The Babylonian Talmud

Niddah

 

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 37a

Shila proceeded to his wife and said to her, 'prepare for me my shroud in order that he have no opportunity of going to Rab and saying things about me'. She prepared his shroud for him; and when the soul of Shila came to its eternal rest people saw a myrtle1 flying from the one bier to the other. 'We may conclude', they said, 'that the Rabbis have been reconciled.'

Raba enquired: Does labour2 render all previous counting in zibah3 void? Does any discharge that causes uncleanness render all previous counting void and, therefore, this also [does it, since] it causes uncleanness like the days of menstruation; or is it possible that only that which4 causes the uncleanness of zibah that renders all the previous counting void, and this, therefore, [does not do it, since] it is no cause of such uncleanness? - Abaye replied: A zibah that is due to an accident provides the answer,5 for this is no cause of the uncleanness of zibah6 and yet renders all previous counting void.7 The other retorted: Indeed, this8 also is a cause of the uncleanness of zibah, for we have learnt: If he observed a first discharge he must be examined, if he observed a second discharge he must be examined, but if he observed a third he need not be examined.9 But according to R. Eliezer who ruled, 'Even after a third discharge he must be examined'10 would you also maintain that, since it is no cause of the uncleanness of zibah, it does not render the previous counting void? - The other replied: According to R. Eliezer the law is so indeed.

Come and hear: R. Eliezer ruled, Even after a third discharge he must be examined, but after a fourth one he need not be examined.11 Does not this refer to the rendering of previous counting void?12 - No, to the imposition on that drop of an uncleanness that may be conveyed through carriage.

Come and hear: After a third discharge. R. Eliezer ruled, he must be examined; after a fourth one he need not be examined; and it is in regard to a sacrifice that I said this13 but not in regard to the rendering void of all previous counting.14 But the fact is that15 according to R. Eliezer you may well solve from here that even that which causes no uncleanness of zibah renders all previous counting void. What, however, [it is asked], is the solution of the problem according to the Rabbis? - Come and hear what the father of R. Abin learnt: 'What had his zibah caused him? Seven days.16 Hence it renders void the counting of seven days. What had his emission of semen caused him? The [uncleanness of] one day. Hence it renders void the counting of one day'. Now what is meant by 'seven days'? If it be suggested that it causes him to be unclean for seven days, [the objection would arise that] in that case it should have been said: As on account of his zibah he is unclean for seven days. Consequently17 it follows, that only that which causes the uncleanness of zibah renders void the counting of the seven days, but that which does not cause the uncleanness of zibah does not render void all previous counting. This is conclusive. Abaye stated: We have an accepted tradition that labour does not render void all previous counting in zibah; and should you find a Tanna who said that it did render the counting void, that must be R. Eliezer.18

It was taught: R. Marinus ruled, A birth does not render void the previous counting after a zibah.19 The question was raised: Is it included in the counting?20 - Abaye replied: It neither renders void the days that were previously counted21 nor is it counted in the prescribed days.21 Raba replied: It does not render void the days counted and it is counted among the prescribed days.22 Whence, said Raba, do I derive this? From what was taught: And after that she shall be clean,23 'after' means after all of them, implying that no uncleanness may intervene between them.24 Now if you agree that [these days]25 are included one can well see the justification for saying that no uncleanness may intervene between them, but if you contend that these days25 are not included the birth, surely, would cause a break between them. And Abaye?26 - He can answer you: The meaning is that the uncleanness of zibah shall not intervene between them.27 Whence, said Raba, do I derive this? From what was taught: Of her issue,23 'of her issue' implies but not of her leprosy,28 'of her issue' but not of her childbirth.29 And Abaye?30 - He can answer you: Deduce once 'Of her issue31 but not of her leprosy' and do not deduce again, 'but not of her childbirth'. And Raba?32 - What an argument is this!33 If you agree that 'of her issue'31 implies 'but not of her childbirth' one can well justify the text; for since it was required for the deduction about childbirth, leprosy also was mentioned on account of childbirth; but if you contend that 'of her issue' implies only 'but not of her leprosy', [the objection would arise] that this could be deduced from And when he that hath an issue is cleansed of his issue,34 which implies 'of his issue' and not of his leprosy. And Abaye?30 - One35 refers to a zab and the other to a zabah, both being necessary. For if the All Merciful had only written

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(1) It was customary to lay a myrtle on a bier (Rashi).
(2) That was accompanied by bleeding.
(3) The prescribed seven days.
(4) By appearing on three days.
(5) Lit., proves'.
(6) As was stated supra.
(7) V. infra.
(8) Zibah that is due to an accident.
(9) Zabim II, 2. Thus it is shown that a third discharge, even if it was due to an accident, provided the first two discharges were not due to such a cause, renders a person a confirmed or major zab.
(10) Zabim l.c., which proves that zibah that is due to an accident never causes a person to be a confirmed zab.
(11) Cf. supra 35a, Naz. 65b.
(12) An objection against Raba, who laid down that that which is no cause of the uncleanness of zibah does not render void the previous counting.
(13) That an examination is necessary.
(14) The counting being always void and is in no way dependent on an examination. Now does not this then prove that even that which causes no uncleanness of zibah renders the counting void?
(15) Contrary to what has been explained before.
(16) This is explained presently.
(17) Since the expression used was 'caused'.
(18) Who holds that zibah due to an accident, though it causes no zibah uncleanness, renders void all previous counting.
(19) If the counting was interrupted by a birth it may be continued after the birth had taken place.
(20) Sc. if the birth took place during the seven days following a zibah, and the days following it were free from all discharge, are these days counted as clean ones and make up the required number of seven?
(21) The counting must be resumed after the clean days of birth have passed.
(22) If the days after birth were free from all discharge.
(23) Lev. XV. 28.
(24) Supra 33b.
(25) That follow a birth.
(26) How in view of this argument can he maintain his view?
(27) That of childbirth does not matter.
(28) Sc. as soon as she counted the days prescribed for zibah (cf. Lev. XV, 28) she brings the required sacrifice, and attains cleanness from zibah irrespective of whether she was or was not still afflicted with leprosy.
(29) As soon as she is free from her zibah she begins to count the seven days and need not wait until the unclean days of childbirth had passed. It is thus obvious that a birth during the days of zibah does not render void the previous counting and that the days following birth are included in the counting.
(30) How in view of this argument can he maintain his view?
(31) Lev. XV, 28.
(32) How can he make two deductions from the same expression?
(33) Lit., that, what'.
(34) Lev. XV, 13.
(35) Of the two texts cited.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 37b

of a zab it might have been presumed to apply to him only, since he does not become unclean through a discharge that is due to an accident, but not to a zabah who becomes unclean even through a discharge that is due to an accident. Hence the necessity for the text about the zabah. And if the All Merciful had written only of a zabah, it might have been presumed to apply only to her, since she does not become unclean through observations [on less than three days] as on [three] days,1 but not to a zab who becomes unclean through [three] observations2 as [through observations on three] days.3 Hence both texts were required.

Said Abaye: Whence do I derive this?4 From what was taught: Her sickness shall she be unclean,5 includes the man who had intercourse with her; 'her sickness shall she be unclean' includes the nights;6 'her sickness shall she be unclean' includes a woman who gave birth in zibah who is required to continue in her uncleanness until seven clean days have passed. Now does not this mean: Clean from the uncleanness of birth?7 - No, clean from that of blood.8

Abaye further stated, Whence do I derive this?9 From what was taught: As are the days of her menstruation so are the days of her bearing. As the days of her menstruation are not suitable [for counting as the days] after her zibah10 and they cannot be included in the counting of the prescribed seven days, so also the days following her bearing which11 are not suitable [for counting as the days] after her zibah may not12 be included in the counting of the seven prescribed days. And Raba? - This is in agreement with13 R. Eliezer who ruled: It14 also renders void all previous counting.15 But may an inference be drawn from the impossible16 for the possible?17 R. Ahadboy b. Ammi replied: This is the view of R. Eliezer who holds that the possible may be inferred from the impossible.18 R. Shesheth, however, replied: Scripture has perforce compared them19 to one another.20

There are some who say: R. Ahadboy b. Ammi citing R. Shesheth replied. This represents the view of R. Eliezer who holds that the possible may be deduced from the impossible; but R. Papa replied: Scripture has perforce compared them to one another.

IF HAVING BEEN IN LABOUR FOR THREE DAYS etc. The question was raised: What is the ruling where she was relieved from both?21 - R. Hisda replied: She is unclean.22 R. Hanina replied: She is clean.23 R. Hanina explained: This may be compared to a king who, when going on a tour, is preceded24 by his troops and it is known that they are the king's troops.25 But R. Hisda, said: [Immediately before his arrival] he would require even more troops.26

We learnt: R. JOSHUA RULED, THE RELIEF FROM PAIN MUST HAVE CONTINUED FOR A NIGHT AND A DAY. AS THE NIGHT AND THE DAY OF THE SABBATH. THE RELIEF [SPOKEN OF IS ONE] FROM PAIN, NOT FROM BLEEDING. The reason then27 is because [she had relief] FROM PAIN and NOT FROM BLEEDING, but if she had relief from both21 she is clean. Does not this present an objection against R. Hisda? - R. Hisda can answer you: There was no need to state that, if she had relief from both, she is unclean, since [metaphorically] the troops completely disappeared; but even where she had relief from pain and not from bleeding where it might have been presumed that as she had not ceased to bleed she has not ceased to labour either and that it was merely stupor that seized her. Hence we were informed [that even in this case she is unclean].

We learnt: IF HAVING BEEN IN LABOUR FOR THREE DAYS OF THE ELEVEN DAYS, SHE WAS RELIEVED FROM HER PAINS FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AND THEN GAVE BIRTH. SHE IS REGARDED AS HAVING GIVEN BIRTH IN ZIBAH. Now, how are we to imagine the circumstances? If it be suggested: As it was stated,28 [the objection would arise:] What need was there to mention THREE seeing that it suffices29 if the labour lasted two days and the relief30 one day? Consequently it must be this that was meant: IF HAVING BEEN IN LABOUR FOR THREE DAYS she was relieved from both,31 or if having been in labour for two days, SHE WAS RELIEVED FROM HER PAINS FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS, SHE IS REGARDED AS HAVING GIVEN BIRTH IN ZIBAH, and this presents, does it not, an objection against R. Hanina? - R. Hanina can answer you: No; the circumstances may in fact be as stated,32 but it is this that we were informed, that although the labour continued33 [for a part only] of the third day and she was relieved from her pains for twenty-four hours34 she is nevertheless unclean, contrary to the view35 of R. Hanina.36

HOW LONG MAY PROTRACTED LABOUR CONTINUE? R. MEIR RULED etc. Now since protracted labour may continue for FIFTY DAYS is there any necessity to mention FORTY? - R. Hisda replied: This is no difficulty. the one37 referring to an ailing woman and the other38 to a woman in good health.

R. Levi ruled: [The birth of] a child is a cause of the cleanness of those days only in which a woman may normally become a zabah,39 but Rab ruled: Even in the days that are suitable for the counting prescribed for a zabah.40 Said R. Adda b. Ahabah: And according to Rab's view41

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(1) Only a discharge that made its appearance on three successive days causes her uncleanness.
(2) Even on the same day.
(3) Cf. B.K. 24a.
(4) His ruling supra 37a.
(5) Lev. XII, 2.
(6) Though the text speaks only of days.
(7) Sc. that no birth must intervene; from which it follows that if it did intervene the days following it may not be included in the prescribed seven days.
(8) Only those days on which a discharge occurred may not be included in the counting, but where the birth was free from bleeding the days following it may well be included.
(9) His ruling supra 37a.
(10) Since the zibah period follows that of menstruation and not vice versa, while a subsequent menstruation period cannot begin before seven clean days have passed after the zibah had ceased.
(11) Like those of menstruation.
(12) If birth took place during the counting.
(13) Lit., 'this whose'.
(14) Childbirth.
(15) From which it is self-evident that the days following it cannot be included in the counting of the seven days. According to the Rabbis, however, whose view Raba follows, birth does not render void all previous counting and the days following, it may well be included in the prescribed seven days.
(16) Menstruation during zibah.
(17) Birth, which may well occur during a zibah period.
(18) Cf. Men. 82b.
(19) Birth and menstruation.
(20) Only a gezerah shawah (v. Glos.) may be questioned, but not a comparison made in the Biblical text itself (hekkesh) despite any argument that might be raised against it.
(21) Pain and bleeding.
(22) Since at any rate she had relief from pain it is obvious that the previous bleeding was not due to childbirth.
(23) The relief from both is an indication that the bleeding also was due to childbirth. Only where the bleeding continued and the pain ceased is it manifest that the former was not due to the labour.
(24) By a day or two.
(25) Similarly the pains and bleeding that precede childbirth must be ascribed to it despite the interval (cf. prev. n.) between them.
(26) As the bleeding ceased it must be obvious that the childbirth had no connection with it.
(27) Why the woman is unclean.
(28) LABOUR FOR THREE DAYS, relief FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS, and bleeding all the time.
(29) For the woman to be unclean.
(30) From pain but not from bleeding.
(31) Pain and bleeding.
(32) LABOUR FOR THREE DAYS, relief FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS, and bleeding all the time.
(33) Cf. Rashal. Cur. edd. 'began'.
(34) And not for a full night and a full day.
(35) Lit., 'to take out'.
(36) Sc. Hananiah the son of the brother of R. Joshua who stated (supra 36b), 'Provided her pains of labour were experienced on her third day . . . she is not regarded as having given birth in zibah'.
(37) Lit., 'here', the number fifty.
(38) Forty.
(39) I.e., the eleven days between the menstruation periods. If a birth, however, takes place after these 'days the woman becomes unclean as a menstruant (as stated supra).
(40) Sc. if labour began during the eleven days of zibah not only are these days clean but also the seven days that follow them. Only when the bleeding continued beyond these seven days does the woman become unclean as a menstruant.
(41) That even the days following the zibah period are clean if the labour began during the zibah days.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 38a

even the days that are suitable for counting after the previous counting had been rendered void1 are also clean.2

We have learnt: HOW LONG MAY PROTRACTED LABOUR CONTINUE? R. MEIR RULED: EVEN FORTY OR FIFTY DAYS. Now this might quite possibly happen according to Rab on R. Adda b. Ahabah's interpretation,3 but according to Levi4 does not this present a difficulty?5 - Levi can answer you: Was it stated that she was clean throughout all these days?6 [No; if the birth occurs] in the days of menstruation7 she is regarded as a menstruant and only when it occurs in the days of her zibah7 is she clean.8

Another reading. R. Levi ruled: [The birth of] a child is a cause of cleanness9 in those days only in which a woman may normally become a major zabah.10 What is the reason? It is written in Scripture,11 Her blood many days.12 Abba Saul in the name of Rab13 ruled: Even in the days in which she may normally become a minor zabah. What is the reason? Days14 and All the days14 are written in the context.15

We have learnt: HOW LONG MAY PROTRACTED LABOUR CONTINUE? R. MEIR RULED: EVEN FORTY OR FIFTY DAYS. Does not this present a difficulty against both of them?16 - Was it stated that she was clean throughout all of them?17 [No;] if she was in labour during the days of her menstruation she is regarded a menstruant and only where this occurred during the days of her zibah18 is she clean.

It was taught: R. Meir used to say. A woman may sometimes bleed19 for a hundred and fifty days20 without becoming a major zabah.21 How? The two days22 preceding the period of her menstruation,23 the seven days of menstruation, two days after menstruation,24 fifty days25 which childbirth causes to be clean, eighty days26 prescribed for a female birth,27 seven days of menstruation28 and the two days29 after the menstruation.30 If so,31 they32 said to him, might not a woman bleed all the days of her life and no major zibah would occur in them?33 - He replied: 'What is it that you have in mind? Is it the possibility of frequent abortions? The law of protracted labour34 does not apply to abortions'.35

Our Rabbis taught: A woman may sometimes36 observe a discharge on a hundred days and yet no major zibah would result from it. How? The two days37 prior to the time of menstruation,38 the seven days of menstruation, two days after menstruation,39 eighty days following the birth of a female child,40 seven days of menstruation and the two days39 after menstruation. What new law does this41 teach us? - That the law differs42 from him who ruled that it was impossible for the uterus to open without some bleeding, [since thereby]43 we were informed that it is possible for the uterus to open without previous bleeding.44

R. JUDAH RULED: . . . SUFFICES FOR HER etc. It was taught: R. Judah citing R. Tarfon ruled, Her [ninth] month suffices for her45 and in this there is one aspect of a relaxation of the law46 and one of restriction.47 How? If she was in labour for two days at the end of the eighth month and for one day at the beginning of the ninth month, even though she gave birth to the child at the beginning of the ninth month, she is regarded as having born it in zibah;48 but if she was in labour for one day at the end of the eighth month and for two days at the beginning of the ninth, even though she bore the child at the end of the ninth month,49 she is not regarded as having given birth in zibah.50 Said R. Adda b. Ahabah: From this51 it may be inferred that R. Judah holds that it is the shofar52 that is the cause.53 But could this54 be right,55 seeing that Samuel stated: A woman can conceive and bear only on the two hundred and seventy-first day56 or on the two hundred and seventy-second day57 or on the two hundred and seventy-third day?57 He58 follows the view of the pious men of old; for it was taught: The pious men of old performed their marital duty on a Wednesday only, in order that their wives59 should not be led to60

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(1) I.e., for ever, since any seven days following a discharge that occurred within any seven days counted after a previous discharge are suitable for counting.
(2) Once labour began within the eleven days of zibah all subsequent days are clean unless the woman was relieved from her pain for the prescribed period, prior to the birth of the child.
(3) Since the counting of the days may sometimes continue for a very long time (cf. prev. n. but one).
(4) Who restricts the labour and birth to the eleven days of zibah.
(5) Sc. how is it possible for a woman to be clean when labour is protracted for forty or fifty days?
(6) The forty or fifty days.
(7) After the protracted labour.
(8) The purport of R. Meir's ruling being that there is no obligation to bring a sacrifice or to count the prescribed number of clean days even though labour continued for forty or fifty days; but the woman remains clean only where the birth occurred in the days of zibah. If it occurs, however, in the days of menstruation she becomes unclean.
(9) Exempting the woman from a sacrifice and from the counting of seven clean days.
(10) I.e., where she experienced a discharge on three consecutive days in the course of the eleven days' period. If the discharge, however, appeared only on one day. she need not wait more than one clean day corresponding to the one unclean day.
(11) In the text from which it was derived that a birth in zibah is a cause of cleanness.
(12) Lev. XV. 25, 'many days' implying a major zabah (cf. prev. n. but one).
(13) Var. lec. Rabbi (Ronsburg).
(14) Lev. XV, 25; instead of 'days' the text has 'all the days' and from this is derived (infra 73a) the law of a minor zabah.
(15) Cf. supra p. 262, n. 12.
(16) Rab and Levi both of whom confined the period of cleanness within the eleven days of zibah.
(17) The forty or fifty days.
(18) After the third day according to Levi, and after the first or second one according to Rab.
(19) Lit., 'be in protracted labour', labour extending over a part of the period.
(20) In succession.
(21) Lit., 'and zibah does not rise among them'.
(22) The last of the eleven days of the zibah period.
(23) As zibah is not established unless a discharge appeared on three consecutive days in the zibah period, and as the third day was already one of the menstruation period, none of the days can be counted as one of a major zibah.
(24) These two days which begin a new zibah period are not sufficient to establish a major zibah (cf. prev. n. mut. mut).
(25) Of protracted labour on the part of an ailing woman (cf. supra 37b ad fin).
(26) The child having been born on the day following the (2 + 7 + 2 + 50 = ) 61st day.
(27) During which there can be no zibah.
(28) Following the (61 + 80 =) 141st day.
(29) V.supra n. 11.
(30) 2 + 7 + 141 (cf. prev. nn.)= 150.
(31) That such a long period may pass without zibah.
(32) The Rabbis who disagreed with him.
(33) Owing to frequent abortions.
(34) Sc. that childbirth at their termination renders them all clean.
(35) Only a viable child confers the privilege.
(36) In the absence of protracted labour.
(37) The last of the eleven days.
(38) V. p. 263. n. 10.
(39) V. p. 263. n. 11.
(40) During which there can be no zibah.
(41) Which is self-evident.
(42) Lit., 'to exclude'.
(43) By implying that a birth on the day following the first two days of the zibah period on each of which a discharge was observed, does not cause zibah.
(44) Had there been bleeding it would have been regarded, in the absence of the pains of labour, as a discharge on the third day (cf. prev. n.) which turns the woman into a confirmed or major zabah.
(45) Cf. relevant n. on our Mishnah.
(46) A month and one day being sometimes regarded as clean.
(47) The cleanness sometimes does not extend even to one day.
(48) Since the greater part of the duration of the labour (two days out of three) was in the eighth month when labour is no cause of cleanness.
(49) During all of which, with the exception of the first two days, she had complete relief from pain.
(50) Provided only that there was no bleeding during the time she was free from pain. The reason follows.
(51) The ruling that two days of labour in the ninth month are a cause of uncleanness.
(52) The trumpet that announces the beginning of a new month.
(53) Of the birth of the child; sc. as soon as the ninth month begins the process of bearing begins with it, irrespective of the moment when birth actually took place. Hence all the blood of labour in that month must be attributed to the child, however long the interval of relief may have lasted.
(54) That birth should take place at the beginning of the ninth month.
(55) Lit., 'I am not'.
(56) Full nine months (of thirty days each) plus one day after intercourse.
(57) Conception being sometimes delayed one or two days (cf. prev. n.).
(58) Samuel, in differing from R. Judah.
(59) By bearing on a weekday. 271, 272 and 273 days make up 38 weeks and 5, 6 and 7 days respectively, so that a conception on a Wednesday results in a birth on a Sunday, Monday or Tuesday.
(60) Lit., 'come into the hand of', by bearing on the Saturday.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 38b

a desecration of the Sabbath.1 'On a Wednesday', but not later?2 - Read: From Wednesday onwards.3 Mar Zutra stated: What was the reason of the pious men of old? - Because it is written, And the Lord gave her conception [herayon],4 and the numerical value of herayon5 is two hundred and seventy-one.6

Mar Zutra further stated: Even according to him who holds that a woman who bears at nine months does not give birth before the full number of months has been completed,7 a woman who bears at seven months may give birth before the full number of months has been completed, for it is stated in Scripture. And it came to pass, after the cycles of days8 that Hannah conceived, and bore a son;9 the minimum of 'cycles'10 is two,11 and the minimum of 'days10 is two.12

R. JOSE AND R. SIMEON RULED: PROTRACTED LABOUR CANNOT CONTINUE FOR MORE THAN TWO WEEKS. Samuel stated: What is the reason of the Rabbis? Because it is written in Scripture. Then she shall be unclean two weeks, as in her menstruation,13 which implies: Only 'as in her menstruation' but not as in her zibah; from which it follows that her zibah is clean for14 'two weeks'.

Our Rabbis taught: A woman may sometimes be in labour15 for twenty-five days and no major zibah would intervene.16 How? Two days preceding her menstruation period;17 seven days of menstruation, two days following menstruation and the fourteen days which18 the childbirth causes to be clean. It is impossible, however, for her to be in labour for twenty-six days, where there is no child,19 without giving birth to it is in zibah.20 But if there was no child would not21 three days suffice?22 - R. Shesheth replied. Read: Where there is a child. Said Raba to him: But was it not stated 'where there is no child'? Rather, said Raba, it is this that was meant: It is impossible for her to be in labour for twenty-six days, where there is a child, without giving birth to it in zibah; and where there is no child but an abortion she is a zabah even after three days. What is the reason? - The law of protracted labour23 does not apply to abortions.

MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN WAS IN PROTRACTED LABOUR DURING THE EIGHTY DAYS24 PRESCRIBED FOR THE BIRTH OF A FEMALE, ALL KINDS OF BLOOD THAT SHE MAY OBSERVE25 ARE CLEAN,26 UNTIL THE CHILD IS BORN, BUT R. ELIEZER HOLDS THEM TO BE UNCLEAN.27 THEY SAID TO R. ELIEZER: IF IN A CASE WHERE THE LAW WAS RESTRICTED IN REGARD TO BLOOD DISCHARGED IN THE ABSENCE OF PAIN,28 IT WAS NEVERTHELESS RELAXED.29 IN REGARD TO BLOOD DISCHARGED DURING PROTRACTED LABOUR, IS THERE NOT EVEN MORE REASON TO RELAX THE LAW30 IN REGARD TO THE BLOOD OF LABOUR IN A CASE WHERE31 IT WAS RELAXED32 EVEN IN REGARD TO A DISCHARGE IN THE ABSENCE OF PAIN?26 HE REPLIED: IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE CASE INFERRED33 SHALL BE TREATED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE ONE34 FROM WHICH IT IS INFERRED. FOR IN WHAT RESPECT WAS THE LAW RELAXED FOR A WOMAN IN THE LATTER CASE?35 IN THAT OF THE UNCLEANNESS OF ZIBAH36 ONLY; WHILE SHE IS STILL SUBJECT TO THE UNCLEANNESS OF THE MENSTRUANT.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: She shall continue [in the blood of her purification],37 includes a woman who was in protracted labour during the eighty days24 prescribed for the birth of a female, viz., that all kinds of blood that she may observe are clean, until the embryo is born,38 but R. Eliezer holds them to be unclean. They said to R. Eliezer: If in the case where the law was restricted in regard to blood discharged in the absence of pain before the child was born,39 it was nevertheless relaxed in regard to blood discharged in the absence of pain after the child was born,40 is there not even more reason to relax the law in regard to the blood of labour after the child was born40 in a case where it was relaxed in regard to the blood of labour before the child was born? He replied: It is enough that the case inferred41 shall be treated in the same manner as the ones from which it is inferred. For in what respect was the law relaxed for a woman in the latter case?42 In that of the uncleanness of zibah only, while she is still subject to the uncleanness of the menstruant. They said to him, We would submit to you an objection in a different form: If in the case where the law was restricted in regard to blood discharged in the absence of pain before the child was born,39 it was nevertheless relaxed in regard to blood discharged at such a time43 in protracted labour, is there not even more reason that, where 'the law was relaxed in regard to blood discharged in the absence of pain after the child was born,44 the law should be relaxed in regard to blood discharged at such a time43 during protracted labour? He replied: Even if you were to offer objections all day long it must be enough that the case inferred44 shall be treated in the same manner as the one42 from which it is inferred. For in what respect was the law relaxed for a woman in the latter case?42 In that of the uncleanness of zibah only, while she is still subject to the uncleanness of the menstruant. Raba observed, R. Eliezer could successfully have offered the Rabbis the following reply: Did you not explain Her blood45 thus: 'Her blood' refers to blood that is normally discharged, but not to such as is due to childbirth?46 Well, here also, it may be explained: And she shall be cleansed from the fountain of her blood,47 'her blood' refers to blood that is normally discharged but not to such as is due to childbirth.48 But might it not be suggested49 [that if a discharge occurred] during the days of menstruation she is a menstruant, [while if it occurred] during the days of zibah she is clean? - Scripture said, She shall continue,50 which implies: One form of continuation throughout all these days.51

MISHNAH. THROUGHOUT ALL THE ELEVEN DAYS52 A WOMAN IS IN A PRESUMPTIVE STATE OF CLEANNESS.53

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(1) Childbirth would necessitate the performance of certain work (e.g., making a fire, boiling hot water) which is otherwise forbidden on the Sabbath.
(2) But why not, seeing that conception on a Thursday, Friday or Saturday would equally result in a birth on a weekday?
(3) But not on the nights preceding (and ritually belonging to) Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, since conception on any of these might result in a birth on a Sabbath which is the two hundred and seventy-third from a Sunday, the two hundred and seventy-second from a Monday and the two hundred and seventy-first from a Tuesday.
(4) Ruth IV, 13.
(5) הריון.
(6) ה = 5, ר = 200, י = 10, ו = 6, ן = 50.
(7) Limekuta'in, 'incompleted (number)'.
(8) E.V., When the time was come about.
(9) I Sam. I, 20.
(10) The plural number.
(11) Each cycle (tekufah) consisting of three months (the year being divided into four cycles) and two cycles consisting, therefore, of six months.
(12) As the text speaks of Hannah's conception and birth of Samuel it follows that a viable child may be born in the seventh month after the short pregnancy of six months and two days.
(13) Lev. XII, 5, E.V., impurity.
(14) Lit., 'and how much'.
(15) Either with or without pains.
(16) Prior to birth.
(17) For notes v. supra 38a.
(18) According to R. Jose and R. Simeon.
(19) This is discussed presently.
(20) Since a child causes the cleanness of fourteen days only (that immediately precede its birth), thus leaving twelve days at the beginning of the period of twenty-six days, there remain three days (between the first seven days of menstruation and the last fourteen) in the course of which she becomes a major zabah.
(21) In the zabah period.
(22) To render her a major zabah.
(23) Sc. the law that a discharge in such circumstances is clean.
(24) The fourteen unclean and sixty-six clean ones (cf. Lev. XII, 5).
(25) During the sixty-six clean days. Within the fourteen days (cf. prev. n.) labour is, of course, impossible.
(26) During the sixty-six days the blood is regarded (cf. Lev. XII, 5) as invariably clean.
(27) If the birth took place during the period of menstruation. During the sixty-six days (cf. prev. n. but one) she is only free from the uncleanness of zibah but not from that of menstruation.
(28) A woman who gave birth to a child after she had experienced a discharge without pain on three consecutive days is regarded as having given birth in zibah.
(29) The woman being exempt from zibah.
(30) To exempt the woman from all forms of uncleanness.
(31) As in the case of a woman who gave birth during the sixty-six clean days (cf. supra n. 1).
(32) To exempt the woman from all forms of uncleanness.
(33) A discharge during labour in the sixty-six days.
(34) Protracted labour at any other time.
(35) Cf. prev. n. Lit,, 'from what did he make it lighter for her'.
(36) Cf. supra n. 8.
(37) Lev. XII, 4.
(38) When she becomes unclean by reason of the birth.
(39) V. supra p. 267, n. 5.
(40) During the sixty-six days.
(41) Protracted labour after the birth of a previous child.
(42) Protracted labour before a birth.
(43) Lit., 'which is with it'.
(44) A discharge during labour in the sixty-six days.
(45) Lev. XV, 25.
(46) Supra 36b, q.v. notes.
(47) Lev. XII, 7.
(48) Only the former is clean, but not the latter.
(49) According to R. Eliezer.
(50) Lev. XII, 4.
(51) They are either all clean or all unclean. No distinction can, therefore, be made between the periods of zibah and menstruation.
(52) That follow the seven days' period of menstruation.
(53) This is discussed in the Gemara infra.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 39a

IF SHE NEGLECTED TO1 EXAMINE HERSELF, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE NEGLECT2 WAS UNWITTING, UNDER CONSTRAINT OR WILFUL, SHE IS CLEAN. IF THE TIME OF HER REGULAR PERIOD HAS ARRIVED AND SHE FAILED TO EXAMINE HERSELF SHE IS DEFINITELY UNCLEAN.3 R. MEIR RULED: IF A WOMAN WAS IN A HIDING-PLACE4 WHEN THE TIME OF HER REGULAR PERIOD ARRIVED AND SHE FAILED TO EXAMINE HERSELF SHE IS DEFINITELY CLEAN, BECAUSE FEAR SUSPENDS THE FLOW OF BLOOD. BUT THE DAYS PRESCRIBED FOR A ZAB OR A ZABAH5 OR FOR ONE WHO AWAITS DAY AGAINST DAY6 ARE7 PRESUMED TO BE UNCLEAN.8

GEMARA. In respect of what laws had this9 to be stated? - Rab Judah replied: In order to lay down that no examination10 is required.11 But since it was stated in the final clause, IF SHE NEGLECTED TO EXAMINE HERSELF,12 it follows, does it not, that at the outset an examination is required? - The final clause applies to the days of the menstruation period; and it is this that was meant: THROUGHOUT ALL THE ELEVEN DAYS A WOMAN IS IN A PRESUMPTIVE STATE OF CLEANNESS13 and no examination is necessary, but during the days of her menstruation period14 an examination15 is required;16 but IF SHE NEGLECTED TO EXAMINE HERSELF, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE NEGLECT WAS UNWITTING, UNDER CONSTRAINT OR WILFUL, SHE IS CLEAN.17

R. Hisda replied: This18 was only required to indicate that R. Meir's ruling that19 a woman who has no regular period is forbidden marital intercourse,20 applies only to the days of her menstruation period, but during the days of her zibah she enjoys21 A PRESUMPTIVE STATE OF CLEANNESS. If so,22 why did R. Meir rule: He must divorce her and never remarry her?20 - Since it is possible to be tempted23 to improper conduct during the days of the menstruation period. But since it was stated in the final clause. IF THE TIME OF HER REGULAR PERIOD HAS ARRIVED AND SHE FAILED TO EXAMINE HERSELF, may it not be concluded that we are here dealing with one who had a REGULAR PERIOD? - The Mishnah is defective and the proper reading is this: THROUGHOUT ALL THE ELEVEN DAYS A WOMAN IS IN A PRESUMPTIVE STATE OF CLEANNESS and is, therefore, permitted to her husband, but during the days of her menstruation period she is forbidden to him. This, however, applies only to a woman who has no regular period, but if she has a regular period she is permitted to him and only an examination is necessary. IF SHE NEGLECTED TO EXAMINE HERSELF, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE NEGLECT WAS UNWITTING, UNDER CONSTRAINT OR WILFUL, SHE IS CLEAN. IF THE TIME OF HER REGULAR PERIOD HAS ARRIVED AND SHE FAILED TO EXAMINE HERSELF SHE IS DEFINITELY UNCLEAN. But, since the final clause is the view of R. Meir,24 the first one is not that of R. Meir, is it? - All the Mishnah represents the view of R. Meir and this is the proper reading: If she was not in a hiding place and the time of her regular period has arrived and she did not examine herself she is unclean, for R. MEIR RULED: IF A WOMAN WAS IN A HIDING PLACE WHEN THE TIME OF HER REGULAR PERIOD ARRIVED AND SHE FAILED TO EXAMINE HERSELF SHE IS CLEAN, BECAUSE FEAR SUSPENDS THE FLOW OF THE BLOOD.

