Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 91a
but they differ here on [the question whether it is necessary for the surplus] denar to consist of real estate. The one Master1 holds that only real estate is regarded as a surplus2 but not movables3 and the other Master4 holds that even movables [are regarded as surplus].5 But can you say so?6 Have we not learned, R. Simeon ruled: Even if there was movable property7 it is of no avail8 unless there was landed property [of the Value of] one denar more than [the total amount of] the two kethubahs?9 - [The fact,] however, is that they10 differ here on [the question whether] a denar of mortgaged property [is regarded as a surplus]. One Master11 holds that only free property constitutes a surplus12 but not mortgaged property, and the other Master13 holds that mortgaged property also [constitutes a surplus]. If so,14 [instead of stating,] 'R. Simeon ruled: If there is a surplus of one denar', should it not have been stated, 'Since there is a surplus of one denar'? - The fact, however, is that they10 differ on [the question whether a sum] less than a denar [constitutes a surplus]. One Master15 is of the opinion that only a denar constitutes a surplus16 but not a sum less than a denar, and the other Master17 holds that even less than a denar [constitutes a surplus]. But did not R. Simeon, however, say 'a denar'? And were you to reply. 'Reverse [their views]',18 does not the first Tanna of the Mishnah19 [it may be retorted] also speak of a denar?20 - The fact, however, [is that we must follow] on the lines of the first two explanations. and reverse [the views].21
Mar Zutra stated in the name of R. Papa: The law [is that where] one [wife died] during her husband's lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are entitled to the 'male children' kethubah, and that one kethubah22 is regarded as the surplus over the other. [Now] granted that if we had been told that '[where] one [wife died] during her husband's lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are entitled to the "male children" kethubah', but had not been told that 'one kethubah is regarded as the surplus over the other' it might have been presumed [that the former law applied] Only where the surplus amounted to a denar but not otherwise.23 [Why,] however, could we [not have] been informed [of the second law only, viz., that] 'one kethubah is regarded as the surplus over the other', and it would have been self-evident,24 [would it not, that this ruling was] due to [the law that 'where] one [wife died] during her husband's lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are entitled to the "male children" kethubah'?25 - If we were given the information in such a manner, [the law] might have been presumed [to apply to a case,] for instance, where a man had married three wives of whom two died during his lifetime and one after his death, and the last mentioned had given birth to a daughter who is not entitled to heirship.26 but [not to the case where] one [wife died] during her husband's lifetime and the other after his death and the latter had given birth to a son,[since in this case] the possibility of a quarrel27 might have to be taken into consideration,28 hence we were taught [that even in this case one kethubah29 is regarded as surplus over the other].30
MISHNAH. IF A MAN WAS MARRIED TO TWO WIVES AND THEY DIED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY HE HIMSELF DIED, AND THE ORPHANS [OF ONE OF THE WIVES]31 CLAIM THEIR MOTHER'S KETHUBAH32 [BUT THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED HUSBAND] IS ONLY ENOUGH33 [FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE] TWO KETHUBAHS34 [ALL THE ORPHANS] RECEIVE EQUAL SHARES.35 IF THERE WAS A SURPLUS36 OF [A MINIMUM OF] ONE DEN A R,37 EACH GROUP OF SONS38 RECEIVE THE KETHUBAH OF THEIR MOTHER.39 IF THE ORPHANS [OF ONE OF THE WIVES]40 SAID, 'WE ARE OFFERING FOR OUR FATHER'S ESTATE ONE DEN AR MORE [THAN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THE KETHUBAHS]', IN ORDER THAT THEY [MIGHT THEREBY BE ENABLED TO] TAKE THEIR MOTHER'S KETHUBAH41 THEIR REQUEST IS DISREGARDED42 AND43 THE ESTATE IS [PROPERLY] VALUED AT THE BETH DIN. IF THE ESTATE INCLUDED44 PROSPECTIVE PROPERTY,45 IT IS NOT [REGARDED] AS [PROPERTY HELD] IN ACTUAL POSSESSION.46 R. SIMEON RULED: EVEN IF THERE WAS MOVABLE PROPERTY47 IT IS OF NO AVAIL48 UNLESS THERE WAS LANDED PROPERTY [WORTH] ONE DENAR MORE THAN [ THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF] THE TWO KETHUBAHS.
GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: If one wife had49 [a kethubah for] a thousand [zuz] and the other for five hundred, each group of sons50 receive the kethubah of their mother provided a surplus of one denar was available; otherwise, they must divide the estate in equal proportions.
It is obvious [that if51 the estate was] large52 and53 it depreciated,54 the heirs have already55 acquired ownership thereof.56 What, [however, is the ruling where the estate was] small and it appreciated?57 - Come and hear the case of the estate of the house of Bar Zarzur which was small and it appreciated, and when [the heirs] came [with their suit] before R. Amram he said to them, 'It is your duty58 to satisfy them'.59 As they disregarded [his ruling] he said to them, 'If you will not satisfy them I will chastise you with a thorn that causes no blood to flow'.60 Thereupon he sent them to R. Nahman, who said to then,, 'Just as [in the case where an estate was] large and it depreciated
(1) The first Tanna.
(2) Lit., 'yes'.
(3) As in the case under dispute the surplus consisted of movables the first Tanna denies the sons of the first wife all rights to their mother's kethubah,
(4) R. Simeon,
(5) Hence his ruling that where there is a surplus (even if it consists of movables) the sons of the first wife, like those of the second, are entitled to the payment of their mother's kethubah,
(6) That R. Simeon regards movables also as a surplus.
(7) Lit., 'property which has no security'.
(8) As far as the calculation of a surplus is concerned,
(9) V. the Mishnah infra.
(10) R. Simeon and the first Tanna.
(11) The first Tanna,
(12) Lit., 'yes'.
(13) R. Simeon.
(14) That the Baraitha under discussion deals with a case where there is a surplus of one denar and that R. Simeon relaxes the ruling of the first Tanna by regarding that denar as surplus even if it represents mortgaged property.
(15) The first Tanna.
(16) Lit., 'yes'.
(17) R. Simeon.
(18) I.e., that in the opinion of the first Tanna the sons of the first wife are deprived of their mother's Kethubah (cf. supra p. 578, n. 7) only where there is no surplus at all, but if there is one, even if of less than a denar, they are entitled to her kethubah, while according to R. Simeon they are entitled to her kethubah only if the surplus amounts to a denar (so Tosaf. s.v. וכי תימא a.I. contrary to Rashi).
(19) Infra, who is in dispute with R. Simeon and who is identical with the first Tanna of the Baraitha (supra 90b) under discussion.
(20) How' then can it be suggested (cf. supra note 4) that the first Tanna admits a surplus of less than a dear?
(21) Cf. supra note 4 mutatis mutandis. The first Tanna deprives the sons of the first wife of her kethubah only where there is no surplus at all but if there is one, even though it consists of movables or mortgaged property. they are to receive her kethubah, while R. Simeon allows them their mother's kethubah only where the denar surplus consists of landed and free property (cf. Tosaf. s.v. כי). The previous objection against the expressions 'if' instead of 'since' (cf. supra p. 579' n. 16) does not arise since R. Simeon is more restrictive than the first Tanna.
(22) That is paid to the heirs of the wife who bad survived her husband and whose kethubah has the status of a debt.
(23) Lit., 'if there is a surplus of a denar, 'yes'; if not, 'not'. Hence one can well understand the necessity for the statement of the second law also.
(24) Lit., 'and l would know'.
(25) Since it is such a case only. where one kethubah has the status of a debt, that could give rise to this law. Where both wives died doting their husband's lifetime the sons of both have obviously equal rights of inheritance and the question of surplus to satisfy the Pentateuchal law of inheritance does not arise.
(26) In respect of her father's estate. As her claim is restricted to bet mother's kethubah alone, not being entitled to a share in the residue of bet father's estate after her mother's kethubah had been paid. no quarrels between bet and the sons of the two other wives could possibly arise on that account. Hence it is lawful for the sons whose mother's kethubah was larger to collect their due by pointing to the sum paid to the daughter (in settlement of her mother's kethubah which has the status of a debt) as the surplus which satisfied the Pentateuchal law of inheritance.
(27) Between that son and his brothers, all of whom have the same rights to their father's estate; v. supra p. 574. n. 8.
(28) I.e.,it might have been presumed that in order to obviate such a quarrel it may have been enacted that in such a case the second kethubah is not regarded as a surplus and all the sons share equally, after the payment of the second kethubah, the residue of their father's estate.
(29) V. supra p. 580, n. 8.
(30) The possibility of a quarrel does not affect the rights of the sons of the first wife.
(31) Whose kethubah was for a larger sum than that of the other.
(32) As heirs of their mother, by virtue of the 'male children' clause (v. Mishnah, supra 52b); while the other heirs demand a division in equal portions on the ground that, irrespective of their mother's 'male children' kethubahs, as sons of the deceased they are entitled to equal shares in his estate.
(33) Lit., 'and there is not there but'.
(34) So that, if their demand is complied with, the brothers would be receiving their respective shares of their mother's kethubahs in virtue of the 'male children' clause, thus allowing no scope for the operation of the Biblical law of succession.
(35) As heirs of their father with equal rights to his estate.
(36) After the two kethubahs had been paid.
(37) So that the pentateuchal law of succession could be applied to it.
(38) Lit., 'these... and these'.
(39) And the residue of the estate (amounting to not less than one denar) is then divided between all the sons in equal portions.
(40) V. supra note I.
(41) Cf. supra notes 4.9 and text.
(42) Lit., 'they do not listen to them'.
(43) Lit., 'but'.
(44) Lit., 'there were there'.
(45) Such, for instance, as an expected inheritance from the orphan's grandfather who survived their father, or an outstanding debt of their father's which would fall due only at some time in the future.
(46) The existing estate must accordingly be divided equally amongst all the sons of the deceased though the addition of the prospective property would have provided a surplus.
(47) Cf. supra p' 579' n' 9'
(48) Cf. loc. cit. n. 10.
(49) Lit., 'to this',
(50) Lit., 'these ' . ' and these'.
(51) At the time the father died,
(52) I.e,, its value exceeded the total amount of the kethubah by not less than a denar,
(53) When it was valued at the court.
(54) So that no surplus remained after deduction of the amounts of the kethubahs,
(55) At the moment of their father's death, when there was a surplus (v. supra note 4).
(56) The sons of the wife whose kethubah was for the larger amount are, therefore, entitled to the larger sum though at the time of the division of the property there was no longer any surplus.
(57) V, supra notes 2-5. Are the sons who claim the larger kethubah now entitled to it as if the surplus had been available at the time of their father's death, or is a claim once lost never recoverable?
(58) Lit., 'go'.
(59) The sons of the woman whose kethubah was for the larger amount,
(60) Metaph. He would place them under the ban.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 91b
the heirs have already acquired ownership thereof, so [also where the estate was] small and it appreciated the other heirs1 have already2 acquired ownership thereof.3 (Mnemonic:4 A thousand and a hundred duty in a kethubah, Jacob put up his fields by words [of] claimants.) A man against whom there was a claim of a thousand zuz had two mansions each of which he sold5 for five hundred zuz. The creditor thereupon came and distrained on one of them and then he was going to distrain on the other. [Whereupon the purchaser] took one thousand zuz, and went to [the creditor] and said to him, 'If [the one mansion] is worth to you one thousand zuz, well and good; but if not, take your thousand6 zuz and go'.7 Rami b. Hama [in dealing with the question] proposed that this case was exactly analogous to that in our Mishnah: IF THE ORPHANS [OF ONE OF THE WIVES] SAID, 'WE ARE OFFERING FOR OUR FATHER'S ESTATE ONE DENAR MORE'.8 But Raba said to him, 'Are the two cases at all alike? There9 the orphans10 would be suffering a loss, but here, does the creditor suffer any loss? He only advanced a thousand zuz and a thousand zuz he receives
And for what amount is the tirpa11 made out?12 - Rabina said: For a thousand zuz. R. 'Awira said: For five hundred. And the law is [that the tirpa is made out] for five hundred.
A certain man against whom someone had a claim for a hundred zuz had two small plots of land each of which he sold5 for fifty zuz. His creditor came and distrained on one of them and then he came again to distrain on the other. [The purchaser. thereupon.] took a hundred zuz and went to him and said, 'If [one of the plots] is worth a hundred zuz13 to you. well and good; but if not, take the one hundred zuz and go'.14 R. Joseph [in considering the question] proposed to say that this was a case exactly analogous to that in our Mishnah: IF THE ORPHANS [OF ONE OF THE WIVES] SAID15 etc. But Abaye said to him, 'Are the two cases at all alike? There the orphans would have suffered a loss, but here, what loss would [the creditor] have? He lent a hundred and receives a hundred'.
For what amount is the tirpa made out? - Rabina said: For a hundred. R. 'Awira said: For fifty. And the law is [that it is made out] for fifty. A certain man against whom there was a claim for a hundred zuz died and left a small plot of land that was worth fifty zuz. As his creditor came and distrained on it the orphans went to him and handed to him fifty zuz. Thereupon he distrained on it again. When they came [with this action] before Abaye. he said to them, 'It is a moral duty incumbent upon orphans16 to pay the debt of their father.17 With the first payment you have performed a moral duty. and now that he has seized [the land again] his action is perfectly lawful',18 This ruling. however, applies only in the case where [the orphans] did not tell him ,19 'These fifty zuz are for the price of the small plot of land', but if they did tell him, 'these fifty zuz are for the price of the small plot of land' ,20 they have thereby entirely dismissed him,21
A certain man22 once sold the kethubah of his mother23 for a goodwill [price]24 and said to [the buyer], 'If mother comes and raises objections I shall not pay you any compensation'.25 His mother then died having raised no objections. but he himself26 came and objected.27 Rami b. Hama [in discussing the case] proposed to decide that he28 takes the place of his mother. Raba, however, said to him: Granted that he did not accept any responsibility for her action, did he not accept responsibility for his own action either?29 Rami b. Hama stated: If Reuben30 sold a field to Simeon30 without a guarantee31 and Simeon then re-sold it to Reuben with a guarantee
(1) Whose mother's kethubah was for the smaller amount.
(2) At the moment their father died, when there was 110 surplus.
(3) Cf. supra note 8 mutatis mutandis,
(4) The words or phrases of the mnemonic correspond to striking terms in the successive rulings that follow,
(5) To one person after he had incurred his debt.
(6) The sum which the seller owed him,
(7) l,e,, 'give up both mansions',
(8) As the offer of the orphans is rejected on account of its excessive nature, so is the purchaser's demand of the excessive valuation of the one mansion also to be rejected.
(9) Our Mishnah.
(10) The sons of the woman whose kethubah was for the lesser amount.
(11) טירפא (rt. טרף 'to seize'), a document issued by a court of law to a claimant (e.g.. a creditor, or a purchaser on whom, as in this case, the seller's creditor has distrained) who is unable to collect his due from the defendant (in this case, the seller), authorizing him to trace his property (including any land the defendant may have sold after the liability in question had been incurred by him) for the purpose of seizing it eventually in payment of his claim.
(12) Lit., 'do we write'. Where the creditor was willing to accept the one mansion from the purchaser in settlement of his claim of one thousand zuz, is it for the five hundred zuz which the purchaser has actually lost, or is it for the one thousand zuz, the amount of the debt he has settled?
(13) The sum which the seller owed him.
(14) I.e., return both plots.
(15) Cf. supra p. 584. nn. 5.9 mutatis mutandis.
(16) Though such a duty cannot be enforced by a court of law.
(17) As a mark of respect for his memory.
(18) Since a debtor's landed property is pledged for his debts.
(19) The creditor, when they paid him the first fifty zuz.
(20) Thus pointing out that the money was not intended as a payment of the debt.
(21) He cannot again seize the land which is now the absolute property of the orphans.
(22) Whose mother married again after his father's death.
(23) During her second husband's lifetime.
(24) טובת הנאה (cf. supra p. 542, n. 4). A very small price only would be paid for such a kethubah, the purchase of which must be in the nature of a mere speculation, since the mother might die during the lifetime of her husband who would inherit it or the son might pre-decease his mother and never come Into Its possession. in both of which eases the purchaser would lose all he paid.
(25) LIt., 'I will not come to your rescue' (rt. פצי in Pa. 'to free , save , rescue separate by force'). i.e., he accepted no responsibility whatsoever for the safety of the money advanced.
(26) As the heir of his mother.
(27) Contending that as he had accepted no responsibility he may now, like his mother, himself object to the sale and thus procure the amount of the kethubah for himself.
(28) The son.
(29) Of course he did. Though he may well cancel the sale on the ground that it was invalid because it had taken place before he (the seller) was in possession of the inheritance (cf. B.M. 16a), he must nevertheless refund to the buyer the full price he had received whatever it may have been. (For an alternative interpretation v. Rashi a.I., second explanation. and cf. Tosaf s.v. דזבנה a.I.).
(30) The names of the first two sons of Jacob (cf. Gen. XXIX, 32f) are taken as fictitious names for 'seller' and 'buyer' respectively.
(31) For compensation in ease of distraint by a creditor.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 92a
and Reuben's creditor1 came and seized it from him, the law is that Simeon must proceed to offer him2 compensation.3 Raba, however, said to him: Granted that [Simeon] had accepted responsibility for general claims,4 did he also accept responsibility for [claims against Reuben] himself?5 Raba admits, however, that where Reuben inherited a field from Jacob6 and sold it to Simeon7 without a guarantee and Simeon then re-sold It to Reuben with a guarantee. whereupon Jacob's creditor came and seized it from him, the law is that Simeon must proceed to offer him8 compensation.9 What is the reason?-Jacob's creditor is regarded as any other creditor.10
Rami b. Hama [further] stated: If Reuben sold a field to Simeon with a guarantee and allowed [the price of the field] to stand11 as a loan,12 and when Reuben died, and his creditor came to seize it from Simeon, [the latter] satisfied him by [refunding to him the] amount ,13 the law is that Reuben's children can tell him, '[As far as] we [are concerned,] our father has left movables14 with you. and the movables of orphans are not pledged to a creditor.'15
Raba remarked: If the other16 is clever he gives them17 a plot of land in settlement of the debt and then he collects it from them,18 in accordance [with a ruling of] R. Nahman who stated in the name of Rabbah b. Abbahu: If orphans collected a plot of land for their father's debt,19 a creditor20 may in turn collect it from them.21 Rabbah22 stated: If Reuben sold all his fields23 to Simeon who In turn sold one field [of these] to Levi, and then Reuben's creditor appeared,24 [the latter] may collect either from the one or from the other.25 This law, however, applies only where [Levi] had bought [land of] medium quality, but if he bought either the best or the worst he may tell him,26 'It is for this reason27 that I have taken the trouble [to buy the best or the worst because either is] land which is not available for you'.28 And even [when he bought] medium quality the law is applicable only where [Levi] did not leave29 medium quality of a similar nature
(1) By virtue of a bond the date of which was antecedent to that of the first sale.
(3) As if Reuben had not been the original seller. As simeon, who guaranteed compensation. would have to fulfil his obligation in the ease of any other buyer he incurs the same liability towards Reuben who, not having given any guarantee for his sale has the same status as any other buyer. ומפצי, rt. פצי cf. supra note 2.
(4) Proceeding from his own creditors.
(5) The answer is obviously in the negative. Simeon is undoubtedly exempt from all such claims.
(6) Sc. his father (cf. supra p. 586, n' 7).
(7) I.e., any other person (v. loc. cit.).
(9) Lit., 'and rescue him from him' (cf. supra p. 586, n. 2).
(10) I.e., as if Jacob had been a stranger and the creditor had no claim against Reuben's father but against the man from whom Reuben had bought the field. Since the claim of the creditor is not against Reuben himself the claim against his father does not affect his right if he once sold the field without guarantee and Simeon resold it to him with a guarantee.
(11) Lit., 'put up', 'established'.
(12) I.e., instead of paying in cash Simeon gave him a note of Indebtedness,
(13) Lit,, zuzim, money', i,e., the amount of the loan which he owed to Reuben's heirs.
(14) Viz., the amount of the debt,
(15) Nor to the buyer who has been deprived by him of the field. Having paid a claim for which the orphans were not responsible, he must suffer the loss himself,
(16) The buyer from whom the orphans now claim the price of the land which he owes,
(17) The orphans.
(18) By virtue of the responsibility which their father, as seller, had undertaken towards him, as buyer. Since the land comes into their possession by virtue of the debt they inherited from their father, it is deemed to be an inheritance which may be seized by a buyer whose purchase had been distrained on by their father's creditor.
(19) Which was owing to him.
(20) Who lent money to their father,
(21) As if the land had been a direct inheritance from their father, although their acquisition of it took place after his death (cf. supra n. 13) as a result of the creditor's inability to meet his obligation.
(22) MS.M. reads, 'Raba', and this is also the reading in the parallel passage in B.K. 8b.
(23) By one deed of sale (v. infra n. 4).
(24) Claiming payment of the debt,
(25) Lit,,'if he wishes he collects from this and if he wishes he etc.', i.e., either from Simeon or from Levi. Where, however, the fields were sold by Reuben under more than one deed (cf. supra n. 2) his creditor cannot distrain on Levi unless the field the latter had bought was the last one that Reuben had sold to Simeon. If it was not the last, Levi may refuse payment on the ground that, even after Simeon had bought that field, Reuben was still in possession of sufficient property to meet his creditor's claim, and that no creditor can distrain on property sold while free property remained in the debtor's possession.
(26) The creditor who is entitled to recover his debt from the medium quality of the debtor's free, or sold property.
(27) That the creditor might have no legal claim upon it,
(28) Cf. supra n. 5'
(29) With Simeon.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 92b
but if he did leave medium quality of a similar nature he may lawfully tell him,1 'I have left for you ample land2 from which to collect [your debt]'.
Abaye stated: If Reuben sold a field to Simeon with a guarantee and a creditor of Reuben's came to distrain on it the law is that Reuben may proceed to litigate3 with that creditor and [the latter] cannot say to him, 'You are no party to me'4 for [the other can] retort, 'For whatever you will take away from him he will turn to me [to claim compensation]'5 Others say: Even where no guarantee was given6 the same law7 applies, since [Reuben] may say to him,8 'I do not like Simeon to have any grievance against me
Abaye [further] stated: If Reuben sold a field to Simeon without a guarantee and there appeared against him9
(1) The creditor.
(2) Lit., 'place'.
(3) ומפצי Cf. supra p. 586, n. 2.
(4) Since he was distraining against Simeon and not against him who, as an uninterested party, has no right to be a pleader in the lawsuit (cf. B.K. 70a).
(5) 'Hence I am an interested party'.
(6) By Reuben to Simeon.
(7) That the creditor cannot say to Reuben, 'You are no party to me'.
(8) The creditor,
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 93a
claimants1 [disputing his title to the field]2 he3 may withdraw before he has taken possession of it,4 but after he had taken possession of it5 he may no longer withdraw,6 because [Reuben] can say to him,3 'You have agreed to a bag sealed with knots7 and you got it'.8 And from what moment is possession considered to have been effected? - As soon as he9 sets his foot upon the landmarks.10 Others say: Even [If the sale was made] with a guarantee the same law11 applies. since [the seller] might say to him, 'Produce the tirpa12 [that was issued against] you and I shall pay you'.13
MISHNAH. IF A MAN WHO WAS MARRIED TO THREE WIVES DIED, AND THE KETHUBAH OF ONE14 WAS A MANEH,15 OF THE OTHER14 TWO HUNDRED ZUZ, AND OF THE THIRD14 THREE HUNDRED ZUZ16 AND THE ESTATE17 [WAS WORTH] ONLY ONE MANEH18 [THE SUM] IS DIVIDED EQUALLY.19 IF THE ESTATE20 [WAS WORTH] TWO HUNDRED ZUZ [THE CLAIMANT] OF THE MANEH RECEIVES FIFTY ZUZ21 [AND THE CLAIMANTS RESPECTIVELY] OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THE THREE HUNDRED ZUZ [RECEIVE EACH] THREE GOLD DENARII.22 IF THE ESTATE23 [WAS WORTH] THREE HUNDRED ZUZ,24 [THE CLAIMANT] OF THE MANEH RECEIVES FIFTY ZUZ25 AND [THE CLAIMANT] OF THE TWO HUNDRED ZUZ [RECEIVES] A MANEH25 WHILE [THE CLAIMANT] OF THE THREE HUNDRED ZUZ [RECEIVES] SIX GOLD DENARII.26 SIMILARLY, IF THREE PERSONS CONTRIBUTED TO A JOINT FUND27 AND THEY HAD MADE A LOSS OR A PROFIT THEY SHARE IN THE SAME MANNER.28
GEMARA. [THE CLAIMANT] OF THE MANEH RECEIVES FIFTY ZUZ. Should she not be entitled to thirty-three and a third zuz only?29 - Samuel replied: [Here it is a case] where the one who is entitled to the two hundred zuz gave a written undertaking to the woman who was entitled to one maneh, 'I have no claim whatsoever upon the maneh'.30 But if so,31 read the next clause: [THE CLAIMANTS RESPECTIVELY] OF THE TWO HUNDRED, AND THE THREE HUNDRED ZUZ [RECEIVE EACH] THREE GOLD DENARII, [why, it may be objected, could she32 not] tell her,33 'You have already renounced your claim upon34 it'? - Because she can reply. 'I have only renounced my claim'.35
IF THE ESTATE [WAS WORTH] THREE HUNDRED etc. [Why should THE CLAIMANT] OF THE TWO HUNDRED ZUZ36 RECEIVE A MANEH [when in fact] she should be entitled to seventy-five zuz only?37 - Samuel replied: [Our Mishnah refers to a case] where the woman who was entitled to the three hundred zuz gave a written undertaking to the one who was entitled to the two hundred zuz and the other who was entitled to a maneh, 'I have no claim whatsoever upon you in respect of one maneh'.38 R. Jacob of Nehar Pekod39 replied in the name of Rabina: The first clause deals with two acts of seizure40 and the final clause deals with two acts of seizure.40 'The first clause deals with two acts of seizure' viz. seventy-five zuz came into their hands41 the first42 time43 and one hundred and twenty-five the second42 time.44 'The final clause deals with two acts of seizure, viz., seventy-five came into their hands41 the first42 time43 and two hundred and twenty-five the second42 time.45
It was taught: This46 is the teaching of R. Nathan. Rabbi,47 however, said, 'I do not approve48 of R. Nathan's views in these [cases]46 for49 [the three wives]50 take equal shares'.51
SIMILARLY IF THREE PERSONS CONTRIBUTED. Samuel ruled: If two persons contributed to a joint fund,52 one of them a maneh, and the other two hundred zuz,
(1) עסיקין 'contestants' (v. Rashi). Others: 'disputes' (cf. Jast. s.v, עסק II).
(2) Aliter: 'Protests against the tithe were issued' (v. fast. loc. cit.).
(4) If he has not yet paid for it.
(5) And so legally acquired it. Legal acquisition may be effected before the price of the land had been paid, the price becoming a debt due to the seller.
(6) Despite the disputes involved.
(7) Rashi (B.K. 9a): A bag full of wind.
(8) I.e.'you made a purchase without proper investigation and you must bear the unpleasant consequences.
(9) The buyer.
(10) Of the field, to level them (v. Rashi B.M. 14b).
(11) That the buyer may not withdraw after he had taken possession.
(12) V. supra p. 584, n. 8.
(13) I.e., before the court has authorized the distraint the buyer has no right to cancel the sale on the ground that he is troubled by claimants, Only when the court has given its decision in favour of the claimants, and the land was actually taken away from him, has he the right to call upon the seller for compensation.
(14) Lit., 'this',
(15) A hundred zuz (v. Glos.).
(16) And the three contracts bore the same date, If they bear different dates the collection of any earlier kethubah takes precedence over the later one.
(17) Lit., 'there was'.
(18) A hundred zuz (v. Glos.).
(19) Since the three women have equal claims upon that maneh, the smallest kethubah being for no less than one maneh.
(20) Lit., 'there was'.
(21) This will be discussed in the Gemara infra.
(22) I,e., seventy-five zuz. A gold denar twenty-five silver denarii or zuz (v. B.M. 45b). The two women take equal shares in the two hundred zuz since the kethubah of either is for no less a sum and the money available is equally pledged to both.
(23) Lit., 'there was',
(24) So that the first maneh is pledged to all the three women (cf. supra note 2). the second to the claimants of the two hundred and the three hundred respectively, while the third maneh is only pledged to the claimant of the three hundred.
(25) V. supra note 4'
(26) One hundred and fifty us.
(27) Lit., 'who put into a bag' sc. for trading purposes.
(28) In proportion to the amounts contributed.
(29) I,e., a third of the first maneh, since she has no claim at all upon the second maneh,
(30) Which is legally pledged to her. In that maneh she has only one rival claimant in the person of the woman whose kethubah is for three hundred, The maneh is consequently to be divided between the two only.
(31) That the holder of the kethubah for the two hundred us has renounced her claim upon the first maneh,
(32) The claimant of the three hundred zuz.
(33) The holder of the kethubah for the two hundred.
(34) Lit 'you have removed yourself from'.
(35) 'As far as the claimant of the maneh was concerned but not my legal right to a share in it', i.e., she only undertook to abstain from litigation with the claimant of the maneh in order to enable her thereby to obtain a half of that sum, but she had not renounced her right to a share in that maneh should she ever wish to assert it against the third wife, the holder of the kethubah for the three hundred us. She is, therefore, entitled, as far as the balance of that maneh is concerned, to claim a share equal to that of the third wife, which, together with her share in the second maneh, amounts to (50/2 + 100/2) seventy-five us or three gold denarii,
(36) Who, as stated above, has renounced fifty zuz of the first maneh.
(37) I.e., a half of the balance of fifty of the first maneh and a half of the second maneh amounting to a total of (520/2 +100/2 = 25 +50) seventy-five zuz, The third maneh upon which she has no claim at all (cf. supra p. 590. n. 7) must, of course, be excluded from the calculations of her share.
(38) While the woman whose kethubah was for two hundred us did not renounce any of her rights in favour of the holder of the kethubah for the one maneh. The first maneh is consequently divided between these two, the second maneh between the second and the third woman while the third maneh is given to the third woman only.
(39) Lit., 'the river of Pekod', a town east of Nehardea, or a district in S.E. Babylon. Pekod is mentioned in Jer. L, 21 and Ezek. XXIII, 23.
(40) l.e., the women collected the amounts mentioned in two instalments, the second of which was not available when the first was collected.
(41) Lit., 'fell'.
(42) Lit., 'one'.
(43) Since each woman had a claim upon this sum the three divide it between them in equal shares, each one receiving twenty-five zuz.
(44) The first one, having already received twenty-five us, now claims no more than seventy-five zuz, and since her claim to the seventy-five zuz is legally equal to the claims of the other two women the sum is equally divided between them and she receives a third of it, or twenty-five zuz, bringing up her total collection to FIFTY ZUZ. The second woman who has a claim upon the full balance of a hundred zuz divides the sum with the third woman each receiving fifty zuz which, added to the twenty-five zuz each received of the first maneh, amounts to a total of seventy-five zuz, or THREE GOLD DENARII.
(45) Seventy-five us of these, as in the previous case (cf. supra n. 4), is equally divided between the three women thus allowing a total of FIFTY ZUZ for the first woman. The second one who also received twenty-five zuz at the first division and who still claims a balance of two hundred minus twenty-five one hundred and seventy-five us receives twenty-five zuz as her share in the seventy-five us mentioned and another fifty zuz which is her share in the maneh that is equally divided between her and the third woman, thus receiving a total of twenty-five plus twenty-five plus fifty a hundred zuz or a MANEH. The balance of fifty us now remaining is given to the third woman who thus receives a total of twenty-five plus twenty-five plus fifty plus fifty one hundred and fifty==six GOLD DENARII.
(46) The part of our Mishnah which deals with the eases of the three women.
(47) R. Judah the Patriarch or Prince, compiler of the Mishnah.
(48) Lit,, 'see'.
(49) Lit., 'but'.
(50) Despite the difference in the amounts of their respective kethubahs.
(51) The estate being equally pledged to all the three, the woman who claims the smallest amount has no less a right to it than the women who claim the bigger amounts have a right to theirs. Only in the case of contributors to a common fund are profits and losses to be divided in proportion to the respective amounts contributed.
(52) Cf. supra p. 590, n. 10.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 93b
the Profit is to be equally divided.1 Rabbah said: It stands to reason [that Samuel's ruling applies] where an ox [was purchased]2 for ploughing and Was used3 for ploughing.4 Where, however, an ox [was purchased] for ploughing5 and was used3 for slaughter6 each of the Partners7 receives a share in proportion to his capital.8 R. Hamnuna, however, ruled: Where an ox [was bought] for ploughing,9 even if it was used3 for slaughter10 the profit must be equally divided.11
An objection was raised: If two persons contributed to a joint fund,12 one of them a maneh, and the other, two hundred zuz, the profit is to be equally divided.13 Does not this refer to an ox [bought] for ploughing and used3 for slaughter, and [thus presenting] an objection against Rabbah? - No, it refers to an ox that was bought for ploughing and was used for ploughing.9 What, however, [is the law where] an ox [was bought] for ploughing and used3 for killing? Does each partner7 [in such a case] receive a share in proportion to his capital? Then instead of stating in the final clause, 'If one man had bought [some oxen] out of his own money and the other [had bought some] out of his own money14 and the animals were mixed up, each partner7 receives a share in proportion to his capital',15 could not a distinction have been made in the very same case,16 [thus:] 'This17 applies only where an ox was bought for ploughing and was used for ploughing, but where an ox was bought for ploughing and was used for slaughter each partner receives a share in proportion to his capital'? - It is this, in fact, that18 was implied: 'This19 applies only where an ox was bought for ploughing and was used for ploughing. but where an ox was bought for ploughing and was used for slaughter' the law is the same as 'if one man had bought [some oxen] out of his own money and the other [had bought some] out of his own money, and the animals were mixed up [in which case] each party receives a share in proportion to his capital'.
We learned: SIMILARLY IF THREE PERSONS CONTRIBUTED TO A JOINT FUND AND THEY MADE A LOSS OR A PROFIT THEY SHARE IN THE SAME MANNER. Does not 'THEY MADE A LOSS mean that they made a loss on their actual transaction, and A PROFIT' that they made a profit on their actual transaction?20 - R. Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: No; they made 'A PROFIT' [owing to the issue of] new coins21 and THEY MADE A LOSS' [by the deterioration of a coin into] an istira22 that was only suitable for application to a bunion.23
MISHNAH. IF A MAN WHO WAS MARRIED TO FOUR WIVES DIED, HIS FIRST WIFE24 TAKES PRECEDENCE25 OVER THE SECOND, THE SECOND TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE THIRD AND THE THIRD OVER THE FOURTH. THE FIRST MUST TAKE AN OATH26 [IN ORDER TO GIVE SATISFACTION] TO THE SECOND,27 THE SECOND TO THE THIRD,28 AND THE THIRD TO THE FOURTH,28 WHILE THE FOURTH RECOVERS PAYMENT WITHOUT AN OATH.29 BEN NANNUS SAID: SHOULD SHE30 HAVE THE ADVANTAGE BECAUSE SHE IS THE LAST? SHE ALSO MAY NOT EXACT PAYMENT EXCEPT ON OATH, IF ALL [KETHUBAHS] WERE ISSUED ON THE SAME DAY THEN THE WOMAN [WHOSE KETHUBAH] PRECEDED THAT OF THE OTHER, EVEN IF ONLY BY ONE HOUR,31 GAINS [THE FIRST RIGHT]. AND SO IT WAS THE CUSTOM IN JERUSALEM TO INSERT THE HOURS [IN SUCH DOCUMENTS]. IF ALL KETHUBAHS WERE ISSUED AT THE SAME HOUR AND THE ESTATE IS WORTH NO MORE32 THAN A MANEH [THE WOMEN] RECEIVE EQUAL. SHARES.
GEMARA. On what principle do they33 differ? - Samuel replied:
(1) Lit., 'for the middle'.
(2) With the joint capital.
(3) Lit., 'stands'.
(4) So that the share of one partner in the ox is as essential as that of the other, the animal being useless for work unless it is whole.
(5) And much more so if it was purchased for slaughter. (Cf. infra note 7.)
(6) Its value in flesh having in the meantime increased.
(7) Lit., 'this ' ' ' this'.
(8) Since the carcase can be well divided. The original intention to use the animal for ploughing only (cf. supra note 3) does not alter the fact that in the end it was used for the purpose which admitted of division.
(9) V. supra nn. 3 and 7'
(10) Cf. supra n. 4 mutatis mutandis.
(11) Lit., 'for the middle'.
(12) Cf. supra p. 590 n. 10.
(13) Tosef. Keth. X.
(14) One party having bought more expensive and, therefore, much stronger animals than the other.
(15) Tosef. I.e.; since stronger animals are capable of more work.
(16) Spoken of in the first clause, where the two men bought an ox jointly.
(17) That profits are equally divided.
(18) Lit., 'thus also'.
(19) That profits are equally divided.
(20) Which is in contradiction to Samuel's ruling (Rashi). .Aliter: Since it is self-evident that profits on an ox that was both bought and used for slaughter are to be divided proportionally, this ruling, being superfluous in such a case, must refer to that of an ox that was originally bought for ploughing and was only subsequently used for slaughter. Thus an objection arises against R. Hamnuna (v. Tosaf, s,v. מאי a.I.).
(21) The older currency which the men originally invested being worth more than the new currency. so that the profit in the terms of the new currency was not made on any business transactions but on the actual coins. Since then it is the original investments that are returned to their owners the return must be in proportion to the respective original investments. Any profit, however, that is the result of business transactions is equally divided, (V. Rashi. Cf., however, Tosaf. s.v. הותירו a.I.)
(22) A coin (v. Glos.).
(23) As a cure. I.e., coins that have been withdrawn from circulation and, having lost their monetary value, are of no more use than a piece of metal. Such a loss (cf. supra note 4) must be borne by the two men in proportion. A trading loss, however, is, as Samuel ruled, to be equally divided.
(24) I,e,, the woman whose kethubah bears the earliest date.
(25) In respect of her claim to her kethubah,
(26) That she had received no payments from her husband, on account of her kethubah, prior to his death,
(27) Who might lose all her kethubah should no balance remain after the first had collected her due,
(28) Cf. supra n. 4 mutatis mutandis,
(29) If the orphans are of age. In the ease of orphans who are still in their minority no one may exact payment from them except with an oath; v. supra 87a.
(30) The fourth.
(31) Provided the hour had been entered in the document.
(32) Lit., 'and there is not there',
(33) Ben Nannus and the first Tanna.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 94a
[Their dispute relates to a case,] for instance, where It was found that one of the fields1 did not belong to him,2 their point of difference3 being the question [of the legality of the action] of a creditor of a later date who forestalled [one of an earlier date] and distrained [on the debtor's property]. The first Tanna holds that such distraint has no legal validity,4 and Ben Nannus holds that whatever he distrained on is legally his,5 R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha replied: Both6 agree that the distraint [of a creditor of a later date] has no legal validity,7 but here they differ on the question whether provision is to be made against the possibility that [the fourth woman might] allow the ground to deteriorate. One Master8 is of the opinion that provision is to be made against the possibility that she9 might allow the ground10 to deteriorate,11 and the other Master is of the opinion that no provision need be made against such a possibility. Abaye replied: The difference between them6 is the ruling of Abaye the Elder who stated: The 'orphans' spoken of12 are grown-ups and there is no need to say that minors13 [are included].14 The first Tanna15 does not hold the view of Abaye the Elder while Ben Nannus upholds it.16
R.Huna stated: If two brothers or two partners had a lawsuit17 against a third party18 and one of them went with that person to law,19 the other20 cannot say to him,21 'You are not my party'22 because23 [the one who went to law] acted on his behalf also.24
R. Nahman once visited Sura25 and was asked what the law was in such a case.26 He replied: This is [a case that has been stated in] our Mishnah: THE FIRST MUST TAKE AN OATH [IN ORDER TO GIVE SATISFACTION] TO THE SECOND, THE SECOND TO THE THIRD AND THE THIRD TO THE FOURTH, but it was not stated, 'the first to the third'. Now, what could be the reason?27 Obviously28 because [the second] has acted on her behalf also. But are [the two cases] alike? In the latter,29 an oath for one person is the same as an oath for a hundred,30 but in this case31 he32 might well plead, 'Had l been present I would have submitted more convincing arguments'.33 This,34 however, applies only when he32 was not In town [when the action was tried] but if he was in town [his plea is disregarded, since if he had any valid arguments] he ought to have come.35
It was stated: If two deeds36 bearing the same date37 [are presented in court,38 the property in question],39 Rab ruled, should be divided [between the two claimants], and Samuel ruled: [The case is to be decided at] the discretion of the judges.40 Must it be assumed that Rab follows the view Of R. Meir who holds that the signatures of the witnesses make [a Get] effective,41
(1) Which the first three women had taken in payment of their respective kethubahs.
(2) I.e., it was found that the deceased husband had taken it by violence from a person who might appear at any moment to claim it, and any one of the three wives, that might thus be deprived of her field, would ultimately proceed 10 make her claim against the field that had been reserved for the fourth wife.
(3) In arguing the question whether the fourth woman may be asked by one of the other women to take an oath that she had not already collected her kethubah during the lifetime of their husband,
(4) And the creditor who holds the earlier-dated bond may consequently distrain on that property. Similarly in the case of the kethubah spoken of in our Mishnah, as that of the fourth woman bears the latest date, any of the other women, being in the position of earlier creditor, may distrain on her field wherever she is deprived of the field that had been allotted to her. And since the fourth may thus be deprived of her field by any of the others at any time there is no need to make sure of her claim by the imposition of an oath, and she, consequently, RECEIVES PAYMENT WITHOUT AN OATH.
(5) As the fourth woman (cf. supra note I) could not consequently be deprived of her field once it has been allotted to her SHE ALSO MAY NOT RECEIVE PAYMENT EXCEPT UNDER AN OATH.
(6) Ben Nannus and the first Tanna.
(7) Against the claims of an earlier creditor,
(8) Ben Nannus.
(9) The fourth woman.
(10) That has been allotted to her.
(11) If no oath were imposed upon her she would realize that her tenure of the property may only be temporary and would consequently exploit it to the full and neglect its amelioration. Hence the ruling that she also must take an oath before she receives payment.
(12) In the Mishnah supra 87a and Shebu. 45a: From orphans' property she cannot recover payment except on oath. (Cf. Mishnah Git, 48b: Payment from orphans can be received only from the poorest land).
(13) Who require greater protection.
(14) Cf. Git. 50a, Shebu. 47b.
(15) Who exempts the fourth woman from the oath.
(16) Our Mishnah does not refer to the particular case which Samuel mentioned and the oath is imposed upon the fourth woman as a protection of the orphans and not vis-_-vis the other women,
(17) In connection with their joint ownership.
(18) Lit,, 'one'.
(19) And lost his case.
(20) Brother or partner.
(21) The third party.
(22) And so demand a new trial on his share.
(24) Lit,, 'he did his mission'.
(25) V. supra p. 383, n. 7'
(26) Dealt with by R. Huna.
(27) For exempting the first from taking an oath vis-_-vis the third.
(28) Lit., 'not?'
