being priests only, are naturally few) and it must be offered at a very low price. To save the woman trouble R. Gamaliel allows her terumah double the quantity of unconsecrated victuals so that by reducing the price of the former by a half she would easily dispose of it and be able to acquire with the proceeds her required ordinary victuals. R. Judah, however, makes no provision for saving her trouble, and allows her only a slight margin of terumah above that of ordinary food estimated at the current prices.
(33) Lev. XXII, 11, v. also supra p. 340, n. 5; only such may eat terumah.
(34) She does not become his own wife before he acquired her through the levirate marriage.
(35) I.e., OR ALL OF THEM WITH THE LEVIR LESS ONE DAY WITH HER HUSBAND etc. If when one day only of the twelve months was not spent with the husband she does not acquire the privilege of eating terumah, how much less would such a privilege be acquired when all the period less one day was not spent with the husband!
(36) Lit., 'he taught'.
(37) Lit., 'this, and he need not tell this'.
(38) Of the later Beth din.
(39) V. supra p. 341, nn. 3-4.
(40) Who (supra 75b) gave as the reason for the ruling of the earlier Mishnah that the woman might allow her relatives to drink of her cup of terumah.
(41) Forbidding terumah during the first twelve months also permitting it after the expiration of that period.
(42) Which extends the prohibition until the entry into the bridal chamber.
(43) V. supra p. 340, n. 6.
(44) And she might allow her relatives to drink from it (v. supra note 6). As this would not happen after the twelve months when the intended husband, becoming liable for her maintenance and desirous of preventing her from giving away his victuals to her relatives in her father's house, provides for her an abode of her own, the woman was permitted to eat terumah.
(45) V. supra p. 341, n. 3. Hence the extension of the prohibition until the entry into the bridal chamber.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 58b
According to R. Samuel b. Judah, however, the earlier [ruling of the] Mishnah is due to [the possible detection of] a bodily defect and the later is also due to [the possible detection of] a bodily defect, what then is [the reason for] their difference? - [The principle underlying] the difference is the [efficacy of an] examination by outsiders. One Master1 is of the opinion that an examination by others2 is regarded as effective,3 while the other Master4 holds the opinion that an examination by others is not regarded as effective.5
MISHNAH. IF A MAN CONSECRATED HIS WIFE'S HANDIWORK,6 SHE MAY NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO WORK AND TO CONSUME [THE PROCEEDS HERSELF].7 [IF, HOWEVER, HE CONSECRATED] THE SURPLUS8 [ONLY]. R. MEIR RULED: IT IS DULY CONSECRATED.9 R. JOHANAN HA-SANDELAR RULED: IT REMAINS UNCONSECRATED.9
GEMARA. R. Huna stated in the name of Rab:10 A woman is entitled to say to her husband, 'I do not wish either to be maintained by you or to work for you'. He holds the opinion that when the Rabbis regulated [the relations of husband and wife] her maintenance was fundamental11 while [the assignment of the proceeds of] her handiwork [to her husband] was due [only to their desire for preventing] ill-feeling.12 If, therefore, she said, 'I do not wish either to be maintained by you or to work for you', she is entitled to do so.13 An objection was raised: Maintenance [for a wife] was provided in return for her handiwork!14 - Read: Her handiwork was assigned [to her husband] in return for her maintenance. May it be suggested that [our Mishnah] provides support for his15 view? [It stated,] IF A MAN CONSECRATED HIS WIFE'S HANDIWORK SHE MAY NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO WORK AND TO CONSUME [THE PROCEEDS HERSELF]. Does not [this refer to a wife for whom her husband is able16 to] provide maintenance?17 - No; [it is a case where the husband is unable to] provide her maintenance. If, however, [her husband is unable to] provide her maintenance, what need was there to state [such an obvious case]?18 Even according to him who holds that a master has the right to say to his slave, 'Work for me but I will not maintain you,'19 such a rule applies only to a Canaanite slave concerning whom Scripture has not written 'with thee', but not to a Hebrew slave concerning whom it is written in Scripture. With thee,20 how much less then [would this apply to] his wife?21 - It22 was necessary [as an introduction to] the final clause: [IF, HOWEVER, HE CONSECRATED] THE SURPLUS [ONLY]. R. MEIR RULED: IT IS DULY CONSECRATED.23 R. JOHANAN HA-SANDELAR RULED: IT REMAINS UNCONSECRATED. Now [R. Huna's ruling] is in disagreement with that of Resh Lakish. For Resh Lakish stated: You must not assume that R. Meir's reason24 is because he is of the opinion that a man may consecrate that which has not yet come into existence25 but this is R. Meir's reason: Since [a husband] has the right to compel her to work, his consecration is regarded as if he had said to her, 'May your hands26 be consecrated to Him who created them'. But, surely, he27 did not use such an expression!28 - Since R. Meir was heard to state that a man does not utter his words to no purpose,29 [the expression the husband used here]30 may be regarded as if he had actually said to her, 'May your hands be consecrated to Him who created them'. But is R. Meir of the opinion that a man cannot consecrate anything that is not yet in existence? Surely it was taught: If a man said to a woman, 'Be thou betrothed unto me after I shall have become a proselyte' or 'After thou shalt have become a proselyte'. 'After I shall have been set free', 'After thou shalt have been set free', 'After thy husband will have died', 'After thy sister will have died', or 'After thy brother-in-law shall have submitted to halizah31 from thee', she, R. Meir ruled, is legally betrothed!32 - From that [Baraitha] the inference33 may indeed be drawn;34 from this, [our Mishnah], however, it cannot be inferred.35 [IF, HOWEVER, HE CONSECRATED] THE SURPLUS [ONLY]. R. MEIR RULED: IT IS DULY CONSECRATED. When does it become consecrated? - Both Rab and Samuel stated: The surplus becomes consecrated only after [the wife's] death.36 R. Adda b. Ahabah stated: The surplus is consecrated while she is still alive.37 [In considering this statement] R. Papa argued: In what circumstances?38 If it be suggested: Where [the husband] allows her maintenance39 and also allows her40 a silver ma'ah41 for her other requirements,42 what [it may be retorted] is the reason of those who stated that it 'becomes consecrated only after [the wife's] death'?43 If, however, it is a case where [the husband] does not allow her maintenance and does not allow her a silver ma'ah for her other requirements, what [it may be objected] is the reason of him who stated that 'it is consecrated while she is still alive'? - This is a case indeed44 where he does allow her maintenance; but does not allow her a silver ma'ah for her other requirements. Rab and Samuel are of the opinion that [the Rabbis] have ordained
(1) The author of the earlier Mishnah.
(2) Lit., 'outside'. Which the man would naturally arrange at the expiry of the twelve months when he becomes liable for her maintenance.
(3) I.e., after such an examination a man can no longer refuse to marry the woman on the ground of the subsequent detection in her of some bodily defect. Hence his ruling (v. supra p. 344. n. 7).
(4) I.e., the authorities of the latter ruling.
(5) And the man may cancel the engagement. Hence the prohibition to eat terumah until the entry into the bridal chamber when the man himself has the opportunity of ascertaining the condition of her body.
(6) Which partly belongs to him (v. infra 64b).
(7) The reason is given infra.
(8) Of the proceeds in excess of the sum required for her maintenance.
(9) The reason is given infra.
(10) The Hebrew equivalent of the last five words is wanting in the corresponding passage in B.K. 8b.
(11) Since a woman cannot always earn sufficient for her maintenance.
(12) Between husband and wife.
(13) As the Rabbinical enactment aimed at the benefit of the woman only, she may well decline that favour if she is so minded.
(14) Which belongs to her husband (supra 47b). This implies that the assignment of a wife's handiwork to her husband was the original provision.
(15) R. Huna's.
(16) And, indeed, also desires to do so. Cf. Rashi and Tosaf. s.v. מאי.
(17) And since he is nevertheless precluded from consecrating her handiwork it follows, as R. Huna ruled, that a wife is entitled to refuse maintenance and to retain her right over her work.
(18) That he has no right to consecrate her handiwork which does not belong to him!
(19) B.K. 87b, supra 43a, Git. 12a.
(20) Deut. XV, 16.
(21) What need then was there to state the obvious?
(22) The first clause which is indeed self-evident.
(23) Though he does not maintain her.
(24) For giving a husband the right of consecrating his wife's handiwork.
(25) Such as the woman's work before she has performed it.
(26) Which, of course, were in existence at the time of the consecration. Thus it has been shown that according to Resh Lakish it is the opinion of R. Meir that a husband has the right to compel his wife to work.
(27) The husband.
(28) He did not say 'Your hands', but 'Your handiwork'.
(29) V. 'Ar. 5a.
(30) Since it would serve no purpose at all in the form he used it.
(31) V. Glos
(32) When the respective conditions are fulfilled, though at the time of the betrothal they were still unfulfilled (Yeb. 92b, 93b, B.M. 16b). This then shows that a man can legally dispose even of that which is not yet in existence.
(33) V. n. 7 final clause.
(34) Lit., 'yes'.
(35) Since the reason may well be the one given supra by Resh Lakish.
(36) When her husband inherits her estate.
(37) As soon as it is produced.
(38) Could the two opposing views be justified.
(39) Whereby he acquires the right to her earnings.
(40) Every week.
(41) V. Glos.
(42) Whereby he acquires the right to the surplus of her earnings in excess of the sum required for her maintenance, cf. infra 64b.
(43) Since the husband is entitled to both her earnings and the surplus the consecration should take effect even while she is alive.
(44) Lit., 'for ever'; 'always'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 59a
maintenance [for a wife] in return for her handiwork,1 and a silver ma'ah2 in return for the surplus;3 and since the husband does not give her the silver ma'ah, the surplus remains hers.4 R. Adda b. Ahabah, however, is of the opinion that maintenance was ordained in return for the surplus,3 and the silver ma'ah in return for her handiwork; and since [the husband] supplies her maintenance, the surplus is his. On what principle do they5 differ? - The Masters hold that the usual6 is for the usual,7 and the Master holds that the fixed [sum]8 is for the fixed [quantity].9 An objection was raised: Maintenance [for a wife] was provided in return for her handiwork!10 - Read: In return for the surplus of her handiwork. Come and hear: If he does not give her a silver ma'ah for her other requirements, her handiwork belongs to her!11 - Read: The surplus of her handiwork belongs to her. But, surely, in connection with this statement it was taught: What [is the quantity of work that] she12 must do for him?13 The weight of five sela's14 of warp in Judaea [etc.]!15 - It is this that was meant: What is the quantity of work [that she must do] in order that we might determine how much is her surplus? The weight of five sela's of warp in Judaea which is ten sela's16 in Galilee. Samuel stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan ha-Sandelar.17 But could Samuel have made such a statement? Have we not learned: [If a woman said to her husband]. 'Konam,18 if I do aught for your mouth',19 he20 need not annul her vow.21 R. Akiba, however, said: He20 must annul it, since she might do more work than is due to him.22 R. Johanan b. Nuri said: He20 must annul her vow23 since he might happen to divorce her24 and she would [owing to her vow] be forbidden to return25 to him.26 And Samuel stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri?27 - When Samuel stated, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri' [he referred only] to the surplus.28 Then let him29 specifically state, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri in respect of the surplus', or else 'The halachah is not in agreement with the first Tanna',30 or else, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Akiba!31 - But, replied R. Joseph, you speak of konamoth?32 Konamoth are different. For, as a man may33 forbid to himself the fruit of his fellow34 so may he also consecrate35 that which is not yet in existence.36 Said Abaye to him:37 It is quite logical that a man should be entitled to forbid the use of the fruit of his fellows to himself,38 since he may also forbid his own fruit39 to his fellow;40 should he, however, have the right to forbid something that is not yet in existence,41 seeing that no man has the right42 to forbid the fruit of his fellow to his fellow?43 - But, replied R. Huna son of R. Joshua, [that44 is a case] where the woman said, 'My hands shall be consecrated to Him who created them', [such consecration being valid] since her hands are in existence.45 But even if she had said so, could she consecrate them? Are they not mortgaged to him?46 - [This is a case] where she said,47 'When I shall have been divorced'.48 But is there a consecration that could not take effect now49 and would nevertheless become effective later?50 - And why not? retorted R. Elai. Were a man to say to his friend, 'This field that I am selling you shall be consecrated as soon as I shall have re-purchased it from you', would it not51 become consecrated?52 R. Jeremiah demurred: What a comparison? There53 [the seller] has the right to consecrate [his field];54 here,55 however, [the woman] has no power to divorce herself!56 This55 is rather similar57 to the case of a man who said to another, 'This field which I have sold to you shall become consecrated after I shall have re-purchased it from you', where it does not become consecrated.58 R. Papa demurred: Are the two cases at all similar? There59 both the field itself and its produce are in the possession of the buyer, but here60 the wife's person is in her own possession. This60 is rather similar61 to the case of a man who said to another,
(1) Which belongs to the husband.
(2) Every week.
(3) V. supra p. 347. n. 14.
(4) And cannot consequently be consecrated by him until after her death when he inherits it.
(5) Rab and Samuel on the one hand and R. Adda b. Ahabah on the other.
(7) The proceeds of the woman's handiwork. A surplus, however, in excess of the sum required for her maintenance, is unusual.
(8) The silver ma'ah.
(9) A wife's handiwork the quantity of which is prescribed (v. infra 64b).
(10) Supra 47b, 58b. An objection against R. Adda b. Ahabah.
(11) Infra 64b; which proves that the ma'ah is in return for her handiwork not for the surplus. An objection against Rab and Samuel,
(12) A wife.
(13) Her husband.
(14) V, Glos. s.v. Sela'.
(15) Infra 64b. This 'handiwork', not the surplus. How then could the insertion of 'surplus' be justified?
(16) The Galilean sela' being equal to half that of Judaea.
(17) In our Mishnah.
(18) קונם, (konam) one of the expressions of a vow. V. Glos.
(19) I.e., that her husband shall be forbidden to eat anything prepared by her or purchased from the proceeds of her work.
(20) The husband who is empowered to annul his wife's vows. V. Num. XXX, 7f.
(21) As a wife's work belongs to her husband she has no right to dispose of it by vow or in any other way. Her vow is, therefore, null and void and requires no invalidation.
(22) More than the quantity to which he is entitled (v. infra 64b). Any work in excess of that quantity remains at the disposal of the wife who is entitled to forbid it to her husband by a vow. Hence the necessity for annulment.
(23) Not only on account of the surplus as stated by R. Akiba.
(24) When he loses all claim to her work, and her vow becomes effective.
(25) He would not be able to remarry her because her vow would prevent her from performing for him any of the services which a wife must do for her husband. [R. Johanan b. Nuri is of the opinion that the surplus belongs to the husband and the woman has thus no right to forbid it to him by vow.]
(26) V. Ned. 85a and infra 66a and 70a.
(27) According to whom the woman's vow becomes valid after her divorce though at the time the vow was made the work she will do afterwards has not yet come into existence. From this it follows that a person may similarly consecrate anything that is not yet in existence. How, then, could Samuel who adopts this view as the halachah also state that the halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan ha-Sandelar according to whom a thing which is not yet in existence cannot be consecrated? [For this can be the only reason for R. Johanan ha-Sandelar's view in the Mishnah according to Samuel who explained the reference in the Mishnah to be to the surplus after the wife's death (v. supra p. 347) which R. Johanan ha-Sandelar will regard as unconsecrated because, at the time when the husband consecrated his wife's handiwork, it was not yet in existence (Rashi).
(28) And not to all her work which has not yet come into existence. This answer could be easily refuted, since the same objection that has been raised against the 'handiwork' may equally be raised against the 'surplus' which also was not in existence when the vow was made. This had been waived, however, in view of the more general objection that follows (Rashi). [Tosaf: Samuel's statement that the halachah is like R. Johanan b. Nuri is limited to his view that the surplus belongs to the husband v. supra p. 349. n. 14].
(30) From which it would be inferred that annulment of the vow is necessary only on account of the surplus.
(31) Who specifically mentioned the surplus. Since none of these expressions was used it is obvious that Samuel could not have referred to the surplus only.
(32) Plural of konam, a general term for vows which are usually introduced by konam.
(33) In making a vow.
(34) Though he could not consecrate such fruit to the Sanctuary.
(35) I.e prohibit to himself by a vow.
(36) I.e., seeing that he can, by means of a vow, prohibit to himself a thing which is not in his possession, he can also prohibit a thing which is not yet in existence. Hence the validity of the vow. In our Mishnah, however, where the subject is ordinary consecration to the sanctuary, halachah is indeed in agreement with R. Johanan ha-Sandelar that the consecration is invalid.
(37) R. Joseph. 'To him' is wanting in MS.M.
(38) By a vow.
(39) To any particular person, by means of a vow, or to everybody by a general consecration to the Sanctuary.
(40) He may forbid his fellow's fruit to himself as the master of his own body; and he may forbid his fruit to his fellow as the owner of his fruit.
(41) The woman's work. Neither her work (which has not yet been done) nor her right to it
(which she will regain only after divorce) is yet in existence.
(42) Even by a vow.
(43) Certainly not. As a person has no right to do the latter, he being neither master of his fellow's body nor owner of his fruit, so he should not be entitled to do the former (v. supra note 1.)
(44) R. Johanan b. Nuri's ruling which Samuel adopted as the halachah.
(45) Whereas our Mishnah deals with the case where she consecrated her handiwork, and this is not yet in existence.
(46) Her husband. How then could she consecrate that which is not hers?
(47) The consecration shall take effect.
(48) At that time she is again independent of her husband.
(49) As in the case under discussion where the woman while living with her husband is ineligible to dispose of her work.
(50) Obviously not. How then could the halachah be in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri?
(51) When it is re-purchased.
(52) It certainly would. Similarly in the case of a woman's work after she is divorced.
(53) The case of the field one is about to sell.
(54) Since at the time of the consecration it is still to his possession. Hence also the effectiveness of his present consecration after he had re-purchased that field.
(55) In the case of the consecration of a wife's work while she is still with her husband.
(56) How then could she have the power to consecrate her work even for the future?
(57) Lit., 'this is not equal but',
(58) Because at the time of the consecration it was no longer in his possession.
(59) The case of the sold field,
(60) V. supra p. 351, n. 15.
(61) V. p. 351, n. 17.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 59b
'This field which I have mortgaged to you shall be consecrated after I have redeemed it,' where it is consecrated. R. Shisha son of R. Idi demurred: Are these cases similar? There it1 is in his2 power to redeem it; but here she has no power to divorce herself. This is rather similar to the case of a man who said to his fellow, 'This field which I have mortgaged to you for ten years3 shall be consecrated when I shall have redeemed it', where it becomes consecrated. R. Ashi demurred: Are these cases similar? There4 he2 has the power to redeem it at least after ten years, but here she has never the power to divorce herself!5 - But, replied R. Ashi, you speak of konamoth! Konamoth are different [from ordinary vows] since they effect the consecration of the body6 itself;7 and [the reason here8 is the same] as that of Raba, for Raba stated: Consecration,9 leavened food10 and manumission11 cancel a mortgage.12 They13 should then14 become consecrated forthwith!15 - The Rabbis have imparted force to a husband's rights16 [over his wife] so that they13 shall not become consecrated forthwith.17
MISHNAH. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE KINDS OF WORK WHICH A WOMAN MUST PERFORM FOR HER HUSBAND: GRINDING CORN, BAKING BREAD, WASHING CLOTHES, COOKING, SUCKLING HER CHILD, MAKING READY HIS BED AND WORKING IN WOOL. IF SHE BROUGHT HIM ONE BONDWOMAN18 SHE NEED NOT DO ANY GRINDING OR BAKING OR WASHING. [IF SHE BROUGHT] TWO BONDWOMEN,19 SHE NEED NOT EVEN COOK OR SUCKLE HER CHILD. IF THREE, SHE NEED NEITHER MAKE READY HIS BED NOR WORK IN WOOL. IF FOUR, SHE MAY LOUNGE20 IN AN EASY CHAIR.21 R. ELIEZER SAID: EVEN IF SHE BROUGHT HIM22 A HUNDRED BONDWOMEN HE MAY23 COMPEL HER TO WORK IN WOOL; FOR IDLENESS LEADS TO UNCHASTITY. R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL SAID: EVEN24 IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE UNDER A VOW TO DO ANY WORK HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER KETHUBAH25 TO HER FOR IDLENESS LEADS TO IDIOCY.26
GEMARA. GRINDING CORN! How could you imagine this?27 - Read: Attending to28 the grinding.29 And if you prefer I might say: With a hand mill. Our Mishnah30 does not agree with the view of R. Hiyya. For R. Hiyya taught: A wife [should be taken] mainly for the sake31 of her beauty; mainly for the sake32 of children.33 And R. Hiyya further taught: A wife is mainly for the wearing32 of a woman's finery. And R. Hiyya further taught: He who wishes his wife to look graceful34 should clothe her in linen garments. He who wishes his daughter to have a bright complexion,35 let him, on the approach of her maturity, feed her with young fowls and give her milk to drink. SUCKLING HER CHILD. Must it be assumed that our Mishnah36 does not agree with the View of Beth Shammai? For was it not taught: If a woman vowed not to sickle her child she must, said Beth Shammai, pull the breast out of its mouth,37 and Beth Hillel said: [Her husband] may compel her to suckle it.38 If she was divorced he cannot compel her; but if [the child] knows her39 [her husband] pays her the fee and may compel her to suckle it in order [to avert] danger?40 - It may be said to be in agreement even with the view of Beth Shammai, but here41 we are dealing with such a case, for instance, where the woman made a vow and her husband confirmed it; Beth Shammai being of the opinion that he has thereby put his finger between her teeth,42 while Beth Hillel hold that it is she that has put her finger between her teeth.43 Then44 let them45 express their disagreement as regards a kethubah generally.46 Furthermore, it was taught:47 Beth Shammai said: She need not suckle [her child]!48 - But, clearly, our Mishnah is not in agreement with the view of Beth Shammai. 'If [the child] knows her'.
(1) The mortgaged field.
(2) The man who consecrated the field.
(3) During which period he has no power to redeem it, as a wife has no power to divorce herself.
(4) The ten years' mortgage.
(5) The two cases, therefore, cannot be compared.
(6) Of the animal or object consecrated.
(7) In relation to the man concerned; and unlike other consecrations to the Temple Treasury, can never be redeemed.
(8) For the validity of the consecration of the wife's work.
(9) Of a pledged animal for the altar.
(10) Which is pledged to a non-Israelite but kept in the possession of an Israelite when the time for its destruction on the Passover Eve arrives. No leaven or leavened food though pledged to a non-Jew may be kept in Jewish possession from the mid-day of Passover Eve until the conclusion of the Passover festival,
(11) Of a mortgaged slave,
(12) Similarly here, the consecration cancels the husband's claim upon the body or work of his wife. Hence the validity of her consecration.
(13) The wife's hands.
(14) V. supra n. 15.
(15) Why then has it been stated that the consecration becomes effective only after her divorce.
(16) שעבודא דבעל lit., 'the subjection or pledging to the husband'.
(17) His rights, as long as she lives with him, are not merely those of a creditor to whom an object has been mortgaged or pledged but the fuller rights of a buyer. For further notes on the whole of this passage, v. Ned. Sonc. ed. pp. 265ff.
(18) Or a sum that would purchase one.
(19) Or their value. V. supra n. 1.
(20) Lit., 'sit'.
(21) I.e., she need not perform even minor services for him. She is under no obligation to leave her chair to bring him any object even from the same house (cf. Rashi). קתדרא, cf. **, 'an easy chair', 'soft seat'.
(22) Her husband.
(23) Or, according to another interpretation, 'should'.
(24) I.e., precautions must be taken against idleness not only in the case mentioned by R. Eliezer but also in the following where the husband himself forbade the work.
(25) Thus enabling her to engage in work again.
(26) שיעמום, 'stupefaction', 'dullness'.
(27) A woman, surely, could not be expected to turn the sails or the wheels of a mill.
(28) Lit., 'causing'.
(29) She performs the accompanying services only.
(30) Which imposes duties of work upon a wife.
(31) Lit., 'a woman is not but'.
(32) V. p. 353, n. 14.
(33) Not as a bondwoman for her husband. R. Hiyya agrees, however, that a wife is expected to work in wool in return for the maintenance her husband allow's her. His only objection is to menial work such as the grinding of corn which has an injurious effect upon her womanly grace. V. Tosaf. s.v. תני.
(34) Lit., 'to nurse', 'to make pliant', 'to make graceful'.
(35) Lit., 'that he may make white'.
(36) Which imposes upon a wife the duty of suckling her children.
(37) I.e., her vow is valid, because she is under no obligation to suckle her child.
(38) According to their view it is a mother's duty to suckle her child and her vow is, therefore, null and void.
(39) And refuses to be nursed by any other woman (Rashi). [Isaiah Trani: Even if it does not refuse to be suckled by another woman, its separation from its mother, whom it has learnt to recognize, may prove injurious to the infant].
(40) Tosef. Keth. V. Since Beth Shammai maintain here that a wife is under no obligation to suckle her children (cf. supra n. 6) out Mishnah (cf. supra n. 5) obviously cannot be in agreement with their view.
(41) In the cited Baraitha.
(42) I.e., it is the husband's fault that the vow remained valid. He could easily have annulled it had he wished to do so. (V. Num. XXX, 7ff).
(43) She should not have vowed (cf. supra note 7).
(44) If, as now suggested, the husband has confirmed the vow the woman had made.
(45) Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.
(46) Where a woman vowed that her husband was to have no benefits from her. According to Beth Shammai she would be entitled to her kethubah because it is the man's fault that her vow remained valid (cf. supra p. 354, n. 11), while according to Beth Hillel she would receive no kethubah because the making of the vow was her fault (cf. p. 354. n. 12).
(47) In respect of any woman, even one who made no vow.
(48) How then could it be suggested that our Mishnah is in agreement with the view of Beth Shammai?