Raba replied: This25 is to tell that she26 does not27 cause twenty-four hours retrospective uncleanness. An objection was raised: A menstruant,28 a zabah,28 and a woman who awaits day against day29 or who is in childbirth30 cause twenty-four hours retrospective uncleanness! - This is indeed a refutation.

R. Huna b. Hiyya31 citing Samuel replied: This25 is to tell that she cannot establish for herself a regular period during the days of her zibah.32

R. Joseph33 remarked: I have not heard this traditional explanation.34 Said Abaye35 to him, You yourself have told it to us,36 and it was in connection with the following that you told it to us: If she was accustomed to observe a flow of menstrual blood on the fifteenth day,37 and this was changed38 to the twentieth day,37 marital intercourse is forbidden39 on both dates.40 If this was changed twice to the twentieth day,41 marital intercourse is again forbidden on both dates. And in connection with this you have told us: Rab Judah citing Samuel explained. This42 was learnt only [when she was accustomed to observe a flow] on the fifteenth day after her ritual immersion43 which is the twenty-second day44 after her observation of her discharge, since on such a day45 she is already within the days of her menstruation period,46 but the fifteenth day after her observation, on which she is still within the days of her zibah period,47 cannot be established as a regular period. R. Papa stated: I recited this tradition before R. Judah of Diskarta [and asked:] Granted that she cannot establish thereby48 a regular period,49 must we take into consideration the possibility of such a regular period?50 The latter remained silent and said nothing at all. Said R. Papa: Let us look into the matter ourselves. [It has been laid down that] if she was accustomed to observe a flow of menstrual blood on the fifteenth day and this was changed to the twentieth day, marital intercourse is forbidden on both days.51

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(1) Lit., 'she sat and did not'.
(2) Lit., 'and she did not examine'.
(3) It being presumed that the discharge had made its appearance at the regular time.
(4) Taking refuge from raiders or brigands.
(5) The seven clean days that must be counted after a confirmed zibah before cleanness is attained.
(6) One clean day for one unclean one, where the discharge appeared on no more than two days.
(7) Though within the ELEVEN DAYS.
(8) Unless the contrary was proved by an examination.
(9) The first clause of our Mishnah.
(10) Morning and evening (cf. supra 11a).
(11) After the eleven days such examination must be resumed.
(12) This presumably referring to the eleven days of the zibah period.
(13) Since her flow of blood had come to an end during menstruation.
(14) Following the conclusion of the eleven days of zibah.
(15) Morning and evening (cf. supra 11a).
(16) Ab initio.
(17) Only when THE TIME OF HER REGULAR PERIOD HAS ARRIVED AND SHE FAILED TO EXAMINE HERSELF IS SHE UNCLEAN.
(18) The first clause of our Mishnah.
(19) Lit., 'but according to R. Meir who said'.
(20) Supra 12b.
(21) Lit., 'stands'.
(22) That during the eleven days of zibah intercourse is permitted.
(23) Lit., 'come'.
(24) His name having been given explicitly.
(25) The first clause of our Mishnah.
(26) As the flow of her blood is suspended.
(27) After the first discharge during these days.
(28) On the first day of her observing a discharge.
(29) Cf. prev. n. After three observations she also would, of course, become a zabah.
(30) As soon as the uterus opened.
(31) Var. lec. Hiyyah b. R. Huna (Bomb. ed. and Rashi).
(32) Though menstruation began on the same day in three successive months.
(33) A disciple of Rab Judah who was the disciple of both Rab and Samuel.
(34) Attributed to Samuel.
(35) A disciple of R. Joseph who was often reminding his Master of traditions he had forgotten owing to a serious illness (cf. Ned. 41a).
(36) 'Before your illness'.
(37) After undergoing ritual immersion, as will be explained infra.
(38) Once.
(39) In the next two months.
(40) It is forbidden on the fifteenth which is the date of her regular period, and it is also forbidden on the twentieth since it is possible that henceforth that day would become her regular period. If in the third month also she experiences the discharge on the twentieth, she establishes thereby a new regular period and henceforth only the twentieth is forbidden while the fifteenth becomes permitted.
(41) V. p. 271, n. 14.
(42) That the fifteenth day is regarded as a regular period that cannot be altered unless the discharge appeared three times in three consecutive months respectively on a different date.
(43) Which is performed at the conclusion of the seven days' period of menstruation.
(44) The seven days of menstruation (cf. prev. n.) plus the fifteen days.
(45) Lit., 'for there'.
(46) Which begins after eighteen days (i.e., the seven days of menstruation plus the eleven, the days of the zibah period) have passed since the first day of the discharge, and continues for seven days.
(47) Cf. prev. n.
(48) By observing a discharge for three months on the same date during zibah.
(49) That could not be abolished by less than three observations on a different date in three consecutive months respectively.
(50) So that where a woman observed a discharge on the fifteenth day in each of three consecutive months intercourse on that day should be forbidden in the fourth months on the ground that, despite the zibah period in which the fifteenth day occurs, a regular period may have been established and the discharge would again appear on that date.
(51) Supra q.v. notes.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 39b

And in connection with this Rab Judah citing Samuel stated: This1 was learnt only [when she was accustomed to observe a flow] on the fifteenth day after her ritual immersion,2 which is the twenty-second day3 after her observation of her discharge, and it was changed to the twenty-seventh day4 so that when the twenty-second day5 comes round again she is well within the days of her zibah period,6 and yet it was stated that intercourse was forbidden on both days. It is thus clear that the possibility of a regular period7 must be taken into consideration.8 R. Papa is thus9 of the opinion that the twenty-two days10 are reckoned from the twenty-second day11 while the beginning of the menstruation and zibah period12 is reckoned from the twenty-seventh day.13 Said R. Huna son of R. Joshua to R. Papa: Whence do you draw your ruling? Is it not possible that the twenty-second day also is reckoned from the twenty-seventh day,14 so that when the twenty-second day comes round again the woman is within the days of her menstruation period?15 And this16 is also logical. For if you do not admit this,16 consider the case of a17 hen that laid eggs on alternate days18 and once ceased laying for two days and again laid on the following day. When it reverts to its former habit,19 does it do so in accordance with the present20 or in accordance with the past?21 You have no alternative but to admit that it would do it in accordance with the present.22 Said R. Papa to him: With reference, however, to what Resh Lakish ruled, 'A woman may establish for herself a settled period during the days of her zibah but not during the days of her menstruation' and to what R. Johanan ruled, 'A woman may establish for herself a settled period during the days of her menstruation', is not one to understand this as being a case,23 for instance, where she observed a discharge on the first day of the month, on the fifth of the month and again on the first of the second month and on the fifth of that month, and finally24 she observed a discharge on the fifth of the month while on the first of that month she observed none? And yet it was stated that 'a woman may establish for herself a settled period during the days of her menstruation'. It thus clearly follows25 that we reckon the days from the first day of the month?26 - No, the other replied, it is this that R. Johanan meant: A woman, for instance, who observed a discharge on the first day of the month, on the first day of the next month and on the twenty-fifth of that month, and on the first day of the following month, in which case we presume that27 she experienced an influx of additional blood.28 So also Rabin and all seafarers, when they came,29 reported the tradition30 in agreement with the explanation of R. Huna son of R. Joshua. [

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(1) V. supra p. 272, n. 4.
(2) Which is performed at the conclusion of the seven days' period of menstruation.
(3) The seven days of menstruation (cf. prev. n.) plus the fifteen days.
(4) After her discharge.
(5) Since the day on which the discharge should have appeared.
(6) There being only (22 - 5 =) 17 days since her last discharge on the twenty-seventh. The seventeenth day,
(the last of the seven days of menstruation and the ten of the eleven days of zibah) is obviously within the zibah period.
(7) Even on a day in the zibah period.
(8) V. supra p. 272, n. 12.
(9) Since he regards the twenty-second day as one of the days of the zibah period.
(10) On which intercourse was forbidden.
(11) Sc. the days on which formerly the discharge usually made its appearance and not from the twenty-seventh day.
(12) At the conclusion of the menstruation period, seven days later.
(13) The day on which the discharge last appeared. The twenty-second day after the twenty-second is only the seventeenth day after the twenty-seventh (cf. prev. n. but five).
(14) On which the discharge last appeared.
(15) The twenty-two days consisting of 7 (menstruation) + 11 (zibah) + 4 (of the seven of the present menstruation period) days.
(16) That the reckoning should begin from the day of the last discharge rather than from the day on which the discharge should have appeared.
(17) Lit., '(what about) that'.
(18) Lit., 'that lays on a day and holds back on (the next) day' (bis).
(19) Laying on alternate days.
(20) Lit., 'as before it', i.e., laying on alternate days beginning with the last day (the sixth in the case submitted) refraining on the seventh and laying again on the eighth, and so on.
(21) Lit., 'as originally', i.e., alternating with the day on which laying should have taken place (the fifth in the case submitted), thus laying on both the seventh as well as the sixth.
(22) Since alternation with the day on which laying should have taken place would only result (cf. prev. n.) in a new disturbance of the regularity (laying on two consecutive days). Similarly, in the case of the woman, a reversion to her regular periods can only be effected by counting the days from the one on which her discharge last appeared, viz., from the twenty-seventh day.
(23) Lit., 'how is one to imagine, not?'
(24) Lit., 'and now'.
(25) Since the fifth day of the month is regarded as of the 'days of her menstruation'.
(26) Though on that day no discharge had appeared. From which it follows that the counting of the days begins from the day on which the discharge should have appeared and not from that on which it appeared the last time.
(27) The reason why the discharge made its appearance on the twenty-fifth day of the second month and not on the first day of the following month.
(28) And, as a result, the discharge whose regular time of appearance was still the first of the month made its appearance a little earlier. The first day of the month being within seven days from the twenty-fifth of the previous month (on which the discharge appeared) may well be described as within the days of menstruation.
(29) From Palestine to Babylon.
(30) Of R. Johanan.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 40a

CHAPTER 5

MISHNAH. FOR A FOETUS BORN FROM ITS MOTHER'S SIDE1 THERE IS NO NEED2 TO SPEND3 THE PRESCRIBED DAYS OF UNCLEANNESS4 OR THE DAYS OF CLEANNESS;5 NOR DOES ONE INCUR ON ITS ACCOUNT THE OBLIGATION TO BRING A SACRIFICE.6 R. SIMEON RULED: IT IS REGARDED AS A VALID BIRTH. ALL WOMEN ARE SUBJECT TO UNCLEANNESS7 [IF BLOOD APPEARED] IN THE OUTER CHAMBER,8 FOR IT IS SAID IN SCRIPTURE, HER ISSUE IN HER FLESH BE BLOOD;9 BUT A ZAB AND ONE WHO EMITTED SEMEN CONVEY NO UNCLEANNESS UNLESS THE DISCHARGE10 CAME OUT OF THE BODY. IF A MAN WAS EATING TERUMAH WHEN HE FELT THAT HIS LIMBS SHIVERED,11 HE TAKES HOLD OF HIS MEMBRUM12 AND SWALLOWS THE TERUMAH. AND THE DISCHARGES CONVEY UNCLEANNESS, HOWEVER SMALL THE QUANTITY, EVEN IF IT IS ONLY OF THE SIZE OF A MUSTARD SEED OR LESS.

GEMARA. R. Mani b. Pattish stated: What is the Rabbis' reason?13 Scripture said, If a woman have conceived seed and born14 a man child,15 implying:16 Only if she bears where she conceives.17 And R. Simeon?18 - That text19 implies that even if she bore in the same manner only as she conceived20 she21 is unclean by reason of childbirth.22 What, however, is R. Simeon's reason?23 - Resh Lakish replied: Scripture said, She bear,24 to include25 A FOETUS BORN FROM ITS MOTHER'S SIDE. And the Rabbis?26 - That text24 is required to include27 a tumtum28 and an hermaphrodite. Since it might have been presumed that as it is written man child29 and maid child30 [the laws in the context apply only to] one who is undoubtedly male or undoubtedly female but not to a tumtum or an hermaphrodite, hence we were informed that the law applies to the latter also. And R. Simeon?31 - He deduces it32 from a teaching of Bar Liwai; for Bar Liwai taught. For a son,33 implies: For any son, whatsoever his nature; For a daughter,33 for any daughter, whatsoever her nature. And the Rabbis?34 - They require this text for the deduction that a separate sacrifice is due for each son and for each daughter.35 And R. Simeon?31 - He deduced it32 from the following which a Tanna recited before R. Shesheth: This is the law for her that beareth36 teaches37 that a woman brings one sacrifice for many children. It might be presumed that she brings only one sacrifice for a birth and for a zibah . . . But would then one sacrifice suffice for a woman after childbirth who ate blood or for one after childbirth who ate forbidden fat? - Rather say: It might be presumed that a woman brings only one sacrifice for a birth that took place before the completion of her clean days and for one that took place after their completion.38 Therefore it was expressly written, 'This'.39 And the Rabbis?40 - Although 'this'41 was written it was also necessary to have the text, 'For a son or for a daughter'.42 For it might have been presumed that this law43 applies only to two distinct conceptions44 but45 that in the case of a simultaneous conception as, for instance, that of Judah and Hezekiah the sons of R. Hiyya,46 one sacrifice suffices,47 hence we were informed [that even in such a case separate sacrifices are required for each birth].

R. Johanan stated: R. Simeon, however, agrees that in the case of consecrated beasts [the body of the young extracted by means of a caesarean cut] is not sacred.48 What is the reason? He deduces the expression of 'birth' here49 from that of 'birth' in the case of the firstling:50 As in the latter case51 the reference is to one that openeth the womb52 so here also it is only to one that 'openeth the womb'. But why should not the expression of 'birth' here49 be deduced from that of 'birth' in the case of a human being:53 As in the latter case54 a foetus extracted from its mother's side is included55 so here also the young extracted from its mother's side should be included? - It stands to reason that the deduction should be made from the firstling, since 'the dam'56 might also be deduced from 'the dam'.57 On the contrary! Should not the deduction be made from the expression used of the human being, since thereby an ordinary birth58 would be deduced from an ordinary birth?59 But the fact is that the deduction was properly to be made from the firstling since in both cases60 the expression 'dam'61 is used, both are sacred beasts and both are subject to the laws of piggul, nothar62 and uncleanness.63 On the contrary! Should not the deduction be made from the expression used of the human being since both cases64 are those of ordinary birth,65 neither is restricted to the male sex,66 neither67 is naturally sacred,68 and neither69 is a priestly gift?70 The former71 are more in number.72

R. Hiyya son of R. Huna citing Raba observed, A Baraitha was taught which provides support for the statement of R. Johanan:73 R. Judah stated, This is the law of the burnt-offering, it is that which goeth up,74 behold these75 are three limitations

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(1) By means of the caesarean operation. Lit., 'goes out of a wall'.
(2) For its mother.
(3) Lit., '(women) do not sit for it'.
(4) Seven for a male and fourteen for a female (v. Lev. XII, 2,5).
(5) Thirty-three days after the seven (cf. prev. n.) for a male and sixty-six days after the fourteen for a female (v. Lev. XII, 4f).
(6) Prescribed for a woman after childbirth (v. Lev. XII, 6ff).
(7) Of menstruation.
(8) The vagina; though it did not flow out beyond it.
(9) Lev. XV, 19; emphasis on 'in her flesh' implying: Even if the discharge did not flow out of her body.
(10) Lit., 'uncleanness'.
(11) A symptom of the imminent discharge of semen.
(12) To prevent outflow.
(13) For their ruling in the first clause of our Mishnah.
(14) So A.V. The A.J.V. reads, 'be delivered and bear'.
(15) Lev. XII, 2, dealing with the laws of cleanness and uncleanness and the prescribed sacrifice after childbirth.
(16) By the juxtaposition of 'conceived' and 'born'.
(17) Only then do the laws (cf. prev. n.) apply, but not where a caesarean operation had to be performed.
(18) How in view of this exposition can he differ from the Rabbis?
(19) V. p. 276. n. 15.
(20) A mashed foetus (cf. supra 26a, 27b).
(21) Lit., 'his mother'.
(22) The Rabbis, however, require no text for this ruling since in their opinion (cf. supra 26a) the presence of the placenta alone is a sufficient cause of uncleanness.
(23) For his ruling in our Mishnah.
(24) But if she bear a maid-child, Lev. XII, 5.
(25) By the superfluity of the expression, since it would have sufficed to state 'but if a maid-child'.
(26) How can they maintain their ruling in view of this exposition?
(27) Among those who subject their mothers to the laws prescribed in the context.
(28) V. Glos.
(29) Lev. XII, 2.
(30) Lev. XII, 5.
(31) Whence does he deduce the last mentioned law?
(32) Cf. prev. n.
(33) Lev. XII, 6.
(34) What deduction do they make from this text?
(35) Though conception of the latter took place before the completion of the clean days of the former.
(36) Lev. XII, 7.
(37) Since 'beareth' is not restricted to one child only.
(38) If a child is born after the completion of the eighty days (fourteen unclean and sixty-six clean ones) prescribed for the birth of a female child, the former was obviously born 'before their completion'.
(39) Lev. XII, 7, implying, This birth alone requires a sacrifice, but an additional birth requires an additional sacrifice.
(40) In view of this text what need was there for that of Lev. XII, 6?
(41) V. supra note 2.
(42) Lev. XII, 6.
(43) That one birth 'before the completion' of the eighty days and one 'after their completion' require two separate sacrifices.
(44) The second one having begun during the eighty days that followed the first, and its birth having occurred after the completion of these days.
(45) Cf. Rashal. Cur. edd. in parenthesis insert: 'One of which was an abortion'.
(46) The second of whom was born three months after the former (supra 27a).
(47) Lit., 'with one sacrifice it is sufficient for her'.
(48) Like other beasts whose blemish preceded their consecration, its value only is consecrated. It may, therefore, be sold, when it loses its sanctity and may be used for shearing or work, while its price is used for the purchase of valid sacrifices.
(49) When a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat, is born (E.V. brought forth) in the context dealing with consecrated beasts (Lev. XXII, 27).
(50) All the firstling males that are born (Deut. XV, 19).
(51) Lit., 'there'.
(52) Ex. XXXIV, 19.
(53) If a woman be delivered and bear a man-child (Lev. XII, 2).
(54) Lit., 'there'.
(55) As R. Simeon laid down in our Mishnah.
(56) It shall be seven days under the dam (Lev. XXII, 27) about consecrated beasts.
(57) It shall be with its dam (Ex. XXII, 29) about the firstling.
(58) I.e., a beast that is not a firstling.
(59) I.e., a child that is not a firstborn son, the text (Lev. XII, 2) speaking of any child whether a firstborn or not.
(60) The consecrated beast and the firstling.
(61) Cf. supra nn. 3 and 4.
(62) On these terms v. Glos.
(63) To a human being none of these applies.
(64) Those of the child and the consecrated beast.
(65) Cf. supra nn. 5 and 6.
(66) While only a male is subject to the law of a firstling.
(67) Unlike the firstling that is sacred from birth.
(68) The consecration of the beast is entirely due to a human act.
(69) Unlike the firstling which is the priest's due.
(70) A peace-offering, for instance, remains the property of its owner. A burnt-offering is completely burnt on the altar.
(71) The five points of likeness between the consecrated beast and the firstling.
(72) Than the four points of likeness between the beast and a human being.
(73) Supra, that R. Simeon agrees in the case of consecrated beasts that the body of the young extracted from one by means of a caesarean cut is not sacred.
(74) Lev. VI, 2.
(75) The expressions, 'this', 'it', 'which goes up'.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 40b

excluding1 a sacrifice that was slain in the night, whose blood was poured out,2 or whose blood was taken outside the hangings,3 which, even though it was placed upon the altar, must be taken down.4 R. Simeon stated: From the term 'burnt-offering'5 I would only know that the law applied to6 a valid burnt-offering; whence, however, the inference for including7 one that was slain in the night, whose blood was poured out,8 whose blood was taken outside the hangings3 or was kept overnight, that was taken out,9 that was unclean, nothar,10 one slain with the intention of eating it later than its permitted time limit or beyond its permitted place limits, whose blood was received or sprinkled by disqualified men,11 those sacrifices whose blood is to be sprinkled above12 and was sprinkled below,12 those whose blood is to be sprinkled below12 and was sprinkled above,12 those whose blood is to be applied within13 and was applied without,14 and a paschal lamb and a sin-offering that had not been slain as such?15 Whence, I ask, is the inference? Since it was explicitly said in Scripture, This is the law of the burnt-offering,16 the scope of the law is widened: One law for all that are placed upon the altar, so that once they have been put up they must not be taken down. As one might presume that I also include7 a beast that covered17 or was covered,18 that was set aside19 for an idolatrous purpose, that was worshipped, the hire of a harlot, the price of a dog, kil'ayim, trefah20 and one that had been extracted by means of a caesarean operation, it was explicitly stated, 'This'.21 But what reason do you see for including22 the former and for excluding the latter?

____________________
(1) From the scope of the law in the context that once a sacrifice had been placed upon the altar it must never be removed from it.
(2) So that the essential service of sprinkling upon the altar could not be performed with it.
(3) Sc. the enclosure around the Temple that corresponded to the hangings of the court of the Tabernacle of Moses in the wilderness.
(4) Only the other disqualified sacrifices, enumerated infra in R. Simeon's ruling, must not, according to R. Judah also, be taken down from the altar once they have been put upon it (cf. Zeb. 84b).
(5) Lev. VI, 2.
(6) Lit., 'I have not but'.
(7) In the scope of the law.
(8) So that the essential service of sprinkling upon the altar could not be performed with it.
(9) Sc. the flesh of a burnt-offering that was taken out and then brought back and placed upon the altar.
(10) Sacrificial meat that was kept beyond the time allowed for its consumption.
(11) Priests who had a blemish, for instance.
(12) The red line around the altar's sides.
(13) Sc. the inner altar that was placed within the Hekal.
(14) On the altar in the Temple court.
(15) Lit., 'not for their name', the man intending them at the time to serve respectively as different kinds of sacrifices.
(16) Lev. VI, 2, emphasis on 'law'.
(17) A woman.
(18) By a man.
(19) In a special place.
(20) On these terms v. Glos.
(21) Which implies a limitation.
(22) In the scope of the law.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 41a

Since Scripture both widened and limited the scope of the law, you might rightly say:1 I include the former whose disqualification arose within the Sanctuary and exclude the latter whose disqualification did not arise within the Sanctuary.2 At all events, it was here taught that the young extracted by means of a caesarean operation is not included in the scope of the law;3 and this refers, does it not, to the young that were so extracted in the case of a consecrated beast?4 - R. Huna son of R. Nathan replied: No, the reference is to one so extracted in the case of a firstling. But is not the law of the firstling5 deduced from the expression of openeth the womb.6 What then do you suggest? That the reference is to one of the consecrated beasts? Is not7 this [it could be retorted] inferred from a deduction of 'the dam' from 'the dam'?8 - What a comparison!9 If you grant that the reference is to a consecrated beast one can well understand the necessity for two Scriptural texts:10 One11 to exclude12 the young of an unconsecrated beast born by way of a caesarean cut and then consecrated, and the other,13 to exclude14 the young of a consecrated beast15 born by way of the caesarean cut,16 he being of the opinion that the young of consecrated beasts become sacred only after they come into a visible existence,17 but if you maintain that the reference is to a firstling [the objection would arise:] Is not this18 deduced from the expression openeth the womb?19 This20 may also be supported by reason. For 'a beast that covered or was covered, that was set aside for an idolatrous purpose, that was worshipped and kil'ayim' were mentioned.21 Now is the law concerning these deduced from this text?22 Is it not in fact deduced from a different text:22 Of the cattle23 excludes24 a beast that covered or was covered, Of the herd23 excludes24 a beast that was worshipped, Of the flock23 excludes24 one that was set aside for an idolatrous purpose, Or of the flock23 excludes25 one that gores?26 And, furthermore, is the law concerning kil'ayim27 deduced from here? Is it not in fact deduced from a different text: When a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat, is brought forth;28 'a bullock' excludes kil'ayim, 'or a goat' excludes one that29 only resembles it?30 But the fact is that two series of texts were required there: One in connection with an unconsecrated beast31 and the other in connection with a consecrated beast; well then, in this case also two texts were similarly required.

Our Rabbis taught: If a woman was in protracted labour32 for three days,33 but the embryo was born by way of a caesarean cut, she is to be regarded as having given birth in zibah.34 R. Simeon, however,35 ruled: A woman in such circumstances is not regarded as36 having given birth in zibah. The blood, furthermore, that issues from that place37 is unclean, but R. Simeon declared it clean. The first clause may be well understood, since R. Simeon follows his known view38 and the Rabbis follow theirs; on what principle, however, do they differ in the final clause?39 - Rabina replied: This is a case where, for instance, the embryo was born through the side

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(1) By recourse to a process of reasoning.
(2) V. Zeb. 27b.
(3) So that it is obviously not regarded as sacred.
(4) In agreement with R. Johanan's interpretation of R. Simeon s view.
(5) Viz., that a firstling extracted by means of a caesarean cut is not subject to the restrictions and sanctity of a firstling.
(6) Ex. XXXIV, 19; emphasis on the last word. Now since it is not sacred it is obviously to be treated like an ordinary beast and must be removed from the altar even after it had been placed upon it; what need then was there to exclude it by the text of Lev. VI, 2.
(7) That the one so extracted is not sacred.
(8) Supra 40a ad fin.
(9) Lit., 'that, what'.
(10) 'This' and 'the dam'.
(11) 'The dam'.
(12) From sanctity, in consequence of which it must be removed from the altar even after it had been placed on it.
(13) 'This'.
(14) From the law that requires a sacrifice that was once upon the altar never to be taken down.
(15) Though the dam is sacred.
(16) Since the disqualification arose without the Sanctuary.
(17) Sc. on being born, but no earlier; and when the young was born it was already disqualified. Rashi deletes 'he being . . . existence'.
(18) V. supra p. 281, n. 8.
(19) Of course it is. Hence the conclusion that the reference must be to a consecrated beast.
(20) That all the disqualifications enumerated supra, including the young born by way of the caesarean cut, apply only to consecrated beasts and to their young.
(21) Supra 40b.
(22) Lit., 'from there'.
(23) Lev. I, 2.
(24) 'Of' implying a limitation.
(25) By the use of the redundant 'or'.
(26) And killed a human being. The last three classes (covered, was covered and gores) are such whose status was determined on the evidence of only one witness or their owner. Hence they are only forbidden as sacrifices but permitted for ordinary use; but if their status is determined on the evidence of two witnesses they are forbidden for ordinary use also.
(27) In beasts; a cross-breed between a goat and a sheep.
(28) Lev. XXII, 27.
(29) Being born from a goat and having the appearance of a lamb.
(30) The goat. Now, since it follows from these texts that the beasts are not sacred, what need was there for an additional text from which to deduce that even though they have already been put upon the altar they must be taken down from it?
(31) Which a man consecrated.
(32) Accompanied by bleeding.
(33) During her zibah period; the discharge having made its appearance on each of the three days.
(34) Sc. she is subject to the restrictions of a confirmed or major zabah. Only in the case of normal birth is the blood during the labour preceding it exempt from the uncleanness of zibah.
(35) Being of the opinion (v. our Mishnah) that such a birth is valid.
(36) Lit., 'this is not'.
(37) This is explained infra.
(38) Expressed in our Mishnah (cf. prev. n. but two).
(39) If the blood issued through the caesarean cut the opinions should have been reversed: According to R. Simeon, who regards the birth as valid, the blood should be unclean while according to the Rabbis it should be clean.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 41b

while the blood issued1 through the womb; and R. Simeon follows his view while the Rabbis follow theirs.2 R. Joseph demurred: Firstly, is not then the final clause identical with the first?3 And, furthermore, 'from that place' means, does it not, the place of birth?4 Rather, said R. Joseph, this is a case, where, for instance, both the embryo and the blood issued through the side,5 and the point at issue between them6 is whether the interior of the uterus is unclean. The Masters hold that the interior of the uterus is unclean,7 while the Master holds that the interior of the uterus is clean.8

Resh Lakish stated: According to him who holds the blood to be unclean the woman also9 is unclean10 and according to him who holds the blood to be clean the woman also is clean. R. Johanan, however, stated: Even according to him who holds the blood to be unclean the woman is clean. In this R. Johanan follows a view he previously expressed. For R. Johanan citing R. Simeon b. Yohai stated: Whence is it deduced that a woman is not unclean11 unless the discharge issues through its normal channel? From Scripture which says, And if a man shall lie with a woman having her sickness,12 and shall uncover her nakedness - he hath made naked her fountain,13 which teaches that a woman is not unclean11 unless the discharge of her sickness issues through its normal channel.