(29) Lit., 'there', that is our Mishnah.
(30) Once the woman has declared on oath that her husband had not paid her kethubah, her claim to it is established irrespective of the number of women who plead that she may have been paid by her husband.
(31) Lit., 'here'.
(32) The brother or partner who was not present at the trial.
(33) Which would have enabled him to win his case. Our Mishnah, therefore, provides no answer to the enquiry addressed to R. Nahman.
(34) That the plea, 'Had I been present etc.' is admissible.
(35) To court,
(36) Of a sale or a gift relating to the same property.
(37) Lit., 'coming forth in one day'.
(38) As the hour at which a deed was executed was not usually entered (except in Jerusalem) it cannot be determined which of the deeds is the earlier and which is the later document.
(39) I.e., the property of the donor or seller respectively which the holders of the deeds claim.
(40) שודא דדײני, v. supra p. 541. n. 12. The judges are empowered to give their decision in favour of the claimant who in their opinion deserves it (so Rashi and R. Tam, Tosaf. B.B. 350 s.v שודא) According to Rashb. (B.B. loc. cit.) the judges estimate which of the two claimants the seller or donor was more likely to favour. This may also be the opinion of Rashi (cf. infra 94b s.v. ושמואל ad fin).
(41) Git. 3b. Lit., 'the witnesses of the signature cut (the marriage union)'. In the ease of a deed, too. the validity should begin on the date the signatures were attached. And since the two deeds bear the same date and no hours are specified (cf. supra p. 597, n. 22) the two should have the same force and there can be no other alternative but that of dividing the property equally between the two claimants.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 94b
and that Samuel follows the view of R. Eleazar who holds that the witnesses to the delivery [Of a Get] make it effective?1 - No, all2 follow the view of R. Eleazar,3 but it is the following Principle on which they differ here. Rab is of the opinion that a division [between the claimants] is preferable and Samuel holds that [leaving the decision to] the discretion Of the judges is prefer. able. But can you maintain that Rab follows the view Of R. Eleazar? Surely, Rab Judah stated in the name of Rab, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Eleazar in matters Of divorce' [and he added.] 'When I mentioned this in Samuel's presence he said: "Also in the case of other deeds". Does not this then imply that Rab is of the opinion that in the case Of deeds [the halachah is] not [in agreement with R. Eleazar]?' Clearly. Rab follows the view Of R. Meir and Samuel that of R. Eleazar.
An objection was raised: 'If two deeds4 bearing the same date [are produced in court, the property In question] is to be divided. Is not this an objection against Samuel?5 - Samuel can answer you: This represents the view of6 R. Meir but I follow the view of R. Eleazar.7
But if this8 represents the view of R. Meir, read the final clause: 'If he9 wrote [a deed] for one man10 [and then he wrote a deed for,] and delivered it to another man, the one to whom he delivered [the deed] acquires legal possession'. Now if [this8 represents the view of] R. Meir why does he acquire possession? Did he not, in fact, lay down that the signatures of the witnesses11 make [a Get] effective?12 - This13 [is a question which is also in dispute between] Tannaim.14 For it was taught: And the Sages say [that the money]15 must16 be divided,17 while here18 it was ruled that the trustee19 shall use his own discretion.20
The mother of Rami b. Hama21 gave her property in writing to Rami b. Hama in the morning, but in the evening she gave it in writing to Mar 'Ukba b. Hama.22 Rami b. Hama came before R. Shesheth who confirmed him in the possession of the property. Mar 'Ukba then appeared before R. Nahman who Similarly confirmed him in the possession of the property. R. Shesheth, thereupon, came to R. Nahman and said to him, 'What is the reason that the Master has acted in this way?' 'And what is the reason', the other retorted, 'that the Master has acted in that way?' 'Because', the former replied, '[Rami's deed was written] first' ,23 'Are we then', the other retorted, 'living in Jerusalem where the hours are inserted [in deeds]?'24 'Then why [the former asked] did the Master act in this way?'25 '[I treated it,] the other retorted, [as a case to be decided] at the discretion of the judges'.26 'I too'' the first said, '[treated the case as one to be decided at] the discretion of the judges' ,27 'In the first place' the other retorted, 'I am a judge28 and the Master is no judge, and furthermore, you did not at first come with this argument' ,29
Two deeds [of sale]30 were once presented before R. Joseph, one being dated,31 'On the fifth of Nisan' ,32 and the other was vaguely dated, 'In Nisan'. R. Joseph confirmed the [holder of the deed which had the entry,] 'fifth of Nisan' in the possession of the property. 'And I', said the other, 'must lose?' 'You', he replied, 'are at a disadvantage, since it may be suggested that your deed was one that was written33 on the twenty-ninth of Nisan'34 'Will, then, the Master', the other asked, 'write for me
(1) Cit. 9b. The date of the signatures is immaterial. Since, therefore, it is possible that the donor or seller has delivered the one deed before he delivered the other, the judges must use their discretion in deciding which of the two claimants was the more likely to have been favoured by the deceased.
(2) L.it., 'all the world', Rab and Samuel.
(3) Since his ruling is the accepted law (cf. Cit. 86b).
(4) V. supra p 597' nn. 20-23.
(5) Who maintained that it is left to the discretion of the judges to decide which of the claimants is to receive the property in dispute.
(6) Lit., 'this according to whom?'
(7) Since Samuel has Tannaitic authority for his view he may well differ from R. Meir.
(8) The Baraitha, the first clause of which has been quoted.
(9) The seller or donor.
(10) To whom, however, he did not deliver it until a later date (v. infra n. 7).
(11) Not the delivery of the document.
(12) And since the first deed was signed before the other, the holder of that deed should have acquired possession despite the fact that it was delivered to him after the second deed had been delivered to the other man. The Baraitha must consequently represent the view of R. Eleazar who, as is evident from the first clause, also upholds the ruling that the property in dispute must he divided, How then, in opposition to two Tannaim, could Samuel (cf. supra p. 598' n. 7) maintain his view?
(13) The point in dispute between Rab and Samuel,
(14) Cf. supra n. 2.
(15) Which a man sent through an agent to a certain person who, however, died before the agent could deliver It to him (v. Cit, 14b).
(16) If on returning the agent found that the sender also had died,
(17) Between the heirs of the sender and the heirs of the payee.
(18) In Babylon.
(19) השליש lit., 'the third party', I.e., the agent through whom the money was sent. The parallel passage (Git. 14b) reads, השליח 'the messenger. Colds, suggests that השלי which was an abbreviation for השליח was here wrongly read השליש.
(20) A ruling which is based on the same principle as that of Samuel's in respect of the judges. The ruling of the Sages is followed by Rab while that adopted by the Rabbis in Babylon is followed by Samuel,
(21) Cf. B.B. 151a where an incident involving the same characters is recorded. The circumstances, however, are not exactly identical and the arguments involve totally different principles. The two records (v. Tosaf. s,v, אמיה) obviously deal with two different incidents.
(22) And it was not known to which of the two the deed was delivered first.
(23) In the morning, while that of his brother was written in the evening.
(24) Of course not. Since in Babylon no hours were entered in deeds it is obvious that, in accordance with the usage of the place. if two deeds were written on the same day no preference is to be given to one because it was written a few hours earlier than the other, Rami, therefore, can claim no preference over Mar 'Ukba.
(25) Since both deeds have the same force the property should have been equally divided between Rami and Mar 'Ukba. Why was it all confirmed in the possession of the latter?
(26) I.e..following the ruling of R. Eleazar that it is the witnesses to the delivery that render a deed effective, he estimated that it was Mar 'Ukba, for whom his mother had been known to have had greater affection, to whom his deed had been delivered first.
(27) And since his decision was given first, R. Nahman should not have reversed it by relying merely on his own discretion,
(28) Appointed by the Exilarch and the academy (Rashi).
(29) He did not at first contend that he treated the case as one that was dependent on the discretion of the judges but submitted that Rami was entitled to the property because his deed was written first. As this submission was erroneous, since outside Jerusalem no hours were entered in deeds and the case was not tried in Jerusalem but in Babylon, his decision could well be reversed.
(30) Both relating to the same field that was sold under a guarantee for indemnification.
(31) Lit., 'written'.
(32) The first civil month in the Hebrew calendar corresponding to March-April.
(33) Lit., 'son of'.
(34) I.e., the last day of the month. Hence the priority of the claim of the holder of the presumably earlier deed.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 95a
a tirpa1 [authorizing distraint on property sold]2 after the first of Iyar?'3 'They',4 he replied, 'might tell you: You [are holding a deed] that was written on the first of Nisan' .5 What means of redress [can he6 have recourse to]?7 - They8 write out authorizations9 to one another.10
MISHNAH. IF A MAN WHO WAS MARRIED TO TWO WIVES SOLD HIS FIELD,11 AND THE FIRST WIFE12 HAD GIVEN A WRITTEN DECLARATION TO THE BUYER, 'I HAVE NO CLAIM WHATSOEVER UPON YOU', THE SECOND WIFE13 MAY14 DISTRAIN ON THE BUYER, AND THE FIRST WIFE12 ON THE SECOND, AND THE BUYER ON THE FIRST WIFE,15 AND SO THEY GO ON IN TURN UNTIL THEY ARRANGE SOME COMPROMISE BETWEEN THEM, THE SAME LAW APPLIES ALSO TO16 A CREDITOR17 AND TO16 A WOMAN CREDITOR,17
GEMARA. What matters it even if she HAD GIVEN him A WRITTEN DECLARATION? Has it not been a man says to another, 'I have no claim whatsoever on this field, I have no concern in it and l entirely dissociate myself from it', his statement is of no effect?18 - Here we are dealing with a case where a kinyan was executed.19 But even if kinyan had been executed, what is the use? Could she not say, 'I merely wished to oblige my husband'?20 Have we not, in fact, learned: If a man bought [a married woman's property]21 from her husband and then bought it also from the wife, his purchase is legally invalid.22 Does not this11 13 show clearly that the woman can plead, 'l merely wished to oblige my husband'?20 R. Zera replied in the name of R. Hisda: This is no difficulty. One ruling23 is that of R. Meir and the other24 is that of R. Judah. For it was taught: [If a husband] drew up a deed25 for the buyer26 [of a field of his wife],27 and she did not endorse it, [and then he drew up a deed] for another buyer [of a field of hers]27 and that she did endorse, she loses thereby [her claim to] her kethubah,'28 so R. Meir.29 R. Judah, however, said: She may plead, 'I30 merely meant to oblige my husband;31 what [claim] can you have against me?'32
As to Rabbi,33 however, would he allow the anonymous Mishnah here to represent the view of R. Meir and the anonymous Mishnah there34 to represent the view of R. Judah?35 R. Papa replied: [Our Mishnah deals] with the case of a divorced woman,36 and it represents the opinion of all. R. Ashi replied: Both Mishnahs37 represent the views of R. Meir,38 for R. Meir maintains his view39 only there where two buyers are concerned,40 since in such a case she may well be told, 'If you wished to oblige. you should have done so in the case of the first buyer',41 but where Only one buyer [is concerned]. even R. Meir admits [that the sale is invalid].42 while our Mishnah43 [refers to a case] where [the husband had first] written out a deed for another buyer.44
Elsewhere we learned: Payment cannot be recovered from mortgaged property where free assets are available, even if they are only of the poorest quality.45 The question was raised: If the free assets were blasted46 may the mortgaged property be distrained on? - Come and hear: [If a husband] drew up a deed for the buyer [of a field of his wife] and she did not endorse it [and then he drew up a deed] for another buyer [of a field of hers] and that she did endorse, she loses thereby [her claim to] her kethubah,' so R. Meir.47 Now, if it could be imagined that where the free assets were blasted the mortgaged property may be distrained on [the difficulty would arise:] Granted that she lost [her right to recover] her kethubah from the second buyer,48 why49 should she not be entitled50 to recover it, at any rate, from the first buyer?51 - Said R. Nahman b. Isaac:52 The meaning of 'she loses' is that she loses [her right to recover her due] from the second buyer.53 Said Raba: Two objections may be raised against this explanation:54 In the first place [it may be pointed out] that [the expression of] 'she loses' implies total loss. And, furthermore, it was taught: If a man borrowed from one person and sold his property to two others, and the creditor gave a written declaration to the second buyer, 'I have no claim whatever upon you', [this creditor] has no claim whatever upon the first buyer, since the latter can tell him, 'I have left you55 a source56 from which to recover your debt'!57 - There,58 [it may be argued59 that] it was he60 who had deliberately caused the loss to himself.61
Said R. Yemar to R. Ashi:
(1) V. supra p. 584, n. 8.
(2) By the same vendor.
(3) The month following Nisan. Lit., 'from Iyar onwards'. However late in Nisan the deed may have been written it could not have been later than the first of the following month, and the vendee should, therefore (v. supra p. 600, n. 9)' be entitled to distrain at least on those vendees who purchased their property from the same vendor after he had purchased his.
(4) The vendees whose purchases were effected after the first of Iyar.
(5) And since his deed was consequently of an earlier date than the one that was written on the 'fifth of Nisan', the holder of the latter deed was not entitled to the property which R. Joseph confirmed in his possession. 'Before distraining on our purchases', the vendees (v. supra n. 8) might well plead, 'claim the land which you have actually bought'.
(6) The holder of the 'In Nisan' deed.
(7) In view of the alternative pleadings. Should he make a claim against the holder of the deed written On the fifth of Nisan the latter could retort that 'In Nisan' meant the twenty-ninth of the month; and should he attempt to distrain on those who bought after the first of Iyar they could retort that 'In Nisan' meant the first of that month.
(8) The holders of the 'In Nisan' and 'fifth of Nisan' deeds.
(9) To distrain on subsequent buyers.
(10) The holder of the 'In Nisan' deed is thus enabled to distrain on the subsequent vendees by virtue of his own deed or by virtue of that of the 'fifth of Nisan' held by the other. Since the vendor guaranteed to indemnify either of them he may distrain on behalf of the other if the later vendees plead that his deed was written as early as on the first of Nisan; or if, in reply to the claim of the holder of the 'fifth of Nisan' deed, they pleaded that the 'In Nisan' deed was written as late as on the twenty-ninth and that the holder of the earlier deed should consequently have distrained on him and not on them, who were later purchasers, he may distrain on them by virtue of his own deed.
(11) Which was pledged for the kethubahs of the women,
(12) I.e., the woman who was married first and whose kethubah consequently bore the earlier date.
(13) Whose claim upon the field was not in any way impaired.
(14) When her husband dies.
(15) Since she had renounced in his favour her claims upon that field.
(16) Lit., 'and so',
(17) This is explained infra.
(18) Supra 83a q.v. for notes, Git. 77a.
(19) Lit., 'they (sc. witnesses) acquired from her (on behalf of the vendee)'. Such a kinyan (as was laid down by Amemar, supra 83b) is taken to refer to the land itself and not merely to the woman's abstract renunciation.
(20) St. her kinyan was not meant to be taken seriously.
(21) Which (a) her husband inserted in her kethubah as a special security for the sum of that kethubah, apart from the general security on all his estate, or (b) her husband assigned to her after their wedding as special security for her kethubah, or (c) she had brought to her husband as marriage dowry and for the money value of which he had made himself responsible to her (v. B,B. 49b ff).
(22) Cit. 55b, B.B. loc. cit. (13) The ruling that the sale is invalid.
(23) That of our Mishnah,
(24) The ruling that the sale is invalid.
(25) Lit., 'he wrote .
(26) Lit., 'for the first'.
(27) V, supra p. 602, n. 11.
(28) If her husband has no free property left. She cannot recover her kethubah even from the first buyer since he might plead that when he had bought his field her husband was still left in the possession of that field which he subsequently sold to the second purchaser.
(29) Because by refusing to endorse the first deed she made it clear that she had no desire to please her husband. Her action in endorsing the second deed may, therefore, be regarded as the true expression of her consent to the sale and her earnest renunciation of her claim upon the property.
(30) In endorsing the second deed.
(31) Cf. supra p. 602, n. 10,
(32) Surely none. She is, therefore, entitled to recover her kethubah from the second buyer.
(33) R. Judah the Patriarch, the Redactor of the Mishnah.
(34) Git, 55b just cited.
(35) Since the halachah agrees as a rule with the anonymous Mishnah a contradiction would arise.
(36) Who renounced her rights to the purchased field after she had been divorced, so that the plea of obliging her husband is clearly inadmissible.
(37) Lit., 'all of it', our Mishnah as well as the one in Git. 55b.
(38) Both dealing with a woman who was still living with her husband,
(39) That the woman loses her kethubah.
(40) As was specifically mentioned in that Baraitha. Cf. supra note 7'
(41) As she had not done it she cannot now plead that her object was to oblige her husband.
(42) Since she may plead that she merely wished to oblige her husband.
(43) Which regards the woman's renunciation as valid.
(44) Whose deed she refused to endorse. Cf. supra p. 603, n. 7.
(45) Git. 48b.
(46) After the sale of the others.
(47) Cf. supra p, 603 notes,
(48) On account of her endorsement of his purchase.
(49) Since her first source of payment was no longer available,
(50) As in the case of free assets that were blasted.
(51) Whose purchase corresponds to the 'mortgaged property' referred to in the enquiry. Since, however, she is not allowed to distrain on the first it follows, does it not, that even if the free assets were blasted, payment cannot be recovered from mortgaged property.
(52) The Baraitha quoted provides no solution to the question.
(53) Her right to recover her kethubah from the first buyer, however, remains unimpaired.
(54) Which R. Nahman b. Isaac advanced.
(55) 'When I purchased the first field'.
(56) The field which the second buyer had subsequently purchased.
(57) Similarly in the ease of the woman, her kethubah cannot be recovered from the first buyer who might well plead that he too had left her a source from which to collect her kethubah, R. Nahman h. Isaac's explanation thus stands refuted by two objections.
(58) In the Baraitha cited by Raba,
(59) In justification of R. Nahman b. Isaac's explanation. So according to R. Tam and R. Han (v. Tosaf, s.v. התם a. l.), contrary to Rashi who regards what follows as the conclusion of Raba's arguments, v. infra n. 5.
(60) The creditor,
(61) By signing the declaration in favour of the second buyer though he was well aware that by this act he loses the only source available for the recovery of his debt. In the ease of a woman, however, whose kethubah does not fall due for payment until after the death of her husband, it may well be maintained that the renunciation of her rights in favour of the second buyer, during the lifetime of her husband, was not regarded by her as of any practical consequence, and the loss ultimately ensuing cannot, therefore, be said to have been deliberately caused by herself. As the two eases are not analogous R. Nahman b. Isaac's explanation stands unrefuted, The first objection raised by Raba remains unanswered as happens sometimes in such Talmudic discussions where only the second of two objections is dealt with. Moreover the first objection is rather feeble and may well be met by the reply that the expression 'she loses' need not necessarily imply total loss (so Tosaf. loc, cit.), According to Rashi 'There . ' himself', is taken by Raba as an argument against the solution of the problem that was attempted by inference from the first Baraitha, and might also be inferred from the last one quoted (cf. Golds.). 'There', i,e.,in the eases dealt with in the last Baraithas, the argument runs, it was he', i e.,the claimant (the woman in the first case and the creditor in the second) 'who had caused the loss to himself'; and no inference can, therefore, be drawn from either of these cases in respect of the one referred to in the question where the claimant is in no way responsible for the loss of the free assets.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 95b
This,1 Surely, is the regular practice2 [of the courts of law]? For did not a man once pledge a vineyard to his friend for ten years3 but it aged after five years,4 and [when the creditor] came to the Rabbis5 they wrote out a tirpa6 for him?7 - There8 also it was they9 who caused the loss to themselves. For, having been aware that it may happen that a Vineyard should age,10 they should not have bought [any of the debtor's pledged land].11 The law, however, is that where free assets are blasted, mortgaged property may be distrained on. Abaye ruled: [If a man said to a woman]12 'My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so', and then the woman13 married, her husband has the Status of a vendee and her successor14 has no legal claim15 in face16 of her husband. In agreement with whose view [was Abaye's ruling laid down]? In agreement with the following Tanna.17 For it has been taught: [If one man said to another,] 'My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so' and the first recipient went down [into the estate] and sold it, the second may reclaim the estate18 from those who bought it; so Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: The second may receive only that which the first has left.19 But could Abaye have laid down such a ruling? Did not Abaye in fact, Say, 'Who is a cunning rogue? He who counsels20 to sell21 an estate22 in accordance with the ruling of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel?23 - Did he Say, 'She may marry'?24 All he said was, 'The woman married'.25
Abaye further stated: [If a man said to a woman.]26 'My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so' and the woman sold [the estate] and died, her husband27 may seize It from the buyer, the woman's successor28 [may seize it] from the husband,29 and the buyer from the successor,30 and all the estate is confirmed in the possession of the buyer.31 But why should this case be different from the following where we learned: AND SO THEY GO ON IN TURN UNTIL THEY ARRANGE SOME COMPROMISE BETWEEN THEM?-There they are all suffering some loss32 but here it is only the buyer who suffers the loss.33
Rafram went to R. Ashi and recited this argument to him: Could Abaye have laid down such a ruling?34 Did he not, in fact, lay down: [If a man said to a woman.] 'My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so',and then the woman married, her husband has the status of a vendee, and her successor has no legal claim in face of her husband?35 - The other replied: There [it is a woman] to whom he36 spoke while she was feme sole,37 but here [we are dealing with one] to whom he36 spoke when she was married.38 For it is this that he meant to tell39 her? 'Your successor only shall acquire Possession; your husband shall not'.40
THE SAME LAW APPLIES ALSO TO A CREDITOR. A Tanna taught:41 The same law applies to42 a creditor and two buyers43 and also to a woman, who was a creditor,44 and two buyers.45
MISHNAH. A WIDOW IS TO BE MAINTAINED OUT OF THE ESTATE OF [HER DECEASED HUSBAND'S] ORPHANS [AND] HER HANDIWORK BELONGS TO THEM. IT IS NOT THEIR DUTY, HOWEVER, TO BURY HER; IT IS THE DUTY OF HER HEIRS, EVEN THOSE WHO INHERIT HER KETHUBAH, TO BURY HER.
GEMARA. The question was asked: Have we learnt,46 'is to be maintained'47 or 'one who is maintained'?48 Have we learned, 'is to be maintained', in agreement with the men of Galilee,49 so that there is no way50 [by which the orphans] can avoid51 maintaining her; or have we rather learned 'one who is maintained',48 in agreement with the men of Judaea,52 so that [the orphans,] if they wish it, need not53 maintain her?
(1) To allow creditors to distrain on mortgaged property wherever free assets are blasted.
(2) Lit., 'and, surely, actions every day'.
(3) The terms entered in the mortgage deed being that the creditor was to enjoy the usufruct of the vineyard during the ten years, in payment of his loan, while the vineyard itself was to return to the debtor at the end of that period without any further payment or obligation on his part.
(4) I.e., ceased yielding produce before the creditor had recouped himself in full.
(5) To claim the balance of the loan,
(6) V. supra p. 584, n. 8.
(7) And thereby enabled him to distrain on all property which the debtor had sold after the date On which the mortgage deed was written. This being the regular practice in the administration of the law, why was the question, supra 95a, at all raised?
(8) The ease just cited.
(9) Who purchased the lands from the debtor though they were well aware that these were already pledged to the mortgagee of the vineyard.
(10) And that this might happen before the expiry of the ten years in consequence of which the creditor would naturally distrain on the debtor's remaining property.
(11) Having bought it they have only themselves to blame for the consequences. The regular practice of the courts in such actions has, therefore, no bearing on the ease referred to in the question.
(12) Who (as will be explained Infra) was feme sole.
(13) Lit., 'and stood up'.
(14) Lit., 'to after you'.
(15) Lit., 'nothing'.
(16) Lit., 'place'.
(17) R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.
(18) After the death of the first donee who, by the terms of the gift, was entitled to the usufruct during his lifetime only but had no right to sell the estate itself
(19) B.B. 137a; and since the first has sold the estate the second his no rightful claim upon it.
(20) So Rashb. (B. B. 137a). Aliter. Who lakes counsel with himself (R. Gersh.).
(21) And much more so one who sells (so according to Rashb. v. supra n. 15).
(22) Which was given to a person with the stipulation that after his death it shall pass over to another person.
(23) Sotah 21b, B. B. loc. cit. Though such a sale is morally wrong, since the donor meant the second donee to have the estate after the death of the first, it is nevertheless quite legal on the basis of the ruling of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel. Now since Abaye condemns the person who acts on the ruling of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, would he himself base a ruling of his on this view' of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel?
(24) Which would have implied approval.
(25) A fait accompli. Her action, however, though legal, is nevertheless condemned by Abaye as morally wrong.
(26) Who (v. infra) was married.
(27) Who has the status of a first buyer.
(28) Cf. supra p. 606, n. 9.
(29) Because, unlike the previous ease where the woman of whom Abaye spoke was unmarried, the woman in this case (v. supra n. 4) was married at the time the estate was presented to her and her successor. Her husband who was not in any way mentioned by the donor is, therefore, deemed to have been Implicitly excluded by the donor from all rights to, or claim upon. the estate.
(30) In agreement with the ruling of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel that the first donee has the right to sell the estate.
(31) It cannot again be taken away from him by the husband, since his present tenure of the estate is no longer based upon his rights as a buyer from the married woman but upon the rights derived from her successor. In the former ease the husband as 'first buyer' (v. supra note 5) would have had right of seizure. In the latter ease he has none.
(32) The buyer loses some of his purchase money and the women lose portions of their kethubah.
(33) The husband and the donees are only claiming a gift.
(34) That all the estate is confirmed in the possession of the buyer.
(35) Cf. supra p. 606, n. 7 and 9.
(36) The donor.
(37) Cf. supra p. 606, n. 7.
(38) Cf. supra p. 607, n. 4.
(39) Lit., 'what did he (mean) to say?'
(40) Cf. supra 607. n. 7.
(41) In explanation of our Mishnah.
(42) Lit., 'and so'.
(43) The total value of whose purchases from the debtor represents the amount of the debt. The creditor, if he renounced his claim to the extent of that portion of the debt that was secured on the second buyer's purchase, may distrain on the purchases of the first buyer who in turn distrains on the second buyer (whose purchase was that of property that was already pledged to the first in security of his purchase) who in turn distrains on the creditor (by virtue of his renunciation); and so they go on in turn until a compromise is arranged.
(44) Sc. who claims the amount of her kethubah.
(45) Cf. supra n' 9 mutatis mutandis.
(46) In our Mishnah.
(47) ניזונת sc. the reading given supra.
(48) הניזונת in which case the Mishnah means that only the handiwork of a widow, who is maintained by the orphans, belongs to them.
(49) Who entered in the kethubah the clause. 'You shall dwell in my house and be maintained therein out of my estate throughout the duration of your widowhood' (v. Mishnah supra 52b).
(50) 'To go' (cf. fast.).
(51) Aliter. There is no possibility of avoiding (cf. Levy).
(52) Who added to the clause mentioned (supra n. 4), 'Until the heirs may consent to pay you your kethubah' (Mishnah. supra 52b).
(53) If they had paid her the kethubah.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 96a
- Come and hear what1 R. Zera stated in the name of Samuel:2 'The find of a widow belongs to herself'. Now if you grant that what we learnt was, one who is maintained' [this ruling is] quite justified,3 but if you insist that what we learnt was 'is to be maintained'4 [why,5 it might be objected, should they not] have the same rights as a husband, and just as in the latter case6 a wife's find belongs to her husband, so it, the former case7 also the find of the woman8 should belong to the heirs?9 - I may still insist that what we have learnt10 was 'is to be maintained'; for the reason why11 the Rabbis have ordained that the find of a wife belonged to her husband is in order that he shall bear no grudge12 against her, but as regards these13 let them bear the grudge.14
R.Jose b. Hanina ruled: All manner of work which a wife must render to her husband15 a widow must render to the orphans, with the exception of serving one's drinks,16 making ready one's bed and washing one's face, hands or feet.17 R.Joshua b. Levi ruled: All manner of service that a slave must render to his master a student must render to his teacher, except that of taking off his18 shoe.19 Raba explained: This ruling20 applies only to a place where he21 is not known, but where he is known there can be no objection.22 R. Ashi said: Even where he21 is not known the ruling20 applies only where he does not put on tefillin23 but where he puts on tefillin, he may well perform such a service.22 R.Hiyya b. Abba stated in the name of R. Johanan. A man who deprives his student of [the privilege of] attending on him acts as if he had deprived him of [an act of] kindness, for it is said in Scripture, To him that deprives24 his friend25 of kindness.26 R. Nahman b. Isaac said: He also deprives27 him of the fear of heaven, for it is said in Scripture, And he forsaketh the fear of the Almighty.28
R.Eleazar ruled: If a widow29 seized movables [to provide] for her maintenance, her act is30 valid.31 So it was also taught: If a widow seized movables [to provide] for her maintenance, her act is30 valid.31 And so R. Dimi, when he came,32 related: It once happened that the daughter-in-law of R. Shabbethai seized33 a saddle bag34 that was full of money,35 and the Sages had no power to take it out of her possession.
Rabina ruled: This36 applies only to maintenance but [movables seized] in payment of a kethubah may be taken away from her. Mar son of R. Ashi demurred: Wherein [is the case of seizure] for a kethubah different [from the other]? Is it because [the former may be distrained for] on landed property and not on movables, may not maintenance also, [it may be objected, be distrained] on landed property and not on movables? The fact, however, is that as in respect of maintenance seizure30 is valid,31 so it is also valid in respect of a kethubah.
Said R. Isaac b. Naphtali to Rabina: Thus, in agreement with your view, it has also been stated in the name of Raba. R.Johanan stated in the name of R. Jose b. Zimra: A widow who allowed two or three years to pass37 before38 she claimed maintenance loses her maintenance. Now [that it has been said that] she loses [her maintenance after] two years, was it necessary [to mention also] three? - This is no difficulty; the lesser number39 refers to a poor woman while the bigger one39 refers to a rich woman;40 or else: The former39 refers to a bold woman and the latter39 to a modest woman.41 Raba ruled: This42 applies only to a retrospective claim,43 but in respect of the future she is entitled [to maintenance].
R.Johanan enquired: If the orphans plead, 'We have already paid44 [the cost of maintenance45 in advance]', and she retorts, 'I did not receive it', who must produce the proof?
(1) So MS.M. reading דאמר Cur. edd. omit the daleth.
(2) Alfasi and Asheri omitting. 'R. Zera stated' read 'Samuel stated'.
(3) Our Mishnah representing the view of the men of Judaea, Samuel's ruling might be applied to a widow who (v. supra note 7) was not maintained by the orphans.
(4) In agreement with the men of Galilee who allow' the orphans no alternative.
(5) In view of the fact that they must always maintain the widow as a husband must always maintain his wife.
(6) Lit., 'husband'.
(7) Lit., 'here', Sc. the case referred to by Samuel.
(8) I.e., the widow.
(9) As Samuel, however, ruled that it belongs to herself it must be concluded that the reading in our Mishnah is, 'one who is maintained'.
(10) In our Mishnah.
(11) Lit., 'what',
(12) איבה 'enmity'.
(13) The orphans who are legally bound to maintain her.
(14) It is only the handiwork of the widow that belongs to the orphans, in return for the maintenance she receives from them, as the handiwork of a wife, for a similar reason, belongs 10 her husband.
(15) V. supra 59b.
(16) Lit., 'mixing (the drink in his) cup'. Rt. מזג to mix with water (to weaken its strength) or spices.
(17) These are intimate services to which a husband only is entitled.
(18) Lit., 'loosening', 'undoing'.
(19) Only a Canaanite slave performs this menial service, and a student performing it might be mistaken for such a slave,
(20) That a student should not assist his teacher in taking off his shoes.
(21) The student.
(22) Lit 'we have nothing against it'.
(23) V. GIos. As slaves also do not wear tefillin (v Git. 40a), his status might well be mistaken.
(24) למס, rt. מסס 'to melt'.
(25) Sc. the student one teaches.
(26) Job VI, 14. The previous verse speaks of help which is homiletically applied to that of the student to his teacher. R.V. renders v. 14. To him that is ready to faint kindness should be shewed from his friend. 'Should be shewed' is changed by A. J. V. to 'is due'.
(27) Lit., 'breaks off'.
(28) Job VI, 14; E.V., Even10 him that forsaketh etc. [Personal attendance on scholars constitutes in itself a good education in righteous conduct and fear of the Almighty, v. Bet. 7b.
(29) Whose maintenance may be distrained for on landed property only (v. supra 69b).
(30) Ex post facto.
(31) Lit., what she seized she seized'.
(32) From Palestine to Babylon.
(33) From the estate of her deceased husband.
(34) דסקיא Gr. , a bag made up of two pouches.
(35) For her maintenance.
(36) That the seizure of movables by a widow is ex post facto valid.
(37) Lit.. 'who delayed'.
(38) Lit., 'and not'.
(39) Lit., 'here'.
(40) Who is able to live for a considerable time on her own means. Such a woman cannot be assumed to have surrendered her right to maintenance before a period of three years had elapsed.
(41) Who is too shy to litigate or to go to court. Cf. supra n. 2 second clause.
(42) The loss of maintenance.
(43) For the time that has passed.
(44) To the widow.
(45) For the ensuing year.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 96b
Is the estate [of the deceased man] in the presumptive possession of the orphans1 and consequently it is the widow who must produce the proof, or is the estate rather in the presumptive possession of the widow2 and the proof must be produced by the orphans? Come and hear what Levi taught: [In a dispute on the maintenance of] a widow, the orphans must produce the proof3 so long as she is unmarried,4 but if she was married5 the proof must be produced by her.6
R.Shimi b. Ashi said: [This point7 is a matter in dispute between] the following8 Tannaim: She9 may sell [portions of her deceased husband's estate] but should specify in writing,10 'These I have sold for maintenance,' and 'These I have sold for the kethubah' [as the case may be]; so R. Judah. R. Jose, however, ruled: She11 may sell [such portions] and need not specify the purpose12 in writing, for in this manner she gains an advantage.13 They14 thus apparently15 differ on the following point: R. Judah, who ruled that it is necessary to specify16 the purpose,17 holds that the [deceased man's] estate is in the presumptive possession of the orphans and that it is the widow who must produce the proof,18 whilst R. Jose, who ruled that it was not necessary to specify the purpose, upholds the view that the estate is in the presumptive possession of the widow and that it is the orphans who must produce the proof.19 Whence [is this20 made so obvious]? It is quite possible that all14 agree that the [deceased man's] estate is in the presumptive possession of his widow and that the orphans must produce the proof,21 but R. Judah22 is merely tendering good advice [by following which the widow] would prevent people from calling23 her a glutton.24 For were you not to admit this,25 could not the question26 raised by R. Johanan27 be answered from the Mishnah:28 She may sell [her deceased husband's estate] for her maintenance out of court but should enter [in the deed of sale,] 'I have sold these for maintenance'?29 Consequently30 It must be concluded31 that no deduction may be made from the Mishnah28 because therein only good advice was tendered;32 and so also here33 [it may similarly be submitted that R. Judah] was only tendering good advice.32 Or else: All34 may agree that the estate [of the deceased] is in the presumptive possession of the orphans, but R. Jose's reason35 is exactly the same as [that given by] Abaye the Elder who stated: To what may the ruling36 of R. Jose be compared? To [the instructions of] a dying man who said, 'Give two hundred zuz37 to So-and-so, my creditor,38 who may take them, if he wishes, in settlement of his debt or, if he prefers, he may take then, as a gift',
(1) Who are his legal heirs.
(2) To whom it is pledged in accordance with an enactment of the Rabbis.
(3) That they have paid her in advance.
(4) Since the estate is pledged to her (v. supra n. 9).
(5) And claims the cost of her maintenance for the time past.
(6) Having married she loses the security of her Former husband's estate.
(7) The question of the presumptive ownership of the deceased man's estate.
(8) Lit., 'as', 'like'.
(9) A widow.
(10) In the deeds of sale.
(11) A widow.
(12) Whether it was maintenance or kethubah.
(13) Lit., 'her power is beautiful', as will be explained anon.
(14) R. Judah and R. Jose.
(15) Lit., 'what not'?
(16) In the deeds of sale.
(17) Whether it was maintenance or kethubah.
(18) That she has not been paid the cost of maintenance. Hence it is to her advantage that the purpose of the sale should be specified. Should she fail to do so, the orphans, when she comes to claim her kethubah from them, might refuse payment on the ground that her sale had the purpose of recouping her for her kethubah. Her alternative plea, 'If so, pay me for my maintenance' could be met by the counter plea that they had already Paid for it in movables, a plea which, when coming from orphans, the court must accept.
(19) A specification of the purpose, therefore, would bring no advantage to her. Its omission, on the other hand, might well prove advantageous in the case where the deceased man's estate was completely consumed by the orphans and the widow had recourse to distraining on landed property which he sold during his lifetime. Submitting that her own sales had the purpose of providing for her maintenance she may legally distrain on such property which is pledged for her kethubah. Had she, however, specified that her sales had the purpose of recovering her kethubah she could no longer distrain on her husband's sold property which (v. Git. 48b) is not pledged for her maintenance.
(20) The conclusion of R. Shimi.
(21) That the widow had already received the allowance for her maintenance.
(22) In ruling that the widow should specify the purpose for which her sales are made.
(23) Lit., 'that they shall not call'.
(24) Were she to omit from the deed of sale the mention of her kethubah people might assume that all the proceeds of her sales were spent on her maintenance alone. As a reputed glutton her chances of a second marriage would be diminished (v. Rashi).
(25) Lit., 'say so', that R. Judah in his ruling is merely tendering advice.
(26) Lit., 'that'.
(27) 'Who must produce the proof' (supra 96a ad fin.).
(28) Infra 97b.
(29) Of course it could. The reason for the requirement of a specification of the purpose of the sale that underlies R. Judah's ruling in the Baraitha should obviously hold good for the similar ruling in the Mishnah. If the reason in the former is that the estate remains in the presumptive possession of the orphans, the same reason would apply to the latter. And since a Mishnah, unlike a Baraitha, must be known to all students, R. Johanan's question would easily have been answered.
(30) Since the question had to be solved from Levi's Baraitha.
(31) Lit., 'but'.
(32) But the presumptive possession of the estate is that of the widow.
(33) In the Baraitha.
(34) R. Judah and R. Jose.
(35) For the ruling that the purpose of the sale need not be specified in the deed.
(36) V. supra n. 8. משל lit., 'simile'.
(37) V. Glos.
(38) Cf. B.B. 138b.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 97a
who, if he takes them as a gift, has not the same advantage [as if he had taken them for his debt].1
In what manner does [a widow] sell [her deceased husband's property] for her maintenance?2 - R. Daniel son of R. Kattina replied in the name of R. Huna: She sells [portions of it] once in twelve months3 and the buyer supplies her maintenance [in instalments]4 once every thirty days. Rab Judah, however, stated: She sells once in six months and the buyer provides her maintenance [in instalments] once every thirty days.
It was taught in agreement with R. Huna: [A widow] sells5 once in twelve months and the buyer supplies her maintenance [in instalments] once every thirty days. It was also taught in agreement with Rab Judah: [A widow] sells once in six months and the buyer provides her maintenance [in instalments] once every thirty days.
Amemar said: The law is that [a widow] sells [sufficient land to suffice her] for six months and the buyer provides her maintenance [in instalments] once every thirty days. Said R. Ashi to Amemar: What [about the ruling] of R. Huna? - 'I', the other replied, 'have not heard of it', by which he meant,6 'I do not approve of it'.
R. Shesheth was asked: May [a widow] who sold [land] for her maintenance subsequently distrain on it7 for her kethubah? This question was raised on [the basis of a ruling of] R. Joseph who stated, 'If a widow has sold [any of her deceased husband's estate]8 the responsibility for the indemnity falls upon the orphans,9 and if the court sold [any such property] the responsibility for the indemnity again falls upon the orphans'10 What [then, it was asked, is the ruling]? May she, since the responsibility for the indemnity falls upon the orphans, distrain [on the land],11 or is it possible that [the buyers] may tell her,12 'Granted that you have not accepted general13 responsibility for indemnity, did you not indeed accept responsibility [against distraint] by yourself either?'14 - You, he replied, have learned it: '[A widow]15 may continue to sell16 until [only the estate of] the value of her kethubah [remains], and this is a support to her since she might thus collect her kethubah from the residue'. Thus17 it may be inferred that only if she left [estate corresponding to the value of her kethubah] may18 [she collect her kethubah]. but if she did not leave [so much of the estate,19 she may] not.20 But is it not possible that he21 was merely tendering good advice, in order that people might not call her a swindler?22 - If so,23 he21 should have stated, 'She collects her kethubah from the remainder', why [then did he also add,] 'A support to her'? Consequently it must be inferred that only if she left [estate corresponding to the value of her kethubah] may18 [the widow collect her kethubah], but if she did not leave [so much19 she may] not.20
The question was raised: If a man sold [a plot of land]24 but [on concluding the sale] he was no longer in need of money, may his sale25 be withdrawn26 or not?27 Come and hear: There was a certain man who sold a plot of land to R. Papa because he was in need of money to buy some oxen, and, as eventually he did not need it, R. Papa actually returned the land to him! - [This is no proof since] R. Papa may have acted beyond the strict requirements of the law.28
Come and hear: There was once a dearth at Nehardea29 when all the people sold their mansions,30 but when eventually wheat arrived31 R. Nahman told them: The law is that the mansions must be returned to their original owners! - There also the sales were made in error since it eventually became known that the ship32 was33 waiting in the bays.34 If that is so,35 how [explain] what Rami b. Samuel said to R. Nahman, 'If [you rule] thus you will cause them36 trouble in the future',37 [whereupon] he replied, 'Is dearth a daily occurrence?' and to which the former retorted, 'Yes, a dearth at Nehardea is indeed a common occurrence'?38 And the law is that if a man sold [a plot of land]39 and [on concluding the sale] was no longer in need of money the sale may be withdrawn.
MISHNAH. A WIDOW, WHETHER [HER HUSBAND DIED] AFTER [HER] BETROTHAL40 OR AFTER [HER] MARRIAGE41 MAY SELL [OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND'S ESTATE] WITHOUT [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN. R. SIMEON RULED: [IF HER HUSBAND DIED] AFTER MARRIAGE41 SHE MAY SELL42 [OF HIS ESTATE] WITHOUT [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN,43 [BUT IF ONLY] AFTER [HER] BETROTHAL, SHE MAY NOT SELL [ANY OF THE ESTATE] EXCEPT WITH [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN, SINCE SHE IS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE, AND ONE WHO IS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE MAY NOT SELL [SUCH PROPERTY] EXCEPT WITH [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN.
GEMARA. One can readily see [that the privilege44 of a woman who was widowed] AFTER MARRIAGE is due to [her immediate need for] maintenance;45
(1) A debt may be distrained for on sold property, but a gift may not. Similarly with the widow, by omitting, in agreement with the ruling of R. Jose, the specification of the purpose of her sales, she retains the right to distrain on her deceased husband's sold property by advancing the plea that her own sales had been made for the purpose of her maintenance (which cannot, of course, be distrained for on such property) and that she was now seeking to recover her kethubah to which such property is pledged. To protect herself against the plea of the orphans that her kethubah also was paid out of her sales, she might arrange for witnesses to he present when the sales for her maintenance take place and when she makes a verbal declaration to that effect.