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 60a
At what age?1 - Raba in the name of R. Jeremiah b. Abba who had it from Rab replied: Three months. Samuel, however, said: Thirty days; while R. Isaac stated in the name of R. Johanan: Fifty days. R. Shimi b. Abaye stated: The halachah is in agreement with the statement of R. Isaac which was made in the name of R. Johanan. One can well understand [the respective views of] Rab and R. Johanan since they are guided by the child's keenness of perception.2 According to Samuel, however, is such [precocity]3 at all possible? - When Rami b. Ezekiel came4 he said, 'Pay no regard to those rules which my brother Judah laid down in the name of Samuel; for this said Samuel: As soon as [the child]5 knows her'.6 A [divorced woman] once came to Samuel [declaring her refusal to suckle her son]. 'Go', he said to R. Dimi b. Joseph, 'and test her case'.7 He went and placed her among a row of women and, taking hold of her child, carried him in front of them. When he came up to her [the child]8 looked at her face with joy,9 but she turned her eye away from him. 'Lift up your eyes'. he called to her, 'come, take away your son'. How does a blind child know [its mother]? R. Ashi said: By the smell and the taste.10 Our Rabbis taught: A child must be breast fed for11 twenty-four months. From that age onwards12 he is to be regarded as one who sucks an abominable thing; these are the words of R. Eliezer. R. Joshua said: [He may be breast fed] even for four or five years. If, however, he ceased13 after the twenty-four months and started again14 he is to be regarded as sucking an abominable thing.15 The Master said, 'From that age onwards he is to be regarded as one who sucks an abominable thing'. But I could point out a contradiction: As it might have been presumed that human16 milk is forbidden17 since such [prohibition may be deduced from the following] logical argument: If in the case of a beast18 in respect of which the law of contact19 has been relaxed20 [the use of] its milk has nevertheless been restricted,21 how much more should the use of his milk be restricted in the case of a human being in respect of whom the law of contact has been restricted;22 hence it was specifically stated, The camel because it23 cheweth the cud [. . . it is unclean unto you],24 only 'it' is unclean; human milk, however, is not unclean but clean. As it might also have been presumed that only [human] milk is excluded25 because [the use of milk] is not equally [forbidden] in all cases26 but that [human] blood is not excluded27 since [the prohibition of eating blood] is equally applicable in all cases,28 hence it was specifically stated, it,29 only 'it' is forbidden; human blood, however, is not forbidden but permitted.30 And [in connection with this teaching] R. Shesheth has stated: Even [a Rabbinical] ordinance of abstinence is not applicable to it!31 - This is no difficulty. The latter32 [refers to milk] that has left [the breast]33 whereas the former34 [refers to milk] which has not left [the breast]. [This law, however], is reversed in the case of blood,35 as it was taught: [Human] blood which [is found] upon a loaf of bread must be scraped off and [the bread] may only then be eaten; but that which is between the teeth36 may be sucked without any scruple.37 The Master stated, 'R. Joshua said: [He may be breast fed] even for four or five years'. But was it not taught that R. Joshua said: Even when [he carries] his bundle on his shoulders?38 - Both represent the same age.39 R. Joseph stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Joshua. It was taught: R. Marinus said, A man suffering from an attack on the chest40 may suck milk41 [from a beast] on the Sabbath.42 What is the reason? - Sucking is an act of unusual43 unloading44 against which, where pain45 is involved, no preventive measure has been enacted by the Rabbis. R. Joseph stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Marinus. It was taught: Nahum the Galatian46 stated, If rubbish47 was collected48 in a gutter49 it is permissible to crush it with one's foot quietly50 on the Sabbath, and one need have no scruples about the matter. What is the reason? - Such repair is carried out in an unusual manner51 against which, when loss is involved,52 the Rabbis enacted no preventive measure. R. Joseph stated: The halachah is in agreement with the ruling of Nahum the Galatian. 'If he ceased, however, after the twenty-four months and started again he is to be regarded as one who sucks an abominable thing'. And for how long?53 - R. Judah b. Habiba replied in the name of Samuel: For three days. Others read: R. Judah b. Habiba recited54 before Samuel: 'For three days'. Our Rabbis taught: A nursing mother whose husband died within twenty-four months [of the birth of their child] shall neither be betrothed nor married again
(1) Lit., 'until how much?' i.e., at what age is a child assumed to know its mother, and to refuse in consequence to be suckled by another woman?
(2) Lit., 'every one according to his sharpness'; the former fixing it at the age of three months and the latter at that of fifty days.
(3) That a child should know its mother at the age of thirty days.
(4) From Palestine to Babylon, v. infra 111b.
(5) Whatever its age.
(6) May a mother be compelled to suckle it, even after she has been divorced. She is only entitled to a fee from the child's father.
(7) To ascertain whether the child knew its mother.
(8) Cur. edd. הות, (fem.). Read with Bomb. ed. הוה (masc.).
(9) Af. of סוי, 'to look up with joy' (Jast.). 'to gaze longingly'.
(10) Of the milk.
(11) Lit., 'a baby sucks and continues until'.
(12) If he is still breast fed.
(13) Lit., 'he separated'.
(14) Lit., 'and returned'.
(15) Cf. Tosef. Nid. II.
(16) Lit., 'those who walk on two (legs)'.
(17) V. Rashi; lit., 'unclean'.
(18) Of the unclean classes enumerated in Lev. XI, 4ff and Deut, XIV, 7ff.
(19) By a human being.
(20) Contact with a live animal, even of the unclean classes (v. supra n. 10), does not cause uncleanness.
(21) It is forbidden for human consumption (v. Bek, 6b).
(22) Contact with a menstruant, for instance, causes uncleanness.
(23) Emphasis on 'it' (הוא) (v. infra n. 20).
(24) Lev. XI, 4.
(25) Lit., 'I take out', sc. from the prohibition of consuming it.
(26) The milk of a clean beast being permitted.
(27) From the restriction of consuming it.
(28) Even the blood of a clean beast is forbidden.
(29) The second 'it' (הוא) in Lev. IV, 11. Cf. supra n. 14. According to another interpretation the exclusion of blood is derived from the expression זה (E.V. these) at the beginning of the verse (Rashi).
(30) Cf. Ker. 22a and . infra n. 6.
(31) I.e., human milk is not only Pentateuchally, but also Rabbinically permitted. How then is this ruling to be harmonized with the previous Baraitha cited from Niddah which regards human milk as an 'abominable thing'?
(32) Lit., 'that', the last mentioned Baraitha which permits the consumption of human milk.
(33) And is collected in a utensil.
(34) Which, regarding the milk as an 'abominable thing', forbids it to one older than twenty-four months.
(35) As long as it remains within the body it is permitted; but as soon as it leaves it is forbidden as a preventive measure against the eating of animal blood.
(36) I.e., which has not been separated from the body.
(37) Ker. 21b.
(38) I.e., even at an age when the child is capable of carrying small loads he may still be breast fed. How then is this to be reconciled with the Baraitha cited from Niddah (V. supra note 5)?
(39) Lit., 'one size' or 'limit'.
(40) גונה (rt. גנה 'to groan'), one sighing painfully under an attack angina pectoris. V. Jast.
(41) Goat's milk which has a curative effect (v. Rashi).
(42) Though the release of the milk from the animal's breast resembles the plucking of a plant from its root, or the unloading of a burden, which is forbidden on the Sabbath,
(43) כלאחר יד, lit., 'as if by the back of the hand'.
(44) מפרק (rt. פרק Piel, 'break down', 'detach'). Milking an animal with one's hands is regarded as direct unloading (or detaching) which on the Sabbath is Pentateuchally forbidden (cf. Shab. 95a); releasing the milk by sucking is an unusual or indirect unloading or detaching which is only Rabbinically forbidden.
(45) V. supra p. 357, n. 11.
(46) Of Galatia or Gallia in Asia Minor,
(47) Lit., 'small pieces of straw',
(48) Lit., 'that went up'.
(49) And thus prevents the proper flow of the water.
(50) בצנעא lit., 'privately'.
(51) V. supra p. 357. n. 14.
(52) Were the gutter to remain choked up the overflow of the water would cause damage.
(53) Must the break last for the child to be regarded as having ceased to suck.
(54) A Baraitha, His statement was not merely the report of a ruling of Samuel who was but an Amora.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 60b
until [the completion of the] twenty-four months;1 so R. Meir. R. Judah however, permits [remarriage] after eighteen months.2 Said R. Nathan3 b. Joseph: Those4 surely, are the very words of Beth Shammai and these5 are the very words of Beth Hillel; for Beth Shammai ruled: Twentyfour months,6 while Beth Hillel ruled: Eighteen months!6 R. Simeon b. Gamaliel replied, I will explain:7 According to the view8 [that a child must be breast fed for] twenty-four months9 [a nursing mother] is permitted to marry again after twenty-one months,10 and according to the view11 [that it is to be breast fed for] eighteen months12 she may marry again after fifteen months;13 because a [nursing mother's] milk deteriorates only three months after [her conception].14 'Ulla stated: The halachah is in agreement with the ruling of R. Judah;15 and Mar 'Ukba stated: R. Hanina permitted me to marry [a nursing woman] fifteen months after [the birth of her child].16 Abaye's metayer once came to Abaye and asked him: Is it permissible to betroth [a nursing woman] fifteen months after [her child's birth]? - The other answered him: In the first place17 [whenever there is disagreement] between R. Meir and R. Judah the halachah is in agreement with the view of R. Judah;15 and, furthermore, [in a dispute between] Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel the halachah is in agreement with the view of Beth Hillel;18 and while 'Ulla said, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah',15 Mar 'Ukba stated, 'R. Hanina permitted me to marry [a nursing woman] fifteen months after [the birth of her child]', how much more then [is there no need for you to wait the longer period] since you only intend betrothal. When he19 came to R. Joseph20 the latter told him, 'Both Rab and Samuel ruled that [a nursing woman] must wait twenty-four months exclusive of the day on which her child was born and exclusive of the day on which she is betrothed'.21 Thereupon he22 ran23 three parasangs24 after him, (some say, one parasang along sand mounds), but failed to overtake him. Said Abaye: The statement made by the Rabbis that 'Even [a question about the permissibility of eating] an egg25 with kutha26 a man shall not27 decide28 in a district [which is under the jurisdiction] of his Master' was not due [to the view that this might] appear as an act of irreverence29 but to the reason that [a disciple] would have no success in dealing with the matter. For I have in fact learned the tradition of Rab and Samuel and yet I did not get the opportunity of applying it.30 Our Rabbis taught: [If a nursing mother] gave her child to a wet nurse or weaned him, or if he died, she is permitted to marry again forthwith.31 R. Papa and R. Huna son of R. Joshua intended to give a practical decision in accordance with this Baraitha, but an aged woman said to them, 'I have been in such a position32 and R. Nahman forbade me [to marry again].33 Surely, this could not have been so;34 for has not R. Nahman in fact permitted [such remarriage]35 in the Exilarch's family?36 - The family of the Exilarch was different [from ordinary people] because no nurse would break her agreement37 with them.38 Said R. Papi to them:39 Could you not have inferred it40 from the following? It has been taught: [A married woman] who was always anxious41 to spend her time42 at her paternal home,43 or who has some angry quarrel at her husband's home,44 or whose husband was in prison,44 or had gone to a country beyond the sea,45 or was old or infirm,44 or if she herself was barren, old,46 incapable of procreation or a minor,46 or if she miscarried after the death of her husband, or was in any other way incapacitated for propagation, must47 wait three months.48 These are the words of R. Meir. R. Jose,49 however, permits betrothal or marriage forthwith.50 And [in connection with this] R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in agreement with R. Meir in respect of his restrictive measures!51 - 'This', they52 answered him, 'did not occur to us'. The law is [that if the child] died [remarriage by his mother] is permitted [forthwith], but if she has weaned him [her remarriage] is53 forbidden. Mar son of R. Ashi ruled: Even if the child died [the remarriage of the mother] is forbidden, it being possible that she has killed it so as to be in a position54 to marry. It once actually happened that a mother strangled her child. This incident, however, is no proof.55 That woman56 was an imbecile, for it is not likely that [sane] women would strangle their children. Our Rabbis taught: If a woman was given a child to suckle57 she must not suckle together with it either her own child or the child of any friend of hers. If she agreed to a small allowance for board she must nevertheless eat much.58 Whilst in charge of the child59 she must not eat things which are injurious for the milk. Now that you said [that she must] not [suckle] 'her own child' was there any need [to state] 'nor the child of any friend of hers'? - It might have been assumed that only her own child [must not be suckled] because owing to her affection for it she might supply it with more [than the other child] but that the child of a friend of hers [may well be suckled] because if she had no surplus [of milk] she would not have given any at all. Hence we were taught [that even the child of a friend must not be suckled]. 'If she agreed to a small allowance for board she must nevertheless eat much'. Wherefrom? - R. Shesheth replied: From her own.60 'Whilst in charge of the child she must not eat things which are injurious'. What are these? - R. Kahana replied: For instance, cuscuta,61 lichen, small fishes and earth.62 Abaye said: Even pumpkins and quinces. R. Papa said: Even a palm's heart63 and unripe dates.64 R. Ashi said: Even kamak65 and fish-hash. Some of these cause the flow of the milk to stop while others cause the milk to become turbid. A woman who couples in a mill will have epileptic children. One who couples on the ground will have children with long necks. [A woman] who treads66 on the blood67 of an ass will have scabby68 children. One who eats66 mustard will have intemperate children.69 One who eats66 cress will have blear-eyed children. One who eats66 fish brine70 will have children with blinking eyes.71 One who eats72 clay73 will have ugly children. One who drinks72 intoxicating liquor will have ungainly74 children. One who eats72 meat and drinks wine will have children
(1) Were she to marry sooner and happen to become pregnant, the child would have to be taken from her breast before the proper time.
(2) The shorter period is in his opinion quite sufficient for the suckling of a child.
(3) Var. lec. 'Jonathan' (v.Tosef. Nid. Il).
(4) The words of R. Meir.
(5) R. Judah's words.
(6) As the period during which a child must be breast fed. What then was the object of the repetition of the same views?
(7) Read אפרש (v. She'iltoth, Wayera, III). Cur. edd. אכריע (rt. כרע, Hif. 'to over-balance', 'compromise').
(8) Lit., 'the words of him who says'.
(9) Beth Shammai.
(10) Not, as R. Meir ruled, twenty-four.
(11) Lit., 'the words of him who says'.
(12) Beth Hillel.
(13) And not, as R. Judah ruled, eighteen.
(14) For three months, at least, after her remarriage the child's breast feeding need not be interrupted. The views of Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel thus differ from those of R. Meir and R. Judah respectively.
(15) That a nursing mother need not wait more than eighteen months.
(16) In agreement w1th the view of Beth Hillel as interpreted by R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.
(17) Lit., 'one'.
(18) Who, according to R. Simeon b. Gamaliel's interpretation, require a nursing mother to postpone remarriage for no longer a period than fifteen months.
(19) Abaye, who was a disciple of R. Joseph.
(20) To consult him on the question his metayer addressed to him.
(21) Yeb. 43a.
(23) In an attempt to stop his metayer from acting on his decision.
(24) V. Glos.
(25) That was found in a slaughtered fowl (v. Tosaf. s.v. אפילו a.l.). The question of eating a properly laid egg with milk (v. next note) could of course never arise.
(26) A preserve containing milk.
(27) Though the answer is simple and obvious.
(28) Lit., 'solve'.
(29) Against the Master.
(30) When the question was addressed to him. MS.M. adds; 'because at that time I forgot it'.
(31) After her husband's death. She need not wait until the period for suckling mentioned above has expired.
(32) Lit., 'with me was (such) an event'.
(33) Before the expiration of the period prescribed for the breast feeding of the child.
(34) Lit., 'Is it so'?
(35) V. supra n. 12.
(36) The children having been entrusted to hired nurses. This actually happened in the case of his own wife Yaltha (v. She'iltoth, Wayera, XIIl and cf. Golds. a.l.).
(37) Lit., 'return', 'retract'.
(38) Hence it was safe to allow their widows to remarry (note 12). In the case of ordinary people, however, the nurse might well change her mind at any moment and the child would consequently have to fall back upon the nursing of his own mother. Should she then happen to be in a state of pregnancy the child would be in danger of starvation.
(39) R. Papa and R. Huna.
(40) The decision of R. Nahman reported by the woman,
(41) Pass. particip. of רדף 'to pursue', 'be anxious'.
(42) Lit., 'to go'.
(43) And she was there when her husband died.
(44) At the time of his death.
(45) And there he died.
(46) When her husband's death occurred.
(47) Though in all such cases it is obvious that the woman cannot be pregnant.
(48) Before remarriage or betrothal. This is a precaution against a similar marriage or betrothal on the part of a normal woman who might be pregnant.
(49) This is also the reading of She'iltoth. The reading of Tosef. Yeb. VI, 6 and 'Erub. 47a is 'R. Judah'.
(50) After the husband's death. Cf. Yeb, and 'Erub. l.c.
(51) It is consequently forbidden for any widow to marry again before the prescribed period of three months has elapsed even where the cause of the prohibition, i.e., that of possible pregnancy, does not apply. Similarly in the case of a nursing mother remarriage would obviously be forbidden even where the child died or is otherwise independent of his mother's nursing. Why then had R. Papa and R. Huna to rely solely upon the aged woman's report?
(52) R. Papa and R. Huna.
(53) Since it is possible that her action was due to her desire to marry.
(54) Lit., 'and went'.
(55) Lit., 'and this is not'.
(56) Who strangled her child.
(57) Lit., 'behold that they gave her a son to give (him) suck'.
(58) Of her own (v. infra) in order to maintain a healthy supply of milk.
(59) Lit., 'with it'.
(60) Cf. supra n. 2.
(61) כשות, v. Jast., hops (Rashi).
(62) Cf. infra p. 363, n. 4.
(63) Read קרא (cf. Rashi). Cur. edd. קרא (gourd).
(64) Lit., 'palm branch'.
(65) כמכא, 'curdled milk', 'an appetizing sauce made of milk', (cf. Fleischer to Levy, and Jast.).
(66) During her pregnancy.
(67) Read דמא (Aruk.). Cur. edd., רמא.
(68) Or 'bald', reading גורדני (cf. Rashi). Var. גרגרני 'gluttons', 'bibbers'.
(69) Or 'gluttons'.
(70) Or 'small fish' (Rashi) in brine (Jast.).
(71) Aruk (s.v. מץ), 'small eyes'.
(72) During her pregnancy.
(73) גרגושתא, a certain kind of reddish clay was believed to possess medicinal qualities as an astringent. Cf. Smith, Dict. Gk. Rom. Ant. s.v. creta, v. Jast.
(74) Lit., 'black'. Cf. Jast.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 61a
of a robust constitution. One who eats eggs will have children with big eyes. One who eats fish will have graceful children. One who eats parsley1 will have beautiful children. One who eats coriander will have stout2 children. One who eats ethrog3 will have fragrant children. The daughter of King Shapur, whose mother had eaten ethrog3 [while she was pregnant] with her, used to be presented before her father as his principal perfume. R. Huna4 related: R. Huna b. Hinena tested us [with the following question:] If she5 says that she wishes to suckle her child and he6 says that she shall not suckle it her wish is to be granted,7 for she would be the sufferer.8 What, [however, is the law] where he says that she shall suckle the child and she says that she will not suckle it? Whenever this9 is not the practice in her family we, of course, comply with her wish; what, [however, is the law] where this is the practice in her family but not in his? Do we follow the practice of his family or that of hers? And we solved his problem from this: She10 rises with him11 but does not go down with him.12 What, said R. Huna, is the Scriptural proof?13 - For she is a man's wife,14 [she is to participate] in the rise of her husband but not in his descent. R. Eleazar said, [The proof is] from here: Because she15 was the mother of all living16 she was given [to her husband]17 to live but not to suffer pain. IF SHE BROUGHT HIM ONE BONDWOMAN etc. Her other duties, however, she must obviously perform; [but why?] Let her say to him, 'I brought you a wife in my place'!18 - Because he might reply, 'That bondwoman works for me and for herself, who will work for you!' [IF SHE BROUGHT] TWO BONDWOMEN, SHE NEED NOT EVEN COOK OR SUCKLE etc. Her other duties, however, she must obviously perform; [but why]? Let her say to him, 'I brought you another wife who will work for me and for her, while the first one [will work] for you and for herself!' - Because he might reply, 'Who will do the work for our guests19 and occasional visitors!'20 IF THREE, SHE NEED NEITHER MAKE READY HIS BED. Her other duties, however, she must perform; [but why]? Let her say to him, 'I brought you a third one21 to attend upon our guests and occasional visitors!' - Because he might reply, 'The more the number of the household the more the number of guests and occasional visitors'. If so,22 [the same plea could also be advanced] even [when the number of bondwomen was] four! - [In the case of] four bondwomen, since their number is considerable they assist one another. R. Hana, or some say R. Samuel b. Nahmani, stated: [SHE BROUGHT] does not mean that she had actually brought; but: Wherever she is in a position to bring,23 even though she has not brought any. A Tanna taught: [A wife is entitled to the same privileges] whether she brought [a bondwoman] to him24 or whether she saved up for one out of her income. IF FOUR, SHE MAY LOUNGE IN AN EASY CHAIR. R. Isaac b. Hanania25 stated in the name of R. Huna: Although it has been said, SHE MAY LOUNGE IN AN EASY CHAIR she should26 nevertheless fill27 for him his cup, make ready his bed and wash his face, hands and feet.28 R. Isaac b. Hanania29 further30 stated in the name of R. Huna: All kinds of work which a wife performs for her husband a menstruant also may perform for her husband, with the exception of filling31 his cup, making ready his bed and washing his face, hands and feet.32 As to 'the making ready of his bed' Raba explained that [the prohibition] applies only in his presence but [if it is done] in his absence it does not matter.33 With regard to 'the filling of his cup'. Samuel's wife made a change34 [by serving] him with her left hand. [The wife of] Abaye placed it35 on the edge36 of the wine cask. Raba's [wife placed it] at the head-side of his couch, and R. Papa's [wife put it] on his foot-stool.37 R. Isaac b. Hanania38 further39 stated: All [foodstuffs] may be held back from the waiter40 except meat and wine.41 Said R. Hisda: [This applies only to] fat meat and old wine. Raba said: Fat meat42 throughout the year but old wine only in the Tammuz43 season.44 R. Anan b. Tahlifa related: I was once standing in the presence of Samuel when they brought him a dish of mushrooms, and, had he not given me [some of it], I would have been exposed to danger.45 I, related R. Ashi, was once standing before R. Kahana when they brought him slices46 of turnips in vinegar, and had he not given me some, I would have been exposed to danger. R. Papa said: Even a fragrant date [if not tasted may expose one to danger].45 This is the rule: Any foodstuff that has a strong flavour or an acrid taste [will expose a man to danger45 if he is not allowed to taste of it]. Both Abbuha47 b. Ihi and Minjamin b. Ihi [shewed consideration for their waiter] the one giving [him a portion] of every kind of dish48 while the other gave [him a portion]49 of one kind only.50 With the former Elijah51 conversed, with the latter he did not. [It was related of] two pious men, and others say of R. Mari and R. Phinehas the sons of R. Hisda, that one of them52 gave [a share to his waiter]53 first54 while the other gave him last.55 With the one who gave [the waiter his share] first, Elijah56 conversed; with the one, however, who gave his waiter last, Elijah did not converse.57 Amemar, Mar Zutra and R. Ashi were once sitting at the gate of King Yezdegerd58 when the King's table-steward59 passed them by. R. Ashi, observing that Mar Zutra
(1) כרפם=כרפסא, celery, parsley, or other green vegetables.
(2) Or 'fleshy', cf. בישרא, 'flesh'.
(3) אתרוגא or אתרוג, a fruit of the citrus family used (a) as one of the 'four kinds' constituting the ceremonial wreath on Tabernacles and also (b) as a preserve.
(4) Var. lec. 'Papa' (Asheri and MS.M.).
(5) The mother of a child.
(6) The father.
(7) Lit., '(we) listen to her'.
(8) Through the accumulation of the milk in her breast. Lit., 'the pain is hers'.
(9) The breast feeding of a child by its mother.
(10) A wife.
(11) Her husband.
(12) Supra 48a. A wife enjoys the advantages of her husband but not his disadvantages.
(13) For the statement cited.
(14) Gen. XX, 3 בעולת בעל of the rt. עלה 'to go up', 'rise'.
(15) Eve, symbolizing all married women.
(16) Gen. III, 20.
(17) Adam, mentioned earlier in the verse.
(18) בחריקאי, abs. הריקא, lit., 'gap'. As the bondwoman takes her place she should be exempt altogether from domestic duties,
(19) אורחי, guests that spend a month or a week.
(20) פרחא) פרחי 'flying'), visitors who pay only a short visit.
(21) Lit., 'another'.
(22) If an increase in the number of bondwomen causes a corresponding increase in that of guests and visitors.
(23) I.e., if she has the means.
(24) Her husband.
(25) MS.M., 'Hanina'.
(26) She is not compelled but is advised (v. Rashi s.v. אבל a.l.).
(27) מוזגת, rt. מזג ' to mix, sc. wine with water or spices.
(28) Such personal services are calculated to nurse a husband's affections (Rash. l.c.).
(29) MS.M. 'Hanina'.
(30) Read (v. marg. note, a.l.) ואמר. Cur. edd. omit the Waw,
(31) Cf. supra n. 3.
(32) In order to prevent undue intimacy between husband and wife during her period of Levitical uncleanness.
(33) Lit,, 'we have nothing in it'.
(34) During her 'clean days', after menstruation and prior to ritual immersion, when marital relations are still forbidden.
(35) V. supra note 10.
(36) Lit., mouth'.
(37) Cf. Golds. Others: (v. Jast.) 'chair'.
(38) MS.M. 'Hanina'.
(39) V. supra note 6.
(40) Until he has finished serving the meal.
(41) Which excite his appetite and any delay in satisfying it causes him extreme pain.
(42) Must not be held back.
(43) תמוז, the fourth month of the Hebrew calendar corresponding to July-August.
(44) When the weather is extremely hot and spicy wine is tempting.
(45) Of faintness due to the extreme pangs of hunger excited by the flavour of the dish,
(46) גרגלידי the 'upper portions'.
(47) Bomb. ed., 'Abuth'.
(48) As it was served.
(49) At the beginning of the meal, of the first dish.
(50) Keeping back the others until the conclusion of the meal.
(51) The immortal prophet, the maker of peace and herald of the Messianic era.
(52) Lit., 'master'.
(53) Of every dish he served.
(54) Before he tasted of it himself.
(55) After he himself and his guests had finished their meal.
(56) V. supra note 7.
(57) By failing to give the waiter a share as soon as the various dishes were served he caused him unnecessary pain of unsatisfied desire and hunger.
(58) Or Yezdjird, one of the Kings of Persia.
(59) אטורנגא; compound word: 'table' and 'maker'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 61b
turned pale in the face, took up with his finger [some food from the dish and] put it to his mouth. 'You have spoilt the King's meal' [the table-steward]1 cried. 'Why did you do such a thing?' he was asked [by the King's officers].1 'The man who prepared that dish',2 he3 replied, 'has rendered the King's food objectionable'. 'Why?' they asked him. 'I noticed', he replied, 'a piece of leprous swine4 flesh in it'. They examined [the dish] but did not find [such a thing]. Thereupon he took hold of his finger and put it on it,5 saying, 'Did you examine this part?' They examined it and found it [to be as R. Ashi had said]. 'Why did you rely upon a miracle?' the Rabbis asked him. 'I saw', he replied, 'the demon of leprosy hovering over him'.6 A Roman once said to a woman, 'Will you marry me?' - 'No,' she replied. Thereupon7 he brought some pomegranates, split them open and ate them in her presence. She kept on swallowing all the saliva8 that irritated her, but he did not give her [any of the fruit] until [her body] became swollen.9 Ultimately he said to her, 'If I cure you, will you marry me?' - 'Yes', she replied. Again7 he brought some pomegranates, split them and ate them in her presence. 'Spit out at once, and again and again',10 he said to her, all saliva that irritated you'. [She did so] until [the matter] issued forth from her body in the shape of a green palm-branch; and she recovered. AND WORKING IN WOOL. Only IN WOOL but not in flax. Whose [view then is represented in] our Mishnah? - It is that of R. Judah. For it was taught: [Her husband] may not compel her to wait11 upon his father or upon his son, or to put straw before his beast;12 but he may compel her to put straw before his herd.13 R. Judah said: Nor may he compel her to work in flax because flax causes one's mouth to be sore14 and makes one's lips stiff.15 This refers, however, only to Roman flax. R. ELIEZER SAID: EVEN IF SHE BROUGHT HIM A HUNDRED BONDWOMEN. R. Malkio stated in the name of R. Adda b. Ahabah: The halachah is in agreement with R. Eliezer. Said R. Hanina the son of R. Ika: [The rulings concerning] a spit,16 bondwomen17 and follicles18 [were laid down by] R. Malkio; [but those concerning] a forelock,19 wood-ash20 and cheese21 [were laid down by] R. Malkia. R. Papa, however, said: [If the statement is made on] a Mishnah or a Baraitha [the author is] R. Malkia [but if on] a reported statement22 [the author is] R. Malkio. And your mnemonic23 is, 'The Mishnah24 is queen'.25 What is the practical difference between them?26 - [The statement on] Bondwomen.27 R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL SAID etc. Is not this the same view as that of the first Tanna?28 - The practical difference between them [is the case of a woman] who plays with little cubs29 or [is addicted to] checkers.30
MISHNAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIMSELF BY VOW TO HAVE INTERCOURSE WITH HIS WIFE31 BETH SHAMMAI RULED: [SHE MUST CONSENT TO THE DEPRIVATION FOR] TWO WEEKS;32 BETH HILLEL RULED: [ONLY FOR] ONE WEEK.32 STUDENTS MAY GO AWAY33 TO STUDY THE TORAH, WITHOUT THE PERMISSION [OF THEIR WIVES FOR A PERIOD OF] THIRTY DAYS; LABOURERS [ONLY FOR] ONE WEEK. THE TIMES FOR CONJUGAL DUTY PRESCRIBED IN THE TORAH34 ARE: FOR MEN OF INDEPENDENCE,35 EVERY DAY; FOR LABOURERS, TWICE A WEEK; FOR ASS-DRIVERS,36 ONCE A WEEK; FOR CAMEL-DRIVERS,37 ONCE IN THIRTY DAYS; FOR SAILORS,38 ONCE IN SIX MONTHS. THESE ARE THE RULINGS OF R. ELIEZER.