Resh Lakish citing R. Judah Nesi'ah14 ruled: If the uterus15 became detached and dropped upon the ground the woman is unclean, for it is said, Because thy filthiness16 was poured out,17 and thy nakedness18 uncovered.19 In what respect?20 If it be suggested: In that of an uncleanness for seven days11 [the objection would arise:] Did not the All Merciful speak of blood and not of a solid piece? - As a matter of fact the reference is to the uncleanness until evening.21

R. Johanan ruled: If the uterus produced a discharge that was22 like two pearl drops23 the woman is unclean. In what respect? Should it be suggested: In respect of an uncleanness for seven days11 [it might be objected:] Are there not just five unclean kinds of the blood for a woman, and no more? - The fact is that the reference is to the uncleanness until evening.24 This, however, applies only to two drops but if there was only one drop it may be assumed that it originated elsewhere.25

ALL WOMEN ARE SUBJECT TO UNCLEANNESS [IF BLOOD APPEARED] IN THE OUTER CHAMBER. Which is the OUTER CHAMBER? - Resh Lakish replied: All that part which, when a child sits, is exposed. Said R. Johanan to him: Is not that place deemed exposed as regards contact with a dead creeping thing?26 Rather, said R. Johanan, as far as the glands.27 The question was raised: Is the region between the glands regarded as internal or as external? - Come and hear what R. Zakkai taught: The region up to the glands and that between the glands is regarded as internal. In a Baraitha it was taught: As far as the threshing-place. What is meant by threshing-place? - Rab Judah replied: The place where the attendant threshes.28

Our Rabbis taught: In her flesh29 teaches that she30 contracts uncleanness internally as externally. But from this text I would only know of the menstruant, whence the deduction that the same law applies to a zabah? It was explicitly stated, Her issue31 in her flesh.29 Whence the proof that the same law applies also to one who emitted semen? It was explicitly stated, Be.32 R. Simeon, however, ruled: It is enough that she be subject to the same stringency of uncleanness as the man who had intercourse with her. As he is not subject to uncleanness unless the unclean discharge issued forth, so is she not subject to uncleanness unless her unclean discharge issued forth. But could R. Simeon maintain that 'it is enough that she be subject to the same stringency of uncleanness as the man who had intercourse with her'? Was it not in fact taught: 'They shall both bathe themselves in water, and be unclean until the even.33 What, said R. Simeon, does this34 come to teach us? If that it applies also to one who came in contact with semen35 [it could be retorted:] Was it not in fact36 stated below, Or from whomsoever [the flow of seed goeth out]?37 But [this is the purpose of the text:] Since the uncleanness arises in a concealed region38 and since an uncleanness in a concealed region is elsewhere ineffective, a special Scriptural ordinance was required39 [to give it effect in this particular case]'40 - This is no difficulty: The latter deals with one who received the semen at intercourse,41 while the former refers to one who ejected it subsequently.42 'Ejected'! Should not her uncleanness be due43 to her preceding intercourse?44 - This is a case where she had undergone ritual immersion in respect of her intercourse.45 This then46 says that for one who had intercourse it suffices to be unclean only until the evening. But did not Raba rule: A woman who had intercourse is forbidden to eat terumah for three days since it is impossible that she should not eject some semen during that time?47 - Here48 we are dealing with one who was immersed49 with her bed.50 It may thus51 be inferred that Raba52 spoke of a woman53 who went herself on foot and performed immersion, but then is it not possible that she had ejected the semen while she was walking?54

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(1) During the three days of labour, that preceded the birth.
(2) Cf. supra no. 2.
(3) It is; why then the needless repetition?
(4) How then could Rabina explain this as 'the womb'?
(5) The clause thus differing from the first one which deals with an issue of blood from the normal place during labour.
(6) R. Simeon and the Rabbis.
(7) The blood that comes in contact with the uterus causes, therefore, uncleanness for a day until the evening, though, having finally issued through the caesarean cut, it cannot be regarded as a menstrual discharge to subject the woman to an uncleanness of seven days.
(8) The blood that issued through the caesarean cut, though it passed through the uterus, is, therefore, regarded as the blood of a mere wound which conveys no uncleanness. Should the blood issue through the womb, provided there was no relief from pain prior to the birth, the blood, as that of labour, would also, during the zibah period, be clean on account of the birth of the child despite its emergence by way of a caesarean cut.
(9) Though the birth was from her side.
(10) Seven days, as a menstruant.
(11) As a menstruant.
(12) Dawah, applied to the menstrual discharge.
(13) Lev. XX, 18.
(14) The Prince, Judah II.
(15) Or a part of it. Lit., source.
(16) Nehushtek, applied to the uterus.
(17) Sc. 'dropped upon the ground'.
(18) Erwatek, synonymous with uncleanness.
(19) Ezek. XVI, 36; which shows that a uterus dropped out is as unclean as when it is in its place; hence the uncleanness.
(20) Is the uncleanness caused.
(21) On account of the woman's external contact with the unclean uterus.
(22) Lit., perspired'.
(23) White and clear.
(24) The discharge having been in contact with the uterus which is in contact with the woman.
(25) Lit., 'came from the world', not from the uterus, and is consequently clean.
(26) Sc. if the latter came in contact with that place uncleanness is conveyed to the woman though contact with an internal organ conveys no uncleanness. Now since the place is deemed to be exposed, how can Resh Lakish apply to it the expression 'in her flesh' (cf. infra) and regard it as internal?
(27) Of the vagina.
(28) Euphemism.
(29) Lev. XV, 19.
(30) A menstruant of whom the text speaks.
(31) A Heb. word of the same root as zabah.
(32) Her issue in her flesh be etc. (Lev. XV, 19).
(33) Lev. XV, 18.
(34) The repetition of the law of bathing which, as far as the man is concerned, was already stated earlier in Lev. XV, 16.
(35) Sc. the woman.
(36) Lit., 'already'.
(37) Lev. XXII, 4, and this was explained (infra 43b) to apply to a woman who came in external contact with semen virile. Why then the repetition?
(38) Of the body, where internal contact with the semen virile takes place.
(39) Lit., 'it is'.
(40) From which it is evident that, according to R. Simeon, though a man is not subject to an uncleanness arising in an unexposed region of the body, a woman is subject to such an uncleanness. How then could it be maintained that according to R. Simeon 'it is enough that she be subject to the same stringency of uncleanness as the man who had intercourse with her'?
(41) Whose uncleanness is due to a special Scriptural ordinance.
(42) And for whose uncleanness it is enough to be as stringent as that of the man.
(43) Lit., 'let it go out for him'.
(44) Cf. prev. n. but two.
(45) The ejection having taken place after the immersion.
(46) Since, as has been explained, the law subjecting the woman to 'be unclean until the even' (Lev. XV, 18) applies to one who had intercourse.
(47) After three days the semen becomes vapid and conveys uncleanness no longer. Now since during the three days the woman invariably remains unclean, how, according to Raba, could R. Simeon rule that the woman is clean if she had undergone ritual immersion before the three days have passed?
(48) In R. Simeon's ruling (cf. prev. n.).
(49) After intercourse.
(50) As she herself did not move her body it is quite possible for her to avoid ejection.
(51) Since R. Simeon's rule, according to which the uncleanness terminates at evening, refers only to a woman who was carried in a bed.
(52) Who holds the woman to be unclean for three days after intercourse.
(53) Lit., 'that when Raba said'.
(54) So that her subsequent immersion should render her completely free from both the uncleanness of intercourse and that of the ejection. How then could Raba maintain that she is unclean for three days?

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 42a

And should you reply: It is possible that1 some remained2 [the objection would arise]: If so, should not the expression used have been:3 We take into consideration the possibility that some might have remained? - The fact, however, is that according to Raba also this is a case where the woman was immersed with her bed, but there is no difficulty since one ruling4 deals with a woman who5 turned over6 while the other7 deals with one who5 did not turn over;8 and Raba9 interpreted the Scriptural text in this manner:10 When Scripture wrote, They shall both bathe themselves in water and be unclean until the even,11 it referred to a woman who did not turn over but one who did turn over is forbidden to eat terumah for three days since it is impossible that she should not eject some semen during this time.

R. Samuel b. Bisna enquired of Abaye: 'Is a woman ejecting semen12 regarded as observing a discharge or as coming in contact with one?13 The practical issue14 is the question of rendering15 any previous counting16 void,17 and of conveying uncleanness by means of the smallest quantity17 and of conveying uncleanness internally as well as externally'.17 But what is the question?18 If he19 heard of the Baraithas [he should have known that] according to the Rabbis she is regarded as observing a discharge while according to R. Simeon she is regarded as coming in contact with one; and if he19 did not hear of the Baraitha,20 is it not logical that21 she should be regarded as coming in contact with one?22 - Indeed he may well have heard of the Baraitha and, as far as the Rabbis are concerned, he had no question at all;23 what he did ask concerned only the view of R. Simeon. Furthermore, he had no question24 as to whether uncleanness is conveyed internally as externally;25 what he did ask was whether any previous counting is rendered void and whether uncleanness is conveyed by means of the smallest quantity. When [he asked in effect] R. Simeon ruled that 'it is enough that she be subject to the same stringency of uncleanness as the man who had intercourse with her' he meant it only in respect of conveying uncleanness internally as externally26 but as regards rendering any previous counting void and conveying uncleanness by means of the smallest quantity she is regarded as one observing a discharge, or is it possible that27 there is no difference?28 There are others who read: Indeed he19 may never have heard of the Baraitha,29 but30 it is this that he asked in effect: Since the All Merciful has considered it proper to impose a restriction31 at Sinai on those who emitted semen,32 she must be regarded as one who observed a discharge, or is it possible that no inference may be drawn from Sinai, since it was placed under an anomalous law, seeing that zabs and lepers who are elsewhere subject to major restrictions were not subjected by the All Merciful to that restriction?31 - The other33 replied: She is regarded as one who has observed a discharge. He34 then came to Raba35 and put the question to him. The latter replied: She is regarded as one who observed a discharge. He thereupon came to R. Joseph who also told him: She is regarded as one who observed a discharge. He34 then returned to Abaye and said to him: 'You all spit the same thing',36 'We', the other replied, 'only gave you the right answer. For when R. Simeon ruled that "it is enough that she be subject to the same stringency of uncleanness as the man who had intercourse with her" it was only in respect of conveying uncleanness internally as externally,37 but in respect of rendering any previous counting void and in respect of conveying uncleanness by means of the smallest quantity she is regarded as one who observed a discharge.38

Our Rabbis taught: A menstruant,39 a zabah,40 one who awaits a day for a day40 and a woman after childbirth41 contract uncleanness internally42 as well as externally. Now, the enumeration of three of these cases43 may well be justified, but how is one to explain the mention of the woman after childbirth? If the birth44 occurred during her menstruation period she is a menstruant,45 and if it occurred during her zibah period she is a zabah?45 - The mention46 was necessary only in the case of one who went down47 to perform ritual immersion in order to pass out thereby from the period of uncleanness to that of cleanness;48 and this49 is in agreement with a ruling given by R. Zera citing R. Hiyya b. Ashi who had it from Rab: If a woman after childbirth went down47 to perform ritual immersion in order to pass out thereby from her period of uncleanness to that of cleanness,48 and some blood was detached from her body,50 while she was going down,51 she is unclean,52 but if it occurred while she was going up, she is clean.53 Said R. Jeremiah to R. Zera: Why should she be unclean if this occurred 'while she was going down'? Is not the blood merely an absorbed uncleanness?54 - Go, the other replied, and ask it of R. Abin to whom I have explained the point at the schoolhouse and who nodded to me with his head.55 He went and asked him [the question], and the latter replied: This was treated like the carcass of a clean bird which56 conveys uncleanness to garments57 while it is still passing through the oesophagus.58 But are the two cases at all similar

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(1) Even after the ejection.
(2) And that the uncleanness of which Raba spoke is due to this possibility.
(3) Instead of the statement, 'it is impossible that she should not eject'.
(4) Raba's.
(5) After the immersion.
(6) Hence 'it is impossible that she etc.'.
(7) R. Simeon's.
(8) Her uncleanness, therefore, terminates at evening.
(9) In his ruling.
(10) Lit., 'took his stand on the text and thus he said'.
(11) Lev. XV, 18.
(12) After she had undergone ritual immersion and was freed thereby from the uncleanness of intercourse to which she was subject (as stated supra) under a specific Scriptural ordinance.
(13) Externally. Internal contact, being within a concealed region, is (as stated supra 41b) of no consequence.
(14) Between uncleanness through (a) observation and (b) contact.
(15) During the eleven days of zibah.
(16) Of the prescribed seven days.
(17) Which is the case with an observation but not with contact.
(18) Lit., 'what is your desire?'
(19) R. Samuel who raised the question.
(20) Supra 41b, where the Rabbis ruled that the ejection of semen conveys uncleanness internally as well as externally, while R. Simeon ruled that it is enough for the woman to be as unclean as the man who had intercourse with her. For the reading 'Baraitha' cf. Bomb. ed. Cur. edd. 'our Mishnah'.
(21) Since the discharge does not originate from the woman's own body.
(22) Of course it is. Why then did R. Samuel raise the question at all?
(23) Since the Rabbis ruled that uncleanness is conveyed internally as well as externally it is obvious that the woman is regarded as one observing a discharge, and is, therefore, subject all the more to the other restrictions.
(24) Even according to R. Simeon.
(25) Well knowing that no internal uncleanness is conveyed (cf. supra n. 6).
(26) Sc. as the man is free from internal uncleanness so is she.
(27) Since he regarded her only as one coming in contact with a discharge.
(28) And she is in all respects to be treated as such.
(29) V. supra p. 288 n. 5.
(30) In reply to the objection, 'Is it not logical that she should be regarded as coming in contact with one?'
(31) Not to approach the mountain.
(32) V. Ex. XIX, 15. 'Come not near a woman'. This shows that the emission of semen is subject to a higher degree of uncleanness than contact with a dead creeping thing, which did not subject a person to the restriction.
(33) Abaye.
(34) R. Samuel b. Bisna.
(35) Var. lec. Rabbah (Bah).
(36) Lit., 'spittle', i.e., your opinions are all traceable to the same source.
(37) Sc. as the man is free from internal uncleanness so is she.
(38) Since in the case of the man also (to whose degree of uncleanness hers is compared) any previous counting is rendered void and the smallest quantity conveys uncleanness.
(39) After one observation during her menstrual period.
(40) Cf. prev. n. mut. mut. If this single observation is followed by two other observations the woman is a confirmed zabah and must count seven days before she attains to cleanness, but if no other observation followed she only awaits one clean day for the unclean one.
(41) This is explained presently.
(42) Sc. as soon as the discharge made its way into the vagina.
(43) Lit '(almost) all of them'.
(44) And the discharge observed.
(45) Who was already specifically enumerated among the first three cases.
(46) Of the woman after childbirth.
(47) After the seven or fourteen days of uncleanness following the birth of a male and a female respectively.
(48) The period of thirty-three clean days after the seven, and the sixty-six clean days after the fourteen (cf. prev. n.).
(49) The ruling that a woman in such circumstances contracts uncleanness internally.
(50) In the vagina, where it remained for a day or two.
(51) Since the mere passing of the seven or fourteen days does not restore the woman to cleanness unless immersion had been performed (cf. supra 35b). When the unclean blood (cf. next n.) is completely discharged from the body a second immersion is required since no cleanness had been attained by the first.
(52) While the blood is retained in the vagina, on account of her carriage of, or contact with the detached blood in it.
(53) When, owing to the immersion, her clean period had already begun and the blood is clean. It has thus been shown that the Baraitha under discussion is in agreement with the first case, 'while she was going down, she is unclean' of R. Zera.
(54) Which (cf. Hul. 71a) cannot convey uncleanness either through contact or through carriage. Granted that a menstrual, or a zibah discharge causes a woman's uncleanness even while it is still absorbed in the vagina (as deduced supra from a Scriptural text), how can this blood, which is neither menstrual nor one of zibah and which (if it had come in external contact with the woman) could only have caused one day's uncleanness convey to the woman any uncleanness at all while still absorbed?
(55) As a mark of approval.
(56) Though it conveys no uncleanness to the garments of the man who comes in contact with it.
(57) Those of the man who eats of it.
(58) An 'absorbed uncleanness'.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 42b

seeing that in the latter case no uncleanness is conveyed by external contact1 while here uncleanness would be conveyed when it emerges from the body?2 - Here also it is a case where the discharge emerged from the body.3 But if it emerged from the body, what need was there to mention such a case?4 - It might have been presumed that as the immersion is effective in respect of blood that is internal it is also effective in respect of the other,5 hence we were informed [that in the latter case the immersion is of no avail]. The difficulty about our cited tradition6 is well solved; but as regards the woman after childbirth7 [the difficulty arises again]: If the birth occurred during her menstruation period she is a menstruant, and if it occurred during her zibah period she is a zabah?8 - Here we are dealing with the case of a dry birth.9 But in the case of a dry birth,10 what point is there in the statement that uncleanness is contracted internally as well as externally?11 - The statement is justified in a case for instance, where the embryo put its head out of the ante-chamber;12 and this13 is in agreement with R. Oshaia, for R. Oshaia stated, 'This14 is a preventive measure15 against the possibility that the embryo might put its head out of the ante-chamber';16 and this17 is also in line with the following ruling: A certain person once came before Raba and asked him, 'Is it permissible to perform a circumcision on the Sabbath?' 'This', the other replied, 'is quite in order'. After that person went out Raba considered: Is it likely that this man did not know that it was permissible to perform a circumcision on the Sabbath? He thereupon followed him and said to him, 'Pray tell me all the circumstance of the case'.18 'I', the other told him, 'heard the child cry late on the Sabbath eve but it was not born until the Sabbath'. 'This is a case', the first explained to him, 'of a child19 who put his head out of the ante-chamber20 and consequently his circumcision21 is one that does not take place at the proper time,22 and on account of a circumcision that does not take place at the proper time the Sabbath may not be desecrated.'23 The question was raised: Is that region in a woman24 regarded as an absorbed place or as a concealed one? - In what respect could this matter? - In the case, for instance, where her friend inserted in her in that region a piece of nebelah of the size of an olive. If you say that it is regarded as an absorbed place, this nebelah being now an absorbed uncleanness25 would convey no uncleanness to the woman,26 but if you say that it is a concealed place, granted that no uncleanness could be conveyed by means of contact27 uncleanness would be conveyed by means of carriage?28 - Abaye replied: It is regarded as an absorbed place. Raba replied: It is regarded as a concealed one. Said Raba: Whence do I derive this? From what was taught: Since the uncleanness arises in a concealed region, and since an uncleanness in a concealed region is elsewhere ineffective, a special Scriptural ordinance was required [to give it effect in this particular case].29 And Abaye?30 - The meaning31 is this: There is one reason and there is yet another.32 In the first place the woman should be clean since the uncleanness is an absorbed one; and, furthermore, even if you were to find some ground for saying that it is a concealed uncleanness and an uncleanness in a concealed region is ineffective, this33 is a specific Scriptural ordinance.

The question was raised: Is the region through which the nebelah of a clean bird conveys uncleanness to a human being34 regarded as an absorbed place or as a concealed one? In what respect can this matter? - In a case, for instance, where his friend pushed a piece of nebelah of the size of an olive into his mouth.35 If you regard it as an absorbent place, this nebelah being now an absorbed uncleanness would convey no uncleanness, but if36 you say that it is a concealed one, granted that no uncleanness is conveyed by means of contact,37 uncleanness would be conveyed by means of carriage?38 - Abaye replied: It is an absorbed place, but Raba replied: It is a concealed one. Whence, said Abaye, do I derive this? From what was taught: As it might have been presumed that the nebelah of a beast conveys uncleanness to a person's garments by way of his oesophagus,39 it was explicitly stated in Scripture, That which dieth of itself,40 or is torn of beasts, he shall not eat to defile himself therewith,41 which implies: Only that42 which has no other form of uncleanness but that which is conveyed through the eating thereof42 [conveys uncleanness by way of the oesophagus],39 but this43 is excluded since it conveys uncleanness even before one had eaten of it. But why should not this44 be inferred a minori ad majus from the nebelah of a clean bird: If the nebelah of a clean bird which is not subject to uncleanness externally is subject to uncleanness internally39 how much more then should this,43 which is subject to uncleanness externally, be subject to uncleanness internally? - Scripture said, 'therewith'41 which implies: Only therewith45 but not with any other.43 If so, why was it stated in Scripture, And he that eateth?46 To prescribe for one who touches or carries it the same size as that which was prescribed for one who eats of it: As one who eats of it incurs guilt on consuming the full size of an olive so also one who touches or carries it contracts uncleanness only if it is of the size of an olive.

Raba ruled: A man holding a dead creeping thing in a fold of his body47 is clean, but if he holds nebelah in a fold of his body he is unclean. 'A man holding a dead creeping thing in a fold of his body is clean', since a dead creeping thing conveys uncleanness by means of touch, while a concealed region of the body47 is not susceptible to the uncleanness of touch. 'If he holds nebelah in a fold of his body he is unclean' for, granted that he contracts no uncleanness through touch, he contracts it, at any rate, through carriage. If a man held a dead creeping thing in the fold of his body48 and he thus brought it into the air spaces49 of an oven50 the latter is unclean. Is not this obvious?51 - It might have been presumed that the All Merciful said, Into the inside of which,52 implying:

____________________
(1) Cf. prev. n. but two.
(2) From which it is evident that it is rather like other kinds of uncleanness. Why then should it be different from those in conveying uncleanness even while in an absorbed condition?
(3) Sc. if the blood was detached before the immersion the woman becomes unclean after, but not before its complete emergence.
(4) Apparently none, since it is obvious that unclean blood conveys uncleanness when it emerges from the body.
(5) That was detached and remained for a time within the vagina.
(6) R. Zera's ruling.
(7) Included in the Baraitha under discussion, which can now no longer be compared with the ruling of R. Zera.
(8) Cf. relevant notes supra 42a ad fin.
(9) And one that was free from bleeding: so that the question of menstrual, or zibah blood does not arise.
(10) Where there is no detached blood either within or without.
(11) How can there be uncleanness in the absence of all blood?
(12) And then draw it back (cf. Strashun). Although the head is now within (internal) the woman is unclean as if the embryo had actually been born (external).
(13) The ruling that the projection of the head of the embryo without the ante-chamber is regarded as birth.
(14) That a midwife is unclean for seven days if she touched a dead embryo before it was extracted, though its mother remains clean until extraction had been effected.
(15) Enacted by the Rabbis. Pentateuchally the embryo, being at the time an 'absorbed uncleanness', would convey no uncleanness at all.
(16) Hul. 72a; and the midwife would then touch it when, having touched a corpse, her uncleanness would be Pentateuchal. Thus it follows that according to R. Oshaia the projection of the embryo's head without the ante-chamber is regarded as the actual birth. Similarly in the case under discussion, as soon as the embryo had put its head out of the ante-chamber its mother is subject to the uncleanness of birth as if the birth had taken place.
(17) V. supra n. 2.
(18) Lit., 'how was the body of the incident?'
(19) Whose cry could be heard.
(20) On the Friday, when he was heard crying.
(21) On any day after the following Friday which is the eighth day of his virtual birth.
(22) Circumcision being due on the eighth day of birth.
(23) The circumcision must, therefore, be postponed until the Sunday. At all events, Raba's ruling shows that the projection of the embryo's head without the ante-chamber is regarded as birth (cf. supra n. 2).
(24) Euphemism.
(25) And, therefore, regarded as non-existent.
(26) Either through contact or carriage (cf. prev. n.).
(27) The uncleanness by contact not applying to a concealed region of the body.
(28) Since the woman was carrying the nebelah.
(29) Supra 41b q.v. notes.
(30) How can he maintain his view in contradiction to Raba's citation?
(31) Of the cited statement.
(32) Lit., 'one and more he says'.
(33) The woman's uncleanness (cf. supra n. 5).
(34) Sc. the oesophagus. Only by swallowing it does the nebelah of a clean bird convey uncleanness to man.
(35) So that he himself did not touch it with his hands.
(36) Cur. ed. insert the last two words in parenthesis, and marg. n. substitutes 'what would you say'.
(37) The uncleanness by contact not applying to a concealed region of the body.
(38) The man having carried the nebelah in his mouth.
(39) Sc. by swallowing it.
(40) Heb. nebelah.
(41) Lev. XXII, 8.
(42) The nebelah of a clean bird.
(43) Nebelah of a beast.
(44) That the nebelah of a beast conveys uncleanness by way of the oesophagus.
(45) Sc. only if a person swallowed the nebelah of a clean bird do his garments become unclean.
(46) Lev. XI, 40, in respect of the nebelah of a beast.
(47) Under his arm-pit, for instance.
(48) Under his arm-pit, for instance.
(49) Without touching its sides.
(50) Of earthenware.
(51) Apparently it is, since all earthen vessels contract uncleanness from a dead creeping thing within their air spaces though there was no direct contact between it and the creeping thing.
(52) E.V., 'whereinto'; Every earthen vessel whereinto any of them falleth (Lev. XI, 33).

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 43a

But not the inside of its inside,1 hence we were informed [that the oven is unclean].2

Resh Lakish ruled: If a reed was held in a fold of the body of a zab and he shook therewith a clean person the latter remains clean.3 If a reed was held in the fold of the body of a clean person and he shook therewith a zab the former is unclean.4 What is the reason?5 Because Scripture said, And whomsoever he that hath issue6 toucheth, without having rinsed his hands in water,7 and this8 refers to the shaking of a zab, a form of conveyance of uncleanness the like of which we do not find anywhere in all the Torah; and the All Merciful expressed this in the term of touching,9 in order to tell that shaking and touching must be performed with a part of the body which is like one's hands; as one's hands are exposed10 so must any other part of the body11 be exposed.

BUT A ZAB AND ONE WHO EMITTED SEMEN CONVEY NO UNCLEANNESS etc. A ZAB, because it is written in Scripture, When any man hath an issue out of his flesh,12 [which implies that no uncleanness is conveyed] unless his issue emerged 'out of his flesh'; ONE WHO EMITTED SEMEN, because It is written, And if the flow of seed go out from a man.13

IF A MAN WAS EATING TERUMAH WHEN HE FELT etc. Was it not, however, taught: R. Eliezer stated, whoever holds his membrum when he makes water is as though he had brought a flood on the world?14 - Abaye replied: One does it with a thick rag.15 Raba stated: It may even be done with a soft rag, for once the semen has been detached the subsequent touch is of no consequence.16 And Abaye?17 - He takes into consideration the possibility of an additional discharge. And Raba? - He does not consider the possibility of an additional discharge. But does he not?18 Was it not in fact taught: 'To what may this be compared? To the putting of a finger upon the eye when, so long as the finger remains on it, the eye continues to tear'? Now Raba?19 - It is unusual to get heated twice in immediate succession.20

Samuel ruled, Any semen the emission of which is not felt throughout one's body causes no uncleanness. What is the reason? - The All Merciful has said, The flow of seed,21 implying that the text22 deals only with such as is fit to produce seed. An objection was raised: If a man was troubled with unchaste thoughts in the night and when he rose up he found his flesh heated, he is unclean!23 - R. Huna explained this to apply to a man who dreamt of indulging in sexual intercourse, it being impossible to indulge in the act without experiencing the sensation. Another rendering: Samuel ruled, Any semen which does not shoot forth like an arrow causes no uncleanness. What is the practical difference between the latter reading and the former reading? - The practical difference between them is the case where the detachment of the semen was perceived but the emergence was not felt.24 Now this ruling which was quite obvious to Samuel was a matter of enquiry for Raba. For Raba enquired: What is the law where the detachment of the semen was perceived but its emergence was not felt?25 - Come and hear: If a man who emitted semen performed immersion26 before he had made water, his uncleanness is resumed when he makes water!27 - There it is different, since the emergence of most of the semen was perceived. Others have a different reading: Samuel ruled, Any semen which does not shoot forth like an arrow causes no fructification. It is only fructification that it does not cause but it does cause uncleanness, for it is said in Scripture. If there be among you any man, that is not clean by reason of that which chanceth him,28 which implies: Even a chance emission29 whatever its nature.30

Raba enquired: What is the law where an idolater indulged in sexual thoughts,31 and then32 he went down and performed ritual immersion?33 If you were to find some case where we follow the time of detachment34 [the question would arise]. Does this apply only where the law is thereby restricted,35 but not here36 where the law would thereby be relaxed,37 or is it possible that no distinction is made? - This is undecided.

Raba enquired: What is the ruling where the urine of a zabah had been detached from the source38 and then she went down and performed ritual immersion?39 If you were to find some case where we follow the time of the detachment [the question would arise], Does this apply only to semen, since it cannot be restrained,40 but not to her urine which she is able to restrain,41 or is it possible that no distinction is made? - This is undecided.