(2) למזונות, so MS.M. Cur. edd. omit the word.
(3) Sufficient to Provide for her maintenance during all that period.
(4) He must not pay the full price in one instalment in order that he may be enabled, should the widow marry before she receives all the instalments, to hand over the balance to the orphans.
(5) Portions of her deceased husband's estate.
(6) Lit.,'as if to say'.
(7) On the very land she has sold.
(8) To reimburse herself for her maintenance or kethubah, but guaranteeing indemnity to the buyer.
(9) Since it is they who are responsible for the widow's kethubah and maintenance.
(10) Infra 100a.
(11) Though she herself had sold it; and refer the buyers to the orphans.
(12) When she proceeds to distrain on the land she sold them.
(13) Lit., 'of the world', sc. if other claimants distrained on the land.
(14) And, consequently. she is not allowed to distrain on such property.
(15) To provide for her maintenance.
(16) Portions of her deceased husband's estate.
(17) Since according to this ruling the widow must have recourse to the residue.
(18) Lit., 'yes'.
(19) But sold all of it.
(20) Collect her kethubah by distraining on the lands she sold.
(21) The author of the Baraitha, in ruling that a portion of the estate corresponding to the value of the kethubah must remain unsold.
(22) L1t., 'retractor'. Legally. however, she may well distrain on the property of such buyers.
(23) If the ruling was in the nature of advice.
(24) For the sole reason that he needed money for some specific purpose.
(25) Since he no longer needed the money.
(26) On the ground of being a sale made in error.
(27) Owing to the fact that at the time of the sale the seller was still in need of money.
(28) לפנים משירת הדין lit., 'within the line of the law', i.e., he surrendered his legal right for the sake of benefiting a fellow man; v. B.K. Sonc. ed. p. 584, n. 2.
(29) V. supra p. 222, n. 8.
(30) To use the proceeds for the purchase of wheat.
(31) And prices fell so that the sellers of the mansions were no longer in need of the money.
(32) That carried the grain.
(33) At the time the sales were effected.
(34) Sheltering until the subsidence of the high water. Had these sellers been aware of the fact that the ship was so near they would never have thought of selling their mansions. Such sales may, therefore, be regarded as sales in error, which may be withdrawn. The question under discussion, however, refers to a seller who was actually in need of money when his sale was effected (v. p. 616, n. 16) and whose release came only after the sale.
(35) That the reason for R. Nahman's ruling was that the ship was already in the bays at the time the sales were arranged. So according to Rashb. (v. Tosaf. s. v. אי, a.l.) contra Rashi who takes this argument to he in support of the reason given for R. Nahman's ruling.
(36) The sellers.
(37) Because they will not be able to find buyers.
(38) Granted the frequency of dearth at Nehardea, the detention of the provision ships in the bays is obviously of no common occurrence. Consequently it must be concluded that R. Nahman's reason for the cancellation of the sales was not because 'the ship was in the bays' but because the sellers, though in need of money when the sales were arranged, had no need of the money subsequently, such cases being of frequent occurrence.
(39) V. supra p. 616, n. 13.
(40) When her claim is restricted to that of her kethubah only (v. our Mishnah infra).
(41) When she claims also maintenance.
(42) For her maintenance.
(43) Since she cannot be expected to starve until Beth din find time to deal with her case.
(44) To SELL... WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF BETH DIN.
(45) Cf. supra n. 4.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 97b
what, however, is the reason1 [for conferring this privilege2 upon one widowed] after betrothal?3 - 'Ulla replied: In order to [enhance the] attractions4 [of matrimony].5 R. Johanan replied: Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court. What is the practical difference between them?6 - The practical difference between them is the case of a divorced woman. For according to him who replied, 'In order to [enhance the] attractiveness [of matrimony]' a divorced woman also may7 claim [the privilege8 of the provision for matrimonial] attractiveness; but according to him who replied, 'Because no man Wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court' a divorced woman [is not entitled to the privilege since] the man does not care [for her dignity].
We learned: And a divorced woman may not sell [of her former husband's estate]9 except with the sanction of Beth din.10 Now, according to him who replied, 'Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court' the ruling is well justified since for a divorced wife one does not care; but according to him who replied, 'In order to [enhance the] attractions [of matrimony'. why should not] a divorced woman11 also be entitled to claim [the privilege of the provision for matrimonial] attractiveness? - This represents the view of R. Simeon.12 If [this represents the view of] R. Simeon [the objection arises: Was not this principle] already laid down in the earlier clause, AFTER HER BETROTHAL SHE MAY NOT SELL etc.?13 - It might have been presumed [that his ruling applied] Only to a woman widowed after [her] betrothal, since in her case there was not much affection,14 but that a divorced woman, in whose case there was much affection,15 may16 demand [the privilege of the provision for matrimonial] attraction.17 But have we not learned this18 also: WHO IS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE which includes,19 does it not, a divorced woman?20 - No, [it includes one who is both] divorced21 and' not divorced,22 as [the one spoken of by] R. Zera who stated: Wherever the Sages described a woman as both divorced and not divorced22 her husband is responsible for her maintenance.23
Come and hear: As she24 may sell [of her deceased husband's estate] without [the sanction of] Beth din so may her heirs, those who inherit her kethubah, sell [such property] without [the sanction of] Beth din. Now, according to him who replied, 'Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court' one can well see the reason for this ruling;25 for as it is disagreeable to him26 that she should suffer indignity so it is also disagreeable to him that her heirs should suffer indignity. According to him, however, who replied, 'In order to [enhance the] attractiveness [of matrimony]', what [consideration for] attractiveness [it may be objected] could there be in respect of her heirs?27 - 'Ulla interpreted this [to be a case where] her daughter, for instance, or her sister, Was her heir.28
MISHNAH. [A WIDOW WHO] SOLD HER KETHUBAH OR PART OF IT, OR PLEDGED IT OR PART OF IT, OR PRESENTED IT OR PART OF IT, TO A STRANGER, MAY NOT SELL THE RESIDUE [OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND'S ESTATE]29 EXCEPT WITH
(THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN.30 THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: SHE MAY SELL [THE LAND PLEDGED FOR HER KETHUBAH] EVEN IN FOUR OR FIVE INSTALMENTS31 AND [IN THE MEANTIME]32 SHE MAY SELL [OF HER HUSBAND'S ESTATE TO PROVIDE] FOR HER MAINTENANCE WITHOUT [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN, ENTERING, [HOWEVER, IN THE DEED OF SALE,] 'I SOLD [THE LAND TO PROVIDE] FOR MY MAINTENANCE'.33 A DIVORCED WOMAN, HOWEVER, MUST NOT SELL [SUCH PROPERTY] EXCEPT WITH [THE SANCTION OF] BETH DIN.
GEMARA. Who [is the author of the first ruling in] our Mishnah?34 - It is R. Simeon. For it was taught: If a woman sold [all] her kethubah or pledged it, or mortgaged [the land that was pledged for] her kethubah to a stranger, she is not entitled to maintenance.35 R. Simeon ruled: Even if she did not sell or pledge [all] her kethubah, but half of it only, she loses her maintenance.36 Does this37 then imply that R. Simeon holds the view that we do not regard part of the amount38 as being legally equal to the full amount, while the Rabbis maintain that part of the amount is legally regarded as the full amount? But, [it may be objected], have we not in fact heard the reverse? For was It not taught: And he39 shall take a wife its her virginity40 excludes one who is adolescent41 [some of whose] virginity is ended; so R. Meir. R. Eleazar and R. Simeon permit42 [the marriage] of one who is adolescent?43 - There44 they differ [on the interpretation] of Scriptural texts,45 R. Meir being of the opinion that 'virgin'46 implies even [one who retains] some of her virginity; 'her virginity'47 implies only one who retains all her virginity;48 'in her virginity'49 implies only50 [when previous intercourse with her took place] in a natural manner,51 but not when in an unnatural manner.52 R. Eleazar and R. Simeon, however, are of the opinion that 'virgin' would have implied a perfect virgin; 'her virginity' implies even [one who retains] only part of her virginity;
(1) Of the first Tanna of our Mishnah.
(2) As far as her kethubah is concerned.
(3) Why should not a claim of this nature (cf. supra note 1) be subject to the jurisdiction of a court just as that of any other claimants?
(4) Lit., 'grace'.
(5) In the absence of the privilege some women might refuse to consent to their betrothal; v. supra 84a.
(6) 'Ulla and R. Johanan.
(7) Since the privilege is not dependent on the husband's feelings.
(8) V. supra note 8.
(9) To reimburse herself for her kethubah.
(10) Mishnah infra.
(11) Since the privilege is not dependent on the husband's feelings.
(12) Who, as follows from his ruling in our Mishnah, does not recognize the principle of providing for matrimonial attractiveness.
(13) Cf. supra n. 4' Why then should the same principle be repeated?
(14) Lit., 'her favour (in the eyes of the husband) was not much'. Her husband having died before he married her. As no woman would expect privileges after such a slight matrimonial relationship there was Do need to confer the privilege (v. supra p. 618, n. 5) upon such a widow,
(15) Cf. previous note mutatis mutandis. V. Tosaf. s.v, אלמנה a.I. for two other interpretations.
(16) Even according to R. Simeon.
(17) Hence the necessity for the two rulings.
(18) The case of a divorced woman.
(19) Lit., 'to include what?'
(20) After her marriage. It cannot refer to a woman divorced after her betrothal since her case could be inferred a minori ad majus from that of A WIDOW... AFTER HER BETROTHAL.
(21) After betrothal.
(22) One, for instance, to whom the husband has thrown a letter of divorce in a public thoroughfare and it is uncertain whether it fell nearer to her or to him (v. Git. 74a).
(23) Our. Mishnah thus teaches that the husband's responsibility for the maintenance of a woman in such circumstances ceases with his death, and his orphans, therefore, are under no obligation to maintain her out of his estate. She is well entitled to maintenance during his lifetime since it is through him that she is prevented from contracting a second marriage; but after his death, when she is free to marry again, her claim which was all the time of a doubtful nature must lapse.
(24) A widow.
(25) The right of the heirs to sell without the sanction of Beth din.
(26) The husband.
(27) Who as a rule are males (cf. Rashi). A female enjoys the right of inheritance only in the absence of males.
(28) In whose case the consideration of rendering matrimony attractive must be reckoned with.
(29) For her maintenance.
(30) This is the view of R. Simeon (v. Gemara infra).
(31) Lit., 'times'.
(32) Before the last instalment is sold.
(33) Such insertion being in certain cases advantageous for the woman (as explained supra 96b).
(34) According to which a widow who sold even only part of her kethubah may not sell of her husband's estate without the sanction of Beth din.
(35) Tosef. Keth. XI, supra 54a. If. however, she sold etc. a part of it only she is still entitled to maintenance. Cur. edd. insert here in parentheses, 'these are the words of R. Meir', a sentence which is wanting in the Tosefta. Rashi retains it.
(36) Tosef. Keth. XI; as she loses her maintenance she may not sell without the sanction of Beth din. Cf. supra n. 4 and Rashi on our Mishnah, s.v. לא תמכור. Rashal actually inserts in the text 'and the rest she may not sell except with the sanction of Beth din', a reading which was apparently wanting in Rashi's text as well as in cut. edd., but was known to the Tosafists (v. Tosaf. s.v. מכרה).
(37) The dispute between R. Simeon and the Rabbis according to which the former regards the absence of a part as the absence of the whole while the latter do not.
(38) Sc. of the kethubah. Lit., 'silver' with reference to Ex. XXII, 17.
(39) A High Priest.
(40) Lev. XXI, 13.
(41) A bogereth (v. Glos.).
(42) A High Priest.
(43) Yeb. 595. The absence of a part of her virginity not being regarded as the absence of all virginity. Thus it follows that, while R. Simeon does not regard the absence of a part as the absence of the whole, the Rabbis do, which is the reverse of their respective views here (v. p. 621, n. 7).
(44) In the Baraitha cited from Yeb.
(45) Not on the question whether a part legally equals the whole.
(48) Which excludes the one who is adolescent some of whose virginity is ended.
(49) בבתוליה (Lev. XXI, 13)
(50) Lit., 'yes'.
(51) Is she forbidden to a High Priest.
(52) The superfluous ב (='in') in בבתוליה implies intercourse in the place of virginity. Unnatural intercourse with a na'arah (v. Glos) whereby virginity is not affected, is consequently excluded.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 98a
'in her virginity'1 implies only one2 whose entire virginity is intact,3 irrespective of whether [previous intercourse with her was] of a natural or unnatural character.4 A certain woman5 once seized a silver cup on account of her kethubah6 and then claimed her maintenance. She appeared before Raba. He [thereupon] told the orphans, 'Proceed to provide for her maintenance; no one cares for the ruling of R. Simeon who laid down that we do not regard part of the amount as legally equal to the full amount.
Rabbah the son of Raba sent to R. Joseph [the following enquiry:] Is a woman7 who sells [of her deceased husband's estate] without [an authorization of] Beth din required to take an oath8 or is she not required to take an oath? - And [why, the other replied, do you not] enquire [as to whether] a public announcement9 [is required]? I have no need, the first retorted, to enquire concerning a public announcement because R. Zera has stated in the name of R. Nahman, 'If a widow assessed [her husband's estate] on her own behalf10 her act is invalid';11 now, how [is this statement] to be understood? If a public announcement9 has been made [the difficulty arises,] why is her act invalid? Must we not consequently assume that there was no public announcement, and [since it was stated that] Only [if the assessment was made] 'on her own behalf' is 'her act invalid' it follows, does it not, [that if she made it] on behalf of another12 her act is valid?13 - [No,] a public announcement may in fact have been made but [her act is nevertheless invalid] because she can be told, 'Who [authorized] you to make the assessment?'14 as was the case with a certain man with whom corals15 belonging to orphans had been deposited and he proceeded to assess them on his own behalf for four hundred ZUZ, and when later its price rose to six hundred zuz, he appeared before R. Ammi, who said to him, 'Who [authorized] you to make the assessment?'16 And the law is that she17 is required to take an oath,18 but there is no need to make a public announcement.19
MISHNAH.IF A WIDOW WHOSE KETHUBAH WAS FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ SOLD20 [A PLOT OF LAND THAT WAS] WORTH A MANEH21 FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ OR ONE THAT WAS WORTH TWO HUNDRED ZUZ FOR ONE MANEH, HER KETHUBAH IS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN THEREBY SETTLED.22 IF HER KETHUBAH, HOWEVER, WAS FOR ONE MANEH, AND SHE SOLD [LAND THAT WAS] WORTH A MANEH AND A DENAR' FOR ONE MANEH, HER SALE IS VOID. EVEN THOUGH SHE DECLARED, I WILL RETURN THE DENAR TO THE HEIRS' HER SALE IS VOID.23 R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL RULED: HER SALE22 IS ALWAYS VALID24 UNLESS THERE WAS25 [SO MUCH LAND] THERE AS WOULD HAVE ENABLED HER26 TO LEAVE27 FROM A FIELD AN AREA OF NINE KAB,28 AND FROM A GARDEN THAT OF HALF A KAB29 OR, ACCORDING TO R. AKIBA, A QUARTER OF A KAB.29 IF HER KETHUBAH WAS FOR FOUR HUNDRED ZUZ AND SHE SOLD [PLOTS OF LAND]30 TO [THREE] PERSONS, TO EACH FOR ONE MANEH,31 AND TO A FOURTH32 [SHE SOLD] WHAT WAS WORTH A MANE HAND A DENAR FOR ONE MANEH,33 [THE SALE] TO THE LAST PERSON IS VOID BUT [THE SALES] OF ALL THE OTHERS ARE VALID.
GEMARA. Wherein does [the sale of a plot of land] THAT WAS WORTH TWO HUNDRED ZUZ FOR ONE MANEH differ [from the previous case? Is it] because she34 might be told, 'You yourself have caused the loss'? [But, then, why should she not, where she SOLD A PLOT OF LAND THAT WAS] WORTH A MANEH FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ, also [be entitled to] say, 'It is I who have made the profit'?35 - R. Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha:
(1) Which includes one who is adolescent (Lev. XXI, 13).
(2) Being a na'arah (v. Glos.).
(3) Is permitted to be married by a High priest.
(4) Yeb. 595. She is forbidden even if it was unnatural. Her virginity must he completely intact. Cf. supra note 11. Thus it has been shewn that the dispute between R. Simeon and the Rabbis (sc. R. Meir) has no bearing on the legal relationship between the part and the whole (cf. supra note 4). but on the method of interpreting certain Scriptural texts.
(5) A widow.
(6) The amount of which exceeded the value of the cup.
(7) A widow.
(8) That she did not collect more than her due.
(9) Of the intended sale of the estate, as is the procedure where the sale is ordered by the court.
(10) And seized it for her kethubah.
(11) Lit., 'she did nothing'; the orphans may at any time reclaim that land and refund her the amount of her kethubah.
(12) I.e., she sold the estate for her kethubah to a third party.
(13) Lit., 'what she did she did'; which shews that no public announcement is required in the case of the sale under discussion.
(14) As neither the court nor the orphans had given her any such authorization the estate must remain in the legal possession of the orphans. If, however, she sells to other people her act is valid since she is fully authorized to do so.
(15) כסיתא (so Rashi). Cur. edd., כיסתא fodder'. MS. M. כסותא 'garment'.
(16) Cf. supra n. 8 mutatis mutandis.
(17) A woman in the circumstances spoken of 10 Rabbah's enquiry supra.
(18) V. supra note 2.
(19) Cf. n. 3. [This implies that the assessment must nevertheless be made in the presence of an expert valuer (Trani)].
(20) From her deceased husband's estate.
(21) V. Glos.
(22) Because she is to blame for the loss incurred.
(23) Since she had no right to sell a part of the land (representing the value of the denar) her entire sale is deemed to have been made in error and is. therefore, void.
(24) Even if the land she sold was worth more than the amount of her kethubah; because she can refund the balance to the orphans.
(25) Lit., 'shall be'.
(26) If she had not sold for more than her due. Lit. , 'sufficient', 'as much as'.
(27) Exclusive or inclusive of the land she sold over and above the area representing the value of the amount that was due to her.
(28) Sc. in which such a quantity of seed could be sown. An area of that size represents the minimum of land that can be profitably cultivated. By leaving a lesser area the woman is causing undue loss to the orphans. and her sale must consequently be annulled. If the lesser area, however, would have remained even if she had sold what was her due, her sale is valid since the orphans could not in any case have made profitable use of the residue.
(29) The minimum area that can be profitably laid out as a garden. Cf. supra n. 9 mutatis mutandis.
(30) From her deceased husband's estate.
(31) Lit., 'to this for a maneh and to this for a maneh'.
(32) Lit., 'last'.
(33) So that in the last sale she disposed of more than her due.
(34) The widow who effected the sale.
(35) And so have a claim to another maneh.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 98b
Rabbi1 has taught here2 that all [profits3 belong] to the owner of the money.4 As it was taught,5 'If one unit6 was added to [the purchases made by an agent] all [the profit belongs] to the agent'; so R. Judah, but R. Jose ruled,, '[The profit] is to be divided',7 [and, in reply to the objection,] But, surely, it was taught that R. Jose ruled, All [profit belongs] to the owner of the money! Rami b. Hama replied: This is no difficulty for the former refers to an object that has a fixed value8 while the latter refers to one that has no fixed9 value.10 R. Papa stated: The law is that11 [the profit made by the agent on] an object that had a fixed value must be divided,7 but if on an object that had no fixed value all [profit belongs] to the owner of the money. What does he12 teach us?13 - That the reply that was given14 is the proper one.15 The question was raised: What [is the law where a man] said to his agent,16 'Sell for me a lethek'17 and the latter presumed18 to sell a kor.19 [Is the agent deemed to be merely] adding to the owner's instructions and [the buyer, therefore,] acquires possession of a lethek, at all events, or is he rather transgressing his instructions and [the buyer, therefore,] acquires no possession of a lethek either? - Said R. Jacob of Nehar Pekod20 in the name of Rabina, Come and hear: If a householder said to his agent, 'Serve a piece [of meat]21 to the guests', and the latter said to them, 'Take two',22 and they took three,22 all of them are guilty23 of trespass.24 Now if you agree [that the agent]25 was merely adding to the host's instruction one can well understand the reason why the householder is guilty of trespass. If you should maintain, however, [that the agent]25 was transgressing his instruction [the objection could well be advanced:] Why should the householder be guilty of trespass? Have we not In fact learned: If an agent performed his mission it is the householder who is guilty of trespass but if he did not perform his mission it is the agent who is guilty of trespass?26 - Here we may be dealing with a case where the agent said to the guests, 'Take one at the desire27 of the householder28 and one at my own request's27 and they took three.
Come and hear: IF HER KETHUBAH, HOWEVER, WAS FOR A MANEH, AND SHE SOLD [LAND THAT WAS] WORTH A MANEH AND A DENAR FOR A MANEH, HER SALE IS VOID. Does29 not [this mean] that SHE SOLD [LAND THAT WAS] WORTH A MANEH AND A DENAR FOR A MANE band a denar,30 and that by29 [the expression,] 'FOR A MANEH' the maneh that was due to her [is meant], and by29 EVEN31 [one is to understand] EVEN THOUGH SHE DECLARED, I WILL RETURN THE DENAR TO THE HEIRS [by repurchasing for them] land of the value of a denar'? And was it not nevertheless stated, HER SALE IS VOID?32 - No,33 retorted R. Huna the son of R. Nathan, [this is a case] where [she sold] at the lower price.34
(1) R. Judah I, the Patriarch, compiler of the Mishnah c. 200 C.E.
(2) In our Mishnah.
(3) Made by an agent.
(4) Since the widow was merely acting as the agent of the orphans, who are the owners, she cannot lay any claim to the profit she made.
(5) V. infra, o. 12.
(6) Lit., 'one more'.
(7) Between agent and owner; v. Tosef. Dem, VIII.
(8) And, since it is not certain in whose favour the additional unit was given away by the seller, its value must be equally divided between the agent and the owner of the money.
(9) So that the additional unit cannot be regarded as a gift, but as a part of the purchase, payment for which was made with the money of the owner. Hence it is the latter only who is entitled to the added unit.
(10) Thus it has been shewn that our Mishnah which deals with land (something that has no fixed value) and assigns the profits to the original owner (the orphans) is in agreement with the view of R. Jose.
(11) הלכתא so cur. edd. and R. Han. MS.M. and a reading approved by Tosaf. (s.v. אמר) is הלכך 'therefore'.
(12) R. Papa.
(13) By his statement which is only a repetition of what has just been laid down. This question seems to imply the reading of הלכך (v. supra n. 13) rather than that of הלכתא, (Tosaf.).
(14) By Rami b. Hama.
(15) Lit., 'that which we replied is a reply'.
(16) Lit., 'to him'.
(17) Sc. a plot of land in which a lethek ( half a kor) of grain may be sown.
(18) Lit., 'and went'.
(19) V. Glos.
(20) A town situated on the east of Nehardea.
(21) Which was subsequently found to have been consecrated food.
(23) The host in respect of the first, the agent in respect of the second and the guests 10 respect of the third.
(24) Me'il. 20a.
(25) Like the agent spoken of in the enquiry.
(26) Hag. 10b, Kid. 42b, Ned. 54a, Me'ii. 205. Consequently it must be concluded, must it not. that an agent in the circumstances mentioned is deemed to have added to, and not transgressed, his instructions?
(27) Lit., 'knowledge'.
(28) Thus performing his mission.
(29) Lit., 'what'.
(30) Sc. for its full price, so that no error was involved.
(31) Which, in view of the fact that the denar obviously belongs to the orphans, is apparently meaningless.
(32) As the woman is in a position similar to that of the agent spoken of in the enquiry it follows that as her sale is void so is that of the agent.
(33) I.e., our Mishnah is not to be understood as suggested.
(34) Sc. for one maneh only; the error 10 the sale, not the excess of the land sold, being the reason for the invalidity of the sale. [Read with MS.M. and Tosaf. בדזילא instead of בדאויל in cur. edd.].
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 99a
But since the final clause1 [deals with a case] where [she sold] at a lower price, [would not] the earlier clause2 [naturally3 refer to one] where [she did] not [sell] at a lower price. for has [it not] been stated in the final clause, IF HER KETHUBAH WAS FOR FOUR HUNDRED ZUZ AND SHE SOLD [PLOTS OF AND] TO [THREE] PERSONS4 TO EACH FOR ONE MANEH, AND TO A FOURTH4 [SHE SOLD] WHAT WAS WORTH A MANE HAND A DENAR FOR ONE MANEH, [THE SALE] TO THE LAST PERSON IS VOID BUT [THE SALES] OF ALL THE OTHERS ARE VALID?5 - No, both the earlier and the final clause [refer to a sale] at a lower price, but6 it is this that we were informed in the final clause: The reason [why her sale is void is] because [she sold]7 at a lower price [the property] that belonged to the orphans,8 but [if that9 had been done] with her own,10 her sale is valid.11 But is not this already inferred from the first clause: WHOSE KETHUBAH WAS FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ SOLD [A PLOT OF LAND THAT WAS] WORTH A MANEH FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ OR ONE THAT WAS WORTH TWO HUNDRED ZUZ FOR ONE MANEH, HER KETHUBAH IS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN THEREBY SETTLED?12 - It might have been assumed [that the ruling13 was applicable] there Only because [by her one act] she completely severed her connection with that house,14 but that here15 [the sale for] the first maneh [should be deemed invalid] as a preventive measure against [the assumption of the validity of the sale for the] last maneh,' hence we were informed [that the law was not so].
Some there are who say: You have no need to ask [for a ruling] where [a man said to his agent,] 'Go and sell for me a lethek'16 and [the latter] sold for him a kor, since [in this case the agent] was undoubtedly adding to his instructions.17 The question, however, arises as to what is the ruling where the man said to the agent, 'Go and sell for me a kor' and he sold for him Only one lethek.16 Do we [in such a case] lay down that [the agent] might tell the man, 'I have done for you that which is more advantageous to you, for [had I sold the full kor, and] you were no longer in need of money you could not have retracted',18 or is it rather [held that the owner] might retort to him, 'It is no satisfaction to me that many deeds [should be held] against me'? - R. Hanina of Sura19 replied, Come and hear: If one man gave to another a gold denar20 and told him, 'Bring me a shirt', and the other brought him a shirt for three sela's and a cloak for three sela's, both are guilty of trespass.21 Now if you admit that an agent in similar circumstances22 has performed his mission and was only adding to his instructions, one can well see why the owner23 is guilty of trespass.24 If, however, you should maintain that [the agent in such circumstances] was transgressing his instructions, why should [the owner] be guilty of trespass?25 - Here we are dealing with a case where [the agent] brought him [a shirt that was] worth six sela's for three.26 If so27 why should the agent be guilty of trespass? - On account of the cloak.28 But if that were so,29 read the final clause: R. Judah ruled, Even in this case29 the owner is not guilty of trespass because he might say [to the agent,] 'I wanted a big shirt and you brought me one that is small and bad'!30 - 'Bad' means31 'bad in respect of the price', for32 [the owner can] tell him, 'Had you brought me one for six sela's [my gain would have been] even greater since it would have been worth twelve sela's.'33 This34 may also be proved by an inference. For it was stated:35 R. Judah admits [that if the transaction was] in pulse both36 are guilty of trespass
(1) Of our Mishnah.
(2) The clause just cited.
(3) Since two clauses are not necessary to lay down the same principle.
(4) V. our Mishnah for notes.
(5) An objection against R. Huna the son of R. Nathan (cf. supra n' 9).
(6) As to the objection (v. supra n. 9).
(7) To the fourth person.
(8) Sc. land that exceeded the amount that was due to her.
(9) The sale of land of the value of a maneh and a denar for one maneh only.
(10) I.e., when she was selling to the first three persons. and when the extra land for the denar was still hers.
(11) Because the law of overreaching is inapplicable to landed property even where the error amounted to as much as a sixth of the value; much less when it is no more than one hundredth.
(12) Which shews that where the additional land sold constituted a part of the woman's due, her sale is valid. Cf. supra p. 627, n. 11.
(13) That the sale is valid when the land belongs to the woman,
(14) In such a case naturally no preventive measures are called for.
(15) The case in the final clause.
(16) V. supra p. 626, n. 2.
(17) And the buyer is consequently entitled to the possession at least of the lethek (cf. supra 98b).
(18) The sale consequently should be valid.
(19) Cf. supra p. 383, n. 7.
(20) Rashi: The gold denar twenty-five silver denarii, or six sela's (cf. B.M. 44b). [Rashi probably means approximately six sela's, since one sela' four denarii, or the extra denar may be surcharge as agio. v, Strashun].
(21) If the denar was found to have belonged to the sanctuary. Me'il. 21a.
(22) Selling one lethek where the instruction was to sell two (a kor) is similar to spending on an object three sela's where the instruction was to spend on it six (a gold denar).
(23) Lit., 'master of the house', sc. the man who gave the denar to the agent.
(24) He is responsible for the offence since his wish had been carried out.
(25) Consequently it must be inferred that the agent spoken of 10 the enquiry has performed his mission (cf. supra p. 628, n. 6).
(26) Cf. supra note 4.
(27) That the agent carried out the sender's instructions.
(28) Which he bought entirely on his own responsibility.
(29) That the agent bought for three sela's an article that was actually worth six,
(30) Me'il, loc. cit. If the reply given (cf. supra n. 9) is to be accepted R. Judah's statement is apparently meaningless.
(31) Lit., 'what'.
(32) Despite the fact that the shirt bought was actually worth six sela's.
(33) The higher the price the higher in proportion is the profit. Aliter: One who pays a higher price is allowed a greater discount (cf. Rashi s.v. דא ל, and Tosaf. s,v. כל a.I.).
(34) That by 'bad' R. Judah meant 'bad in respect of the price', that the shirt bought for three sela's was actually worth six, and that the reason why the owner is not guilty of trespass is because his wish to have the advantage of the bigger purchase had not been carried out.
(35) Tosef. Me'il, II.
(36) The owner and the agent.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 99b
because [the quantity of] pulse for a sela' [is in exactly the same proportion as] that for one perutah.1 This is conclusive. How is this2 to be understood? If it be suggested [that it refers] to a place where [pulse] is sold by conjectural estimate, does not one [it may be objected] who pays a sela' obtain the commodity at a much cheaper rate?3 - R. Papa replied: [It refers] to a place where each kanna4 is sold5 for one perutah.6 Come and hear: IF HER KETHUBAH WAS FOR FOUR HUNDRED ZUZ AND SHE SOLD [PLOTS OF LAND] TO [THREE] PERSONS7 TO EACH FOR ONE MANEH, AND TO A FOURTH7 [SHE SOLD] WHAT WAS WORTH A MANEH AND A DEN AR FOR ONE MANEH [THE SALE] TO THE LAST PERSON IS VOID BUT [THE SALES] OF ALL THE OTHERS ARE VALID!8 - [This9 is no proof, for] as R. Shisha the son of R. Idi replied10 [that the final clause of our Mishnah deals] with small plots of land,11 [so it may] in this discussion12 also [be argued that the clause cited deals] with small plots of land.13 It is obvious [that if a man] instructed [his agent to sell a plot of land] to one person but not to two persons [and he sold it to two' the sale is invalid14 for] he distinctly told him, 'To one person but not to two persons'.15 What, [however, is the ruling where] he gave instructions [that the sale shall be made] to one person without mentioning any further limitation?16 R. Huna ruled: 'To one person' implies 'but not to two'.17 Both R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna, however, ruled: 'To one person'18 may mean even to two;19 'to one', may mean16 even to a hundred.19 R. Nahman once happened to be at Sura20 when R. Hisda and Rabbah b. R. Huna came to visit him. 'What [is the ruling], they asked him, in such a case?'21 - To one', he replied, [may mean] even to two, 'to one' may mean even to a hundred. '[Are the sales valid,]' they asked him, 'even where the agent made an error?'22 - 'I do not speak', he replied, 'of a case where the agent had made an error'. 'But did not a Master', they asked again, 'say [that the law of] overreaching does not apply to landed property'?23 This24 applies only where the owner made the error; but where the agent has made the error [the owner] might tell him, 'I sent you to improve my position but not to impair it'.25 Whence, however, is it inferred that a distinction may be drawn between the agent and the owner? - [From] what we have learned, 'If a man tells his agent, "Go and give terumah", the latter must give sold no more than a lethek. The validity of the sales of the former is consequently no criterion for the "validity of the sales of the agent in question. the terumah in accordance with the disposition of the owner,26 and if he does not know the owner's disposition, he should give the terumah in a moderate manner, viz., one fiftieth.27 If he reduced [the denominator by] ten28 or added ten to it29 his terumah is nevertheless valid',s while in respect of an owner26 it was taught: If, when setting apart terumah, there came up in his hand even so much as one twentieth30 his terumah is valid.31 Come and hear: IF HER KETHUBAH WAS FOR FOUR HUNDRED ZUZ AND SHE SOLD [PLOTS OF LAND] TO [THREE] PERSONS32 TO EACH FOR ONE MANEH, AND TO A FOURTH32 [SHE SOLD] WHAT WAS WORTH A MANEH AND A DENAR FOR ONE MANEH, [THE SALE] TO THE LAST PERSON IS VOID BUT [THE SALES] OF ALL OTHERS ARE VALID.33 R. Shisha the son of R. Ishi replied: [This clause deals] with small plots of land.34
MISHNAH. IF AN ASSESSMENT OF THE JUDGES35 WAS BY ONE SIXTH LESS, OR BY ONE SIXTH MORE [THAN THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY]. THEIR SALE IS VOID. R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL RULED: THEIR SALE IS VALID FOR, OTHERWISE,36 OF WHAT ADVANTAGE WOULD THE POWER OF A COURT BE? IF A BILL FOR INSPECTION,37 HOWEVER, HAS BEEN DRAWN UP, THEIR SALE IS VALID EVEN IF THEY SOLD FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ38 WHAT WAS WORTH ONE MANEH,38 OR FOR ONE MANEH WHAT WAS WORTH TWO HUNDRED ZUZ.
GEMARA. The question was asked: What is the legal status of39 an agent?40 -
(1) The smallest coin. No advantage is gained10 making a bigger purchase. The owner's wish 10 this case, unlike that of the shirt (cf. supra p. 629, n. 13) may consequently be regarded as having been carried out. Thus it has been shewn that the reason why R. Judah exempts the owner in the case of the shirt is the one indicated. (Cf. p. 629.0. 14).
(2) The transaction10 pulse.
(3) Than one who buys for a perutah only. The more the amount spent by the buyer the more generous the conjectural estimate of the seller How then could it be said (cf. supra n. 1) that no advantage is gained from the purchase of a larger quantity?
(4) כנא (cf. ) a small measure of capacity.
(5) Lit., 'measured'.
(6) V . Glos. ; no advantage, therefore, is gained from the purchase of larger quantities. Read with MS.M. דכײלי כנא כנא בפרוטה Cur edd., 'where they measure with kannai (pl. of kanna) so that he tells him. Each kanna for a perutah'.
(7) V. our Mishnah for notes.
(8) Though at the time she sold to each of the first three persons she was in fact authorized (or entitled) to sell much more. As these sales of the woman (which are analogous to an agent's sale of a lethek when his instructions were to sell as much as a kor) are valid, so one would expect the sale of the agent to be valid, and a reply is thus obtained to the enquiry supra 995.
(9) Cf. supra note 8.
(11) Detached from one another.
(12) L1t., 'here'.
(13) Cf. supra n. 11. In such circumstances the woman was never expected (entitled or authorized) to sell for all the four hundred zuz to one person at one and the same time. By selling the small plots each for a price not higher than one maneh she is in a different legal position from that of the agent who,10 fact, was expected to sell a full kor while he actually
(14) Even if the sale of a lethek, where the instructions were to sell a kor, were to be ruled as being valid.
(15) Thus clearly expressing his objection to be responsible for more than one deed of sale.
(16) Are the agent's sales to two persons. in such circumstances, valid or not?
(17) The sales, therefore, are invalid.
(18) Unless some definite form of restriction has been expressed.
(19) The sales to them are consequently valid. The mention of one person only is regarded as the usual manner of speech, which is not intended to exclude any larger number of persons.
(20) V. supra p. 383, n. 7'
(21) As the one just discussed.
(22) By accepting a lower price.
(23) V. Mishnah B.M. 56a, why then should the agent's error cause the invalidity of the sale? [Var. lec., 'But did the Master not say etc.',the reference being to R. Nahman's ruling reported B.M. 108a, v. Tosaf. s.v. הכי].
(24) The law just quoted.
(25) Hence the invalidity of the sale.
(26) Lit., 'master of the house'.
(27) Of the produce.
(28) Sc. one fortieth of the whole, which is the quantity of terumah given by men of a liberal disposition (v. Ter. IV, 3).
(29) A sixtieth, which is the measure given by one who is of a mean disposition (v. loc, cit.).
(30) Ter. IV 4; but if his error was greater his terumah is invalid.
(31) Which proves conclusively that a distinction is made between an error made by an owner and one made by his agent.
(32) V. our Mishnah for notes.
(33) Though the multiplicity of sales and inevitable deeds might be objected to' if not by the orphans themselves, by Beth din. Since, however, no such objection is admitted in this case, the same ruling should apply to the case discussed in the enquiry supra 99a.
(34) That were detached from one another, so that it was impracticable to sell them all to one person. Hence the validity of the sales. Where one plot of land, however, is concerned, the owner might well object to have the responsibility of a multiplicity of deeds.
(35) Of a deceased husband's estate which was sold to pay the kethubah of his widow.
(36) Lit., 'if so'.
(37) אגרת) אגרת בקורת= letter', 'bill'; בקורת from rt. בקר, 'to examine' 'inspect'), a legal document, issued by a court, inviting the public to inspect property put up by an order of the court for sale.
(38) V. Glos.
(39) Lit. 'like whom'.
(40) Who made a mistake in the sale he was instructed to effect.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 100a
Raba in the name of R. Nahman replied: An agent [has the same status] as judges,1 but R. Samuel b. Bisna replied in the name of R. Nahman: As a widow.2 'Raba in the name of R. Nahman replied: An agent [has the same status] as judges', for as judges do not act in their [personal interests] so does an agent not act in his [personal interests], thus excluding a widow who acts in her [own personal interests]. 'R. Samuel b. Bisna replied in the name of R. Nahman: As a widow', for as the widow is a single individual so is an agent a single individual; thus excluding members of a court, who are many. - And the law is that an agent [has the same legal status] as a widow. But why [should this case be] different from that concerning which we learned: If a man tells his agent, 'Go and give terumah' the latter must give the terumah in accordance with the disposition of the owner, and if he does not know the owner's disposition, he should separate terumah in a moderate manner, viz. one fiftieth. If he reduced [the denominator by] ten or added ten to it his terumah is, nevertheless, valid?3 - There4 [the circumstances are different], for, since someone might give his terumah in a niggardly manner while some other might give it liberally, [the agent]5 might tell the owner, 'I deemed6 you to be of such [a disposition]';7 but here, since it was clearly an error, [the owner] might well say, 'You should have made no error'.8
R. Huna b. Hanina stated in the name of R. Nahman: The halachah is in agreement with the ruling of the Sages.9 [Can it be said,] however, that R. Nahman does not hold [that the act of a court is invariably valid since, otherwise,] of what advantage would the power of a court be,10 when R. Nahman, in fact, ruled in the name of Samuel:11 If orphans came to take their shares in their father's estate, the court must appoint for [each of] them a guardian and [these guardians] choose for [each of] them a proper share, and when [the orphans] grow up they may enter a protest [against the settlement]; but R. Nahman in his own name, laid down: Even when they grow up they may enter no protest since, otherwise, of what advantage would the power of a court be? - This is no difficulty, the former12 [referring to a case] where the guardians made a mistake while the latter13 [deals with one] where no error was made. If no error was made, on what grounds could [the orphans] enter their protest? - On that of the adjacent fields.14
When R. Dimi came15 he stated: It once happened that Rabbi16 acted in agreement with the ruling of the Sages9 when Perata, the son of R. Eleazar b. Perata, grandson of R. Perata the Great, asked him, 'If so, of what advantage would the power of a court be?'10 And [as a result] Rabbi reversed his decision. Thus it was taught by R. Dimi. R. Safra, however, taught as follows: It once happened that Rabbi16 desired to act in agreement with the ruling of the Sages,9 when Perata, the son of R. Eleazar b. Perata, grandson of R. Perata the Great, said to him, 'If so, of what advantage is the power of a court?' And17 [as a result] Rabbi did not act as he intended.18 Must it be assumed that they19 differ on this principle: One master20 holds the view that if [in giving a decision] a law cited in a Mishnah21 has been overlooked the decision must be reversed, and the other Master22 upholds the view23 that it cannot be reversed?24 - No; all19 agree that if [in giving a decision] a law cited in a Mishnah has been overlooked the decision must be reversed, but one Master holds that the incident occurred in one way25 while the other holds that it occurred in the other way.25
R. Joseph stated: If a widow sold [any of her deceased husband's estate]26 the responsibility for the indemnity falls upon the orphans,27 and if the court sold [any such property]28 the responsibility for the indemnity again falls upon the orphans.29 [Is not this ruling] obvious?30 - It was not necessary [indeed in respect of] the widow,30 but was required [in respect of] the court; for it might have been assumed
(1) The sale is valid if the error did not amount to a sixth (v. our Mishnah).
(2) The slightest error renders the sale invalid (cf. the Mishnah supra 98a.)
(3) Ter. IV, 4 and supra 99b q.v. for notes. This then shews, contrary to what was laid down above as law (cf. supra n. 5)' that a slight error does not render an agent's act invalid.
(4) In the case of an agent giving terumah for the owner.
(5) Who gave more, or less, than the owner was inclined to give.
(6) Lit., 'estimated'.
(7) Niggardly or liberal as the case might be.
(8) Hence the invalidity of the sale however slight the error may have been.
(9) The first mentioned ruling in our Mishnah.
(10) I.e., the view of R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL.
(11) V. Kid. Sonc. ed. p. 210, notes.
(12) Lit., 'that', R. Nahman's ruling in the name of Samuel (cf. supra n. 2).
(13) R. Nahman's ruling in his own name (cf. supra, n. 3)'
(14) Lit., 'on (the ground of) the sides', sc. the unsatisfactory situation of their allotted fields owing to their distance from other fields which they already possessed.
(15) From Palestine to Babylon.
(16) R. Judah I, the Patriarch, compiler of the Mishnah.
(17) So MS.M. (wanting in cur. edd.).
(18) Lit., 'the act'.
(19) R. Dimi and R. Safra.
(20) R. Dimi.
(21) Sc. that of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, which, unlike that of the first Tanna, is also supported by a reason.
(22) R. Safra.
(23) Which is, however, most unlikely.
(24) Had then Rabbi acted in agreement with the Sages' ruling, he would not have been able to reverse his decision.
(25) Lit., 'thus'.
(26) To reimburse herself for her maintenance or kethubah, guaranteeing indemnity to the buyer.
(27) Because they are responsible for the widow's kethubah and maintenance, and she, in selling the estate, was merely acting as their agent.
(28) For the maintenance of a widow or daughter. Cf. also supra n. 10 mutatis mutandis.
(29) Cf. supra n. 10 mutatis mutandis and 97a.