GEMARA. What is the reason of Beth Shammai?39 - They derive their ruling from [the law relating to] a woman who bears a female child.40 And Beth Hillel? - They derive their ruling from [the law relating to] one who bears a male child.41 Why should not Beth Hillel also derive their ruling from [the law relating to] a woman who bears a female child?42 - If they had derived their ruling from [the law relating to] a woman who bears a child they should indeed have ruled thus, but [the fact is that] Beth Hillel derive their ruling from [the law of] the menstruant.43 On what principle do they44 differ? - One45 is of the opinion that the usual46 [is to be inferred] from the usual,47 and the other48 is of the opinion that what a husband has caused49 should be derived from that which he has caused.50 Rab stated: They44 differ only in the case of one who specified [the period of abstention] but where he did not specify the period it is the opinion of both that he must divorce her forthwith and give her the kethubah. Samuel, however, stated: Even where the period had not been specified the husband may delay [his divorce],51 since it might be possible for him to discover some reason52 for [the remission of] his vow.53 But surely, they54 once disputed this question; for have we not learned: If a man forbade his wife by vow to have any benefit from him he may, for thirty days, appoint a steward,55 but if for a longer period he must divorce her and give her the kethubah. And [in connection with this] Rab stated: This ruling applies only where he specified [the period] but where he did not specify it he must divorce her forthwith and give her the kethubah, while Samuel stated: Even where the period had not been specified the husband may also postpone [his divorce],51 since it might be possible for him, to discover some grounds52 for [the annulment of his vow]?56 - [Both disputes are] required. For if [their views] had been stated in the former57 only it might have been assumed that only in that case did Rab maintain his view, since [the appointment] of a steward is not possible but that in the second case58 where [the appointment] of a steward is possible he agrees with Samuel. And If the second case58 only had been stated it might have been assumed that only in that case did Samuel maintain his view59 but that in the former case60 he agrees with Rab. [Hence both statements were] necessary. STUDENTS MAY GO AWAY TO STUDY etc. For how long [may they go away] with the permission [of their wives]? - For as long as they desire.
(1) V. Rashi.
(2) Lit., 'thus'.
(3) R. Ashi.
(4) דבר אחר, lit., 'another thing', sc. 'something unnameable', e.g., swine, leprosy, idolatry and sodomy.
(5) One of the pieces of meat.
(6) Mar Zutra (v. Rashi).
(7) Lit., 'he went',
(8) That welled up in her mouth as a result of the acrid flavour of the fruit.
(9) Lit., 'it became (transparent) like glass' (v. Rashi).
(10) Lit., 'spit (and) eject' (bis).
(11) Lit., 'to stand', v. Rashi.
(12) Such as a horse or an ass or (according to another interpretation) 'male beasts' (v. Rashi and cf. Bah a.l.).
(13) Cattle or (according to the second interpretation in n. 9) 'female beasts'.
(14) Or 'swollen', v. next note.
(15) Because the spinner must frequently moisten the thread, with his saliva (v. Jast.). Aliter: 'the flax causes an offensive smell in the mouth and distends the lips' (cf. Rashi and Golds.).
(16) That has been used for the roasting of meat on a festival, may at the time be put aside (v, Bezah 28b).
(17) Whom a woman brought to her husband at her marriage (v. our Mishnah).
(18) That these, even without the pubic hairs, are sufficient indication of pubes (v. Nid. 52a).
(19) Belorith בלורית (cf. Sanh, Sonc. ed. p. 114, n. 5). An Israelite trimming the hairs of a heathen must withdraw his hand at a distance of three finger's breadth on every side of the forelock (A.Z. 29a).
(20) אפר מקלה, is forbidden to be spread on a wound because it gives the appearance of an incised imprint (v. Mak. 21).
(21) Forbidden, if made by a heathen, because it is smeared over with lard.
(22) שמעתתא, an opinion or dictum of Rabbis, not recorded in a Mishnah or Baraitha, reported by their disciples or colleagues.
(23) An aid to the recollection as to which statements were made by R. Malkia and R. Malkio respectively.
(24) מתניתא a general term for Mishnah and Baraitha in contradiction to שמעתתא (v. supra note 7).
(25) I.e., more authoritative than a reported statement. Malkia מלכיא whose name closely resembles (queen) מלכתא (and not Malkio) is to be associated with the Mishnah and the Baraitha that are designated queen.
(26) R. Hanina and R. Papa.
(27) Which is recorded in our Mishnah. According to R. Papa the comment on it must be that of R. Malkia (cf. supra note 10) while according to R. Hanina it is included among the statements attributed to R. Malkio, v, A.Z. 29a, and Mak. 21a.
(28) R. Eliezer. What difference is there for all practical purposes whether the reason for the ruling Is unchastity or idiocy?
(29) V. Jast. Or 'wooden cubs', counters in a game (cf. Levy).
(30) נדרשיר or נרדשיר nardeshir, the name of a game played on a board; 'chess' (Rashi). [So named after its inventor Ardeshir Babekan, v, Krauss T.A. III, p. 113]. A woman who spends her time in this manner may be exposed to the temptation of unchastity but is in no danger of falling into idiocy.
(31) Lit., 'IF A MAN FORBADE BY VOW HIS WIFE FROM INTERCOURSE'.
(32) After this period it is the duty of the husband either to have his vow disallowed or to release his wife by divorce.
(33) From their homes,
(34) Ex. XXI, 10.
(35) טײלין (rt. טול, Piel, 'to walk about'), men who have no need to pursue an occupation to earn their living and are able 'to walk about' idly.
(36) Who carry produce from the villages to town and whose occupation requires their absence from their home town during the whole of the week.
(37) Who travel longer distances from their homes.
(38) Whose sea voyages take them away for many months at a time.
(39) Who allow TWO WEEKS.
(40) Intercourse with whom is forbidden for two weeks (v. Lev. XII, 5),
(41) In whose case the prohibition is restricted to one week (ibid. 2).
(42) The fact that the longer period of two weeks has Pentateuchal sanction should entitle a husband to vow abstention for a similar length of time.
(43) The period of whose uncleanness is only seven days (v. Lev. XV, 19).
(44) Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.
(45) Lit., 'Master', sc. Beth Hillel.
(46) Such as a quarrel between husband and wife resulting in a vow of abstention.
(47) Menstruation which is a monthly occurrence. Births are not of such regular occurrence.
(48) Beth Shammai.
(49) Abstention on account of his vow.
(50) Birth. Menstruation is not the result of a husband's action.
(51) For two weeks according to Beth Shammai or one week according to Beth Hillel.
(52) פתח, lit., 'a door'; some ground on which to justify his plea that had he known it he would never have made that vow; v, Ned, 21.
(53) A competent authority, if satisfied with the reason, may under such conditions disallow a vow.
(54) Rab and Samuel.
(55) To supply his wife's needs.
(56) Cf. supra n. 11. Why then should Rab and Samuel unnecessarily repeat the same arguments?
(57) The vow against marital duty.
(58) A vow forbidding other benefits.
(59) Since the appointment of a steward is feasible.
(60) The vow against marital duty.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 62a
What should be the usual periods?1 - Rab said: One month at the college2 and one month at home; for it is said in the Scriptures, In any matter of the courses which came in and went out month by month throughout all the months of the year.3 R. Johanan, however, said: One month at the college and two months at home; for it is said in the Scriptures, A month they were in Lebanon and two months at home.4 Why does not Rab also derive his opinion from this text?4 - The building of the holy Temple is different [from the study of the Torah] since it could be carried on by others.5 Then why does not R. Johanan derive his opinion from the former text?3 - There [the conditions were] different because every man was in receipt of relief.6 Rab said:7 A sigh breaks down half of the human constitution,8 for it is said in Scripture, Sigh, therefore, thou son of man; with the breaking of thy loins9 and with bitterness shalt thou sigh.10 R. Johanan, however, said: Even all the human constitution, for it is said in Scripture, And it shall be when they say unto thee: Wherefore sighest thou? that thou shalt say: Because of the tidings, for it cometh; and every heart shall melt, and all hands shall be slack, and every spirit shall faint, and all knees shall drip with water.11 As to R. Johanan, is it not also written, 'With the breaking of thy loins'? - [The meaning of] this is that when [the breaking] begins it does so from the loins. And as to Rab, is it not also written, 'And every heart shall melt, and all hands shall be slack, and every spirit shall be faint'? - The report of the holy Temple is different since [the calamity] was very severe. An Israelite and an idolater were once walking together on the same road and the idolater could not keep pace with the Israelite. Reminding him of the destruction of the holy Temple [the latter] grew faint and sighed; but still the idolater was unable to keep pace with him. 'Do you not say', the idolater asked him, 'that a sigh breaks half of the human body'? - 'This applies only', the other replied, 'to a fresh calamity but not to this one with which we are familiar. As people say: A woman who is accustomed to bereavements is not alarmed [when another occurs]'. MEN OF INDEPENDENCE EVERY DAY. What is meant by tayyalin?12 - Raba replied: Day students.13 Said Abaye to him: [These are the men] of whom it is written in Scripture, It is vain for you14 that ye rise early, and sit up late, ye that eat of the bread of toil; so He giveth15 unto those who chase their sleep away;16 and 'these',17 R. Isaac explained, 'are the wives of the scholars,18 who chase the sleep from their eyes19 in this world and achieve thereby the life of the world to come',20 and yet you Say. Day students'!21 - [The explanation]. however, said Abaye, is in agreement [with a statement] of Rab who said [a man of independence is one.] for instance, like R. Samuel b. Shilath22 who eats of his own, drinks of his own and sleeps in the shadow of his mansion23 and a king's officer24 never passes his door.25 When Rabin came26 he stated: [A man of independence is one]. for instance, like the pampered men of the West,27 R. Abbahu28 was once standing in a bath house, two slaves supporting him, when [the floor of] the bath house collapsed under him.29 By chance he was near a column [upon which] he climbed30 taking up the slaves with him.31 R. Johanan was once ascending a staircase, R. Ammi and R. Assi supporting him, when the staircase collapsed under him. He himself climbed up and brought them up with him. Said the Rabbis to him, 'Since [your strength is] such, why do you require support?32 - 'Otherwise', he replied. what [strength] will I reserve for the time of my old age?' FOR LABOURERS TWICE A WEEK. Was it not, however, taught: Labourers, once a week? - R. Jose the son of R. Hanina replied: This is no difficulty; the former33 [speaks of labourers] who do their work in their own town while the latter [speaks of those] who do their work in another town - So it was also taught: Labourers [perform their marital duties] twice a week. This applies only [to those] who do their work in their own town, but for those who do their work in another town [the time is only] once a week FOR ASS-DRIVERS ONCE A WEEK. Rabhah son of R. Hanan34 said to Abaye: Did the Tanna35 go to all this trouble36 to teach us [merely the law relating to] the man of independence37 and the labourer?38 - The other replied: No;
(1) That students should (a) be permitted to be away from their wives even with their consent, and (b) remain at home (v. Rashi). According to one opinion the restrictions spoken of here apply to labourers only. Students are allowed greater freedom. (V. Tosaf. s.v. אלא, a.l.).
(2) Lit., 'here'.
(3) I Chron. XXVII, emphasis on 'month by month'.
(4) I Kings V, 28.
(5) Solomon had sufficient men for the work and required each group for no longer than one month out of every three. The study of the Torah demands more time.
(6) The stipend allowed by the king. This allowance enabled a husband to provide a comfortable living for his wife who, in return, consented to his absence from home every alternate month. In the case of students, however, whose study brings no worldly reward to their wives, the period of absence from home should not exceed one month in every three.
(7) The following discussion is introduced here on account of the difference of opinion between Rab and R. Johanan on the application of Scriptural texts, which is characteristic of this as of the previous discussion.
(8) Lit., 'body'.
(9) The loins are in the middle of the body.
(10) Ezek. XXI, 11.
(11) Ibid. 12. The prophet's sigh is accompanied by shattering effects on all parts of the body.
(12) Cf. supra p. 369, n, 5.
(13) בני פירקי, lit., 'sons of the lesson', i.e., students domiciled in the college town who are able to live in their own homes and to attend the college for lessons only.
(14) This admonition is addressed to those who pursue worldly occupations.
(15) Without toiling for it.
(16) Ps. CXXVII, 2. E.V., unto his beloved. לידידו is homiletically treated as coming from the rt. נדד 'to shake', 'chase away'.
(17) 'Those who chase their sleep away'.
(18) תלמידי חכמים. V. Glos. s.v. talmid hakam.
(19) In sitting up all night waiting for the return of their husbands from the house of study.
(20) As a reward for the consideration they shew to their studious husbands. Since the wives of students who come from other towns would not be expecting their husbands to return home every day, the reference must obviously be to those who live in the college town, i,e., the day students, which proves that even these remain all night at the college.
(21) How could men who spend their nights in study be expected to perform the marital duty daily?
(22) A teacher of children (v. supra 50a) who made an unostentatious but comfortable living.
(23) אפדנא 'mansion', 'palace', i,e., his own home (cf. 'the Englishman's home is his castle').
(24) פריסתקא, MS. M. דרוקא 'a detachment of soldiers',
(25) To exact from him service or money. As his wants were moderate, he had no need to be under obligation to anyone for his food or drink and had no need to go fat to seek his livelihood. A man in such a position might well be described as a man of independence.
(26) From Palestine to Babylon.
(27) palestine, which lay to the west of Babylon where this statement was made,
(28) This is told in illustration of the physical strength enjoyed by the Palestinians,
(29) And the three were in danger of falling into the pool of water over which the floor was built,
(30) Grasping it with one hand,
(31) With his other hand.
(32) Lit., 'to support him'.
(33) Lit., 'here'. Our Mishnah.
(34) MS.M., R. Hanin b. Papa.
(35) The author of the first clause of out Mishnah, which deals with the ease of a vow.
(36) Lit., 'fold himself up'.
(37) V. supra p. 369. n. 5.
(38) Whose times only could be affected by an abstinence of ONE WEEK (Beth HIllel) or TWO WEEKS (Beth Shammai). The other classes of persons enumerated, whose times are once in thirty days or at longer intervals, would not thereby be affected.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 62b
to all.1 But was it not stated ONCE IN SIX MONTHS?2 - One who has bread in his basket is not like one who has no bread in his basket.3 Said Rabbah4 son of R. Hanan to Abaye: What [is the law where] an ass-driver becomes a camel-driver?5 - The other replied: A woman prefers one kab6 with frivolity to ten kab6 with abstinence.7 FOR SAILORS, ONCE IN SIX MONTHS. THESE ARE THE WORDS OF R. ELIEZER. R. Beruna8 stated in the name of Rab:9 The halachah follows R. Eliezer. R. Adda b. Ahabah, however, stated in the name of Rab: This is the view of R. Eliezer only. but the Sages ruled: Students may go away to study Torah without the permission [of their wiveseven for] two or three years.10 Raba stated: The Rabbis11 relied on R. Adda b. Ahabah12 and act accordingly at the risk of [losing] their lives.13 Thus R. Rehumi who was frequenting [the school] of Raba at Mahuza14 used to return home on the Eve of every Day of Atonement. On one occasion15 he was so attracted by his subject [that he forgot to return home]. His wife was expecting [him every moment, saying.] 'He is coming soon,16 he is coming soon'16 As he did not arrive she became so depressed that tears began to flow from her eyes. He was [at that moment] sitting on a roof. The roof collapsed under him and he was killed.17 How often18 are scholars to perform their marital duties? - Rab Judah in the name of Samuel replied: Every Friday night.19 That bringeth forth its fruit in its season,20 Rab Judah, and some say R. Huna, or again. as others say. R. Nahman, stated: This [refers to the man] who performs his marital duty every Friday night.21 Judah22 the son of R. Hiyya and son-in-law of R. Jannai was always spending his time23 in the school house but every Sabbath eve24 he came home. Whenever he arrived the people saw25 a pillar of light moving before him. Once he was so attracted by his subject of study [that he forgot to return home]. Not Seeing26 that Sign. R. Jannai said to those [around him], 'Lower27 his bed,28 for had Judah been alive he would not have neglected the performance of his marital duties'. This [remark] was like an error that proceedeth from the ruler,29 for [in consequence] Judah's30 soul returned to its eternal rest. Rabbi was engaged in the arrangements for the marriage of his son into the family of R. Hiyya,31 but when the kethubah32 was about to be written the bride passed away.33 'Is there, God forbid', said Rabbi, 'any taint [in the proposed union]?'34 An enquiry was instituted35 into [the genealogy of the two] families [and it was discovered that] Rabbi descended from Shephatiah36 the son of Abital37 while R. Hiyya descended from Shimei a brother of David.38 Later39 he40 was engaged in preparations for the marriage of his son into the family of R. Jose b. Zimra. It was agreed that he41 should spend twelve years at the academy.42 When the girl was led before him41 he said to them, 'Let it43 be six years'. When they made her pass before him [a second time] he said,'I would rather marry [her first] and then proceed [to the academy]'. He felt abashed44 before his father, but the latter said to him.'My son, you45 have the mind of your creator;46 for in Scripture it is written first, Thou bringest them in and plantest them47 and later it is written, And let them make Me a sanctuary. that I may dwell among them.48 [After the marriage] he departed and spent twelve years at the academy. By the time he returned his wife49 had lost the power of procreation. 'What shall we do?', said Rabbi. 'Should we order him to divorce her, it would be said: This poor soul waited in vain! Were he to marry another woman, it would be said: The latter is his wife and the other his mistress.' He prayed for mercy to be vouchsafed to her, and she recovered. R. Hanania b. Hakinai was about to go away to the academy towards the conclusion of R. Simeon b. Yohai's wedding. 'Wait for me', the latter said to him, 'until I am able to join you'.50 He, however, did not wait for him but went away alone and spent twelve years at the academy. By the time he returned the streets of the town were altered and he was unable to find the way51 to his home. Going down to the river bank and sitting down there he heard a girl being addressed thus: 'Daughter of Hakinai, O, daughter of Hakinai, fill up your pitcher and let us go!' 'It is obvious',52 he thought, 'that the girl is ours', and he followed her. [When they reached the house] his wife was sitting and sifting flour. She53 lifted up her eyes and seeing him, was so overcome with joy54 that she fainted.55 'O, Lord of the universe',[the husband] prayed to Him, 'this poor soul; is this her reward?'56 And so he prayed for mercy to be vouchsafed to her and she revived. R. Hama b. Bisa went away [from home and] spent twelve years at the house of study. When he returned he said, 'I will not act as did b. Hakina'.57 He therefore entered the [local] house of study and sent word to his house. Meanwhile his son, R. Oshaia58 entered, sat down before him and addressed to him a question on [one of the] subjects of study. [R. Hama]. seeing how well versed he was in his studies, became very depressed. 'Had I been here,'59 he said, 'l also could have had such a child'.- [When] he entered his house his son came in, whereupon [the father] rose before him, believing that he wished to ask him some [further] legal questions. 'What60 father', his wife chuckled,61 'stands up before a son!' Rami b. Hama applied to him [the following Scriptural text:] And a threefold cord is not quickly broken62 is a reference to R. Oshaia, son of R. Hania. son of Bisa.63 R. Akiba was a shepherd of Ben Kalba Sabua.64 The latter's daughter. seeing how modest and noble [the shepherd] was, said to him, 'Were I to be betrothed to you. would you go away to [study at] an academy?' 'Yes', he replied. She was then secretly betrothed to him and sent him away. When her father heard [what she had done] he drove her from his house and forbade her by a vow to have any benefit from his estate. [R. Akiba] departed. and spent twelve years at the academy. When he returned home he brought with him twelve thousand disciples. [While in his home town] he heard an old man saying to her, 'How long
(1) Even in respect of the other classes a vow may be made for the specified periods only.
(2) In the case of sailors. How could these be affected by an abstention of ONE WEEK or TWO WEEKS?
(3) Proverb (Yoma 18b. Yeb. 32b). The latter experiences the pangs of hunger much more than the former who can eat the bread should he decide to use it up. A sailor's wife may partially satisfy her desires by the hope that her husband may at any moment return. A vow extinguishes all her hope; and she must not, therefore, be allowed to suffer longer than the periods indicated.
(4) Vat. 'Raba' (MS.S. and Asheri).
(5) I.e., may an ass-driver become a camel-driver without the permission of his wife, in view of the longer absence from home which the new occupation will involve.
(6) V. Glos.
(7) Proverb, (Sotah 20a, 21b). A woman prefers a poor living in the enjoyment of the company of her husband to a more luxurious one in his absence. She would, therefore, rather have her husband for a longer period at home, though as a result he would be earning less, than be deprived of his company for longer periods. though as a result he would be earning more.
(8) Vat. lec. 'Mattena' (Alfasi).
(9) Vat. Iec, 'Raba' (Asheri).
(10) And the halachah would be in agreement with the Sages who ate the majority.
(11) I.e, his (Raba's) contemporaries.
(12) According to whose statement the Sages permitted students to leave their homes for long periods (v. supra n. 3).
(13) I.e., they die before their time as a penalty for the neglect of their wives (v. Rashi).
(14) A town on the Tigris, noted for Its commerce and its large Jewish population.
(15) Lit., 'one day'.
(16) Lit., 'now',
(17) Lit., 'his soul rested', sc, came to its eternal test.
(18) Lit., 'when'.
(19) Lit., 'from the eve of Sabbath to the eve of Sabbath'.
(20) Ps. 1,3.
(23) Lit., 'was going and sitting'.
(24) בי שמשי 'twilight', sc, of the Sabbath eve.
(25) Read with MS.M., יהװ קא חזו Cur. edd., הוה...חזי (sing.) may refer to R. Jannai.
(26) Cf. supra p' 375' n. 18,
(27) Lit., 'bend', a mark of mourning for the dead,
(29) Cf. Eccl, X, 5'
(30) So MS.M., reading דיהודה.
(31) He was about to marry R. Hiyya's daughter (Rashi).
(32) V. Glos,
(33) Lit,, 'the soul of the girl rested'. V. supra p' 375, n. 10.
(34) The unexpected death of the bride being due to providential intervention to prevent an undesirable union,
(35) Lit,, 'they sat and looked in',
(36) David's son (II Sam, III,4).
(37) One of David's wives (ibid.).
(38) As the latter was not a descendent of the anointed king's family it was not proper for his daughter to be united in marriage with one who was.
(39) Lit,, 'he went'.
(41) Rabbi's son.
(42) The marriage to be celebrated at the end of this period.
(43) The period of study prior to the marriage.
(44) On account of his apparent fickleness,
(45) In being influenced by affection to shorten the courting interval and to hasten the marriage day.
(46) Who also hastened the day of His union with Israel,
(47) Ex, XV, 17, i.e,, only after settlement in the promised land was the sanctuary (the symbol of the union between God and Israel) to be built.
(48) Ex. XXV, 8, i.e., while still in the wilderness. (V. p. 376,n.22).
(49) Having been separated from him for more than ten years (Rashi, cf. Yeb. 34b).
(50) At the conclusion of the marriage festivities.
(51) Lit., 'did not know (how) to go'.
(52) Lit., 'infer from this'.
(53) Read with MS.M., דלי Cut. edd., דל עינה may be rendered 'he lifted up her eye' i.e., he attracted her attention. (v. Jast. s.v. סוי).
(54) Cf. supra p' 355, n. 12.
(55) Lit., 'her spirit fled'.
(56) For depriving herself of her husband so many years for the sake of the Torah.
(57) Who entered his house unexpectedly and thereby neatly caused the death of his wife.
(58) Who was unknown to his father.
(59) I.e., had he remained at home and attended to the education of his son.
(60) Lit., is 'there'.
(61) Lit., 'said'.
(62) Eccl. IV, is.
(63) Three generations of scholars all living at the same time, v. B.B. Sone. ed. p. 537.0.8.
(64) One of the three richest men of Jerusalem at the time of the Vespasian siege. V. Git. 56a.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 63a
will you lead the life of a living widowhood?' 'If he would listen to me,' she replied. 'he would spend [in study] another twelve years'. Said [R. Akiba]: 'It is then with her consent that I am acting'. and he departed again and spent another twelve years at the academy. When he finally returned he brought with him twenty-four thousand disciples. His wife heard [of his arrival] and went out to meet him, when her neighbours said to her, 'Borrow some respectable clothes and put them on', but she replied: A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast.1 On approaching him she fell upon her face and kissed his feet. His attendants were about to thrust her aside, when [R. Akiba] cried to them, 'Leave her alone, mine and yours are hers'.2 Her father, on hearing that a great man had come to the town, said, 'I shall go to him; perchance he will invalidate my vow',3 When he came to him [R. Akiba] asked, 'Would you have made your vow if you had known that he was a great man?' '[Had he known]' the other replied. 'even one chapter or even one Single halachah [I would not have made the vow]'. He then said to him, 'I am the man'.4 The other fell upon his face and kissed his feet and also gave him half of his wealth.5 The daughter of R. Akiba acted in a similar way6 towards Ben Azzai. This is indeed an illustration of the proverb:7 'Ewe follows ewe; a daughter's acts are like those of her mother.' R. Joseph the son of Raba [was] sent [by] his father to the academy under8 R. Joseph. and they arranged for him [to stay there for] six years. Having been there three years and the eve of the Day of Atonement approaching. he said, 'I would go and see my family'. When his father heard [of his premature arrival] he took up a weapon and went out to meet him. 'You have remembered', he said to him, 'your mistress!'9 Another version: He said to him, 'You have remembered your dove!'10 They got involved in a quarrel and neither the one nor the other ate of the last meal before the fast.11
MISHNAH. IF A WIFE REBELS12 AGAINST HER HUSBAND. HER KETHUBAH13 MAY BE REDUCED BY SEVEN DENARII14 A WEEK.15 R. JUDAH SAID: SEVEN TROPAICS.16 FOR HOW LONG MAY THE REDUCTION CONTINUE TO BE MADE? UNTIL [A SUM] CORRESPONDING TO HER KETHUBAH [HAS ACCUMULATED].17 R. JOSE SAID: REDUCTIONS MAY BE MADE CONTINUALLY UNTIL [SUCH TIME] WHEN, SHOULD AN INHERITANCE FALL TO HER FROM ELSEWHERE, [HER HUSBAND] WILL BE IN A POSITION TO COLLECT FROM HER THE [FULL AMOUNT DUE]. SIMILARLY, IF A HUSBAND REBELS AGAINST HIS WIFE, AN ADDITION OF THREE18 DENARII A WEEK IS MADE TO HER KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH SAID: THREE TROPAICS.