Raba enquired: What is the law where the urine of an idolatress42 who was a zabah had been detached

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(1) Inside, for instance, an arm-pit which is inside the oven.
(2) The implication, 'but not the inside of its inside' excludes only the case where a creeping thing was within a vessel whose rim and mouth projected above the vessel in which it was contained.
(3) The reason is given presently.
(4) Since he 'carried' the zab. The carrying of a zab as the carrying 'of his couch conveys uncleanness to the carrier (cf. Lev. XV, 10).
(5) Why a person who was shaken by a reed held in the fold of the body of a zab remains clean.
(6) Heb. zab.
(7) Lev. XV, 11.
(8) Since the text cannot refer to direct touch which was already dealt with in Lev. XV, 7.
(9) 'Toucheth'.
(10) Lit., 'as there from outside'.
(11) If it is to convey uncleanness.
(12) Lev. XV, 2, emphasis on 'out'.
(13) Ibid. 16. Cf. prev. n.
(14) Supra 13a.
(15) Which intercepts the warmth of one's hand.
(16) Lit., 'since it uprooted it uprooted'.
(17) Why, in view of Raba's explanation, does he insist on a thick rag?
(18) So with Bah. Cur. edd. omit.
(19) What has he to say to this?
(20) Lit., 'any being heated and being heated again at the time is not usual'. The comparison with the eye holds good only when a discharge was originally due to friction.
(21) Lev. XV, 16, emphasis on the last word.
(22) Then he shall . . . . be unclean (ibid.).
(23) Mik. VIII, 3; because he might also have emitted some semen. As this would presumably occur without his being aware of it, an objection arises against Samuel.
(24) According to the first reading uncleanness would, and according to the latter reading would not be caused.
(25) Is uncleanness thereby conveyed or not?
(26) Which frees him from his uncleanness.
(27) Mik. VIII, 4 (cur. edd. '3', is an error). Now here there was obviously no perception, and yet uncleanness is nevertheless conveyed. An objection against Samuel.
(28) Deut. XXIII, 11, mikreh of the rt. קרה (v. foll. n.).
(29) Keri of the rt. קרי (cf. prev. n.).
(30) Lit., 'in the world'.
(31) As a result of which semen had been detached but did not emerge.
(32) For the purpose of his conversion to Judaism.
(33) Subsequent to which the semen emerged.
(34) Sc. that, in the case of an Israelite, uncleanness is caused where the detachment was perceived even though the emergence was not felt.
(35) Uncleanness is caused.
(36) The case of the idolater.
(37) Since at the time of the detachment the man was still an idolater and free from the laws of uncleanness.
(38) Which is a 'father of uncleanness'.
(39) Whereby she is freed from her uncleanness; and then she made the water. Is she, it is asked, unclean because at the time of the detachment she was unclean or is she clean because the emergence took place when she was already in a condition of cleanness?
(40) In consequence of which detachment must be regarded as virtual emergence.
(41) So that the emergence is a separate process which, having taken place after immersion, causes no uncleanness.
(42) Which is Rabbinically unclean.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 43b

from the source, and then she1 went down and performed ritual immersion? If you were to find a case2 where we follow the time of the detachment even where the woman can restrain the discharge [the question would arise], Does this apply only to the Israelitish woman who is Pentateuchally unclean but not to an idolatress who was a zabah, since she is only Rabbinically unclean,3 or is it possible that no difference is made between them? - This is undecided.

AND THE DISCHARGES CONVEY UNCLEANNESS HOWEVER SMALL THE QUANTITY. Samuel ruled: [the discharge of] a zab4 must be such a quantity as would stop the orifice of the membrum, for it is said in Scriptures Or his flesh be stopped from his issue.5 But have we not learnt: AND THE DISCHARGES CONVEY UNCLEANNESS, HOWEVER SMALL THE QUANTITY? - He6 maintains the same view as R. Nathan. For it was taught: R. Nathan citing R. Ishmael ruled, [the discharge of] a zab4 must be such a quantity as would stop the orifice of the membrum; but [the Rabbis] did not agree with him.7 What is R. Ishmael's reason? - Because Scripture said, Or his flesh be stopped from his issue.5 And the Rabbis?8 - That text9 is required for the inference that the discharge conveys uncleanness only when in a state of fluidity10 but not when it is dry.11 And R. Ishmael?12 - That13 is inferred from run.14 And the Rabbis?15 - That text14 serves the purpose of indicating the number:16 His issue,9 implies once; His flesh run,9 implies twice; With his issue,9 implies three times; thus it was taught that a zab who observed three discharges is under an obligation to bring a sacrifice; Or his flesh be stopped from his issue, it is his uncleanness,9 implies that he is unclean even on account of a part of the number of his issues,17 this teaches that a zab who observed only two discharges conveys uncleanness to his couch and seat. As to R. Ishmael, however,18 whence does he deduce the number required?19 - He derives it from an exposition of R. Simai; for it was taught: R. Simai stated, Scripture enumerated two issues and described the man as unclean20 and it also enumerated three issues and described the man as unclean,21 how is this to be reconciled? Two observations subject a man to the restrictions of uncleanness, and three observations render him liable to bring a sacrifice. But according to the Rabbis22 who deduced both numbers from 'This shall be his uncleanness in his issue',23 what deduction do they make from the text 'when any man hath an issue out of his flesh'?24 - They require it for the deduction that uncleanness does not begin until the discharge emerged from one's flesh. What need, however, was there for 'His issue be unclean'?24 - 'This teaches that the issue itself25 is unclean.

R. Hanilai citing R. Eliezer son of R. Simeon ruled: Semen conveys uncleanness to the man who emitted it,26 however small its quantity, but as regards the man who touched it its quantity must be of the bulk of a lentil.27 But did we not learn, AND THE DISCHARGES CONVEY UNCLEANNESS, HOWEVER SMALL THE QUANTITY, which applies, does it not, to the case of one who touched semen? - No, it applies only to one who emitted it.26

Come and hear: In one respect the law of semen is more restrictive than that of a dead creeping thing while in another respect the law of a dead creeping thing is more restrictive than that of semen. 'The law of a dead creeping thing is more restrictive' in that no distinction [of age] is made about its uncleanness,28 which is not the case with semen.29 'The law of semen is more restrictive' in that uncleanness is conveyed by its smallest quantity, which is not the case with a creeping thing.30 Now does not this apply to one who touched the semen?31 - No, it applies only to one who emitted it.32 But was it not taught as being on a par with the creeping thing: As the latter is a case of touching so also the former?31 - R. Adda b. Ahabah replied: The ruling referred to a creeping thing in general33 and to semen in general.34 But does a creeping thing convey no uncleanness even when it is of the smallest bulk? Have we not in fact learnt: Members of the body35 have36 no prescribed minimum size [and uncleanness is, therefore, conveyed] by less than the size of an olive of corpse,37 by less than the size of an olive of nebelah or by less than the size of a lentil of a dead creeping thing?38 - It is different with a member of the body39 since the whole of it takes the place of the size of a lentil; for were any part of it40 missing,41 would the member42 have conveyed any uncleanness?43 What is meant by the 'distinction in uncleanness' in the case of semen? If it be suggested: The distinction between the semen of an Israelite and that of foreigners [it could be objected]: Is there not in this case also44 a distinction between a sea-mouse and a land-mouse?45 - The distinction rather is that between a minor and an adult.46

R. Papa stated: This ruling47 is a point at issue between Tannas:48 [For it was taught] whence do we derive the inclusion in uncleanness of one who touched semen? From Scripture which explicitly stated, Or whosoever;49 and elsewhere Tannas differ on a relevant point,50 for there are those who hold that a deduction is carried through in all respects51 while others hold that a deduction is limited by its original basis.52 Now according to those who hold that a deduction is carried through in all respects51 it follows that as a dead creeping thing53 conveys uncleanness through touch so does semen convey uncleanness by touch and, consequently,54 as a dead creeping thing conveys uncleanness only when it is of the bulk of a lentil so does semen convey uncleanness only when it is of the bulk of a lentil; while according to him who maintained that a deduction is limited by its original basis55 it also follows that as a dead creeping thing conveys uncleanness through touch so does semen convey uncleanness through touch, but then, limiting it to its original basis, as semen conveys uncleanness to the man who emitted it, however small its quantity, so does it also convey uncleanness to the man who touched it, however small its quantity.56 Said57 R. Huna son of R. Nathan to R. Papa: Whence the proof that the inclusion in uncleanness of one who touched semen is deduced from the expression of 'Or whosoever occurring in the context dealing with the creeping thing?58 Is it not possible that the inclusion is derived from the expression of 'Or from whomsoever the flow of seed goeth out,59 and60 all may be of the opinion that a deduction is to be carried through in all respects?61 The Tannas62 were asked63 Some recited as R. Papa while others recited in agreement with R. Huna son of R. Nathan.

MISHNAH. A GIRL ONE DAY OLD IS SUBJECT TO THE UNCLEANNESS OF MENSTRUATION. ONE WHO IS TEN DAYS OLD IS SUBJECT TO THE UNCLEANNESS OF ZIBAH. A BOY ONE DAY OLD IS SUBJECT TO THE UNCLEANNESS OF ZIBAH, AND TO THE UNCLEANNESS OF LEPROSY AND THAT OF CORPSEUNCLEANNESS; HE SUBJECTS [HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIDOW] TO THE DUTY OF LEVIRATE MARRIAGE;64 HE EXEMPTS [HIS MOTHER] FROM THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE,65 HE ENABLES HER66 TO EAT TERUMAH AND HE ALSO CAUSES HER TO BE DISQUALIFIED FROM EATING TERUMAH;67

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(1) For the purpose of her conversion to Judaism.
(2) In respect of an Israelitish woman.
(3) Cf. supra n. 5.
(4) If it is to convey uncleanness.
(5) Lev. XV, 3.
(6) Samuel.
(7) Pes. 67b.
(8) How can they maintain their ruling in view of this text?
(9) Lev. XV, 3.
(10) Lit., 'wet', when the orifice can 'be stopped' by it.
(11) When it crumbles away and is incapable of adhesion.
(12) How, in view of this explanation, can he still maintain his ruling?
(13) That a discharge conveys uncleanness only when in a state of fluidity.
(14) Run with his issue (Lev. XV, 3).
(15) How can they maintain their ruling in view of this text?
(16) Of issues that determine the various grades of uncleanness.
(17) 'From his issues' (emphasis on 'from') implying 'a part'.
(18) Who requires the expression of 'run with his issue' for the inference he mentioned supra.
(19) As just indicated according to the Rabbis.
(20) When any man hath an issue out of his flesh (Lev. XV, 2), counts as one; his issue be unclean (ibid), counts as a second.
(21) This shall be his uncleanness in his issue (Lev. XV, 3) counts as one; His flesh run with his issue (ibid.) counts as a second; or his flesh be stopped from his issue (ibid.) counts as a third.
(22) Lit., 'him'.
(23) Supra.
(24) Cf. supra n. 12.
(25) And not only the man who suffered from it.
(26) Lit., 'to the one who observes'.
(27) A lesser quantity, as is the case with a dead creeping thing, conveys no uncleanness.
(28) Young and old are equally unclean.
(29) The uncleanness on account of an emission of semen being restricted to one who is over nine years of age.
(30) Tosef. Kel. I. Cf. supra n. 2.
(31) But this would present an objection against R. Hanilai's ruling.
(32) Lit., 'to the one who observes'.
(33) Lit., 'the name of' or 'any'.
(34) Sc. it referred to the form of uncleanness appropriate to each. A dead creeping thing can never convey uncleanness unless its bulk is of the prescribed size, while semen, when it concerns the man who had emitted it, may convey uncleanness, however small its quantity.
(35) Sc. any part of it which consists of flesh, sinews and bones (v. Bertinoro).
(36) In regard to the conveyance of uncleanness.
(37) Cf. prev. n. but one.
(38) Oh. I, 7, which shows that a dead creeping thing conveys uncleanness, however small its bulk.
(39) V. p. 300, n. 10.
(40) Lit., 'a portion'.
(41) Cf. supra p. 300, n. 10.
(42) That was smaller than a lentil.
(43) Obviously not; which shows that it is only on account of its importance that the force of conveying uncleanness (as a piece of the prescribed size) was imparted to it. Any other part of the body, however, is subject to the prescribed minimum.
(44) That of a creeping thing.
(45) Of course there is! A sea-mouse (cf. Hul. 126b) conveys no uncleanness.
(46) No uncleanness is conveyed by that of a child under nine years of age.
(47) Of R. Hanilai, that semen less in quantity than the bulk of a lentil conveys no uncleanness by means of touch.
(48) Lit., 'like Tannas'.
(49) This is now presumed to refer to Lev. XXII, 5, which deals with the uncleanness of a creeping thing.
(50) Which (as will be shown presently) has a bearing on this deduction:
(51) Lit., 'judge from it and (again) from it', i.e., all that applies to the case from which deduction is made is also applicable to the case deduced
(52) Lit., 'judge from it and set it in its (original) place', i.e., the rules applicable to the case deduced limit the scope of the deduction.
(53) From the law of which that of semen had presumably been deduced (cf. n. 12).
(54) Lit., 'and from it', since 'a deduction is carried through in all respects.'
(55) V. p. 301, n. 15.
(56) It has thus been shown that R. Hanilai's ruling is a point at issue between Tannas. Is it likely, however, that R. Hanilai would differ from the Tannas who presumably hold a different view?
(57) In an attempt to remove the difficulty (cf. prev. n. second clause).
(58) Lev. XXII, 5, as presumed by R. Papa supra.
(59) Lev. XXII, 4.
(60) Since the deduction is not made from the contact of the creeping thing.
(61) Sc. even if all were to uphold this view, uncleanness would nevertheless be conveyed by the touch of the smallest quantity of semen, since the inference is made, not from the uncleanness of the creeping thing but from that of the emission of semen which is conveyed by the smallest quantity.
(62) Those who recited Mishnahs and Baraithas at the college; v. Glos. s.v. (b).
(63) To give a decision as to whether R. Papa or R. Huna was in the right.
(64) Provided he was born prior to his brother's death.
(65) If he was born after his father's death though he only lived for a short while.
(66) His mother, the daughter of an Israelite, who was married to a priest, though the latter was dead when the child was born.
(67) This is now presumed to refer to a priest's daughter who was married to an Israelite who died and was survived by a son one day old (v. Gemara infra.)

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 44a

HE INHERITS AND TRANSMITS;1 HE WHO KILLS HIM IS GUILTY OF MURDER, AND HE COUNTS TO HIS FATHER, TO HIS MOTHER AND TO ALL HIS RELATIVES AS1 A FULLY GROWN MAN.2

GEMARA. Whence is this ruling3 deduced? - [From the following]. For our Rabbis taught: From the term woman4 I would only know that the laws5 are applicable to a grown-up woman, whence, however, the inference that a girl one day old is also subject to the uncleanness of menstruation? Since it was explicitly stated, And a woman.6

ONE WHO IS TEN DAYS OLD IS SUBJECT TO THE UNCLEANNESS OF ZIBAH. Whence is this ruling deduced? [From the following]. For our Rabbis taught: From the term woman7 I would only know that the laws are applicable to a grown-up woman, whence, however, the inference that a girl who is ten days old is also subject to the uncleanness of zibah? Since it was explicitly stated, And a woman.8

A BOY ONE DAY OLD etc. Whence is this ruling deduced? - [From the following Scriptural text]. For the Rabbis taught: When any man,9 what was the object of stating, 'When any man'?10 To include a boy one day old in the restrictions of the uncleanness of zibah; so R. Judah. R. Ishmael son of R. Johanan b. Beroka said, This deduction is not necessary, for surely it is stated in Scripture, And of them that have an issue, whether it be a man or a woman;11 'whether it be a man' means one of any age, whether adult or minor, 'or a woman means one of any age, whether an adult or minor. But if so12 what need was there to state, 'When any man'?13 The Torah employed ordinary phraseology.14

[IS SUBJECT TO . . . ] THE UNCLEANNESS OF LEPROSY, since it is written, When a man shall have in the skin of his flesh,15 implying a man of any age.

[IS SUBJECT TO . . . ] THAT OF CORPSE-UNCLEANNESS, because it is written, And upon the persons that were there,16 implying a person of any age.

HE SUBJECTS [HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIDOW] TO THE DUTY OF LEVIRATE MARRIAGE, for it is written, If brethren dwell together,17 implying brothers who are contemporaries.18

HE EXEMPTS [HIS MOTHER] FROM THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE, for the All Merciful has said, And have no child,17 but this man has one.

HE ENABLES HER TO EAT TERUMAH, for it is written, And such as are born in his house, they may eat19 of his bread,20 read it as, 'Shall cause to eat21 of his bread'.

AND HE ALSO CAUSES HER TO BE DISQUALIFIED FROM EATING TERUMAH. For the All Merciful has said, And have no child,22 but she has one. But what was the point of speaking of a 'child' seeing that the same applies even to an embryo, for it is written,23 As in her youth,22 which excludes24 one who is pregnant?25 Both texts were required. For if the All Merciful had only written, 'And have no child' [it might have been presumed that the law26 applied to that case] because originally there was but one body and now there are two bodies,27 but that in this case,28 where there was originally one body and now also there is only one body, it may be held that the woman may eat terumah, hence the All Merciful has written, 'As in her youth'.29 And if the All Merciful has only written, 'As in her youth' [it might have been presumed that the law30 applied to that case alone] since originally the woman's body was empty and now it is a full one, but that in this case,31 where her body was originally empty and is now also empty, the woman may well eat terumah. Hence the necessity for both texts. Now, the Scriptural texts have been well explained, but as regards our Mishnah, why just A BOY ONE DAY OLD, seeing32 that even an embryo also disqualifies its mother? - R. Shesheth replied: We are here dealing with the case of a priest who had two wives, one who had previously been a divorced woman33 and the other was not a divorced woman,34 and he had sons from the latter35 and one son from the former,36 so that the latter37 causes the slaves of his father38 to be disqualified from eating terumah;39 thus indicating that the law is contrary to the view40 of R. Jose. He having laid down that an embryo41 also causes disqualification we were informed here that only A BOY ONE DAY OLD causes disqualification but not an embryo.42

HE INHERITS AND TRANSMITS. From whom does he INHERIT? Obviously from his father; and to whom does he TRANSMIT? Obviously to his paternal brothers;43 but could not these if they wished inherit from their father and, if they preferred, inherit from him?44 - R. Shesheth replied: The meaning is, He45 inherits the estate of his mother to transmit it46 to his paternal brothers;47 hence only then when he is ONE DAY OLD but not when he is an embryo. What is the reason? - Because it48 dies first,49 and no son may inherit from his mother

____________________
(1) This is explained in the Gemara.
(2) Lit., 'bridegroom'.
(3) That A GIRL ONE DAY OLD etc.
(4) Lev. XV, 19, which deals with the laws of the menstruant.
(5) Cf. prev. n.
(6) Lev. XV, 19. E.V. and if a woman.
(7) Cf. prev. n. but two. The exposition now is based on what follows in the Scriptural text: Her issue...be blood.
(8) Cf. prev. two notes.
(9) Lev. XV, 2. Lit. 'a man, a man'.
(10) Sc. it would have sufficed if one 'man' (cf. prev. n.) had been omitted, the rendering being, 'when a man'.
(11) Lev. XV, 33.
(12) That the law has been enunciated in Lev. XV, 33.
(13) Lev. XV, 2. Lit., 'a man, a man'.
(14) Lit., 'spoke in the language of men', who are in the habit of repeating their words. No inference, therefore, may be drawn from the repetition of 'a man'.
(15) Lev. XIII, 2.
(16) Num. XIX, 18, in the context dealing with corpse-uncleanness.
(17) Deut. XXV, 5, in the context of the law of levirate marriage and halizah.
(18) Lit., 'who had one (and the same) sitting in the world'.
(19) יאכלו, yokelu (kal).
(20) Lev. XXII, 11.
(21) יאכילו, ya'akilu (hif.).
(22) Lev. XXII, 13.
(23) In the same context.
(24) From the privilege of eating terumah.
(25) Sc. if an embryo causes its mother to be disqualified from eating terumah it is self-evident that a child does it, what need then was there for the text, 'and have no child'?
(26) Of disqualification (cf. p. 304, n. 14).
(27) Mother and born child.
(28) Lit., 'here', that of a pregnant woman.
(29) To indicate that even a pregnant woman is disqualified.
(30) Of disqualification (cf. supra p. 304, n. 14).
(31) Where the child was already born.
(32) As has just been shown.
(33) Whom a priest is forbidden to marry and whose children from a priestly marriage are disqualified priests and are themselves forbidden to eat terumah and, of course, have no right to confer the privilege of eating it upon their slaves.
(34) And whose sons from her marriage with the priest are qualified priests who also confer upon their slaves the right of eating terumah.
(35) Cf. prev. n.
(36) Cf. supra n. 8.
(37) After the death of his father, the priest.
(38) Whom he and his brothers jointly inherit from their deceased father.
(39) On account of his share in them; it being impossible to distinguish which of the slaves are his and which are his brothers'.
(40) Lit., 'to bring out'.
(41) From a forbidden marriage (cf. supra n. 8).
(42) The disqualification spoken of in our Mishnah thus referring to the slaves and not, as has previously been assumed, to the child's mother, the difficulty raised supra is now solved.
(43) Since only paternal relatives are entitled to inherit one's estate.
(44) Of course they could, since the child's estate would in any case revert on his death to his father from whom they would inherit it. What meaning then could be assigned to the law that he TRANSMITS?
(45) A BOY ONE DAY OLD.
(46) When he dies.
(47) Who were born from the same father but not from the same mother.
(48) The embryo, when its mother dies.
(49) Sc. before its mother.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 44b

in the grave1 to transmit the inheritance to his paternal brothers. But, surely, this2 is not? so, for was there not a case where an embryo made three convulsive movements?3 - Mar son of R. Ashi replied: [Those were only reflexive movements] like those of the tail of the lizard which moves convulsively [even after it has been cut off].4

Mar son of R. Joseph citing Raba explained: This5 means to say that he causes a diminution in the portion of the birthright.6 Mar son of R. Joseph citing Raba further ruled: A son born after the death of his father causes no diminution in the portion of the birthright.7 What is the reason?8 It is required that They shall have born to him.9 Thus10 it was taught at Sura; but at Pumbeditha it was taught as follows: Mar son of R. Joseph citing Raba ruled, A firstborn son that was born after the death of his father11 does not receive a double portion. What is the reason? It is necessary that He shall acknowledge,12 and ['he',] surely, is not [there to acknowledge]. And the law is in agreement with all those versions which Mar son of R. Joseph cited in the name of Raba.

HE WHO KILLS HIM IS GUILTY OF MURDER, since it is written, And he that smiteth any man mortally,13 implying, whatever the age.14

AND HE COUNTS TO HIS FATHER, TO HIS MOTHER AND TO ALL HIS RELATIVES AS A FULLY GROWN MAN, In respect of what law? - R. Papa replied: In respect of that of mourning. In agreement with whose view [is our Mishnah]?15 It cannot be, can it, in agreement with16 R. Simeon b. Gamaliel who ruled: Any human17 child18 that survived for thirty days cannot be, regarded as a miscarriage,19 from which it follows that if he had not lived so long he would have been a doubtful case?20 - Here21 we are dealing with the case of a child concerning whom it is established that the months of his pregnancy were duly fulfilled.22

MISHNAH. A GIRL OF THE AGE OF THREE YEARS AND ONE DAY MAY BE BETROTHED23 BY INTERCOURSE; IF THE YABAM24 HAD INTERCOURSE WITH HER, HE ACQUIRES HER THEREBY;25 THE GUILT26 OF ADULTERY27 MAY BE INCURRED THROUGH HER,28 AND SHE29 CAUSES UNCLEANNESS TO THE MAN WHO HAD INTERCOURSE WITH HER SO THAT HE IN TURN CONVEYS UNCLEANNESS TO THAT UPON WHICH HE LIES,30 AS TO A GARMENT WHICH HAS LAIN UPON [A ZAB].31 IF SHE WAS MARRIED TO A PRIEST, SHE MAY EAT TERUMAH. IF ANY OF THE INELIGIBLE PERSONS32 COHABITED WITH HER HE DISQUALIFIES HER FROM THE PRIESTHOOD.33 IF ANY OF THE FORBIDDEN DEGREES ENUMERATED IN THE TORAH COHABITED WITH HER HE IS TO BE EXECUTED ON HER ACCOUNT, BUT SHE34 IS EXEMPT [FROM THE PENALTY]. IF ONE WAS YOUNGER THAN THIS AGE INTERCOURSE WITH HER IS LIKE PUTTING A FINGER IN THE EYE.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: A girl of the age of three years may be betrothed by intercourse; so R. Meir. But the Sages say: Only one who is three years and one day old. What is the practical difference between them? - The school of R Jannai replied: The practical difference between them is the day preceding the first day of the fourth year.35 R. Johanan, however, replied: The practical difference between them is the rule that thirty days of a year are counted as the full year.36

An objection was raised: A girl of the age of three years and even one of the age of two years and one day may be betrothed by intercourse; so R. Meir. But the Sages say: Only one who is three years and one day old.

____________________
(1) Sc. after his death.
(2) That an embryo dies before its mother.
(3) After its mother was dead.
(4) But are no signs of life.
(5) The law that A BOY ONE DAY OLD... TRANSMITS.
(6) If, for instance, there were two brothers other than the boy in question, and one of them was the firstborn, the estate is divided, not into three portions (two for the ordinary portions of the two brothers and one for the birthright), but into four portions. Each brother, including the young child, receives one such portion and the firstborn receives the additional fourth portion as his birthright. The firstborn thus receives, as the portion of his birthright, a quarter of the estate, and not (as would have been the case if the child were excluded) a third.
(7) Though he receives his due portion in the estate. In the case mentioned as an instance in the prev. n. the estate would first be divided into three portions (as if the embryo did not exist) and the firstborn would receive, as his birthright, one of these, which represents a third of the estate. The remaining two thirds would then be divided into three equal shares, each of the three brothers receiving one, I.e., two ninths of the estate. The full portion of the firstborn would accordingly amount to (1/3 + 2/9 = 5/9) five ninths of the estate, while, where the child was one day old, the firstborn's full portion would only amount to half the estate, i.e., (5/9 - 1/2 = 1/18) one eighteenth less.
(8) That a born child does, and an embryo does not cause a diminution in the portion of the birthright.
(9) Deut. XXI, 15, emphasis on 'him', sc. while the father is alive. An embryo cannot come within the category of 'have born'.
(10) The version just given.
(11) In the case, for instance, where his widow bore twins, or where he was survived by two widows and both bore sons and one of these was the firstborn.
(12) Deut. XXI, 17.
(13) Lev. XXIV, 17.
(14) Lit., 'from any place'.
(15) Which, treating an infant one day old in the various laws embodied in it as a grown-up man, obviously assumes him to be viable.
(16) Lit., 'that not as'.
(17) Opp. to cattle where the period is only eight days.
(18) Of doubtful premature birth.
(19) Thirty days being a period that suffices to establish the viability of a child.
(20) Now since according to our Mishnah a child may be regarded as viable on the first day of its life (cf. p. 307, n. 9) its view must differ from that of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, must it not?
(21) In our Mishnah.
(22) Lit., 'whose months have ended'. The child's viability is beyond question even according to R. Simeon b. Gamaliel who (cf. p. 307, n. 12) referred only to a doubtful premature birth.
(23) Subject to her father's approval.
(24) The brother of her deceased childless husband, whose duty it is to contract the levirate marriage with her.
(25) In consequence of which he gains possession of his deceased brother's estate, is entitled if she dies to inherit her own estate and even if he is a priest, he may defile himself to her as to a legally married wife.
(26) Punishable by death.
(27) Lit., 'on account of the wife of a man'.
(28) If, for instance, her father betrothed her to one man and another cohabited with her.
(29) When a menstruant.
(30) Lit., 'lower couch'.
(31) Lit., 'like the upper'.
(32) A bastard or a slave, for instance.
(33) Sc. if she was the daughter of a priest she loses the privilege of eating terumah.
(34) Being a minor.
(35) Lit., 'the eve of the beginning of the year'. According to R. Meir she attains the prescribed age on that day while according to the Rabbis she does not attain it until the following day.
(36) According to R. Meir the prescribed age is attained as soon as thirty days of the third year have passed, while according to the Rabbis it is not attained until the first day of the fourth year.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 45a

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 45b

when HE ATTAINS HIS MAJORITY he shall cohabit with her1 and give her a divorce.2

MISHNAH. THE VOWS OF A GIRL OF THE AGE OF ELEVEN YEARS AND ONE DAY MUST BE EXAMINED;3 THE VOWS OF ONE WHO IS OF THE AGE OF TWELVE YEARS AND ONE DAY ARE VALID;4 AND THROUGHOUT THE TWELFTH YEAR THEY ARE TO BE EXAMINED.3 THE VOWS OF A BOY OF THE AGE OF TWELVE YEARS AND ONE DAY MUST BE EXAMINED;5 THE VOWS OF ONE WHO IS OF THE AGE OF THIRTEEN YEARS AND ONE DAY ARE VALID; AND THROUGHOUT THE THIRTEENTH YEAR THEY ARE TO BE EXAMINED.5 PRIOR TO THIS AGE,6 EVEN THOUGH THEY SAID, 'WE KNOW IN HONOUR OF WHOSE NAME WE HAVE MADE OUR VOW' OR 'IN HONOUR OF WHOSE NAME WE HAVE MADE OUR DEDICATION', THEIR VOW7 IS NO VALID VOW AND THEIR DEDICATION IS NO VALID DEDICATION. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS AGE,8 EVEN THOUGH THEY SAID, 'WE DO NOT KNOW IN THE HONOUR OF WHOSE NAME WE HAVE MADE OUR VOW' OR 'IN HONOUR OF WHOSE NAME WE HAVE MADE OUR DEDICATION', THEIR VOW IS A VALID VOW AND THEIR DEDICATION IS A VALID DEDICATION.

GEMARA. But since it was stated, THE VOWS OF A GIRL OF THE AGE OF ELEVEN YEARS AND ONE DAY MUST BE EXAMINED,9 what need was there for stating, THE VOWS OF ONE WHO IS OF THE AGE OF TWELVE YEARS AND ONE DAY ARE VALID? - It might have been presumed that henceforth they must always be examined,10 hence we were informed that after the age of twelve years and a day the vows are invariably valid. But since it was stated, THE VOWS OF ONE WHO IS OF THE AGE OF TWELVE YEARS AND ONE DAY ARE VALID,11 what need was there for stating, AND THROUGHOUT THE TWELFTH YEAR THEY ARE TO BE EXAMINED?12 - It might have been presumed that, since a Master has laid down that 'Thirty days of a year are counted as a full year', where we examined her vows during a period of thirty days13 and she knew not how to express their significance,14 no further examinations15 should be held16 hence we were informed that her vows are to be examined all through the twelfth year. Then let the last two cases be stated, THE VOWS OF ONE WHO IS OF THE AGE OF TWELVE YEARS AND ONE DAY ARE VALID, AND THROUGHOUT THE TWELFTH YEAR THEY ARE TO BE EXAMINED, but17 what was the need for the statement, THE VOWS OF A GIRL OF THE AGE OF ELEVEN YEARS AND ONE DAY MUST BE EXAMINED? - It was required: Since it might have been suggested that as a rule examination was necessary in the twelfth year and unnecessary in the eleventh year, but that where we see that the girl is particularly bright she might also be examined in the eleventh year,18 we were informed that the period of examination invariably begins at the age of eleven years and one day. What was the need19 for stating, PRIOR TO THIS AGE and SUBSEQUENT TO THIS AGE? - It might have been presumed that the previous rulings20 applied only where the children themselves spontaneously say nothing21 but that where they do assert spontaneous opinion22 we may rely upon them, hence we were informed that even their own assertions do not affect the age limits.