(30) Cf supra n. 11.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 100b
that whoever buys from the court does so in order that he may have the benefit of a public announcement,1 hence we were informed [that the responsibility for the indemnity still remains upon the orphans].
R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL RULED etc. To what limit [of error]?2 - R. Huna b. Judah replied in the name of R. Shesheth: To a half.3 So it was also taught: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled, If the court sold for one maneh what was worth two hundred zuz, or for two hundred zuz what was worth one maneh, their sale is valid. Amemar laid down in the name of R. Joseph: A court that sold [one's estate] without a [previous] public announcement are deemed4 to have overlooked a law cited in a Mishnah and [their decision]5 must be reversed. [You say] 'Are deemed'?4 since
Have they not in actual fact overlooked one,' we learned:6 The assessment [of the property] of the orphans7 [must be accompanied by a public announcement for a period of] thirty days, and the assessment of consecrated land8 [for a period of] sixty days; and the announcement must be made both in the morning and in the evening?9 - If [the ruling10 were to be derived] from that [Mishnah alone] it might be presumed that it applied only to an agent11 but not to a court; hence we were taught10 [that the law applied to a court also].
R. Ashi raised an objection against Amemar: IF AN ASSESSMENT OF JUDGES WAS BY ONE SIXTH LESS, OR ONE SIXTH MORE [THAN THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY], THEIR SALE IS VOID, but [it follows] if it corresponded to the actual worth of the land12 their sale is valid. Does not this13 [apply even to a case] where no public announcement was made?14 - No; [it applies only to one] where an announcement was made. But since the final clause [refers to a case] where an announcement was made [must not] the first clause15 [refer to one] where no announcement was made; for in the final clause it was taught: IF A BILL FOR INSPECTION,16 HOWEVER, HAS BEEN DRAWN UP, THEIR SALE IS VALID EVEN IF THEY SOLD FOR TWO HUNDRED ZUZ WHAT WAS WORTH ONE MANEH, OR FOR ONE MANEH WHAT WAS WORTH TWO HUNDRED ZUZ ?17 - The fact indeed is [that the first clause refers to a case] where no announcement was made, and [yet18 there is] no difficulty, for one ruling19 refers to objects concerning which public announcements must be made, while the other20 refers to objects concerning which no public announcements are made, such as21 slaves, movables and deeds.
(What is the reason [why no announcement is made in the case of] slaves? - [Because if one were made] they might hear It and escape. Movables and deeds? - Because they might be stolen.) If you wish I might reply:22 One ruling23 refers to a time when an announcement is made while the others refers to a time when no announcement is made, the Nehardeans having laid down that for poll-tax,24 maintenance25 and funeral expenses [an estate]26 is sold without a public announcement.27 And if you prefer I might reply:22 One ruling23 applies to a place where announcements are made while the other20 applies to one where no announcements are made, R. Nahman having stated: Never was a bill for inspection28 drawn up at Nehardea.29 From this [statement]30 one implied that [the reason31 was] because they32 were experts in assessments; but R. Joseph b. Minyomi stated: It was explained to me by R. Nahman [that the reason is] because they33 were nicknamed 'consumers of publicly auctioned estates',34
Rab Judah ruled in the name of Samuel: Orphans' movables must be assessed35 and sold forthwith.36 R. Hisda ruled in the name of Abimi: They are to be sold37 in the markets.38 There is, however, no difference of opinion between them.39 One speaks of a place40 in the proximity of a market ,41 while the other deals with one40 from which the market is far.42
R. Kahana had in his possession some beer that belonged to the orphan R. Mesharsheya b. Hilkai. He kept it until the festival,43 saying, 'Though it might deteriorate,44 it will have a quick sale.'45
Rabina had In his possession some wine belonging to the orphan Rabina the Little, his sister's son, and he had also some wine of his own which he was about to take up to Sikara.46 When he came to R. Ashi and asked him, 'May I carry [the orphan's wine] with my own'47 the other told him, 'You may go; it is not superior to your own.
MISHNAH. [A MINOR] WHO EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF MI'UN,48 A FORBIDDEN RELATIVE OF THE SECOND DEGREE,49 OR A WOMAN WHO IS INCAPABLE OF PROCREATION IS NOT ENTITLED EITHER TO A KETHUBAH50 OR TO THE BENEFITS51 [OF HER MELOG48 PROPERTY]52 OR TO MAINTENANCE,53 OR TO HER WORN OUT ARTICLES.54 IF THE MAN, HOWEVER, HAD MARRIED HER AT THE OUTSET ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT SHE WAS INCAPABLE OF PROCREATION SHE IS ENTITLED TO A KETHUBAH. A WIDOW WHO WAS MARRIED TO A HIGH PRIEST,55 A DIVORCED WOMAN OR A HALUZAH48 WHO WAS MARRIED TO A COMMON PRIEST,56 A BASTARD OR A NETHINAH48 WHO WAS MARRIED TO AN ISRAELITE. OR THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WHO WAS MARRIED TO A NATHIN,48 OR A BASTARD IS ENTITLED TO A KETHUBAH.57
GEMARA. Rab taught: A minor who is released by means of a letter of divorce is not entitled to a kethubah58 and, much less so, [a minor] who exercises the right of mi'un48 Samuel taught: [A minor] who exercises the right of mi'un48 is not entitled to a kethubah,59 but a minor who is released by a letter of divorce is entitled to her kethubah.60 Samuel61 follows his [previously expressed] principle; for he laid down: [A minor] who exercises the right of mi'un62 is not entitled to a kethubah63 but a minor who is released by a letter of divorce is entitled to her kethubah,'64 [a minor] who exercises the right of mi'un62 is not [through this act] disqualified from marrying the brothers [of her husband],65 nor is she thereby disqualified from marrying a priest,66 but [a minor who] is released by a letter of divorce is [through this act] disqualified from marrying the brothers [of her husband]67 and also from marrying a priest;68 [a minor] who exercises the right of mi'un need not wait three months69
(1) Lit.,'it is with the intent that a voice may be brought out for him that he buys'. Since any sale by a court must be preceded by a public announcement. it is conceivable that if any person had a claim upon the land in question he would advance it as soon as the announcement had been made. A buyer who is presumably aware of these considerations might. therefore, be assumed to feel so secure in his purchase as to surrender his guarantee for indemnity. [Aliter: Whoever buys from the Beth din buys for the purpose that he might gain publicity as a man of means, without necessarily expecting any guarantee of indemnification; Strashun].
(2) Is the sale valid.
(3) Of the actual value.
(4) Lit., 'are made'.
(5) Unlike an erroneous decision that does not conflict with a Mishnah, which remains in force and compensation is paid by the court.
(6) In a Mishnah.
(7) That is put up for sale to meet the claims of their father's widow or daughters.
(8) Sold by the Temple treasurer.
(9) 'Ar. 21b.
(10) Laid down by Amemar in the name of R. Joseph.
(11) Who sells orphans' property.
(12) Lit., 'worth for worth', or 'equal for equal'.
(13) The implied ruling that the sale is valid.
(14) Is this then an objection against Amemar?
(15) Since two adjacent clauses would not repeat the same law.
(16) Which involves. of course, a public announcement (v. supra p. 632, n. 12).
(17) Is this then an objection against Amemar?
(18) Despite the deduction which is apparently in contradiction to Amemar's ruling.
(19) Lit., 'here', the ruling of Amemar.
(20) The first clause of our Mishnah.
(21) Lit., 'and these are objects concerning which no public announcement is made'.
(22) To the objection against Amemar that was raised supra.
(23) Lit., 'here', the ruling of Amemar.
(24) On behalf of orphans.
(25) Of one's widow or daughters.
(26) Of a deceased, inherited by his orphans.
(27) Since in all these cases money is urgently needed no time can be spared for the usual public announcement that must precede other sales ordered by a court; v. supra 8a.
(28) Cf. supra p. 632, n. 12.
(29) Cf. supra p. 222, n. 8.
(30) Of R. Nahman.
(31) For dispensing with a bill of inspection at Nehardea.
(32) The Nehardeans.
(33) Who bought orphans' estates that were offered for sale after a public announcement.
(34) A description of contempt. At such enforced sales the buyers usually made exorbitant profits at the expense of the helpless orphans.
(35) Immediately on their father's death.
(36) In order to prevent their deterioration.
(37) [Read with MS. M.: They are taken to the markets, מוליכין]
(38) Or 'on market days' (cf. Rashi, s.v. דמקרב).
(39) Rab Judah and R. Hisda.
(40) L1t., 'that'.
(41) Aliter: A time when market day is near (cf. Rashi loc. cit.).
(42) Aliter. 'When market day is a long way of' (cf. I.e.).
(43) Though beer must be classed as movables.
(44) איצצתא. 'depreciation in the market' or 'deterioration of quality' (cf Jast.) Aliter: 'Though it might become sour', (cf. Rashi).
(45) Lit., 'will bring quick money', I.e , there will be no need to sell on credit. Cash sales, though at a comparatively small price, are preferable to sales on credit that might command a higher price.
(46) [A town on the Tigris near Mahuza. Obermeyer. p. 186].
(47) Sc. may a trustee undertake the risk of sea transport [The wine could be taken from Matha Mehasia (Sura) the home of Rabina to Sikara, either overland or by boat. The former journey, though shorter, was the more expensive and involved greater risk of breakage to the earthenware barrels in which the wine was transported, v. Obermeyer, p. 188ff.]
(48) V. Glos.
(49) Who is forbidden by Rabbinic, though not by Pentateuchal, law (cf. Yeb. 21a).
(50) Cf. Yeb. 113a, B.M. 67a; the first mentioned because her separation may be affected even against her husband's will, the second was penalized for contracting an unlawful marriage (cf. Yeb. 85b) while in the case of the last her marriage is regarded as a contract under false pretences.
(51) Lit., 'fruit'. Aliter: Usufruct.
(52) Sc. her husband is under no obligation to pay her ransom if she is taken captive, though in the case of a legal and normal marriage a husband must assume such obligation (in return for the usufruct of his wife's melog property). As this woman is not entitled to a kethubah she is also deprived of the right to be ransomed which is one of the terms of a kethubah. Aliter; Her husband need not refund the usufruct,
(53) Cf. supra note 5 mutatis mutandis. The limitations of this ruling are dealt with infra 107b.
(54) The articles which she brought to her husband on marriage and the value of which was included in her kethubah. If her husband has used these articles he need not compensate her for their wear or loss when she leaves him.
(55) V. Lev. XXI, 13.
(56) V. ibid. 7.
(57) Yeb. 84a.
(58) Since the marriage of a minor, n his opinion, has no validity and her status is that of one seduced,
(59) Cf. supra note 3.
(60) Because a divorce can be given with the husband's consent only.
(61) In his ruling just cited.
(62) V. Glos,
(63) Cf. supra p. 639, R. 3.
(64) V. p. 639, n. 13.
(65) V. p. 639, n. 11,
(66) Since she has not the status of a divorced woman, mi'un dissolving the union retrospectively.
(67) Because it is forbidden to marry a woman whom ones brother had divorced.
(68) V, Lev. XXI, 7'
(69) After mi'un, before contracting a second marriage, though such a period must be allowed to pass in the case of any other divorced woman or widow. Cf. supra n' 5.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 101a
but [a minor who] was released by a letter of divorce must wait three months.1 What does he2 teach us when all these cases have already been taught:3 If [a minor] has exercised the right of mi'un against her husband he is permitted to marry her relatives4 and she is permitted to marry his relatives,4 and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest;5 but if he gave her a letter of divorce he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives and he also disqualifies her from marrying a priest?6 - He found it necessary [to restate these rulings in order to mention:] 'She must wait three months' which we did not learn.7
Must one assume [that they8 differ on the same principles] as the following Tannaim: R. Eliezer stated, There is no validity whatsoever in the act of a minor, and her husband is entitled neither to anything she finds,9 nor to the work of her hands,9 nor may he invalidate her vows;10 he is not her heir9 and he may not defile himself for her;11 this being the general rule: She is in no respect regarded as his wife, except that it is necessary for her to make a declaration of refusal;12 and R. Joshua stated, The act of a minor is valid, and her husband has the right to anything she finds13 and to the work of her hands,13 to invalidate her vows,14 to be her heir,13 and to defile himself for her;15 the general principle being that she is regarded as his wife in every respect, except that she may leave him12 by declaring her refusal against him?16 Must one then assume that Rab17 has laid down the same principle as that of R. Eliezer18 and that Samuel19 has laid down the same principle as that of R. Joshua?20 - There is no difference of opinion between them21 as to what was the view22 of R. Eliezer;23 they differ only in respect of the view22 of R. Joshua. Samuel [ruled] In agreement with R. Joshua; but Rab argued that24 R. Joshua maintained his view only there25 [where the benefits26 are transferred] from her to him27 but not [where the benefits28 are to be transferred] from him to her.29
OR TO HER WORN OUT ARTICLES. Said R. Huna b. Hiyya to R. Kahana: You have told us in the name of Samuel that this30 was taught only in respect of melog,31 but that to zon barzel31 property she is entitled. R. Papa, in considering this statement, raised the point: To which [class of women did Samuel refer]? If it be suggested: To [A MINOR] WHO EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF MI'UN [the difficulty would arise:] If [the articles] are still in existence she would be entitled to receive them in either case,32 and if they were no longer in existence she would in neither case32 be entitled to receive them.33 [Is the reference], then, to A WOMAN WHO IS INCAPABLE OF PROCREATION? [But here again, it may be objected:] If [the articles] were still in existence she would receive them in either case,32 and if they no longer existed [the ruling] should be reversed: She should receive melog property since [the capital] always remains in her legal possession34 but should not receive zon barzel property since [the capital] does not remain in her possession.35 [The fact,] however, [is that the reference is] to A FORBIDDEN RELATIVE OF THE SECOND DEGREE, in whose case36 the Rabbis have penalized the woman in respect of [what is due to her] from the man,37 and the man in respect of [what is due to him] from the woman.38 R. Shimi b. Ashi remarked: From R. Kahana's statement39 it may be inferred [that if a lawful wife] brought to her husband40 a cloak,41 the article is [to be treated as] capital and the man may not continue to wear it until it is worn out.42 But did not R. Nahman, however, rule that [a cloak must be treated as] produce?43 - He44 differs from R. Nahman. IS NOT ENTITLED [. . .] TO A KETHUBAH. Samuel stated: This was taught only in respect of the maneh45 and the two hundred zuz,'46 to the additional jointure,47 however, she48 is entitled. So it was also taught: The women concerning whom the Sages have ruled, 'They are not entitled to a kethubah' as, for instance, a minor who exercised the right of mi'un39 and the others enumerated in the same context,49 are not entitled to the maneh50 or to the two hundred zuz,51 but are entitled to their additional jointures; women, however, concerning whom the Sages have ruled, 'They may be divorced without [receiving their] kethubah' as, for instance, [a wife who] transgresses the [Mosaic] law, and others enumerated in the same context,52 are not entitled to their additional jointures47 and much less to [their statutory kethubahs of] a maneh50 or two hundred zuz;51 whilst a woman who is divorced on the ground of in repute53 takes only54 what is hers55 and departs. This56 provides support to R. Hunah who laid down: If she played the harlot [a wife] does not in consequence forfeit
(1) As any other woman (v. supra note 8).
(2) Samuel, in the statement cited.
(3) In a Mishnah.
(4) V. supra p. 639, n. 11.
(5) Cf. note 5'
(6) Yeb. 1085.
(7) in the Mishnah of Yeb. cited.
(8) Rab and Samuel.
(9) To which a lawful husband is entitled.
(10) Which is the privilege of a husband (cf. Num. XXX, 7ff).
(11) If he is a priest. Only a lawful husband may (cf. Lev. XXI, 2).
(12) If she wishes to marry another man.
(13) Rabbinic law has conferred upon him the same rights as those of a lawful husband. Cf. p. 640, n. 17.
(14) Which is the privilege of a husband (cf. Num. XXX, 7ff).
(15) Even if he is a priest (cf. supra n. 1). Since he inherits her she is regarded as a meth mizwah (v. Glos.) for whom he may defile himself though Pentateuchally she is not his proper wife; v. Rashi Yeb. 108a.
(16) And no letter of divorce is required. Yeb. 89b, 108a.
(17) Who does not allow a kethubah to a divorced minor.
(18) Who ruled: 'There is no validity whatsoever in the act of a minor'.
(19) Who allows to a minor her kethubah,
(20) Who ruled that 'the act of a minor is valid'. Is it likely, however, that Rab and Samuel who were Amoraim would engage in a dispute which is practically a mere repetition of that of Tannaim?
(21) Lit., 'all the world', sc, Rab and Samuel.
(22) Lit., 'according'.
(23) I.e., even Samuel must admit that according to R. Eliezer, no kethubah is due to a minor a minori ad majus (cf. infra nn. 16 to 19 and text mutatis mutandis).
(24) Lit., 'up to here',
(25) In the case cited from Yeb.
(26) Inheritance, handiwork and finds.
(27) A husband may well be given such privileges in order to encourage men to undertake the responsibilities of married life.
(28) Such as the kethubah and the other privileges contained therein.
(29) There is no need to hold out inducements of marriage to a woman who is assumed to be always craving for marriage.
(30) That the woman spoken of in our Mishnah is not entitled to compensation for the WORN OUT CLOTHES. It will be discussed anon to which of the three classes of woman mentioned Samuel referred.
(31) V. Glos.
(32) Whether they were melog or zon barzel.
(33) Since, in the case of zon barzel, the husband might plead that what he used up was legally his, and in respect of melog also, though he had no right to use up the 'capital'. he might still plead justification on the ground that it would have become his by the right of heirship if he had survived her. In either case he would be justified in his claim that the minor's right to compensation does not come into force except on divorce.
(34) And the husband, therefore, had no right to use it up.
(35) But in that of the husband who was consequently entitled to use it up completely.
(36) Since both husband and wife are guilty of a transgression.
(37) Lit., 'fined her in respect of what is his'. Viz the kethubah and maintenance as well as for the wear of melog articles which he used up unlawfully and for which,10 the case of a lawful marriage. he would have been liable to pay compensation to the woman.
(38) Lit. , 'fined him in respect of what is hers'. He must pay compensation for the wear of zon barzel articles which he used up, though a lawful wife cannot object to such use. [Although the woman is nor mally entitled to compensation for the wear of the zon barzel property, it is still considered a fine, as legally the husband should, in this case, not be made to pay since he does not divorce of his own free will (R. Nissim). Var. lec. , they fined her in respect of what is hers (i.e..the melog property) and him in respect of what is his (i.e., the zon barzel property).]
(39) That in a forbidden marriage the woman is not entitled to compensation for worn out melog articles.
(40) On marrying him.
(41) As melog.
(42) If he did so he must pay compensation.
(43) Supra 79b.
(44) R. Kahana.
(45) The statutory kethubah that is due to one who married as a widow or divorcee.
(46) Due to a virgin (cf. supra note 7 mutatis mutandis).
(47) Which a husband settles on his wife at his own pleasure.
(48) Lit., 'they', sc, the classes of women mentioned in our Mishnah.
(49) Lit., 'and her associates'.
(50) V. supra note 7.
(51) V. supra n. 8.
(52) Cf. supra n. 10 and v. Mishnah supra 72a.
(53) Lit., 'on evil name', sc. of faithlessness.
(54) MS.M. inserts, 'the worn out clothes'.
(55) Lit., 'before her', sc. her 'melog property.
(56) The last ruling in the cited Baraitha.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 101b
her worn out articles that are still in existence.
A tanna recited in the presence of R. Nahman: [A wife who] played the harlot forfeits in consequence her worn out articles [though they are still] in existence. 'If she' , the other said to him, 'has played the harlot, have her chattels also played the harlot?1 Recite rather: She does not forfeit her worn out articles [that are still] in existence' - Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated in the name of R. Johanan: This2 is the view of the unnamed R. Menahem,3 but the Sages ruled: [A wife who] played the harlot does not thereby forfeit her worn out articles that are still in existence.
IF THE MAN, HOWEVER, HAD MARRIED HER etc. Said R. Huna:A woman incapable of procreation [has sometimes the status of] a wife and [sometimes she has] no such status;4 a widow5 [has always the status of] a proper wife. 'A woman incapable of procreation [has sometimes the status of] a wife and [sometimes she] has no such status'; if the husband knew of her [defect]6 she is entitled to a kethubah7 and if he did not know of her [defect] she is not entitled to a kethubah. 'A widows [has always the status of] a proper wife', for, whether her husband was aware of her [widowhood] or whether he was not aware of it, she is always entitled to a kethubah. Rab Judah, however, said: The one8 as well as the other9 [has sometimes the status of] a wife and [sometimes she has] no such status,4 for [in either case] if her husband was aware of her [condition or status] she is entitled to a kethubah and if he was not aware of it she is not entitled to a kethubah. An objection was raised: If [a High Priest] married on the presumption that [the woman] was in her widowhood10 and it was found that she had been in such a condition,10 she is entitled to her kethubah. Does not this imply that if11 there was no presumption12 she is not entitled to a kethubah?13 - Do not infer 'that11 if there was no such presumption' but infer [this:] If he married her on the presumption that she was not in her widowhood14 and it was found that she had been in such a condition,14 she is not entitled to a kethubah. What, however, [is the ruling where he married her] with no assumption? Is she entitled [to a kethubah]? Then instead of stating, 'On the presumption that [the woman] was in her widowhood14 and it was found that she had been in such a condition,14 she is entitled to her kethubah', should it not rather have been stated, 'With no assumption she is entitled to her kethubah'15 and [it would have been obvious that this16 applied] with even greater force to the former?17 Furthermore, it was explicitly taught: If he18 married her in the belief19 [that she was a widow] and it was found that his belief was justified,19 she is entitled to a kethubah, but if he married her with no assumption she is not entitled to a kethubah. [Does not this present] an 'objection against R. Huna? - It was our Mishnah that caused R. Huna to err. He thought that, since a distinction was drawn in the case of a woman incapable of procreation20 and no distinction was drawn in respect of a widow, it must be inferred that a widow is entitled [to a kethubah even if she was married] with no assumption of her status. [In fact, however] this is no [proper conclusion], for in stating the case of a widow the author intended to apply to it21 the distinction drawn in the case of the woman who was incapable of procreation.22
MISHNAH. IF A MAN MARRIED A WIFE AND SHE MADE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH HIM THAT HE SHOULD MAINTAIN HER DAUGHTER23 FOR FIVE YEARS, HE MUST MAINTAIN HER FOR FIVE YEARS. IF SHE WAS [SUBSEQUENTLY]24 MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN AND ARRANGED WITH HIM ALSO THAT HE SHOULD MAINTAIN HER DAUGHTER23 FOR FIVE YEARS, HE, TOO, MUST MAINTAIN HER FOR FIVE YEARS. THE FIRST HUSBAND IS NOT ENTITLED TO PLEAD, 'IF SHE WILL. COME TO ME I WILL MAINTAIN HER',25 BUT HE MUST FORWARD HER MAINTENANCE TO HER AT THE PLACE WHERE HER MOTHER [LIVES].26 SIMILARLY, THE TWO HUSBANDS CANNOT PLEAD, 'WE WILL MAINTAIN HER JOINTLY', BUT ONE MUST MAINTAIN HER AND THE OTHER ALLOW HER THE COST OF HER MAINTENANCE. IF SHE27 MARRIED24 HER HUSBAND MUST SUPPLY HER WITH MAINTENANCE AND THEY28 ALLOW HER THE COST OF HER MAINTENANCE. SHOULD THEY29 DIE, THEIR OWN DAUGHTERS ARE TO BE MAINTAINED OUT OF THEIR FREE ASSETS ONLY30 BUT SHE27 MUST BE MAINTAINED EVEN OUT OF ASSIGNED PROPERTY, BECAUSE SHE31 [HAS THE SAME LEGAL STATUS] AS A CREDITOR. PRUDENT MEN USED TO WRITE,32 'ON CONDITION THAT I SHALL MAINTAIN YOUR DAUGHTER FOR FIVE YEARS WHILE YOU [CONTINUE TO LIVE] WITH ME'.
GEMARA. It was stated: A man who said to his fellow, 'I owe you a maneh'33 is, R. Johanan ruled, liable; but Resh Lakish ruled: He is free. How is one to understand [this dispute]? If [it refers to a case] where the man said to them34 'You are my witnesses', what [it might be objected] is the reason of Resh Lakish who holds him to be free?35 If [it is a case] where he did not say to them,34 'You are my witnesses, what [it might equally be objected] can be the reason of R. Johanan who holds him liable?36 The fact is37 that [the dispute relates to a case] where he did not tell them, 'You are my witnesses', but here we are38 dealing [with the case of a person] who said to another, 'I owe you a maneh'33 by [handing to him]39 a note of indebtedness.40 R. Johanan ruled: He is liable, because the contents41 of a bond42 has the same force as if the man [who delivered it] said, 'You are my witnesses'; but Resh Lakish ruled: He is free, because the contents41 of a bond has no binding force.
We learned: IF A MAN MARRIED A WIFE AND SHE MADE AN AGREEMENT WITH HIM THAT HE SHALL MAINTAIN HER DAUGHTER FOR FIVE YEARS, HE MUST MAINTAIN HER FOR FIVE YEARS. Does not this refer to43 , a case like this?44
(1) Surely not.
(2) The version recited by the Tanna in the presence of R. Nahman.
(3) Sc. whose rulings were often quoted anonymously in the Mishnah and the Baraitha. [The reference is to R. Menahem b. R. Jose, v, Neg. 262.]
(4) Lit., 'and not a wife'.
(5) Even if married to a High Priest (cf. Lev. XXI, 14).
(6) Before he married her.
(7) He is assumed to have acquiesced.
(8) MS,M., one incapable of procreation'.
(9) 'A widow' (so MS.M.) who was married to a High Priest.
(10) Lit., 'so'.
(11) Lit. , 'but' -
(12) A case analogous to that where the High Priest was not aware of the woman's widowhood, supra.
(13) An objection against R. Huna.
(14) Lit. , 'so'.
(15) So Bah. Cur. edd. omit the last six words.
(16) The woman's right to her kethubah.
(17) Lit. , 'that', where the High Priest actually presumed the woman's widowhood.
(18) A High Priest.
(19) בידוע particip. pass. of ידע ('to know') with prefix.
(20) 'IF THE MAN, HOWEVER, HAD MARRIED HER AT THE OUTSET . . . SHE IS ENTITLED etc.'.
(21) Lit., 'stands on'.
(22) Which immediately precedes it.
(23) From another husband.
(24) before the expiration of the five years.
(25) Sc. refusing maintenance on the ground that her mother with whom she lives was no longer his wife.
(26) Var. lec., 'to the place of her mother' (so according to the separate edd. of the Mishnah and Alfasi).
(27) The daughter.
(28) Respectively; each one the full cost.
(29) The two husbands (v. supra n. 2).
(30) Cf. 48b.
(31) Whose rights are based on a written bond.
(32) In any agreement to maintain a wife's daughter.
(33) V. Glos.
(34) Those who were present at the time of his admission of the debt.
(35) Such a ruling, surely. is contrary to what has been laid down in Sanh. 29b.
(36) This, surely, is also contrary to what was taught in Sanh. 29b, that the admission is valid only where the debtor explicitly stated, 'You are my witnesses'.
(37) Lit., 'always'.
(38) Lit., 'in what are we'.
(39) In the presence of witnesses.
(40) In which the debt is acknowledged in the man's handwriting but is not attested by his signature nor by that of witnesses.
(41) Lit., 'thing'.
(42) Delivered in the presence of witnesses.
(43) Lit., 'what, not?'
(44) Where the husband had handed over the written agreement (cf. supra note 8 mutatis mutandis) in the presence of witnesses without specifically appointing them as such. Had the document been duly signed the ruling, being so obvious, would have been superfluous. Does this then present an objection against Resh Lakish?
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 102a
- No, [our Mishnah is dealing] with deeds on verbal agreements,1 and [the ruling2 was necessary] in accordance with [the view] of R.Giddal, since R. Giddal has laid down in the name of Rab:3 [if4 one man said to another.] 'How much are you giving to your son?' [and the other replies.] 'Such and such a sum', and [when the other asks.] 'How much are you giving to your daughter?' [the first replies.] 'Such and such a sum', [and on the basis of this talk] a betrothal was effected,5 kinyan is deemed to have been executed, these being matters concerning which kinyan is effected by a mere verbal arrangement.6
Come and hear: If a man gave to a priest in writing [a statement] that he7 owed him five sela's8 he must9 pay him the five sela's and his son is not redeemed thereby!10 - There [the law] is different because one is under a pentateuchal obligation [to give them] to him.11 If that be so, why did he write? - In order to choose for himself a priest.12 If that is the case13 why is not his son redeemed?14 - In agreement with a ruling of 'Ulla; For 'Ulla said, pentateuchally [the son] is redeemed as soon as [the father] gives [the note of money indebtedness to the priest,] and the reason why the Rabbis ruled that he was not redeemed is because a preventive measure was enacted against the possibility of the assumption that redemption may be effected by means of bonds [in general].15
Raba said: [Their '6 dispute seems to follow the same principles] as [laid down by] Tannaim: [If the guarantee] of a guarantor appears16 below the signatures to bonds of indebtedness,17 [the creditor] may recover his debt from [the guarantor's] free property.18 Such a case once came before R. Ishmael who decided that [the debt] may be recovered from [the guarantor's] free property.18 Ben Nannus, however, said to him, '[The debt may] be recovered neither from free property nor from assigned property'. 'Why?' the other asked him. 'Behold', he replied, 'this is just as if [a creditor] were [in the act of] throttling a debtor19 in the street,20 and his friend found him and said to him, "Leave him alone and I will pay you", [where he is undoubtedly] exempt from liability, since the loan was not made through trust in him.'21 May it not be suggested that R. Johanan holds the same view as R. Ishmael while Resh Lakish holds that of Ben Nannus? - On the view of Ben Nannus there can be no difference of opinion;22
(1) שטרי פסיקתא in which the witnesses enter the terms that were verbally agreed upon between the parties and duly attach their signatures.
(2) Which might appear superfluous in view of the fact that the agreement has been properly drawn up and duly signed.
(3) Kid. 9b.
(4) In negotiating a marriage.
(5) Lit., 'they stood and betrothed'.
(6) No symbolic kinyan being necessary. Our Mishnah, too' deals similarly with a verbal agreement from which symbolic kinyan was absent; and, contrary to the opinion that an agreement without kinyan is invalid, it lays down the law In agreement with R. Giddal.
(7) Lit., 'that I'.
(8) Or shekels. Such a sum is due to the priest for the redemption of an Israelite's firstborn son (cf. Ex. XIII, 13 and Num. XVIII, 16).
(9) Though the document was unsigned and no kinyan was executed and, in consequence. should have no more legal force than a verbal admission. This contradicts Resh Lakish.
(10) Bek. 510.
(11) [He is not actually obliged Biblically to give to this particular priest, hence omit to him' with MS.M. which reads 'because it is Biblical'.]
(12) In the absence of the written document the five sela's could have been given to any other priest.
(13) That the Pentateuchal obligation confers upon a legally invalid document the force of one that was duly signed by witnesses.
(14) A legal bond, surely, might be regarded as a virtual payment.
(15) Other than those In which the father of the child himself assumed the liability. (14) R. Johanan and Resh Lakish.
(16) Lit., 'which goes out'.
(17) [The guarantor simply declaring 'I am guarantor' without attaching his signature (Tosaf.).]
(18) But not from property which he sold or mortgaged. Since the signatures of the witnesses do not appear below the guarantee, the guarantor's undertaking can have no more force than a verbal promise, or a loan that has not been secured by a bond, in which case no assigned property is pledged to the creditor.
(19) Lit., 'his fellow'.
(20) Sc. using violence against him.
(21) Such a guarantee is offered for the sole purpose of rescuing the debtor from the creditor's violence. It cannot be regarded as a serious guarantee to discharge the debt, since the debt was incurred before the guarantee was given, v. B.B. 175b.
(22) I.e., even R. Johanan must admit that Ben Nannus differs from his ruling. For, if in the case of a guarantee which has Pentateuchal authority (v. B.B. 173b), Ben Nannus does not recognize the validity of a personally unattested undertaking, how much less would he recognize such an undertaking in a case like that spoken of by R. Johanan.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 102b
their dispute, however, might relate to the view of R. Ishmael. R. Johanan is, [of course,] in agreement with R. Ishmael, while Resh Lakish [might argue:] R. Ishmael maintains his view there1 only2 because a pentateuchal responsibility is involved3 but [not] here where no pentateuchal responsibility is involved.
The [above] text [stated]: 'R. Giddal has laid down in the name of Rab: [If one man said to another,] "How much are you giving to your son?" [and the other replied,] "Such and such a sun,", and [when the other asks,] "How much are you giving to your daughter?" [the first replies,] "Such and such a sum", [and on the basis of this talk] betrothal was effected, kinyan is deemed to have been executed, these being matters concerning which kinyan is effected by a mere verbal arrangement'.4 Said Raba: It stands to reason that Rab's ruling should apply [only] to the case of a man whose daughter was5 a na'arah,6 since the benefit [of her betrothal]7 goes to him,8 but not to that of a bogereth,6 since the benefit [of the betrothal of the latter]' does not go to him; but, by God! Rab meant [his ruling to include] even one who is a bogereth. For, should you not concede this, [the objection could be put:] What benefit does the son's9 father derive?10 The reason consequently must be that11 owing to the pleasure of the formation of a mutual family tie they decide to allow one another the full rights of kinyan.
Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Are those verbal arrangements,12 allowed to be recorded13 or are they not allowed to be recorded?14 - They, the other replied, may not be recorded.15 He16 raised an objection against him:17 PRUDENT MEN USED TO WRITE,18 ON CONDITION THAT I SHALL MAINTAIN YOUR DAUGHTER FOR FIVE YEARS WHILE YOU [CONTINUE TO LIVE] WITH ME'?19 - The meaning of20 'WRITE' [in this context] is 'say'. Could 'saying', however, be described as 'writing'? - Yes, for so we learned: If a husband gives to his wife a written undertaking,21 'I have no claim whatsoever upon your estates',22 and R. Hiyya taught:23 If a husband said24 to his wife.25
Come and hear: Deeds of betrothal26 and marriage27 may not be written except with the consent of both parties,28 but, [it follows, that] with the consent of both parties they may be written. Does not this refer to29 deeds based on verbal agreements?30 - No; deeds of actual betrothal,31 [the ruling32 being] in agreement with R. papa and R. Sherabya; for it was stated: If a man wrote it33 in her name34 but without her consent she is, said Rabbah35 and Rabina, betrothed, but R. Papa and R. Sherabya aid, She is not betrothed.36
Come and hear: SHOULD THEY DIE, THEIR OWN DAUGHTERS ARE TO BE MAINTAINED OUT OF THEIR FREE PROPERTY ONLY BUT SHE MUST BE MAINTAINED EVEN OUT OF ASSIGNED PROPERTY, BECAUSE SHE [HAS THE SAME LEGAL STATUS] AS A CREDITOR!37 Here we are dealing with a case where the man was made to confirm his obligation38 by a kinyan.39 If so,40 [the same right41 should be enjoyed, should it not, by one's own] daughters also? - [This is a case] where kinyan was executed in favour of the ones but not in favour of the others.42 Whence this certainty?43 - Since she was in existence at the time the kinyan was executed, the kinyan in her favour is effective; the other daughters,44 however, since they were not in existence at the time the kinyan was executed, the kinyan in their favour is not effective. But do we not also deal with the case where they45 were in existence at the time of the kinyan, this being possible where,46 for instance, the man had divorced his wife and then remarried her? - [This] however, [is the explanation:] Since she is not covered by the provision of Beth din47 kinyan in her case is effective; in the case of the other daughters, however, who are protected by the provision of Beth din,47 kinyan is not effective. Are they, on that account, worse off?48 - This, however, is the reason: In the case of his own daughters, since they are protected by the provision of Beth din,47 it might be assumed that he entrusted them49 with some bundles [of money].50
THE FIRST HUSBAND IS NOT ENTITLED TO PLEAD [etc.] R.Hisda stated: This51 implies that [the place of] a daughter must be with her mother.52 Whence, [however, the proof] that we are dealing here53 with one who is of age; is it not possible that54 we are dealing only with a minor [whose custody must be entrusted to her mother] on account of what had once happened? For it was taught: If a man died and left a young son with his mother,55 [and while] the father's heirs demand, 'Let him be brought up with us' his mother claims, 'My son should be brought up by me', [the son] must be left with his mother, but may not be left with anyone who is entitled to be his heir.56 Such a case57 once occurred and [the heirs] killed him on the eve of passover!58 - If that were so59 it should have been stated,60 'To wherever she is,'
(1) The case of the guarantor.
(2) Lit., 'until here'.
(3) The recognition of a guarantor's responsibility is (as stated supra) Pentateuchal.
(4) Supra 102a q.v. for notes.
(5) At the time betrothal was negotiated.
(6) V. Glos.
(7) Sc. the sum of money or object of value which the man gives to the woman as a token of betrothal which constitutes the required kinyan.
(8) Lit., to his hand'. As a return for the benefit he, it may well be presumed, readily agrees that even his verbal undertaking should have the legal force of a personally attested written deed.
(9) Sc. the bridegroom's.
(10) Surely none; since the pecuniary benefit from his son's betrothal does not belong to him.
(11) Lit., 'but'.
(12) Lit., 'words', spoken of supra, in connection with which no symbolic kinyan was executed.
(13) Sc. in a deed, by witnesses.
(14) For, if they were to be embodied10 a deed, the holder of such a deed would be enabled to distrain on assigned property to which, in the absence of symbolic kinyan, he is legally not entitled. [The question, according to Isaiah Trani, is whether these may be reduced to writing without the consent of both parties, either of whom may object to encumbering the property with a mortgage, v. Shittah Mekubbezeth a.I. and R. Nissim on Kid.9b also, for other interpretations.]
(15) Cf. supra nn. 10 and 11.
(17) R. Ashi.
(18) כותבין emphasis on 'WRITE'.
(19) Though the agreement was only verbal. How then could K. Ashi maintain that verbal arrangements may not be embodied in a deed?
(20) Lit., 'what'.
(22) Mishnah supra 830.
(23) In reference to this Mishnah which uses the expression of writing (v. supra n. 3).
(24) Emphasis on the word האומר.
(25) Which proves that a verbal statement is sometimes described as a written one.
(26) Verbal agreements between the parties on the amounts promised.
(27) Kethubah contracts.
(28) B.B. 167b,Kid.9b.
(29) Lit., 'what, not?'
(30) Cf. supra p. 647, n. 13. An objection thus arises against R. Ashi who ruled that verbal agreements 'may not be recorded'. [On Trani's interpretation (supra p. 650, n. II) this passage is adduced in support of R. Ashi that such deeds cannot be written without the consent of both parties. This will, however, necessitate the deletion of the words '(it follows that) with the consent of both they may be written', which words10 fact do not occur in MS.M.]
(31) Betrothal may be effected by a deed wherein the man enters, 'Behold thou art betrothed unto me'.
(32) Which requires the consent of the woman to such a deed.
(33) A deed of betrothal.
(34) Or 'for her sake', that of the woman he wishes to betroth.
(35) Var., 'Raba' (MS.M., the parallel passage in Kid., and Codes).
(36) Kid. 9b, 48a.
(37) Since only a written deed would confer upon her such a status it is obvious that such a deed was in her possession, an objection against R. Ashi (cf. supra n. 12).
(38) To maintain his wife's daughter.
(39) Lit., 'where they acquired (symbolic) possession from his hand'. Hence the permissibility of writing a deed.
(40) That the verbal agreement was under a kinyan.
(41) To exact the cost of maintenance from assigned property.
(42) Lit., 'to this'.
(43) The Mishnah, surely, does not mention kinyan in the case of the one and omit it in that of the others.
(44) Who were presumably born from the marriage contracted at the time of the kinyan.
(45) The man's own daughters.
(46) Lit., 'and how is this to be imagined?'
(47) The clause of the kethubah which entitles daughters born from that marriage to maintenance.
(48) The contrary might, in fact, be expected: As they enjoy the privilege of the clause in the kethubah (v. supra n. 10) they should also be entitled to the privilege of the kinyan.
(49) Lit., 'caused them to seize', before he died.
(50) Or valuables, to discharge his obligation on the account of their maintenance.
(51) The ruling that the maintenance of one's wife's daughter must be forwarded to the place where her mother lives.
(52) The brothers who maintain her are not entitled to demand that she shall live with them.
(53) In our Mishnah.
(54) In stating. 'WHERE HER MOTHER (LIVES)'.
(55) לאמו; wanting in Bomb. ed.
(56) An interested party may be suspected of murder.
(57) That the child was entrusted to the care of relatives who were entitled to be his legal heirs.
(58) In order to secure his property. Now since there is nothing to prove that an older daughter (who is well capable of looking after herself) must also be maintained at her mother's house and cannot be compelled to live with the brothers and receive maintenance from them, an objection arises against R. Hisda. [Detractors of the Talmud, it may be mentioned, professed to find in this passage an allusion to the 'ritual' murder of 'Christian' children! The absurdity of this suggestion was pointed out by Eric Bischoff in his Talmudkatechismus, p. 38, where he describes it as 'sinnlos' (senseless). It is evident that this incident was recorded to emphasize the danger of entrusting a child to the care of one who stands to benefit by its death. For we see here that even the sanctity of the Festival did not deter the brothers from perpetrating a crime for the purpose of gain. This danger has also been recognized in the English Law of Insurance which lays down that a man cannot insure his child's life to derive a benefit on its death].
(59) That a daughter who is of age may be compelled to live with her brothers.
(60) In our Mishnah.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 103a
why then was it stated, 'AT THE PLACE WHERE HER MOTHER [LIVES]'?1 Consequently it must be inferred that [the place of] a daughter, whether she be of age or a minor, is with her mother.
THE TWO HUSBANDS CANNOT PLEAD etc. A certain man once leased his mill to another for [the consideration of the latter's services in] grinding [his corn].2 Eventually he became rich and bought another mill and an ass. Thereupon he said to the other, 'Until now I have had my grinding done at your place but now3 pay me rent'. - 'I shall', the other replied, 'only grind for you'.4 Rabina [in considering the case] intended to rule that it involved the very principle that was laid down in our Mishnah: THE TWO HUSBANDS CANNOT PLEAD, 'WE WILL MAINTAIN HER JOINTLY', BUT ONE MUST MAINTAIN HER AND THE OTHER ALLOWS HER THE COST OF HER MAINTENANCE.5 R. 'Awira, however, said to him: Are [the two cases] alike? There [the woman]6 has Only one stomach, not two;7 but here8 [the lessee] might well tell the owner, 'Grind [in your own mill]9 and sell; grind [in mine]10 and keep'.11 This,12 however, has been said only in a case where [the lessee] has no [other orders for] grinding at his mill,13 but if he has [sufficient orders for] grinding at his mill he may in such circumstances be compelled [not to act] in the manner of Sodom.14
MISHNAH. SHOULD A WIDOW SAY, 'I HAVE NO DESIRE TO MOVE FROM MY HUSBAND'S HOUSE', THE HEIRS CANNOT TELL HER, GO TO YOUR FATHER'S HOUSE AND WE WILL MAINTAIN YOU', BUT THEY MUST MAINTAIN HER IN HER HUSBAND'S HOUSE15 AND GIVE HER A DWELLING BECOMING HER DIGNITY. IF SHE SAID, HOWEVER,16 HAVE NO DESIRE TO MOVE FROM MY FATHER'S HOUSE', THE HEIRS ARE ENTITLED TO SAY TO HER, 'IF YOU STAY WITH US YOU WILL HAVE YOUR MAINTENANCE, BUT IF YOU DO NOT STAY WITH US YOU WILL RECEIVE NO MAINTENANCE'. IF SHE BASED HER PLEA16 ON THE GROUND THAT SHE WAS YOUNG AND THEY17 WERE YOUNG,18 THEY MUST MAINTAIN HER WHILE SHE LIVES IN THE HOUSE OF HER FATHER.
GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught:19 [A widow] may use [her deceased husband's] dwelling as she used it during his20 lifetime. [She may also use] the bondmen and bondwomen, the cushions and the bolsters, and the silver and gold utensils as she used them during the lifetime of her husband, for such is the written undertaking he gave her: 'And you shall dwell in my house and be maintained therein out of my estate throughout the duration of your widowhood'.21
R. Joseph learnt:22 'In my house' [implies] 'but not in my hovel'.23
R. Nahman ruled: If orphans sold a widow's dwelling24 their act is legally invalid.25 But why [should this case be] different from that of which R. Assi spoke in the name of R. Johanan as follows:26 If the male orphans forestalled [the female orphans] and sold27 some property of a small estate28 their sale is valid?29 - There30 [the property] Was not pledged to any daughter31 during [her father's] lifetime,32 but here33 [the dwelling] was pledged to the widow34 during [her husband's] lifetime.35
Abaye stated: We have a tradition that if a widow's dwelling36 collapsed it is not the duty of the heirs to rebuild it.' So it was also taught: If a widow's dwelling36 collapsed it is not the duty of the heirs to rebuild it.37 Furthermore, even if she says, 'Allow me and I shall rebuild it at my own expense', she is not granted her request .38
Abaye asked: What [is the legal position if] she repaired it?39 - This is undecided.40
IF SHE SAID, HOWEVER,'I HAVE NO DESIRE' etc. Why should they not give her maintenance while she lives there?41 - This supports [a statement] of R. Huna who said, 'The blessing of a house [is proportionate] to its size'.42 Why then can they not give her according to the blessing of the house?43 - That is so.44 Said R. Huna: The sayings45 of the Sages [are a source of] blessing, wealth and healing. [As to] 'blessing',[we have] the statement just mentioned. 'Wealth'? - Because we learned: If one sold fruits to another46 [and the buyer] pulled47 them, though they have not yet been measured,48 ownership is acquired. If, however, they have been measured,49 but [the buyer] has not pulled them, ownership is not acquired. But if [the buyer] is prudent he rents the place where they are kept.50 'Healing'? - For we learned: A man should not chew wheat and put it on his wound during the Passover because it ferments.51
Our Rabbis taught: When Rabbi52 was about to depart [from this life] he said, 'I require [the presence] of my sons'. When his sons entered into his presence he instructed them: 'Take care that you shew due respect to your mother. The light53 shall continue to burn in its usual place, the table53 shall be laid in its usual place [and my] bed shall be spread in its usual place.54 Joseph of Haifa and Simeon of Efrath who attended on me in my lifetime shall attend on me when I am dead'.
'Take care that you shew due respect to your mother'. Is [not this instruction] Pentateuchal, since it is written, Honour thy father and thy mother?55 - She was their stepmother.56 [Is not the commandment to honour] a stepmother56 also Pentateuchal, for it was taught: Honour thy father and thy mother,'55 'thy father'57 includes58 'thy stepmother','and thy mother'59 includes60 'thy Stepfather',61 and the superfluous waw62 includes 'thy elder brother'? - This exposition63 [was meant to apply] during [one's own parents'] lifetime but not after [their] death.
'The light shall continue to burn in its usual place, the table shall be laid in its usual place [and my] bed shall be spread in its usual place'.64 What is the reason? - He used to come home again at twilight every Sabbath Eve. On a certain Sabbath Eve a neighbour came to the door speaking aloud, when his handmaid whispered, 'Be quiet for Rabbi is sitting there'. As soon as he heard this he came no more,in order that no reflection might be cast65 on the earlier saints.66
'Joseph of Haifa and Simeon of Efrath who attended on me in my lifetime shall attend on me when I am dead'. He was understood to mean, 'In this world'.67 When it was seen however, that their biers preceded his68 [all] said that the conclusion must be that he was referring to the other69 world, and that the reason why he mentioned it70 was that it might not be suspected that they were guilty of some offence71 and that it was only the merit of Rabbi that protected72 them until that moment .73
'I require'. he said to them, '[the presence] of the Sages of Israel', and the Sages of Israel entered into his presence. 'Do not lament for me',74 he said to them, 'in the smaller towns,
(1) Emphasis on MOTHER.
(2) No money rental having been arranged.
(3) 'That I have another mill in which to grind my corn'.
(4) But will pay no rent.
(5) As 10 this case a cash payment must be made though originally only maintenance gas undertaken so in the case of the miller a cash rental may be demanded though the original arrangement was for payment in service.
(6) Spoken of in our Mishnah.
(7) She cannot he expected to consume a double allowance of food. Hence there is no other alternative but that of substituting one monetary payment for one allowance of food.
(8) The case of the miller.
(9) The one you bought.
(10) The one I hired from you.
(11) A suggestion which may well be adopted by the owner without any loss to himself.
(12) That the lessee cannot be compelled to pay a cash rental.
(13) It would be an act of injustice to compel him to pay rent while his machinery stood idle. It is more equitable that he should be enabled to continue the original agreement whereby he is both kept employed and pays his rent.
(14) The Sodomites were notorious for refusing to do any favours even when they cost them nothing. 'A dog-in-the-manger attitude' (cf. B.B. Sonc. ed. p. 62, n. 3).
(15) בבית בעלה, so MS.M. Wanting incur. edd.
(16) For refusing to live with the heirs.
(17) The heirs, children from another wife.
(18) In consequence of which she fears quarrels or temptation.
(19) Cf. Tosef. Keth. XI.
(20) Lit., 'her husband'.
(21) Mishnah supra 52b.
(22) In explaining the Mishnah cited.
(23) Supra 540 q.v. for notes.
(24) Which formed part of her deceased husband's estate.
(25) Lit., 'they have not done anything'.
(26) Lit., 'for R. Assi stated in the name of R. Johanan'.
(27) Before the court had dealt with the case.
(28) Of their deceased father, which is legally due to the daughters (cf. infra 108b).
(29) Lit., 'what they sold is sold', Yeb. 67b, Sotah 21b, B.B. 1400.
(30) The sale of a small estate.
(31) Lit., 'to her'.
(32) A father is under no legal obligation to maintain his daughters.
(33) A widow's dwelling.
(34) Lit., 'to her'.
(35) As is evident from the Mishnah supra 52b.
(36) Which formed part of her deceased husband's estate.
(37) Her claim upon the dwelling terminates as soon as it is no longer fit for habitation.
(38) Lit., 'they do not listen to her'.
(39) The dilapidated dwelling (v. Rashi). Aliter; May she repair it? (V. Tosaf. s.v. ה ג a.l.) Is she entitled, it is asked, to continue to live In that dwelling so long as it can be kept up by repairs or must she quit it as soon as dwelling in it becomes impossible without repairs.
(40) Teku, v. Glos.
(41) In her father's house.
(42) Tosef. Keth. XII, B.B. 144b. The more the members of a household the cheaper the cost of living.
(43) Sc. an allowance equal to the cheaper cost of her maintenance at the house of the heirs.
(44) Lit., 'thus also'; she is in fact entitled to such an allowance.
(45) Lit., 'tongue', 'language'.
(46) The price having been agreed upon.
(47) 'Pulling' (meshikah, v. Glos.).
(48) Measuring is not an essential factor of a sale, since it merely determines the quantity sold.
(49) V. B.B. 84b as to how and where.
(50) Mishnah B.B. 84b. If the fruit is kept in the seller's domain the buyer who for some reason is unable to transport his purchase forthwith and fears that the seller might retract and cause him financial loss, may thus protect himself by renting the spot on which the fruit is kept and thereby acquire possession of the fruit since a man's domain acquires possession for him. A buyer thus gets wealth by taking the hint of the Sages.
(51) Pesah. 39b. From this saying one learns of a remedy for a wound.
(52) R. Judah I (135-220 C.E.) the Patriarch, compiler of the Mishnah.
(53) Which he used during his lifetime.
(54) 'Bed shall. . . place' is wanting in MS.M.
(55) Ex. XX, 12.
(56) Lit., 'a father's wife'.
(57) את אביך emphasis on את the sign of the defined accusative, which is not absolutely essential in the context.
(58) Lit., 'this'. Cf., however, Beth Joseph, Y.D. 240 ad fin. where the reading is לרבות 'to include'.
(59) ואת אמך. supra n. 7 mutatis mutandis.
(60) V. supra note 8.
(61) Lit. 'thy mother's husband'.
(62) In ואת אמך.
(63) Lit., 'these words', respect for step.parents.
(64) V. supra note 4.
(65) Lit., 'to bring out'.
(66) צדיקים 'righteous and pious men' who were denied the privilege of revisiting their earthly homes.
(67) I.e., they should attend to his burial (Rashi) or to the light. table and bed at his house, of which he spoke earlier.
(68) They died about the same time as Rabbi and were buried first.
(69) Lit., 'that'.
(70) Lit., 'that he said thus', that they should attend on him.
(71) Lit., 'that they may not say: They had something'.
(72) Lit., 'benefitted'.
(73) Until the end of his days.
(74) Or 'hold funeral orations'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 103b
and reassemble1 the college after thirty days.2 My son Simeon is wise3 my son Gamaliel Nasi4 and Hanina b. Hama shall preside [at the college].
'Do not lament for me in the smaller towns'. He was understood to give this instruction In order [to cause less] trouble.5 As it was observed, however, that when lamentations were held in the large towns everybody6 came7 they arrived at the conclusion that his instruction was due to [a desire to enhance] the honour [of the people].8
'Reassemble the college after thirty days', because [he thought] 'I am not more important than our teacher Moses concerning whom it is Written in Scripture. And the children of Israel wept for Moses in the plains of Moab thirty days'.9
For thirty days they mourned both day and night; subsequently10 they mourned in the day-time and studied at night or mourned at night and studied during the day, until a period of twelve months of mourning11 [had passed].
On the day that Rabbi died a bath kol12 went forth and announced: Whosoever has been present at the death of Rabbi is destined to enjoy the life of the world to come. A certain fuller,13 who used to come to him14 every day, failed to call on that day; and, as soon as he heard this, went up upon a roof, fell down to the ground and died. A bath kol12 came forth and announced: That fuller also is destined to enjoy the life of the world to come. 'My son Simeon is wise. What did he14 mean?15 - It is this that he meant: Although my son Simeon is wise, my son Gamaliel shall be the Nasi.16 Said Levi, 'Was It necessary to state this?'17 - It was necessary'. replied R. Simeon b. Rabbi, 'for yourself and for your lameness'.18 What was his19 difficulty?20 Does not Scripture state, But the kingdom gave he to Jehoram, because he was the firstborn?21 - The other22 was properly representing23 his ancestors24 but R. Gamaliel was not properly representing23 his ancestors.25 Then why did Rabbi act in the manner he did?26 - Granted that he27 was not representing his ancestors In wisdom he was worthily representing them in his fear of sin.28
'Hanina b. Hama shall preside at the college'. R. Hanina, however, did not accept [the office] because R. Afes was by two and a half years older than he; and so R. Afes presided. R. Hanina sat [at his studies] outside [the lecture room],29 and Levi came and joined him. When R. Afes went to his eternal rest30 and R. Hanina took up the presidency Levi had no one to join him31 and came in consequence to Babylon.
This description coincides with the following:32 When Rab was told that a great man who was lame made his appearance at Nehardea33 and held a discourse [in the course of which he] permitted [the wearing of] a wreath,34 he said,'It is evident35 that R. Afes has gone to his eternal rest, and R. Hanina has taken over the presidency; and that Levi having had no one to join him, has come [down here].' But might not one have suggested that R. Hanina came to his eternal rest, that R. Afes continued In the presidency as before36 and that Levi who had no one to join him came [therefore, to Babylon]? If you wish I might reply: Levi would have submitted to the authority of R. Afes. And if you prefer I might reply: Since [Rabbi] once said, 'Hanina b. Hama shall preside at the college', there could be no possibility of his not becoming head;37 for about the righteous it is written in Scripture. Thou shalt also decree a thing, and it shall be established unto thee.38
Was there not R. Hiyya?39 - He had already gone to his eternal rest.40 But did not R. Hiyya, state, 'I saw Rabbi's sepulchre41 and shed tears upon it'? - Reverse [the names]. But did not R. Hiyya state, 'On the day on which Rabbi died holiness ceased'? - Reverse [the names]. But has it not been taught: When Rabbi fell in R. Hiyya entered into his presence and found him weeping. 'Master', he said to him, 'Why are you weeping? Was it not taught: '[If a man] dies smiling it is a good omen for him, if weeping it is a bad omen for him; his face upwards it is a good omen, his face downwards it is a bad omen; his face towards the public it is a good omen, towards the wall it is a bad omen; if his face is greenish it is a bad omen, if bright and ruddy it.is a good omen; dying on Sabbath Eve42 is a good omen, on the termination of the Sabbath43 is a bad omen; dying on the Eve of the Day of Atonement is a bad omen, on the termination of the Day of Atonement44 is a good omen; dying of diarrhoea is a good omen because most righteous men die of diarrhoea?' And the other replied, 'I weep on [account of my impending separation from] the Torah and the commandments'?45 - If you wish I might reply: Reverse [the names]; and if you prefer I might reply: In fact there Is no need to reverse [the names; but as] R. Hiyya was engaged in the performance of pious deeds Rabbi thought 'I will not disturb him'.46 This47 is in line with the following:48 When R. Hanina and R. Hiyya were engaged in a dispute R. Hanina said to R. Hiyya, 'Do you [venture to] dispute with me? Were the Torah, God forbid, to be forgotten in Israel, I would restore it by means of my dialectical arguments'. - 'I', replied R. Hiyya, 'make provision that the Torah shall not be forgotten in Israel. For I bring flax seed, sow it, and weave nets [from the plant]. [With these] I hunt stags with whose flesh I feed orphans and from whose skins I prepare scrolls, and then proceed to a town where there are no teachers of young children, and write out the five Books of the Pentateuch for five children [respectively] and teach another six children respectively the six orders of the Mishnah, and then tell each one: Teach your section to your colleagues"'. It was this that Rabbi [had in mind when he] exclaimed, 'How great are the deeds of Hiyya?' Said R. Simeon b. Rabbi to him: '[Greater] even than yours?' - 'Yes', he replied. 'Even', asked R. Ishmael the son of R. Jose, 'than my father's?' - 'God forbid', the other replied. 'Let no such thing be [mentioned] in Israel!'49
'I desire', he50 announced, 'the presence of my younger son R. Simeon entered into his presence and he entrusted him with the orders51 of wisdom. 'I desire the presence of my elder son', he announced. When R. Gamaliel entered he entrusted him with the traditions and regulations51 of the Patriarchate. 'My son', he said to him, 'conduct your patriarchate with men of high standing,52 and cast bile among the students'.53
But , surely, this54 is not proper55 for is it not written in Scripture, But he honoureth them that fear the Lord,56 and the Master said that this [text might be applied to] Jehoshaphat, King of Judah. who, on seeing a scholar, used to rise from his throne, embrace him and kiss him, and call him 'My master, my master; my teacher, my teacher'? - This is no difficulty: The latter attitude57 [is to be adopted] in private; the former57 in public.58
It was taught: Rabbi was lying [on his sickbed] at Sepphoris59 but a [burial] place was reserved for him at Beth She'arim.60 Was it not, however, taught: Justice, justice shalt thou follow.61 follow Rabbi to Beth She'arim? - Rabbi was [indeed] living at Beth She'arim62 but when he fell ill63 he was brought to Sepphoris
(1) Lit., 'and cause to sit.
(2) Of lamentation and mourning. No longer period for mourning shall be allowed.
(3) חכם. this is explained in the Gemara infra. V. also infra n. 24 and p. 659. n. 9.
(4) נשיא 'prince'. 'president', 'patriarch'. On some of the dignities and honours attached to the offices of Nasi, Hakam, and Ab-beth-din respectively v. Hor. 13b.
(5) By restricting the lamentations to the larger towns the inhabitants of the smaller ones as well as the villagers would be spared the time and trouble involved in arranging, or attending, the public funeral services.
(6) Lit., 'all the world'.
(7) Both from the smaller towns and the villages.
(8) Cf., 'he wished that Israel might be honoured in greater measure through him' (Sanh. 470).
(9) Deut. XXXIV, 8.
(10) Lit., 'from now onwards'.
(11) Lit., 'that they mourned twelve months of the year'.
(12) V. Glos.
(13) [Probably this was the fuller mentioned in Ned. 410 (Jacob Emden).]
(15) One would naturally expect the wise son rather than the other to succeed his father as Nasi. Why then did Rabbi mention the wisdom of the one as apparently a reason for the appointment of the other?
(16) Cf. supra p. 658 nn. 13-14. [Halevy Doroth, II, p. 20, n. I, explains that what Rabbi primarily meant was that Simeon shall be the Hakam and Gamaliel the Nasi. The precedence, however, given in his instructions to Simeon, although his office was second to that of the Nasi, indicated that Rabbi desired to have a secondary meaning attached to his words. Hence the question, 'what did he mean?'].
(17) That Gamaliel, who was the elder son and entitled to the succession, shall be the Nasi.
(18) Levi was lame (v. Suk. 530). Aliter (Jast.): 'Do we need thee and thy limping (lame remark)?'
(19) R. Simeon b. Rabbi's.
(20) In understanding Levi's objection.
(21) II Chron. XXI, 3. (Cf. p. 659, n. 10). What need then was there, as Levi objected, for Rabbi's specific instruction?
(22) Lit., 'that', Jehoram.
(23) Lit., 'fulfilling the place of'.
(24) Since there was no other son possessing a superior claim.
(25) His younger brother having been wiser. Hence the necessity for Rabbi's specific instructions. Aliter; What was his (sc. Levi's) difficulty? (Is it) that Scripture stated, But the kingdom . . . the firstborn, that (firstborn, it may be replied.) was properly representing his ancestors but R. Gamaliel etc. (cf. S. Strashun).
(26) Lit. , 'thus'.
(28) Moral conception and conduct (cf. Abboth III, II; Sonc. ed. III, 9' p. 32).
(29) Since he could not recognise R. Afes as his superior.
(30) Lit., 'his soul rested'.
(31) Lit., 'to sit at his side'.
(32) Lit., 'and that is'.
(33) V. supra p. 222, n. 8.
(34) On the Sabbath, when the carrying of objects from one domain into another is forbidden (cf. Shab. 59b).
(35) Lit., 'infer from this'.
(36) Lit., 'as he sat he sits'.
(37) Lit., 'that he should not reign'. Consequently he must have survived R. Afes.
(38) lob XXII, 28.
(39) Who was superior to both R. Hanina and R. Afes. Why was he overlooked by Rabbi?
(40) When Rabbi was making his testamentary appointments.
(41) 'His coffin' (Rashi).
(42) Being the approach of the day of rest.
(43) Lit., 'at the going out of the Sabbath'.
(44) One's sins having been forgiven during the day.
(45) All of which proves that R. Hiyya was still alive when Rabbi was on his deathbed.
(46) Lit., 'cause him to be idle' or 'to relax'.
(47) The testimony to R. Hiyya's piety and public benefactions.
(48) Lit., 'and that is (why)'.
(49) Cf. B.M. 85b where the parallel passage contains some variations including the substitution of 'R. Ishmael the son of R. Jose' for 'R. Simeon b. Rabbi'.
(50) Rabbi. The story of the last moments of his life, interrupted by the Preceding discussions, explanations and incidents, is here resumed.
(51) Plur. const. of מדר 'order', 'rules and regulations'.
(52) ברמים (sing. רם 'high', 'elevated'). Aruch reads, דמים) בדמים 'equivalent', 'compensation', 'value') 'as something precious'.
(53) Sc. 'introduce a firm discipline in the college'.
(54) Keeping scholars under a discipline which many might regard as degrading.
(55) Lit., 'I am not'.
(56) Ps. XV, 4.
(57) Lit., 'that'.
(58) Scholars, like the general public, may be expected to respect the common rules and regulations and to pay homage to the Patriarch.
(59) V. supra p. 410, n. 6.
(60) Identified with (a) the modern Tur'an. a village situated ten kilometres E.N.E. of Sepphoris (I. S. Horowitz, Palestine s.v.); (b) Besara, mentioned in Josephus, the modern Dscheda W. of the Valley of Jezreel (Klein. S. EJ. 4, 427).
(61) Deut. XVI, 20.
(62) 'Rabbi . . . She'arim' is wanting in עין יעקב edd.
(63) V. B.M. 85a.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 104a
because it was situated on higher ground1 and its air was salubrious.
On the day when Rabbi died the Rabbis decreed a public fast and offered prayers for heavenly mercy. They. furthermore, announced that whoever said that Rabbi was dead would be stabbed with a sword.
Rabbi's handmaid2 ascended the roof and prayed: 'The immortals3 desire Rabbi [to join them] and the mortals4 desire Rabbi [to remain with them]; may it be the will [of God] that the mortals may overpower the immortals'. When, however, she saw how often he resorted to the privy,5 painfully taking off his tefillin6 and putting them on again, she prayed: 'May it be the will [of the Almighty] that the immortals may overpower the mortals'. As the Rabbis incessantly continued7 their prayers for [heavenly] mercy she took up a jar and threw it down from the roof to the ground. [For a moment] they ceased praying8 and the soul of Rabbi departed to its eternal rest.9 'Go', said the Rabbis to Bar Kappara, 'and investigate'.10 He went and, finding that [Rabbi] was dead, he tore his cloak and turned the tear backwards. [On returning to the Rabbis] he began: 'The angels11 and the mortals12 have taken hold of the holy ark.13 The angels overpowered the mortals and the holy ark has been captured'. 'Has he', they asked him, 'gone to his eternal rest?' - 'You', he replied, 'said it; I did not say it'.
Rabbi, at the time of his passing, raised his ten fingers towards heaven14 and said: 'Sovereign of the Universe, it is revealed and known to you that I have laboured in the study of the Torah with my ten fingers and that I did not enjoy [any worldly] benefits even with my little finger. May it be Thy will that there be peace In my [Jast] resting place'. A bath kol15 echoed, announcing, He shall enter into peace; they shall rest on their beds.16
[Does not] the context require [the singular pronoun:] 'On thy bed'?17 This provides support for R. Hiyya b. Gamda. For he stated in the name of R. Jose b. Saul: When a righteous man departs from this world the ministering angels say to the Holy One, blessed be He, 'Sovereign of the Universe, the righteous man So-and-so is coming', and he answers them, 'Let the righteous men come [from their resting places], go forth to meet him, and say to him that he shall enter into peace [and then] they18 shall rest on their beds'.
R. Eleazar stated: When a righteous man departs from the world he is welcomed by19 three companies of ministering angels. One exclaims, 'Come20 into peace'; the other21 exclaims, He who walketh in his uprightness,22 while the third23 exclaims, 'He shall enter into peace; they shall rest on their beds'.22 When a wicked man perishes from the world he is met24 by three groups of angels of destruction. One announces, 'There is no peace, saith the Lord, unto the wicked';25 the other23 tells him, 'He26 shall lie down in sorrow',27 while the third23 tells him, 'Go down and be thou laid with the uncircumcised'.28
MISHNAH. SO LONG AS SHE LIVES IN HER FATHER'S HOUSE [A WIDOW]29 MAY RECOVER HER KETHUBAH AT ANY TIME.30 AS LONG, HOWEVER, AS SHE LIVES IN HER HUSBAND'S HOUSE SHE MAY RECOVER HER KETHUBAH ONLY WITHIN31 TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, BECAUSE IN THE COURSE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS SHE HAS SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITIES32 OF RENDERING33 FAVOURS34 CORRESPONDING [IN VALUE TO THE AMOUNT OF] HER KETHUBAH; SO R. MEIR WHO LAID DOWN THE RULING IN THE NAME OF R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: SO LONG AS SHE LIVES IN HER HUSBAND'S HO USE [A WIDOW]35 MAY RECOVER HER KETHUBAH AT ANY TIME,36 BUT AS LONG AS SHE LIVES IN HER FATHER'S HOUSE SHE MAY RECOVER HER KETHUBAH ONLY WITHIN31 TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.37 IF [THE WIDOW] DIED, HER HEIRS MUST MENTION38 HER KETHUBAH WITHIN31 TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.39
GEMARA. Said Abaye to R. Joseph. [Is it logical40 that] the poorest woman in Israel [should be allowed to recover her kethubah] ONLY WITHIN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS and Martha the daughter of Boethus41 also ONLY WITHIN TWENTY-FIVE As?42 - The other replied: In accordance with the camel is the burden.43
The question was raised: Must she,44 according to R. Meir, lose in proportion?45 -This must stand undecided.46
THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: SO LONG. Said Abaye to R.Joseph: [Is it reasonable that if] she comes before sunset she may recover her kethubah and that [if she came] after sunset she may not recover it? [Is it likely that] she has surrendered it in that short while? - 'Yes', the other replied. 'all the standards of the Sages are such. In [a bath of] forty se'ah47 [for instance] one may perform ritual immersion; In [a bath of] forty se'ah minus one kortob47 one may not perform ritual immersion
Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab: R. Ishmael son of R. Jose testified in the presence of Rabbi to a statement he made48 in the name of his father that [the ruling in our Mishnah] was taught only [in respect of a woman] who produces49 no deed of the kethubah but if she produces49 the deed of the kethubah she may recover [the amount of] her kethubah at any time.50 R. Eleazar, however, ruled: Even if she produces49 the deed of the kethubah she may recover the amount within twenty-five years Only.
R. Shesheth raised an objection: 'A creditor may recover his debt [at any time]. even if there was no mention of it.'51 Now, how is this to be understood? If [it refers to a creditor] who holds no bond, whereby [it might be asked] could he recover his debt? Consequently [it must refer to one] who does hold a bond [from which it follows, does It not, that] only a creditor [may recover his due]. because he is not likely to have surrendered his claim, but that a widow52 [is deemed to have] surrendered?53 - He54 raised the objection and he also removed it: This55 may, in fact, refer to56 one who holds no bond,57 but58 here we are dealing with a case59 where the debtor60 admits [his liability].61 But, Surely. R. Elai had stated: They62 taught. 'A divorced woman has the very same rights as a creditor'.63 Now, how are We to understand [this ruling]? If [it refers to a divorcee] who holds no kethubah, whereby [it might be objected] could she recover her due? Consequently [it must refer to one] who does hold a kethubah, [from which it follows, does it not, that] only a divorcee [may recover her kethubah] because she is not likely to have surrendered it, but that a widow [is deemed to have] surrendered?64 - Here also [it is a case] where the defendant60 admits [the claim].65
R. Nahman b. Isaac stated: R. Judah b. Kaza learnt in the Baraitha of the school of Bar Kaza, If she66 claimed her kethubah
(1) Cf. Meg. 60: 'Why was it called Sepphoris (צפורי)? Because it was perched on the top of a hill like a bird' (צפור 'bird').
(2) A famous character, known for her sagacity and learning.
(3) Lit., 'those above', 'the angels'.
(4) Lit., 'those below', 'lower regions'.
(5) He was suffering from acute and painful diarrhoea (cf. B.M. 85a).
(6) V. Glos. These must not be worn when the body is not in a state of perfect cleanliness.
(7) Lit., 'they were not silent'.
(8) Lit., 'they remained silent'.
(9) Lit., 'rested'.
(10) Rabbi's condition.
(11) אראלים lit., 'messengers' (Jast.); cf. B.H. מלאך. Aliter; 'God's lions' (Levy).
(12) מצוקים (rt. יצק 'to cast'). Aliter; 'The just' (Rashi).
(13) Metaph. Rabbi was known as 'our holy teacher'.
(14) Lit., 'in an upward direction'.
(15) V. Glos.
(16) Isa. LVII, 2.
(17) In harmony with the first part of the verse. [Strashun amends 'on his bed'].
(18) The righteous who went out to welcome him.
(19) Lit., 'go out to meet him'.
(20) Var. 'He shall enter' (עין יעקב).
(22) Isa. LVII, 2.
(23) Lit., 'and one'.
(24) Lit., 'go out to meet him'.
(25) Isa. XLVIII, 22.
(26) M.T. reads 'Ye' תשכבון. [This is also the reading of MS.M.].
(27) lsa. L, 11.
(28) Ezek. XXXII, 19.
(29) Who is maintained by her deceased husband's heirs.
(30) Lit.,'for ever'.
(31) Lit., 'until'.
(32) Lit,, 'there is (the opportunity)'.
(33) At the expense of the heirs who maintain her.
(34) To neighbours and friends, by giving them small gifts.
(35) V. supra note 8.
(36) Lit., 'for ever'.
(37) If a longer period has been allowed to pass she is presumed to have surrendered her claim. Such surrender cannot be assumed In the case of a widow who lives in her late husband's house, since the respect shewn to her by the heirs with whom she lives may well account for her bashfulness to advance a claim which might disturb the cordial relations between them.
(38) Sc. claim.
(39) Of her husband's death. They lose their claim if a longer period has been allowed to lapse.
(40) According to R. Meir's ruling in our Mishnah.
(41) One of the rich women of Jerusalem in the time of the Titus and Vespasian siege (cf. Git. 56a) whose kethubah amounted to a very high figure.
(42) A kethubah like that of the latter, surely. could not be spent in small gifts in the same period as one for the minimum amount of a kethubah.
(43) Proverb. The richer the woman the more she may be expected to spend.
(44) A widow who claimed her kethubah within twenty-five years.
(45) Sc. one twenty-fifth of her kethubah for each year that she has allowed to pass. Lit.,'divide into three'.
(46) Teku v. Glos.
(47) V. Glos.
(48) Lit., 'which he said'.
(49) Lit., 'goes out from under her hands'.
(50) It is held that if she had surrendered her kethubah she would have destroyed the deed or given it up to the heirs.
(51) For twenty-five years.
(52) Who enjoyed the protection of the heirs for all those years and who, furthermore, is not actually 'out of pocket' when her kethubah is surrendered.
(53) An objection against R. Eleazar.
(54) R. Shesheth.
(55) The Baraitha just cited.
(56) Lit., 'always'.
(57) The inference being: Only a creditor who holds no bond is not presumed to have surrendered his claim but that a widow who holds no kethubah is presumed to have surrendered her claim.
(58) In reply to the objection: How could the claim be proved in the absence of a bond?
(59) Lit., '10 what?'
(60) Lit., 'he who is liable.
(61) Cf. supra n. 7.
(62) The authors of the Baraitha.
(63) She may recover her kethubah even after twenty: five years.
(64) V. supra notes 1 and 2.
(65) Sc. that her kethubah had not yet been paid.
(66) A widow (cf. supra p. 665, n. 8).
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 104b
she is again entitled to the original period.1 and if she produced2 the deed of the kethubah she may recover [the amount of] her kethubah at any time.3
R. Nahman b. R. Hisda sent [the following message] to R. Nahman b. Jacob: Will our Master instruct us as to whether the dispute4 [refers to] one who produced a deed of the kethubah or to one who produced no deed of the kethubah,' and with whose ruling does the halachah agree? - The other replied: The dispute refers to one who produced no deed of the kethubah, but [a woman] who produced a deed of the kethubah may recover her kethubah at any time;5 and the halachah is in agreement with the ruling of the Sages.
When R. Dimi came6 he reported R. Simeon b. Pazzi who laid down in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi who had it from Bar Kappara: This7 was taught only in respect of the maneh8 and the two hundred zuz.8 To any additional jointure, however, the woman is always entitled.9 R. Abbahu in the name of R. Johanan, however, ruled: She is not entitled even to the additional jointure; for R. Aibu has laid down in the name of R. Jannai: The additional provisions10 of a kethubah are subject to the same rules11 as the kethubah itself.12 So it was also said:13 R. Abba laid down in the name of R. Huna who had it from Rab: This was taught only in respect of the maneh and the two hundred zuz. To any additional jointure, however, she is always entitled.14 Said R. Abba to R. Huna: Did Rab really say this?15 - 'Do you wish', the other replied, to silence me16 or to stand me a drink?'17 - 'I',the other replied. wish to silence you!'
The mother-in-law of R. Hiyya Arika18 was the wife of his brother,19 and [when she became] a widow lived in her father's bouse. [R. Hiyya] maintained her for twenty.five years at her paternal home [but when] at the end [of the period] she said to him. 'Supply me with my maintenance' he told her, 'You have no [longer any claim to] maintenance'. 'pay me [then', she said'my] kethubah'. 'You have no claim,' he replied- 'either to maintenance or to the kethubah' ,20 She summoned him to law before Rabbah b. Shila. 'Tell me', [the judge] said to him,21 'what exactly were the circumstances. 'I maintained her', the other21 replied. 'for twenty-five years at her paternal home and, by the life of the Master!, I carried [the stuff] to her on my shoulder'. 'What is the reason', [the judge] said to him, 'that the Rabbis22 ruled, so LONG AS SHE LIVES IN HER HUSBAND'S HOUSE [A WIDOW] MAY RECOVER HER KETHUBAH AT ANY TIME? Because we assume that she did not claim it in order [to save herself from] shame.23 Similarly here also24 [it may well be assumed] that she did not [previously] submit her claim in order [to save herself from] shame.23 Go, and supply her [maintenance]'. [As R. Hiyya] disregarded [the ruling. the judge] wrote out for her an adrakta25 on his property. Thereupon he came to Raba and said to him, 'See, Master, how he treated my case',26 'He has given you the proper ruling', the other replied. 'If that is the case',[the widow] said to him,27 'let him28 proceed to refund me the produce29 [he has consumed] since that day30 to date'. 'Shew me' he27 said to her, 'your adrakta'.31 As he observed that it did not contain the clause,32 'And we have ascertained that this estate belonged to the deceased', he said to her, 'The adrakta is not properly drawn up'.33 'Let the adrakta be dropped'. she said; 'and let me receive [the refund for the produce] from the day on which the period of the public announcement terminated34 to date'. 'This',35 he replied. applies only to a case36 where no error has crept37 into the adrakta, but where an error occurs37 in the adrakta the document possesses no validity'.38 'But did not the Master himself lay down', she exclaimed, '[that the omission39 of the clause] pledging property [is to be regarded as the] scribe's error?'40 - 'In this case', Raba told her, '[the omission] cannot be said to be a scribe's error, for even Rabbah b. Shila originally41 overlooked the point'.42 He thought: Since both belonged to him43 what matters it [whether the widow distrains] on the one or the other.44 But this is not [the proper view]. For sometimes [the widow] might go and improve those [lands]45 while those belonging to her husband46 would be allowed47 to deteriorate and [the heir might eventually] tell her, 'Take yours48 and return to me mine',49 and a stigma50 would thus fall51 upon the court.52
MISHNAH. TWO JUDGES OF CIVIL LAW53 WERE [ADMINISTERING JUSTICE] IN JERUSALEM, ADMON AND HANAN B. ABISHALOM. HANAN LAID DOWN TWO RULINGS54 AND ADMON LAID DOWN SEVEN: 55
IF A MAN WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA AND HIS WIFE CLAIMED MAINTENANCE, HANAN RULED:
(1) Of twenty-five years. Lit. , 'behold she is as at first'.
(2) Lit. , 'goes out from under her hands'.
(3) Cf. supra note 12.
(4) Between R. MEIR and THE SAGES.
(5) Cf. supra p. 667. n. 12.
(6) From Palestine to Babylon.
(7) That after a period of twenty-five years a widow is presumed to have surrendered her kethubah.
(8) V. Glos., sc. the statutory kethubah which is one maneh in the case of marriage with a widow and two hundred zuz in that with a virgin.
(9) Since this may be regarded as a gift (and not as the legal kethubah) from the husband to his wife.
(10) Lit., 'conditions', of which the additional jointure is one.
(11) Lit., 'like'.
(12) One who loses the statutory kethubah must also forfeit the additional jointure.
(13) By Amoraim.
(14) V. supra notes 4 to 6.
(15) [MS.M. inserts, He (R. Huna) said he was silenced; cf. Ned. Sonc. ed. p. 242. notes.]
(16) I.e., was his question intended to imply incredulity?
(17) I.e., he wished in all earnestness to ascertain whether Rab had actually made that statement so that in return for the valuable information he might treat him to a cup of wine. אישתיקן and אשקײן a play upon the similarity of the letters.
(18) The tall.
(19) Who died childless and whose estate was inherited by R. Hiyya.
(20) In accordance with the ruling of the Sages in our Mishnah.
(21) R. Hiyya.
(22) Sc. THE SAGES.
(23) Cf. supra p. 665. n. 16, second clause.
(24) Where so much respect was shewn to her by R. Hiyya that he carried her foodstuffs to her on his shoulder.
(25) אדרכתא (rt. דרך 'to tread'). an authorization following that of another legal document called tirpa (cf. B.B. , Sonc. ed., p 738. n. 1) which a court issues to a claimant after he had traced the defendant's property. to seize it (to 'tread' on) for the purpose of having it offered for public sale and his recovering the proceeds or the land itself at the Price valued.
(26) Lit., 'judged me'.
(28) R. Hiyya.
(29) Of the land that was valued at a sum corresponding to that of her kethubah.
(30) On which she received the adrakta (according to the opinion of Rabbah). when it was signed (according to Abaye). or when the period of the announcement of the public sale terminated (according to Raba). From such date the land passes into the possession of the claimant and its produce also from that day onwards belongs to him (cf. B.M. 36b).
(31) V. supra p. 669. n. 7.
(32) Lit., 'that it was not written in it'.
(33) The adrakta referred to all R. Hiyya's landed property. while legally it should have been restricted to those which he inherited from his deceased brother. On his own lands the widow could have no claim whatsoever.
(34) In agree. melt with the view of Raba (cf. supra p. 669. n. 12). After the claimant discovers a field that belonged to the defendant he reports to the court who value it, and arrange for a period of thirty days for the public announcement. at the end of which the claimant comes into possession (v. B.M. 35b).
(35) That the land passes into the possession of the claimant on one of the dates mentioned (supra p. 669. n. 12).
(36) Lit., 'these words'.
(37) Lit., 'is written'.
(38) Lit., we have not in it'; the land does not pass into the ownership of the claimant until he takes actual possession of it.
(39) From a deed.
(40) And is deemed to have been entered though the scribe had omitted it (B.M. 140. B.B. 169b). Why then should an error in the adrakta cause its invalidity?
(41) [Rightly omitted in MS.M.]
(42) Lit., 'in that'. In that he had an adrakta made out against R. Hiyya's own property.
(43) R. Hiyya.
(44) R. Hiyya's brother's or his own. Hence he drew up the adrakta on all R. Hiyya's lands.
(45) Which did not belong to her husband but to his heir and which the court handed over to her in return for her claim.
(46) And were legally pledged for her kethubah.
(47) By the heir who is well aware that he can at any time re-claim his own land and transfer the property of the deceased to his widow,
(48) Cf. supra p. 670, n. 16.
(49) Cf. supra p. 670. n. 15.
(50) Lit., 'murmur', 'reflection'.
(51) Lit., 'and come to bring out'.
(52) Who would be accused of carelessness or indifference in the provision they made for the widow.
(53) גזירות (plural of גזירה, 'decree', 'decision'). Var., גזילות (plural of גזילה 'robbery') v. infra. Cf. B.K. 58b, Sonc. ed. p. 340, n. 1.
(54) From which the Sages differed.
(55) V. supra n. 2. The rulings are enumerated in this Mishnah and in those following.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 105a
SHE MUST TAKE AN OATH1 AT THE END2 BUT NOT AT THE BEGINNING.3 THE SONS OF THE HIGH PRIESTS,4 HOWEVER, DIFFERED FROM HIM AND RULED THAT SHE MUST TAKE AN OATH BOTH AT THE BEGINNING3 AND AT THE END.2 R. DOSA B. HARKINAS AGREED WITH THEIR RULING. R. JOHANAN B. ZAKKAI SAID: HANAN HAS SPOKEN WELL; SHE NEED TAKE AN OATH ONLY AT THE END.2
GEMARA. I Would point out an Inconsistency: 'Three judges in cases of robbery5 were [administering justice] in Jerusalem. Admon b. Gadai,6 Hanan the Egyptian and Hanan b. Abishalom'. Is there not an inconsistency between 'three'7 and 'TWO', and an inconsistency between 'CIVIL'8 and 'robbery'?9 One might well admit that there is no [real] inconsistency between the 'three' and the 'TWO' since he10 may be enumerating [only those] whom he con siders important11 and omitting12 [the one] whom he does not consider important. Does not, however, the inconsistency between 'CIVIL' and 'robbery' remain? - R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: [Both terms may be justified on the grounds] that they13 imposed fines14 for acts of robbery;15 as it was taught: If [a beast] nipped off a plant, said R. Jose. the Judges of Civil Law in Jerusalem ruled that if the plant was in its first year [the owner of the beast pays as compensation] two silver pieces.16 if it was in its second year [he pays as compensation] four silver pieces.17
I point out [another] contradiction: Three judges of Civil Law were [administering justice] in Jerusalem. Admon, and Hanan and Nahum?18 - R. Papa replied: He who mentioned Nahum was R. Nathan;19 for it was taught: R. Nathan stated, 'Nahum the Mede also was one of the Judges of Civil Law in Jerusalem', but the Sages did not agree with him.
Were there, however, no more [judges]? [Did not] R. Phinehas. in fact, state on the authority of R. Oshaia that there were three hundred and ninety four courts of law20 in Jerusalem, and an equal number of Synagogues. of Houses of Study21 and of schools?22 - Judges there were many, but we were speaking of Judges of Civil Law only.
Rab Judah stated in the name of R. Assi: The Judges of Civil Law in Jerusalem received their salaries out of the Temple funds23 [at the rate of] ninety-nine maneh.24 If they were not satisfied is they were given an increase.