GEMARA. REBELS in what [respect]? - R. Huna replied: [In respect] of conjugal Union .R. Jose the son of R. Hanina replied: [In respect] of work. We learned, SIMILARLY, IF A HUSBAND REBELS AGAINST HIS WIFE. Now according to him who said, '[In respect] of conjugal union [this ruling] is quite logical and intelligible;19 but according to him who said, '[In respect] of work', is he20 [it may be objected] under any obligation [at all to work] for her?21 - Yes,22 [rebellion being possible] when he declares 'I will neither sustain nor support [my wife]' - But did not Rab state: If a man says. 'I will neither sustain nor support [my wife]'. he must divorce her and give her the kethubah?23 - Is it not necessary to consult him [before ordering him to divorce her]?24 An objection was raised: The same25 [law26 is applicable to a woman] betrothed27 or married, even to a menstruant, even to a sick woman and even to one who was awaiting the decision of the levir.28 Now,29 according to him who said, '[In respect] of conjugal union' it is quite correct to mention the sick,
(1) A quotation from Prov. XII, 10.
(2) I.e., it is thanks to her suggestion and encouragement that he and, through him, his disciples, were able to acquire their knowledge.
(3) Which a competent authority may under certain conditions do.
(4) Lit., 'he'.
(5) Lit., money'.
(6) As her mother had done towards R. Akiba
(7) Lit., 'and this it is that people say'.
(8) Lit., 'before'.
(9) זונתך, Lit., 'your harlot'. Var. lec. 'thy mate', 'thy beloved'.
(10) יונתך This version is obtained by the slight interchange of a י for a ז (cf. Supra n. 8).
(11) לא איפסיק (rt. פסק, 'to separate', sever', 'cease') i.e., did not eat the סעודה המפסקת, the 'meal which, so to speak. causes one to cease' the eating of food until the conclusion of the Day of Atonement after nightfall On the following day.
(12) The term is explained in the Gemara infra.
(13) V. Glos.
(14) Plural of denar. V. Glos.
(15) This is regarded as the equivalent of the value of the seven kinds of work (supra 59b) a woman is expected to perform for her husband. (Cf. M.R. Gen. LII).
(16) Half a denar.
(17) Then she may be divorced, and cannot claim her kethubah.
(18) Corresponding to the three obligations of a husband, prescribed in Ex. XXI, 10.
(19) Since a husband, like a wife, might sometimes decide to rebel in this respect.
(20) A husband.
(21) Surely not. How then, in this respect. is rebellion applicable to him?
(22) I.e., his duty to maintain and support his wife corresponds to her duty to work for him.
(23) Infra 77a. presumably at once, while according to Out Mishnah every week AN ADDITION . . . IS MADE TO HER KETHUBAH.
(24) Of course it is; since he may quite possibly be persuaded to resume his obligations. It is during this period of negotiation that the weekly additions are made to the kethuhah.
(25) Lit., '(it is) one to me'.
(26) Relating to the rebellion of a wife against her husband.
(27) When she declares that she will refuse to marry.
(28) Infra 64a. שומרת יבם, the widow of a man who died childless, who must either be taken in marriage by her deceased husband's brother or submit to halizah (v. Glos.) from him.
(29) Cut. edd. insert in parentheses: 'This is correct according to him who said "(In respect) of work'; but according to him who said (In respect) of conjugal union", is a menstruant capable of conjugal union? - He can answer you: One who has bread in his basket is not like one who has none'. Others say, v, infra p. 382.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 63b
but according to him who said, '[In respect] of work', is a sick woman [it may be objected] fit to do work?1 - The fact,however, is that2 [in respect] of conjugal union all3 agree that [a wife who refuses] is regarded as a rebellious woman.4 They3 differ only in respect of work. One Master is of the opinion that [for a refusal] of work [a wife] is not to be regarded as rebellious and the other Master holds the opinion [that for a refusal] of work also [a wife] is regarded as rebellious. [To turn to] the main text,5 If a wife rebels against her husband, her kethubah may be reduced by seven denarii a week. R. Judah said: Seven tropaics. Our Masters, however, took a second vote6 [and ordained] that an announcement regarding her shall be made on four consecutive Sabbaths and that then the court shall send her [the following warning]: 'Be it known to you that even if your kethubah is for a hundred maneh7 you have forfeited it'.8 The same [law is applicable to a woman] betrothed or married, even to a menstruant, even to a sick woman, and even to one who was awaiting the decision of the levir.9 Said R. Hiyya b. Joseph to Samuel: Is a menstruant capable of conjugal union?10 - The other replied: One who has bread in his basket is not like one who has no bread in his basket11 Rami b. Hama stated: The announcement concerning her12 is made only in the Synagogues and the houses of study. Said Raba: This may be proved by a deduction,13 it having been taught,'Four Sabbaths consecutively'.14 This is decisive.15 Rami b. Hania further stated: [The warning] is sent to her16 from the court twice, once before the announcement and once after the announcement. R. Nahman b. R. Hisda stated in his discourse: The halachah is in agreement with our Masters.17 Raba remarked: This is senseless.18 Said R. Nahman b. Isaac to him, 'Wherein lies19 its senselessness? I, in fact, told it to him, and it was in the name of a great man that I told it to him. And who is it? R. Jose the son of R. Hanina!' Whose view then is he20 following? - The first of the undermentioned.21 For it was stated: Raba said in the name of R. Shesheth, 'The halachah is that she16 is to be consulted',22 while R. Huna b. Judah stated in the name of R. Shesheth, 'The halachah is that she is not to be consulted'.23 What is to be understood by 'a rebellious woman'?24 - Amemar said: [One] who says. 'I like him25 but wish to torment him'.26 If she said, however, 'He is repulsive to me', no pressure is to be brought to bear upon her.27 Mar Zutra ruled: Pressure is to be brought to bear upon her.28 Such a case once occurred, and Mar Zutra exercised pressure upon the woman and [as a result of the reconciliation that ensued] R. Hanina of Sura29 was born from the re-union. This, however,30 was not [the right thing to do]. [The successful] result] was due to the help of providence.31 R. Zebid's daughter-in-law rebelled [against her husband]32 and took possession of her silk [cloak].33 Amemar, Mar Zutra and R. Ashi were sitting together34 and R. Gamda sat beside them; and in the course of the session they laid down the law: [If a wife] rebels she forfeits her worn-out35 clothing that may still be in existence. Said R. Gamda to them, 'Is it because R. Zebid is a great man that you would flatter him? Surely R. Kahana stated that Raba had only raised this question36 but had not solved it'. Another version:37 In the course of their session they decided: [If a wife] rebels she does not forfeit her worn-out clothing38 that may still be in existence. Said R. Gamda to them,
(1) Naturally not. How then could she in this respect be guilty of rebellion?
(2) Lit., 'but'.
(3) R. Huna and R. Jose.
(4) And the Baraitha cited deals with conjugal union.
(5) Of the quotation, 'the same law etc.' cited supra 63a ad fin.
(6) Lit., 'they (i.e., their votes) were counted again'.
(7) V. Glos.
(8) At the end of the four weeks.
(9) Cf. Tosef. Keth. V., and supra notes 1 and 2.
(10) Obviously not; she being forbidden to her husband until the conclusion of the days of her Levitical uncleanness and the seven subsequent 'clean days'.
(11) Cf. supra p. 374. n. 9 The woman's declared rebellion and the man's knowledge that even during her cleanness she will remain forbidden. aggravate the pain of the deprivation and entitle him to immediate redress.
(12) A woman who rebelled against her husband
(13) From the very text of the ordinance.
(14) Emphasis on Sabbaths' days of test when everybody is free from work and able to attend Synagogue and the houses of study.
(15) Lit., 'Infer from this'.
(16) A woman who rebelled against her husband.
(17) Whose ruling is recorded in the Baraitha just cited (v. supra p. 381. n. 12 and text).
(18) בורכא (cf. בור 'empty'. uncultivated'). 'a hollow, senseless statement'. The addition of the כ is on the analogy of words like ערכך (Levy). Others derive if from ברך 'cave out' (v. Jast.)
(19) Lit , 'what'.
(20) Raba who regarded the statement as senseless.
(21) Lit., 'like that'
(22) With a view to inducing her to resume her duties, and during the negotiations. contrary to the view of our Masters, only the weekly sum mentioned is deducted from her kethubah. [On this interpretation which follows Rashi, Raba decides in accordance with our Mishnah against our Masters. Tosaf. explains differently R Nahman, In stating that the halachah is with our Masters, meant to exclude thereby the view of Rami B Hama regarding the two warnings. He maintained that the words of our masters had to be taken as they stand, with no mention of any warning before the proclamation. This is however rejected by Raba, who declares, on the authority of R. Shesheth, the halachah to be that a warning is given prior to the proclamation The warning will, In this case, be that she will lose the while of her kethubah should she still prove recalcitrant after the proclamation].
(23) [On Tosaf. interpretation. (Previous note) the meaning is she is not warned before but only after the proclamation, agreeing with R. Nahman b. R. Hisda].
(24) Heb. moredeth, whose divorce is to be delayed and deductions are in the meantime to be made from her Kethubah.
(25) Her husband.
(26) In this case divorce is delayed in the hope that the weekly reductions of her kethubah and the persuasions used by the court will induce her to change her attitude.
(27) [The husband can, if he wishes, divorce her forthwith without giving her kethubah; v. Rashi and Tosaf. s.v. אבל.]
(28) V. Supsra note 4.
(29) Supra was the seat of the famous school of Rab, in the South of Babylonia.
(30) Though the pressure in this case resulted to the birth of a great man.
(31) Lit., 'assistance of heaven'
(32) [She said, 'He is repulsive to me' (Rashi) v. infra p. 384, n. 5].
(33) Which she had brought with her when she married, and which was assessed and entered to her Kethubah.
(34) Lit., 'sat'.
(35) V supra n. 11
(36) As to the forfeiture of worn-out clothes.
(37) Lit., 'there are who say'.
(38) V. supra p. 383, n. 21.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 64a
'Is it because R. Zebid is a great man1 that you turn the law against him? Surely R.Kahana stated that Raba had only raised the question but had not solved it'. Now that it has not been stated what the law is,2 [such clothing] is not to be taken away from her if she has already seized them, but if she has not yet seized them they are not to be given to her. We also make her wait twelve months, a [full] year. for her divorce,3 and during these twelve months she receives no maintenance from her husband.4 R. Tobi b. Kisna stated in the name of Samuel: A certificate of rebellion may be written against a betrothed woman but no such certificate may be written against one who is awaiting the decision of the levir.5 An objection was raised: The same [law6 is applicable to a woman] betrothed or married, even to a menstruant, even to a sick woman and even to one who was awaiting the decision of the levir!7 - This is no contradiction. The one8 refers to the case where the man claimed her;9 the other10 to that where she claimed him.11 For R. Tahlifa b. Abimi stated in the name of Samuel: If he claimed her9 he is attended to;12 if she claimed him she is not attended to.13 To what case did you explain the statement of Samuel14 as referring? To the one where she claimed him?15 [But if so] instead of Saying16 'A certificate of rebellion may be written against a betrothed woman' it should have been said, 'On behalf of a betrothed woman'!17 - This is no difficulty. Read, 'On behalf of a betrothed woman'.18 Wherein does a woman awaiting the decision of the levir differ [from the man] that no [certificate of rebellion should be issued on her behalf]? Obviously because we tell her, 'Go, you are not commanded [to marry]';19 [but. then.] a betrothed woman also should be told, 'Go, you are not commanded [to marry]'!19 Again should [it be explained to be one] where she comes with the plea Saying. 'I wish to have a staff in my hand and a spade for my burial',20 [this then should] also apply to a woman awaiting the decision of the levir if she comes with such a plea! - [The proper explanation] then [must be this]: Both statements21 [refer to the case] where the man claimed,22 and yet there is no difficulty. since one23 may refer24 to the performance of halizah and the other25 to that of the levirate marriage. For R. Pedath stated in the name of R. Johanan: [If the levir] claimed her for the performance of halizah his request is to be attended to,26 but if he claimed her for the levirate marriage his request is disregarded.27 Why [is he] not [attended to when he claims her] for the levirate marriage? Naturally because we tell him, 'Go and marry another woman'; [but then even when he claims her] for the performance of halizah could we not also tell him, 'Go and marry another woman'? Again should the answer be: [Because] he can plead. 'As she is bound to me28 no other wife will be given me'. Here also29 [could he not plead] 'As she is bound to me no other wife will be given to me'? - [The proper explanation] then [is this]: Both statements30 [deal with one] who claimed her for the levirate marriage. but there is really no difficulty. one31 being32 in agreement with the earlier Mishnah while the other is32 in agreement with the latter Mishnah. For we have learned: The commandment of the levirate marriage must take precedence over that of halizah.33 [This was the case] in earlier days when [levirs] had the intention of observing the commandment - Now, however, when their intention is not the fulfilment of the commandment, it has been ruled that the commandment of halizah takes precedence over that of the levirate marriage.34 FOR HOW LONG MAY THE REDUCTION CONTINUE TO BE MADE? etc. What [is meant by] TROPAICS? R. Shesheth replied: [one tropaic is] an istira. And how much is an istira? - Half a zuz.35 So it was also taught: R. Judah said: Three tropaics which [amount to] nine ma'ah35 [the reduction being at the rate of] one ma'ah and a half per day.36 R. Hiyya b. Joseph asked Of Samuel: In what respect is he37 different [from his wife] that he is allowed [a reduction] for the Sabbath,38 and in what respect is she different [from him] that she is not allowed [an addition] for the Sabbath?39 - In her case,40 since it is a reduction that is made, [the seventh tropaic the husband gains] does not have the appearance of Sabbath pay. In his case, however,41 since it is additions that are made,
(1) And would humbly accept the ruling.
(2) Lit., 'neither thus nor thus'.
(3) To afford her an opportunity of changing her attitude.
(4) [Rashi and Adreth among others restrict this procedure to a rebellion out of repulsion, a case illustrated in their view by the daughter-in-law of R. Zebid (v. Supra p. 383, n. 10). Where the rebellion was out of malice she loses her kethubah and dowry completely after the warning at the end of four weeks. Maim., on the other hand, applies it to rebellion out of malice. In the case of rebellion out of repulsion, she is granted a divorce immediately because 'she is not a captive to her husband that she should be forced to have intercourse with him', and though she forfeits her kethubah, she loses none of her dowry (v. Maim. Yad. Ishuth XIV, 8, and commentaries a.l.). In his view the case of R. Zebid's daughter-in-law was one of rebellion out of malice].
(5) Shomereth yabam, v. Glos,
(6) Of. 'a rebellious 'woman'.
(7) Supra 63a, notes.
(8) The Baraitha cited (v. suprs n. 8).
(9) And she refused him.
(10) Samuel's ruling reported by R. Tobi.
(11) And he refused to marry her.
(12) And he is awarded a certificate of rebellion against her.
(13) She is not entitled to a certificate of rebellion against him, which should enable her to obtain the weekly additions to her Kethubah (v. our Mishnah). The reason is given infa. Thus it has been shown that there is a legal difference between the case where he makes the claim and between the case where she makes the claim.
(14) V. p. 384, n. 11.
(15) V. p. 384, n. 12.
(16) Lit., 'that'.
(17) Against her husband.
(18) The emendation involving only the slight change of על to ל.
(19) A woman is under no obligation to propagate the race (v. Yeb. 65b).
(20) I.e., a son who will provide for her while she is alive and arrange for her burial when she dies.
(21) Lit., 'these and these', the statement reported in the name of Samuel as well as the other cited from 63a Supra.
(22) And she refused him.
(23) The Baraitha cited (v. supra p. 384, n. 8).
(24) Lit., 'here'.
(25) Samuel's ruling reported by R.Tobi.
(26) V.supra p.384, n. 13.
(27) The reason is given anon in the latter Mishnah cited.
(28) By the marital bond which only halizah can sever.
(29) When he claims her for levitate marriage.
(30) V. supra p. 385. n. 8.
(31) V. supra p. 385. n. 10.
(32) Lit., 'here'.
(33) A woman who refused the levir's claim was, therefore, guity of rebellion, and a certificate against her was issued to the levit.
(34) No certificate of rebellion may, therefore, be issued against a woman who refuses such a marriage.
(35) V. Glos.
(36) The week consisting of six working days.
(37) The husband.
(38) Seven tropaics corresponding to all the days of the week including the Sabbath day.
(39) The nine ma'ah at the rate of one and a half per day corresponding to six days only (cf. supra n. 9).
(40) I.e. , when the woman rebels.
(41) When the man rebels against his wife.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 64b
[another addition for the seventh day] would have the appearance of Sabbath pay. R. Hiyya b. Joseph [further] asked of Samuel: What [is the reason for the distinction] between a man who rebels [against his wife] and a woman who rebels [against her husband]?1 - The other replied. 'Go and learn it from the market of the harlots; who hires whom?'2 Another explanation: [The manifestation of] his passions is external; hers is internal.
MISHNAH. IF A MAN3 MAINTAINS HIS WIFE THROUGH A TRUSTEE, HE MUST GIVE HER [EVERY WEEK] NOT LESS THAN TWO KABS4 OF WHEAT OR FOUR KABS OF BARLEY. SAID R. JOSE: ONLY R. ISHMAEL WHO LIVED NEAR EDOM5 GRANTED HER A SUPPLY OF BARLEY.6 HE MUST ALSO GIVE HER HALF AKAB OF PULSE AND HALF ALOG4 OF OIL; AND AKAB OF DRIED FIGS OR A MANEH4 OF PRESSED FIGS,7 AND IF HE HAS NO [SUCH FRUIT] HE MUST SUPPLY HER WITH A CORRESPONDING QUANTITY OF OTHER8 FRUIT. HE MUST ALSO PROVIDE HER WITH A BED, A MATTRESS9 AND10 A RUSH MAT. HE MUST ALSO GIVE HER [ONCE A YEAR] A CAP FOR HER HEAD AND A GIRDLE FOR HER LOINS; SHOES [HE MUST GIVE HER] EACH MAJOR FESTIVAL;11 AND CLOTHING [OF THE VALUE] OF FIFTY ZUZ EVERY YEAR. SHE IS NOT TO BE GIVEN NEW [CLOTHES]12 IN THE SUMMER OR WORN-OUT CLOTHES IN THE WINTER, BUT MUST BE GIVEN THE CLOTHING [OF THE VALUE] OF FIFTY ZUZ DURING THE WINTER, AND SHE CLOTHES HERSELF WITH THEM WHEN THEY ARE WORN-OUT DURING THE SUMMER; AND THE WORN-OUT CLOTHES REMAIN HER PROPERTY.13 HE MUST ALSO GIVE HER [EVERY WEEK] A SILVER MA'AH FOR HER [OTHER] REQUIREMENTS14 AND SHE IS TO EAT WITH HIM ON THE NIGHT OF EVERY SABBATH.15 IF HE DOES NOT GIVE HER A SILVER MA'AH FOR HER OTHER REQUIREMENTS, HER HANDIWORK BELONGS TO HER.16 AND WHAT [IS THE QUANTITY OF WORK THAT] SHE MUST DO FOR HIM?17 THE WEIGHT OF FIVE SELA'S OF WARP IN JUDAEA, WHICH AMOUNTS TO TEN SELA'S IN GALILEE,18 OR THE WEIGHT OF TEN SELA'S OF WOOF19 IN JUDAEA, WHICH AMOUNTS TO TWENTY SELA'S IN GALILEE.18 IF SHE WAS NURSING [HER CHILD] HER HANDIWORK IS REDUCED AND HER MAINTENANCE IS INCREASED. ALL THIS APPLIES TO THE POOREST IN ISRAEL, BUT IN THE CASE OF A MEMBER OF THE BETTER CLASSES20 ALL IS FIXED ACCORDING TO THE DIGNITY OF HIS POSITION.
GEMARA. Whose [view is represented in] our Mishnah?21 [It seems to be] neither that of R. Johanan b. Beroka nor that of R. Simeon. For we learned: And what must be its22 size? Food for two meals for each, [the quantity being] the food one eats on weekdays and not On the Sabbath; so R. Meir. R. Judah said: As on the Sabbath and not as on weekdays. And both intended to give the lenient ruling.23 R. Johanan b. Beroka said:24 A loaf that is purchased for a dupondiom25 [when the cost of wheat is at the rate of] four se'ah25 for a sela'.25 R. Simeon said:26 Two thirds of a loaf, three of which are made from a Kab.27 Half of this [loaf is the size prescribed] for a leprous house,28 and half of its half29 renders one's body30 unfit;31 and half of the half of its half to be susceptible to Levitical uncleanness,32 Now, whose [view is that expressed in our Mishnah]?33 If [it be suggested that it is that of] R. Johanan b. Beroka [the prescribed TWO KABS would only] be [sufficient for] eight [meals].34 and if [the suggestion is that it is that of] R. Simeon [the TWO KABS would] be [sufficient even for] eighteen [meals].35 - [Our Mishnah may] in fact [represent the view of] R. Johanan b. Beroka but, as R. Hisda said elsewhere,36 'Deduct a third of them for the [profit of the] shopkeeper',37 so here38 also take a third39 and add to them.40 But [do not the meals] still amount only to twelve?41 - She eats with him on Friday nights -42 This is satisfactory according to him who explained43 [TO EAT In our Mishnah as] actual eating. What, however, can be said according to him who explained 'eating' [to mean] intercourse? Furthermore, [would not her total number of meals still] be only thirteen?44 - The proper answer is really this:45 As R. Hisda said elsewhere,46 'Deduct a half for the [profit of the] shopkeeper.47 so here48 also take a half49 and add to them.50 (Does not a contradiction arise between the two statements of R. Hisda?51 - There is no contradiction. One statement refers52 to a place where [the sellers of the wheat] supply also wood53 while the other refers52 to a place where they do not supply the wood.)54 If so55 [the number of meals] is sixteen.56 With whose [view then would our Mishnah agree]? With R. Hidka who ruled: A man must eat on the Sabbath four meals?57 - It may be said to represent even the view of the Rabbis, for one meal is to be reserved for guests and occasional visitors.58 Now that you have arrived at this position [our Mishnah] may be said to represent even the view of R. Simeon,59 for according to the Rabbis60 three meals should be deducted61 for guests and occasional visitors62 and according to R. Hidka63 two Only are to be deducted for guests and occasional visitors.64 SAID R. JOSE: ONLY . . . GRANTED A SUPPLY OF BARLEY etc. Do they eat barley at Edom only and throughout the world none IS eaten? - It is this that he meant: ONLY R. ISHMAEL WHO LIVED NEAR EDOM GRANTED A SUPPLY OF BARLEY equal to twice the quantity of wheat, because the Idumean barley was of an inferior quality. THE MAN MUST ALSO GIVE HER HALF A KAB OF PULSE. Wine, however, is not mentioned. This provides support for a view of R. Eleazar. For R. Eleazar stated:
(1) I.e., why does the former lose only half a tropaic a day while the latter loses a full tropaic each day?
(2) The man naturally hires the woman; which shows that the male feels the deprivation mote than the female, His compensation. therefore, must be proportionately higher.
(3) A husband who does not live with his wife.
(4) V. Glos.
(5) In the South of Palestine.
(6) This is explained in the Gemara infta.
(7) דבילה, a cake of pressed figs. The latter is sold by weight; the former by measure,
(8) Lit., 'from another place'.
(9) מפץ, a mat of bark or reeds,
(10) The separate edd. of the Mishnah read, 'And if he has no mattress he gives her a rush mat'.
(11) I.e., Passover, Pentecost and Tabernacles.
(12) Which provide more warmth than outworn clothes.
(13) Even after her husband had provided her with the new outfit. This is further discussed in the Gemara infra.
(14) Smaller expenses.
(15) I.e., Friday nights, the prescribed time for marital intercourse.
(16) This is explained supra 59a as referring to the surplus.
(17) Where he supplies her with the prescribed allowances.
(18) The Galilean sela' being equal in weight to half of the Judaean sela'.
(19) It is twice as difficult to web the warp than the woof. Hence a larger Output is required of the latter than of the former.
(20) מכובד. lit., 'honoured', respected'.
(21) Which prescribed for a wife a minimum of TWO KABS.
(22) The loaf of bread required for an 'erub tehumin. (v. Glos.).
(23) I.e., to reduce the prescribed minimum of the 'erub. R. Meir used to consume at a weekday meal less bread than at a Sabbath meal at which the richness of the additional Sabbath dishes tempted him to eat more bread. R. Judah, however, consumed on Sabbath, when several satisfying courses ate served, less bread than he would on weekdays owing to the smaller number of courses.
(24) In determining the quantity of bread required for two meals.
(25) V. Glos.
(26) V. p. 388, n. 12.
(27) Of wheat.
(28) If a person remained in such a house (v. Lev. XIV, 33ff) for a length of time during which the quantity of bread mentioned can be consumed his clothes become unclean and require ritual washing (cf. Neg. XIII, 9).
(29) If it consists of Levitically unclean food.
(30) Of the person who ate it,
(31) To eat terumah before he performs ritual immersion, v. 'Er. 82b.
(32) [This latter passage does not occur in the Mishnah 'Er. but is introduced in the Gemara on 83a as a teaching by a Tanna].
(33) Where a wife is allowed a minimum of TWO KABS of wheat for the week. Since she must have at least two meals a day, the two Kabs should provide fourteen (seven times two) meals, besides an additional one or two (respectively. according to the Rabbis or to R. Hidka, infra) for the Sabbath day.
(34) According to R. Johanan b. Beroka a loaf that contains food for two meals (v. supra p. 388. n. 12) is one 'that is purchased for a dupondium when the cost of wheat is at the rate of four se'ah for a sela', Each sela' = four denarii, each denar = six ma'ahs and each ma'ah = two dupondia. Consequently a sela' = (4 X 6 X 2) forty eight dupondta. a se'ah = six Kabs = twelve half-Kabs. Consequently four se'ahs (4 X 12) forty-eight half-Kabs. For a dupondium, therefore, half a Kab of wheat is obtained; and since this quantity supplies two meals each quarter of a Kab provides one meal. The TWO KABS consequently provide only eight meals.
(35) R. Simeon's minimum is 'two thirds of a loaf, three of which ate made of a Kab'. If two thirds represent two meals (v. supra p. 388, n. 12) each third represents one meal. If three loaves are made from one Kab, each Kab represents (3 X 3) nine meals. The TWO KABS, therefore, represent (6 X 9) = eighteen meals. Now since according to our Mishnah a wife must be allowed fourteen meals plus one additional meal or two for the Sabbath (v. supra note 9) neither the view of R. Johanan b. Beroka nor that of R. Simeon can be represented by it.
(36) V. 'Er. 82b.
(37) Though the shopkeeper buys at the rate of four se'ahs for a sela' = half a kab for a dupondium (v. supra p. 389. n. 10) he sells at a higher price, leaving for himself a profit of one third of the purchase price. For each dupondium, therefore, he sells only two thirds of half a kab. One third of half a Kab or one sixth of a Kab thus provides one meal. Two Kabs therefore, would produce (2 x 6) = twelve meals.