Our Rabbis taught: These23 are the rulings of Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Eleazar stated, The age limits that were assigned to the girl apply to the boy while those assigned to the boy apply to the girl.24 R. Hisda stated: What is Rabbi's reason? Because it is written in Scripture, And the Lord God built25 the rib26 which teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, endowed the woman with more understanding27 than the man. And the other?28 - He requires that text25 for the same deduction as the one made by Resh Lakish, for Resh Lakish citing R. Simeon b. Menasya stated, And the lord God built the rib which he took from the man into a woman, and he brought her unto the man,29 teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, plaited Eve's hair and then brought her to Adam, for in the sea-towns they describe net-work as binyatha.30 But what is R. Simeon b. Eleazar's reason? - R. Samuel son of R. Isaac replied: As a boy frequents the house of his teacher his subtlety31 develops earlier.32

It was asked: Is the intervening period33 regarded as that of under, or of over age?34 - In respect of what law could this matter: If in that of vows, it is neither regarded as that of under age nor as that of over age?35 - Rather in respect of punishments.36 Now what is the ruling? - Both Rab and R. Hanina replied: The intervening period is regarded as that of under age.37 Both R. Johanan and R. Joshua b. Levi replied: The intervening period is regarded as that of over age. Said R. Nahman b. Isaac: Your mnemonic38 is: Now this was the custom in former time in Israel.39

R. Hamnuna raised an objection:40 SUBSEQUENT TO THIS AGE, EVEN THOUGH THEY SAID, WE DO NOT KNOW IN HONOUR OF WHOSE NAME WE HAVE MADE OUR VOW' OR 'IN HONOUR OF WHOSE NAME WE HAVE MADE OUR DEDICATION' THEIR VOW IS A VALID VOW AND THEIR DEDICATION IS A VALID DEDICATION. Thus41 it follows, does it not, that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age? Said Raba to him, Read then the first clause: PRIOR TO THIS AGE, EVEN THOUGH THEY SAID, 'WE KNEW IN HONOUR OF WHOSE NAME WE HAVE MADE OUR VOW' OR 'IN HONOUR OF WHOSE NAME WE HAVE MADE OUR DEDICATION', THEIR VOW IS NO VALID VOW AND THEIR DEDICATION IS NO VALID DEDICATION. Thus42 it follows, does it not, that the intervening period is regarded as that of over age? - This, however, is no argument, Raba having laboured under a misapprehension. He thought that R. Hamnuna drew his inference from a Mishnah redundancy,43 [hence he argued that] instead of drawing an inference from the final clause he might as well have drawn one from the first clause; but this was not the case. R. Hamnuna in fact drew his inference from the very wording44 of our Mishnah. How [he reasoned] is one to understand the expression of 'SUBSEQUENT TO THAT AGE'? If by that time one had not yet grown two hairs, one would, surely, still be a minor.45 Consequently it must refer to one who had grown two hairs,

____________________
(1) Thus, being of age, affecting valid kinyan of marriage.
(2) Being now in all respects her lawful husband, halizah is no longer necessary.
(3) To ascertain whether the girl was aware of their significance.
(4) No examination being necessary.
(5) Cf. prev. n. but one, mut. mut.
(6) The first day of the twelfth year in the case of a girl and the first day of the thirteenth year in that of a boy.
(7) Since they are still minors.
(8) Twelve years and a day in the case of a girl and thirteen years and a day in that of a boy when they respectively attain their majority.
(9) From which it might well be inferred that at a later age her vows are valid and no examination is necessary.
(10) And that the age of eleven years and one day is only the limit below which even an examination does not establish the validity of a vow.
(11) And it has previously been stated that from the age of eleven years and one day vows must be examined.
(12) A ruling which evidently follows (cf. prev. n.) from the previous statements.
(13) The first of the twelfth year.
(14) Thus revealing her mental incapacity.
(15) During the remaining months of that year.
(16) On the assumption that the examinations during the thirty days have established for the rest of that year that her mental state was that of a minor.
(17) In view of the explicit statement that examinations are conducted throughout the twelfth year.
(18) And if she shows sufficient mental development her vows are valid even at that early age.
(19) In view of the earlier statements.
(20) On the limits of minority and majority.
(21) Sc. they do not claim 'we know' when they are under the age limit or 'we do not know' when they are above the limit.
(22) Cf. Prev. n. mut. mut.
(23) The statements on the respective age limits of a boy and a girl, according to which the latter matures earlier than the former.
(24) The boy, in his opinion, maturing earlier.
(25) Wa-yiben.
(26) Gen. II, 22. E.V., And the rib...made He.
(27) Binah, of a root that is analogous to that of wa-yiben (prev. n. but one).
(28) R. Simeon b. Eleazar; how in view of this deduction can he maintain his view?
(29) Gen. II, 22. E.V., And the rib . . . made He.
(30) 'Building'.
(31) Or 'shrewdness .
(32) Lit., 'enters into him first'.
(33) From the age of eleven years and a day to that of twelve years and a day and from twelve years and a day to thirteen years and a day in the case of a girl and a boy respectively.
(34) Lit., 'as before time or as after time'.
(35) As stated supra.
(36) And in the case where the boy or the girl had grown two pubic hairs. In the absence of these, even one of age is exempt from punishments.
(37) And exempt from punishment.
(38) An aid to the recollection of the respective authorship of the two views just expressed.
(39) R. Joshua b. Levi was a Levite, whilst Rab and R. Hanina were Israelites; and those who were 'in Israel' (Israelites) gave former time' which recalls 'before time' ('under age') as their ruling (Tosaf. Asheri).
(40) Against R. Johanan and R. Joshua b. Levi.
(41) Emphasizing SUBSEQUENT.
(42) Emphasis on PRIOR.
(43) Sc. the apparent superfluity of the rulings PRIOR TO THIS AGE etc. and SUBSEQUENT TO etc. discussed and explained supra.
(44) Lit., 'from the body'.
(45) How then could it be ruled, THEIR VOW IS VALID etc.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 46a

the reason for the ruling1 being that one was over age, when all requirements2 were satisfied.3 Thus it follows, does it not, that the intervening period4 is regarded as that of under age?5 A further objection was [also] raised by R. Zera: When . . . man . . . shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of . . .6 What was the purpose of stating 'man'? To include in the scope of the law a boy of the age of thirteen years and one day whose vows are valid, though he is unable to 'utter clearly'. Now how is this to be understood? If it be suggested that the reference is to a boy who had not yet grown two hairs, [the objection could be raised:] Such a boy would still have the status of a minor.7 The reference consequently must be to one who had grown two hairs, the reason being that he is thirteen years and one day old, when he is regarded as a 'man'. Thus8 it follows, does it not, that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age?9 - This is indeed a refutation.

R. Nahman stated, The question10 is a point at issue between Tannas:11 [For it was taught:] If a boy of the age of seven years grew two hairs they are attributed to a mole;12 from the age of nine years to that of twelve years and one day they are also to be attributed to a mole,12 but R. Jose son of R. Judah ruled: They13 are a sign of puberty; at the age of thirteen years and one day, all agree that they are a sign of puberty.14 Now is not this self-contradictory: You said, 'From the age of nine years to that of twelve years and one day they are also to be attributed to a mole', from which it follows that at the actual age of thirteen years they are a sign of puberty; but then it is stated, 'At the age of thirteen years and one day . . . they are a sign of puberty', from which it follows, does it not, that at the actual age of thirteen years they are to be attributed to a mole? Must you not concede then that this question15 is a point at issue between the Tannas, one Master16 holding that the intervening period is regarded as that of over age while the other Master maintains that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age?17 No; all may agree that the intervening period is regarded as that under age, but both clauses refer to a girl the first18 supporting the view of Rabbi19 while the latter20 represents that of R. Simeon b. Eleazar.21 And if you prefer I22 might reply: Both clauses refer to a boy, and the first represents the view of R. Simeon b. Eleazar while the latter represents the view of Rabbi.23 And if you prefer I24 might reply: Both clauses are the view of Rabbi, but one25 refers to a boy while the other26 refers to a girl. And if you prefer I24 might say: Both clauses are the view of R. Simeon b. Eleazar, but the one26 refers to a boy while the other25 refers to a girl.

'R. Jose son of R. Judah ruled: They are a sign of puberty.' R. Keruspedai son of R. Shabbethai explained: This applies only where they27 are still on him.28 So it was also taught: If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had grown two hairs they are to be attributed to a mole; from the age of nine years to that of twelve years and one day, though the hairs are still on him, they are to be attributed to a mole. R. Jose son of R. Judah ruled: They are a sign of puberty.

Raba stated: The law is that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age. R. Samuel b. Zutra taught Raba's tradition in the following form:29 Raba stated, A minor all through her twelfth year may make a declaration of mi'un30 and go away,31 but from that age upwards she may not make a declaration of mi'un32 but33 she may not submit to halizah.34 Is not this statement, however, self contradictory? You said, 'she may not make a declaration of mi'un' from which it is evident that35 she is regarded as one of age; but if she is of age why may she not submit to halizah? And were you to reply that he36 was in doubt,37 [it could be retorted:] Was he in doubt? Did not Raba in fact rule: A minor on attaining the age of majority need not be examined38 since there is presumption that she has grown the signs of puberty? - This39 applies only to general cases, but not here where an examination was held and no hairs were found. If so,40 why should she not be allowed to make a declaration of mi'un? The possibility is taken into consideration that they might have fallen off. This would be a satisfactory explanation according to him who holds that such a possibility is taken into consideration, but what explanation can be offered according to him who holds that such a possibility need not be taken into consideration? Was it not stated: R. Kahana41 ruled, There is no need to consider the possibility that they may have fallen off and R. Papi ruled, The possibility must be considered? - This42 applies only to the matter of halizah,43 but as regards mi'un the possibility is taken into consideration.44 Thus it follows that according to him who holds that the possibility45 is taken into consideration she may submit to halizah; but [it may be objected:] Did he not merely say that the possibility46 is taken into consideration?47 The fact is that this48 is a case where she was not examined,49 but the possibility50 is taken into consideration as regards halizah,51 and when Raba stated 'There is presumption' he meant it in regard to mi'un,52 but in regard to halizah53 an examination54 is a pre-requisite. R. Dimi of Nehardea stated: The law is that the possibility that the hairs may have fallen off is taken into consideration.55 This,56 however, applies only where one had betrothed her57 during the intervening period and cohabited after that period, since a Pentateuchal doubt is thereby involved,58 but not to the original betrothal alone.59

R. Huna ruled: If [a child]60 dedicated some food and then ate it, he61 is subject to flogging, for it is said in Scripture, When... man . . . shall clearly utter a vow,62 and He shall not break his word,63 which64 implies that whosoever is able to 'utter clearly'65 is subject to the prohibition of 'he shall not break his word'66 and only he who is not able to 'utter clearly' is not subject to the injunction of 'he shall not break his word'. R. Huna b. Judah addressed an objection to67 Raba68 in support of R. Huna:

____________________
(1) Cf. prev. n.
(2) Age and external marks of puberty.
(3) Lit., 'when the thing was completed'.
(4) When the prescribed age limit had not yet been reached.
(5) An objection against R. Johanan, and R. Joshua b. Levi.
(6) Num. VI, 2.
(7) How then could his vow be valid?
(8) Since the law is applicable only to one who is above the age of thirteen years and a day.
(9) An objection against R. Johanan. and R. Joshua b. Levi.
(10) To which age the intervening period belongs.
(11) Lit., 'as Tannas'.
(12) From which hair grows; and they are, therefore, no evidence of puberty.
(13) In the latter case, from nine years to twelve years and a day.
(14) Kid. 16b.
(15) To which age the intervening period belongs.
(16) The first Tanna.
(17) Which proves R. Nahman's contention.
(18) According to which the growth of the hairs at the age of thirteen years is sufficient evidence.
(19) Who stated supra that in the case of a girl the age of thirteen years is regarded as over the prescribed age.
(20) From which it is inferred that the growth of hairs at the age of thirteen is attributed to a mole.
(21) Who, as stated supra, regards a girl at the age of thirteen years as being under the age prescribed.
(22) Still maintaining that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age.
(23) V. supra 45b.
(24) Still maintaining that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age.
(25) The last clause.
(26) The first clause.
(27) The two hairs.
(28) When he attained his majority. If by that time they have fallen off it is obvious that their growth was merely due to a mole.
(29) From which also it may be inferred that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age.
(30) V. Glos.
(31) And there is no need to consider the possibility that she may have grown two hairs. If any hairs had grown they must be attributed to a mole. It thus follows that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age.
(32) Since at this age the possibility must be considered that she may have grown two hairs.
(33) If her husband died childless.
(34) Because her majority is not yet established.
(35) If she has grown two hairs.
(36) Raba.
(37) Whether a girl at such an age had, or had not grown pubic hairs; and consequently he forbade mi'un in case she was already of age, and forbade halizah in case she was still a minor.
(38) For the presence of hairs.
(39) Raba's ruling just cited.
(40) That an examination has established the absence of hairs.
(41) So MS.M. and marg. gl. Cur. edd. 'Papa'.
(42) That where no hairs were found there is no need to consider the possibility that they may have fallen off.
(43) Since by forbidding it the law is thereby restricted.
(44) And mi'un is, therefore, forbidden and (cf. prev. n. mut. mut.) only a proper divorce can dissolve the marriage.
(45) That the hairs may have fallen off.
(46) Emphasis on this word.
(47) Of course he said. How then can he allow halizah when the question of majority is still a matter of doubt?
(48) Raba's ruling just cited.
(49) And as she has attained the age of majority, when she might be presumed to have grown pubic hairs, she must be forbidden mi'un and subjected to the restrictions of divorce.
(50) That she never grew pubic hairs.
(51) And he cannot submit to halizah in order to be exempt from divorce. Since the law must always be restricted.
(52) Cf. prev. n. but two.
(53) Sc. to allow her to submit to halizah and be exempt from divorce (cf. prev. n. but one).
(54) To establish the presence of hair.
(55) Once she has attained the age of majority, though on examination no hairs are found, she may no longer exercise the right of mi'un.
(56) Cf. prev. n.
(57) With the approval of her mother or brothers.
(58) Cohabitation, which is a Pentateuchal form of 'acquisition' in marriage, having taken place at an age when she may well be presumed to have attained her majority.
(59) That was not followed by cohabitation after the age of majority had been attained. As the betrothal of a minor (if it was not effected through her father) has only Rabbinical sanction, the Rabbis did not insist on the restrictions of a divorce where her majority was in doubt. Where, however, hairs have grown, though betrothal took place during her minority, the Rabbis forbade mi'un and insisted on the restrictions of a divorce as a preventive measure against the possibility of allowing mi'un to one with whom cohabitation took place after majority had been attained.
(60) Who understands the significance of dedications and vows.
(61) Though exempt from penalties in other cases.
(62) Num. VI, 2, from which it is deduced that a minor approaching manhood (or womanhood), viz., a boy in his thirteenth year (or a girl in her twelfth), provided he (or she) understands the significance of vows and dedications, is regarded as a man (or woman).
(63) Num. XXX, 3.
(64) By analogy.
(65) Sc. understands the significance of vows.
(66) A negative precept punishable by flogging.
(67) Not 'against'.
(68) MS.M. and Maharsha delete the last two words the Heb. for which in cur. edd. is enclosed in parenthesis. [The objection is against those who hold infra that others who ate it are subject to flagellation but not the child. V. Maharsha].

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 46b

Since we find that Scripture has put a minor on a par with an adult1 as regards a presumptuous oath, a self-imposed prohibition2 and [the injunction] not to break his word, it might have been presumed that he should also incur the liability of a sacrifice for eating that which he had dedicated, hence it was explicitly stated,3 This is the thing.4 At any rate, was it not here stated that guilt was incurred for infringing a self imposed prohibition or [the injunction] not to break one's word?5 Read: The prohibition6 not to break his word.7 [You say,] 'The prohibition not to break his word'! Whatever your assumption may be [a difficulty arises]. If an intelligent minor8 approaching manhood is Pentateuchally forbidden to break his word, he should also incur the penalty of flogging;9 and if an intelligent minor approaching manhood is not Pentateuchally forbidden to do it, there should not be10 even a mere prohibition?11 - The prohibition12 applies to those who are responsible for him.13 May it then be inferred from this ruling14 that if a minor eats nebelah15 it is the duty of Beth din to take it away from him?16 Here we may be dealing with a case, for instance, where the minor dedicated the food and others17 ate it.18 This explanation is quite satisfactory according to him who laid down that if a minor dedicated some food and others17 ate it the latter are to be flogged, but what can be said in explanation according to him who ruled that they were not to be flogged; for it was stated: If a minor dedicated some food and others ate it, R. Kahana ruled, They are not to be flogged, while both R. Johanan and Resh Lakish ruled, They are to be flogged? - The prohibition19 is20 merely Rabbinical21 and the Scriptural text22 serves as a mere prop.

[Reverting to] the above text, 'If a minor dedicated some food and others ate it, R. Kahana ruled, They are not to be flogged, while both R. Johanan and Resh Lakish ruled, They are to be flogged'. On what principle do they differ? - The Masters23 are of the opinion that an intelligent minor approaching manhood is under a Pentateuchal obligation24 while the Master25 is of the opinion that an intelligent minor approaching manhood is only under a Rabbinical obligation.24 R. Jeremiah raised an objection: If a fatherless girl26 made a vow, her husband may disallow it for her. Now if you grant that an intelligent minor approaching manhood is only under a Rabbinical obligation24 one can well justify the ruling,27 since the force of a Rabbinical marriage28 may well annul a Rabbinical vow, but if you maintain that the obligation24 is Pentateuchal, could [it may be objected] the force of a Rabbinical marriage29 annul a Pentateuchal vow? - R. Judah citing Samuel replied: Her husband may disallow her vow for her whatever your assumption might be. If the minor's obligation24 is Rabbinical, the whole matter is a Rabbinical affair; and if the obligation is Pentateuchal, it is a case of a minor who eats nebelah30 where it is not the duty of the Beth din to take it away from him. But would she not be eating, in reliance upon the first disallowance,31 even when she attains her majority?32 - Rabbah b. Liwai replied: Her husband disallows her vow for her every now and then.33 This,34 however, applies only to one who cohabited with her.35 But, surely, no husband may disallow vows made prior to marriage?36 - This37 is in agreement with R. Phinehas who cited Raba,38 for R. Phinehas citing Raba stated: Any woman who vows acts in reliance on the opinion of her husband.39

Said Abaye, Come and hear: If a minor has not yet grown two hairs, R. Judah ruled, his terumah is not40 valid; while R. Jose ruled, Before reaching the age when his vows are valid41 his terumah is not valid, but after reaching the age when his vows are valid42 his terumah is valid.43 Assuming44 that R. Jose is of the opinion that terumah at the present time is a Pentateuchal institution, his ruling would be well justified if you grant that an intelligent minor approaching manhood is under a Pentateuchal obligation,45 since a man under a Pentateuchal obligation may well render fit46 Pentateuchal tebel,47 but if you maintain that he is only under a Rabbinical obligation,48 could a man under a Rabbinical obligation render fit Pentateuchal tebel?49 - No, R. Jose is of the opinion that terumah at the present time is only a Rabbinical institution. But does R. Jose hold that terumah at the present time is only Rabbinical? Was it not in fact taught in Seder Olam:50 'Which thy fathers possessed and thou shalt possess it,51 they had a first,52 and a second53 possession54 but they had no need for a third one';55 and R. Johanan stated, 'Who is the author of Seder Olam? R. Jose?'56 - R. Jose may well be its compiler57 but he himself does not uphold this view.58 This59 may also be supported by a process of reasoning. For it was taught: A dough60 that had become subject to the restrictions of terumah61 or became sour through a leaven of terumah,

____________________
(1) Cf. supra n. 9.
(2) V. Num. XXX, 3.
(3) In the same context as the oath and a self-imposed prohibition.
(4) Num. XXX, 2, emphasis on 'this', sc. but no other.
(5) Evidently it was; but since such a negative precept is punishable by flogging, R. Huna's ruling evidently finds support in the citation.
(6) Issur instead of issar ('bond', self-imposed prohibition).
(7) Without incurring a flogging.
(8) Sc. one understanding the significance of vows and dedications.
(9) As in the case of all Pentateuchal prohibitions.
(10) Since the Rabbis do not subject minors to preventive measures.
(11) Issur (cf. prev. n. but three).
(12) Spoken of supra, which is in fact only Rabbinical.
(13) Not to the minor himself (cf. prev. n. but two).
(14) According to which those responsible for a minor must prevent him from encroaching even on that which is only Rabbinically forbidden.
(15) Symbolic of any religious transgression.
(16) But if so why (cf. Yeb. 114a) was there a divergence of view on this question?
(17) Adults.
(18) The original reading, 'prohibition and [the injunction] not to break', may, therefore, be retained and yet no support would be forthcoming for R. Huna since the penalty of flogging does not apply to the minor but to the adults who ate that which he has dedicated.
(19) Sc. 'the prohibition not to break his vow'.
(20) According to R. Kahana.
(21) As was first suggested supra.
(22) From which deduction was made supra 46a ad fin.
(23) R. Johanan and Resh Lakish.
(24) To observe the laws of vows and dedications.
(25) R. Kahana.
(26) A minor whose marriage was contracted by her mother or brothers.
(27) The husband's right by virtue of his marriage with the minor (cf. prev. n.) to disallow her vows.
(28) The marriage of a minor contracted in the absence of her father has only Rabbinical sanction.
(29) Cf. prev. n.
(30) Cf. supra p. 322, n. 14.
(31) Which has only Rabbinical validity.
(32) When she is subject to Pentateuchal prohibitions.
(33) Even after she has attained her majority.
(34) That the disallowance has Pentateuchal force.
(35) After she had attained majority. Cohabitation at that age having the Pentateuchal force of 'acquisition' the marriage which thus has Pentateuchal sanction may well enable the husband to disallow a vow that has Pentateuchal sanction.
(36) How then can he disallow here a vow that was made by a minor before her subsequent Pentateuchally valid marriage?
(37) The ruling that the husband may disallow the minor's vow though when she comes of age her vow would assume Pentateuchal validity.
(38) Sc. there is no need to explain, as presumably suggested, that the husband 'disallows the vow every now and then', for even though he only disallowed it during her minority, there is no need to disallow it again when she attains her majority.
(39) As the minor was at least Rabbinically married when her vow was made, its validity is entirely dependent on her husband's pleasure. Only where a woman was not married at all at the time her vow was made is her subsequently married husband precluded from disallowing it.
(40) In the separate edd. of the Mishnah this word is missing.
(41) V. foll. n.
(42) Sc. an intelligent minor approaching manhood whose vows are to be examined.
(43) Ter. I, 3.
(44) Lit., 'they (the Rabbis of the college) thought'.
(45) In regard to his vows and dedications and consequently also in regard to his terumah.
(46) By separating terumah from it.
(47) Sc. produce the separation of terumah from which is Pentateuchally ordained, v. Glos.
(48) As R. Kahana maintains.
(49) An objection against R. Kahana.
(50) 'Order of the World', a chronological compilation by R. Jose b. Halafta in the first half of the second century.
(51) Deut. XXX, 5, repetition of the verb 'to possess'.
(52) After the conquest of Joshua'.
(53) In the days of Ezra.
(54) Sc. the sanctity of the Land of Israel having ceased with the destruction of the first Temple and the Babylonian exile, a second 'possession' (sc. sanctification) was necessary.
(55) Since the second sanctification (as the Scriptural text implies) remained for all time. As the land remained sacred the Pentateuchal obligation of terumah also obviously remained in force.
(56) How then (cf. prev. n.) could it be maintained here that R. Jose holds the institution of terumah at the present time to be merely Rabbinical?
(57) Lit., 'taught it'.
(58) That the second sanctification remained for all time. He may well be of the opinion that it ceased with the destruction of the second Temple and the Roman exile and that terumah at the present time is merely a Rabbinical institution.
(59) Cf. prev. n.
(60) Ordinary and unconsecrated.
(61) Where for instance, some terumah fell into a dough that was less than a hundred times the quantity of the former. Rabbinically, terumah cannot be neutralized unless it was mixed up with unconsecrated commodities that exceeded its quantity a hundredfold.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 47a

is subject to the obligation of the dough-offering1 and2 does not become unfit through contact with a tebul yom;3 so R. Meir and R. Judah, but R. Jose and R. Simeon exempt it from the obligation of the dough-offering. Assuming4 that he who holds that the institution of terumah5 is Pentateuchal also holds that of the dough-offering5 to be Pentateuchal and that he who holds that terumah5 is Rabbinical also holds the dough-offering5 to be Rabbinical, the ruling would be well justified if you grant that R. Jose6 is of the opinion that the dough offering at the present time is only Rabbinical, since the Rabbinic law which subjects the dough to the restrictions of terumah may well override the Rabbinical law of the dough-offering, but if you maintain that the institution of the dough-offering7 is Pentateuchal,8 could the Rabbinic law which subjects the dough to the restrictions of terumah override the institution of the dough offering which is Pentateuchal?9 - But is it not possible that R. Jose holds that terumah at the present time is a Pentateuchal institution while the dough offering is only a Rabbinical one, as in fact R. Huna son of R. Joshua stated in a reply?10 For R. Huna son of R. Joshua stated, I found the Rabbis of the college sitting at their studies and saying, 'Even according to him who holds that terumah at the present time is a Rabbinical institution, the dough offering is a Pentateuchal one, for during the seven years in which they11 conquered Canaan and during the seven years in which they divided it12 they were under the obligation of the dough offering though they were under no obligation to give tithe'; and I told them, 'Even according to him who holds that terumah at the present time is Pentateuchal, the dough offering is only Rabbinical, for it was taught: If Scripture had written, "when you come"13 it might have been presumed [that the obligation of the dough-offering should come into force] as soon as two or three spies had entered, hence it is said, In your coming,14 I have spoken15 only of the coming of all of you and not of the coming of a portion of you; but when Ezra brought them up not all of them went up with him.'16

MISHNAH. THE SAGES SPOKE OF [THE PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT OF] A WOMAN IN FIGURATIVE SPEECH: AN UNRIPE FIG, A FIG IN ITS EARLY RIPENING STAGE AND A RIPE FIG. SHE IS LIKE AN UNRIPE FIG' WHILE SHE IS YET A CHILD; A FIG IN ITS EARLY RIPENING STAGE' WHEN SHE IS IN THE AGE OF17 HER MAIDENHOOD. DURING BOTH THE LATTER AND THE FORMER AGES,18 THEY19 RULED, HER FATHER IS ENTITLED TO ANYTHING SHE FINDS AND TO HER HANDIWORK AND TO THE RIGHT OF INVALIDATING HER VOWS. 'A RIPE FIG' - AS SOON AS SHE BECOMES A BOGERETH, AND HER FATHER HAS NO LONGER ANY RIGHT OVER HER.

WHAT ARE THE MARKS [OF A BOGERETH]? R. JOSE THE GALILEAN SAYS: THE APPEARANCE OF20 THE WRINKLE BENEATH THE BREAST. R. AKIBA SAYS: THE HANGING DOWN OF21 THE BREASTS. BEN AZZAI SAYS: THE DARKENING OF THE RING AROUND THE NIPPLE. R. JOSE SAYS: [THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BREAST TO A STAGE] WHEN ONE'S HAND BEING PUT ON THE NIPPLE IT SINKS AND ONLY SLOWLY RISES AGAIN.

GEMARA. SHE IS LIKE 'AN UNRIPE FIG'22 WHILE SHE IS YET A CHILD, as it is written in Scripture, The fig-tree putteth forth her green figs.23

'A FIG IN ITS EARLY RIPENING STAGE',24 WHEN SHE IS IN THE AGE OF HER MAIDENHOOD, as we have learnt: Figs [become subject to tithe] as soon as they reach an early stage of ripening25 and Rabbah b. Bar Hana explained this to mean: As soon as their tips grow white. And if you prefer I might say that the meaning26 is derived from the following: For my soul became impatient of them, and their soul also loathed27 me.28

A RIPE FIG',29 as one would say, 'It has come forth complete.'30

WHAT ARE THE MARKS [OF A BOGERETH]? R. JOSE THE GALILEAN SAYS: THE APPEARANCE OF THE WRINKLE. Samuel explained: Not the actual appearance of the wrinkle, but it suffices if, when putting her hands behind her, the wrinkle beneath the breast seems to appear. Samuel31 examined his slave and paid her four zuz compensation for the indignity. Samuel thereby followed his principle, for Samuel stated: Of them32 may ye make bondmen33 for ever,34 I have given them to you for work35 but not to be subjected to indignities. Samuel assigned his female slaves to individual husbands.36 R. Nahman interchanged them.37 R. Shesheth entrusted them to Arabs38 but told them 'Be careful to have no intercourse with an Israelite'.

R. JOSE SAYS etc. What is the meaning of ukaz?39 - Samuel replied: The nipple of the breast.

Our Rabbis taught: What are the marks of bagruth? R. Eleazar son of R. Zadok stated, When the breasts begin to shake.40 R. Johanan b. Beroka stated, When the top of the nose41 grows white. But is not a woman when this grows white already old? - Rather said R. Ashi, when the top of the nose splits.42 R. Jose stated, When a ring is formed around the nipple. R. Simeon stated, When the mons veneris grows lower.