[You say] 'They were not satisfied'?25 Are we dealing with wicked men?26 The reading in fact is,27 [If the amount was] not Sufficient28 an increase was granted to them even if they objected.29
Karna30 used to take one istira31 from the innocent32 party and one istira from the guilty party and then informed them of his decision.33 But how could he34 act in such a manner? Is it not written in Scripture, And thou shalt take no gift?35 And should you reply that this applies only where he does not take from both [litigants] since he might [in consequence] wrest judgment, but Karna, since he took [the same amount] from both parties, would not come to wrest judgment, [it can be retorted:] Is this permitted even where one would not come to wrest judgment? Was it not in fact taught: What was the purpose of the statement And thou shalt take no gift?35 If to teach that one must not acquit the guilty or that one must not condemn the innocent [the objection Surely could be raised]. It was already specifically stated elsewhere in Scripture, Thou shalt not wrest judgement.36 Consequently it must be concluded that even [where the intention is] to acquit the innocent or to condemn the guilty the Torah laid down, And thou shalt take no gift?37 - This37 applies only where [the judge] takes [the gift] as a bribe,38 but Karna took [the two istira] as a fee.39 But is it permissible [for a judge to take money] as a fee.39 Have we not in fact learned: The legal decisions of one who takes a fee for acting as judge are null and void?40 - This40 applies only to a fee for pronouncing judgment, while Karna was only taking compensation for loss of work.41
But [is a judge] permitted to take compensation for loss of work? Was it not in fact taught: Contemptible is the judge who takes a fee for pronouncing judgment; but his decision is valid?42 Now, what is to be understood [by fee]. If it be suggested [that it means] a fee for acting as judge [the objection would arise: How could be said,] 'his decision is valid', when in fact we have learned:43 The legal decisions of one who takes a fee for acting as judge are null and void? Consequently it must mean44 a fee for loss of work,45 and yet it was stated, was it not, 'Contemptible is the judge etc.'? - This applies only to a loss of work that cannot be proved, but Karna received [compensation for] loss of work that could be proved. for he was [regularly occupied in] smelling tests46 at a wine store,47 and for this he was paid a fee.48 This is similar to the case49 of R. Huna. When a lawsuit was brought to him, he used to say to the [litigants]. 'Provide me with a man who will draw the water50 in my place51 and I will pronounce judgment for you'.
Said R. Abbahu: Come and see how blind are the eyes of those who take a bribe. If a man has pain in his eyes he pays away money to a medical man and he may be cured or he nay not be cured, yet these take what is only worth one perutah52 and blind their eyes [therewith]. for it is said in Scripture. For a gift blindeth them that have sight.53
Our Rabbis taught: For a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise,54 and much more so those of the foolish; And pervert the words of the righteous,54 and much more so those of the wicked. Are then fools and wicked men capable of acting as judges?55 - But it is this that is meant: 'For a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise', even a great Sage who takes bribes will not depart from the world without [the affliction of] a dullness of the mind,56 'And pervert the words of the righteous',
(1) That she has no property of her husband's in her possession.
(2) Sc. when her husband dies and she claims her kethubah.
(3) I.e., during his lifetime when she claims her maintenance.
(4) בני כהנים גדולים A similar description occurs in Oh. XVII, 5. Cf. supra p. 64, n. 6, בית דין של כהנים 'Priestly Court' or 'Court of Priests'.
(5) Or any damage.
(6) I.e, Admon mentioned in our Mishnah.
(7) In the Baraitha cited.
(8) Cf. supra note 1.
(9) In the Baraitha cited.
(10) The author of our Mishnah.
(11) On the admissibility of another rendering v. Tosaf. s.v., דחשיב, a.I.
(12) Lit., 'did not teach'.
(13) The judges mentioned.
(14) Lit., 'decreed decrees'. Hence the term 'CIVIL' גזירות: (v. supra p. 672, n. 1) in our Mishnah.
(15) גזילות (cf. supra p. 672, nn. 1 and 8). Hence the justification for the use of this term in the Baraitha.
(16) A silver piece = one ma'ah or a third of a denar, v. Glos.
(17) B.K. 58b.
(18) Inconsistent with our Mishnah which mentions only TWO. V., however, Tosaf s.v. דחשיב.
(19) [Who considered Nahum important, v. Maharsha].
(20) Each consisting of twenty-three judges.
(21) For Mishnah and Talmud.
(22) For children.
(23) תרומת הלשכה, lit., 'heave-offering of the (people) to the (Temple treasure) chamber'.
(24) V. Glos.
(25) לא רצו
(26) Who expect from the public funds more than is required for a decent living. A judge's salary most not exceed the actual cost of his living (v. Rashi).
(27) Lit., 'but'.
(28) To provide for a decent living.
(29) V. supra p. 673, n. 15.
(30) A judge if the Exile. Cf Sanh. 17b, Sonc. ed. p.88, n. 5.
(31) V. Glos.
(32) A the party in whose favour judgment was to he given.
(33) Lit., 'and judged for them the law'.
(35) Ex. XXIII. 8.
(36) [Deut. XVI, 19.
(37) Ex. XXIII, 8.
(38) Sc. with the intention of perverting judgment.
(39) For his professional services.
(40) Kid. 58, Bek. 29a.
(41) Lit 'idleness'.
(42) Lit, 'his Judgment is judgment'. a fee for acting as judge [the objection would arise: How could it be said,] 'his decision is valid', when in fact we have learned: 1 The
(43) So Bah. Cur. edd. 'it was taught'.
(44) Lit., 'but'.
(45) Lit., 'idleness'.
(46) To advise the owner as to which wine could be stored for longer and which only for shorter periods.
(47) אמברא Rashi reads the noun in the pl., stores'.
(48) Lit., 'and they gave him a zuz' (v. Glos.). When acting as judge he was entitled to demand compensation for his loss.
(49) Lit., 'like that'.
(50) 'For the irrigation of my land'.
(51) בחריקאי, cf. supra p. 364. n. 4
(52) The smallest coin, v.Glos.
(54) Deut. XVI, 19.
(55) Obviously not; how then is it likely that anyone would offer them any bribe
(56) Lit., 'blindness of heart'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 105b
even one who is righteous in every respect and takes bribes will not depart from this world without [the affliction of] confusion of mind. When R. Dimi came1 he related that R. Nahman b. Kohen made the following exposition: What was meant by the Scriptural text, The King by justice establisheth the land, but he that loveth gifts overthroweth it? If the judge is like a king who is not in need of anything2 he establisheth the land, but if he is like a priest who moves to and fro among the threshing floors,3 he overthroweth it.4
Rabbah b. R. Shila stated: Any judge who is in the habit of borrowing5 is unfit to pronounce judgment. This, however, applies only where he possesses nothing to lend to others, but where he possesses things to lend [his borrowing] does not matter.6 This, however, cannot surely be correct;7 for did not Raba borrow things from the household of Bar Merion, although they did not borrow anything from him? - There he desired to give them better standing.8
Raba stated: What is the reason for [the prohibition9 against taking] a gift?10 Because as soon as a man receives a gift from another he becomes so well disposed towards him11 that he becomes like his own person, and no man sees himself in the wrong.12 What [is the meaning of] shohad?13 She-hu had.14
R. Papa said: A man should not act as judge either for one whom he loves or for one whom he hates; for no man can see the guilt of one whom he loves or the merit of one whom he hates.
Abaye said: If a scholar15 is loved by the townspeople [their love] is not due to his superiority but [to the fact] that he does not rebuke them for [neglecting] spiritual16 matters.
Raba remarked: At first I thought that all the people of Mahuza17 loved me. When I was appointed judge18 I thought that some19 would hate me and others20 would love me. Having observed, however, that the man who loses21 to-day22 wins tomorrow I came to the conclusion that if I am loved they all love me and if I am hated they must all hate me.
Our Rabbis taught: And thou shalt take no gift;23 there was no need to speak of [the prohibition of] a gift of money, but [this was meant:] Even a bribe of words24 is also forbidden, for Scripture does not write, And thou shalt take no gain.25 What is to be understood by 'a bribe of words'?24 - As the bribe offered to Samuel.26 He was once crossing [a river] on a board27 when a man came up and offered him his hand.28 'What', [Samuel] asked him, 'is your business here?' - 'I have a lawsuit', the other replied. 'l', came the reply, 'am disqualified from acting for you in the suit'.
Amemar was once engaged in the trial of an action,29 when a bird flew down upon his head and a man approached and removed it. 'What is your business here?' [Amemar] asked him. 'I have a lawsuit', the other replied. 'I', came the reply, 'am disqualified from acting as your judge'.
Mar 'Ukba once ejected some saliva30 and a man approached and covered it. 'What is your business here?' [Mar 'Ukba] asked him. 'l have a lawsuit', the man replied. 'I', came the reply, 'am disqualified from acting as your judge'.
R. Ishmael son of R. Jose, whose aris31 was wont to bring him a basket full of fruit32 every Friday33 but on one occasion34 brought it to him on a Thursday, asked the latter, 'Why the present change?' I have a lawsuit', the other replied, 'and thought that at the same time35 I might bring [the fruit] to the Master'. He did not accept it from him [and] said,'I am disqualified to act as your judge'. He thereupon appointed a couple of Rabbis to try the case for him. As he was arranging the affair36 he [found himself] thinking, 'If he37 wished he could plead thus, or if he preferred he might plead thus'.38 'Oh', he exclaimed, 'the despair that waits for those who take bribes'!39 If I, who have not taken [the fruit at all], and even if I had taken I would only have taken what is my own, am In such [a state of mind], show much more [Would that40 be the state of] those who accept bribes'.
A man once brought to R. Ishmael b. Elisha41 [a gift of] the firstfleece.42 'Whence',the latter asked him, 'are you?' - 'From such and such a place', the other replied. 'But', [R. Ishmael] asked, 'was there no priest to whom to give it [in any of the places] between that place and this?'43 - 'I have a lawsuit', the other replied, 'and thought that at the same time44 I would bring [the gift] to the Master'.He said to him, 'I am unfit to try your action',and refused to receive [the gift] from him. [Thereupon] he appointed two Rabbis to try his action. As he was arranging this affair45 he [found himself] thinking, 'If he46 wished he could plead thus, or if he preferred he might plead thus'.47 'Oh', he exclaimed, 'the despair that awaits those who take bribes! If I, who did not take [the gift], and even if l had taken it I would only have accepted that which is my due, am in such [a state of mind], how much more [would that be the case with ] those who accept bribes'.
A man once brought to R. Anan a bale of small marsh fish.48 'What is your business here', the latter asked him. 'I have a lawsuit', the other replied. [R. Anan] did not accept it from him, and told him, 'I am disqualified to try your action'. 'I would not now request', the other said to him, 'the Master's decision [in my lawsuit]; will the Master, however, at least accept [the present] so that I may not be prevented from offering my first-fruit?49 For it was taught: And there came a man from Baal-shalishah, and brought the man of God bread of the first-fruits, twenty loaves of barley, and fresh ears of corn in his sack;50 but was Elisha51 entitled to eat first-fruit?52 This, however, was intended to tell you that one who brings a gift to a scholar [is doing as good a deed] as if he had offered first-fruits'. It was not my intention to accept [your gift', R. Anan] said to him, 'but now that you have given me a reason I will accept it' - Thereupon he sent him to R. Nahman to whom he also dispatched [the following message:] 'Will the Master try [the action of] this man, for I, Anan,53 am disqualified from acting as judge for him'. 'Since he has sent me such a message', [R. Nahman] thought, 'he must be his relative' -54 An orphans' lawsuit was then in progress55 before him; and he reflected:
(1) From Palestine to Babylon.
(2) Sc. is independent of other people's help or favours.
(3) Collecting his dues.
(4) Cf Sanh. 7b.
(5) Any objects. The verb שאל, here used, does not apply to money.
(6) Lit., 'we have nothing against it'.
(7) Lit., 'Is it really so?'
(8) His borrowing was of no benefit to himself. Lit., 'to cause them to be important'. For a similar reason Rabbah levied a contribution for charity on the orphans of the house of Bar Merion (cf. B.B. 8a).
(9) Upon a judge.
(10) Even where the judge intended to act justly.
(11) Lit., 'his mind draws near to him'.
(12) Lit., 'guilt'.
(13) שוחד, 'gift', 'bribe'.
(14) שהוא חד, 'that he (the recipient) is one (with the giver)'. This is not intended as etymology but as a word play.
(15) Lit., 'one who has caught fire by (association with) Rabbis'.
(16) Lit 'of heaven'.
(17) V. supra p. 319, n. 9'
(18) In that town.
(19) Who would lose their lawsuits.
(20) In whose favour judgment would be given.
(21) Lit, 'who is made guilty'.
(22) Lit., 'now'.
(23) Ex. XXIII, 8.
(24) Or 'acts'.
(25) בצע which would have meant a monetary bribe.
(26) Lit., 'as that of Samuel'.
(27) Or 'ferry'.
(28) To assist him.
(29) Lit., 'was sitting and deciding a law'.
(30) Lit., 'threw saliva before him'.
(31) Gardener-tenant (v. Glos.).
(32) As rent, from R. Ishmael's garden which he cultivated.
(33) מעלי שבתא, lit., 'entering of the Sabbath', sc. Sabbath Eve.
(34) Lit., 'day'.
(35) Lit., 'by the way'.
(36) Lit., 'went and came'.
(37) His aris.
(38) All possible pleadings in favour of the aris rose spontaneously to his mind.
(39) So Jast. תיפח נפשם, lit., 'may their ghost blow out', or 'be blown' (rt. נפח 'to blow').
(40) Cf. supra n.3.
(41) Who was a priest and entitled to the priestly does.
(42) Cf. Deut. XVIII, 4.
(43) Lit., 'from there to here'.
(44) Lit., 'by the way'.
(45) Lit., 'went and came'.
(46) The man who offered him the priestly due.
(47) Cf. supra notes 1-5.
(48) בי גילי 'among the marshes'. Sc. that live among the reeds in the swamps ( Jast.). [Obermeyer p. 245. n. 1 suggests בי גילי to be the name of a place, Al Kil on the Tigris].
(49) Cf. Ex. XXIII, 19.
(50) II Kings IV, 42.
(51) Who was no priest. Tradition ascribes him to the tribe of Gad (cf. Pesah. 68a and Rosh. a.l.).
(52) Obviously not; why then did he accept 'first-fruits'?
(53) Wanting in MS.M.
(54) It is forbidden to act as judge or witness in a relative's lawsuit.
(55) Lit., 'was standing'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 106a
The one1 is a positive precept and the other2 is also a positive precept. but the positive precept of shewing respect for the Torah2 must take precedence. He, therefore, postponed3 the orphans' case and brought up that man's suit. When the other party4 noticed the honour he was shewing him5 he remained speechless.6 [Until that happened] Elijah7 was a frequent visitor of R. Anan whom he was teaching the Order of Elijah.8 but as soon as he9 acted in the manner described10 [Elijah] stayed away. He9 Spent his time11 in fasting, and in prayers for [God's] mercy, [until Elijah] came to him again; but when he appeared he greatly frightened him. Thereupon he12 made a box [for himself] and in it he sat before him until he concluded his Order with him. And this is [the reason] why people speak of the Seder Eliyyahu Rabbah and the Seder Eliyyahu Zuta.13
In the days14 of R. Joseph there was a famine.15 Said the Rabbis to R. Joseph, 'Will the Master offer prayers for [heavenly] mercy'? He replied, 'If Elisha, with whom, when the [main body of] Rabbis had departed, there still remained two thousand and two hundred Rabbis,16 did not offer up any prayers for mercy in a time of famine,15 should I [at such a time venture to] offer prayers for mercy? But whence is it inferred that so many remained? - [From Scripture] where it is written, And his servant said: How should I set this before a hundred men.?17 Now what is meant by [the expression.] 'Before a hundred men'? If it be suggested that all18 [was to be set] before the hundred men [one might well object that] in years of famine [all this] is rather a large quantity. Consequently it must be concluded19 that each [loaf was set] before a hundred men.20
When the [main body of] Rabbis departed from the school of Rab there still remained behind one thousand and two hundred Rabbis; [when they departed] from the school of R. Huna there remained behind eight hundred Rabbis. R. Huna when delivering his discourses [was assisted] by thirteen interpreters.21 When the Rabbis stood up after R. Huna's discourses22 and shook out their garments the dust rose [so high] that it obscured the [light of] day, and people in Palestine23 said, 'They have risen after the discourses of R. Huna the Babylonian' - When [the main body of] Rabbis departed from the schools of Rabbah and R. Joseph there remained four hundred Rabbis and they described themselves as orphans. When [the main body of] Rabbis departed from the school of Abaye
(others say, From the school of R. Papa, while still others say, From the school of R. Ashi) there remained two hundred Rabbis, and these described themselves as orphans of the orphans.
R. Isaac b. Radifa said in the name of R. Ammi: The inspectors of [animal] blemishes24 in Jerusalem received their wages from the Temple funds.25 Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: The learned men who taught the priests the laws of ritual slaughter received their fees from the Temple funds.25 R. Giddal said in the name of Rab: The learned men who taught the priests the rules of kemizah26 received their fees from the Temple funds.25 Rabbah b. Bar Hana said in the name of R. Johanan: Book readers27 in Jerusalem received their fees from the Temple funds.28
R. Nahman said: Rab stated that the women who wove the [Temple] curtains received their wages from the Temple funds25 but I maintain [that they received them] from the sums consecrated for Temple repairs, since the curtains were a substitute for builder's work.
An objection was raised: The women who wove the [Temple] curtains, and the house of Garmo29 [who were in charge] of the preparation of the shewbread,30 and the house of Abtinas29 [who were in charge] of the preparation of the incense,31 received their wages from the Temple funds!32 - There33 [it may be replied] the reference is [to the curtains] of the gates;34 for R. Zera related in the name of Rab: There were thirteen curtains in the second Temple, seven corresponding to the seven gates,35 one for the entrance to the Hekal,36 one for the entrance to the 'Ulam,36 two37 [at the entrance] to the Debir36 and two [above them and] corresponding to them in the upper storey.38
Our Rabbis taught: The women who brought up their children for the [services of the red] heifer,39 received their wages from the Temple funds. Abba Saul said: The notable40 women of Jerusalem fed them and maintained them.
R. Huna enquired of Rab:
(1) Lit., 'that', to judge the orphan.
(2) Respect for a man of learning (cf. B.K. 41b) and consequently also for those who are related to him.
(3) Lit., removed', 'put aside'.
(4) Lit., 'the master of his law (suit').
(5) His opponent. whom R. Nahman presumed to he R. Anan's relative.
(6) Lit., 'his plea was stopped'.
(7) Cf supra p. 488, n. 6.
(8) סדר אליהו, a Rabbinic work of mysterious origin and authorship.
(9) R. Anan.
(10) Lit , 'thus'. He allowed himself to be the unconscious tool of the man who cunningly bribed him.
(11) Lit., 'sat'.
(12) R. Anan.
(13) The former was taught when P. Anan was without, the latter when he was within, the box (Rashi). [Tosaf.: the Treatise consists of a large and small book, hence the names Rabbah and Zuta. Both constitute the Midrash known as Tanna debe Eliyyaha].
(14) Lit., 'years'. a reference perhaps to the period during which he was head of the academy.
(15) ריתחא, lit., 'agitation'. excitement', hence 'anger'. Owing to God's anger the world was afflicted with famine (v. Rashi).
(16) To dine with him.
(17) II Kings IV, 43.
(18) Lit., 'all of them', i.e., the twenty loaves of barley and fresh ears of corn, enumerated in the preceding verse.
(19) Lit., 'but'.
(20) There were twenty loaves of barley (II Kings II, 42). one loaf of bread of the first-fruits (ibid.) and one loaf of fresh ears of corn (ibid.). a total of twenty-two loaves. Since each loaf was set before a hundred men the total number of the men must have been (twenty-two times one hundred =) two thousand two hundred (Rashi).
(21) Each of whom addressed a section of the crowded audiences, v. Glos. s.v. Amora.
(22) Lit., 'sitting'.
(23) Lit., 'in the west'.
(24) מבקרי מומין, lit., 'those who examine blemishes', officials whose duty it was to ascertain whether any beast was unfit as a sacrifice owing to a disqualifying blemish.
(25) תרומת הלשכה, v. supra p. 673, n. 13.
(26) קמיצה, (rt. קמץ, 'to close the hand'), 'taking a handful' from a meal-offering. Cf. e.g., Lev. II, 2 and Men. 11a.
(27) Who check scribal errors.
(28) In order to preserve the accuracy of the written word the services of the readers were placed free at the disposal of any member of the public (cf. Rashi).
(29) A priestly family.
(30) Cf. Ex. XXV. 30 and Yoma 38a.
(31) Cf. Ex. XXX, 23ff and Yoma 38a.
(32) An objection against R. Nahman.
(33) In the Baraitha just cited.
(34) Which cannot be regarded as forming a part of the structure of the building, while R.Nahman spoke of those curtains that replaced a wall that in the first Temple formed the partition between the Holy of Holies and the Hekal (v. infra n.5 and Yoma 51b).
(35) Of the Temple court.
(36) The Hekal (היכל) or 'Holy', was situated between the 'Ulam (אולם) the Temple porch and the Debir (דביר), and contained the candlestick, the table for the shewbread and the golden altar. The Debir, or the Holy of Holies, contained the ark and the cherubim.
(37) With a space of one cubit between them in place of the thickness of the wall in the first Temple (cf. supra note 3).
(38) To form a partition between the chamber above the Debir and that above the Hekal.
(39) Cf. Num. XIX, 2ff. Certain services in connection with its preparation had to be entrusted to children who from birth were brought up under conditions of scrupulous ritual purity. For this purpose the mothers had to live in specially constructed buildings from the ante-natal period until the time the children were ready for their duties. (Cf. Suk. 21a).
(40) Rich (Rashi).
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 106b
May vessels of ministry1 be procured2 with the offerings consecrated to Temple repair? Are these [a part of] the equipment3 of the altar and were, therefore,4 purchased5 with the offerings consecrated to Temple repair, or are they rather among the requirements of the sacrifices and were, therefore, procured6 with the Temple funds? - 'They'. the other7 replied, 'may be procured2 with the Temple funds only'.
He raised an objection against him; And when they had made an end, they brought the rest of the money8 before the King and Jehoiada,9 whereof were made vessels for the house of the Lord, even vessels wherewith to minister10 etc. - The other11 replied: He that taught you the Hagiographa did not teach you the Prophets: But there were not made for the hose of the Lord cups12 etc. for they gave that to them that did the work.13 But if so,is there not a contradiction between the two Scriptural texts? - There is really no contradiction. The former is a case14 where after the collections were made [for Temple repair] there remained a balance,15 while the latter14 is a case where no balance remained.16 But even if there was a balance after the Collection had been made, what of it?17 R. Abbahu replied: Beth din make a mental18 Stipulation that if they19 be required they should be utilized for their original purpose20 and that if [they would] not [be required] they should be [spent] on vessels of ministry.
A Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael taught: Vessels of ministry were provided21 from the Temple funds; for it is said in Scriptures The rest of the money,22 now what funds shewed a balance?23 Obviously24 the Temple funds.25 But might it not be suggested that only the balance itself [could be spent on the vessels of ministry]?26 - As Raba said,27 The burnt-offering28 implies the first burnt-offering,29 so must the money30 imply the first money.31 An objection was raised: The incense and all congregational sacrifices were provided32 from the Temple funds; the golden altar,33 the frankincense34 and the vessels of ministry were provided from the residue of the drink-offerings;35 the altar for the burnt-offerings,36 the chambers and the courts were provided from the funds that were dedicated for Temple repair, [and whatever was situated] outside the court walls37 was provided out of the surplus of the Temple funds;38 and it is this that [explains what] we learned: The city wall and its towers and all other requirements of the city were provided from the surplus of the Temple funds?39 - This [point40 is in fact a question at issue between] Tannaim. For we learned: What were they doing41 with the surplus of the offerings [for the Temple funds]?42 Beaten gold [plates that served as] a covering for [the walls and floor]43 of the Holy of Holies. R. Ishmael said: The surplus of the fruit44 [was spent on the purchase of sacrifices] for the dry season45 of the altar, while the surplus of the offerings [for the Temple funds] was spent upon vessels of ministry. R. Akiba said: The surplus of the offerings [for the Temple funds was spent on sacrifices] for the dry season of the altar while the surplus of the drink-offerings35 was used for [the purchase of] the vessels of ministry. R. Hanina, the deputy High Priest, said: The surplus of the drink-offerings [was spent on sacrifices] for the dry season of the altar, while the surplus of the offerings [for the Temple funds was spent] on vessels of ministry. And neither the one nor the other46 admitted that [there ever was a surplus] in the [proceeds of the] fruit.47
What is [meant by] 'fruit'?48 - It was taught: What were they doing with the surplus of the offering [to the Temple funds]?49 They bought fruit at a low price and sold it at a higher price, and with the profits sacrifices were purchased for the dry season of the altar; and it is this that [explains what] we learned: The surplus of the fruits was spent on sacrifices for the dry season of the altar. What is meant by 'neither the one nor the other admitted that [there ever was a surplus] in [proceeds of the] fruit'?50 - [The following of] which we learned: What were they doing with the surplus51 of the Temple funds? They purchased therewith wines, oils and various kinds of fine flour, and the profit [resulting was credited] to the sacred funds; so R. Ishmael. R. Akiba said: No sale for profit is made with the sacred funds nor out of those of the poor.52 Why [may no sales for profit be made] with sacred funds? - There must be no poverty where there is wealth. Why [is] no [sale for profit made] with the poor funds? - Because a poor man might come unexpectedly and there would be nothing to give him.
IF A MAN WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA. It was stated: Rab ruled,
(1) For use on the 'external' altar, a stone structure in the Temple court.
(2) Lit., 'made'.
(3) Lit., 'need', 'requirement'.
(4) Since the altar was builder's work.
(5) Lit. 'come'.
(6) Lit., 'they were making them'.
(8) That was dedicated to Temple repair.
(9) 'The priest' is in cur.edd. enclosed in parentheses. It does not appear in M.T.
(10) II Chron. XXIV, 14; which proves that offerings for Temple repair may be used for the provision of vessels of ministry. An objection against Rab.
(12) Sc. vessels of ministry.
(13) II Kings XII. 14-15.
(14) Lit., 'here'.
(15) Lit., 'they collected and left over'; hence it was permissible to procure 'vessels wherewith to minister' with the balance.
(16) Lit., 'where they collected and did not leave'.
(17) Cf. supra n.8 ab init.; how could funds collected for one purpose lawfully be used for another?
(18) Lit., 'heart'.
(19) The funds collected.
(20) Lit., 'if they were required they were required'.
(21) Lit., 'come'.
(22) II Chron. XXIV, 14.
(23) Lit, 'which is the money that has a remainder'.
(24) Lit.. 'be saying, this'.
(25) Since after the current yearly expenses were met the balance was allowed to remain in the treasury.
(26) But the main funds could not.
(27) Pes. 58b, B.K. 111a.
(28) העולה Lev. VI, 5, emphasis on the definite article.
(29) Sc. that is offered on the altar every morning before all other sacrifices.
(30) הכסף (II Chron. XXIV, 14) emphasis again on the definite article (cf. supra n.21).
(31) I.e., the income of the current year, and not only the balance. Cf. infra p. 684, n. 7.
(32) Lit., 'come'.
(33) Which, since it was not attached to the ground and was movable, was not regarded as a part of the structure of the building.
(34) That was placed at the side of the shewbread. The Wilna Gaon omits frankincense; v. J. Shek. IV, 3.
(35) This is explained in Men. 90a.
(36) The 'external' altar, cf. supra p. 682, n. 10.
(37) E.g., the women's court and the city walls.
(38) Sc. after the expenses for the current year have been met. Cf. supra p. 683, n. 24.
(39) Shek. IV, 2. Does not this Baraitha, which lays down that vessels of ministry were provided out of the surplus of the drink-offerings contradict the teaching of the school of R. Ishmael?
(40) From which funds the vessels of ministry were procured.
(41) When the new year began on the first of Nisan and the funds of the previous year were no longer allowed to be used for the purchase of congregational sacrifices.
(42) Of the previous year.
(44) This is explained infra.
(45) קיץ המזבח. Sc. when no private offerings were available and the altar lay idle; v. Shebu., Sonc. ed. p. 50, n. 3.
(46) Lit., 'and this and this', sc. R. Akiba and R. Hanina.
(47) Shek. 6a. Thus it is shewn that the opinion expressed at the school of R. Ishmael is a question in dispute between Tannaim.
(48) In the Mishnah just cited.
(49) V. supra P. 684, n. 10.
(50) Sc. how could they be so sure of the conditions of the market at all times?
(51) Lit., 'surplus of the remainder'.
(52) Shek. IV, 3. R. Akiba, and similarly R. Hanina (cf. supra n. 1). is thus of the opinion that there could never have been a surplus of tho fruit since it was never sold.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 107a
An allowance for maintenance must be granted1 to a married woman,2 but Samuel ruled: No allowance may be granted1 to a married woman.2 Said Samuel: Abba3 agrees with me [that no allowance is to be granted]4 during the first three months,5 because no man leaves his house empty. In a case where a report was received6 that he7 was dead there is no difference of opinion between them.8 They only differ when no one heard that he7 was dead. Rab ruled, 'An allowance for maintenance must be granted' since he7 is under an obligation [to maintain her]; on what ground however, did Samuel rule, 'No allowance may be granted'? - R. Zebid replied: Because it might well be assumed that he handed over to her some bundles [of valuables].9 R. Papa replied: We must take into consideration the possibility that he told her, 'Deduct [the proceeds of] your handiwork10 for your maintenance'.11 What is the practical difference between them?12 - The practical difference between them is the case of a woman who is of age13 but [the proceeds of whose handiwork] did not suffice [for her maintenance],14 or a minor15 [the proceeds of whose handiwork] is sufficient [for her maintenance].16
We learned: IF A MAN WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA AND HIS WIFE CLAIMED MAINTENANCE, HANAN RULED: SHE MUST TAKE AN OATH AT THE END BUT NOT AT THE BEGINNING. THE SONS OF THE HIGH PRIESTS, HOWEVER, DIFFERED FROM HIM AND RULED THAT SHE MUST TAKE AN OATH BOTH AT THE BEGINNING AND AT THE END. They thus17 differ only in respect of the oath but [agree, do they not,] that maintenance must be given to her?18 - Samuel explained [this to refer to a case] where a report had been received that [the absent husband] was dead. Come and hear: If [a husband] went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance she must, said the sons of the High Priests, take an oath,19 Hanan said: She need not take an oath. If [the husband] came, however, and declared, 'I have provided for her maintenance'20 he is believed.21 Here also [it may be replied] is a case where a report was received that he was dead. But, did it not Say, 'If [the husband] came, however, and declared'?22 [The meaning of the expression is,] If he came after the report had been received.
Come and hear: If [a husband] went to a country beyond the sea, and his wife claimed maintenance, and he returned and said [to her], 'Deduct your handiwork for your maintenance', he is entitled [to withhold it]. If Beth din, however, granted the allowance before [he returned] their decision is valid.23 Here also it is a case where a report that he had died was received.
Come and hear: If [a husband] went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance, Beth din take possession of24 his estate and provide food and clothing for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters or for anything else!25 - R. Shesheth replied; [Here it is a case] where a husband maintained his wife at the hands of a trustee.26 If so, [should not maintenance be granted to] one's sons and daughters also?27 [It is a case] where [a husband] made provision for the maintenance of his wife28 but not of his daughters.28
Whence this certainty?29 - This, however, said R. Papa, [is the explanation: This is a case] where she heard from one witness that [her husband] had died. To her, since she could Marry on the evidence of one witness, we must also grant maintenance; to his sons and daughters, however, since they, even if they desired it, could not be allowed to take possession of his estate on the evidence of one witness, maintenance also may not be granted - What [is meant by] 'anything else'? R. Hisda replied: Cosmetics. R. Joseph replied: Charity. According to him who replied, 'Cosmetics' the ruling30 would apply with even greater force to
(1) By the court, out of her husband's estate.
(2) Whose husband is away from home. אשת איש, lit., 'the wife of a man'.
(3) Sc. Rab who was also known as Abba Arika.
(4) Added by Bah in the text.
(5) Of the husband's absence.
(6) Lit., 'when they heard'.
(7) The absent husband.
(8) Lit., 'all the world (sc. Rab and Samuel) do not differ'; both agree that the woman is entitled to an allowance for maintenance.
(9) Out of which to defray the cost of her maintenance.
(10) Which are a husband's due.
(11) And that she may have consented.
(12) R. Zebid and R. Papa.
(13) Whom a husband might safely entrust with valuables.
(14) In consequence of which she would not have consented in return for her handiwork to forego her right to maintenance. Such a woman. according to R. Zebid, would still not be entitled to the court's ruling for her allowance, while according to R. Papa she would.
(15) Whom no husband would entrust with valuables.
(16) And who, in consequence, might have consented to forego her maintenance in return for her handiwork. Such a minor, according to P. Zebid, would, while according to R. Papa she would not. be entitled to the court's ruling for an allowance.
(17) Lit., 'until here' -
(18) An objection against Samuel.
(19) Cf. supra p. 672, n. 4.
(20) By entrusting her with some valuables.
(21) If he takes the prescribed oath, and the amount allowed by the court must be refunded to him. From here it obviously follows that the court does make an allowance from an absent husband's estate, a legal practice which is contrary to Samuel's ruling.
(22) A dead man, sorely, could not come and make a declaration.
(23) Tosef. Keth. XII. Lit. , 'what they have fixed is fixed'; which proves that the court does make an allowance to a wife from her absent husband's estate, contrary to the ruling of Samuel,
(24) Lit 'go down into'.
(25) This is explained infra. Cf. supra 48a. A contradiction thus arises (cf. supra n. 5) against Samuel's view.
(26) Who now refuses to continue to act on his behalf. A husband's appointment of a trustee conclusively proves that he has left no valuables with his wife for her maintenance, and that be could not have asked her to retain her handiwork for her maintenance. Hence it is quite proper for Beth din to arrange for her maintenance. Where no trustee, however, is appointed Samuel's ruling holds.
(27) Since it is assumed that he had entrusted the maintenance of his wife to a trustee, why not assume the same in regard to his sons and daughters?
(28) Lit., 'for this'.
(29) That provision was made for the one and not for the others. The Baraitha, surely, draws no distinction.
(30) That 'anything else' was not to be provided for.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 107b
charity1 . He, however, who replied, 'Charity' [restricts the ruling to this alone] but cosmetics [he maintains] must be given to her, for [her husband] would not be pleased that she should lose her comeliness.2
Come and hear: A yebamah3 during the first three months is maintained out of the estate of her husband - Subsequently4 she is not to be maintained either out of the estate of her husband or out of that of the levir. If, however, [the levir] appeared in court5 and then absconded she is maintained out of the estate of the levir!6 - Samuel can answer you: What possibility need we take into consideration in the case of this [woman]?7 If that of8 [having been entrusted9 with] bundles of valuables10 [one could well object that such a levir] is not well disposed towards her;11 and if that of12 [the remission of] her handiwork13 [the fact is, it could be retorted, that] she is under no obligation to give it to him.14
Come and hear: A woman who went with her husband to a country beyond the sea and then came back and stated, 'My husband is dead', may, if she wishes, successfully claim her maintenance and, if she prefers, may equally claim her kethubah. [If she stated, however,] 'My husband has divorced me', she may be maintained15 to the extent of her kethubah!16 - Here also [it may be replied, it is a case] where a report was received that he had died. Then17 why [is she maintained] only to the extent of her kethubah? - Because she herself has brought the loss upon herself.18
Come and hear: In what circumstances was it laid down that [a minor who] exercised her right of refusal19 is not entitled to maintenance? It cannot be said, In [those of] one who lives with her husband, since [in such circumstances] her husband is under an obligation to maintain her, but [in those], for instance, [of one] whose husband went to a country beyond the sea, and she borrowed money and spent it20 and then21 exercised her right of refusal. Now, the reason [why she is not entitled to maintenance is obviously] because she exercised her right of refusal; had she, however, not exercised her right of refusal, maintenance would have been granted to her?22 - Samuel can answer you: What possibility need we provide against as far as she is concerned? If against that of23 [having been entrusted with] bundles of valuables [it may be pointed out that] no one entrusts a minor with valuables; and if against that of [the man's remission of] her handiwork24 [the fact is, it could be argued, that] the handiwork of a minor does not suffice [for her maintenance].25 What is the ultimate decision?26 When R. Dimi came27 he related: Such a case was submitted to Rabbi at Beth She'arim28 and he granted29 the Woman30 an allowance for her maintenance, [while a similar case was submitted] to R. Ishmael at Sepphoris31 and he did not grant her any maintenance. R. Johanan was astonished at this decision - What reason [he wondered] could R. Ishmael see that [in consequence of it] he allowed her no maintenance? Surely the sons of the High Priests and Hanan differed only on the question of the oath,32 but [they all agree, do they not, that] maintenance is to be given to her? - R. Shaman b. Abba answered him: Our Master, Samuel, in Babylon has long ago explained this [as being a case] where a report had been received that [the absent husband] had died. 'You', the other remarked, 'explain so much with this reply'.
When Rabin came27 he related: Such a case was submitted to Rabbi at Beth She'arim28 and he did not grant the woman30 any maintenance, [while in a similar case which was submitted] to R. Ishmael at Sepphoris31 [the latter] granted her an allowance for her maintenance. Said R. Johanan: What reason could Rabbi see for not granting her an allowance, when Hanan and the sons of the High Priests obviously differed only in respect of the oath32 but [agreed that] maintenance is to be given her? - R. Shaman b. Abba replied: Samuel in Babylon has long ago explained this [as being a case] where a report has been received that [the absent husband] had died. 'You',the other remarked, 'explain so much with this answer'. The law, however, is in agreement with Rab,33 and a married woman is to be granted an allowance for her maintenance. The law is also in agreement with a ruling which R. Huna laid down in the name of Rab, R. Huna having stated on the authority of Rab: A wife is within her rights when she says to her husband, 'I desire no maintenance from, and refuse to do [any work for you]'. The law, furthermore, agrees with a ruling of R. Zebid34 in respect of glazed vessels,35 R. Zebid having laid down: Glazed vessels35 are permitted36 if they are white or black,37 but forbidden38 if green.39 This,40 however, applies only to such41 as have no cracks42 but if they have cracks they are forbidden.38
MISHNAH. IF A MAN WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA AND SOMEONE CAME FORWARD43 AND MAINTAINED HIS WIFE, HANAN SAID: HE LOSES HIS MONEY.44 THE SONS OF THE HIGH PRIESTS45 DIFFERED FROM HIM AND RULED: LET HIM TAKE AN OATH AS TO HOW MUCH HE SPENT AND RECOVER IT. SAID R. DOSA B. HARKINAS: [MY OPINION IS] IN AGREEMENT WITH THEIR RULING. R. JOHANAN B. ZAKKAI SAID: HANAN SPOKE WELL [FOR THE MAN] PUT HIS MONEY ON A STAG'S HORN.46
GEMARA. Elsewhere we have learned: If a man is forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from another
(1) Since a court which has no power to provide from a man's estate for his own wife's enjoyments would have much less power to exact charity from his estate.
(2) Supra 482.
(3) A woman whose husband died without issue, and who awaits levirate marriage or halizah which must not take place before the lapse of three months after her husband's death.
(4) Lit., 'from now and onwards'.
(5) To answer the widow's demand for marriage or halizah.
(6) Yeb. 41b. Is not this then (cf. supra P. 687, n. 5) an objection against Samuel's ruling?
(7) To deprive her in consequence of her maintenance.
(8) Lit., 'on account of'.
(9) By the absent levir, before his departure.
(10) To cover her cost of living.
(11) Lit., 'his mind is not near to her', and it is, therefore, most unlikely that he left any valuables with her.
(12) Lit., 'on account of'.
(13) Sc. that he might have allowed her to retain the proceeds of her handiwork to defray therewith her cost of living.
(14) Hence the indisputable right of the court to grant an allowance out of the absent levir's estate. In the case of an absent husband, however, where both possibilities must be taken into consideration, Samuel's ruling holds.
(15) Out of her husband's estate, by an order of the court.
(16) Because if she was10 fact divorced she is well entitled to her kethubah, and if she was not divorced she has a rightful claim to maintenance. Now, is not this ruling (cf. supra p. 687. n. 5) an objection against Samuel's ruling?
(17) Since the assumption is that she is a widow.
(18) By declaring that she had been divorced. A divorcee is entitled to her kethubah but, unlike a widow, is not entitled to maintenance.
(19) V. Glos. s.v. mi'un.
(20) Lit., 'and ate'.
(21) Lit., 'she stood up'.
(22) Which is an objection (cf. supra p. 687. n. 5) against Samuel.
(23) Lit., 'on account of'.
(24) V. supra p. 689, n. 3.
(25) And she would not have agreed to release her husband from his obligation to maintain her in return for the inadequate income from her handiwork.
(26) Lit., 'what is there about it?' Is maintenance to be allowed to a wife out of her absent husband's estate?
(27) From Palestine to Babylon.
(28) Cf. supra p. 663, n. 4.
(29) Out of the estate of her absent husband.
(30) Lit., 'her'.
(31) Cf. supra p. 410, n. 6.
(32) V. our Mishnah.
(33) Supra 107a ab init.
(34) [This is introduced here because R. Zebid figures in the above discussion; or, it is likely that both the rulings of R. Huna and R. Zebid were adopted at the same session, v. Shittah Mekubbezeth].
(35) If earthenware.
(36) For use (cf. infra note 5ff).
(37) These kinds of glaze prevent absorption despite the porous nature of the earthenware.
(38) To be used at all, if they once contained heathen foodstuffs or heathen wine of libation (nesek), or on the Passover if they ever contained frames, any foodstuffs that were not free from leavened substances of any of the five kinds of grain
(cf. Hal. I, i).
(39) Or 'yellow'. The last mentioned glaze, unlike the former, contains crystals of alum which increase the absorptive capacity of the potsherd (cf. A.Z. 33b).
(40) That green (or yellow) glazed earthenware is permitted (v. sura note 4).
(41) Lit , 'and it was not said but'.
(42) In the glazed surface.
(43) Lit., 'and one rose'.
(44) He has no legal claim upon the husband who neither instructed him to advance the money nor promised to refund his expenses.
(45) Cf. supra p. 672, n. 7.
(46) Metaph. He could never recover the money from the stag, nor can he recover it from the woman or her husband (cf. p. 691 n. 12).
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 108a
the latter may nevertheless pay for him his shekel,1 repay his debt2 and restore to him any object he may have lost; but where a reward is taken,3 the benefit is to be given4 to the sacred funds.5 Now, one can well be satisfied [with the ruling that] he may 'pay for him his shekel' [because by this payment] he merely performs a religious act,6 for it was taught:7 It is lawful to withdraw8 [from the funds of the Temple treasury] on the account of that which was lost,9 collected10 or about to be collected;11 and [the ruling that he may] restore to him any object he may have lost' [is also intelligible since thereby] also he is performing a religious duty;12 but [how could he be permitted to] 'repay his debt' [when thereby] he undoubtedly benefits13 him? - R. Oshaia replied: 'This ruling14 is that of15 Hanan who said: HE LOSES HIS MONEY.16 Raba, however, replied: The ruling14 may be said [to agree even with the view of] the Rabbis,17 for here18 we are dealing [with the case of a man] who borrowed money on the condition that he does not repay it [except when he is inclined to do so].19 It is well that Raba does not give the same reply as R. Oshaia, since [he wishes] the ruling to agree even with the opinion of the Rabbis. On what ground, however, does not R. Oshaia [wish to] give the same reply as Raba? - R. Oshaia can answer you: Granted that he20 has no actual benefit;21
(1) His annual contribution to the fund for congregational sacrifices. According to Tosaf. (s.v. ועל) provided it was lost on its way to the Temple treasury, v. infra n. 10.
(2) Which he may be owing to a third party.
(3) For the return of a lost object; and this man either refuses to take it or where he, too, is forbidden by vow to derive any benefit from the other man, v. Ned. 33a.