(38) In our Mishnah.
(39) The shopkeeper's profit which the husband saves by the supply of wheat instead of shop baked loaves.
(40) To the presumed number of eight. Four is a third of twelve which is the number of meals two Kabs provide.
(41) Cf. supra p. 389. n. 13 ad fin. As, however, she requires fourteen plus one or plus two meals for the week (v. supra p. 389. n. 9) she is still short of three or four meals.
(42) Lit., 'the nights of the Sabbath'. Friday night belongs to the Sabbath, the day always beginning with the sunset of the previous day.
(43) Infra 65b.
(44) The twelve mentioned (v. supra p. 389. n. 13 ad fin.) plus the one she has on Friday night. She is thus still short of a meal or meals (v. supra p. 389. n. 9) for the Sabbath day.
(45) Lit., 'but'.
(46) V. 'Er. 82b.
(47) Cf. supra p. 389, n. 13 mutatis mutandis.
(48) In our Mishnah.
(49) V. supra note 1.
(50) Cf. supra note 2 mutatis mutandis. The woman thus obtains her full number of meals.
(51) Lit., 'a difficulty of R. Hisda against R. Hisda'.
(52) Lit., 'that'.
(53) For the baking of the bread. In such a case the shopkeeper deducts only a third for his profit.
(54) And the shopkeeper sells at a profit equal to half of his purchase price to compensate himself for the cost of the wood.
(55) That a half is to be added.
(56) Each half Kab producing four, instead of the presumed two meals, the two Kabs would produce (4 X 4 ) sixteen meals.
(57) Shab. 117a. As R. Hidka is in the minority, would an anonymous Mishnah which usually represents the halachah agree with the opinion of an individual against that of a majority?
(58) Cf. supra p. 364. nn. 5-6. This leaves the woman with fifteen meals, twelve for the six weekdays and three for the Sabbath.
(59) According to whom the TWO KABS would provide eighteen meals.
(60) Who maintain that only three meals are prescribed for the Sabbath.
(61) From the eighteen.
(62) Cf. supra note 1.
(63) Whose view is that for the Sabbath four meals are prescribed.
(64) Leaving for the woman four Sabbath meals plus twelve for the week days.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 65a
No allowance for wine is made for a woman.1 And should you point out the Scriptural text, I will go after my lovers, that give me my bread and my water, my wool and my flax. mine oil and my drink,2 [it may be replied that the reference is to] things which a woman desires.3 And what are they? Jewellery. R. Judah of Kefar Nabirya4 (others say: of Kefar Napor5 Hayil) made the following exposition: Whence is it derived that no allowance for wines is made for a woman? - [From Scripture in] which it is said, So Hannah rose up after she had eaten6 in Shiloh, and after drinking.7 only 'he had drunk' but she did not drink. Now, then, would you also [interpret:] 'She had eaten'8 that he6 did not eat? - What we say is [that the deduction may be made] because the text has deliberately been changed. For consider: It was dealing with her, why did it change [the form]?9 Consequently it may be deduced that it was 'he who drank' and that she did not drink. An objection was raised: If [a woman] is accustomed [to drink] she is given [an allowance of drink]! - Where she is accustomed to drink the case is different. For R. Hinena b. Kahana stated in the name of Samuel, 'If she was accustomed [to drink] she is given an allowance of one cup; if she was not accustomed [to it] she is given an allowance of two cups'. What does he mean? - Abaye replied: It is this that he means: If she was in the habit [of drinking] two cups in the presence of her husband she is given one cup in his absence; if she is used [to drink] in the presence of her husband only one cup, she is given none at all in his absence. And if you prefer I might say: If she is used [to drink] she is allowed some wine for her puddings10 only. For R. Abbahu stated in the name of R. Johanan: It happened that when the Sages granted the daughterin-law of Nakdimon11 b. Gorion a weekly12 allowance of two se'ahs of wine for her puddings she13 said to them, 'May you grant such allowances to your daughters'. A Tanna taught: She was a woman awaiting the decision of the levir.14 Hence they did not reply Amen after her.15 A Tanna taught: One cup16 is becoming to a woman; two are degrading. [and if she has] three she solicits publicly.17 [but if she has] four she solicits even an ass in the street and cares not. Raba said: This was taught only [in respect of a woman] whose husband is not with her; but if her husband is with her [the objection to her drinks] does not arise.18 But, Surely. [there is the case of] Hannah whose husband was with her!19 - With a guest20 it is different,21 for R. Huna stated Whence is it inferred that a guest is forbidden marital union? [From Scripture in] which it is said, And they rose up in the morning early and worshipped before the Lord, and returned, and came to their house to Ramah; and Elkanah knew Hannah his wife; and the Lord remembered her,22 only23 then24 but not before. Homa, Abaye's wife, came to Raba25 and asked him, 'Grant me an allowance of board', and he granted her the allowance. 'Grant me [she again demanded] an allowance of wine'. 'I know', he said to her, 'that Nahmani26 did not drink wine'. 'By the life of the Master [I swear]'. she replied. 'that he gave me to drink27 from horns28 like this'.29 As she was showing it to him her arm was uncovered and a light shone30 upon the court. Raba rose, went home and solicited R. Hisda's daughter.31 'Who has been to-day at the court?' enquired R. Hisda's daughter. 'Homa the wife of Abaye'. he replied. Thereupon she followed her, striking her with the straps32 of a chest33 until she chased her out of all Mahuza.34 'You have', she said to her, 'already killed three [men].35 and now you come to kill another [man]!' The wife of R. Joseph the son of Raba came before R. Nehemiah the son of R. Joseph and said to him, 'Grant me an allowance of board', and he granted her. 'Grant me also an allowance of wine' [she demanded], and he granted her. 'I know', he said to her, 'that the people of Mahuza drink wine'. The wife of R. Joseph the son of R. Menashya of Dewil36 came before R. Joseph and said to him, 'Grant me an allowance of board', and he granted her. 'Grant me', she said, 'an allowance of wine', and he granted her. 'Grant me', she said again. 'an allowance of silks'. 'Why silks?' he asked. 'For your sake', she replied. 'and for the sake of your friend and for the sake of your associates'.37 HE MUST ALSO PROVIDE HER WITH A BED, A MATTRESS etc. Why38 should he give her A MATTRESS AND A RUSH MAT?39 - R. Papa replied: [This is done only] in a place where it is the practice to girth the bed with ropes.40 which would hurt41 her. Our Rabbis taught: She42 is not given43 a cushion and a bolster. In the name of R. Nathan it was stated: She is given a cushion and a bolster. How is this to be understood? If it is a case where she is used to it,44 what [it may be objected] is the reason of the first Tanna?45 And if it is a case where she is not used to it,44 what [it may be asked] is the reason of R. Nathan?46 - [The statement was] necessary only in the case where it47 was his habit but not her habit.48 The first Tanna49 is of the opinion that [her husband] may say to her, 'When I go away50 I take them and when I return I bring them back with me',51 while R. Nathan holds the opinion that she can tell him, 'It might sometimes happen [that you will return] at twilight52 when you will be unable to bring them53 and so you will take mine54 and make me sleep on the ground'.55 HE MUST ALSO GIVE HER [ONCE A YEAR] A CAP. Said R. Papa to Abaye:
(1) Alcoholic drinks might lead her to unchastity (v. Rashi).
(2) Hos. II, 7. And my drink, ושקוײ, presumably including wine.
(3) שקוײ (cf. supra n. 9) being derived from the rt. שוק 'to long'. 'desire'.
(4) MS. M., גבוריא. [Neburja. identified with en-Nebraten in upper Galilee].
(5) נפור MS.M. גבור; marg., גבור.
(6) אכלה. This is taken as perfect 3rd pers. fem; according to the accentuation of M.T. it is the inf. estr. with fem.termination.
(7) I Sam. I, 9. E.V., They had drunk. M.T. שתה, Inf. is taken as the equivalent of (3rd masc. sing.) שתה, 'he (Elkanah) had drunk'.
(8) The word אכלה (ibid.) instead of אכל, אכלם or אכלו
(9) From the finite to the infinite.
(10) ציקי קדירה (v. Jast.). Others, 'as an ingredient or seasoning of a dish' (v. Rashi and Golds.).
(11) Or 'Nicodemon', 'Nicodemus', one of the three wealthiest men in Jerusalem in the days of the siege by Vespasian and Titus (v. Git. 58a).
(12) Lit., 'from the eve of the Sabbath to the eve of the Sabbath'.
(13) In her annoyance at what she considered to be too small an allowance.
(14) Shomereth yabam. V. Glos.
(15) They did not wish their daughters ever to be placed in the position of a widow who is, moreover, subject to the decision of the levir.
(16) Of wine.
(17) Lit., 'with the mouth'.
(18) Lit., 'we have not (anything) against it'.
(19) And she nevertheless, as stated supra. abstained from drink.
(20) אכסנאי (Cf. Gr. **). 'stranger', 'lodger', 'guest'.
(21) Hannah at the time was not in her own home but at Shiloh.
(22) I Sam. I,19.
(23) Lit., 'yes'.
(24) When they had come to their own home.
(25) After Abaye's death (cf. Yeb. 64b).
(26) Lit., 'my comforter', a name by which Abaye was often referred to, v. Git. Sonc. ed. p. 140, n. 6.
(27) משקיא לי, MS.M. Cur. edd., משקי ליה 'gave him to drink'.
(28) Plural of שופרזא, 'a drinking horn' (v. Jast.) or 'deep cups' (cf.Rashi and Levy).
(29) pointing to her arm.
(30) Lit., 'fell'.
(31) His own wife.
(32) Pl. of קולפא (rt. קלף, 'to peel') 'peeled or scrapped leather', 'a leather strap' (v. Jast.); 'a key' (Rashi).
(33) שידא Aruk, שיראי, 'silk'; בקולפא דשיראי 'with a silken strap'. Rashi: 'With the key of a chest'.
(34) V. supra p. 319. n. 9.
(35) Homa had already thrice married and each of her husbands had died (v. Yeb. 64b).
(36) [Perhaps Debeile in the neighbourhood of Hille (near Sura). There is also a Dabil in Armenia, v. Funk, Monuments Talmudica, p. 291].
(37) To enable her to keep up her social standing in the company of her deceased husband's friends and associates.
(38) Since beds were usually furnished with a skin girth (v. Rashi).
(39) Which are much less comfortable for lying on than a skin girth. R. Tam (Tosaf. s.v. מפץ a.l.) deletes MATTRESS since on account of its softness it is useful even where the bed is furnished with a skin spread.
(40) Instead of the skin girth.
(41) דמכגר (Af. of בגר) lit., 'which produce a roughness' (v. Jast.). According to Rashi בגר is to e taken in the sense of 'age'. The ropes cause her pain and 'age her' prematurely.
(42) The wife spoken of to Our Mishnah.
(43) By her husband.
(44) To sleep on a cushion and a bolster.
(45) Who ruled that she is not to be allowed these comforts.
(46) Why should her husband be expected to provide for her more comforts than she habitually requires.
(47) V. p. 394. n. 10.
(48) [Yet on the principle that 'she rises with him' supra 61a, she is entitled to them when she is with him (Rashi)].
(49) V. p. 394. n. 11.
(50) From you.
(51) Since she is not in the habit of using them she does not require them in his absence.
(52) On Sabbath eve.
(53) The carrying of objects is forbidden on the Sabbath, the prohibition beginning at twilight on the Friday evening.
(54) The other bed clothes that he had given her or that she herself had purchased. (V. however, next note).
(55) Hence R. Nathan's ruling that a husband must in all cases provide his wife with cushion and bolster. [Var. lec. (v. Tosaf.) omit 'so you will take mine'. On that reading the woman will argue that she would be made to sleep on the ground, even in his presence, when she is entitled to all the comfort to which he is accustomed, v. supra note 2].
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 65b
This Tanna1 [expects a person to be] 'stripped naked and to wear shoes'!2 'The Tanna,' the other replied. 'was dealing3 with a mountainous region where one cannot possibly manage with less than three pairs of shoes [a year].4 and indirectly he informed us that these should be given to her on the occasion of a major festival so that she might derive joy from them. AND CLOTHING [OF THE VALUE] OF FIFTY ZUZ. Abaye said: Fifty small zuz.5 Whence is this deduced? - From the statement:6 ALL THIS APPLIES TO THE POOREST IN ISRAEL, BUT IN THE CASE OF A MEMBER OF THE BETTER CLASSES ALL IS FIXED ACCORDING TO THE DIGNITY OF HIS POSITION. Now, should one imagine [that the reference is to] fifty real zuz,7 whence [it could be objected] would a poor man obtain fifty zuz? Consequently it must be concluded [that the meaning is] fifty small zuz. SHE IS NOT TO BE GIVEN NEW etc. Our Rabbis taught: Any surplus of food8 belongs to the husband, while any Surplus of worn out clothes belongs to the woman. [You said:] 'Any surplus of worn out clothes belongs to the woman'; of what use are they to her? - Rehaba replied: For putting on during the days of her menstruation so that she may not [by the constant wearing9 of the same clothes] become repulsive to her husband. Abaye stated: We have a tradition that the surplus of the worn out clothes of a widow10 belongs to her husband's heirs. For the reason in the former case11 is that she shall not become repulsive to her husband12 but in this case13 let her be ever so repulsive. HE MUST ALSO GIVE HER [EVERY WEEK] A SILVER MA'AH etc. What [is meant by] SHE IS TO EAT? - R. Nahman replied: Actual eating. R. Ashi replied: Intercourse. We have learned: SHE IS TO EAT WITH HIM ON THE NIGHT OF EVERY SABBATH. Now, according to him14 who said, '[actual] eating' it is quite correct to use the expression SHE IS TO EAT. According to him,15 however, who said, 'intercourse', why [it may be asked] was the expression SHE IS TO EAT used?16 - It is a euphemism.17 as it is written in Scripture. She18 eateth, and wipeth her mouth, and saith: 'I have done no wickedness'.19 An objection was raised: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said, 'She is to eat with him on the night of the Sabbath and on the Sabbath [day]'. Now, according to him20 who said, ' [actual] eating', it is correct to state, 'and on the Sabbath [day]'.21 According to him,22 however, who said, 'intercourse', is there any intercourse on the Sabbath day? Did not R. Huna state, The Israelites are holy and do not have intercourse in the day-time'?23 - But, Surely, Raba stated: It is permitted in a dark room.24 IF SHE WAS NURSING [HER CHILD]. R. 'Ulla the Great made at the Prince's25 door the following exposition: Although it was said:26 'A man is under no obligation to maintain his sons and daughters when they are minors', he must maintain them while they are very young.27 How long?28 - Until the age of six; in accordance [with the view of] R. Assi, for R. Assi stated: A child of the age of six is exempt29 by the 'erub30 of his mother. Whence [is this31 derived]? - From the Statement: IF SHE WAS NURSING [HER CHILD] HER HANDIWORK IS REDUCED AND HER MAINTENANCE IS INCREASED. What can be the reason?32 Surely because he33 must eat together with her. But is it not possible [that the reason32 is] because she34 ailing? - If that were the case it should have been stated, 'If she was ailing', why then [was it stated]. IF SHE WAS NURSING?35 But is it not possible that it was this that we were taught:36 That nursing mothers are commonly ailing?37 It was stated: What is the addition38 that he makes for her?39 R. Joshua b. Levi said: She is given an additional allowance for wine, because wine is beneficial for lactation.
MISHNAH. A WIFE'S FIND AND HER HANDIWORK BELONG TO HER HUSBAND. AND [OF] HER INHERITANCE40 HE HAS THE USUFRUCT DURING HER LIFETIME.41 [ANY COMPENSATION FOR] AN INDIGNITY OR BLEMISH [THAT MAY HAVE BEEN INFLICTED UPON] HER BELONGS TO HER. R. JUDAH B. BATHYRA RULED: WHEN IN PRIVACY42 SHE RECEIVES TWO-THIRDS [OF THE COMPENSATION] WHILE HE43 RECEIVES ONE-THIRD, BUT WHEN IN PUBLIC44 HE RECEIVES TWO-THIRDS45 AND SHE RECEIVES ONE-THIRD. HIS SHARE IS TO BE GIVEN TO HIM FORTHWITH, BUT WITH HERS LAND IS TO BE BOUGHT AND HE43 ENJOYS THE USUFRUCT.46
GEMARA. What does he47 teach us? This surely was already learnt: A father has authority over his daughter in respect of her betrothal [whether it was effected] by money, by deed or by intercourse; he is entitled to anything she finds and to her handiwork; [he has the right] of invalidating her vows, and he receives her letter of divorce; but he has no usufruct during her lifetime. When she marries, the husband surpasses him [in his rights] in that he has usufruct during her lifetime!48 - He49 regarded this50 as necessary [on account of the law relating to] INDIGNITY OR BLEMISH [THAT MAY HAVE BEEN INFLICTED UPON] HER, [which is the subject of] a dispute between R. Judah b. Bathyra and the Rabbis.51
A tanna recited in the presence of Raba: A wife's find belongs to herself; but R. Akiba ruled: [It belongs] to her husband. The other52 said to him: Now that [in respect of the] surplus53
(1) Who imposes upon a husband the duty of giving his wife shoes three times a year and clothing only once a year.
(2) Proverb. By the time the woman will receive her second or third pair of shoes her clothes will be worn to tatters and yet she would be wearing new shoes; a toilet more ludicrous than one uniformly shabby and worn out.
(3) Lit., 'stands'.
(4) Though clothes may conveniently last for the same period.
(5) Provincial zuz (Rashi). A provincial, or country zuz was equal in value to an eighth of the town, Or Tyrian zuz.
(6) Lit., 'since it was taught'.
(7) I.e., of the Tyrian standard (ef. p. 395, n. 14).
(8) I.e., if the woman did not consume all her allowance of food prescribed in our Mishnah.
(9) During her clean and unclean periods.
(10) Whose allowance for clothes is made by her deceased husband's heirs.
(11) Lit., 'there'.
(12) Lit., 'in his presence'.
(13) Lit., 'here'.
(14) R. Nahman.
(15) R. Ashi.
(16) Cf. Bah. a.l.
(17) לישנא מעליא, lit., 'a perfect or appropriate expression'. MS.M.adds, נקט, 'he took up (used)'.
(18) The adulterous woman.
(19) Prov. XXX, 20.
(20) R. Nahman.
(21) Since one has to eat in the day time also.
(22) R. Ashi.
(23) Shab. 86a, Nid. 17a.
(24) V. Ibid.
(25) The Exlarch.
(26) Lit., 'that they (sc. the Rabbis) said'.
(27) Lit., 'the small of the small'.
(28) Must he maintain them.
(29) יוצא, i.e., he does not require one specially prepared for himself (v. Golds.). Rashi takes יוצא in the literal sense, 'he goes out'. i.e., should his father place an 'erub in one direction and his mother to the opposite direction he would be allowed to move only in the direction his mother had chosen. In any case it follows that a child of the age of six is entirely attached to and dependent upon his mother and, consequently, just as a man must provide for his wife so must he provide for the child who is entirely dependent upon her.
(30) V. Glos.
(31) That a father is at all liable to maintain his young children,
(32) For the increase of the maintenance.
(33) The child.
(34) During lactation.
(35) The conclusion, therefore, must be that she was not ailing.
(36) By the use of the expression. NURSING, and not 'ailing'.
(37) As this is quite possible no positive proof is available that it is a father's legal duty to maintain his young children.
(38) For the Increase of the maintenance.
(39) So Bah. Cur. edd. omit.
(40) Which she inherited from a relative (Rashi's first interpretation supported by R. Tam., Tosaf. s.v. וירושתה a.l.).
(41) The capital, however, remains hers.
(42) I.e., if the indignity was imposed in the absence of onlookers or the blemish inflicted upon a concealed part of her body.
(43) Her husband.
(44) I.e., if people witnessed the indignity or if the blemish was inflicted on a part of the body that is exposed.
(45) Since he not only shares her indignity and degradation but, in addition, must also put up with a woman who has become disfigured. V. Rashi.
(46) As is the case with all property that comes into a wife's possession after her marriage. The capital remains hers and after his death or on divorce she recovers also the right of usufruct.
(47) The author of our Mishnah.
(48) V. supra 46b, notes, from which it follows that a husband is entitled to all his wife's possessions enumerated in our Mishnah. Why then were the same rulings repeated here?
(49) The author of our Mishnah.
(50) Our Mishnah.
(51) And could not have been inferred from the statement quoted.
(53) Of a woman's work above the amount required for her maintenance.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 66a
which is her handiwork1 R. Akiba ruled [that it belongs] to herself, how much more so her find? For we learned: [If a woman said to her husband,] 'Konam, if I do aught for your mouth', he need not invalidate her vow;2 R. Akiba, however, said: He must invalidate it, since she might do more work than is due to him!3 - Reverse then: A wife's find belongs to her husband, but R. Akiba ruled [that it belonged] to herself. But surely, when Rabin came4 he stated in the name of R. Johanan: In respect of a surplus5 obtained through no undue exertion all6 agree that [it belongs to the] husband, and they only differ in respect of a surplus5 obtained through undue exertion; the first Tanna being of the opinion [that even this belongs] to her husband while R. Akiba maintains [that it belongs] to herself!7 - R. Papa replied: A find is like a surplus gained through undue exertion,8 [concerning which there is] a difference of opinion between R. Akiba and the Rabbis.
R. Papa raised the question: What is the law where she performed for him two [kinds of work] simultaneously?9 Rabina raised the question: What is the ruling where she did three or four [kinds of work]10 simultaneously? - These must remain undecided.11
[ANY COMPENSATION FOR] INDIGNITY OR BLEMISH [THAT MAY HAVE BEEN INFLICTED UPON] HER. Raba son of R. Hanan demurred:12 Now then,13 if a man insulted his fellow's mare would he also have to pay him [compensation for the] indignity? But is a horse then susceptible to insult?14 - This, however, [is the objection:] If a man spat on his fellow's garment would he15 also have to pay him [compensation for this] indignity? And should you say that [the ruling] is really so,16 surely [it can be retorted] we have learned: If a man spat so that the spittle fell upon another person, or uncovered the head of a woman, or removed a cloak from a person he must pay four hundred zuz;17 and R. Papa explained: This has been taught [to apply] only [where it touched] him18 but if it touched his garment only [the offender] is exempt!19 - [An insult] to his garment involves no indignity to him, [but an insult to] his wife does involve an indignity to him.20
Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Now then,21 If a man insulted a poor man of a good family where all the members of the family are involved in the indignity, must he also pay [compensation for] indignity to all the members of the family?22 - The other replied: There23 it is not their own persons [that are insulted]. Here, however, one's wife is [like] one's own body.
MISHNAH. IF A MAN UNDERTOOK TO GIVE A FIXED SUM OF MONEY TO HIS SON-IN-LAW AND HIS SON-IN-LAW DIED,24 HE25 MAY, THE SAGES RULED, SAY26 'I WAS WILLING TO GIVE [THE MENTIONED SUM] TO YOUR BROTHER BUT I AM UNWILLING TO GIVE IT TO YOU'.27
IF A WOMAN UNDERTOOK TO BRING HER HUSBAND28 ONE THOUSAND DENARII HE MUST ASSIGN TO HER29 A CORRESPONDING SUM OF FIFTEEN MANEH.30 AS A CORRESPONDING SUM FOR APPRAISED GOODS,31 HOWEVER, HE ASSIGNS29 ONE FIFTH LESS.32 [IF A HUSBAND IS REQUESTED TO ENTER IN HIS WIFE'S KETHUBAH:] 'GOODS ASSESSED AT ONE MANEH', AND THESE ARE IN FACT WORTH A MANEH,33 HE CAN HAVE [A CLAIM FOR] ONE MANEH ONLY.34 [OTHERWISE,35 IF HE IS REQUESTED TO ENTER IN THE KETHUBAH:] 'GOODS ASSESSED AT A MANEH', HIS WIFE MUST GIVE HIM [GOODS OF THE ASSESSED VALUE35 OF] THIRTY-ONE SELA'S AND A DENAR,36 AND IF 'AT FOUR HUNDRED [ZUZ]', SHE MUST GIVE [HIM GOODS VALUED35 AT] FIVE HUNDRED [ZUZ.]37 WHATEVER
(1) And should belong to her husband. A husband is entitled to his wife's handiwork (v. our Mishnah) in, return for the maintenance he provides for her (v. supra 58b).
(2) Since a wife's work, and even its surplus (v. supra note 6), belongs to her husband, (v. supra note 7) she has no right to dispose of it without his consent. Her vow, therefore, is null and void and no invalidation is required.
(3) And of this surplus being her own property, she may well dispose. (For further notes v. supra 59a). How then, Raba argued, could the opinion be entertained that, according to R. Akiba, a wife's find (to which she has a greater claim than to the surplus mentioned) should belong to her husband?
(4) From Palestine to Babylon.
(5) V. supra note 6.
(6) Lit., 'all the world', sc. R. Akiba and the Rabbis.
(7) A find should naturally be regarded as a 'surplus obtained through no undue exertion', about which there is no difference of opinion. How then could it be said that the find of a wife is a point in dispute?
(8) Most finds are not easily obtained, and before one finds anything valuable among the deposits of the sea, for instance, many hours and days might have to he spent.
(9) Acting as watchman, for instance, and spinning at the same time.
(10) While doing the former (v. supra n. 2) she was also teaching, for instance. a lesson and hatching eggs. Are such performances regarded as ordinary. or undue exertion?
(11) Teku, v. Glos.
(12) Against R. Judah b. Bathyra (v. our Mishnah).
(13) If a man is to receive compensation for an indignity or injury which he himself has not sustained.
(14) Surely not Raba's objection does not, consequently, arise.
(15) Cf. supra n. 6
(16) That he must pay compensation.
(17) Cf. B.K. 90a.
(18) The body of the offended party.
(19) Which proves conclusively that for such an offence, since it was not committed on one's person, no compensation is paid. Why then should a husband receive compensation for his wife's sufferings which he himself has not experienced?
(20) Read ליה (MS.M.). Cur. edd., read לה, and the rendering (rather unsatisfactory) would be as follows: His garment feels no shame but his wife feels the indignity.
(21) If indirect insult also entitles one to compensation.
(22) certainly not. Why then should the husband receive compensation for indignity to his wife?
(23) The case of indirect insult to the family.
(24) Childless; so that his widow should now be married to, or perform halizah (v. Glos.) with his surviving brother (v. Deut. XXV, 5ff) who, in the case of his marriage with the widow, is entitled to the deceased brother's estate (v. Yeb. 40a).
(25) The father-in-law.
(26) To the surviving brother who by virtue of his right to the estate of the deceased now claims also the slim his father-in-law had promised him.
(27) And the brother must, nevertheless, either submit to halizah from the widow or marry her.
(28) On marriage.
(29) As her kethubah (v. Glos.)
(30) V. Glos. He must, in return for the profits he will be able to derive from his trading with her money, add fifty per cent to the amount his wife brought him. A maneh == a hundred denarii (or zuz), and fifteen maneh == fifteen hundred denarii.
(31) I.e., if she brought to him, on marriage, goods instead of cash. This kind of dowry is designated Shum (appraisement).
(32) Than the appraised value. This refers to an appraisement made during the wedding festivities when the tendency is to over-assess whatever goods the bride brings to her husband. [According to the T.J. a fifth is allowed for the wear and tear of the goods, since her husband is held responsible for them].
(33) I.e., if the assessment was made prior to the wedding festivities. (Cf. p. 401, n. 12).