____________________
(1) Though terumah proper is exempt.
(2) Cf. prev. n. mut. mut.
(3) V. Glos.
(4) Lit., 'they thought' (cf. supra p. 324, n. 12).
(5) At the present time.
(6) Who exempts the dough under discussion from the dough-offering.
(7) At the present time.
(8) And that, consequently, terumah at the present time is also Pentateuchal.
(9) Of course not. A Rabbinical enactment could not override a Pentateuchal law. Consequently it must be admitted (as stated supra 46b ad fin.) that R. Jose holds terumah at the present time to be merely a Rabbinical institution.
(10) Of course it is possible. Hence the Baraitha cited provides no proof for the contention supra that the view that R. Jose holds terumah at the present time to be Rabbinical 'may be supported by a process of reasoning'.
(11) The Israelites in the days of Joshua.
(12) Years that may well be compared to the 'present time'.
(13) Ki thabo'u, so MS.M. Cur. edd., bebo'akem.
(14) Num. XV, 18, in the context of the dough-offering; Heb. beboa'kem, emphasis on kem 'your'.
(15) Of the obligation of the dough-offering.
(16) Since that time, therefore, there could be no Pentateuchal obligation; and the dough offering of the present time must consequently be a mere Rabbinical institution.
(17) Lit., 'these are the days of'.
(18) Childhood and maidenhood.
(19) The Sages.
(20) Lit., 'when it rises'.
(21) Lit., 'when they incline'.
(22) Paggah (v. foll. n.).
(23) Cant. II, 13, paggeha, the noun absolute being paggah (with the pron. suff. of the third sing. fem. and the omission of the dagesh in the pe owing to a preceding he) which proves that the term is applied to the earliest stage of growth.
(24) Bohal (v. foll. n.).
(25) Misheyibahalu, of the same root as bohal.
(26) Of bohal.
(27) Bahalah, of the same rt. as bohal.
(28) Zech. XI, 8; loathing is an early stage in the 'rising' of the food.
(29) צמל Zemel.
(30) Phonetic etymology. יצתה מלאה, yazetha mele'ah containing the letters of צמל.
(31) In his investigations on the applicability of R. Jose's ruling.
(32) Canaanitish slaves.
(33) Ta'abodu, lit., 'you may cause them to work'.
(34) Lev. XXV, 46.
(35) Cf. Prev. n. but one.
(36) Lit., 'he appointed for them', sc. he did not allow promiscuous intercourse among his slaves. To each female slave was assigned one particular male slave.
(37) Unlike Samuel he did not mind promiscuity among his slaves.
(38) Their morality, he held, was not his concern.
(39) Rendered supra 'nipple'.
(40) In walking. Aliter: 'to become stiff' (v. Jast.).
(41) The central circle of the oblate part of the breast (Jast.),
(42) Aliter (Jast.). When the skin of the central circle of the oblate part of the breast appears wrinkled.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 47b

So also did R. Simeon1 state: The Sages have indicated in [the physical development of] a woman three marks below and corresponding ones above. If, namely, she is like an unripe fig above, it may be taken for granted2 that she has not yet grown two hairs. If she is above like a fig in its early ripening, it may be taken for granted2 that she has already grown two hairs. If she is like a ripe fig above it may be taken for granted that the mons veneris has grown lower. What is meant by mons veneris? - R. Huna replied: There is a rounded eminence above that place,3 and as the girl grows in age it steadily grows lower.

Rabbi was asked:4 In agreement with whose view is the halachah? He sent word in reply: In agreement with all so as to restrict5 the law.6 R. Papa and R. Hinena son of R. Ika differ. One taught it7 in connection with this,8 while the other taught it in connection with the law of the Tyrian courtyard. For we have learnt: Which courtyard9 imposes the obligations of tithe?10 R. Simeon11 ruled: A Tyrian courtyard in which objects are safely kept.12 (Why is this described as a Tyrian courtyard? - Rabbah b. Bar Hana citing R. Johanan replied: Since in Tyre they put a watchman at the door of a courtyard.) R. Akiba ruled: Any courtyard which one may open and another close13 is exempt from tithe.14 R. Nehemiah ruled: Any courtyard in which no one is ashamed to eat is subject to tithe.15 R. Jose ruled: Any courtyard into which people may enter and none is asked, 'What do you want?' is exempt.14 R. Judah ruled: If there were two courtyards, one within the other, the inner one is subject to tithe15 while the outer one is exempt.14 Rabbi was asked: In agreement with whose view is the halachah? He replied: The halachah is in agreement with all of them so as to restrict the law.16

MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN AT THE AGE OF TWENTY DID NOT PRODUCE TWO HAIRS,17 SHE MUST BRING EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS TWENTY YEARS OF AGE AND SHE BECOMES CONFIRMED AS A WOMAN WHO IS INCAPABLE OF PROCREATION AND NEITHER PERFORMS HALIZAH NOR IS TAKEN IN LEVIRATE MARRIAGE. IF A MAN OF THE AGE OF TWENTY YEARS DID NOT PRODUCE TWO HAIRS,17 THEY18 MUST BRING EVIDENCE THAT HE IS TWENTY YEARS OLD AND HE BECOMES CONFIRMED19 AS A SARIS20 AND NEITHER SUBMITS TO HALIZAH NOR PERFORMS THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE; SO BETH HILLEL. BETH SHAMMAI RULED: WITH THE ONE AS WELL AS WITH THE OTHER [THIS TAKES PLACE AT] THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN. R. ELIEZER RULED IN THE CASE OF THE MALE, IN AGREEMENT WITH BETH HILLEL, WHILE IN THAT OF THE FEMALE, IN AGREEMENT WITH BETH SHAMMAI, SINCE A WOMAN MATURES EARLIER THAN A MAN.

GEMARA. But I would point out an incongruity: The same law applies whether one is21 of the age of nine years and one day or whether one is of the age of twenty years but had not produced two hairs!22 - R. Samuel son of R. Isaac citing Rab replied: This law23 applies only where other symptoms of a saris24 also appeared on him. Raba observed: This25 may also be arrived at by a deduction. For it was stated, AND HE BECOMES CONFIRMED AS A SARIS.26 This is conclusive.

Where, however, no other symptoms of a saris had developed, how long [is one27 regarded as a minor]? - R. Hiyya taught: Until he has passed middle age.28 Wherever people come with such a case29 before R. Hiyya,30 he used to tell them, if the youth was emaciated, 'Let him first be fattened'; and if he was stout, he used to tell them, 'Let him first be made to lose weight';31 for these symptoms32 appear33 sometimes as a result of emaciation and sometimes they appear as a result of stoutness.

Rab stated: It is the law throughout this chapter that age is calculated from one point of time to another point of time;34 but 'Ulla stated: This is the case only where we have explicitly learnt it.35 According to 'Ulla all is well since there is a satisfactory reason why in one case it was stated36 'one day' while in the other this was not stated; but according to Rab, why was not this37 stated in all cases?38 Furthermore, it was taught: R. Jose b. Kipper stated in the name of R. Eliezer, If thirty days of the twentieth year have passed it is exactly the same as if the entire year had passed;39 and so also Rabbi at Lydda ruled, If thirty days of the eighteenth year have passed it is exactly the same as if the entire year had passed.40 Now one may well agree that there is no difficulty [as regards the contradiction between the ruling] of Rabbi and that of R. Jose b. Kipper, since the former41 is in agreement with Beth Shammai42 while the latter43 is in agreement with Beth Hillel;42 but does not this44 present a difficulty against Rab?45 - This46 is a question in dispute between Tannas.47 For it was taught: The year that is mentioned in connection with consecrated things;48 the year that is mentioned in connection with houses in walled cities;49 the two years50 in connection with a field of one's possession;51 the six years in connection with a Hebrew servant,52 and so also the years in the age of a son and a daughter53 are all to be calculated from one point of time to another point of time.54 Whence do we deduce the duration of the year that was mentioned in connection with consecrated things? R. Aha b. Jacob replied: Scripture said, A lamb of its55 year,56 which implies, Its own year and not a calendar year.57 Whence do we deduce the duration of the year that was mentioned in connection with the houses in walled cities? - Scripture said, Until the end of his year of sale58 which implies, Only his year of sale but not a calendar year.57 Whence do we deduce the duration of the two years in connection with a field of one's possession? - Scripture said, According unto the number of

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(1) Cur. edd. in parenthesis add 'b. Yohai'.
(2) Lit., 'it is known'.
(3) Euphemism.
(4) With reference to the various views given supra on the marks of bogruth.
(5) Sc. whichever of the marks appears the girl is regarded as a bogereth and her father has no longer the right to annul her vows. Aliter: Even if only the earliest of the marks has appeared she enters a doubtful state of bogruth and if her father received on her behalf a token of betrothal from one man and she received a similar token from another she must be properly divorced from both. She must be divorced from the latter in case she is already a bogereth when her father's act cannot annul hers; and she must be divorced from the former in case she is not a bogereth before all the tokens have appeared.
(6) MS.M., Alfasi and Asheri add, 'R. Johanan and Sabya say: the halachah is in agreement with all of them so as to restrict the law'.
(7) Rabbi's reply.
(8) The marks of a bogereth.
(9) So MS.M. and sep. edd. of the Mishnah. Cur. edd. read, 'Tyrian courtyard'.
(10) On produce that was brought into it (cf. Bezah 34b).
(11) Var. lec. Ishmael (v. separate edd. of the Mishnah).
(12) Ma'as. III, 5. Such may be treated for the purpose of tithes as a house and consequently it imposes the obligations of tithe on any produce that is brought into it.
(13) Sc. there is no one man responsible for both the opening and the closing.
(14) Sc. produce brought into it does not become subject to tithe, since such a courtyard cannot be regarded as a suitable place for the safe keeping of objects.
(15) V. p. 329, n. 11.
(16) I.e., if it is in any one of the conditions mentioned it subjects to tithe any produce brought into it.
(17) The marks of puberty.
(18) The relatives of the widow who desire her to be exempt from the duties of halizah and the levirate marriage.
(19) By a display of the prescribed symptoms.
(20) A eunuch.
(21) Lit., 'it is one (and the same) to me'.
(22) Yeb. 96b. So long as the pubic hairs have not appeared a person retains the status of a minor. How then is this to be reconciled with our Mishnah which assigns a new legal status at the age of eighteen or twenty?
(23) Of our Mishnah (cf. prev. n.).
(24) Described in Yeb. 80b.
(25) That before one is regarded a saris other symptoms, besides the absence of pubic hairs, must also have made their appearance.
(26) Which implies that other independent symptoms of a saris had already developed earlier.
(27) If two pubic hairs did not appear.
(28) Lit., 'most of his years'.
(29) Of one who attained the age of twenty without having grown two hairs.
(30) Var. lec. 'Raba' (cf. Yeb. 97a).
(31) Lit., 'cause him to be lean'.
(32) Described in Yeb. 80b.
(33) The reading in Yeb. 97a is 'disappear'.
(34) The age of twenty, for instance, is deemed to have been attained at the completion of full twenty years of life and not merely at the beginning of the twentieth calendar year.
(35) Lit., 'where we learnt we learnt' etc., sc. only where the years and the first day of the year following were specifically mentioned as, for instance, 'three years and one day' (supra 44b), 'eleven years and one day' (supra 45b). Where, however, (as in our Mishnah) the years only are given one day of the twentieth calendar year is regarded as the whole of that year and the person is deemed to be twenty years of age from that day.
(36) Lit., 'that is it that it was stated here'.
(37) 'And one day'.
(38) Lit., 'let him teach'.
(39) Lit., 'behold it is like the twentieth year in all its matters'.
(40) Cf. prev. n.
(41) Eighteen years.
(42) V. our Mishnah.
(43) Twenty years.
(44) The view accepted by both authorities cited that the part of a year is regarded as the whole of it.
(45) Who stated supra that the years must be complete.
(46) Whether the part of a year is regarded as the entire one.
(47) One of whom, as will be shown presently, holds the same view as Rab.
(48) Sc. that certain beasts for sacrifices must be one year old.
(49) Cf., If a man sell a dwelling house in a walled city, he may redeem it within a whole year (Lev. XXV, 29).
(50) This is deduced infra.
(51) Cf. Lev. XXV, 14ff.
(52) Cf., If thou buy a Hebrew servant, six years shall he serve (Ex. XXI, 2).
(53) Which (so it is now presumed) were discussed in our Mishnah.
(54) Cf. p. 331, n. 14 supra.
(55) E.V., 'the first'.
(56) Lev. XII, 6.
(57) Lit., 'the year of the number of the world'.
(58) Lev. XXV, 29, E.V., Within a whole year after it is sold.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 48a

years of the crops he shall sell unto thee,1 which implies2 that one may sometimes sell three crops in two years.3 Whence do we deduce the duration of the six years in connection with a Hebrew servant? - Scripture said, Six years he shall serve, and in the seventh,4 which implies that in the seventh [calendar] year also he shall serve.5 In regard to what law was mention made of 'the years in the age of a son and a daughter'?6 - R. Giddal citing Rab replied: In regard to valuations.7 R. Joseph, however, replied: In regard to the ages8 given in our chapter of 'For a foetus born from its mother's side'.9 Said Abaye to him,10 'Are you in disagreement?'11 - 'No', the other replied, 'he made one statement and I made another statement but there is no essential difference between us'. This is also logically right; for if it could be imagined that there is a radical difference between them and that the one12 who replied, 'In regard to valuations' does not accept the reply, 'In regard to our present chapter'13 [the difficulty would arise:] Did not Rab in fact state, 'It is the law throughout this chapter that age is calculated from one point of time to another point of time'?14 But, then, why did not the one15 who replied, 'In regard to valuations' also add, In regard to our chapter?16 - [The reference17 must be to cases] similar to those previously enumerated: As those18 were recorded in the Scriptures so must these17 be such as were recorded in the Scriptures.19 And the other?20 - [If that were so] it should have been said,17 instead of 'the age of a son and a daughter', the age of a male and a female.21

R. Isaac b. Nahmani citing R. Eleazar22 stated: The halachah is in agreement with the ruling which R. Jose b. Kipper cited in the name of R. Eliezer.23 R. Zera observed: May I be worthy to go up24 and to learn the tradition25 from the Master's mouth. When he went up24 he met R. Eleazar and asked him, 'Did you say: The halachah is in agreement with R. Jose b. Kipper?' - 'What I said was', the other replied, 'that it seemed to be reasonable. For since, throughout the chapter, "one day" was explicitly added26 while in this case27 it was not mentioned it may well be inferred that it seems reasonable [that the halachah is] in agreement with him'.

CHAPTER 6

MISHNAH. IF THE LOWER MARK28 APPEARED BEFORE THE UPPER ONE29 HAD YET MADE ITS APPEARANCE, SHE MAY PERFORM HALIZAH OR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE.30 IF THE UPPER MARK29 APPEARED BEFORE THE LOWER ONE28 HAD MADE ITS APPEARANCE, THOUGH THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE,31 R. MEIR RULED, SHE MAY NEITHER PERFORM HALIZAH NOR CONTRACT THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE; BUT THE SAGES RULED, SHE MAY EITHER PERFORM HALIZAH OR CONTRACT THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE, BECAUSE THEY MAINTAIN: IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE LOWER MARK TO APPEAR BEFORE THE UPPER ONE HAD YET MADE ITS APPEARANCE, BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE UPPER MARK TO APPEAR BEFORE THE LOWER ONE HAD MADE ITS APPEARANCE.32

GEMARA. 'THOUGH THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE'! But has it not in fact APPEARED?33 - 'APPEARED', according to R. Meir;34 'THOUGH THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE' according to the Rabbis.35 Why then was it not stated: 'If the upper mark appeared, R. Meir ruled, She may neither perform halizah nor contract levirate marriage but the Sages ruled, She may either perform halizah or contract levirate marriage'. and I would well have known that their reason is that it is impossible?36 - If 'THOUGH THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE had not been stated, It might have been presumed that in most women the lower mark appears first and in that of a minority the upper mark appears first, and that R. Meir37 is guided by his principle according to which he takes even a minority into consideration,38 while the Rabbis39 are guided by their principle according to which they do not take a minority into consideration;40 and that this41 applies only to a general case, but where an examination was held and no [lower mark] was found the Rabbis, it might have been assumed, agree with R. Meir37 since the upper mark has appeared first, hence we were informed that this IS IMPOSSIBLE and that the lower mark42 had undoubtedly appeared earlier but merely fell off. According to R. Meir43 one may well justify the Scriptural text, Thy breasts44 were fashioned, and thy hair45 was grown,46 but according to the Rabbis,47 should not the order have been reversed?48 - It is this that was meant: As soon as the 'breasts are fashioned' it is known that 'thy hair was grown'. According to R. Meir49 one can well see the justification for the order of the Scriptural text, When they from Egypt bruised thy breasts44 for the bosom45 of thy youth.50 but according to the Rabbis,47 should not the order have been reversed?48 - It is this that was meant: As soon as 'thy breasts' appeared it is known that thy youth45 had appeared. And if you prefer I might reply: As to the meaning of51 shede,52 all the clause was written with regard to the breasts; and it is this that the Holy One, blessed be He, said in effect to Israel:

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(1) Lev. XXV, 15.
(2) Since the minimum of 'years' (plural) is two, and the plural 'crops' denotes all the crops which can be produced in two years.
(3) And this is only possible in two complete years, or a full period of twenty-four months, where the sale took place before the produce of the first calendar year had been harvested. In two calendar years there can be no more than two crops.
(4) Ex. XXI, 2.
(5) But this is possible only if one serves six full years from the date of purchase which took place in the middle of a calendar year. The end of the sixth full year would in such a case coincide with the middle of the seventh calendar year.
(6) Supra 47b ad fin.
(7) Which differ with the ages of the persons valued (cf. Lev. XXVII, 2ff). The ruling here serves the purpose of indicating that, even where the Scriptural text provides no clear guidance on the point, the years mentioned throughout the context are full periods each of twelve months duration.
(8) Even where 'and a day' does not follow the number of years.
(9) Sc. the present Chapter V which begins with these words.
(10) R. Joseph.
(11) With Rab.
(12) Rab.
(13) Lit., 'for a foetus born from its mother's side' (cf. p. 333, n. 11).
(14) Supra 47b. Of course he did. Consequently it must be admitted that Rab and R. Joseph are essentially of the same opinion.
(15) Rab.
(16) Lit., 'for a foetus born from its mothers' side' (cf. prev. n. but one).
(17) In the expression, 'the years in the age of a son and a daughter' (supra 47b).
(18) Consecrated things, houses in wall cities, etc.
(19) Hence his reply that the reference was to valuations (which are also recorded in the Scriptures) though he fully agrees that the same principle applies also to the years in the ages dealt with in the present chapter (which are not Scriptural but merely traditional).
(20) R. Joseph; why does he not add, 'In regard to valuation'?
(21) Which are the expressions of the Scriptures in the context of valuations (cf. Lev. XXVII, 3f.).
(22) R. Eleazar b. Pedath, the famous Palestinian Amora.
(23) Supra 27b.
(24) To Palestine (cf. prev. n. but one).
(25) Cited by R. Isaac b. Nahmani.
(26) Lit., 'learned', after the number of the years.
(27) A man of the age of twenty years (cf. our Mishnah).
(28) Two pubic hairs.
(29) 'A fig in its early ripening' (v. Mishnah supra 47a).
(30) Because she is deemed to have attained her majority.
(31) The apparent contradiction is described in the Gemara infra.
(32) Though it cannot be discovered the hairs may be presumed to have fallen off.
(33) Of course it had; since it was explicitly stated, IF THE UPPER MARK APPEARED BEFORE THE LOWER ONE.
(34) Who ruled that SHE MAY NEITHER PERFORM HALIZAH etc., thus regarding her as a minor because, obviously, the upper mark may appear though the lower one had not yet made its appearance.
(35) THE SAGES, who in either case (v. our Mishnah) regard her as of age.
(36) And this would avoid the insertion of the ambiguous clause, 'THOUGH THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE'.
(37) In regarding the girl as a minor.
(38) And since a minority have the upper before the lower mark, every girl producing the upper mark alone must be regarded as a minor in case she belonged to the minority.
(39) THE SAGES, who in either case (v. our Mishnah) regard her as of age.
(40) As soon, therefore, as the upper mark appeared it may be taken for granted that the lower one had appeared previously.
(41) The ruling of the Sages, which is dependent on the principle of following the majority.
(42) Cf. Bah, wanting in cur. edd.
(43) Who maintains that the upper mark sometimes appears first.
(44) The upper mark.
(45) The lower one.
(46) Ezek. XVI, 7, since the marks do sometimes appear in this order.
(47) Who hold that the upper mark can never appear first.
(48) Hair first and breasts afterwards.
(49) Who maintains that the upper mark sometimes appears first.
(50) Ezek. XXIII, 21.
(51) Lit., 'what'.
(52) The word rendered supra 'bosom'.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 48b

'Thy breasts were swollen, yet thou didst not repent; yea, thy breasts were dried up, yet thou didst not repent'.1 All2 at any rate agree that3 we rely on the lower mark; whence do we deduce this? - Rab Judah citing Rab replied and so it was taught at the school of R. Ishmael: Scripture said, When a man or a woman shall commit any sin that men commit,4 Scripture5 compared the 'woman' to the 'man' in respect of all the punishments in the Torah; as a man is subject to punishments on the appearance of the one mark6 so is also a woman subject to punishments on the appearance of the one mark. Might it not be suggested: Either the one or the other?7 - Like the man: As with the man [the determining factor] is the lower mark and not the upper one so also with the woman it is the lower one that determines majority but not the upper one. So8 it was also taught: R. Eliezer son of R. Zadok stated, Thus did they explain and promulgate at Jamnia: As soon as the lower mark makes its appearance no attention need any longer be paid to the upper one.

It was taught: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel stated, Among towns-women the lower mark appears earlier because they are in the habit of taking baths; among village women the upper mark appears earlier because they grind with millstones.9 R. Simeon b. Eleazar stated: Among the daughters of the rich the right hand side develops earlier because it rubs against their scarves;10 among the daughters of the poor the left side develops earlier because they carry11 jars of water on them. And if you prefer I might say, Because they carry their brothers on their sides.

Our Rabbis taught: The left side develops earlier than the right side. R. Hanina the son of the brother of R. Joshua stated: The left side never developed earlier than the right side except in the case of one woman who lived in our neighbourhood whose left side developed earlier than the right one which later regained its normal strength.

Our Rabbis taught: All girls to be examined must be examined by women. So also R. Eliezer entrusted the examination to his wife, and R. Ishmael entrusted it to his mother. R. Judah ruled: Before the period12 and after the period,13 women examine them.14 During the period15 no woman may examine them, since in doubtful cases16 no woman is allowed to marry17 on the evidence of women. R. Simeon ruled, Even during the period15 women examine them. And a woman may be relied upon when by her evidence the law is restricted but not when it is relaxed thereby. How so? [She may be relied upon when she states: 'The girl] is of age', so that the latter should thereby be denied the right of mi'un, or 'She is a minor', so that she should thereby be denied the right of performing halizah; but she is not trusted when asserting, 'She is a minor', so that she should have the right of exercising mi'un, or 'She is of age', so that she should be entitled to perform halizah.

The Master said, 'R. Judah ruled: Before the period and after the period women examine them'. One can well concede that before the period an examination is required, for should [the same hairs]18 be found after the period they would be regarded as a mole;19 but what need could there be for an examination after the period seeing that Raba has laid down that a minor who has attained the age of her majority need not be examined since there is presumption that she had by that time produced the marks of puberty? - When Raba stated, 'there is presumption', he meant it in respect of mi'un,20 but as regards halizah21 an examination is still required.22 'During the period no women may examine them', because he is of the opinion [that the presence of hairs] during the period [is a mark of majority] as after the period;23 but after the period, when Raba's presumption is applicable, we rely upon women who may, therefore, conduct the examination,22 while during the period, when Raba's presumption is not applicable, we cannot rely upon women, and women, therefore, may not conduct the examination. 'R. Simeon ruled, Even during the period women examine them', for he is of the opinion [that the presence of hairs] during the period [is no more a mark of puberty] than it is before the period; and an examination is, therefore, required so that if [the same hairs]24 should be found after the period they would be regarded as a mole.25 'And a woman may be relied upon when by her evidence the law is restricted but not when it is relaxed thereby.' Who taught this? - If you wish I might say: R. Judah, and [the reference is to evidence] during the period.26

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(1) Aliter (Jast.) and cf. Rashi's first interpretation: Thy breasts began to develop, yet thou didst not repent, thy breasts were fully developed, yet etc.
(2) Lit., 'that all the world'. R. Meir and the Sages.
(3) In determining whether a girl is of age.
(4) Num. V, 6.
(5) By placing the two nouns in juxtaposition.
(6) The lower one, which is the only mark he possesses.
(7) The analogy between 'man' and 'woman' extending only as far as a single mark is concerned, sc. that one mark (upper or lower) suffices to establish the majority of a woman as one mark (the lower) establishes the majority of a man.
(8) That the lower mark alone is the determining factor.
(9) The constant exercise of their arms distends their breasts.
(10) Which are worn on the right side.
(11) So with a certain reading. Cur. edd. 'draw'.
(12) Sc. before the age of eleven years and a day.
(13) After the age of twelve years and a day.
(14) But, whether they report the presence of hair or their absence, the girls in the former case (a time when hairs are regarded as a mere 'mole') are treated as minors. In the latter case (a time when pubic hairs and maturity may well be expected) the girls are deemed to be of age if the women report the presence of hairs; but even if they report their absence, the girls cannot be treated as minors (since the hairs may have fallen off) and they are consequently deprived of the right of mi'un (v. Glos.).
(15) From the age of eleven years and one day to that of twelve years and one day, when their status is a matter of doubt and is entirely dependent on the presence or absence of the hairs.
(16) Cf. prev. n. In the first two cases (cf. prev. n. but one) a doubt hardly exists.
(17) If the women were to report the presence of hairs the girls would have to be allowed to contract levirate marriage.
(18) And no others.
(19) And the girl would still be deemed a minor and denied the right of performing halizah.
(20) Sc. to impose the restriction of denying her the right of mi'un.
(21) I.e., to relax the law by allowing the performance of the rite.
(22) A woman's evidence being in such a case relied upon, since a girl at the age mentioned usually has all the mark of puberty.
(23) Cur. edd. in parenthesis insert 'like'.
(24) And no others.
(25) And the girl would still be deemed a minor and denied the right of performing halizah.
(26) His opinion being that hairs discovered during the period are evidence of puberty as are hairs discovered after the period. If the women report the presence of hairs as a result of which the girl is deprived of the right of mi'un they are relied upon since the law is thereby restricted. Their evidence, however, is not relied upon as regards entitling her to perform halizah since thereby the law would be relaxed.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 49a

And if you prefer I might say: R. Simeon, and [the reference is to evidence] after the period,1 for he does not uphold the principle of Raba's presumption.

BECAUSE THEY MAINTAIN: IT IS POSSIBLE etc. What need again was there for this statement, seeing that it was already taught in the earlier clause? And were you to reply: Because it was desired to lay down an anonymous statement2 in agreement with the Rabbis [it could be objected:] Is not this obvious, since in a dispute between an individual authority and a number of authorities the halachah is in agreement with the majority? - It might have been presumed that R. Meir's reason is more acceptable because Scriptural texts3 provide support for his view, hence we were informed4 [that the halachah is in agreement with the view of the Rabbis]. And if you prefer I might reply: Because it was desired to state,5 'Similarly'.6

MISHNAH. SIMILARLY7 ANY [HOLE IN] AN EARTHEN VESSEL THAT LETS IN A LIQUID8 WILL9 LET IT OUT,10 BUT THERE MAY BE ONE THAT WILL LET IT OUT AND WILL NOT LET IT IN.11 ANY LIMB12 THAT GROWS A NAIL HAS ALSO A BONE IN IT13 BUT THERE MAY BE ONE THAT HAS A BONE IN IT BUT GROWS NO NAIL.14 WHATEVER CONTRACTS MIDRAS-UNCLEANNESS15 ALSO CONTRACTS CORPSE-UNCLEANNESS16 BUT THERE ARE SUCH AS CONTRACT CORPSE UNCLEANNESS17 AND DO NOT CONTRACT MIDRAS-UNCLEANNESS.18

GEMARA. A vessel with a hole THAT LETS IN A LIQUID is unfit for the water of purification19 and is [even more so] unfit20 as a defective vessel;21 one with a hole THAT WILL LET IT OUT22 is fit for the water of purification23 but unfit as a defective vessel.24

R. Assi stated, It was learnt,25 The minimum size [of a hole to render] an earthen vessel [unfit for the consecration of the water of purification] is one that will let a liquid in;26 and one that will let a liquid out22 was mentioned only in respect of a defective vessel.24 What is the reason?27 - Mar Zutra son of R. Nahman replied: Because people do not say,28 'Bring a defective vessel for another defective vessel'.29

Our Rabbis taught: How is an earthen vessel to be tested in order to ascertain whether its perforation is big enough to admit a liquid or not? One brings a tub full of water and puts the pot30 into it. If it absorbs any of the liquid, it may be taken for granted that it lets liquids in; and if not, it may be taken for granted that it only lets liquids out.

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(1) And even then women's evidence is accepted only in so far as to impose restrictions (denial of the right of mi'un). It is not accepted, however, for the purpose of relaxing the law (allowing the performance of halizah).
(2) Which, as a rule, is the accepted law.
(3) From Ezekiel XVI and XXIII (supra 48a).
(4) By the anonymous statement, BECAUSE THEY MAINTAIN etc. (cf. prev. n. but one).
(5) In the next Mishnah.
(6) Introducing similar cases where one process follows or is the result of another though the reverse is impossible.
(7) Cf. prev. n.
(8) In which the vessel stands,
(9) If the liquid was within the vessel.
(10) A lesser hole in fact being required for the latter process than for the former.
(11) Cf. prev. n. mut. mut. The legal purpose of this statement is discussed in the Gemara infra.
(12) Sc. a redundant finger.
(13) And is, therefore, regarded as a proper limb which (cf. supra 43b) conveys uncleanness by overshadowing even though it is smaller than the minimum prescribed for the flesh of a corpse.
(14) In such a case, if the limb is a redundant one, the conveyance of uncleanness (cf. prev. n.) is subject to the prescribed minimum.
(15) Of a zab, to be a 'father of uncleanness (v. Glos.).
(16) Of the same grade (cf. prev. n.) since whatever object is suitable as midras for a zab has the status of a 'vessel' and is, therefore, subject to corpse-uncleanness also.
(17) Having the status of a vessel in respect of susceptibility to all forms of uncleanness including that of 'father of uncleanness' if it came in contact with a corpse.
(18) Sc. to become a 'father of uncleanness' through the midras of a zab. This is further discussed infra in the Gemara.
(19) Which (cf. Num. XIX, 17) must be consecrated in a sound vessel.
(20) To contract uncleanness.
(21) Defective vessels which are still suitable for certain uses are, under given conditions, susceptible to uncleanness (cf. Hul. 54b) but when they have a hole of the nature mentioned they lose even the status of a defective vessel and, like broken sherds, are immune from all forms of uncleanness.
(22) But will not let it in, sc. a smaller hole.
(23) Such a small hole being disregarded in the case of an otherwise sound vessel.
(24) Being already defective the smallest hole deprives it altogether of its status (cf prev. n. but two).
(25) Shonin Sc. as an oral tradition handed down to Moses from Sinai (Rashi).
(26) If the hole is smaller the vessel retains in all respects the status of a sound one (cf. Shab. 95b.).
(27) For the last ruling.
(28) When there is a leak in a defective vessel.
(29) That the former should receive the leakage from the latter. A defective vessel may be so used under an otherwise sound one, since the latter is not discarded on account of a very small hole. When such a hole, however, occurs in a defective vessel it is completely discarded and, therefore, loses its status (cf. supra n. 10).
(30) That is to be tested.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 49b

R. Judah1 said: One inverts the handles of the pot into the tub2 and allows water to float over it. If it then absorbs any, it may be taken for granted that it will let liquids in; but if not, it may be taken for granted that it only lets liquids out. Or else, it3 may be put upon a fire. If the fire stops the leakage it is certain that the pot will only let liquids out; but if not it is certain that it also lets liquids in. R. Jose said: One does not put it upon the actual4 fire since the fire stops it,5 but it is put upon embers. If the embers stop it, it is certain that it only lets liquids out, but if not, it is certain that it also lets liquids in. If it drips drop after drop6 it is certain that it lets liquids in. What is the practical difference between the first Tanna7 and R. Judah? - 'Ulla replied: The practical difference between them is a case of absorption under pressure.8

ANY LIMB THAT GROWS A NAIL etc. If it grows a nail9 it10 conveys uncleanness11 by means of touch, carriage and overshadowing. If it contains a bone but grows no nail it conveys uncleanness12 by means of touch and carriage but does not convey it by means of overshadowing.13

R. Hisda stated: The following was said by our great Master,14 may the Omnipresent be his help. A redundant finger that contains a bone but grows no nail conveys uncleanness12 by means of touch and carriage but does not convey it by means of overshadowing. Rabbah b. Bar Hana explained: This is the case only when it15 is not counted in [the row of the fingers of] the hand.16

WHATEVER CONTRACTS MIDRAS - UNCLEANNESS etc. Whatever object is fit for midras contracts corpse-uncleanness, but there are such as contract corpse-uncleanness and do not contract midras-uncleanness. What is this rule intended to include? - It is intended to include a se'ah measure and a tarkab;17 for it was taught: And he that sitteth on any thing;18 as it might have been presumed that if the zab inverted a se'ah measure and sat upon it or a tarkab measure and sat upon it, it shall be unclean,19 it was explicitly stated, Whereon he that hath the issue sat,18 implying20 that the text refers only to a thing that is appointed for sitting;21 but this one22 is excluded, since people would tell him, 'Get up that we may do our work with it'.23

MISHNAH. WHOSOEVER IS FIT TO TRY CAPITAL CASES IS ALSO FIT TO TRY MONETARY SUITS, BUT ONE MAY BE FIT TO TRY MONETARY SUITS AND YET BE UNFIT TO TRY CAPITAL CASES.