(4) Lit., 'shall fall'.
(5) Ned. 33a. The other may not retain the amount of the reward since it is legally due to the man from whom he is forbidden to derive any benefit.
(6) And confers no benefit upon the other.
(7) Cf. marginal note and Tosaf. B.M. 58a s.v. דתנן. Cur. edd. 'we learned'.
(8) תורמין, (rt. תרם 'to lift', 'separate'). Such withdrawals were made three times a year (cf. Shek. III, i).
(9) Sc. the man whose shekel was lost has a share in the sacrifices purchased out of the funds as if his contribution had actually reached the treasury. According to Tosaf. (loc. cit.); provided it had been handed by him to the Temple treasurer, and it was lost after the withdrawal in the Temple had taken place.
(10) By an agent who lost it on the way. According to Tosaf., after the withdrawal in the Temple had taken place. Cf. supra note 10).
(11) B.M. 58a. From the first two mentioned cases it thus follows that the man whose shekel was lost (cf. notes 10 and 11) gains no benefit from the generosity of the man who paid his shekel in the circumstances mentioned (cf. supra note 2).
(12) And the question of conferring a benefit upon the other does not arise. His object is not the benefit of the man but the religious act.
(13) קמשתרשי (rt. שרש, Hithpa.) 'to take root'.
(14) That he may 'repay his debt'.
(15) Lit.,'who is it?'
(16) Similarly anyone who repays a stranger's debt cannot reclaim it from him. Such a debtor, it follows, is not regarded as the recipient of the amount repaid. For the same reason he cannot be regarded as the recipient of a benefit.
(17) Who hold a man liable for any expenses any. body may have incurred on his behalf.
(18) Lit., 'here in what?'
(19) V. Ned. Sonc. ed. p. 102, n. 5. Since the creditor in such circumstances can never exact payment from the debtor, any man who repays it confers no real benefit upon him.
(20) In the circumstances mentioned (cf. supra n. 7).
(21) From the repayment of the debt.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 108b
has he not [some benefit in being spared] shame?1 Another reading:2 There also he has benefit, the benefit that he [need not] feel embarrassed in the other's presence.3
MISHNAH. ADMON LAID DOWN SEVEN RULINGS: -4 IF A MAN DIES AND LEAVES SONS AND DAUGHTERS, IF THE ESTATE IS LARGE,5 THE SONS INHERIT IT AND THE DAUGHTERS ARE MAINTAINED [FROM IT]6 AND IF THE ESTATE IS SMALL,5 THE DAUGHTERS ARE MAINTAINED FROM IT, AND THE SONS CAN GO BEGGING.7 ADMON SAID, 'AM I TO BE THE LOSER BECAUSE I AM A MALE!'8 R. GAMALIEL SAID; ADMON'S VIEW HAS MY APPROVAL.9
GEMARA. What does he10 mean?11 - Abaye replied: He means this; 'AM I TO BE THE LOSER BECAUSE I AM A MALE and capable of engaging in the study of the Torah?' Said Raba to him: Would, then, he who is engaged in the study of the Torah be entitled to heirship, while he who is not engaged in the study of the Torah not be entitled to be heir?12 - But, said Raba, it is this that he10 meant: AM I BECAUSE I AM A MALE, and entitled to be heir in the case of a large estate, TO BE THE LOSER [of my rights] in the case of a small estate?'
MISHNAH. IF A MAN CLAIMED FROM ANOTHER JARS OF OIL AND [THE LATTER] ADMITTED HIS CLAIM TO [EMPTY] JARS, ADMON RULED: SINCE HE ADMITTED A PORTION OF THE CLAIM HE MUST TAKE AN OATH,13 BUT THE SAGES SAID: THE ADMISSION OF THE PORTION [OF THE CLAIM] IS NOT OF THE SAME KIND AS THE CLAIM.14 R. GAMALIEL SAID; ADMON'S VIEW HAS MY APPROVAL.12
GEMARA. From this15 it may be inferred that, according to the Rabbis,16 [a man from] whom one claimed wheat and barley and he admitted the claim to the barley is exempt [from oath]. Must it then be said that this presents an objection against a ruling which R. Nahman laid down in the name of Samuel? For R. Nahman laid down in the name of Samuel: [A man from] whom one claimed wheat and barley and he admitted one of them is liable [to an oath]?17 - Rab Judah replied in the name of Rab; [Our Mishnah deals with the case of one from] whom a certain quantity18 [of oil] was claimed.19 If so,20 what could Admon's reason be? - This, however, said Raba, [is the explanation]: Both21 [agree] that where [the claimant] said to the other, 'I have the contents22 of ten jars of oil in your tank',23 he claims from him the oil but not the jars, [and if he said], 'You owe me24 ten jars full of oil', he claims both the oil and the jars; they only differ where [the claimant] said to him, 'You owe me24 ten jars of oil'. Admon maintains that in this expression a claim for the jars also is implied, and the Rabbis25 contend that in this expression the jars were not implied.
The reason then26 is because 'in this expression the jars were not implied', but if the jars had been implied in this expression he would apparently have been liable [to the oath]. Must it consequently be presumed that this presents an objection against a ruling of R. Hiyya b. Abba? For R. Hiyya b. Abbah27 ruled: [A man from] whom one claimed wheat and barley, and he admitted one of them, is exempt [from an oath]? - R. Shimi b. Ashi replied: [The making of such a claim]28 is the same as if one had claimed from another a pomegranate with its peel.29 To this Rabina demurred: A pomegranate without its peel cannot be preserved, but oil can well be preserved without jars!30 [The fact] however, is that31 we are here32 dealing [with the case of a man] who said to another, 'You owe me33 ten jars of oil', and the other replied, 'The [claim for the] oil is a pure invention,34 [and as to] the jars, too, I owe you35 five and you have no [claim to any other] five'. Admon maintains that this expression implies a claim to the jars also and, since [the defendant] must take an oath in respect of the jars,36 he must also take an oath by implication37 in respect of the oil, while the Rabbis38 are of the opinion that such an expression does not imply a claim for the jars [so that] what the one claims39 the other did not admit, and what the latter admitted40 the former did not claim.
MISHNAH. IF A MAN PROMISED41 A SUM OF MONEY TO HIS [PROSPECTIVE] SON-IN-LAW AND THEN DEFAULTED,42
(1) Of defaulting. Of course he has. Raba's reply. therefore, is unacceptable to R. Oshaia.
(2) So Bah and Rashal. Wanting in cur. edd.
(3) [The difference between the two versions is that whereas according to the former, the sparing of a feeling of shame is not considered an actual benefit, according to the latter it is regarded as such, v. Glosses of Bezalel Ronsburg].
(4) Lit., 'said seven'. Cf. supra p. 672 nn. 2 and 3.
(5) Lit., 'possessions are many'. The definition of 'large' and 'small' is given in B.B. Sonc. ed. p. 594.
(6) Until their majority or marriage.
(7) Lit., 'go about (people's) doors'.
(8) This is explained in the Gemara.
(9) Lit., 'I see the words of Admon.
(11) Sc. what reason is there to assume that, as regards maintenance, a male should be given any preference at all over a female?
(12) Obviously not. The Pentateuchal laws of inheritance. surely, draw no distinction between a learned, and an ignorant son.
(13) That he owes him no oil.
(14) The claim was for (a) jars and (b) oil, while the admission was in respect of the full claim of the former and of no part of the latter.
(15) The statement of the Sages in our Mishnah (cf.supra n. 7).
(16) Sc. THE SAGES.
(17) Shebu. 40a.
(18) Lit., 'measure'.
(19) JARS does not refer to the actual containers but to their measure or capacity, the jars themselves forming no part of the claim.
(20) That the jars admitted formed no part of the claim.
(21) Lit., 'that all the world', Admon and the Sages.
(22) מלא, lit., 'fulness'.
(23) בור, a receptacle in the oil press.
(24) Lit., 'l have with you'.
(25) Sc. THE SAGES.
(26) Why the Sages do not regard the admission of the claim to the jars as AN ADMISSION OF THE SAME KIND AS THE CLAIM.
(27) MS.M. inserts, 'in the name of R. Johanan'.
(28) 'Jars of oil'.
(29) Between the oil and the jars in which it is kept there exists a definite connection similar to that of the pomegranate and its peel; but between wheat and barley there exists no such connection. An admission of one of the two in the former cases may well be regarded as AN ADMission OF THE SAME KIND AS THE CLAIM though an admission of one of the two in the latter case cannot be so regarded.
(30) In the tank. How then could the one pair be compared to the other?
(31) Lit., 'in what?'
(32) In our Mishnah.
(33) Lit., 'I have with you'.
(34) Lit., 'the things never were'.
(35) Lit.,'you have'.
(36) Having clearly admitted a part of the claim.
(37) V. supra p. 549 n. 3.
(38) Sc. THE SAGES.
(41) Lit., 'fixed'.
(42) פשט לו את הרגל, lit., 'stretched out the leg towards him', as if to say, 'Take the dust of my foot', or 'hang me by the leg, l have nothing to give you' (Rashi).
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 109a
LET [HIS DAUGHTER] REMAIN [SINGLE]1 UNTIL HER HAIR GROWS GREY.2 ADMON RULED: SHE MAY SAY,3 'HAD I MYSELF PROMISED THE SUM ON MY BEHALF I WOULD REMAIN [SINGLE]1 UNTIL MY HAIR GREW GREY, BUT NOW THAT MY FATHER HAS PROMISED IT, WHAT CAN I DO? EITHER MARRY ME OR SET ME FREE'. R. GAMALIEL SAID: ADMON'S WORDS HAVE MY APPROVAL.
GEMARA. Our Mishnah does not [uphold the same view] as that of the following Tanna. For it was taught: R. Jose son of R. Judah stated, There was no difference of opinion between Admon and the Sages that, where a man promised a sum of money to his [prospective] son-in-law and then defaulted, his daughter may say3 My father has promised on my behalf, what can I do?' They only4 differ where she herself promised a sum of money on her own behalf, in which case the Sages ruled: Let her remain [single]5 until her hair grows grey, while Admon maintained that she could say, 'I thought that my father would pay for me [the promised amount], but now that my father does not pay for me, what can I do? Either marry me or set me free'. Said R. Gamaliel: Admon's words have my approval.6
A Tanna taught: This7 applies only to a woman who is of age but in the case of a minor compulsion may be used. Who is to be compelled? If the father [be suggested], should [not the ruling. it may be retorted,] be reversed?8 - But, said Raba, compulsion is exercised against the [prospective] husband that he may give her a letter of divorce.
R. Isaac b. Eleazar laid down on the authority of Hezekiah: Wherever R. Gamaliel stated, 'Admon's words have my approval', the halachah agrees with him. Said Raba to R. Nahman, Even in the Baraitha?9 - The other replied, Did we say 'In the Mishnah?' What we said was, 'Wherever R. Gamaliel stated'.10
Said R. Zera in the name of Rabbah b. Jeremiah: As to the two rulings which Hanan has laid down, the halachah is in agreement with him who followed his view,11 but in respect of the seven rulings that were laid down by Admon, the halachah is not in agreement with him who followed his view.12 What does he13 mean? If it be suggested that he means this: As to the two rulings which Hanan has laid down, the halachah is in agreement with himself and with him who followed his view, and that in respect of the seven rulings that were laid down by Admon, the halachah is neither in agreement with himself nor with him who followed his view,12 [it may be objected:] Did not R. Isaac b. Eleazar lay down on the authority of Hezekiah that 'wherever R. Gamaliel stated, "Admon's words have my approval", the halachah agrees with him'? - What he13 meant, however, must have been this: As to the two rulings which Hanan has laid down, the halachah is in agreement with himself and with him who followed his view,14 but in respect of the seven rulings that were laid down by Admon, the halachah does not agree with him who followed his view15 but agrees with himself in all his rulings. But, surely, R. Isaac b. Eleazar laid down on the authority of Hezekiah that 'wherever R. Gamaliel stated, 'Admon's words have my approval" the halachah agrees with him'. [Does not this imply:] Only16 where he stated;17 but not where he did not state? - The fact, however, is that he13 meant this; As to the two rulings which Hanan has laid down, the halachah is in agreement with himself and with him who followed him,14 but of the seven rulings that were laid down by Admon, there are some concerning which the halachah is in agreement with himself and with him who followed his view18 while there are others concerning which the halachah does not agree with him19 but with him who followed his view,15 [the rule being that] wherever R. Gamaliel stated, 'Admon's words have my approval' is the halachah in agreement with him, but not elsewhere.20
MISHNAH. IF A MAN CONTESTS [THE OWNERSHIP OF] A FIELD ON [THE DEED OF SALE OF] WHICH HE IS SIGNED AS A WITNESS,21 ADMON RULED; [HIS CLAIM IS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE] HE CAN SAY,22 '[LITIGATION WITH] THE SECOND23 IS EASIER FOR ME, SINCE THE FIRST24 IS A MORE DIFFICULT PERSON THAN HE'.25 THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED THAT HE HAS LOST HIS RIGHT.26 IF [THE SELLER]27 MADE IT28 A [BOUNDARY] MARK FOR ANOTHER PERSON29 [THE CONTESTANT]30 HAS LOST HIS RIGHT.31
GEMARA. Abaye said: This32 was taught only [in respect of] A WITNESS, but a judge33 does not lose his title;34 for R. Hiyya taught Witnesses may not sign a deed unless they have read it35
(1) Unmarried and undivorced.
(2) Sc. the son-in-law cannot be compelled either to marry her or to set her free.
(3) To her prospective husband.
(4) Lit., 'concerning what?'
(5) Unmarried and undivorced.
(6) Tosef. Keth. XII.
(7) The ruling of the Baraitha.
(8) If compulsion is to be resorted to, this should not be in the case of a minor whose actions have no legal validity, but in that of one who is of age, whose undertaking is legally valid (v. Strashun).
(9) Just cited, where the dispute relates to a promise made by the daughter herself (cf. Rashi s.v. אפי and Tosaf. s.v. ואפילו a.l.). [R. Nissim; Does this principle apply elsewhere also in a Baraitha? - though here the halachah has been fixed according to the version of our Mishnah].
(10) The halachah, apparently contradictory, being determined by the version of the Mishnah and Baraitha respectively, (cf. Tosaf. l.c.). [Cf. however n. 6].
(11) כיוצא בו, lit., 'like he who goes out with him', sc. R. Johanan b. Zakkai (cf. the Mishnahs supra 105a and 107b). This is discussed anon. aliter; 'Like that which goes out with it', i.e., rulings similar to those laid down by Admon (v. Tosaf.) [According to Adreth a case similar to that of Admon's is provided by one who pays his fellow's debt to his creditor without his instructions. and where the claim is, say, for wheat and barley and the admission is only in regard to one of these, we have an instance similar to that of Admon].
(12) Sc. R. Gamaliel (cf. the Mishnahs supra 108b f). Cf. also p. 697, n.8 mutatis mutandis.
(13) R. Zera.
(14) V. p. 697, n. 8.
(15) I.e., R. Gamaliel (cf. supra note I) who agreed with him in three rulings only, for the halachah agrees with Admon in all his rulings.
(16) Lit. , 'yes'.
(17) Is the halachah in agreement with Admon.
(18) Sc. the three rulings (cf supra n. 4).
(19) Rashal on the interpretation of Tosaf. (v. p. 697, n. 8) emends: 'agrees neither with him nor with etc.'
(20) Lit., 'not those', sc. the rulings of Admon of which R. Gamaliel expressed no approval.
(21) His plea being that the seller has taken it from him by violence.
(22) So separate edd. of the Mishnah, Alfasi and Asheri.
(23) The buyer.
(24) The seller.
(25) Sc. he might plead that he signed as a witness, not because he acknowledged the seller to be the lawful owner, but in the hope that it would be easier for him to recover his field from the buyer than from the seller.
(26) By signing the deed of sale he is presumed to have acknowledged the seller as the lawful owner of that field.
(27) Whose title to the field is contested.
(28) The contested field.
(29) To whom he has sold a field adjacent to it.
(30) Who signed as a witness to the deed of sale in which the contested field was described as the property of the seller, and given as one of the boundaries of the field sold.
(31) Even according to Admon. The plea that the contestant preferred to litigate with the buyer is obviously inadmissible here, and the reason given supra note 6, applies.
(32) The ruling that the contestant HAS LOST HIS TITLE.
(33) Who attested the Signatures of the witnesses to a deed of sale.
(34) To the field sold and, despite his Signature, may reclaim it. A judge is concerned only with the attestation of the witnesses' signature and not with the contents of the deed.
(35) Since it is the contents of the deed to which they must testify.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 109b
but judges1 may sign even though they have not read it.2
IF [THE SELLER] MADE IT A [BOUNDARY] MARK FOR ANOTHER PERSON. Abaye said: This was taught Only [where it was] FOR ANOTHER PERSON, but [if it was made a boundary mark] for himself3 he does not lose his right; for he can say, 'Had I not done that4 for him he would not have sold the field to me'. What [possible objection can] you have?5 That he should have made a declaration [to that effect]? Your friend [it can be retorted] has a friend, and the friend of your friend has a friend.6
A certain man once made a field7 a [boundary] mark for another person,8 [and one of the witnesses,] having contested [its ownership,]9 died, when a guardian was appointed [over his estate].10 The guardian came to Abaye11 who quoted to him: 'IF [THE SELLER] MADE IT A [BOUNDARY] MARK FOR ANOTHER PERSON [THE CONTESTANT] HAS LOST HIS RIGHT'. 'If the father of the orphans had been alive', the other retorted, 'could he not have pleaded, "l have conceded to him12 only one furrow"?'13 - 'You speak well', he said, 'for R. Johanan stated, If he submitted the plea, "l have conceded to you only one furrow", he is believed'. 'Proceed at any rate [Abaye later14 told the guardian] to give him one furrow'.15 On that [furrow, however,] there was a nursery of palm trees, and [the guardian] said to him, 'Had the father of the orphans been alive, could he not have submitted the plea, "I have re-purchased it from him"?'16 - 'You speak well', [Abaye] said to him, 'for R. Johanan ruled, If he submitted the plea, "I have re-purchased it from him" he is believed'.17 Said Abaye: Anyone who appoints a guardian should appoint one like this man who understands how to turn [the scales]18 in favour of orphans.
MISHNAH. IF A MAN WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA AND [IN HIS ABSENCE] THE PATH TO HIS FIELD WAS LOST,19 ADMON RULED: LET HIM WALK [TO HIS FIELD]20 BY THE SHORTEST WAY.21 THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: LET HIM EITHER PURCHASE A PATH FOR HIMSELF EVEN THOUGH IT [COST HIM] A HUNDRED MANEH OR FLY THROUGH THE AIR.
GEMARA. What is the Rabbis'22 reason? Does not Admon speak well?23 - Rab Judah replied in the name of Rab: [The ruling24 refers to a field], for instance, which [the fields of] four persons surrounded on its four sides.25 If that be so, what can be Admon's reason?26 - Raba explained: Where four persons27 succeeded28 [to the adjacent fields] by virtue of the rights of four [persons respectively]29 or where four persons succeeded28 [to them]30 by virtue of one,29 all agree that these may turn him away.31 They32 only differ where one person succeeded33 [to all the surrounding fields] by virtue of four persons.34 Admon is of the opinion that [the claimant can say to that person,] 'At all events35 my path is in your territory'; and the Rabbis hold the opinion [that the defendant might retort,] 'If you will keep quiet, well and good,36 but if not l will return the deeds to their respective original owners whom you will have no chance of calling to law'.37
A [dying man]38 once instructed [those around him] that a palm tree shall be given to his daughters but the orphans proceeded to divide the estate and gave her no palm tree. R. Joseph [in considering the case] intended to lay down that it involved the very same principle as that of our Mishnah.39 But Abaye said to him: Are [the two] alike? There,40 each one can send [the claimant to the path] away;41 but here, the palm tree is in their common possession.42 What is their way out?43 - They must give her a palm tree and divide [the estate] all over44 again.
A [dying man]45 once instructed [those around him] that a palm tree shall be given to his daughter. When he died he left46 two halves of a palm tree.47 Sat R. Ashi [discussing the case] and grappled with this difficulty; Do people call two halves of palms trees a palm tree' or not? - Said R. Mordecai to R. Ashi, Thus said Abimi of Hagronia48 in the name of Raba: People do call two halves of palm trees 'a palm tree'.49
(1) Cf. supra n. 13.
(2) A judge's signature on a deed consequently does not prove that beyond the Signatures of the witnesses he was at all aware of its contents.
(3) Sc. if the contestant himself bought a field from the man whom he accuses of having stolen an adjacent field from him, and the latter, inserting the field in dispute as a boundary, described it as his own.
(4) Lit., 'thus', i.e., agreed to the description of the stolen field as the property of the seller.
(5) Against this plea.
(6) Popular saying. The declaration would eventually reach the ears of the seller who might in consequence cancel the sale.
(7) Which he was accused of having stolen.
(8) To whom he had sold a field adjacent to it.
(9) Cf. supra p. 699, n. I.
(10) To manage it for the orphans.
(11) To claim the field on behalf of his wards.
(12) Of the field in dispute.
(13) That was immediately next to the sold field. The orphans should, therefore, be entitled to reclaim the rest of the field.
(14) After proof had been adduced that the field had been stolen from the father of the orphans.
(15) The minimum which the deceased must have conceded.
(16) After it had been ascribed to him.
(17) [The reason for this ruling. according to Rashi, is because the field is known to have belonged to the contestant and but for his signature referred to, the present occupier has no proof of his title to the field. This admission on the part of the contestant is, however, cancelled by his declaration of having repurchased the field, v. supra 16a.]
(18) Lit.,'to turn over'.
(19) It being unknown in which of the surrounding fields it lay.
(20) He must be allowed a short path through one of the surrounding fields. (This is further explained infra).
(21) The minimum. He cannot claim more than what is, at all events, due to him.
(22) THE SAGES.
(23) The assumption now being that all the surrounding fields belonged to one person who must obviously be held responsible for the lost path.
(24) In our Mishnah.
(25) So that each person can shift responsibility on the others.
(26) How can one be held responsible when all the four are equally involved?
(27) The respective owners of the four surrounding fields.
(28) Lit., 'came'.
(29) Sc. by purchase or gift.
(30) After the path was lost.
(31) Cf. supra note 8.
(32) Admon and the Sages.
(33) Lit., 'came'.
(34) Sc. by purchase or gift.
(35) In whichever field the path was lost.
(36) Lit., 'you will keep quiet' (bis). He will sell him a path at a reasonable price (cf. Rashi). V . however, Tosaf. Yeb. 37b, s.v. דאמר.
(37) Lit., 'and you will not be able to talk law with them'. Cf supra p. 701, n. 8.
(38) The verbal instructions of one in such circumstances have the force of a legally written document.
(39) Like the owners of the adjacent fields each of whom shifts the responsibility for the path on to the others. so can each brother shift the responsibility for the palms tree on to the other brothers.
(40) The case in our Mishnah.
(41) The One path can lie only in one person's held, and each of the defendants can, therefore, well plead that it did not lie in his.
(42) Lit., 'with them', the instructions of the deceased having been given before the division of the estate, and the duty of carrying out his wish is incumbent upon all the heirs jointly.
(43) Lit., 'their correction'. 'redress' -
(44) Lit., 'from the beginning'.
(45) V. supra note 2.
(46) Among his many palm trees.
(47) Sc. two palm trees in each of which he owned a half, and the heirs desired to assign them to the daughter in fulfilment of their father's instructions.
(48) One of the suburbs of Nehardea.
(49) And the brothers can assign these to the daughter despite the greater trouble involved in their cultivation.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 110a
MISHNAH. IF A MAN PRODUCED A BOND OF INDEBTEDNESS AGAINST ANOTHER, AND THE LATTER PRO DUCED [A DEED OF SALE,1 SHEWING] THAT THE FORMER HAD SOLD HIM A FIELD,2 ADMON RULED; [THE OTHER] CAN SAY, HAD I OWED YOU [ANYTHING] YOU WOULD HAVE RECOVERED IT WHEN YOU SOLD ME THE FIELD'.3 THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAY; THIS [SELLER] MAY HAVE BEEN A PRUDENT MAN, SINCE HE MAY HAVE SOLD HIM THE LAND IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO TAKE IT FROM HIM AS A PLEDGE.4
GEMARA. What is the reason of the Rabbis? Does not Admon speak well? - Where [the purchase] money is paid first and the deed is written afterwards, no one disputes that the [defendant] may well say [to the claimant], 'You should have recovered your debt when you sold me the field'.3 They only differ where the deed is written first and the purchase money is paid afterwards. Admon is of the opinion that [the claimant] should have made a declaration [of his motive],5 while the Rabbis6 maintain [that the claimant can retort,] 'Your friend has a friend, and the friend of your friend has a friend'.7
MISHNAH. IF TWO MEN PRODUCED BONDS OF INDEBTEDNESS AGAINST ONE ANOTHER,8 ADMON RULED; [THE HOLDER OF THE LATER BOND CAN SAY TO THE OTHER,] 'HAD I OWED YOU [ANY MONEY] HOW IS IT THAT YOU BORROWED FROM ME?'9 THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: THE ONE RECOVERS HIS DEBT10 AND THE OTHER RECOVERS HIS DEBT.11
GEMARA. It was stated: If two men produced bonds of indebtedness against one another, R. Nahman ruled: The one recovers his debt and the other recovers his debt.12 R. Shesheth said: What is the point13 in exchanging bags?14 The one rather retains his own [money]15 and the other retains his.
All agree16 that if both [litigants possess land of the] best,17 medium or worst quality [distraint for each on the other is] undoubtedly a case of changing bags.14 They differ only where one [of the litigants] has land of medium quality and the other of the worst quality. R. Nahman is of the opinion that 'the one recovers his debt and the other recovers his debt' because in his view an assessment18 is made on the basis of the debtor's19 possessions,20 [so that] the owner of the land of the worst quality proceeds to distrain on the medium quality [of the other]21 which then becomes with him the best; and the other can then proceed to take from him the worst only.22 R. Shesheth, however, said, 'What is the point in exchanging bags?' because he is of the opinion that an assessment23 is made on a general basis,24 [so that] eventually when the original owner of the medium land25 proceeds [to distrain on the property of the other]26 he will only take back his own medium land. But what [reason can] you see, according to R. Nahman, that the owner of the worst quality of land should proceed [to distrain] first? Why should not rather the owner of the medium quality come first and distrain on the worst [of the other] and then let him distrain on it?27 - [But this ruling] applies only28 where the [holder of the worst land] submitted his claim first. But after all when they come to distrain, do they not come simultaneously?29 The fact, however, [is that the ruling] applies only28 where one [of the litigants] has best and medium land, and the other has only of the worst. One Master30 is of the opinion that an assessment31 is made on the basis of the debtor's32 possessions,33 while the other Master34 is of the opinion that an assessments is made on a general basis.35
We have learned: THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: THE ONE RECOVERS HIS DEBT AND THE OTHER RECOVERS HIS DEBT!36 R. Nahman explained this, according to R. Shesheth, [as referring to a case,] for instance, where one borrowed for a period often, and the other for one of five years.37 But how exactly are we to understand this? If it be suggested that the first [bond]38 was for ten years and the second for five, would Admon [it may be objected] have ruled [that the second can say to the first:] 'HAD OWED YOU [ANY MONEY] HOW IS IT THAT YOU BORROWED FROM ME?' The time for payment39 surely, had not yet arrived.40 If, however, [it be suggested that] the first was for five years and the second for ten, how [it may again be objected] is this to be understood? If the time for payment39 had arrived,40 what [it may be asked] could be the reason of the Rabbis?41 And if the time for payment39 had not yet arrived,40 well, payment was not yet due and what [it may again be asked] is Admon's reason? - [This ruling was] required [in that case] only where [the holder of the earlier bond]42 came [to borrow] on the day on which the five years had terminated.43 The Masters44 are of the opinion that it is usual to borrow money for one day45 and the Master46 is of the opinion that one does not borrow money for one day.47
Rama b. Mama explained: We are here48 dealing with [a case where one of the bonds was presented by] orphans49 who are themselves entitled to recover a debt but from whom no debt may be recovered.50
Was it not, however, stated, THE ONE RECOVERS HIS DEBT AND THE OTHER RECOVERS HIS DEBT?51 - [The meaning is:] The one recovers his debt, and the other is entitled to recover it but gets nothing. Said Raba: Two objections [may be advanced] against this explanation. Firstly, it was stated, 'THE ONE RECOVERS HIS DEBT AND THE OTHER RECOVERS51 HIS DEBT'; and, secondly, could not [the other party] allow the orphans to distrain on a plot of land [of his] and then recover it from them,52 in accordance with [a ruling of] R. Nahman, for R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: If orphans collected a plot of land for their father's debt53 the creditor54 may re-collect it from them?55 - This is a difficulty.
Why could it not be explained [that this is a case] where the orphans owned land of the worst quality and the other owned best56 and medium quality, so that the orphans proceed to distrain on his medium land57 and allow him to distrain on their worst only? For, even though58 an assessment59 is made on a general basis60 is not payment from orphans' property recovered from their worst land only?61 - This applies only where [the creditor] has not yet seized [their property] but where62 he had seized it63 he may lawfully retain it.64
MISHNAH. [THE FOLLOWING REGIONS ARE REGARDED AS] THREE COUNTRIES IN RESPECT OF MATRIMONY:65 JUDAEA, TRANSJORDAN AND GALILEE. [A MAN] MAY NOT TAKE OUT [HIS WIFE WITH HIM]66 FROM ONE TOWN67 TO ANOTHER68 OR FROM ONE CITY69 TO AN OTHER. WITHIN THE SAME COUNTRY, HOWEVER, HE MAY TAKE HER OUT WITH HIM FROM ONE TOWN INTO ANOTHER OR FROM ONE CITY INTO AN OTHER70
(1) Bearing a later date than that of the bond.
(2) And thereby he seeks to prove that either he never borrowed the sum claimed or that he repaid It prior to his purchase of the field.
(3) By seizing the purchase price in payment of the debt. Since he did not do it is obvious that he owed bins nothing.
(4) Movables can be hidden away.
(5) And since he did not do so the defendant may well plead, 'HAD I OWED YOU' etc.
(6) THE SAGES.
(7) Cf. supra p. 700, n. 3 mutatis mutandis.
(8) One bond bearing an earlier date than the other.
(9) And this plea exempts him from payment.
(10) Lit., 'bond of his debt'.
(11) No balancing of amounts or exchange of bonds being allowed by the court. Each bond must be treated on its own merits and orders for distraint are given accordingly.
(12) V. p. 703, n. II.
(13) If the amounts of the two debts are equal (v. infra).
(14) Metaph. If the bags are of equal weight there is no advantage to an animal in changing them from one side to the other (Jast.) or to a human being in changing the burden from one hand to the other (Levy). מטרתא, 'leather bag' (Rashi). Cf. 'a liquid measure', 'cask'.
(15) Or property on which the other desires to distrain.
(16) Lit., 'all the world', R. Nahman and R. Shesheth.
(17) Lit., 'best and best'.
(18) On behalf of a creditor who distrains on the debtor's land.
(19) Lit., 'of his'.
(20) If the debtor, for instance, has only two kinds of land, medium and inferior quality, the former is regarded as 'best' and the creditor can only distrain on the inferior land. A creditor (cf. B.K. 7b) may distrain on the 'medium' land of the debtor if he possesses such, or on the 'worst'. He has no right to distrain on the 'best'.
(21) Being in fact the only kind of land the other possesses.
(22) He cannot reclaim the medium quality that was taken from him, since it is now regarded as its present owner's 'best' (cf. supra note 9).
(23) V.supra note 7.
(24) Lit., 'of all men'.
(25) Lit., 'that one'.
(26) Who had taken possession of his medium land.
(27) Cf. p. 704, n. 11. The other could not distrain on the medium which is now his best.
(28) Lit., 'is not required but'.
(29) Since both presented their bonds at court (v. our Mishnah ab init.). Why then should one be allowed an advantage over the other?
(30) R. Nahman.
(31) V. supra p. 704, n. 7.
(32) Lit., 'of his'.
(33) Cf. supra p. 704, n. 9. The owner of the worst land, if allowed to distrain on the other instead of keeping his own. is at an advantage in either case. whether he distrains first or last. If he distrains first he obtains, of course, the other's medium land which, becoming his 'best', cannot be distrained on by the creditor, and the other must consequently recoup himself from his worst. If, on the other hand, the owner of the best and medium land distrains first, it is again the other's worst land (the only kind he possesses) to which he can have recourse, while the other still distrains on his medium.
(34) R. Shesheth.
(35) Cf. supra p. 704. n. 13. Where, therefore, two bonds are simultaneously presented at court and the order would naturally be made that the owner of the worst land distrains first on the other's 'medium' and that the latter then distrains on the same 'medium', the procedure would be as useless as that of 'exchanging bags'.
(36) Is not this an objection against K. Shesheth?
(37) So that it is advantageous to the debtor of the loan for the longer period that his bond shall not be balanced against the other's.
(38) I.e., the one bearing the earlier date.
(39) Lit., 'its time'.
(40) When the second bond was written.
(41) It should be pretty obvious that the holder of the later bond should be believed mince he might well plead as Admon suggested.
(42) The five years' loan.
(43) Payment having been due on the following day.
(44) The Sages. Lit., 'master'.
(45) Hence their ruling that both bonds are valid.
(47) Hence the admissibility of the plea, 'HAD I OWED YOU etc'
(48) In our Mishnah.
(49) Who inherited it from their father.
(50) If they possessed no landed property. Orphans' movables may not be distrained on.
(51) Not merely, 'is entitled to recover etc.
(52) Cf. supra n. 12 mutatis mutandis.
(53) Which someone owed him.
(54) To whom their father owed money.
(55) Supra 92a, Pes. 31a, B.B. 125a.
(56) So cur. edd. and MS.M. R. Nissim and Maharsha omit.
(57) To which a creditor is entitled (cf. supra p. 704. n. 9 second clause).
(58) Lit , also'.
(59) Cf. supra p. 704. n. 7.
(60) Lit., 'of all men'.
(61) V. Git. 48b.
(62) MS.M. 'but here since'.
(63) As in the case under discussion where they seek to take it from him.
(64) Lit., 'he seized'.
(65) Sc. a man who married in one of these cannot compel his wife to go with him to any of the others.
(66) Except with her consent.
(68) In another country.
(69) [עיר According to Rashi כרך is larger than עיר. According to Krauss, the former denotes a city (large or small) surrounded by a wall, v. He'atid. III, 1ff.]
(70) Even if she objects.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 110b
BUT NOT FROM A TOWN TO A CITY NOR FROM A CITY TO A TOWN.1 [A MAN] MAY TAKE OUT [HIS WIFE WITH HIM] FROM AN INFERIOR2 TO A SUPERIOR3 DWELLING, BUT NOT FROM A SUPERIOR3 TO AN INFERIOR2 DWELLING. R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL RULED: NOT EVEN FROM AN INFERIOR DWELLING TO A SUPERIOR DWELLING, BECAUSE THE [CHANGE TO A] SUPERIOR DWELLING PUTS [THE HUMAN BODY] TO A [SEVERE] TEST.4
GEMARA. One may readily grant [the justice of the ruling that a wife may not be compelled to move] FROM A CITY TO A TOWN, since everything [necessary] is obtainable in a city while not everything is obtainable in a town. On what grounds, however, [can she not be compelled to move] FROM A TOWN TO A CITY? - [This ruling] provides support for R. Jose b. Hanina who stated, 'Whence is it deduced that city5 life6 is difficult?7 [From Scripture] where it is said, And the people blessed all men that willingly offered themselves to dwell in Jerusalem.8
R.SIMEON B. GAMALIEL RULED etc. What [is meant by] PUTS [THE HUMAN BODY] TO A [SEVERE] TEST'?9 - In agreement [with a saying] of Samuel. For Samuel said: A change of diet is the beginning of bowel trouble.10
It is written in the Book of Ben Sira: All the days of the poor11 are evil;12 but are there not the Sabbaths and festivals?13 - [The explanation, however, is] according to Samuel. For Samuel said: A change of diet is the beginning of bowel trouble.10 Ben Sira said: The nights also.14 Lower than [all] the roofs is his roof,15 and on the height of mountains is his vineyard,16 [so that] the rain of [other] roofs [pours down] upon his roof and the earth of his vineyard [is washed down] into the vineyards [of others].17
MISHNAH. [A MAN] MAY COMPEL ALL [HIS HOUSEHOLD] TO GO UP18 [WITH HIM] TO THE LAND OF ISRAEL., BUT NONE MAY BE COMPELLED TO LEAVE IT. ALL [ONE'S HOUSEHOLD] MAY BE COMPELLED TO GO UP18 TO JERUSALEM,19 BUT NONE MAY BE COMPELLED TO LEAVE IT. [THIS APPLIES TO] BOTH MEN AND WOMEN.20 IF A MAN MARRIED A WOMAN IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL AND DIVORCED HER IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL, HE MUST PAY HER [HER KETHUBAH] IN THE CURRENCY OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL. IF HE MARRIED A WOMAN IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL AND DIVORCED HER IN CAPPADOCIA HE MUST PAY HER [HER KETHUBAH] IN THE CURRENCY OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL.21 IF HE MARRIED A WOMAN IN CAPPADOCIA AND DIVORCED HER IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL, HE MUST A GAIN PAY [HER KETHUBAH] IN THE CURRENCY OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL.21 R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL, HOWEVER, RULED THAT HE MUST PAY HER IN THE CAPPADOCIAN CURRENCY.
IF A MAN MARRIED A WOMAN IN CAPPADOCIA AND DIVORCED HER IN CAPPADOCIA, HE MUST PAY HER [HER KETHUBAH] IN THE CURRENCY OF CAPPADOCIA.
GEMARA. What [was the expression,] 'MAY COMPEL ALL'22 intended to include? - To include slaves.23 What, however, [was the expression22 intended] to include according to him who specifically mentioned 'slaves' [in our Mishnah]? - To include [removal] from a superior dwelling to an inferior one. What [was the expression,] 'BUT NONE24 MAY BE COMPELLED TO LEAVE IT' intended to include? - To include a slave who fled from outside the Land [of Israel] into the Land in which case his master is told,25 'Sell him here, and go', in order to [encourage] settlement in the Land of Israel. What [was the expression] 'ALL26 . . . MAY BE COMPELLED TO GO UP TO JERUSALEM' intended to include? - To include [removal] from a superior dwelling to an inferior one. What [was the expression,] 'BUT NONE27 MAY BE COMPELLED TO LEAVE IT' intended to include? - To include even [removal] from an inferior dwelling to a superior one; only since as it was stated in the earlier clause,28 'NONE MAY BE COMPELLED TO LEAVE IT it was also stated in the latter clause,29 'NONE MAY BE COMPELLED TO LEAVE IT'.30
Our Rabbis taught: If [the husband] desires31 to go up32 and his wife refuses31 she must be pressed33 to go up; and if [she does] not [consent] she may be divorced34 without a kethubah. If she desires31 to go up32 and be refuses,31 he must be pressed to go up; and if [he does] not [consent] he must divorce her and pay her kethubah. If she desires to leave35 and he refuses to leave, she must be pressed not to leave, and if [pressure is of] no [avail] she may be divorced34 without a kethubah. If he desires to leave35 and she refuses he must be pressed not to leave, and if [coercion is of] no [avail] he must divorce her and pay her kethubah.36
IF A MAN MARRIED A WOMAN etc. Is not this self-contradictory? It was stated, IF HE MARRIED A WOMAN IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL AND DIvorced HER IN CAPPADOCIA HE MUST PAY HER [HER KETHUBAH] IN THE CURRENCY OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL, from which it clearly follows that we are guided by [the currency of the place where the] obligation37 was undertaken.38 Read, however, the concluding clause: IF HE MARRIED A WOMAN IN CAPPADOCIA AND DIVORCED HER IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL HE MUST AGAIN PAY HER [HER KETHUBAH] IN THE CURRENCY OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL, from which it follows, does it not, that we are guided by [the currency of the place] where collection is effected?39 - Rabbah replied: [The rulings] taught here [are among those in which the claims relating to] a kethubah are weaker [than those of other claimants],40 for [the author] is of the opinion that the kethubah is a Rabbinical enactment.41 R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL, HOWEVER, RULED THAT HE MUST PAY HER IN THE CAPPADOCIAN CURRENCY. He is of the opinion42 that the kethubah is Pentateuchal.43
Our Rabbis taught: If a man produces a bond of indebtedness against another [and the place of issue] entered44 therein was Babylon, [the debtor] must allow him to collect it in Babylonian currency. If [the place of issue] entered44 therein was the Land of Israel he must allow him to collect it in the currency of the Land of Israel. If no place of issue was entered44 he must, if it was presented in Babylon, pay him in Babylonian currency; and, if it was presented in the Land of Israel, he must pay him in the currency of the Land of Israel. If merely [a sum of] 'silver [pieces]'45 was entered, the borrower may pay the other whatever he wishes.46 [This is a ruling] which does not apply to47 a kethubah.48 To what [ruling does this49 refer]? - R. Mesharsheya replied: To that in the first clause,50 thus indicating that the law is not in agreement with51 R. Simeon b. Gamaliel who ruled that the kethubah is Pentateuchal.
'If merely [a sum of] "silver [pieces]" was entered the borrower may pay the other whatever he wishes'. May not one say that [a 'silver piece' merely signified] a bar [of silver]? - R. Eleazar replied: [This is a case] where 'coin' was mentioned in the bond.52 May not one suggest [that it signified] small change? - R. Papa replied: Small change is not made of silver.53
Our Rabbis taught: One should always live in the Land of Israel, even in a town most of whose inhabitants are idolaters, but let no one live outside the Land, even in a town most of whose inhabitants are Israelites; for whoever lives in the Land of Israel may be considered to have54 a God, but whoever lives outside the Land may be regarded as one who has no God. For it is said in Scripture, To give you the Land of Canaan, to be your God.55 Has he, then, who does not live in the Land, no God?56 But [this is what the text intended] to tell you, that whoever lives outside the Land may be regarded as one who worships idols. Similarly it was said in Scripture in [the story of] David, For they have driven me out this day that I should not cleave to the inheritance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve other gods.57 Now, whoever said to David, 'Serve other gods'? But [the text intended] to tell you that whoever lives outside the Land58 may be regarded as one who worships idols.59
R. Zera was evading Rab Judah because he desired to go up to the Land of Israel while Rab Judah had expressed [the following view:] Whoever goes up from Babylon to the Land of Israel transgresses a positive commandment, for it is said in Scripture,
(1) The reason is stated infra.
(2) Lit., 'bad'.
(3) Lit., 'beautiful'.
(4) This is further explained by Samuel infra. בודק rt. בדק 'to examine', 'test', 'try'. Aliter ( Jast.): בדק 'to penetrate'; 'the removal to a better residence (and style of living) penetrates (the body and creates disease)'.
(5) Lit., 'cities'.
(6) שישיבת, rt. ישב 'to sit', 'dwell'.
(7) Lit., 'hard', owing to overcrowding, lack of pure country air and an insufficiency of parks and open spaces.
(8) Neh. XI, 2.
(9) בודק cf. supra note 1.