(34) He cannot claim twenty-five percent more than the maneh as in the case where the valuation was made during the wedding festivities (v. supra note 1).
(35) l.e., If the valuation was made during the wedding festivities (cf. supra p. 401, n. 12).
(36) V. Glos. A sela'== four denarii, thirty-one sela's and one denar = (31 X 4 + 1) 125 denarii. A maneh, or a hundred denarii, is a fifth less than one hundred and twenty-five denarii.
(37) [This passage is difficult, and the interpretations of it are many and varied, cf. e.g., Tosaf. s.v. שום. The explanation given follows Rashi. R. Hai Gaon, on the basis of the T.J. (v. supra p. 401, n. 12) explains: If she promised to bring him a dowry (shum) of property worth a maneh, which does not wear out, and is thus always actually worth a maneh, she need not add a fifth to it, v. Shittah Mekubbezeth; v. p. 406, in the case of a bar of gold].
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 66b
A BRIDEGROOM ASSIGNS [TO HIS WIFE IN HER KETHUBAH] HE ASSIGNS AT ONE FIFTH LESS [THAN THE APPRAISED VALUE].
GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: There was no need to state that where the first1 was a scholar and the second an 'am ha-'arez [the father-in-law] can say, 'I WAS WILLING TO GIVE [THE MENTIONED SUM] TO YOUR BROTHER BUT I AM UNWILLING TO GIVE IT TO YOU, but even where the first was 'am ha-'arez and the second a scholar he may also say so.
IF A WOMAN UNDERTOOK TO BRING TO HER HUSBAND ONE THOUSAND DENARII etc. Are not these2 the same as the case in the first clause?3 - He taught [first concerning a] large assessment4 and then he taught also about a smaller assessment;5 he taught about his assessment6 and he also taught about her assessment.7
M I S H N A H. IF A WOMAN UNDERTOOK TO BRING TO HER HUSBAND8 READY MONEY, EVERY SELA'9 OF HERS COUNTS10 AS SIX DENARII.11 THE BRIDEGROOM MUST UNDERTAKE [TO GIVE HIS WIFE]12 TEN DENARII FOR HER [PERFUME]13 BASKET IN RESPECT OF EACH MANEH.14 R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL SAID: IN ALL MATTERS THE LOCAL USAGE SHALL BE FOLLOWED.
GEMARA. This,15 surely, is exactly [the same ruling as] 'He must assign to her a corresponding sum of fifteen maneh'.16 - He taught first about a major transaction17 and then taught about a minor transaction.18 And [both rulings were] necessary. For had that of the major transaction only been taught it might have been assumed [that it applied to this only] because the profit [it brings in] is large but not to a minor transaction the profit from which is small; [hence it was] necessary [to state the latter]. And had we been informed of that of the minor transaction only it might have been said [to apply to this only] because the expenses and responsibility19 are small but not to a large transaction where the expenses and responsibility are great; [hence it was] necessary [to state the former].
THE BRIDEGROOM MUST UNDERTAKE [TO GIVE HIS WIFE] TEN DENARII FOR HER BASKET. What is meant by BASKET?
R. Ashi replied: The perfume basket. R. Ashi further stated: This ruling applies to Jerusalem20 only.
R. Ashi enquired: [Is the prescribed perfume allowance21 made] in respect of each maneh valued or each maneh for which [obligation has been] accepted?22 [And even]23 if you could find [some reason] for stating: ['In respect of each] maneh for which [obligation has been] accepted'22 [the question arises: Is the allowance to be made only on] the first day or every day? Should you find [some ground] for deciding: Every day, [the question still remains whether this applies only to the] first week or to every week. Should you find [some authority] for stating: Every week, [it may be asked whether this applies only to the] first month or to every month - And should you find [some argument] for saying: Every month, [It may still be questioned whether this is applicable only to the] first year or to every year. - All this remains undecided.24
Rab Judah related in the name of Rab: It once happened that the daughter of Nakdimon b. Gorion25 was granted by the Sages26 an allowance of four hundred gold coins in respect of her perfume basket for that particular day, and she27 said to them, 'May you grant such allowances for your own daughters!' and they answered after her: Amen.28 Our Rabbis taught: It once happened that R. Johanan b. Zakkai left Jerusalem riding upon an ass, while his disciples followed him, and he saw a girl picking barley grains in the dung of Arab cattle. As soon as she saw him she wrapped herself with her hair and stood before him. 'Master', she said to him, 'feed me'. 'My daughter', he asked her, 'who are you?' 'I am', she replied, 'the daughter of Nakdimon b. Gorion'. 'My daughter', he said to her, 'what has become29 of the wealth of your father's house?' 'Master', she answered him, 'is there not a proverb current in Jerusalem: "The salt30 of money is diminution?"'31
(Others read: Benevolence).32 'And where [the Master asked] is the wealth of your father-in-law's house?' 'The one', she replied, 'came and destroyed the other'.33 'Do you remember, Master', she said to him, 'when you signed my kethubah?' 'I remember', he said to his disciples, 'that when I signed the kethubah of this [unfortunate woman], I read therein "A million gold denarii from her father's house" besides [the amount] from her father-in-law's house'.34 Thereupon R. Johanan b. Zakkai wept and said: 'How happy are Israel;35 when they do the will of the Omnipresent no nation nor any language-speaking group has any power over them; but when they do not do the will of the Omnipresent he delivers them into the hands of a low people, and not only in the hands of a low people but into the power of the beasts of a low people'.
Did not Nakdimon b. Gorion, however, practice charity? Surely it was taught: It was said of Nakdimon b. Gorion that, when he walked from his house to the house of study, woollen clothes were
(1) Brother who died.
(2) The latter portions of our Mishnah, which contain various instances of deductions of a fifth. (So Rashi. For another interpretation v. Tosaf. s.v. תנא).
(3) AS A CORRESPONDING SUM . . . HE ASSIGNS ONE FIFTH LESS, which includes all the other instances.
(4) ONE THOUSAND DENARII to which the ruling AS A CORRESPONDING SUM . . . HE ASSIGNS ONE FIFTH LESS refers.
(5) GOODS ASSESSED AT A MANEH... THIRTY-ONE SELA'S AND A DENAR. Both cases were necessary, since some might assume that with a larger sum over-estimation is more likely while others might assume that over-estimation is more likely to take place in the case of a smaller sum.
(6) WHATEVER A BRIDEGROOM ASSIGNS . . . ONE FIFTH LESS, referring to a valuation made by him, of goods she had already brought to him before the kethubah had been written.
(7) IF AT FOUR HUNDRED [ZUZ] SHE MUST GIVE etc., the last three words implying that the kethubah had already been written and SHE MUST GIVE the required amount of goods which is naturally valued by her (or her relations) to correspond after due deduction with the amount entered in the kethubah.
(8) On marriage.
(9) Which is worth four denarii.
(10) In respect of the corresponding amount to be entered in her kethubah.
(11) I.e. , fifty percent is added to it as in the case of ready money mentioned in the previous Mishnah. The difference between the two cases will be explained in the Gemara infra.
(12) Whether daily, weekly or more rarely has not been stated.
(13) According to the explanation of the Gemara.
(14) Which she brings on marriage.
(15) The ruling in the first clause of our Mishnah.
(16) V. previous Mishnah. In that case he adds fifty percent, and so he does in this case also. Why then should the same ruling be recorded twice?
(17) A thousand denarii in the previous Mishnah, supra 66a.
(18) EVERY SELA' etc. in the Mishnah of ours.
(19) זיונא (v. Rashi). Jast., 'management, expenses and risks of business': עיסקא זוטא דזוטר זיונא, 'a small capital the management of which is easy'.
(20) Where the women here in the habit of indulging in the use of perfumes.
(21) Ten denarii in respect of each maneh (v. our Mishnah).
(22) by the husband in the kethubah. The latter (v. previous Mishnah) amount to one fifth less than the valuation.
(23) V. Tosaf. s.v. ואם.
(24) Teku, v Glos.
(25) Cf. supra 65a (p. 392, n. 6).
(26) To whom, when her husband died, she applied for an order for an allowance out of her husband's estate.
(27) In her discontent with the amount.
(28) V. supra p. 392, n. 10 and text.
(29) Lit., 'where did it go'.
(30) I.e., the preservative, the safeguard.
(31) חסר, i.e. , spending it in the exercise of charitable and benevolent deeds. As the members of her family were not charitable they lost their money.
(32) חסד (v. supra n. 3) interchange of ד with ר.
(33) The two were mixed up and when the one was lost the other disappeared with it.
(34) The addition made to her kethubah by the bridegroom.
(35) Read with MS.M., אשריהם. Cur. edd., אשריכם, 'happy are you'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 67a
spread beneath his feet and the poor followed behind him and rolled them up!1 - If you wish I might reply: He did it for his own glorification -2 And if you prefer I might reply: He did not act as he should have done,3 as people say, 'In accordance with the camel is the burden'.4
It was taught: R. Eleazar the son of R. Zadok said, 'May I [not] behold the consolation [of Zion] if I have not seen her5 picking barley grains among the horses' hoofs at Acco. [On seeing her plight] I applied to her this Scriptural text: If thou know not, O thou fairest among women, go thy way forth by the footsteps of the flock and feed thy kids;6 read not thy kids7 but thy 'bodies'.8
R. Shaman b. Abba stated in the name of R. Johanan: If a wife brought to her husband9 [a bar of] gold, it is to be assessed and [entered in her kethubah] according to its actual value.10
An objection was raised: '[Broken pieces of] gold are like vessels'.11 Does not this imply12 'like silver vessels' which wear out?13 - No, 'like gold vessels' which do not wear out. If so, [the expression] should have been 'like vessels [made] thereof'! And, furthermore, it was taught: [A bar of] gold is like vessels; gold denarii are like ready money.14 R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: Where the usage is not to change them15 they are valued and are [to be entered in the kethubah] at the rate of their actual value.16 Now, to what is R. Simeon b. Gamaliel referring? If it be suggested [that he refers] to the final clause,17 the inference [it may be pointed out would be] that the first Tanna maintains his opinion18 even when the usage is not to change them, but, surely, [it may be objected] they can not be used as currency!19 It must consequently be assumed20 [that he21 referred] to the first clause and that it is this that was meant: [A bar of] gold is like vessels; and what [is meant by] vessels? silver vessels;22 and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: It is like gold denarii where the usage is not to change them!23 - No;24 he21 may still refer to the final clause but [it is a case where] with difficulty they can be used as currency; and the principles on which they differ is this: One Master25 holds the view that since they can be used as currency we allow her the increase26 and the other Master21 is of the opinion that since they can be used as currency only with difficulty, she is not to have the increase.27
If you prefer I might reply: All the statement28 is that of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, but a clause therein is missing, and the proper reading is as follows: [A bar of] gold is like vessels,29 gold denarii are like ready money. This is the case only where it is the usage to change them,30 but where it is the usage not to change them31 they are to be valued and entered in the kethubah at the rate of their actual value; so R. Simeon b. Gamaliel for R. Simeon b. Gamaliel holds the view that where it is the usage not to change them they are to be valued and [entered in the kethubah] at the rate of their actual value. But [the difficulty] nevertheless [remains that the expression] should have been, 'like vessels [made] thereof'! - This is indeed a difficulty. And if you prefer I might reply: We are here28 dealing with a case of broken pieces of gold.32 R. Ashi said: [We deal here28 with] gold leaf.33 R. Jannai stated: The spices of Antioch34 are35 like ready money.36 R. Samuel b. Nahmani stated in the name of R. Johanan:37 A woman38 is entitled to seize Arabian camels in settlement of her kethubah.39
R. Papi stated: A woman38 may seize clothes40 manufactured at Be Mikse41 for her kethubah.42
R. Papi further stated: A woman38 may seize sacks made at Rodya43 and the ropes of Kamhunya44 for her kethubah.
Raba stated: At first I said: A woman38 is entitled to seize money bags45 of Mahuza46 for her kethubah.42 What was [my] reason? Because [women] relied upon them.42 When I observed, however, that they47 took them and went out with them into the market48 and as soon as a plot of land came their way they purchased it with this money I formed the opinion that they rely49 only upon land.50
MISHNAH. IF A MAN GAVE HIS DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE WITHOUT SPECIFYING ANY CONDITIONS, HE MUST GIVE HER NOT LESS THAN FIFTY ZUZ. IF THE [BRIDEGROOM] AGREED TO TAKE HER IN NAKED HE51 MAY NOT SAY, 'WHEN I HAVE TAKEN HER INTO MY HOUSE I SHALL CLOTHE HER WITH CLOTHES OF MY OWN', BUT HE MUST PROVIDE HER WITH CLOTHING WHILE SHE IS STILL IN HER FATHER'S HOUSE. SIMILARLY IF AN ORPHAN IS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE52 SHE MUST BE GIVEN NOT LESS THAN FIFTY ZUZ. IF [CHARITY] FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE53 SHE IS TO BE FITTED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIGNITY OF HER POSITION.
GEMARA. Abaye stated: By FIFTY ZUZ small coins54 [were meant]. Whence is this statement inferred? - From the statement in the final clause: IF [CHARITY] FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE SHE IS FITTED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIGNITY OF HER POSITION [concerning which], when it was asked, 'What was meant by FUNDS'.55 Rehaba explained: Charity funds.56 Now if we should imagine that by FIFTY ZUZ the actual57 [coins were meant], how much [it may be asked] ought we to give her even IF CHARITY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE! Consequently it must be inferred that by FIFTY ZUZ small coins [were meant].
Our Rabbis taught: If an orphan boy and an orphan girl applied for maintenance,58 the girl orphan is to be maintained first and the boy orphan afterwards,59 because it is not unusual for a man to go begging60 but it is unusual for a woman to do so.61 If an orphan boy and an orphan girl
(1) I.e., taking the stuff away with them.
(2) Such gifts are not regarded as proper charity.
(3) He did not give in accordance with his means.
(4) The richer and the greater the man the more is expected of him.
(5) The daughter of Nakdimon b. Gorion.
(6) Cant. I., 8.
(8) גויותיך, involving the change of ו for ד.
(9) On marriage.
(10) No addition of fifty per cent (as in the case of ready money) and no subtraction of a fifth (as in the case of goods) are made
(11) כלים, the term is explained anon.
(12) Lit., 'what, not?'
(13) And consequently deteriorate in value. How then could R. johanan maintain that a bar of gold is to be entered in the kethubah for its full value without reducing the fifth prescribed for goods?
(14) Since they can be used as currency. An addition of fifty percent in their case must, therefore, be entered in the kethubah.
(15) In the ordinary course of trade, i.e., where they are not taken as currency.
(16) And no addition (as in the case of cash) is made. Tosef. Keth. VI.
(17) Gold denarii etc.
(18) That an addition of fifty percent is to be made (v.supra n. 12).
(19) Lit., 'do not go out'. Why then should they be treated as ready money?
(20) Lit., 'but not'.
(21) R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.
(22) And a reduction of a fifth is therefore to be made.
(23) Cf. supra p. 406, n. 13. Would then R. Johanan accept the opinion of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel against that of the anonymous first Tanna?
(24) R. Simeon b. Gamaliel does not refer to the first clause.
(25) The first Tanna.
(26) Of fifty percent, as in the case of regular currency.
(27) In the case of bar gold, however, it is generally agreed, as R. Johanan ruled, that it is to be entered into the kethubah at the rate of its actual value.
(28) The Baraitha cited.
(29) I.e., gold wares.
(30) Cf. supra p. 406, n. 13 mutatis mutandis.
(31) V. supra p. 406, n. 13.
(32) Which wear away in use. Such are indeed to be treated in the same way as silver ware (as has been suggested supra), their price being entered in the kethubah after a deduction of one fifth had been made. R. Johanan. however, who rules the entry of their actual value deals with the case of large bars which do not perceptibly wear away, and whose full value must consequently appear in the kethubah.
(33) ממלא var. מללא (v. Rashi). Tosaf., 'gold ore'; Golds., 'gold dust'. Cf. p. 407, n. 14 mutatis mutandis.
(34) Or Antiochene, the capital of Syria on the Orontes, founded by Seleucus Nicator. [Antioch was a trading centre for spices (v. Krauss, T.A., I, p. 690)].
(35) In respect of the amount to be entered in a kethubah.
(36) Fifty percent is to be added to the amount the wife brings in on marriage. These spices were so famous that they could always be sold and thus easily turned into cash.
(37) Var. lec., 'Johanan'. (MS. M. and Rosh).
(38) A widow who advances the claim for her kethubah against her deceased husband's estate (v. Tosaf. s.v. גמלים).
(39) Though these are movable objects, they are, owing to the ready sale they command, deemed to have been pledged for the kethubah. פרנא, 'settlement', 'endowment' (cf. Jast.). Rashi's interpretation, 'the profit of a third', is rejected by Tosaf. l.c. [Frankel MGWJ, 1861, p. 118 derives the term from the Gk. ** the outfit which the bride has to bring with her].
(40) V. Rashi; 'sheets' (Jast.).
(41) [A frontier town between Babylon and Arabia (Obermeyer, p. 334)].
(42) Cf. supra n. 6 mutatis mutandis.
(43) Not identified.
(44) [In the neighbourhood of Supra, op. cit. p. 296].
(45) I.e., the sums of money which they contain (Rashi).
(46) A famous commercial town (v. supra p. 319, n. 9).
(47) Windows or divorced women who seized them for their kethubah.
(48) So MS.M. Cur. edd., omit the last three words.
(49) As a guarantee for their kethubah.
(50) Hence they should not be allowed to seize Mahuza bags.
(51) Lit., 'the husband'.
(52) By the guardians of the poor.
(53) Lit., 'there is in the purse'.
(54) V. supra 65b.
(55) Lit., 'bag'.
(56) Lit., 'bag of charity'.
(57) I.e., the Tyrian zuz (v. supra l.c.).
(58) Lit., 'who came to be maintained', Out of the poor funds.
(59) If the funds permit.
(60) Lit., 'his way is to go about the doors'.
(61) Lit., 'to go about'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 67b
applied for a marriage grant1 the girl orphan is to be enabled to marry first and the boy orphan is married afterwards, because the shame of a woman is greater than that of a man.2 Our Rabbis taught: If an orphan applied for assistance to marry,3 a house must be rented for him, a bed must be prepared for him and [he must also be supplied with] all [household] objects [required for] his use, and then he is given a wife in marriage, for it is said in Scriptures, Sufficient for his need in that which he wanteth:4 'sufficient for his need', refers to the house; 'in that which wanteth', refers to a bed and a table; 'he'5 refers to a wife, for so it is said in Scripture, I will make him5 a help meet unto him.6
Our Rabbis taught: 'Sufficient for his need' [implies] you are commanded to maintain him, but you are not commanded to make him rich; 'in that which he wanteth' [includes] even a horse to ride upon and a slave to run before him. It was related about Hillel the Elder that he bought7 for a certain poor man who was of a good family a horse to ride upon and a slave to run before him. On one occasion he could not find a slave to run before him, so he himself ran before him for three miles.
Our Rabbis taught: It once happened that the people of Upper Galilee bought for a poor member of a good family of Sepphoris8 a pound of meat every day.9 'A pound of meat'! What is the greatness in this? - R. Huna replied: [It was] a pound of fowl's meat.10 And if you prefer I might say: [They purchased] ordinary meat for a pound11 [of money].12 R. Ashi replied: The place was13 a small village14 and everyday a beast had to be spoiled for his sake.15
A certain man once applied to16 R. Nehemiah [for maintenance]. 'What do your meals consist of', [the Rabbi] asked him. 'Of fat meat and old wine', the other replied - 'Will you consent [the Rabbi asked him] to live17 with me on lentils?' [The other consented,] lived with him on lentils and died. 'Alas', [the Rabbi] said, 'for this man whom Nehemiah has killed.' On the contrary, he should [have said] 'Alas for Nehemiah who killed this man'! - [The fact], however, [is that the man himself was to blame, for] he should not have cultivated his luxurious habits to such an extent.
A man once applied to18 Raba [for maintenance]. 'What do your meals consist of?' he asked him. 'Of fat chicken and old wine', the other replied. 'Did you not consider', [the Rabbi] asked him, 'the burden of the community?' 'Do I', the other replied, 'eat of theirs? I eat [the food] of the All-Merciful; for we learned: The eyes of all wait for Thee, and Thou givest them their food in due season,19 this, since it is not said, 'in their season' but 'in his20 season', teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, provides for every individual his food In accordance with his own habits'.21 Meanwhile there arrived Raba's sister, who had not seen him for thirteen years, and brought him a fat chicken and old wine. 'What a remarkable incident!'22 [Raba]23 exclaimed; [and then] he said to him, 'I apologize24 to you, come and eat'.
Our Rabbis taught: If a man has no means and does not wish to be maintained [out of the poor funds] he should be granted [the sum he requires] as a loan and then it can be presented to him as a gift; so R. Meir. The Sages, however, said: It is given to him as a gift and then it is granted to him as a loan. ('As a gift'? He, surely, refuses to25 take [gifts]! Raba replied: It is offered to him in the first instance26 as a gift.)
If he has the means but does not want to maintain himself, [at his own expense],27 he is given [what he needs] as a gift, and then he is made to repay it. (If 'he is made to repay it' he would, surely, not take again! - R. Papa replied: [Repayment is claimed] after his death.) R. Simeon said: If he has the means and does not want to maintain himself [at his own expense], no one need feel any concern about him. If he has no means and does not wish to be maintained [out of the poor funds] he is told, 'Bring a pledge and you will receive [a loan]' in order to raise thereby his [drooping] spirit.28
Our Rabbis taught: To lend29 refers to a man who has no means and is unwilling to receive his maintenance [from the poor funds] to whom [the allowance] must be given as a loan and then presented to him as a gift. Thou shalt lend him30 refers to a man who has the means and does not wish to maintain himself [at his own expense] to whom [the allowance] is given as a gift and repayment is claimed from his [estate] after his death, so R. Judah. The Sages, however, said: If he has the means and does not wish to maintain himself [at his own expense] no one need feel any concern about him. To what, however, is the text Thou shalt lend him31 to be applied? The Torah employs ordinary phraseology.32
Mar 'Ukba had a poor man in his neighbourhood into whose door-socket he used to throw four zuz every day. Once33 [the poor man] thought: 'I will go and see who does me this kindness'. On that day [it happened] that Mar 'Ukba was late at34 the house of study and his wife35 was coming home with him. As soon as [the poor man] saw them moving the door he went out after them, but they fled from him and ran into a furnace from which the fire had just been swept. Mar 'Ukba's feet were burning and his wife said to him: Raise your feet and put them on mine. As he was upset,36 she said to him, 'I am usually at home37 and my benefactions are direct'.38 And what [was the reason for] all that?39 - Because Mar Zutra b. Tobiah said in the name of Rab (others state: R. Huna40 b. Bizna said in the name of R. Simeon the Pious; and others again state: R. Johanan said in the name of R. Simeon b. Yohai): Better had a man thrown himself into a fiery furnace than publicly put his neighbour to shame. Whence do we derive this? From [the action of] Tamar; for it is written in Scripture, When she was brought forth,41 [she sent to her father-in-law].42
Mar 'Ukba had a poor man in his neighbourhood to whom he regularly sent four hundred zuz on the Eve of every Day of Atonement. On one occasion43 he sent them through his son who came back and said to him, 'He does not need [your help]'. 'What have you seen?' [his father] asked. 'I saw [the son replied] that they were spraying old wine before him'.44 'Is he so delicate?' [the father] said, and, doubling the amount, he sent it back to him.
When he45 was about to die46 he requested, 'Bring me my charity accounts'. Finding that seven thousand of Sijan47 [gold] denarii were entered therein he exclaimed, 'The provisions are scanty and the road is long', and he forthwith48 distributed half of his wealth. But how could he do such a thing?49 Has not R. Elai stated: It was ordained at Usha that if a man wishes to spend liberally he should not spend more than a filth?50 - This applies only during a man's lifetime, since he might thereby be impoverished51 but after death52 this does not matter.
R. Abba used to bind money in his scarf,53 sling it on his back, and place himself at the disposal of the poor.54 He cast his eye, however, sideways [as a precaution] against rogues.55
R. Hanina had a poor man to whom he regularly sent four zuz on the Eve of every Sabbath. One day he sent that sum through his wile who came back and told him [that the man was in] no need of it. 'What [R. Hanina asked her] did you see?' [She replied:] I heard that he was asked, 'On what will you dine;
(1) Out of the charity funds. Lit., 'came to be married'.
(2) Tosef. Keth. VI.
(3) V. p. 409, n. 12.
(4) Deut. XV, 8.
(5) uk lit., 'unto him'.
(6) Gen. II, 18, referring to a wife. Tosef Keth. VI.
(7) Alfasi: he hired.
(8) A town on one of the Upper Galilean mountains. It was called Sepphoris צפורי (v. Meg. 6a) 'because it was perched on the top of a mountain like a bird', צפור. At one time it was the capital of Galilee and is identified (l.c.) with Kitron (Judges I, 30). V. Klein, S. מאמרים, (fifty-fourff )
(9) Tosef. Pe'ah. IV.
(10) Which was very expensive.
(11) ליטרא, is both a weight, the Roman libra, and a measure of capacity.
(12) The meat was so expensive.
(13) Lit., 'there'.
(14) Where there are no buyers.
(15) All the meat that remained after his one pound had been taken off had to be thrown away for lack of buyers and consumers.
(16) Lit., 'came before'.
(17) שתגלגל (rt. גלל, Pilp.). lit., 'roll', i.e., 'to put up with the inconvenience'.
(18) Lit., 'came before'.
(19) Ps. CXLV,15. בעתו lit., 'in his season'.
(20) V. supra n. 3
(21) V. Rashi.
(22) מאי דקמא, lit., 'what is that before me?'
(23) So Rashi. Ar. reads, קא אמא ==)מאי דקאמא, 'which I said') i.e., the applicant remarked, 'This is just what I have said'. (Cf. Jast.).
(24) Lit., 'I humble myself'. Rashi: 'I spoke too much'. The rt. עני, ענה, may bear either meaning.
(25) Lit., 'not'.
(26) Lit., 'to Open'.
(27) And thus leads a life of penury.
(28) Lit., 'that his mind shall be elated or cheered'. By this offer he is made to feel that he is not treated as a pauper and he consents, therefore, ultimately to take the sum as a loan without a pledge.
(29) העבט, E.V., surely, Deut. XV, 8.
(30) תעביטנו, ibid.
(31) I.e., the repetition of the verb, in the Infinitive and Imperfect (v. supra nn. 2 and 3), from which R. Judah derived his ruling.
(32) Lit., 'spoke in the language of men', who are in the habit of repeating their words. Hence no inference may be drawn from the repetition in the text cited.
(33) Lit., 'one day'.
(34) So MS.M., בבי Cur. edd. לבי.
(35) Who, owing to the late hour, went to meet him.
(36) Lit., 'his mind weakened'. He feared that he was not providentially protected from the heat of the furnace because he was not as worthy of divine protection as his wife.
(37) So that the poor had easy access to her.
(38) Lit., 'near'. She gave them gifts in kind and they could forthwith derive benefit from them. He, however, was not approachable at all times and the alms he gave to the poor were not in kind but in money which had first to be spent before the poor could derive any benefit from it. His benefits, therefore, were indirect.
(39) Why did they make such an effort to escape from the attention of the poor man?
(40) Var Hana (v. B.M. 59a).
(41) To be burned (Gen. XXXVIII, 24).
(42) Ibid., 25. She chose to be burned rather than publicly put her father-in-law to shame. it was only through Judah's own confession (ibid. 26) after he received her private message (ibid 25) that she was saved.