GEMARA. Rab Judah stated: This24 was meant to include a bastard.25 Have we not, however, learnt this once before: 'All are eligible to try monetary suits but not all eligible to try capital cases';26 and when the question was raised, 'What was this intended to include?' Rab Judah replied, 'It was intended to include a bastard'?27 - One statement was intended to include a proselyte and the other to include a bastard. And both statements were necessary. For if we had been informed of the proselyte only it might have been presumed that it applied to him alone because he is eligible to enter the Assembly28 but not to a bastard who is not eligible to enter the Assembly.29 And if we had been informed of the bastard only it might have been presumed to apply to him alone because he issues from an eligible source30 but not to a proselyte who issues from an ineligible source.31 Hence the necessity for both rulings.

MISHNAH. WHOSOEVER IS ELIGIBLE TO ACT AS JUDGE IS32 ELIGIBLE TO ACT AS WITNESS, BUT ONE MAY BE ELIGIBLE TO ACT AS WITNESS AND NOT AS JUDGE.

GEMARA. What [was this33 intended] to include? - R. Johanan replied: To include one who is blind in one eye;34 and who is the author?

____________________
(1) Objecting to the previous test which, since the bottom of the pot is inevitably pressed against the water, would cause the latter to penetrate even through the smallest of holes.
(2) Lit., 'into it', while it is still empty.
(3) The pot to be tested, with water in it.
(4) Lit., 'even not'.
(5) Even if the hole is big.
(6) This is another test, independent of the former.
(7) Supra 49a ad fin.
(8) According to the first Tanna this also is proof that the vessel lets liquids in, while according to R. Judah this is no proof (cf. supra n. 2).
(9) Though the limb is a redundant one, a sixth finger for instance.
(10) Being regarded as a proper limb (cf. relevant n. on our Mishnah).
(11) However small its bulk.
(12) If the bone is not smaller than a barley-grain.
(13) Unless the bulk of the flesh was no less than that of an olive.
(14) Rab.
(15) Being situated outside the row of the normal fingers.
(16) A normal finger, or even a redundant one in the normal row, conveys uncleanness by overshadowing, however small in bulk it may be, as any proper limb.
(17) A measure of capacity containing two kabs; Aliter: ** = three kabs or half a se'ah, a dry measure.
(18) Lev. XV, 6.
(19) Midras-uncleanness that is conveyed to men and objects which become thereby a 'father of uncleanness'.
(20) Emphasis on 'sat' (v. Hag. Sonc. ed., p. 149, n. 2).
(21) Such an object only is subject to the major grade of uncleanness (cf. prev. n. but two).
(22) An inverted measure.
(23) Hence they contract from a zab the uncleanness of touch only and this subjects them only to the uncleanness of the first grade, while through contact with a corpse they become a 'father of uncleanness'.
(24) The second clause of our Mishnah.
(25) Who is a fit person to act as judge in monetary suits but not in capital cases (cf. Sanh. 36b).
(26) Sanh. 32a.
(27) That he is fit to adjudicate in indictory cases. Ibid. 36b. Why then the repetition.
(28) Sc. to marry the daughter of an Israelite.
(29) Cf. Deut. XXIII, 3.
(30) Lit., 'a fit drop', sc. pure Israelite origin.
(31) Heathen origin. Cf. prev. n. mut. mut.
(32) Much more so.
(33) The second rule in our Mishnah.
(34) Such a person is eligible as witness but not as judge. One blind in both eyes is ineligible even as witness.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 50a

- R. Meir.1 For it was taught: R. Meir used to say, What was the purport of the Scriptural text, According to their word shall every controversy and every leprosy be?2 What connection could controversies have with leprosies? But3 controversies were compared to leprosies, as leprosies must be examined by day, since it is written, And in the day when . . . appeareth in him,4 so must controversies be tried by day; and5 as leprosies are not to be examined by a blind man,6 since it is written, Wherever the priest looketh,7 so are controversies not to be tried by a blind man.6 And8 leprosies are further compared to controversies: As controversies are not to be tried by relatives, so are leprosies not to be examined by relatives. In case [one were to argue:] 'As controversies must be tried by three men so must leprosies also be examined by three men, this being logically arrived at a minori ad majus: If controversies affecting one's wealth must be tried by three men, how much more so matters affecting one's body', it was explicitly stated, When he shall be brought unto Aaron the priest or unto one of his sons the priests.9 Thus you have learnt that even a single10 priest may examine leprosies.11

A certain blind man who lived in the neighbourhood of R. Johanan used to try lawsuits and the latter12 told him nothing against it. But how could he12 act in this manner, seeing that R. Johanan actually stated, 'The halachah is in agreement with an anonymous Mishnah', and we have learnt,13 WHOSOEVER IS ELIGIBLE TO ACT AS JUDGE IS ELIGIBLE TO ACT AS WITNESS, BUT ONE MAY BE ELIGIBLE TO ACT AS WITNESS AND NOT AS JUDGE,and when the question was raised, 'What was this intended to include?' R. Johanan replied, 'To include one who is blind in one eye'?14 - R. Johanan found another anonymous Mishnah.15 For we have learnt, Monetary suits must be tried by day and may be concluded by night.16 But why should this anonymous Mishnah17 be deemed more authoritative than the former?18 If you wish I might reply: An anonymous Mishnah which represents the view of a majority19 is preferable. And if you prefer I might reply: Because it20 was taught among the laws of legal procedure.21

MISHNAH. WHATSOEVER IS SUBJECT TO TITHES IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO FOOD-UNCLEANNESS;22 BUT THERE IS A KIND OF FOODSTUFF23 THAT IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO FOOD-UNCLEANNESS AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO TITHES.

GEMARA. What was this24 intended to include? - To include flesh, fish and eggs.25

MISHNAH. WHATSOEVER IS SUBJECT TO THE OBLIGATION OF PE'AH26 IS ALSO SUBJECT TO THAT OF TITHES; BUT THERE IS A KIND OF PRODUCE WHICH IS SUBJECT TO THE OBLIGATION OF TITHES AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THAT OF PE'AH.

GEMARA. What was this24 intended to include? - To include the fig-tree and vegetables, which are not subject to the obligation of pe'ah.27 For we have learnt: They28 have laid down a general rule concerning pe'ah. Whatsoever is a foodstuff, is kept under watch, grows29 from the ground, is all harvested at the same time, and is taken in for storage, is subject to pe'ah.30 'A foodstuff', excludes the after-growths of woad and madder;31 'is kept under watch', excludes hefker; 'grows32 from the ground', excludes morils and truffles;33 'is all harvested at the same time', excludes the fig-tree;34 and is taken in for storage', excludes vegetables. As regards tithes, however, we have learnt: Whatsoever is a foodstuff, is kept under watch and grows from the ground is subject to the obligation of tithes;35 whereas 'is all harvested at the same time36 and is taken in for storage'37 was not mentioned.38 But if garlic or onions39 grew among them40 they are subject [to pe'ah]. For we have learnt: As regards plots of onions between other vegetables, R. Jose ruled, Pe'ah must be left from each41 and the Sages ruled, From one for all.42

Rabbah b. Bar Hana citing R. Johanan ruled: If endives were originally sown for cattle-food and then [the owner] changed his mind43 to use them for human food,

____________________
(1) Who disqualifies a man blind in one eye from acting as judge.
(2) Deut. XXI, 5.
(3) Owing to juxtaposition.
(4) Lev. XIII, 14, emphasis on 'day'. (E.V. 'whensoever' for 'in the day when').
(5) By a further analogy (cf. prev. n. but one).
(6) Even by one who is blind in one eye only.
(7) Lev. XIII,12 emphasis on the last word.
(8) Owing to juxtaposition.
(9) Lev. XIII, 2 emphasis on 'Aaron' and 'one'.
(10) Cf. prev. n.
(11) At any rate it follows, as was stated above, that according to R. Meir a blind man (even if in one eye only) is eligible as judge. Our Mishnah, therefore, represents his view.
(12) R. Johanan.
(13) As an anonymous Mishnah.
(14) Which clearly shows that according to R. Johanan no blind man is eligible to act as judge. Why then did he raise no objection against the blind man's conduct?
(15) Which allows a blind man to act as judge.
(16) Sanh. 32a; which shows that, according to this Mishnah, 'controversies' were not compared to 'leprosies' for though the latter may not be examined by night the trying of the former may well be concluded by night. And since the two were not compared in this respect they were not compared as regards the ineligibility of a blind man either.
(17) The latter, cited from Sanh.
(18) Our Mishnah. Lit., 'and what is the strength of that anonymous etc.'
(19) As does the one from Sanh. Our Mishnah, as was explained supra, represents the view of R. Meir alone.
(20) The latter, cited from Sanh.
(21) With which the tractate of Sanh. deals. A law occurring in a tractate that is devoted to similar laws is more reliable than one occurring in a tractate that is mainly devoted to a totally different subject.
(22) Since only foodstuffs are subject to tithe.
(23) This is presently explained in the Gemara.
(24) The second clause of our Mishnah.
(25) Only foodstuffs that grow from the ground are subject to tithe.
(26) Lit., 'corner'. Cf. When ye reap the harvest . . . thou shalt not wholly reap the corner of thy field . . . thou shalt leave them for the poor (Lev. XIX, 9f).
(27) But are liable to tithes.
(28) The Rabbis.
(29) Var. lec. 'draws its nourishment' (v. Tosaf.).
(30) Pe'ah I, 4.
(31) Plants used only in dyeing which are unsuitable as food.
(32) Var. lec. 'draws its nourishment' (v. Tosaf.).
(33) Which are not planted Aliter: Which (cf. prev. n.) do not draw their nourishment from the ground.
(34) And similar trees whose fruit ripens at different times.
(35) Ma'as. I, 1.
(36) Which would have excluded the fig-tree and the like.
(37) Which would have excluded vegetables.
(38) It thus follows that figs and vegetables are liable to tithes though exempt from pe'ah. The tithe mentioned is, of course, only Rabbinical, since Pentateuchally only corn, wine and oil are subject to the obligations of tithe.
(39) Vegetables that are taken in for storage.
(40) The other vegetables.
(41) Since the other vegetables form a division between one plot and another.
(42) The intervening vegetables being disregarded, Pe'ah III, 4.
(43) While they were still attached to the ground.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 50b

it is necessary1 that he should intend them for the purpose2 after they had been detached; he being of the opinion that intention2 concerning attached [produce] is no valid intention. Raba observed: We also have learnt a rule to the same effect: Thirteen things have been said about the carrion of a clean bird, (and the following is one of them).3 It is necessary4 that it should be intended for food but there is no need for it to be rendered5 susceptible to uncleanness.6 Thus it is clearly evident that7 an intention concerning a live being is no valid intention; so also here8 it must be said, that an intention concerning attached [produce]9 is no valid intention.10 R. Zera said:11 We are dealing here12 with a [flying] pigeon that dropped from on high, so that it was not before us13 to enable one to have any intentions about it.14 Said Abaye to him:15 What can be said about the [case of the] hen of Jamnia?16 - That, the other15 replied, was a wild cock.17 They laughed at him: A wild cock is an unclean bird and an unclean bird does not convey uncleanness!18 - 'When a great man', Abaye told them, 'said something, do not laugh at him. This was a case of a hen that ran away;19 and as to the meaning20 of "wild", it turned wild as far as its master was concerned'.21 R. Papa said: It was a field-hen.22 R. Papa thus followed his known view. For R. Papa ruled, A field-cock is forbidden and a field-hen is permitted; and your mnemonic is 'A male Ammonite23 but not a female Ammonite'. Amemar laid down in his discourse that a field-hen is forbidden.24 The Rabbis observed that it stamps on its prey25 when eating it;26 and it is this bird that is known as girutha.27

Our Rabbis taught: If a pigeon28 fell into a winepress29 and it was intended to pick it up for a Samaritan,30 it is unclean;31 but if it was intended for a dog it is clean,32 R. Johanan b. Nuri33 ruled, Even if intended for a dog it is unclean.31 R. Johanan b. Nuri argued: This is arrived at a minori ad majus. If it34 conveys a major uncleanness,35 though there was no intention,36 should it not convey a minor uncleanness37 though there was no intention? They answered him: No; if you maintain your view in the case of a major uncleanness, which never descends to that,38 would you also maintain it in the case of a minor uncleanness which does descend to that?38 He replied: the hen of Jamnia proves my contention, for it descends to that and, though there was no intention, it was declared unclean. 'From there', they retorted, 'is your proof? In that place there were Samaritans and it was intended that they shall eat it.' Now with what case are we dealing here? If it be suggested with big cities [the objection would arise]: What need was there for intention, seeing that we have learnt: The carcass of a clean beast anywhere39 and the carcass of a clean bird and forbidden fat in large towns40 require neither intention nor to be rendered susceptible.41 If, however, it is suggested: Of villages, [the difficulty arises:] Is there any authority who maintains that in this case no intention is required, seeing that we have learnt: The carcass of an unclean beast42 anywhere43 and the carcass of a clean bird in villages44 require45 intention46 but need not be rendered susceptible?47 - R. Ze'ira b. Hanina replied: We are in fact dealing with an incident in a big city, but48 the winepress caused it49 to be objectionable50 and thus caused the town to be regarded as a village.

'R. Johanan b. Nuri argued: This is arrived at a minori ad majus. If it conveys a major uncleanness, though there was no intention, should it not convey a minor uncleanness though there was no intention? They answered him: No; if you maintain your view in the case of a major uncleanness which never descends to that.' What is meant by 'it never descends to that'? - Raba replied: It is this that they51 in effect said to him,52 'No; if you maintain your view

____________________
(1) If they are to be rendered susceptible to food-uncleanness as human food.
(2) To be used as human food.
(3) The bracketed words are not in the cited Mishnah.
(4) Cf. prev. n. but one mut. mut.
(5) By intentionally wetting it.
(6) As is the case with other dry foodstuffs which must come in contact with liquids before they can be capable of contracting uncleanness. Toh. I, 1.
(7) Since intention is required when it is already carrion though a live bird is usually intended for food.
(8) R. Johanan's ruling.
(9) Which, analogous to a live animal, is not susceptible to uncleanness.
(10) Support is thus adduced for R. Johanan's ruling.
(11) The cited Mishnah affords no support to R. Johanan.
(12) The Mishnah of Toh. cited.
(13) While it was yet alive.
(14) Hence the ruling that 'it is necessary that it should be intended for food' after it was carrion. Where, however, a live animal was intended to be used in due course as food no further intention is necessary after it had been killed,
(15) R. Zera.
(16) Which (v. infra) was in its owner's possession before it died and yet was regarded as a food for the sole reason that the Samaritans living there intended it as such after it was dead.
(17) Not usually intended for food. Hence the necessity for intention after its death.
(18) Through one's oesophagus, v. Hul. 100b. Now since the uncleanness of the hen at Jamnia was conveyed through the oesophagus (sc. by the swallowing of it) it could not possibly have been a wild cock.
(19) Lit., 'rebelled', and thus was not before us while alive and for this reason intention would be necessary after it died. It was one of the young of this hen that dropped at Jamnia and gave rise to the discussion.
(20) Lit., 'and what',
(21) Lit., 'from its master'. As the bird in question was consequently a clean one it may well have conveyed uncleanness (as stated) through the oesophagus.
(22) Or 'a hen of the marshes', which in his opinion (v. infra) is a clean bird.
(23) Is forbidden to enter the Assembly (cf. Deut. XXIII, 4).
(24) As food.
(25) In the manner of birds of prey.
(26) No clean birds eat in this manner.
(27) Presumably the moor-hen. The girutha is an unclean bird (cf. Hul. 109b).
(28) A clean bird.
(29) Where it got crushed and died, becoming repulsive for eating.
(30) To give it to him to eat.
(31) Food-uncleanness. It conveys uncleanness to other foodstuffs through contact, without being rendered susceptible.
(32) Such an intention being invalid.
(33) Holding that no intention is required (v. infra).
(34) The pigeon.
(35) The uncleanness of the person and the clothes worn by him when he ate it.
(36) When, for instance, the man was unaware that he was eating that particular pigeon.
(37) That of food and drink by means of contact.
(38) This is explained presently.
(39) Even in a village where there are not many consumers.
(40) Where consumers are many and any sort of food finds buyers.
(41) 'Uk. III, 3; since a clean beast is usually intended for food both in town and in villages while the carcass of a clean bird and forbidden fat would find consumers in large towns only but not in villages (cf. prev. two notes). Intention, therefore, is required in the latter case but not in the former.
(42) Which is not usually eaten.
(43) Even in large towns,
(44) Where consumers are few.
(45) Since they are not usually eaten.
(46) To enable them to convey uncleanness. In the case of the former, uncleanness is conveyed even in the absence of intention provided its bulk was no less than that of an olive. The intention, however, avails where the bulk of carcass was less than that of an olive and that of other food was less than the bulk of an egg. In such a case the two quantities combine to form together the prescribed bulk of an egg which contracts uncleanness through contact with a dead creeping thing.
(47) Since they would eventually be subject to a major uncleanness.
(48) The reason why the Rabbis require intention.
(49) The pigeon.
(50) So that it is not so very suitable for consumption.
(51) The Rabbis.
(52) R. Johanan b. Nuri.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 51a

in the case of a major uncleanness which never causes an uncleanness of the same grade,1 would you also maintain it in the case of a minor uncleanness which does cause an uncleanness of the same grade?'2 Said Abaye to him: [Should not this3 apply to the latter] with even more reason: If a major uncleanness, concerning which the law has been relaxed in that it does not cause an uncleanness of the same grade,4 conveys uncleanness in the absence of intention, how much more then should a minor uncleanness, concerning which the law has been restricted in that it does cause uncleanness of the same grade,5 convey uncleanness even where there was no intention? - Rather, said R. Shesheth, It is this that they6 implied: 'No; if you maintain your view7 in the case of a major uncleanness, which need not be rendered susceptible,8 would you also maintain it7 in the case of a minor uncleanness which does require to be rendered susceptible?' But is it required to be rendered susceptible? Have we not in fact learnt:9 Three10 things have been said about the carrion of a clean bird,11 it is necessary that it should be intended for food, it conveys uncleanness through the oesophagus only,12 and there is no need for it to be rendered susceptible?13 - Granted that it is not required that a dead creeping thing shall render it susceptible,14 it is nevertheless necessary that it shall be rendered susceptible15 by means of water.16 Why17 is it not required that a dead creeping thing shall render it susceptible? In agreement with what the school of R. Ishmael taught. But then there should be no need for it to be rendered susceptible by means of water also in agreement with what the school of R. Ishmael taught; for the school of R. Ishmael taught: Upon any sowing seed which is to be sown,18 as seeds15 which do not eventually contract a major uncleanness19 must20 be rendered susceptible so must any other thing which does not eventually contract a major uncleanness be rendered susceptible; the carcass of a clean bird is excluded, in that it need not be rendered susceptible, since it eventually contracts a major uncleanness?21 - Rather, replied Raba, or as some say R. Papa, [the reference22 is to] a major uncleanness in general and to a minor uncleanness in general.23

Raba stated: R. Johanan,24 however, agrees in regard to tithe that intention25 concerning attached [produce] is a valid intention.26 Raba explained, Whence do I derive this? From what we learnt: Savory,27 hyssop and calamint28 that are grown in a courtyard, if they are kept under watch,29 are subject to tithe.30 Now how are we to imagine the circumstances?31 If it be suggested that these herbs were originally sown for human consumption [the difficulty would arise]: Was it at all necessary to enunciate such a law?32 Consequently the circumstances must be such, must they not, that the herbs were originally sown for cattle food; and yet it was stated, 'if they are kept under watch'33 they 'are subject to tithe'.34 R. Ashi retorted: Here30 we are dealing with a courtyard in which the herbs grew spontaneously35 so that as a rule they are destined for human consumption, and36 it is this that was meant: If the courtyard affords protection for the produce it grows37 the herbs are subject to tithe; otherwise they are exempt.38

R. Ashi objected:39 Whatsoever is subject to tithes is susceptible to food uncleanness.40 Now if that were so,41 would there not be the case of these42 which are liable to tithe43 and yet44 do not become susceptible to the uncleanness of food?45 - The fact is, said Raba, that it is this that was meant: Any species that is liable to tithe is susceptible to food uncleanness. This46 is also logically sound. For in the final clause47 it was stated, Whatsoever is subject to the law of the first of the fleece48 is also subject to that of the priestly gifts49 but there may be a beast50 that is subject to the law of the priestly gifts and is not subject to that of the first of the fleece.51 Now if it were so52 [the objection would arise]: Is there not also the case of the terefah which is subject to the law of the first of the fleece and yet is not subject to that of the priestly gifts?53 - Rabina retorted: This54 represents the view of55 R. Simeon. For it was taught:56 R. Simeon exempts the terefah from the law of the first of the fleece.57 R. Shimi b. Ashi replied,58 Come and hear: If a man declared his vineyard hefker59 and, rising early in the morning, he cut its grapes, he is liable60 to peret,61 'oleloth,62 the forgotten sheaf63 and pe'ah64 but65 is exempt from tithe.66 But have we not learnt: WHATSOEVER IS SUBJECT TO THE OBLIGATION OF PE'AH IS ALSO SUBJECT TO THAT OF TITHES?67 Must you not then infer from this68 that the reference69 was70 to the whole species?71 This is conclusive.

Elsewhere we have learnt:72 The Sages agree with R. Akiba that if a man sowed dill or mustard seed in two or three different spots he must allow pe'ah from each.73

____________________
(1) When a carcass (a 'father of uncleanness'), for instance, imparted uncleanness to a person the latter cannot impart it to another person, since only a 'father of uncleanness' can carry uncleanness to persons.
(2) Foodstuffs, for instance, that contracted an uncleanness may (Rabbinically) convey the same uncleanness to other foodstuffs.
(3) The view that no intention is necessary.
(4) Cf. p. 350, n. 12.
(5) V. p. 350, n. 13.
(6) The Rabbis.
(7) The view that no intention is necessary.
(8) A carcass, for instance, is unclean irrespective of whether it had been rendered susceptible by liquids or not.
(9) MS.M., 'was it not taught?'
(10) In the Mishnah citation supra the reading for 'three' is 'thirteen' (cf. prev. n.)
(11) A minor uncleanness.
(12) Sc. only when it is being swallowed is uncleanness conveyed to the person and to his clothes.
(13) Cf. supra 50b q.v. notes.
(14) Sc. that it shall cause it to become unclean.
(15) Like any other foodstuffs.
(16) Only after it had been purposely wetted is it susceptible to uncleanness.
(17) Lit., 'wherein the difference?'
(18) Lev. XI, 37.
(19) Sc. they can never convey uncleanness to a person.
(20) If they are to contract any uncleanness.
(21) How then could it be maintained that it is 'necessary that it shall be rendered susceptible by means of water'?
(22) In the argument of the Rabbis.
(23) In the case of the former susceptibility is never required; hence it is that no intention is required either. In the case of the latter susceptibility is usually (though not in the particular case of a bird) required; hence it is that intention also is necessary.
(24) Though he stated (supra 50b) that in regard to uncleanness intention concerning an attached plant is no valid intention.
(25) To use the produce as food for men.
(26) And it is in consequence subject to tithe.
(27) Satureia Thymbra.
(28) Or 'thyme'.
(29) For the purpose, so it is now assumed, of using them for human consumption.
(30) Ma'as. III, 9.
(31) In which the law mentioned applies.
(32) Of course not. The law is too obvious to be stated.
(33) For the purpose, so it is now assumed, of using them for human consumption.
(34) Which shows that intention regarding the use of attached produce in the case of tithe is valid.
(35) Sc. they were never intended to be used as cattle food.
(36) In reply to the objection: What need was there for enunciating a law that was too obvious?
(37) In consequence of which the herbs cannot be regarded as hefker (v. Glos.).
(38) Hefker being exempt from tithe.
(39) Against Raba.
(40) Supra 50a.
(41) That intention to use attached produce for human consumption is valid enough as regards liability to tithe.
(42) Endives sown for the purpose of producing cattle food concerning which the grower changed his mind, while they were still attached to the ground, and decided to use the crop as food for human consumption.
(43) Since intention in this respect (cf. prev. n. but one) is valid.
(44) Intention regarding attached produce being invalid in respect of susceptibility to uncleanness.
(45) How then is Raba's statement to be reconciled with the Mishnah cited?
(46) Raba's interpretation just given.
(47) The Mishnah infra 51b which is the continuation of the previous Mishnah.
(48) Cf. Deut, XVIII, 4.
(49) The shoulder, the two cheeks and the maw given from slaughtered cattle (cf. ibid. 3).
(50) An ox or a goat.
(51) Infra 51b.
(52) That a general statement like 'whatsoever etc.' includes every individual case.
(53) Hul. 136b. Must it not consequently be admitted, as Raba explained, that by the general rule (cf. prev. n.) the whole species was meant?
(54) The Mishnah just cited.
(55) Lit., 'that whose? It is'.
(56) V. marg. gl. Cur. edd. 'for we learnt'.
(57) No proof, therefore, may be adduced from this Mishnah that a general rule refers to the entire species.
(58) Justifying Raba's submission (cf. prev. n. but four).
(59) V. Glos.
(60) For the reason cf. B.K. 94a.
(61) Single grapes dropped during the cutting (cf. Lev. XIX, 10) which must be left for the poor.
(62) 'Gleanings' of the vineyards or a small single bunch of grapes on a single branch 'which are the portion of the poor (cf. Lev. XIX, 10 and Deut. XXIV, 21).
(63) Which had to be left for the poor (cf. Deut. XXIV, 19).
(64) V. Glos. Cf. Lev. XIX, 9.
(65) Since the vineyard is hefker.
(66) Ned. 44b. B.K, 94a.
(67) How then are the two Tannaitic statements to be reconciled?
(68) Cf. prev. n.
(69) In the general rule, 'Whatsoever etc.'.
(70) Not to each individual case.
(71) Of course one must. Raba's submission is thus confirmed.
(72) This is quoted here because an objection against it is raised from our Mishnah.
(73) Pe'ah III, 2.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 51b

Now dill, surely, since it is liable to pe'ah is also liable1 to tithe, for we have learnt, WHATSOEVER IS SUBJECT TO THE OBLIGATION OF PE'AH IS ALSO SUBJECT TO THAT OF TITHES; and since it is liable to tithe it is also susceptible to food uncleanness. It is accordingly evident that anything that is used as a flavouring is susceptible to food uncleanness, since dill is used as a flavouring. But is not this incongruous with the following: 'Castus,2 amomum,3 and the principal spices, crowfoot, asafoetida, pepper and lozenges of bastard safron may be bought with second tithe money but they are not susceptible to food uncleanness; so R. Akiba. Said R. Johanan b. Nuri to him: If they may be bought with second tithe money why are they not susceptible to food uncleanness? And if they are not susceptible,4 they5 should not be bought with second tithe money',6 and in connection with this R. Johanan b. Nuri stated, 'A vote was taken and they decided that these are not to be bought with second tithe money and that they are not susceptible to food uncleanness'?7 - R. Hisda replied: When that Mishnah8 was taught the reference was to dill intended as an ingredient9 of kamak.10 R. Ashi stated, I submitted the following argument before R. Kahana:11 Do not say, 'The reference was to dill intended12 as an ingredient of kamak', from which it would follow that generally13 it is used as flavouring matter,14 but rather that dill is generally intended as an ingredient of kamak.15 For we have learnt: Dill,16 as soon as it has imparted some flavour to a dish, is no longer subject to the restrictions of terumah17 and it is no longer susceptible to food uncleanness.18 From which it follows that before it had imparted any flavour to a dish it is subject to the restrictions of terumah and is susceptible to food uncleanness.19 Now if you were to imagine that as a rule it is used for flavouring14 [the difficulty would arise]: Even if it had not imparted any flavour to a dish [should it not be free from the restrictions of food since] as a rule it is used for flavouring?20 Must you not then infer from this21 that generally it is used as an ingredient of kamak?15 This is conclusive.

MISHNAH. WHATSOEVER IS SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE FIRST OF THE FLEECE22 IS ALSO SUBJECT TO THAT OF THE PRIESTLY GIFTS,23 BUT THERE MAY BE [A BEAST]24 THAT IS SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE PRIESTLY GIFTS AND NOT TO THAT OF THE FIRST OF THE FLEECE. WHATSOEVER IS SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF REMOVAL25 IS ALSO SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE SABBATICAL YEAR,26 BUT THERE IS [A KIND OR PRODUCE] THAT IS SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE SABBATICAL YEAR26 AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF REMOVAL.25

GEMARA. As, for instance, the leaves of arum and of miltwaste.27 THERE IS A KIND OF PRODUCE THAT IS SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE SABBATICAL YEAR AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF REMOVAL, the root of the arum and the root of miltwaste, since it is written in Scripture, And for thy cattle and for the beasts that are in thy land, shall all the increase thereof be for food,28 as long as 'the beasts' eat29 from the field you may feed 'thy cattle' in the house, but when the produce comes to an end for 'the beasts' in the field you must bring it to an end for 'thy cattle' which are in the house; but these,30 surely, have not come to an end.