(10) חולי מעים, lit., 'disease of the bowels', 'abdominal trouble'. Cf. B.B. 146a, Sonc. ed. p. 628 (where מעים is omitted) and Sanh. 101a, Sonc. ed. p. 683.
(11) So A.J.V.; A.V. and R.V. 'afflicted'.
(12) Prov. XV, 15, Ben Sira XXXI, 5.
(13) During which days, at least, the poor were provided with substantial meals.
(14) Ben Sira loc. cit. Not only all the days.
(15) As a poor man he is compelled to live in a low-roofed hovel.
(16) Since he cannot afford a more costly vineyard in the valley.
(17) Ben Sira XXXI, 6-7.
(18) Lit., 'cause to go up'.
(19) From any other Palestinian place.
(20) A wife also may compel her husband to live with her in Jerusalem or the Land of Israel and, if he refuses, she is entitled to demand a divorce and the payment of her kethubah.
(21) The Cappadocian coins were dearer than the corresponding ones of the Land of Israel.
(22) Emphasis on 'ALL'.
(23) Hebrew slaves also may be compelled by their master to follow him to Jerusalem or to the Land of Israel.
(24) Emphasis on 'NONE'.
(25) Lit., 'we say to him'.
(26) Emphasis on 'ALL'.
(27) Emphasis on 'NONE'.
(28) In reference to the Land of Israel.
(29) In respect of Jerusalem.
(30) Though the latter clause is, in fact, redundant, it being self-evident that if a person may be compelled to leave a superior dwelling to move to an inferior one, provided the latter is in Jerusalem, he could not a fortiori be compelled to leave Jerusalem even for the sake of a change from an inferior to a superior dwelling.
(31) Lit., 'says'.
(32) From a country outside the Land, to the Land of Israel, or from a province in the latter to Jerusalem.
(33) This law does not apply to the present time owing to the risks of the journey (Tosaf. s.v. הוא a.l.). Rabbenu Hayim also maintains that living in the Land of Israel is now not a religious act owing to the difficulty and impossibility of fulfilling many of the precepts attached to the soil (Tosaf. loc. cit. q.v.).
(34) Lit., 'she goes out'.
(35) Jerusalem, for a provincial town in the Land of Israel, or the latter for a foreign country.
(36) Tosef. Keth. XII.
(37) To pay the kethubah.
(38) The obligation is undertaken at marriage and collection takes place on divorce (or the man's death).
(39) Cf. supra n. 2.
(40) Cf. supra p. 709, n. 4, B.B. 132b, Sonc. ed. p. 554, n. 9, Bek. 52a.
(41) Non-Pentateuchal (cf. infra n. 6 and text).
(42) Contrary to the view of the first Tanna (cf. supra n. 5).
(43) [In the Jerusalem Talmud the opinions are reversed: R. Gamaliel holds that the kethubah is Rabbinical, whereas the Sages consider it Biblical, the Palestinian giving preference to the Palestine coinage, v. supra 10a].
(44) Lit., 'written'.
(45) No mention being made of the exact denomination.
(46) Since he may assert that the figure in the bond referred to the smallest silver coin.
(47) Lit., 'which is not so in'.
(48) Tosef. Keth. XII.
(49) The last clause.
(50) Sc. unlike a creditor who, according to the first clause, is entitled to collect his due in the currency of the place of issue, a woman collects her kethubah in the cheaper currency only.
(51) Lit., 'to bring out from'.
(52) Lit., 'written in it .
(53) Lit., 'small change of silver people do not make'. Cf. B.B. 165b f, Sonc. ed. p. 722f.
(54) Lit., 'is like as if he has'.
(55) Lev. XXV, 38; implying apparently that only in the land of Canaan would He be their God.
(56) One surely may serve God anywhere.
(57) I Sam. XXVI, 19.
(58) David was compelled to seek shelter from Saul in the country of Moab and the land of the Philistines.
(59) Tosef. 'A.Z. V.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 111a
They shall be carried to Babylon, and there shall they be, until the day that I remember them, saith the Lord.1 And R. Zera?2 - That text1 refers3 to the vessels of ministry.4 And Rab Judah? - Another text also is available:3 I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem, by the gazelles, and by the hinds of the field, [that ye awaken not, nor stir up love,5 until it please]'.6 And R. Zera? - That7 implies that Israel shall not go up [all together as if surrounded] by a wall.8 And Rab Judah? - Another 'I adjure you'9 is written in Scripture. And R. Zera? - That text is required for [an exposition] like that of R. Jose son of R. Hanina who said: 'What was the purpose of those three adjurations?10 - One, that Israel shall not go up [all together as if surrounded] by a wall;8 the second, that whereby the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured Israel that they shall not rebel against the nations of the world; and the third is that whereby the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured the idolaters that they shall not oppress Israel too much'. And Rab Judah? - It is written in Scripture, That ye awaken not, nor stir up.11 And R. Zera? - That text is required for [an exposition] like that of R. Levi who stated: 'What was the purpose of those six adjurations?12 - Three for the purposes just mentioned and the others, that [the prophets] shall not make known the end,13 that [the people] shall not14 delay15 the end,13 and that they shall not reveal the secret16 to the idolaters'.
By the gazelles, and by the hinds of the field.17 R. Eleazar explained: The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Israel, 'If you will keep the adjuration, well and good; but if not, I will permit your flesh [to be a prey] like [that of] the gazelles and the hinds of the field'.
R. Eleazar said: Whoever is domiciled in the Land of Israel lives without sin, for it is said in Scripture, And the inhabitant shall not say, 'I am sick', the people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity.18 Said Raba19 to R. Ashi; We apply this [text]18 to those who suffer from disease.
R.Anan said; Whoever is buried in the Land of Israel is deemed to be20 buried under the altar; since in respect of the latter21 it is written in Scripture, At altar of earth thou shalt make unto me,22 and in respect of the former23 it is written in Scripture, And his laud doth make expiation for his people.24
'Ulla was in the habit of paying visits to the Land of Israel but came to his eternal rest25 outside the Land - [When people] came and reported this to R. Eleazar he exclaimed, 'Thou 'Ulla, shouldst die in an unclean land!.'26 'His coffin', they said to him, 'has arrived'.27 'Receiving a man in his lifetime', he replied, 'is not the same as receiving him after his death'.
A certain man28 who fell under the obligation [of marrying]29 a sister-in-law30 at Be Hozae31 came to R. Hanina and asked him whether it was proper32 to go down there to contract with her levirate marriage. 'His brother', [R. Hanina] replied, 'married a heathen33 and died, blessed be the Omnipresent Who slew him, and this one would follow him!'
Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: As it is forbidden to leave the Land of Israel for Babylon so it is forbidden to leave Babylon34 for other countries. Both Rabbah and R. Joseph said: Even from Pumbeditha35 to Be Kubi.36
A man once moved from Pumbeditha to [settle in] Be Kubi and R. Joseph placed him under the ban.
A man once left Pumbeditha to [take up his abode at] Astunia,37 and he died.38 Said Abaye: 'If this young scholar wanted it, he could still have been alive'.39
Both Rabbah and R. Joseph stated: The fit40 persons of Babylon are received38 by the Land of Israel, and the fit40 ones of other countries are received41 by Babylon. In what respect?42 If it be suggested: In respect of purity of descent,43 surely [it may be objected,] did not the Master say, 'All countries are [like] dough44 towards the Land of Israel,45 and the Land of Israel is [like] dough towards Babylon'?46 - The fact, however, [is that the 'fit'47 are received] in respect of burial.48
Rab Judah said: Whoever lives in Babylon is accounted as though he lived in the Land of Israel; for it is said in Scripture, Ho, Zion, escape, thou that dwellest with the daughter of Babylon.49
Abaye stated: We have a tradition that Babel50 will not witness the sufferings51 [that will precede the coming] of the Messiah.52 He [also] explained it53 to refer54 to Huzal55 in Benjamin which would be named56 the Corner of Safety.57
R. Eleazar stated: The dead outside the Land58 will not be resurrected; for it is said in Scripture, And I will set glory59 in the land of the living,60 [implying] the dead of the land in which I have my desire61 will be resurrected, but the dead [of the land] in which I have no desire will not be resurrected.
R. Abba b. Memel objected: Thy dead shall live, my dead bodies shall arise;62 does not [the expression] 'Thy dead shall live' refer to the dead of the Land of Israel, and 'My dead bodies shall arise' to the dead outside the Land;63 while the text,64 And I will give glory65 in the land of the living60 was written of Nebuchadnezzar concerning whom the All-Merciful said, 'I will bring against them a king who is as swift as a stag'?66 - The other replied: Master, I am making an ex position of another Scriptural text: He that giveth breath unto the people upon it,67 and spirit to them that walk therein.68 But is it not written, My dead bodies shall arise?69 - That was written in reference to miscarriages.70 Now as to R. Abba b. Memel, what [is the application] he makes of the text,71 'He that giveth breath unto the people upon it'? - He requires it for [an exposition] like that of R. Abbahu who stated: Even a Canaanite bondwoman who [lives] in the Land of Israel is assured of a place in72 the world to come, [for in the context] here it is written, unto the people73 upon it,74 and elsewhere it is written, Abide ye here with75 the ass76 [which may be rendered]77 people that are like an ass'.78
And spirit to them that work therein74 [teaches], said R. Jeremiah b. Abba in the name of R. Johanan, that whoever walks four cubits in the Land of Israel is assured of a place79 in the world to come. Now according to R. Eleazar,80 would not the righteous outside the Land81 be revived?82 - R. Elai replied: [They will be revived] by rolling [to the Land of Israel]. R. Abba Sala the Great demurred: Will not the rolling be painful to the righteous? - Abaye replied: Cavities will be made for them underground.
Thou shalt carry me out of Egypt and bury me in their burying-place.83 Karna remarked: [There must be here] some inner meaning. Our father Jacob well knew that he was a righteous man in every way, and, since the dead outside the Land will also be resurrected, why did he trouble his sons?84 Because he might possibly be unworthy to [roll through] the cavities.85
Similarly you read in Scripture, And Joseph took an oath of the children of Israel, [saying....ye shall carry up my bones from hence],86 and R. Hanina remarked: [There is here] an inner meaning. Joseph well knew himself to be a righteous man in every way, and, since the dead outside the Land87 will be revived, why did he trouble his brothers [with a journey of] four hundred parasangs? Because he might possibly be unworthy to [roll through] the cavities.88 His brothers89 sent [the following message] to Rabbah:90 'Jacob well knew that he was a righteous man in every way' etc.91 Ilfa added to this the following incident. A man was once troubled on account of [his inability to marry] a certain woman92 and desired to go down [to her country]; but as soon as he heard this91 he resigned himself to his unmarried state93 until the day of his death. Although you are a great scholar [you will admit that] a man who studies on his own cannot be on a par with a man who learns from his master. And perchance you might think that you have no master [good enough for you here, we may inform you that] you have one, and he is94 R. Johanan. If you are not coming up, however, beware [we advise you] of three things. Do not sit too long, for [long] sitting aggravates one's abdominal troubles;95 do not stand for a long time, because [long] standing is injurious to the heart; and do not walk too much, because [excessive] walking is harmful to the eyes. Rather [spend] one third [of your time] in sitting, one third in standing and one third in walking. Standing is better than sitting when one has nothing to lean against.
'Standing'! How can this be imagined in view of the statement that '[long] standing is injurious to the heart'? - What was meant in fact was this:96 Better than sitting
(1) Jer. XXVII, 22.
(2) How could he act against this text?
(3) Lit., 'is written'.
(4) Enumerated previously in the context (Jer. XXVII, 19ff).
(5) For the Land of Israel.
(6) Cant. II, 7. Before it pleased God to bring them back to their Land they must patiently remain in Babylon.
(7) The text of Cant. II, 7.
(8) Individuals, however, may well go there. Cur. edd., read בחומה MS. M., כחומה, 'like a wall'. So also Emden and Strashun.
(9) Cant. III, 5, which refers to individuals.
(10) The two mentioned (Cant. II, 7, Ill, 5) and the one in Cant. V, 8.
(11) Cant. II, 7, אם תעירו ואם תעוררו, the repetition of the root עור implies (a) all Israel together and (b) individuals.
(12) Each of the three adjurations (cf. supra n. 10) is repeated (cf. supra n. 11).
(13) Of the exile. The beginning of the Messianic era.
(14) By their misdeeds.
(15) ירחקו (rt. רחק 'to be far'). Aliter; Shall not regard the end (of the exile) as being too far off, and so lose hope (Maharsha). Var. ידחקו (rt. דחק 'to press'), 'force by excessive prayer'.
(16) Of intercalation Aliter: The secret of the reasons underlying the commandments in the Torah (Rashi).
(17) Cant. II, 7.
(18) Isa. XXXIII, 24.
(19) Read with עין יעקב 'Rabina', Yalkut: R. Abba, since Raba and R. Ashi were not contemporaries.
(20) Lit., 'as if'.
(21) Lit., 'here'.
(22) Ex. XX, 21.
(23) Lit., 'there'.
(24) Deut. XXXII, 43. The renderings of A.V., R.V. and A.J.V. respectively differ from each other and from the one given here.
(25) Lit., 'his soul rested'.
(26) The italicized words are a quotation from Amos VII. 17.
(27) In the Land of Israel for burial.
(28) Who lived in the Land of Israel.
(29) Lit. 'that fell to him'.
(30) V. Glos. s.v. yibbum.
(31) V. supra p. 504, n. 5.
(32) Lit., 'what is it?'
(33) כותית var. גויה. Apparently a term of contempt for the Jewish woman of Be Hozae (Golds.).
(34) Which was a centre of religion and learning.
(35) V. supra p. 325, n. 5.
(36) It is forbidden to move one's abode. בי כובי was the name of a village in the vicinity of Pumbeditha' (Rashi Kid. 70b); 'the fort of P.' (Jast.).
(37) אסתוניא a place near Pumbeditha. [Identified by Obermeyer (p. 229) with Piruz Shabur.]
(38) So MS.M. Cur. edd. omit the waw.
(39) His death was due to his departure from Pumbeditha.
(40) כשרין, either (a) of pure and legitimate descent or (b) worthy and righteous. V. infra n. 8.
(41) This is explained anon.
(42) Are the 'fit . . . received'.
(43) Cf. supra note 7 (a), sc. that such persons may marry into any pure families of the Land of Israel and Babylon respectively.
(44) Opp. to 'fine flour', sc. a mixed mass the ingredients of which cannot be determined. Metaph. for impurity or illegitimacy of descent.
(45) The families of the latter place would not allow, therefore, any person from the former to marry any of their members.
(46) Kid. 69b, 71a, which proves that as regards purity of descent Babylon stands higher than the Land of Israel. How then could it be said that only the 'fit persons of Babylon are received by the Land of Israel'? On the causes of the lower standard of genealogical purity in the Land of Israel v. Halevy's suggestion quoted in Kid., Sonc. ed. p. 350, n. 6.
(47) Cf. supra note 7 (b).
(48) Only the worthy men of Babylon and other countries should be allowed burial in the Land of Israel and Babylon respectively. Unworthy men should not be admitted to the former whose soil was sacred or to the latter which scholars and saints had made their home (cf. supra note 1).
(49) Zech. II, 11.
(50) בבל, usually rendered 'Babylon', but v. infra notes 6 and 7.
(51) Or 'travail'.
(52) חבלי דמשיח; 'but the more correct reading is חבליה דמשיח (Moore, G.F., Judaism II 361, n. 2). חבלי המשיח 'frequent in modern Christian books is fictitious' (loc. cit.). The 'sufferings' or 'travail' are more fully described in Sanh. 97b, Sonc. ed. p. 654. These are the 'throes of mother Zion which is in labor to bring forth the Messiah - without metaphor, the Jewish people' (Moore, loc. cit. text).
(53) The tradition as to the immunity of Babel.
(54) Not, as might be assumed, to the well known Babylon (cf. supra note 2).
(55) הומל, a village to the north of Jerusalem between Tel Al-Ful and Nob 'the city of the priests'. It was known by many names including that of בבל (v. Horowitz, I.S., Palestine, p. 73. nn 3ff, s.v. אצל). Neubauer, (Geogr. p. 152) describes it as an old fortress in Palestine (v. Jast.). There was also a Huzal in Babylonia between Nehardea and Sura. Cf. Sanh. 19a, Sonc. ed. p. 98, n. 3 and Berliner, Beitr. z. Geogr. p. 32.
(56) וקרו ליה, lit., 'and they would call it'. The pronoun according to Rashi refers to the 'days of the Messiah', but this is difficult.
(57) The noun הוצל is regarded here as the Hof. of נצל 'to save'.
(58) Of Israel.
(59) צבי. Cf. infra notes13 and 18.
(60) Ezek. XXVI, 20.
(61) צביון containing the three letters of צבי (cf. supra note II). God's care for Palestine is taken for granted. Cf. e.g, A land which the Lord thy God careth for; the eyes of the Lord thy God are always upon it (Deut. XI, 12).
(62) Isa. XXVI, 19.
(63) Of Israel.
(64) Lit., 'and what'.
(65) V. supra note II.
(66) צבי also means 'stag' (cf. supra note 11).
(67) The land of Israel.
(68) Isa. XLII, 5.
(69) Isa. XXVI, 19.
(70) Even they will be resurrected but only in the Land of Israel.
(71) Lit., 'that'.
(72) Lit., 'daughter of'.
(74) Isa. XLII, 5.
(76) Gen. XXII, 5.
(77) The consonants עם being the same (cf. supra on. 7 and 9.)
(78) Sc. slaves who are considered the property of the master. As the 'people' spoken of in Isa. XLII, 5, are assured of a place in the world to come so are the 'people' referred to in Gen. XXII, 5. Moore describes this as 'a specimen of exegetical whimsicality, rather than an eccentricity of opinion' (Judaism, II, 380).
(79) Lit., 'son of'.
(80) Who based his view on Ezek. XXVI, 20, supra.
(81) Of Israel.
(82) But this, surely. is most improbable.
(83) Gen. XLVII, 30.
(84) To carry him to Canaan?
(85) Var. lec., 'because he did not accept the suffering of the pain of rolling through the cavities' (Yalkut and עין יעקב).
(86) Gen. L, 25.
(87) Of Israel.
(88) V. p.717, n. 19.
(89) Who lived in Palestine and desired him to join them,
(90) Rabbah b. Nahmani who wad domiciled in Pumbeditha in Babylonia (cf. supra p. 325, n. 5).
(91) V. Karna's remark supra.
(92) Who refused to leave her home country outside Palestine to join him in Palestine.
(93) Lit 'he rolled by himself'.
(94) Lit., 'and who is he?'
(95) Pl. of iu,j, 'nethermost', hence 'piles'.
(96) Lit., 'but'.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 111b
with nothing to lean against is standing with something to lean against.
And thus [his brothers]1 proceeded to say [in their message]: - 'Isaac and Simeon and Oshaia were unanimous in their view that2 the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah in [respect of the mating of] mules'. For it was taught: If a mule was craving for sexual gratification it must not be mated with a horse or an ass3 but [only with one of] its own species.4
R.Nahman b. Isaac stated; By 'Isaac'5 was meant6 R. Isaac Nappaha. By 'Simeon',5 R. Simeon b. Pazzi - others say: Resh Lakish;7 and by 'Oshaia',8 R. Oshaia8 Berabbi.9
R. Eleazar said; The illiterate10 will not be resurrected, for it is said in Scripture, The dead will not live etc.11 So it was also taught: The dead will not live.11 As this might [be assumed to refer] to all, it was specifically stated, The lax12 will not rise,11 [thus indicating] that the text speaks only of such a man as was lax in the study of the words of the Torah.13 Said R. Johanan to him:14 it is no satisfaction to their Master15 that you should speak to them in this manner. That text16 was written of a man who was so lax as17 to worship idols. 'I', the other18 replied, 'make an exposition [to the same effect] from another text. For it is written in Scripture, For thy dew is as the dew of light, and the earth shall bring to life the dead.19 him who makes use of the 'light' of the Torah will the 'light' of the Torah revive, but him who makes no use of the light of the Torah20 the light of the Torah will not revive'. Observing, however, that he21 was distressed, he18 said to him, 'Master, I have found for them22 a remedy in the Pentateuch: But ye that did cleave unto the Lord your God are alive every one of you this day;23 now is it possible to 'cleave' to the divine presence concerning which it is written in Scripture, For the Lord thy God is a devouring fire?24 But [the meaning is this:] Any man who marries his daughter to a scholar, or carries on a trade on behalf of scholars,25 or benefits scholars from his estate is regarded by Scripture26 as if he had cleaved to the divine presence.27 Similarly you read in Scripture, To love the Lord thy God, [to hearken to His voice,] and to cleave unto Him.28 Is it possible for a human being to 'cleave' unto the divine presence? But [what was meant is this:] Any man who marries his daughter to a scholar, or carries on a trade for scholars, or benefits scholars from his estate is regarded by Scripture as if he had cleaved to the divine presence.
R. Hiyya b. Joseph said: A time will come when the just will break through [the soil] and rise up in Jerusalem, for it is said in Scripture, And they will blossom out of the city like grass of the earth,29 and by 'city' only Jerusalem can be meant for it is said in Scripture, For I will defend this city.30
R. Hiyya b. Joseph further stated: The just in the time to come will rise [apparelled] in their own clothes.31 [This is deduced] a minori ad majus from a grain of wheat. If a grain of wheat that is buried32 naked sprouts up with many coverings how much more so the just who are buried in their shrouds.
R. Hiyya b. Joseph further stated: There will be a time when the Land of Israel will produce baked cakes of the purest quality33 and silk34 garments, for it is said in Scripture, There will be a rich35 cornfield36 in the land.37
Our Rabbis taught: There will be a rich cornfield in the Land upon the top of the mountains.37 [From this] it was inferred that there will be a time when wheat will rise as high as a palm-tree and will grow on the top of the mountains. But in case you should think that there will be trouble in reaping it, it was specifically said in Scripture, its fruit shall rustle like Lebanon;37 the Holy One, blessed be He, will bring a wind from his treasure houses which He will cause to blow upon it. This will loosen its fine flour and a man will walk out into the field and take a mere handful38 and, out of it, will [have sufficient provision for] his own, and his household's maintenance.
With the kidney-fat of wheat.39 [From this] it was inferred that there will be a time when a grain of wheat will be as large as the two kidneys of a big bull. And you need not marvel at this, for a fox once made his nest In a turnip and when [the remainder of the vegetable] was weighed, it was found [to be] sixty pounds in the pound weight of Sepphoris.40
It was taught: R. Joseph41 related: It once happened to a man42 at Shihin43 to whom his father had left three twigs of mustard that one of these split and was found to contain nine kab of mustard, and its timber sufficed to cover a potter's hut.
R. Simeon b. Tahlifa44 related. Our father left us a cabbage stack and we45 ascended and descended it by means of a ladder.46 And of the blood of the grape thou drankest foaming wine.47 It was inferred: The world to come is not like this world. In this world there is the trouble of harvesting and treading [of the grapes], but in the world to come a man will bring one grape48 on a wagon or a ship, put it in a corner of his house and use its contents as [if it had been] a large wine cask, while its timber49 would be used to make fires for cooking.50 There will be no grape that will not contain thirty kegs51 of wine, for it is said is Scripture, And of the blood of the grape thou drankest foaming wine,52 read not 'foaming'53 but homer.54
When R. Dimi came55 he made the following statement: What is the implication in the Scriptural text, Binding his foal56 unto the vine?57 There is not a vine in the Land of Israel that does not require [all the inhabitants of] one city58 to harvest it; And his ass's colt59 into the choice60 vine,57 there is not even a wild61 tree in the Land of Israel that does not produce a load of [fruit for] two she-asses.62 In case you should imagine that it contains no wine, it was explicitly said in Scriptures, He washes his garments in wine.57 And since you might say that it is not red it was explicitly stated, And of the blood of the grape thou drankest foaming wine.63 And in case you should say that it does not cause intoxication it was stated, His vesture.64 And in case you should think that it is tasteless it was expressly stated, His eyes shall be red65 with wine,66 any palate that will taste it says, 'To me, to me'.67 And since you might say that it is suitable for young people but unsuitable for old, it was explicitly stated And his teeth white with milk;66 read not, 'teeth white'68 but 'To him who is advanced in years'.69
In what [sense] is the plain meaning of the text70 to be understood?71 - When R. Dimi came72 he explained: The congregation of Israel said to the Holy One, blessed be He, 'Lord of the Universe, wink to me with Thine eyes,73 which [to me will be] sweeter than wine, and shew74 me Thy teeth which will be sweeter than milk'.73 [This interpretation] provides support for R. Johanan who said; The man who [by smiling affectionately] shews75 his teeth to his friend is better than one who gives bins milk to drink, for it is said in Scriptures, And his teeth white with milk,70 read not 'teeth white' but 'shewing the teeth'.76
R. Hiyya b. Adda77 was the Scriptural tutor of the young children of Resh Lakish. [On one occasion] he took a three days' holiday78 and did not come [to teach the children]. 'Why', the other asked hiss when he returned, 'did you take a holiday?' 'My father', he replied, 'left me one espalier79 and on the first day I cut from it three hundred clusters [of grapes], each cluster yielding one keg. On the second day I cut three hundred clusters, each two of which yielded one keg. On the third day I cut three hundred clusters, each three of which yielded one keg, and so I renounced my ownership of more than one half of it'. 'If you had not taken a holiday [from the Torah]', the other told him, 'it would have yielded much more'.80
Rami b. Ezekiel once paid a visit to Bene-berak81 where he saw goats grazing under fig-trees while honey was flowing from the figs, and milk ran from them, and these mingled with each other. 'This is indeed', he remarked, '[a land] flowing with milk and honey'.82
R. Jacob b. Dostai related: From Lod83 to Ono84 [is a distance of about] three miles.85 Once I rose up early in the morning and waded [all that way] up to my ankles in honey of the figs.
Resh Lakish said: I myself saw the flow of the milk and honey of Sepphoris86 and it extended [over an area of] sixteen by sixteen miles.
Rabbah b. Bar Hana said: I saw the flow of the milk and honey in all the Land of Israel
(1) V. nn. 4-5.
(2) Lit., 'said one thing'.
(3) An act which is contrary to the law forbidding the hybridization of heterogeneous animals.
(4) Tosef. Kil. I, Hul. 79a.
(5) Referred to in the message supra
(6) Lit., 'this'.
(7) Sc. R. Simeon b. Lakish.
(8) MS.M., Hoshaia.
(9) Or 'Berebi'. A title of uncertain meaning. It denotes a scholar of any famous college or a qualified Rabbi who remained at college and acted as tutor to senior students. Cf. Mak. 5b, Sonc. ed. p. 25, n. 4 and Naz., Sonc. ed. p. 64, n. 1.
(10) עמי הארצות pl of 'Am ha-'arez v. Glos.
(11) Isa. XXVI, 14.
(12) רפאים cf. רפה ,רפי 'to be or make lax'. A.V and R.V. 'deceased'; R.V. marg. and A. J. V., 'shades'.
(13) Sc. the illiterate (v. supra n. 9).
(14) A. Eleazar.
(15) God Who created all beings even the illiterate.
(16) Isa. XXVI, 14.
(17) Lit., 'who makes himself lax'.
(18) R. Eleazar.
(19) Isa. XXVI, 19.
(20) Sc. the illiterate who does not engage in the study of the Torah.
(21) R. Johanan.
(22) The illiterate.
(23) Deut. IV, 4, emphasis on 'cleave'.
(24) lbid. 24.
(25) Thus enabling them to devote their time to study. Aliter. Assigns them a share in his business as sleeping partners. V. Sanh., Sonc. ed. p. 671, n. 4.
(26) Lit 'Scripture brings up on him'.
(27) The illiterate (v. supra p. 719. n. 19) need not, therefore, be in despair since, by practising any of these alternatives, they also will be included among the resurrected.
(28) Deut. XXX, 20.
(29) Ps. LXXII, 16.
(30) Referring to Jerusalem. II Kings XIX, 34.
(31) Which they wore during their lifetime (J.T. cited by Tosaf. s.v. בלבושיהן a.I.). The noun in the present context apparently refers to the shrouds (v. Tosaf. loc. cit.) and this may also be the opinion of one authority in J.T. (cf. Marginal Glosses to text.).
(33) Cf. Rashi and Jast. גלוסקא, 'a brand of white flour' or 'a white and delicate bread'. (V. infra p. 721, nn. 2 and 3).
(34) Or 'woollen'.
(35) Heb. פסת analogous to פסים (Gen. XXXVII, 3) (E.V. of many colours).
(36) Heb. בר signifies also 'purity'.
(37) Ps. LXXII, 16.
(38) פיסת ידו (cf. supra n. 2).
(39) Deut. XXXII, 14.
(40) Cf. supra p. 410, n. 6.
(41) Read with MS.M. 'R. Jose'.
(42) Halafta of Sepphoris.
(43) A town near Sepphoris.
(44) MS. M. and others (v. Wilna Gaon), 'Halafta'.
(45) In order to gather its leaves.
(46) בסולם. MS. M., במעלות כסולם, 'on steps as on a ladder'.
(47) Deut. XXXII, 14.
(48) Aliter: 'Stalk of grapes' (Jast.).
(49) The stalk of the grape. V. also p. 721, n. 15 Aliter: the wood of the cask which the husk had superseded (Maharsha).
(50) Lit., 'under the dish'.
(51) Each measuring one se'ah (v. infra n. 5).
(52) Deut. XXXII, 14.
(54) חמר the consonants of the two being identical A homer thirty se'ah.
(55) From Palestine to Babylon.
(56) עירה, absol. עיר (v. infra n 10)
(57) Gen XLIX, II.
(58) Heb. עיר (v. supra n. 8).
(59) אתונו, absol. אתון 'she-ass'.
(60) שורקה v. infra n. 13.
(61) סרק analogous to סורקה the ש in שורקה (v. supra n. 12) being read as ס (cf. Maharsha)
(62) V. supra n. II. The number 'two' is perhaps derived from בני (in בני אתונו) which is taken as the pl. const. of בן and signifies no less than two.
(63) Deut. XXXII, 14. Read with MS.M. and עין יעקב, And his vesture in the blood of grapes, which is the conclusion of Gen. XLIX, 11, the text of the present exposition.
(64) סותה, derived from the rt. סות, 'to incite', 'agitate'.
(65) חכלילי (v. infra n. 19).
(66) Gen. XLIX 12.
(67) חכלילי, (v.supra n. 17) is expounded as, the palate (will say:) To me, to me'
(68) לבן שנים
(69) לבן שנים lit., to a son of years'. לבן 'white' also means 'to a son', שנים 'teeth' may also mean, by a change of vowels 'years'.
(70) Gen. XLIX. 12
(71) Lit. 'is written'.
(72) From Palestine to Babylon
(73) חכלילי (cf. supra p. 722. nn. 17 and 19) is again read as חכ-לי-לי, but חכ is regarded as analogous to the rt. חוך 'to laugh', 'to smile affectionately', facial movements which involve the eyes and the teeth.
(74) V. infra note 6 and text.
(75) Lit., 'makes white' (cf. supra note 4).
(76) Lit., 'whitening of the teeth' (cf. supra l.c ).
(77) [MS.M Abba; v. supra 8b].
(78) Lit., 'he relaxed'.
(79) Or 'a vine trained to an espalier'.
(80) Sc. the progressive daily decline of the yield was due to the corresponding increase in the number of days in which he failed to return to his sacred duty of teaching his pupils the word of God.
(81) One of the cities in the tribe of Dan (Josh XIX, 45); now the village Ibn Ibrak, north east of Jaffa (v. Horowitz, I.S , Palestine s.v.)
(82) Cf. e.g.. Ex. III, 8, Num. XIII, 27.
(83) Or Lydda, the Roman Diospolis, W.N.W. of Jerusalem.
(84) Modern Kafr Annah, between Jaffa and Lydda (v. supra note 2).
(85) The actual distance is rather seven miles (v. Horowitz, op. cit., s.v. אונו n. 1).
(86) V. supra p. 410. n. 6.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 112a
and [the total area] was equal [to the land extending] from Be Mikse1 to the Fort of Tulbanke,2 [an area of] twenty-two parasangs in length and six parasangs in breadth.
R. Helbo, R. 'Awira3 and R. Jose b. Hanina once visited a certain place where a peach that was [as large] as a pot of Kefar Hino4 was brought before them. (And how big is a pot of Kefar Hino? - Five se'ah.) One third [of the fruit] they ate, one third they declared free to all, and one third they put before their beasts. A year later R. Eleazar came there on a visit and [a peach] was brought to him. Taking it in his one hand5 he exclaimed, A fruitful land into a salt waste, for the wickedness of them that dwell therein.6
R. Joshua b. Levi once visited Gabla7 where he saw vines laden with clusters of ripe grapes8 standing up [to all appearances] like calves. 'Calves among the vines!', he remarked. 'These', they told him, 'are clusters of ripe grapes'.8 'Land, O Land', he exclaimed, 'withdraw thy fruit; for whom art thou yielding thy fruit? For those Arabs9 who rose up against us on account of our sins?' Towards [the end10 of that] year R. Hiyya happened to be there and saw them11 standing up [to all appearances] like goats. 'Goats among the vines', he exclaimed. 'Go away', they told him, 'do not you treat us as your friend did'.
Our Rabbis taught: In the blessed years12 of the Land of Israel a beth se'ah13 yielded fifty thousand14 kor15 though in Zoan,16 even in the days of its prosperity,17 a beth se'ah yielded [no more than] seventy kor.15 For it was taught: R. Meir said, I saw in the valley of Beth Shean18 that a beth se'ah13 yielded seventy kor.15 Now, among all the countries there is none more fertile than the land of Egypt, for it is said in Scripture, Like the garden of the Lord, like the land of Egypt;19 and there is no more fertile spot in all the land of Egypt than that of Zoan where kings were brought up, for it is written in Scripture, For his princes20 are at Zoan.21 Furthermore, in all the Land of Israel there is no ground more rocky than at Hebron22 where the dead23 were buried. Hebron was nevertheless seven times as fertile24 as Zoan; for it is written in Scripture, And Hebron was built in seven years before Zoan in Egypt,25 now what [can be the meaning of] built? If it be suggested that it was actually built, is it possible [It may be objected that] a man26 would build a house27 for his younger son28 before he built one for his elder son,29 it being stated in Scriptures And the sons of Ham, Cush and Mizraim, and Put and Canaan?30 [The meaning must] consequently be31 that it was seven times as fertile32 as Zoan.33 This refers to stony ground, but [in ground] where there are no stones [a beth se'ah would yield] five hundred [kor].34 This too refers to periods when the land was not blessed,35 but [of the time] when it was blessed35 it is written in Scripture, And Isaac sowed in that land, [and found in the same year a hundredfold].36
It was taught: R. Jose stated, One se'ah37 in Judea yielded five se'ah: One se'ah of flour, one se'ah of fine flour, one se'ah of bran, one se'ah of coarse bran and one se'ah of cibarium.
A certain Sadducee38 once said to R Hanina: 'You may well sing the praises of your country. My father left me one beth se'ah39 and from it [I obtain] oil, wine, corn and pulse, and my cattle also feed on it'.
An Amorite40 once said to a Palestinian,41 'How much do you gather42 from that date tree that stands on the bank of the Jordan?' - 'Sixty kor',37 the other replied. 'You have not improved it'. the former said to him, 'but rather43 ruined it; we used to gather44 from it one hundred and twenty kor'. 'I too', the other replied 'was speaking to you [of the yield] of one side only'.
R. Hisda stated: What [was meant] by the Scriptural text, I give thee a pleasant land, the heritage of the deer?45 Why was the Land of Israel compared to a deer? - To tell you that as the skin of a deer46 cannot contain its flesh47 so cannot the Land of Israel contain its produce.48 Another explanation: As the deer is the swiftest among the animals so is the Land of Israel the swiftest of all lands in the ripening of its fruit. In case49 [one should suggest that] as the deer is swift but his flesh is not fat so is the Land of Israel swift to ripen but its fruits are not rich, it was explicitly stated in Scripture, Flowing with milk and honey50 [thus indicating that they are] richer than milk and sweeter than honey.
When R. Eleazar went up to the Land of Israel he remarked, 'I have escaped [one penalty]'.51 When he was ordained he said, 'I have now escaped two [penalties]'.51 When he was given a seat on the council for intercalation he exclaimed, 'I have escaped the three [penalties]'; for it is said in Scripture, And My hand shall be against the prophets that see vanity etc. They shall not be in the council of My people,52 which refers to53 the council for intercalation, neither shall they be written in the register of the house of Israel,52 refers to53 ordination; neither shall they enter into the land of Israel52 [is to be understood] in accordance with its plain meaning.
When R. Zera went up to the Land of Israel and could not find a ferry wherein to cross [a certain river]54 he grasped a rope bridge and crossed. Thereupon a certain Sadducee sneered at him: 'Hasty people, that put your mouths before your ears,55 you are still, as ever, clinging to your hastiness'. 'The spot', the former replied. 'which Moses and Aaron were not worthy [of entering] who could assure me that I should be worthy [of entering]?' R. Abba56 used to kiss the cliffs of Akko.57 R. Hanina56 used to repair its roads.58 R. Ammi and R. Assi59
(1) V. supra p. 408, n. 9.
(2) The latter was a place on Tel-ben-kaneh, one of the upper reaches of the Euphrates on the boundary between Babylonia and Palestine. Cf. Kid. Sonc. ed. p. 365. n. 8; Horowitz, op. cit. s.v. אקרא דתולבנקי; S. Funk, Juden in Bab. I, p. 13, n. 2.
(3) MS.M. עזריה
(4) [Identified by Klein (Beitrage, p. 184) with Kefar Hananiah in Galilee].
(5) It was so small.
(6) Ps. CVII, 34.
(7) Biblical Gebal, a district between Ammon and Amalek (cf. Ps. LXXXIII, 8) now known as A-gibal, S.E. of the Dead Sea. This Gebal is not to be confused with Gebal, a Zidonian town in the N.W. of Palestine (v. Horowitz, op. cit., s.v.).
(8) קטופי, pl. of קטופא (rt. קטף 'to pluck'), 'fruit ready to be plucked'.
(9) Bomb. ed., 'heathens'.
(10) So Rashi. Cf Maharsha.
(11) The clusters of grapes.
(12) So Rashi. Lit. . 'In her blessings'.
(13) An area of fifty cubits by fifty in which one se'ah (v. Glos.) of seed can be sown.
(14) Lit., 'five myriads'.
(15) V. Glos.
(16) In the land of Egypt.
(17) Lit., 'settlement'.
(18) In the Jordan plain, about twenty miles to the south of Tiberias. The town of Beth Shean is mentioned several times in the Bible (cf. e.g., Josh. XVII. 11 and 16, Judges I, 27, I Sam. XXXI, 10, I Chron. VII, 29). The town once belonged to Egypt (it occurs in the Tel-el-Amarna letters under the name of Bitsani) while at other times in its history it formed part of the Land of Israel. In the post exilic period it belonged neither to the former nor (cf. Hul. 6b, 7a) the latter country, and is taken by R. Meir here as an example of the normal fertility of a neutral district in order to draw the inference that follows.
(19) Gen. XIII, 10.
(20) Sc. rulers, kings. Aliter: the princes of Israel flocked to Zoan to solicit the protection of the kings of Egypt (v. Rashi).
(21) Isa. XXX, 4.
(22) Sixteen miles S.S.W. of Jerusalem.
(23) Cf. Gen. XLIX, 31.
(24) Lit., 'built', 'cultivated'.
(25) Num. XIII, 22.
(26) Ham (v. Gen. X, 6)
(27) And much less a whole town.
(28) Canaan (v. ibid.).
(29) Mizraim (ibid.).
(31) Lit., 'but'.
(32) Lit., 'built', 'cultivated'.
(33) Seven times seventy kor _ four hundred and ninety kor.
(34) At least; only ten more than rocky ground (v. supra n. 9).
(35) Cf. supra p. 725, n. 5.
(36) Gen. XXVI, 12. A hundred times five hundred _ five thousand (v. supra p. 725, nn. 7 and 10 and text).
(37) V. Glos.
(38) [Read with MS. M. Min (v. Glos.) and cf. Git 57a].
(39) Cf. supra p. 725, n. 6.
(40) Of the early inhabitants of Canaan (cf. e.g., Gen. XV, 21).
(41) Lit., 'to a son (inhabitant) of the Land of Israel'; to an Israelite who entered Palestine in the days of Joshua.
(42) Or 'cut' (cf. MS. M. גדריתון).
(43) Cf. Bah.
(44) Cf. supra n. 18.
(45) Jer. III, 19; נחלת צבי, A.V., goodly heritage.
(46) After it had been flayed.
(47) It cannot again be made to cover the full body of the animal.
(48) It grows in such abundance that all the store houses of the land cannot provide sufficient accommodation for its storage.
(49) Lit., 'if'.
(50) V. e.g., Ex. III, 8, Num. XIV, 8.
(51) This is explained anon.
(52) Ezek. XIII. 9.
(53) Lit., 'this'.
(54) The Jordan?
(55) Israel said נעשה, 'we will do' before ונשמע 'and we will hear' (Ex XXIV, 7).
(56) In his love for Palestine.
(57) Acre Or Ptolemais, a city and harbour on the northern end of Haifa Bay on the coast of Palestine.
(58) Lit., 'its stumblings', 'obstacles'.
(59) Cf. p. 727, n. 12.
Talmud - Mas. Kethuboth 112b
used to rise [from their seats1 to move] from the sun to the shade2 and from the shade to the sun.3 R. Hiyya b. Gamda4 rolled himself in its5 dust, for it is said in Scripture, For Thy servants take pleasure in her stones, and love her dust.6
R. Zera said: R. Jeremiah b. Abba stated, 'In the generation in which the son of David7 will come there will be prosecution8 against scholars'. When I repeated this statement in the presence of Samuel, he exclaimed, [There will be] test after test,9 for it is said in Scripture, And if there be yet a tenth in it, it shall again be eaten up.10
R. Joseph learnt:11 [There will be] plunderers12 and plunderers of the plunderers.13
R. Hiyya b. Ashi stated in the name of Rab: In the time to come all the wild trees of the Land of Israel will bear fruit; for it is said in Scripture, For the tree14 beareth its fruit, the fig-tree and the vine do yield their strength.15
(1) Where they sat while delivering their discourses.
(2) In the summer when the heat is intense.
(3) In the cold days of the winter. In order to obviate any fault finding with the weather of Palestine (Rashi).
(4) In his love for Palestine.
(6) Ps. CII, 15.
(7) The Messiah.
(9) Trials and calamities will follow each other in close succession. 'One reduction after the other' (Jast.). MS.M. adds, בוגדים בגדו ובגד בוגדים בגדו. (Isa. XXIV, 16) the assonance of which might have suggested R. Joseph's comment (v. infra n. 15).
(10) Isa. VI, 13.
(11) An exposition of the Isaiah text cited (v.supra n. 12). [Cf. Targum a.l. and B.K., Sonc. ed. p. 9. n. 9].
(12) Who will leave only 'a tenth of it'.
(13) Inferred from 'shall again be eaten up'. Aram. ובזוזי דבזוזי בזוזי (cf. supra note 11).
(14) Sc. 'the wild tree', since fruit-trees are specifically mentioned in the following clause (Rashi).
(15) Joel II, 22.