(43) Lit., 'day'.
(44) קמיה MS.M. Cur. edd., 'to him'.
(45) Mar 'Ukba'.
(46) Lit., 'when his soul was (about to) come to its rest'.
(47) The name of a Persian town in the district of Shiraz, v. Fleischer to Levy's Worterbuch I, p. 560.
(48) Lit ,'he arose'.
(49) Distributing half his wealth.
(50) V. supra 50a.
(51) Lit., 'go down from his wealth'.
(52) I.e , when one is on the point of dying as was the case with Mar 'Ukba.
(53) סודרא 'scarf' or 'turban', a cloth placed over, or wound round the head, hanging down loosely upon, the arms and shoulders.
(54) Who undid the binding and shared the money among themselves.
(55) He would nevertheless spare the poor the feelings of shame.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 68a
on the silver [coloured] cloths1 or on the gold [coloured] ones?2 ' 'It is in view of such cases' [R. Hanina] remarked, 'that R. Eleazar said: Come let us be grateful to the rogues for were it not for then, we3 would have been sinning every day, for it is said in Scripture, And he cry unto to the Lord against thee, and it be sill unto thee.4 Furthermore, R.Hiyya b. Rab of Difti5 taught: R. Joshua b. Korha said, Any one who shuts his eye against charity is like one who worships idols, for here6 it is written, Beware that there be not a base7 thought in thy heart etc. [and thine eye will be evil against thy poor brother]8 and there9 it is written, Certain base7 fellows are gone out,10 as there9 [the crime is that of] idolatry, so here also [the crime is like that of] idolatry'.11
Our Rabbis taught: If a man pretends to have a blind eye, a swollen belly or a shrunken leg,12 he will not pass out from this world before actually coming into such a condition. If a man accepts charity and is not in need of it his end [will be that] he will not pass out of the world before he comes to such a condition.
We learned elsewhere: He13 may not be compelled to sell his house or his articles of service'.14 May he not indeed?15 Was it not taught: If he was in the habit of using gold articles he shall now use copper ones?16 - R. Zebid replied. This is no difficulty. The one17 refers to the bed and table: the other to cups and dishes. What difference is there in the case of the cups and dishes that they are not [to be sold]? Obviously because he can say, '[The inferior quality] is repulsive to me', [but then, in respect of] a bed and table also, he might say [the cheaper article] is unacceptable to me! - Raba the son of Rabbah replied: [This17 refers] to a silver strigil.18 R. Papa replied: There is no difficulty: one19 [refers to a man] before he came under the obligation of repayment,20 and the other refers to a man21 after he had come under the obligation of repayment.22 MISHNAH. IF AN ORPHAN WAS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE BY HER MOTHER OR HER BROTHERS [EVEN IF] WITH HER CONSENT23 AND THEY ASSIGNED24 TO HER A HUNDRED, OR FIFTY ZUZ,25 SHE MAY, WHEN SHE ATTAINS HER MAJORITY,26 RECOVER FROM THEM THE AMOUNT THAT WAS DUE TO HER.27 R. JUDAH RULED: IF A MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE SECOND28 MUST RECEIVE AS MUCH AS THE [FATHER] HAD GIVEN TO THE FIRST. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID: SOMETIMES A MAN IS POOR AND BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND BECOMES POOR.29 THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE30 BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE].
GEMARA. Samuel stated: In respect of the marriage outfit31 the assessment32 is to be determined by [the disposition of] the father.33
All objection was raised: 'The daughters are to be maintained and provided for34 out of the estate of their father. In what manner? It is not to be said, "Had her father been alive he would have given her such and such a sum" but the estate is valued and she is given [her due share]'. Does not ['provided for' refer to] the marriage35 outfit?36 - R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: No; [it refers to] her own maintenance.37 But, surely, it was stated: 'Are to be maintained and provided for'; does not one [of the expressions]38 refer to the marriage39 outfit and the other to her own maintenance?40 - No; the one as well as the other refers to her own maintenance,40 and yet there is no real difficulty, for one of the expressions38 refers41 to food and drink and the other41 to clothing and bedding.
We learned: THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID, SOMETIMES A MAN IS POOR AND BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND BECOMES POOR. THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. Now what is meant by POOR and RICH? If it be suggested that POOR means poor in material possessions, and RICH means rich in such possessions, the inference [should consequently be] that the first Tanna holds the opinion that even when a man was rich and became poor she is given as much as before; but, surely, [it may be objected] he has none [to give]. Must it not then [be concluded that] POOR means poor in mind42 and RICH means rich in mind,43 and yet it was stated, THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. from which it clearly follows that we are not guided by the assumed disposition [of her father], and this presents an objection against Samuel!44 He45 holds the same view as R. Judah. For we learned, R. JUDAH RULED: IF A MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE SECOND SHOULD RECEIVE AS MUCH AS THE [FATHER] HAD GIVEN TO THE FIRST. [Why], then, [did he not] say, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah'?46 - If he had said, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah', it might have been assumed [to apply] only [where her father had actually] given her47 in marriage, since [in that case] he has revealed his disposition, but not [to a case where] he had not given her47 in marriage,48 hence he45 taught us49 that R. Judah's reason is that we are guided by our assumption [as to whit was her father's disposition], there being no difference whether he had already given her50 in marriage or whether he had not given her in marriage; the only object he51 had52 in mentioning [the case where a father] gave her50 in marriage was to let you know the extent of the ruling53 of the Rabbis54 [who maintain] that although he had already given her50 in marriage and had thereby revealed his disposition, we are nevertheless not to be guided by the assumption [as to what may have been the father's disposition].
Said Raba to R. Hisda: In our discourse we stated55 in your name, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. The other replied: May it be the will [of Providence] that you may report in your discourses all such beautiful sayings in my name. But could Raba, however, have made such a statement?56 Surely, it was taught: Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive57 a tenth of [her father's] estate;58 and Raba stated that the law is in agreement with Rabbi!59 - This is no difficulty. The former60 [is a case] where we have formed some opinion about him;61 the latter62 is one where we have not formed any opinion about him.63 This explanation may also be supported by a process of reasoning. For R. Adda b. Ahaba stated: It once happened that Rabbi gave her64 a twelfth of [her father's] estate. Are not the two statements contradictory?65 Consequently66 it must be inferred that the one67 [refers to a father of whom] some opinion had been formed while the other68 [refers to one of whom] we have formed no opinion. This is conclusive proof.
[To turn to] the main text.69 Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father's] estate. They70 said to Rabbi: According to your statement, if a man had ten daughters and one son the sons should receive no share at all on account of71 the daughters? He replied: What I mean is this: The first72 [daughter] receives a tenth of the estate, the second [receives a tenth] of what [the first] had left, and the third [gets a tenth] of what [the second] had left, and then they divide again [all that they had received] into equal shares.
(1) I.e., white linen (Rashi).
(2) Silk cloths dyed. (Rashi a.l.; cf. also Rashi on Ezek. XVI, 16). טלי or טלי may be compared with GR.** , cushion', 'pillow' (v. Levy); 'will you recline at dinner', he was asked, 'on the linen, or silken pillows?' The noun is also rendered, 'table outfit', the expressions, 'silver' and gold' being taker, literally; 'Will you dine with the silver outfit (i.e., with the outfit used in connection with silver vessels) or with the gold outfit?' (Jast.).
(3) Who do not always respond to every appeal for charity.
(4) Deut. XV, 9.
(5) Dibtha, below the Tigris.
(6) In connection with the duty of assisting the poor.
(8) Deut. XV, 9.
(9) Concerning idolatry
(10) Deut. XIII, 14, the expression base, בליעל (v. supra n. 12), occuring in both cases.
(11) It is only thanks to the rogues who claim charity under false pretences that we have an excuse for not responding to every appeal.
(12) V. Rashi; 'a hump' (Jast.). שוק may be rendered 'leg', 'foreleg' or 'shoulder'. The rt. קפה in Piel is to be taken according to Rashi's interpretation in the sense of 'binding', 'forcing', or 'outraging'. It is taken by Jast. as denom. of קפח 'to make high and arched shoulders', 'to cause or pretend to be humpbacked'.
(13) One who owns less than two hundred zuz and wishes to take a share in the poor man's gifts. The possessor of two hundred zuz is forbidden to participate in the poor man's gifts.
(14) Though the proceeds of such a sale would raise the man's capital above the two hundred zuz limit. Pe'ah VIII, 8.
(15) Lit., 'and not?'
(16) Which proves that a poor man is expected to sell his costlier goods before he is allowed to take alms. Why then was it stated here that he is not compelled to sell 'his artical of service'?
(17) The last mentioned Baraitha which orders the sale of 'articles of service'.
(18) There can be no hardship in using instead of one made of a cheaper metal.
(19) The Mishnah from Pe'ah, according to which one is not compelled to sell his articles of service.
(20) I.e., if he possessed less than two hundred zuz and applied for assistance before receiving any help under false pretences. As there is no claim against him he is not to be compelled to sell his articles of service.
(21) Who, being in possession of two hundred zuz, accepted alms under false pretences.
(22) I.e., after it had been discovered that did not belong to the poor classes and was ordered by the court to refund all sums he had received unlawfully. In such a case, if he is unable to meet the claim otherwise, he is compelled to sell his costly articles and to content himself with the use of cheaper ones.
(23) And much more so if without her consent.
(24) Lit., 'wrote'.
(25) As her share in the estate of her deceased father.
(26) Though she had accepted the amount during her minority V.supra note 1.
(27) VI., a tenth of the estate.
(28) Who marries after his death.
(29) The amount he gives to his first daughter is, therefore, no criterion for his second
(30) The second daughter.
(31) Of an orphan.
(32) I.e.,the amount to be given to the orphan on marriage out of her father's estate.
(33) She is to receive a bigger or a smaller amount in accordance with her fathers reputation for generosity or niggardliness.
(34) This is explained anon.
(35) Lit., ['the parnasah of her husband', parnasah being a technical term to denote the estate set aside for the dowry of the orphaned daughter. Frankel MGWJ 1861,p.119 connects it with the Gk. ** cf. supra p. 408. n. 6].
(36) A contradiction against the ruling of Samuel.
(37) Before marriage, while she is still with her brothers.
(38) 'To be (a) maintained and (b) provided for'.
(39) V. p. 416, n. 13.
(40) V. p. 416, n. 15.
(41) Lit., 'that'.
(42) Niggardly; having the mind or disposition of a poor man.
(44) Who stated that the amount is determined by what is known of the disposition of her father. How, it is asked, could Samuel differ from a Mishnah?
(46) Which would have been a shorter statement and would have included the name of its author also.
(47) HIS FIRST DAUGHTER.
(48) Since his disposition had not beers revealed.
(49) By his specific ruling.
(50) HIS FIRST DAUGHTER.
(51) The compiler of our Mishnah.
(52) Lit., 'and that.'
(53) Lit., 'power'.
(54) The Sages
(55) Or: Shall we state etc. (cf Rashi, s v. דרשינן Bezah 28a)
(56) That the amount to be given to an orphan on marriage is determined, as R. Judah ruled, by the disposition of her father.
(57) On marriage.
(58) Ned. 39b.
(59) I.e., that the amount the daughter is to receives is a legally, prescribed proportion. How then could he have said that the halachah was in agreement with R. Judah (v supra note 7)?
(60) Lit., that', the statement that the halachah follows R. Judah (v. supra note 7 )
(61) The orphan's father. Knowing his disposition it is possible to determine accordingly what amount his daughter shall be allowed on marriage.
(62) Lit., 'that', the law that the proportion she is to receive is always a tenth of the estate.
(63) If he was unknown to the court and no one is able to supply reliable information on the point.
(64) An orphan on marriage.
(65) According to the former statement Rabbi allowed only one tenth while according to the latter he allowed a twelfth.
(66) To reconcile the contrary statements.
(67) The case where a twelfth had been allowed.
(68) Cf. supra p. 418, n. 13.
(69) A citation from which has been discussed supra..
(70) The scholars at the college.
(71) Lit.,'in the place of'.
(72) It is at present assumed, 'the first to marry'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 68b
But did not each one receive what was hers?1 - It is this that was meant: If all of theme wish2 to marry at the same time they are to receive equal shares.3 This provides support for [the opinion] of R. Mattena; for R. Mattena has said: If all of them wish to marry at the same time they are to receive one tenth. 'One tenth'! Can you imagine [such a ruling]?4 The meaning must consequently be that5 they are to receive their tenths at the same time.6 Our Rabbis taught: The daughters,7 whether they had attained their adolescence before they married or whether they married before they had attained their adolescence, lose their right to maintenance8 but not to their allowance for marriage outfit; so Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Eleazar said: If they also attained their adolescence, they lose the right to their marriage outfit.9 How should they proceed?10 - They hire for themselves husbands11 and exact their outfit allowance. R. Nahman stated: Huna told me, The law is in agreement with Rabbi.
Raba raised an objection against R. Nahman: IF AN ORPHAN WAS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE BY HER MOTHER OR HER BROTHERS [EVEN IF] WITH HER CONSENT, AND THEY ASSIGNED TO HER A HUNDRED, OR FIFTY ZUZ, SHE MAY, WHEN SHE ATTAINS HER MAJORITY, RECOVER FROM THEM THE AMOUNT THAT WAS DUE TO HER. The reason then12 is because she was a minor;13 had she, however, been older14 her right15 would have been surrendered!16 - This is no difficulty; the one17 , is a case where she protested;18 the other,19 where she did not protest.20 This expla nation may also be supported by a process of reasoning. For otherwise21 there would arise a contradiction between two statements of Rabbi.22 For it was taught, 'Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father's] estate', [which implies] only when23 she is maintained24 but not25 when she is not maintained.26 Must it not in consequence be concluded that one [statement deals with one] who protested and the other [with one] who did not protest. This proves it.
Rabina said to Raba: R. Adda b. Ahaba told us in your name, If she attained her adolescence she need not lodge a protest;27 if she married she need not lodge a protest;27 but if she attained her adolescence and was also married it is necessary for her to lodge a protest.28 But could Raba have made such a statement? Surely, Raba pointed out an objection against R. Nahman [from the Mishnah of] AN ORPHAN, and the other replied that 'the one is a case where she protested, the other where she did not protest'!29 - This is no difficulty. One30 is a case where she is maintained31 by them;32 the other,33 where she is not maintained by them.34
R. Huna stated in the name of Rabbi: [The right35 to] marriage outfit is not the same as that36 conferred by a condition in a kethubah.37 What is meant by 'is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a kethubah'? Should it be suggested38 that whereas for the allowance for a marriage outfit even property pledged39 may be seized,40 [for the fulfilment of an obligation36 under] the terms of a kethubah no pledged property41 may be seized,42 what [new point, it may be objected,] does this teach us? Surely it is a daily occurrence [that pledged property] is seized for marriage outfit but not for maintenance! [Should it], however, [be suggested that] whereas for a marriage outfit movable objects also may be seized, [for the fulfilment of an obligation under] a condition in a kethubah only real estate. but not movable objects, may be seized, [it may be objected that,] according to Rabbi, for the one as well as the other43 [movable objects] may be seized. For it was taught: Both landed property and movable property may be seized for the maintenance of a wile or daughters;44 so Rabbi! What, then, is meant by '[The right to] marriage outfit is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a kethubah'? - As it was taught: If a man45 said that his daughters must not be maintained out of his estate he is not to be obeyed.46 [If, however, he said, that] his daughters shall not receive their marriage outfit out of his estate he is obeyed, because [the right to] marriage outfit is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a kethubah47 . [
(1) Of course she did. Each one is entitled to a tenth of the value of the estate as it stood at the time she married. Why then should there be a new division in equal shares, which would deprive those who married earlier from what was their due?
(2) Lit., 'came'.
(3) After each in turn had received a tenth of the value of the estate as it stood at the moment her share was allowed to her. Since subsequently they will all pool their shares it does not matter which of them is given her share first. the only object of the allotment of the successive shares is to determine what part of the estate is to be left for the son. If there were three daughters for instance, the division would proceed as follows: One daughter would be allowed one tenth of the estate; the other 1/10 X 9/10; and the third 1/10 X 81/100. The son would, therefore, receive 1- (1/10-9/100 - 81/1000)= 729/1000, and each daughter would ultimately get a 271/3 X 1000 of the entire estate.
(4) Certainly not. If every daughter is entitled to a tenth of the estate, several daughters, surely, should receive more than one tenth.
(5) Lit., 'but'.
(6) The reading being עישור כאחד instead of עישור אחד (one tenth'). Cf. supra n. 9.
(7) Of a man who left an estate and is survived by sons.
(8) Because the terms of a kethubah provide for the maintenance of daughters only until adolescence (v. Glos. s.v. bogereth) or marriage, whichever is the earlier.
(9) The tenth of the estate to which, as stated supra, a daughter is entitled. In his opinion it is only one who is a minor, nacarah (v. Glos.), that receives such tenth, once she has reached her adolescence, or married as a nacarah, without claiming at the time her full marriage outfit, she loses her claim to it.
(10) If they had not been married early and are desirous of securing their tenth before losing it through age.
(11) [They hire men to declare that they would marry them (Strashun)].
(12) why she may recover the amount prescribed for her marriage outfit,
(13) At the time she married.
(14) Even If she was still a nacarah at the time of marriage.
(15) To her full claim.
(16) And she would not be entitled to the balance of her marriage outfit. This anonymous Mishnah then is in agreement with the view of R. Simeon b. Eleazar. Now, since the halachah is usually in agreement with the anonymous Mishnah how could R. Nahman maintain that the halachah is in agreement with Rabbi?
(17) Rabbi's statement that she does not lose her marriage outfit.
(18) When less than her due was assigned to her.
(19) Our Mishnah.
(20) Hence it is only a minor, who cannot surrender her rights, that may recover the balance when she becomes of age. One, however, who has passed her minority (cf. supra note 8) may well surrender her right. Her silence is regarded as consent.
(21) Lit., 'for if so', that Rabbi maintains that in all cases a daughter on attaining adolescence does not lose the right to her marriage outfit,
(22) Lit., 'that of Rabbi against that of Rabbi'.
(23) Lit., 'yes'.
(24) Is she to receive a tenth of the whole.
(25) She is to receive no such allowance.
(26) I.e., after she had attained her adolescence, How then could Rabbi also have stated that a daughter always (v. supra n. 1) receives her outfit?
(27) Against the full, or partial loss of her marriage outfit allowance. Even without her protest she retains he right to the tenth of the estate that is due to her,
(28) Otherwise she loses her claim to the marriage outfit.
(29) Supra. Cf. supra p. 420, notes 11 to 14. From which it follows that once she passes her minority, though she did not attain her adolescence, a daughter loses her full claim to an outfit allowance if she did not lodge her protest on marriage. How then could it be said that according to Raba, 'if she married (provided it was before attaining her adolescence) she need not lodge a protest'?
(30) Raba's ruling that 'if she married she need not lodge a protest'.
(31) After her marriage.
(32) Her brothers. In such a case it is to be presumed that her silence was not due to her consent to lose her outfit but to the belief that, as they continued to maintain her, they would also give her in due course the full amount of her outfit allowance.
(33) The inference from our Mishnah according to which one who has passed out of her minority surrenders on marriage her right to the balance of her outfit.
(34) Hence she loses the right to her outfit unless she lodged her protest.
(35) Of a daughter.
(36) Of a daughter's maintenance.
(37) Cf. supra 52b.
(38) As a point of difference between the two rights.
(39) By the brothers (not by the father).
(40) Since it represents a fixed sum (one tenth of the estate) it had the validity of a debt incumbent upon the estate.
(41) Even if it was only the brothers who pledged it (v. Git. 48b)
(42) As the amount is not a fixed quantity it has not the same force as a debt.
(43) For maintenance as well as for marriage outfit.
(44) And much more so for marriage outfit which has the validity of a debt of a debt (cf. supra nn. 6 and 8).
(45) On his death bed.
(46) Since even a dying man, whose verbal instructions have the validity of a legal contract, cannot annul the undertaking to maintain his daughters which he entered in the kethubah.
(47) While the latter is obligatory upon the deceased and upon his heirs, the firmer has to be provided by the heirs only where the deceased did not give specific instructions to the contrary.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 69a
Rah inserted1 [the following enquiry] between the lines2 [of a communication3 he sent] to Rabbi: What [is the law] where the brothers have encumbered [the estate they inherited from their father]?4 [When the enquiry reached him] R. Hiyya [who] was sitting before him asked, '[does he mean:] They sold it or pledged it?' - 'What difference call this make?'5 the other retorted. Whether they sold it [he continued] or pledged it, [the estate] may he seized [to meet the obligation] of marriage outfit but may not be seized for that of maintenance
As to Rab, however, if his enquiry [related to brothers] who sold [the estate], he should have written to him, 'sold'; and if his enquiry [related to brothers] who pledged it, he should have written to him, 'pledged'! - Rab wished to ascertain the law concerning both cases and he thought: If I write to him 'sold' [I shall get] satisfaction If he were to send [in reply] that 'the estate may be seized', since the same ruling would apply with even greater force to the case where they pledged [the estate]. If, however, he were to send me in reply that 'it may not be seized',the question [in respect of brothers] who pledged [the estate] would still remain. If, [again]. I were to write to him, 'pledged' then if he sent in reply that 'the estate may not be seized' this ruling would apply with even greater force [to the case where] they sold it. Should he, however, send a reply that 'it may be seized', the question [in respect of brothers] who sold It would still remain. I will, therefore, write to him , 'encumbered' which might mean the one6 as well as the other7
R. Johanan, however, ruled: [An estate]8 may not be seized either [to meet the obligation of the] one or of the other.9
The question was raised: Did not R. Johanan hear the ruling of Rabbi, but if he had heard it he would have accepted it? Or is it possible that he heard it and did not accept it? - Come and hear what has been stated: If a man died and left two daughters and one son, and the first forestalled [the others] and took a tenth of the estate while the other did not manage to collect [her share] before the son died10 , R. Johanan ruled: The second11 has surrendered her right.12 Said R. Hanina: Something that is even more striking than this has been said, [viz.. that an estate] may be seized13 [to meet the obligation] of a marriage outfit though it may not be seized for that of maintenance, and you nevertheless state, 'The second has surrendered her right'?14 Now, if that were the case,15 he16 should have asked him 'who said it?'17
But is it not possible that he in fact did not hear it [at first]18 and when he [finally] heard he accepted it, but there19 [the circumstances are] different, since the house [of the second daughter] has now ample provisions?20 Said R.Yemar to R. Ashi: Now then,21 if she22 found anything at all, so that her house is amply provided for, would we in such a case also not give her a tenth of the estate? - The other replied: I said, A house amply provided for from the same estate.23
Amemar ruled: A daughter24 has [the legal status of] an heiress. Said R. Ashi to Amemar: Should it be desired to settle her claim25 by means of a money payment such a settlement cannot be effected for the same reason?26 - 'Yes', the other replied. 'Should it be desired [the first asked] to settle her claim by [giving her] one plot of land, such a settlement cannot be effected for the same reason?'26 - 'Yes', the other replied .27 R. Ashi, however, ruled: A daughter28 has [the legal status of] a creditor.29 And Amemar also withdrew his former opinion. For R. Minyomi son of R. Nihumi stated: I was once standing before Amemar and a woman who claimed a tenth of [her deceased father's] estate appeared before him, and I observed [that it was his] opinion that if [her brothers] desired to settle with her by means of a money payment he would have agreed to the settlement.30 For he heard the brothers say to her, 'If we had the money we would settle with you31 by a cash payment', and he remained silent and told them nothing to the contrary.
Now that it has been said that [a daughter in her claim to her tenth]28 has the legal status of a creditor [the question arises whether she is the creditor] of the father or of the brothers. In what respect can this matter? - In respect [of allowing her] to collect [her tenth] either from their medium32 land and without an oath,33 or of their worst land with an oath.34 Now what [is the law]? - Come and hear [of the decision] of Rabina: He allowed the daughter of R. Ashi to collect [her tenth] from Mar35 the son of R. Ashi out Of his medium land, without an oath, but from the son of R. Sama36 the son of R. Ashi out of his worst land with an oath.37
R. Nehemiah the son of R. Joseph sent the following message to Rabbah the son of R. Huna Zuta38 of Nehardea:39 When this woman40 presents herself to you, authorize her to collect a tenth part of [her deceased father's] estate even from the casing of handmills.41
R. Ashi stated: When we were at the college of R. Kahana we authorized the collection [of a daughter's tenth] from the rent42 of houses also.
R. Anan sent [this communication] to R. Huna, '[To] our colleague Huna, greetings.43 When this woman40 presents herself before you, authorize her to collect a tenth part of [her father's] estate'. [When the communication arrived,] R. Shesheth was sitting before him. 'Go', [R. Huna] said to him,44 'and convey45 to him46 [the following message]-and he47 who does not deliver the message48 to him shall fall under the ban - "Anan, Anan, [is the collection to be made] from landed, or from movable property? And who presides at the meal in a house of mourning?"'49 R. Shesheth went to R. Anan and said to him: The Master50 is a teacher,51 and R. Huna is a teacher of the teacher,52 and he pronounced the ban against anyone who would not convey53 [his message] to you;54 and had he not pronounced the ban I would not have said, 'Anan, Anan, [is the collection to be made] from landed, or movable property, and who presides at the meal in a house of mourning?'55 Thereupon, R. Anan went to Mar 'Ukba and said to him: See, Master, how R. Huna addressed56 me as 'Anan, Anan';57 and, furthermore, I do not know what he meant by the message he sent me on marziha.58 The other said to him: Tell me now
(1) Lit., 'suspended'.
(2) חטי perhaps from חטט 'to dig'. 'scratch' hence a line drawn with a stylus (cf Rashi and last.). Aruk renders 'stitches' (cf חוט 'thread'), and this is apparently the interpretation adopted by Tosaf (s v. תלה a l.), the meaning being that 'among the documents that were sewn together one containing the enquiry was appended'; or, 'among the stitches holding the documents together the one containing the enquiry was inserted'.
(3) A friendly,' letter (Rashi).
(4) May it be seized by the daughter for their marriage outfit?
(5) Lit.,'what goes out (results) from it?'
(6) Lit., 'thus'.
(7) Sold or pledged. And should there be a difference in law between the two cases, Rabbi in his reply would naturally indicate it.
(8) Which the brothers sold or pledged. Cf. supra.
(9) I.e., maintenance or marriage outfit.
(10) And the entire estate fell to the lot of the daughters.
(11) Since she did not collect her tenth while the son was alive, i.e., before she and her sister became the sole heirs,
(12) A daughter may claim a tenth of the estate from a son only but not from a daughter whose rights are equal to hers.
(13) Though it has been pledged or sold.
(14) To her marriage outfit, even in an estate which had been neither sold nor pledged. The first sister, surely, cannot possess a stronger claim upon the estate than a buyer or a creditor, V. Git. 51a.
(15) That R. Johanan never heard Rabbi's ruling.
(16) R. Johanan.
(17) Since he did not ask him this it may be inferred that R. Johanan did hear Rabbi's ruling but did not accept it. For this reason also he did not withdraw his ruling in the case of the two daughters.
(18) Rabbi's ruling.
(19) The case of the two daughters which was discussed after he had heard Rabbi's ruling and accepted it.
(20) At first she was entitled to a tenth only and now she gets a half. In such circumstances she may well be expected to surrender her claim to the tenth. Rabbi, however, deals with a case where the brothers are alive, and the daughters ate entirely dependent on their tenths,
(21) If the argument of additional provision is admissible.
(22) The second sister.
(23) From which she was to receive her tenth.
(24) In respect of her right to a tenth of her father's estate.
(25) To the tenth of the estate. Lit., 'to remove her'.
(26) Because she has the status of an heiress, Lit., 'thus also'.
(27) As heiress she has the right to claim a share in the actual property her father left and in every portion of it.
(28) In respect of her right to a tenth of her father's estate.
(29) Her claim may, therefore, be met by a money payment or by the allotment of any plot of land of the value of a tenth of the estate that is due to her.
(30) Lit., 'he would have removed (sc. dismissed) her',
(31) So MS. M. adding לך after סליקנא.
(32) Land is classified as עידית best בינונית, medium Or זיבורית worst, and payments are made from these respective qualities in accordance with the strength and validity of any particular claim. Cf. e g., Git. 48b.
(33) That she had never taken anything from the estate. This would be the law if she were regarded as the creditor of the brothers.
(34) If she is regarded as the father's creditor. In the latter case she would be subject to the restrictions imposed on a creditor who claims his debt from the debtor's orphans (v. Get. 48b).
(35) Who survived his father and from whom his sister claimed a portion of her tenth.
(36) Who predeceased R. Ashi and whose son, on the death of his grandfather (R. Ashi), inherited his father's (R. Sama's) share and was now sued by his aunt to give her the portion of her tenth that his father as a son of R. Ashi owed her (Rashi). [Ritba and others: R. Sama died shortly after R. Ashi, before his daughter managed to collect her tenth share in the estate].
(37) According to Rabina, then, the daughter was regarded as the debtor of her brothers (Mar and R. Sama). From the former, therefore, who was alive she consequently collected of the best and without an oath (cf. supra p. 425 , n. 11). From the latter, however, she could only collect through his son as the creditor of has father's and was therefore subject to the restrictions of a creditor who collects from orphans (cf. supra. note I).
(38) Var. lec., 'Zuti' (cf. B.B. 66b)
(39) V. supra p. 222, n. 8.
(40) The bearer, whose case R. Nehemiah had investigated.
(41) The casing being regarded as landed estate from which her tenth may be collected.
(42) The yield of the houses being legally regarded, like, the houses themselves, as landed property (cf. supra n. 8').
(43) Lit., 'peace.
(44) To R. Shesheth.
(45) Lit., 'say'.
(46) To R. Anan.
(47) I.e., 'If you do not deliver the message etc.', the third person being used for euphemism.
(48) I.e., using exactly the same words, lit., 'say'.
(49) R. Huna was apparently offended by the tone or wording of R. Anan's communication. Hence the abusive reply.
(50) R. Anan.
(51) A complimentary introduction to the unpleasant message that follows
(52) I.e., R. Anan. An excuse for carrying out his instructions though they were offensive to R. Anan.
(53) Lit., 'say'.
(54) Lit., 'to him'.
(55) The seat of honour at the meal in a house of mourning was given to the greatest scholar in the company
(56) Lit , 'sent'.
(57) Without the title of 'R.'
(58) מרזיחה rendered supra, 'a house of mourning'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 69b
how the incident actually occurred. 'The incident', the first replied, 'happened in such and such a way'. 'A man', the other exclaimed, 'who does not know the meaning of marziha should [scarcely] presume to address1 R. Huna as, "our colleague Huna".'
What [is the meaning of] marziha. - Mourning; for it is written in Scripture, Thus saith the Lord: Enter not into the house of mourning2 etc.3
R. Abbahu stated: Whence is it deduced that a mourner sits at the head [of the table]?4 [From Scripture] wherein it is said, I chose out their way, and sat at the head,5 and dwelt as a king in the army, as one that comforteth6 the mourners.7 But does not yenahem8 mean [one who comforts] others?9 R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: The written form is YNHM.10 Mar Zutra said: [The deduction11 is made] from here: We-sar marzeah seruhim,12 he who is in bitterness and distracted13 becomes the chief14 of those that stretched themselves.15
Raba stated: The law [is that payment may be exacted] from landed property, but not from movable property, whether in respect of maintenance, kethubah or marriage outfit.16
MISHNAH. IF A MAN DEPOSITED17 A SUM OF MONEY FOR HIS [UNMARRIED] DAUGHTER WITH A TRUSTEE,18 AND [AFTER SHE WAS BETROTHED]19 SHE SAYS, 'I TRUST MY HUSBAND',20 THE TRUSTEE MUST ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITION OF HIS TRUST;21 SO R. MEIR. R. JOSE, HOWEVER, SAID: WERE [THE TRUST] ACTUALLY22 A FIELD23 AND SHE WISHED TO SELL IT, WOULD IT NOT BE DEEMED24 SOLD FORTHWITH!25 THIS APPLIES TO ONE WHO IS OF AGE.26 IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR.
GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: If a man deposited for his son-in-law with a trustee a sum of money wherewith to buy a field for his daughter, and she says, 'Let it be given to my husband', she is entitled [to have her wish fulfilled, if it was expressed] after her marriage27 but if only after her betrothal the trustee must act according to the conditions of his trust;28 so R. Meir. R. Jose, however, said: A woman who is of age has a right [to obtain her desire] whether [it was expressed] after her marriage or only after betrothal, but [in the case of] a minor [whether her wish was expressed] after marriage or after betrothal, the trustee must act in accordance with the conditions of his trust.29 What is the practical difference between them?30 If it be suggested that the practical difference between them is the case of a minor after her marriage, R. Meir holding the opinion that [even] she is entitled [to have her wish] and R. Jose comes to state that even after marriage [It is only] a woman who is of age that is entitled to have her wish31 but not a minor, [in that case] what of32 the final clause,33 IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR. Who [it might be asked] could have taught this? If it be suggested [that the author was] R. Jose, [it could be objected:] This, surely, could be inferred from the first clause; for, since R. Jose said, WERE [THE TRUST] ACTUALLY A FIELD AND SHE WISHED TO SELL IT, WOULD IT NOT BE DEEMED SOLD FORTHWITH! [it follows34 that only] one that is of age, who is eligible to effect a sale, was meant,35 but not a minor who is ineligible to effect a sale.36 Consequently it must be R. Meir [who was the author of] it, and a clause is in fact missing [from our Mishnah], the proper reading being as follows:37 'THE TRUSTEE MUST ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF HIS TRUST. This applies only [to a woman whose desire was expressed] after her betrothal, but if after her marriage she is entitled [to have her wish]. THIS [furthermore] APPLIES TO ONE WHO IS OF AGE. IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR.'38 - [The fact]. however, is that the practical difference between them is the case of one who is of age [whose wish was expressed] after her betrothal.39
It was stated: Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel. The halachah is in agreement with R. Jose. Raba ion the name of R. Nahman said, The halachah is in agreement with R. Meir. Ilfa40 reclined41 upon a sail mast42 and43 said: 'Should any one come and submit to me any statement [in the Baraithoth] of R. Hiyya and R. Oshaia44 which I cannot make clear to him [with the aid] of our Mishnah I will drop from the mast45 and drown myself'. An aged man came and recited to him [the following Baraitha:]46 If a man47 said, 'Give my children48 a shekel a week',49 and they require a sela',50 a sela' is to he given to them.51 But if he said, 'Give them no more than a shekel', only a shekel is to he given to them.52 If, however, he gave Instructions that if these died others53 shall be his heirs in their stead, only one shekel [a week] is to be given to them, irrespective of whether he used the expression of 'give' or 'give no [more]',54 [Ilfa] said to him: [Do you wish to know] whose ruling this55 is?
(1) Lit., 'sent'.
(2) מרזה, Heb. from Aram. מרזיחה
(3) Jer. XVI, 5
(4) At the meal in a house of mourning.
(5) E V., as chief. ואשב ראש may bear both renderings.
(6) This is explained by R. Nahman anon.
(7) Job. XXIX, 25.
(8) ינחם Imperf. Piel of נחם.
(9) How then could the text be said to refer to the mourner who is himself to be comforted?
(10) ינחם, which may be vocalized as the Pus form Yenuham, 'one who is comforted'. Though the text must retain its obvious meaning with the M.T. vocalization of ינחם, the possibility of reading ינחם as ינחם also permits of the Midrashic exposition (Tosaf. s.v. אמר).
(11) That the mourner is to sit at the head of the table at the meal in a house of mourning.
(12) וסר מרזח סרוחים, Amos, VI, 7. Midrashically, שר=סר (chief, I.e., 'sits at the head'), מרזח is divided into מר (bitter) and זח (rt. זוח distracted), and סרוחים is taken to refer to the comforters who stretch themselves on their couches or on the ground at the feet of the mourner. (Cf. Golds.). E.V., And the revelry of men that stretched themselves shall pass away.
(13) I.e. , the mourner.
(14) I.e. , sits at the head of the table during the meal.
(15) Before him, sc. those, who came to offer their condolence.
(16) A Gaonite provision, תקנת הגאונים, empowers also the seizure of movable property to meet any of these obligations (cf Tosaf. supra 51a. s.v. ממקרקעי). [This Takkanah has been ascribed to Hunai Gaon and dated 787, v. Epstein, L. The Jewish Marriage, p. 255 and Tykocinski, Die Gaonaischen Verordnungen, p. 35ff].
(17) Lit., 'he who made a third', i.e., appointed a third person as trustee.
(18) Cf. supra n. 12, instructing him to use the money after his death for the benefit of his daughter, e.g., to buy for her a field.
(19) So Tosaf (s.v. המשליש) contrary to Rashi's 'married', v. Gemara infra.
(20) 'And desire the money to be given to him',
(21) Lit., 'what was put in his hand as a third party'. The daughter's wish is to be disregarded and the trustee buys a field with it.
(22) Lit., 'was not but'.
(23) Not merely a sum of money with which to buy one.
(24) Lit., 'behold it'.
(25) Lit., 'from now', sc. from the moment she expressed her desire to sell it, and the same should apply where the trust consisted of a sum of money. The sum of money must consequently be at her disposal and she may gave it to her husband if she desires to do so.
(26) The point of this limitation is discussed in the Gemara infra.
(27) The assumption being that the father wished the trustee to act only until his daughter's marriage.
(28) V. supra p. 428, n. 16.
(29) Tosef. Keth. VI. Cf. supra p. 428, n. 16.
(30) R. Meir and R. Jose, i.e., does R. Meir in the Baraitha refer to a minor also or only to one who is of age?
(31) Lit., 'yes'.
(32) Lit., 'say'.
(33) Of our Mishnah.
(34) Since R. Jose gave as the reason for his ruling the consideration that she could have sold the field if she wished
(35) Lit., 'yes'.
(36) The final clause, then, would be superfluous
(37) Lit , and thus he taught'.
(38) Now, since R. Meir also admits that the act of a minor has no validity, his statement in the Baraitha cited that after marriage she is entitled to have her wish must refer to one who is of age and not to a minor. What, then, is the practical difference between R. Meir and R. Jose?
(39) According to R. Meir her wish is to be ignored; according to R. Jose it is to be granted. Cf. supra p. 428, n. 14 As to a minor both agree that bet request is not to be granted even if she makes it after her marriage
(40) Scholar and merchant, a contemporary of R. Johanan. When the latter was appointed to the presidency of the college the former was away from his home town, engaged in the pursuit of his commercial enterprises. What follows happened on his return when he was told that had he devoted more time to his studies and less to commerce the presidency would have been offered to him. V. Ta'an. 21a.
(41) Lit., suspended himself' (cf. Rashi Git. 32b, s.v. דתלי Pesah. 68b, s.v. ותלי).
(42) Or sail-yard. Cf. Rashi. Other renderings: 'Sail, or mast of a boat', 'mastyard', איסקריא, GR.**,(perhaps from rt. סקר, 'to espy', hence 'espying place') 'mast' or 'yard' (v. Jast.) מכותא cf. Assyr. makua, a kind of 'boat', 'mast' or 'sail-yard' (v. Rashi, a.l. and Git. 36a, Rashb. B.B. 161b); 'a ship' (Aruk). In the parallel passage. Ta'an 21a, the reading for דמכותא is דספינתא (of a ship).
(43) To prove that despite has commercial undertakings he had not forgotten his studies.
(44) These were regarded as the most authoritative of the Baraitha collections
(45) Cf. p 430, n. 9.
(46) Demanding Mishnaic authority for its rulings V. infra note 12.
(47) Lying on his death bed, or setting out on a long journey.
(48) Out of the estate he leaves behind.
(49) For their maintenance
(50) A sela' two shekels
(51) Their father's mention of the smaller coin. it is assumed, was not meant to exclude the bigger one. All that he implied was that his children should be given no more than their actual weekly requirements.
(52) Though they may be in need of more.
(53) Whom he named.
(54) Because in this case it is evident that it was his intention to economize as much as possible. (11) Because in this case it is evident that it was his intention to economize as much as possible on the weekly maintenance of his children in order that the heirs he nominated might in due course receive as large an inheritance as possible.
(55) That, though the children need more than their father had allowed them, the instructions of the deceased must be carried out.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 70a
It is that of R. Meir1 who laid down that it is a religious obligation to carry out the instructions of a dying man.2
R. Hisda stated in the name of Mar 'Ukba: The law is that whether [the dying man] said, 'Give' or 'give no more',3 his children are to he given all that they require. But have we not, however, an established principle that the halachah is in agreement with R. Meir who laid down that it is a religious obligation to carry out the instructions of a dying man? - This applies to other matters, but in this case [the father] is quite satisfied [that his children should be provided with all they need]; and in limiting their allowance,4 his object was5 to encourage them.6
We learned elsewhere: With regard to little children,7 their purchase is a valid purchase and their sale is a valid sale in the case of movable objects.8 Rafram explained: This has been taught in the case only where no guardian had been appointed,9 but where a guardian had been appointed neither their purchase nor their sale has any legal validity. Whence is this inferred? From the expression, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR. But might not the case where a trustee10 had been appointed be different?11 - If so,12 it should have been stated, 'IN THE CASE OF A MINOR, HOWEVER, a trustee must act in accordance with the conditions of his trust' what [then was the purpose of the expression,] THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR? Hence it may be inferred [that the same law is applicable] in all cases.13
MISHNAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW TO HAVE ANY BENEFIT FROM HIM HE MAY, [IF THE PROHIBITION IS TO LAST] NOT MORE14 THAN THIRTY DAYS, APPOINT A STEWARD,15 BUT IF FOR A LONGER PERIOD HE MUST DIVORCE HER16 AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE17 HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH, BUT MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH [IF IT WAS FOR] TWO MONTHS. IF HE WAS A PRIEST18 HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] TWO MONTHS,19 BUT MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH [IF IT WAS FOR] THREE.
IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT TASTE A CERTAIN FRUIT20 HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE17 HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] ONE DAY, [BUT IF FOR] TWO DAYS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. IF, HOWEVER, HE WAS A PRIEST18 HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] TWO DAYS [BUT IF FOR] THREE HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH.
IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT MAKE USE OF A CERTAIN ADORNMENT21 HE MUST DI VORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JOSE RULED: [THIS22 APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT23 IS GIVEN, AND TO RICH WOMEN [IF THE TIME LIMIT23 IS] THIRTY DAYS.
GEMARA. Since, however, he24 is under an obligation to [maintain] her25 how can he forbid her by a vow [to have any benefit from him]? Has he then the power26 to cancel his obligation? Surely we have learned: [If a woman said to her husband] 'Konam, if I do aught for your mouth' he need not annul her vow;27 from which28 it is evident that, as she is under an obligation to him,29 she has no right to cancel her obligation,30 similarly here, since he is under an obligation to [maintain] her he should have no right to cancel his obligation!31 - [This,] however, [is the right explanation:] As he32 is entitled to say to her,33 'Deduct [the proceeds of] your handiwork for your maintenance'34
(1) Expressed in our Mishnah by the ruling that despite the request of the daughter the trustee must carry out the instructions of her deceased father.
(2) Cf. Git. 14b, 15a and 40a.
(3) Cf. supra 69b ad fin.
(4) Lit., 'and (as to) that which be said thus'.
(5) Lit., 'he came'.
(6) To lead a thrifty life and to make an effort to earn their livelihood.
(7) Of the ages of nine and eight' (Rashi. a.l. s.v. הפעוטות). 'six and seven' (Rashb. B.B. 155b, s.v. אלא).
(8) Transactions in landed estate, however, may be made by such only as have produced signs of puberty or have attained the age of twenty, v. Git. 59a, 65a, B.B. l.e.
(9) By a father or the court.
(10) With definite instructions as to the use he was to make of the trust money.
(11) From an ordinary guardian who is expected to use his own discretion in the best interests of the orphans. In the latter case the orphan's transaction might be deemed valid because it is not against their father's instructions and, being in the interest of the orphans, the guardian might well be presumed to have acquiesced.
(12) That a distinction is to be drawn between a trustee with special instructions and an ordinary guardian.
(13) Where there is a guardian, whose charge is somewhat similar to that of a trustee. Lit , 'even in the world'.
(14) Lit., 'until'.
(15) To supply his wife's maintenance.
(16) I.e., if the woman demands her freedom.
(17) Who, unlike a priest (v. Lev. XXI, 7), may remarry his divorced wife.
(18) Cf. supra n. 4.
(19) A priest was allowed more time in order to afford him a longer period of retracting before his divorce separates her from him for ever.
(20) He confirmed a vow she had made to that effect (Rashi). Though he has no right to forbid his wife the eating or tasting of any foodstuffs he may, by keeping silent when she herself makes such a vow, confirm it; v. Num. XXX, 7ff. Others: He vowed to abstain from his wife should she taste a certain fruit; v. Isaiah Trani.
(21) Cf. supra n. 7 mutatis mutandis.
(22) That in the case of a vow against a wife's adornments, the husband must DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH.
(23) To the duration of the vow.
(24) A husband.
(25) His wife.
(26) Lit., 'all (power) as if from him?'
(27) Supra 59a and notes.
(28) Since no annulment is required.
(29) A wife's handiwork belongs to her husband.
(30) In consequence of which her vow is null and void and requires no annulment.
(31) And his vow also should, therefore, be null and void.
(32) A husband.
(33) His wife.
(34) I.e., he would neither maintain her nor expect her to give him her handiwork (v. supra n. 8).
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 70b
he [in making his vow] is regarded1 as having said to her, 'Deduct [the proceeds of] your handiwork for your maintenance'.
If, however, one is to adopt the ruling R. Huna gave in the name of Rab, for R. Huna stated in the name of Rab: A wife may say to her husband , 'I would neither be maintained by, nor work [for you]', why should there be no need to annul [her vow] when she said 'Konam, if l do aught for your mouth'? Let it rather be said that as she is entitled to say, 'I would neither be maintained by nor work [for you]' she [in making her vow] might be regarded1 as having said, 'I would neither be maintained by, nor work [for you]'?2 - [The fact,] however, [is that] the explanation is not that 'he is regarded'3 but that he actually said to her, 'Deduct your handiwork for your maintenance.' If so,4 what need has she of a steward?5 - [She needs one] where [the proceeds of her handiwork] do not suffice.6 If, [however, her handiwork] does not suffice,7 our original question arises again!8 R. Ashi replied: [This is a case] where [her handiwork] suffices for major requirements but does not suffice for minor requirements.
How is one to understand these 'minor requirements'? If the woman is in the habit of having them, they are, surely, a part of her regular requirements,9 and if she is not used to them10 what need has she for a steward?11 - [The law concerning a steward] is required only where she was used [to them] in her father's house but consented to dispense with them when with her husband.12 In such a case she can say to him, 'Hitherto, before you forbade me by a vow [to have any benefit from you], I was willing to put up with your [mode of living], but now that you have forbidden me [to enjoy any benefit from you] I am not able to put up [any longer] with your [mode of living]'. And wherein lies the difference [between a vow for more, and one for] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS? - [Within a period of] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS people would not become aware of it, and the matter would be no degradation to her; but after a longer period13 people would hear of it, and the matter would be degrading to her.
If you prefer I might reply: [His vow14 is valid] only if he vowed while she was merely betrothed to him.15 But has a betrothed woman, however, any claim to maintenance?16 - [Yes], if the time [for the celebration of the marriage] arrived and she was17 not married. For we have learned: If the respective periods expired18 and they were not married,19 they20 are entitled to maintenance21 out of the man's estate, and [if he is a priest] may also eat terumah.22 Wherein then lies the difference [between a vow for more, and one for] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS? - [During a period of] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS an agent23 performs his mission; for a longer period no agent performs his mission.
And if you prefer I might reply: [The husband's vow24 is valid] when he made it while she was betrothed to him and she was [afterwards] married.
But if she was married [afterwards] she must obviously have understood her position and accepted it!25 - [It is a case] where she pleaded, 'I thought I shall be able to bear it but now I cannot bear it'.
But granted that such a plea26 is properly admissible27 in respect of bodily defects;28 is it admissible, however, in respect of maintenance?29 - Clearly, then, we can only explain as we explained at first.
HE MAY, [IF THE PROHIBITION IS TO LAST] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS, APPOINT A STEWARD. Does not the steward, however, act on his30 behalf?31 - R. Huna replied: [Our Mishnah refers] to one who declared, 'Whoever will maintain [my wife] will not suffer any loss'.32 But, even if be spoke in such a manner, is not the steward acting on his behalf? Have we not learned: If a man who was thrown into a pit cried that whosoever should hear his voice should write a letter of divorce for his wife, [the hearers]33 may lawfully34 write, and deliver [it to his wife]?35 - How now! there36 the man said, 'should write';37 but did the man here38 say, 'should maintain'? All he said was, 'whoever will maintain'.39
But surely R. Ammi said: In [the case of] a fire [breaking] out on the Sabbath]40 permission was given to make the announcement 'Whosoever shall extinguish it will suffer no loss'.41 Now what does [the expression] 'In a fire'42 exclude? Does it not exclude a case of this kind?43 - No; [it was meant] to exclude other acts that are forbidden on the Sabbath.44
Rabbah raised an objection: If a man is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from another man, and he has nothing to eat [the other] may go to a shopkeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him , 'So-and-so is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from me, and I do not know what to do for him'. [The shopkeeper] may then give to the one and recover the cost from the other.45 Only such [a suggestion]46 is permitted but not that of 'whoever will maintain [my wife] will not suffer any loss'?47 - [The formula,] 'There is no question' is here implied:48 There is no question [that a man may announce,] 'whoever will maintain [my wife] will not suffer any loss', since he is speaking to no one in particular;49 but even in this case where, since he is familiar with him50 and goes and speaks to him directly, [it might have been thought that his mere suggestion is] the same as if he had expressly told him,50 'You go and give him',51 hence we were taught [that this also is permitted].
[To revert to] the main text.52 If a man is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from another man, and he has nothing to eat, [the other] may go to a shopkeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him, 'So-and-so is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from me, and I do not know what to do for him'. [The shopkeeper] may then give to the one and recover the cost from the other.53 If his54 house is to be built, his wall to be put up or his field to be harvested [the other] may go to labourers with whom he is familiar and say to them, 'So-and-so is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from me, and I do not know what to do for him'. They may then work for him and recover55 their wages from the other. If they were going on the same journey and the one had with him nothing to eat, [the other]56 may give [some food] to a third57 person as a gift and the first may take it [from that person] and eat it.58 If no third person57 is available, he56 may put the food upon a stone or a wall, and say, 'Behold this is free59 for all who desire [to take it]', and the other60 may take it and eat it.61 R. Jose, however, forbids this.62 Raba said: What is R. Jose's reason? - [It is forbidden as] a preventive measure against
(1) Lit., 'is made'.
(2) And her vow should be valid. Why then has it been said that her husband 'need not annul her vow'?
(3) Lit., 'do not say; be is made'.
(4) That her handiwork is not taken away from her.
(5) The proceeds of her handiwork could be spent on her maintenance.
(6) To make up the legally prescribed sum (v. supra 64b).
(7) And it is, therefore, still her husband's duty to maintain her in part.
(8) How can he by his vow cancel an obligation that is incumbent upon him?
(9) Lit., 'she is used to them'.
(10) Being mere luxuries.
(11) The husband, surely, is not expected to provide for such luxuries.
(12) Lit., 'roll' with him', i.e., to put up with his mode of living.
(13) Lit., 'more'.
(14) That his wife shall not HAVE ANY BENEFIT FROM HIM.
(15) When he is under no obligation to maintain her.
(16) Certainly not (v. supra n. 13). What need then was there to state the obvious?
(17) Lit., 'they were'. V. n. 2.
(18) Lit., 'the time (for the respective marriages referred to supra 57a) arrived'.
(19) Through the man's delay.
(20) The women mentioned.
(21) In accordance with a Rabbinical ordinance.
(22) Mishnah supra 57a. Since in such circumstances the man is Pentateuchally under no obligation to maintain his betrothed his vow forbidding her to have any benefit is valid; and as he is obliged to maintain her in accordance with Rabbinic law he must appoint a steward to look after her maintenance.
(23) The steward appointed (v. our Mishnah).
(24) V. supra p. 435, n. 12.
(25) What claim then could she advance?
(26) Mistaken judgment.
(27) Lit., 'that we say so'.
(28) Though a woman at first consented to live with the man who suffered from such defects she may subsequently plead that she under-estimated her feeling and that now she cannot bear them (v. infra 77a). A woman may well be excused her first error of judgment in such circumstances.
(29) No woman, surely, could plead that she was not aware that a person could live without food. As she has once accepted the disability she should not be entitled to change her mind.
(30) The husband's.
(31) Lit., 'do his mission'. The answer being in the affirmative, the question arises why his agent should be allowed to do on his behalf what he himself is not allowed to do.
(32) He would reimburse him.
(33) Though they have received no direct instructions.
(34) Lit., 'behold these'.
(35) Git. 66a; as if they had been agents who had received direct instructions from him. Similarly the steward spoken of in our Mishnah should be regarded as the husband's agent (v. supra p. 436, n. 15).
(36) The case of divorce.
(37) A definite instruction.
(38) In the matter of maintenance.
(39) This is not even an indirect instruction but a mere intimation. Anyone acting on such an intimation only cannot be regarded as agent.
(40) When a Jew is forbidden to do any work himself or to instruct someone else, even a Gentile, to do it for him.
(41) Shab. 121a.
(42) Implying a fire only and not other cases.
(43) A person's announcement concerning compensation for the maintenance of his wife whom he himself is forbidden to maintain, or any similar announcements which might lead someone to perform on behalf of that person what he himself is forbidden to do.
(44) The sanctity of the Sabbath demands greater restrictions which need not he applied to other prohibitions such as those of vows for instance.
(45) Ned. 43a. Lit., 'gives to him and comes and takes from this'.
(46) Which is rather vague and non-committal.
(47) Which is more explicit and a committal undertaking. An objection against R. Huna.
(48) Lit., 'be (the Tanna of that Mishnah) said'.
(49) Lit., 'to the world'.
(50) The shopkeeper.
(51) And, thereby becoming his virtual agent, be should, like himself, be forbidden to supply any provisions.
(52) Of the citation from Ned. 43a.
(53) V. supra p. 437, n. 14.
(54) The man who is forbidden to have benefit from the other by a vow.
(55) Lit., 'and come and take'.
(56) Benefit from whom he is forbidden to derive.
(57) Lit., 'another'.
(58) Cf. infra n. 16.
(59) Lit., 'they are ownerless property'.
(60) V. supra note 9.
(61) MS.M. omits ומותר ('and it is permitted') which seems superfluous here as well as supra. V. supra n. 13.
(62) V. Ned. 43a.