MISHNAH. WHATSOEVER31 HAS SCALES HAS FINS BUT THERE ARE SOME THAT HAVE FINS AND NO SCALES. WHATSOEVER32 HAS HORNS HAS HOOFS BUT THERE ARE SOME THAT HAVE HOOFS AND NO HORNS.

GEMARA. WHATSOEVER HAS SCALES [etc.] [viz.] a clean fish;33 THERE ARE SOME THAT HAVE FINS AND NO SCALES, refers to an unclean fish.34 Now consider: Since we35 rely on the scales,36 what need then was there for the All Merciful to mention37 fins?38 - If the All Merciful had not written fins it might have been presumed that the written word kaskeseth39 meant40 fins and that even an unclean fish [is, therefore, permitted]. Hence has the All Merciful written 'fins' and 'scales'.41 But now that the All Merciful has written both 'fins' and 'scales', whence is it deduced that kaskeseth39 means the covering? Because it is written, And he was clad with a coat of mail.42 Then why43 did not the All Merciful write kaskeseth39 and there would be no need for the mention of fins?44 - R. Abbahu replied and so it was also taught at the school of R. Ishmael: To make the teaching great and glorious.45

MISHNAH. WHATSOEVER REQUIRES A BENEDICTION AFTER IT REQUIRES ONE BEFORE IT, BUT THERE ARE THINGS THAT REQUIRE A BENEDICTION BEFORE THEM AND NOT AFTER THEM.

GEMARA. [What was the last clause46 intended] to include? - To include vegetables. But according to R. Isaac who did say a benediction47 after the eating of vegetables, what was this46 intended to include? - To include water. But according to R. Papa who said a benediction47 after he drank water, what was it46 intended to include? - To include the performance of commandments.48 But according to the Palestinians49 who after removing their tefillin say the benediction of ' . . . who hath sanctified us by his commandments, and hath commanded us to keep his statutes', what does this50 include? - It includes

____________________
(1) V. Bah,
(2) **, a fragrant root,
(3) Cf. **, a spice indigenous to India and Syria.
(4) To food uncleanness, which is evidence that they are not regarded as a foodstuff.
(5) Since only foodstuffs may be bought with second tithe money.
(6) 'Uk. III, 5.
(7) Now how is this Mishnah (from which it follows that flavouring spices are not susceptible to food uncleanness) to be reconciled with the inference drawn supra from the Mishnah of Pe'ah III, 2?
(8) Of Pe'ah, from which it was inferred that dill is regarded as food.
(9) Not as a mere flavouring.
(10) A milk sauce. Such dill is rightly regarded as a foodstuff and is consequently susceptible to food uncleanness.
(11) Cur. edd. in parenthesis add, 'he said'.
(12) Emphasis on this word.
(13) Where the owner's intention has not been expressed.
(14) Lit., 'for (the flavouring of) the dish', and should, therefore, be exempt from food uncleanness.
(15) And so subject to all the laws of a foodstuff.
(16) Of terumah.
(17) Should the root subsequently fall into a dish of ordinary food no complications would arise.
(18) 'Uk. III, 4; it being regarded as mere flavouring matter.
(19) I.e., it is regarded as food.
(20) Of course it should. Why then was its exemption from the restrictions made dependent on the imparting of some flavour to a dish?
(21) Cf. Prev. n,
(22) Cf. Deut. XVIII, 4.
(23) Sc. the shoulder, the two cheeks and the maw that are due to the priest from slaughtered cattle (cf. Deut. XVIII, 3).
(24) An ox or a goat.
(25) In the Sabbatical year. When no produce is left in the field for the beasts the owner must remove all stored produce from his house into the field (cf. Deut. XXVI, 13).
(26) Cf. Lev. XXV, 2ff.
(27) These and similar products are SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF REMOVAL since (cf. infra) their supply is exhausted before the end of the year, and also TO THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE SABBATICAL YEAR.
(28) Lev. XXV, 7.
(29) Okeleth of the same rt. as le'ekol (rendered supra, for food').
(30) The roots of the herbs mentioned.
(31) Among fishes.
(32) Among animals.
(33) Sc. one that may be eaten.
(34) Cf. prev. n. mut. mut.
(35) In determining whether a fish is clean or unclean.
(36) As has been stated in our Mishnah, WHATSOEVER HAS SCALES HAS FINS.
(37) As one of the marks of a clean fish in Lev. XI, 9ff.
(38) Lit., fins which the All Merciful has written, wherefore to me'.
(39) The word rendered scales'.
(40) Lit., 'what kaskeseth that is written.'
(41) Thus indicating that each is a distinctive mark.
(42) Kaskasim (of the same rt, as kaskeseth). I Sam. XVII, 5.
(43) Since the meaning of kaskeseth is definitely established and cannot be mistaken for that of fins.
(44) Since WHATSOEVER HAS SCALES HAS FINS.
(45) Isa. XLII, 21. Even an apparently superfluous word adds to the greatness and glory of the Torah.
(46) BUT THERE ARE etc.
(47) '... who createst many living beings' (cf. P. B. p. 290).
(48) Those, for instance, of lulab, shofar, zizith and tefillin which require a benediction only before and not after they are performed.
(49) Lit., 'the sons of the west'. Palestine lay to the west of Babylon where the discussion took place.
(50) BUT THERE ARE etc.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 52a

fragrant odours.1

MISHNAH. IF A GIRL2 HAS GROWN TWO PUBIC HAIRS SHE3 MAY EITHER PERFORM HALIZAH OR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE, AND SHE IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO PERFORM ALL THE COMMANDMENTS THAT ARE ENUMERATED IN THE TORAH. SO ALSO A BOY, IF HE HAS GROWN TWO PUBIC HAIRS, IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO PERFORM ALL THE COMMANDMENTS ENUMERATED IN THE TORAH. HE IS FURTHERMORE LIABLE TO THE PENALTY OF A STUBBORN AND REBELLIOUS SON4 AS SOON AS HE HAS GROWN TWO HAIRS UNTIL THE TIME WHEN HIS BEARD FORMS A CIRCLE.5 (THIS REFERS TO THE LOWER, AND NOT TO THE UPPER ONE, BUT6 THE SAGES USED A EUPHEMISM,)7 A GIRL WHO HAS GROWN TWO HAIRS8 MAY NO LONGER EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF MI'UN. R. JUDAH RULED: MI'UN MAY BE EXERCISED UNTIL THE BLACK9 PREDOMINATES.10

GEMARA. But since we have learnt, SHE IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO PERFORM ALL THE COMMANDMENTS THAT ARE ENUMERATED IN THE TORAH, what need was there for stating, SHE MAY EITHER PERFORM HALIZAH OR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE?11 - To exclude a ruling of R. Jose who stated, 'In the Biblical section12 it is written man,13 but as regards a woman there is no difference between a major and a minor'.14 Hence we were informed that15 if she has grown two hairs she may perform halizah,16 but otherwise she may not. What is the reason? A woman is to be compared to man.17

But since it was stated, SO ALSO A BOY, IF HE HAS GROWN TWO PUBIC HAIRS,18 what need was there for stating, HE IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO PERFORM ALL THE COMMANDMENTS ENUMERATED IN THE TORAH? And should you reply: Because it was desired to teach, HE IS FURTHERMORE LIABLE TO THE PENALTY OF A STUBBORN AND REBELLIOUS SON [the objection would arise]: Have we not learnt this once: 'When does one become liable to the penalty of a stubborn and rebellious son? As soon as one grows two hairs until the time the beard forms a circle. (By this was meant the lower, and not the upper one, but the Sages used a euphemism)'? - This is so indeed; only because details were specified about the girl those relating to the boy were also specified.

IF A GIRL HAS GROWN etc. R. Abbahu citing R. Eleazar stated, The halachah is in agreement with R. JUDAH. R. Judah, however, agrees that if she was subjected to cohabitation after she had grown two hairs,19 she may no longer exercise the right of mi'un.20 The colleagues of R. Kahana desired to give a practical decision21 in agreement with the ruling of R. Judah, although intercourse had taken place, but R. Kahana addressed them as follows: Did not such an incident happen with the daughter of R. Ishmael?22 She, namely, came to the schoolhouse to exercise the right of mi'un while her son was riding on her shoulder; and on that day were the views of R. Ishmael mentioned at the schoolhouse; and the Rabbis wept bitterly23 saying, 'Over a ruling which that righteous man24 had laid down should his offspring stumble!' For Rab Judah citing Samuel who had it from R. Ishmael stated: And she be not seized,25 [then only]26 is she forbidden,27 but if she was seized she is permitted. There is, however, another class of woman who is permitted27 even if she was not seized. And who is that? A woman whose betrothal was a mistaken one,28 and who, even if her son sits riding on her shoulder, may exercise the right of mi'un and go away.29 Thereupon they took a vote and decided: Up to what age may a girl30 exercise the right of mi'un? Until that at which she grows two hairs. [On hearing this incident] they31 abstained and did not act as they first intended.32 R. Isaac and the disciples of R. Hanina gave a practical decision in agreement with R. Judah, though the girl had been subjected to intercourse. R. Shamin b. Abba proceeded to tell it in the presence of R. Johanan; R. Johanan proceeded to tell it in the presence of R. Judah Nesi'ah33 and the latter sent a constable34 who took her away.35

R. Hisda citing Mar Ukba stated: The meaning36 is not that the black must actually predominate but that it shall be such as, when two hairs lie flat, has the appearance37 of the black predominating over the white,38 Raba stated: Two hairs that reach from rim to rim.

R. Helbo citing R. Huna stated: The two hairs of which the Rabbis spoke39 must40 have follicles at their roots. R. Malkio citing R. Adda b. Ahabah ruled: Follicles suffice even in the absence of hairs. Said R. Hanina the son of R. Ika: The rulings concerning a spit,41 bondwomen42 and follicles43 were laid down by R. Malkio, but those concerning a forelock,44 wood-ash45 and cheese46 were laid down by R. Malkia. R. Papa, however, stated: If the statement was made on a Mishnah or a Baraitha the author is R. Malkia but if on reported traditions47 the author is R. Malkio. And the mnemonic48 is, 'The mathnitha49 is queen'.50 What is the practical difference between them?51 - The practical difference between them is the statement on bondwomen.52 R. Ashi stated, Mar Zutra told me that R. Hanina of Sura felt about this the following difficulty: Would not a single Tanna53 go out of his way to teach54 us the law of the follicles? - If one55 had informed us of the law of the follicles it might have been presumed that [puberty is not established] unless there were two hairs in two follicles respectively, hence we were informed56 that even two hairs in one follicle are sufficient. But is there such a phenomenon?57 Is it not in fact written in Scripture, He that would break me with a tempest, and multiply my wounds without cause58 in connection with which Raba59 remarked: Job blasphemed with the mention of tempest and he was answered with a tempest. He 'blasphemed with the mention of tempest', saying to Him, 'Sovereign of the world, perhaps a tempest has passed before Thee, and caused Thee to confuse "Job"60 with "enemy"?'61 'He was answered with a tempest': Then the Lord answered

____________________
(1) Before the smelling of which, but not after, a benediction (cf. P.B. p. 290) is said.
(2) Being twelve years and one day old.
(3) If her husband died childless.
(4) Cf. Deut. XXI, 18ff and Sanh. 68b.
(5) When he is regarded as an adult who is no longer subject to this law.
(6) In speaking in vague terms.
(7) Lit., 'spoke in clean language'.
(8) Having thus passed out of her minority.
(9) The pubic hair.
(10) The growth of no more than two hairs does not suffice in his opinion to deprive her of the right of mi'un (cf. Gemara infra).
(11) Which are rites already included in the general rule.
(12) Of halizah.
(13) Deut. XXV, 7; 'man', excluding the woman, implies that only the male must be of age.
(14) Sc. a minor also may perform halizah.
(15) In the case of a girl also.
(16) Lit., 'yes'.
(17) Cf. Yeb. 105b, B.B. 156a.
(18) A statement which brings the boy under the same obligations as the girl.
(19) So that there was a valid marriage kinyan (cf. Kid, 2a) after she had attained her majority.
(20) Only where no intercourse had taken place after two hairs have grown does R. Judah maintain his view (cf. relevant n. on our Mishnah). The first Tanna, however, maintains that, even if she allowed only one moment to pass after the growth of two hairs, irrespective of whether intercourse did or did not take place, her right to mi'un is lost.
(21) Lit., 'to do a deed'.
(22) Who, after her father's death, while she was in her minority was given in marriage by her mother.
(23) Lit., 'a great weeping'. For the reading cf. MS.M. Cur. edd. 'and she wept . . . in the schoolhouse and they said'.
(24) R. Ishmael.
(25) Num, V, 13. E. V. neither she be taken in the act.
(26) Sc. if she did not act under compulsion but willingly.
(27) To her husband.
(28) If, for instance, a condition was attached to it and the condition remained unfulfilled, or if the marriage was with a minor (in the absence of her father) whose act (even with the consent of her mother) has no validity. In such a case the woman may leave her husband without a letter of divorce and she has the status of a feme sole who had never before been married.
(29) Since the marriage had no validity.
(30) Lit., 'the daughter'.
(31) R. Kahana's colleagues.
(32) Lit., 'and did not do the deed'.
(33) The Prince, Judah II.
(34) Or 'a detachment of police. Lit., 'searcher'.
(35) From her second husband who had married her in reliance on her mi'un.
(36) Of R. Judah's ruling on our Mishnah.
(37) Owing to the length of the hairs.
(38) The skin.
(39) V. our Mishnah.
(40) If they are to be taken as a mark of puberty.
(41) That has been used on a festival for the roasting of meat, may, by an indirect movement, be made to slip into a corner, though direct movement is forbidden (v. Bezah 28b).
(42) Brought by a woman to her husband at her marriage (v. Keth. 59b).
(43) The law cited here.
(44) The law that an Israelite who trims the hairs of a heathen must withdraw his hand at a distance of three fingers' breadth on every side of the forelock (v. A.Z. 29a).
(45) Forbidden to be spread on a wound because it gives it the appearance of an incised imprint (v. Mak. 21a).
(46) If made by a heathen is forbidden to be eaten on account of the lard that he smears over it.
(47) Shemathatha, those not recorded in a Mishnah or a Baraitha.
(48) To help one to recollect which of the statements mentioned were made by R. Malkio and R. Malkia respectively.
(49) Mathnitha, a general term for both Mishnah and Baraitha as opposed to shemathatha (cf. prev. n. but one).
(50) Sc. more authoritative than a reported statement. Malkia (מלכיא) whose name closely resembles מלכתא (queen) is to be associated with the Mishnah and the Baraitha that are designated 'queen'.
(51) R. Hanina and R. Papa.
(52) Which is recorded in a Mishnah. According to R. Papa the comment on it must be that of R. Malkia (cf. prev. n. but one) while according to R. Hanina it is one of the rulings attributed to R. Malkio,
(53) If follicles alone, in the absence of hairs, sufficed to establish puberty.
(54) Anywhere in the Mishnah.
(55) Tanna.
(56) By the mention of two hairs only.
(57) Two hairs in one follicle.
(58) Job IX, 17.
(59) Var. lec. Rabbah (cf. B.B. 16a).
(60) איוב (Iyob).
(61) אויב (Oyeb).

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 52b

Job out of the whirlwind, and said1 to him, 'Most foolish man,2 I have created many hairs3 in a man's head and for every hair I have created a separate follicle, so that two should not suck from the same follicle, for if two were to suck from the same follicle they would impair the sight of man. I did not confuse one follicle with another, would I confuse "Job" and "enemy"?'4 - This is no difficulty since one5 refers to the body while the other6 refers to the head.

Rab Judah citing Samuel ruled: The two hairs of which they spoke [establish puberty] even if one is on the crest and the other on the testes. So it was also taught: The two hairs of which they spoke [establish puberty] even if one grows on her back and the other on her belly, one on the joints of the fingers of her hand and the other on the joints of her toes; so R. Simeon b. Judah of Kefar Akko who cited it in the name of R. Ishmael.7 But Rab citing R. Assi ruled: puberty is not established unless two hairs grow in the same spot.

Our Rabbis taught: Up to what age may a girl exercise the right of mi'un? Until she grows two hairs; so R. Meir. R. Judah ruled: Until the black predominates.8 R. Jose ruled: Until a ring is formed around the nipple. Ben Shelakoth ruled: Until she grows her hair in profusion.9 In connection with this R. Simeon stated: Hanina b. Hakinai once met me at Zidon and said to me,10 'When you arrive at R. Akiba's ask him "until what age may a girl exercise the right of mi'un". If he tells you, "Until she grows two hairs", ask him this: Did not Ben Shelakoth testify in the presence of all of you at Jamnia, "Until she grows her hair in profusion", and you did not say to him a word to the contrary?' When I arrived at R. Akiba's the latter told me, 'I do not know anything about the growing of hair in profusion, and I do not know Ben Shelakoth; a girl may exercise the right of mi'un until the age when she grows two hairs'.

MISHNAH. THE TWO HAIRS SPOKEN OF IN REGARD TO THE RED HEIFER11 AND IN REGARD TO LEPROSY12 AS WELL AS THOSE SPOKEN OF ANYWHERE ELSE13 MUST BE LONG ENOUGH FOR THEIR TIPS TO BE BENT TO THEIR ROOTS; SO R. ISHMAEL. R. ELIEZER RULED: LONG ENOUGH TO BE GRASPED BY A FINGER-NAIL, R. AKIBA RULED: LONG ENOUGH TO BE TAKEN OFF WITH SCISSORS.

GEMARA. R. Hisda citing Mar Ukba stated: The halachah is in agreement with the views of all these in that the law is thereby invariably restricted.14

MISHNAH. A WOMAN WHO OBSERVED A BLOOD-STAIN15 IS IN AN UNSETTLED CONDITION16 AND MUST17 TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WAS DUE TO ZIBAH; SO R. MEIR. BUT THE SAGES RULED: IN THE CASE OF BLOOD-STAINS THERE IS NO [NEED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR BEING] DUE TO ZIBAH.

GEMARA. Who are THE SAGES? - R. Hanina b. Antigonus. For it was taught: R. Hanina b. Antigonus ruled, In the case of blood-stains there is no [need to consider the possibility of their being] due to zibah, but sometimes blood-stains do lead to zibah. How so? If a woman18 put on three shirts that she had previously examined and then found a blood-stain on each of them, or if she19 observed a discharge20 on two days and [a blood-stain on] one shirt,21 these are the blood-stains that lead to zibah. But since in the case of three shirts, where she observed no direct discharge from her body, the possibility of zibah is taken into consideration, why was it necessary to mention22 that of 'two days and one shirt'? - It might have been presumed23 that in any instance like this24 the woman brings a sacrifice which may be eaten,25 hence we were informed [that only the possibility26 of zibah is taken into consideration].27 Raba observed: In this matter R. Hanina b. Antigonus vindicated his case against the Rabbis. For why is it [that when a bloodstain] less than three beans in size is in one spot we do not take into consideration the possibility of zibah? [presumably] because we assume that it is the result of observations on two days.28 But then why should we not, even if a stain of the size of three beans was in one spot, similarly assume that only to the extent of the size of two and a half beans the discharge was from her body while the rest is the blood of a louse due to the filth?29 - And the Rabbis?30 - Since the stain31 can be divided up into parts of the size of a bean and over for each day32 we do not ascribe it to any external cause. As to R. Hanina b. Antigonus, is it33 only when a stain of the size of three beans in one spot that we do not take the possibility of zibah into consideration, but if it is in three different places34 the possibility is taken into consideration? But did you not say35 that this36 applies only to stains on37 three shirts,38 from which it follows that it does not apply to stains39 in three spots?40 - He41 spoke to them on the line of the view of the Rabbis. As far as I am concerned, he said in effect, it42 applies only to three shirts38 and not to three spots;40 but according to your view, agree with me at least that, where she had observed a stain of the size of three beans in one spot, we assume that to the extent of two and a half beans the discharge came from her body while the rest is the blood of a louse due to the filth. And the Rabbis? - Since the stain43 can be divided up into parts of the size of a little more than a bean for each day,44 we do not ascribe it to any external cause,

Our Rabbis taught: If a woman observed a blood-stain, if it is big enough43 to be divided into parts corresponding respectively to three beans, each of which being slightly bigger than the size of a bean, she must take into consideration the possibility of zibah; otherwise, she need not take this possibility into consideration. R. Judah b. Agra citing R. Jose ruled: In the one case and in the other45 the possibility must be taken into consideration.46

____________________
(1) Job XXXVIII, 1.
(2) Lit., 'fool that (you are) in the world'.
(3) The Heb. word for tempest, 'se'arah', may also be rendered 'hair'.
(4) From which it is obvious that two hairs can never grow from the same follicle. How then could it be maintained (supra 52a) that two hairs may sometimes grow from the same follicle?
(5) The case of the hairs mentioned in our Mishnah.
(6) The hairs mentioned in connection with Job,
(7) The reading to 'ruled' is that of MS.M. Cur. edd. read, 'And the Rabbis [what is their view]? R. Hisda replied'. Bah substitutes 'Ashi' for 'Hisda'.
(8) Cf. relevant n. on our Mishnah,
(9) Cf. Tosaf.
(10) So MS.M.
(11) Cf. A.Z. 24a and Parah II, 5.
(12) Cf. Neg. I, 5.
(13) In regard to the marks of puberty.
(14) Sc. as soon as the hairs grow to the smallest length mentioned in our Mishnah she is no longer regarded as minor and the right of mi'un is denied to her, while halizah may not be performed until the hairs grew to the maximum of the lengths mentioned, when her majority is beyond all doubt.
(15) On her underclothing.
(16) Lit., 'damaged', sc. the calculations (that enable her to determine in which days she is liable to menstruation and in which she is susceptible to zibah) are upset since she is unable to ascertain when exactly the discharge (of which the blood-stain is the result) had occurred.
(17) Under certain circumstances (cf. Gemara infra).
(18) On three consecutive days respectively during the period in which she is susceptible to zibah,
(19) In the zibah period (cf. prev. n.).
(20) An actual flow of blood.
(21) That was previously duly examined.
(22) That zibah must be taken into consideration.
(23) If the latter case had not been mentioned.
(24) Two actual discharges and one blood-stain.
(25) Sc. that the sacrifice is deemed to be valid as in the case of certain zibah.
(26) But not the certainty.
(27) So that the sacrifice is of a doubtful nature. As the method of killing that is prescribed for a bird sacrifice renders an unconsecrated bird nebelah and forbidden to be eaten, the bird sacrifice offered in this case must (on account of its doubtful nature) be forbidden to be eaten.
(28) While zibah cannot be established unless discharges occurred on three consecutive days.
(29) Of menstruation; so that (cf. prev. n.) there was no zibah at all.
(30) How can they maintain their ruling in view of this argument?
(31) Being of generous dimensions and rather larger than the size of three beans.
(32) So that on each day there may have been a new stain of the size prescribed.
(33) As Raba's statement seems to suggest.
(34) Though on the same shirt.
(35) In the Baraitha supra.
(36) That the possibility of zibah is taken into consideration.
(37) Lit., 'yes'.
(38) One stain on each.
(39) Lit., 'not'.
(40) On the same shirt.
(41) R. Hanina according to Raba's submission.
(42) That the possibility of zibah is taken into consideration.
(43) Being of generous dimensions and rather larger than the size of three beans.
(44) So that on each day there may have been a new stain of the size prescribed.
(45) Sc. even if the stain was no bigger than the size of two beans.
(46) Since it is possible that at least one of the stains was due to a discharge at twilight which counts as two (v. infra).

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 53a

Rabbi stated: R. Judah b. Agra's ruling is acceptable where she did not examine1 and the ruling of the Sages where she did examine. What is meant by 'she did examine' and by 'she did not examine'? - Raba replied: I found the Rabbis of the schoolhouse sitting at their studies and discoursing thus: 'Here2 we are dealing with the case of a woman who examined herself,3 but did not examine her shirt;4 and even her own body was examined by her only at the twilight of R. Judah,5 while at the twilight of R. Jose6 she did not examine herself. In such a case, the Rabbis being of the opinion that at the twilight of R. Jose it is already night, [the question of zibah does not arise] since she had examined herself at the twilight of R. Judah,7 and R. Jose follows his own view, he having stated that twilight is a doubtful time'.8 But I said to him: 'Had her hands been kept in her eyes9 throughout the twilight10 you would11 have spoken well,12 but now,13 is it not possible that she experienced a discharge14 as soon as she had removed her hands?'15 They then told me, 'We only spoke of a case where the woman had her hands in her eyes9 throughout the twilight'.

'Rabbi stated: R. Judah b. Agra's ruling16 is acceptable where she did not examine'. Now17 what is meant by 'she did not examine'? If it be suggested that she examined herself in the twilight of R. Judah but did not examine herself in the twilight of R. Jose [the difficulty would arise]: From this18 it follows that R. Judah holds19 that even where she examined herself both times,20 the possibility of zibah must be considered; [but why should this be so] seeing that she did examine herself?21 It is obvious then [that the meaning22 is] that she did not examine herself either in the twilight of R. Judah or in that of R. Jose;23 but if she had examined herself in R. Judah's twilight24 and did not examine herself in R. Jose's25 there is no need for her to consider the possibility [of zibah].26 It is thus clear that the twilight of R. Jose is according to Rabbi27 regarded as night.28 Now read the final clause: 'And the ruling of the Sages where she did examine' - What is meant by 'she did examine'? If it be suggested that she examined herself in the twilight of R. Judah but did not examine herself in that of R. Jose,29 it would follow30 that the Rabbis are of the opinion that even if she did not examine herself in either31 there is no need to consider the possibility of zibah [but why should this be so] seeing that she did not examine herself?32 It is obvious then that [the meaning33 is] that she examined herself both in the twilight of R. Judah and in that of R. Jose, but that if she had examined herself in the twilight of R. Judah and not in that of R. Jose the possibility of zibah34 must be considered.35 It is thus clear that the twilight of R. Jose is according to Rabbi36 regarded as doubtful time.37 Does not this then present a contradiction between two statements of Rabbi?38 - It is this that he39 meant: The view of R. Judah b. Agra40 is acceptable to the Rabbis41 when she did not examine herself at all either in R. Judah's twilight or in that of R. Jose's, for even the Sages differed from him42 only when she has examined herself in R. Judah's twilight43 and did not examine herself in that of R. Jose,44 but where she did not examine herself at all they agree with him,45 But does not the following show incongruity?46 [For it was taught:] If a woman observed a bloodstain, the observation being one of a large one,47 she must take into consideration the possibility of a discharge at twilight,48 but if the observation was one of a small stain49 she should not take the possibility into consideration. This is the ruling of R. Judah b. Agra who cited it in the name of R. Jose. Said Rabbi: I heard from him50 that in both cases must the possibility be taken into consideration; 'and', he said to me, 'it is for this reason: What if she had been a menstruant who did not51 make sure of her cleanness52 from the minha time53 and onwards, would she not54 have been regarded as being in a presumptive state of uncleanness?55 And his ruling is acceptable to me where she has examined herself. Now what is meant by 'she has examined herself'? If it be suggested that she has examined herself in the twilight of R. Judah and did not examine herself in that of R. Jose, it would follow that R. Judah b. Agra holds that even though she did not examine herself either in the twilight of R. Judah or in that of R. Jose the possibility need not be considered; but why should this be so seeing that she did not examine herself? It must be obvious then that she did examine herself both in the twilight of R. Judah and in that of R. Jose. Thus it follows that R. Judah b. Agra holds that if she examined herself in the twilight of R. Judah and not in that of R. Jose she need not consider the possibility. It is thus clear that the twilight of R. Jose is according to R. Judah b. Agra regarded as night. Does not this then present a contradiction between two rulings of R. Judah b. Agra?56 In the absence of Rabbi's interpretations57 there would well be no difficulty, since the former ruling might refer to a case where she has examined herself in R. Judah's twilight and not in that of R. Jose while here it is a case where she has examined herself in R. Jose's twilight as in that of R. Judah's; but with Rabbi's interpretations58 does not the contradiction arise? - Two Tannas expressed different views as to the opinion of R. Judah b. Agra. The first Tanna holds that the twilight of R. Judah ends first

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(1) This is discussed presently.
(2) In the dispute between R. Judah b. Agra and the Rabbis,
(3) Each day at twilight.
(4) Which was examined for the first time on the third day when a stain of the size of two beans was discovered. As it is thus unknown when the stain was made, the possibility must be taken into consideration that there may have been a discharge at the twilight of each, or at least one, of the two days; and, since a discharge at twilight counts as two (one for the passing and one for the coming day), that she had experienced no less than three discharges on three consecutive days.
(5) Which extends after sunset for a time during which one can walk a distance of a thousand cubits.
(6) Which lasts no longer than a 'wink of the eye', beginning and ending later than R. Judah's twilight.
(7) When she had ascertained that on that day she was clean, Any subsequent discharge at the twilight of R. Jose could only be counted as one for the following day. The total of her discharges cannot consequently have been more than two.
(8) Cf. prev. n. but one, As it is possible that there was a discharge at that time
(which counts as both possible day and possible night) the woman must be treated as if she experienced two discharges (one on the passing, and one on the incoming day) in addition to the discharge on the other day in question, thus making a total of three discharges.
(9) Euphemism.
(10) Of R. Judah.
(11) As far as the Rabbis are concerned.
(12) Since it would have been definitely established that during the passing day no discharge had occurred.
(13) That a general statement was made that the discharge is always ascribed to one day only.
(14) During the twilight of R. Judah.
(15) And this would count as two.
(16) That the possibility of zibah is to be considered even where a stain is not big enough to be divided into three parts, each of the prescribed minimum.
(17) Since Rabbi stated that only in this case he accepted the ruling of R. Judah b. Agra, it follows that where she did examine herself he does not accept his ruling though R. Judah himself maintains that the possibility of zibah must be considered even in the latter case.
(18) Since 'no examination' only means the absence of one in R. Jose's twilight though one did take place in R. Judah's twilight.
(19) Cf. prev. n. but one.
(20) The twilight of R. Judah and the twilight of R. Jose.
(21) Making sure that on that day there was no discharge. How then could one subsequent possible discharge in the night be counted as two?
(22) Of the expression 'she did not examine',
(23) So that the possibility must be considered that she may have experienced a discharge in R. Judah's twilight.
(24) Thus ascertaining that she was clean on that day.
(25) Which is regarded as night.
(26) Since one discharge in the night cannot possibly be counted as two discharges.
(27) Who on this point disagrees with R. Judah.
(28) Cf. prev. n. but two
(29) And it is in this case only that Rabbi stated that the ruling of the Sages is acceptable but, it follows, where she examined herself in neither, though the Rabbis still maintain that the possibility of zibah need not be considered he holds that it must be taken into consideration.
(30) Cf. prev. n.
(31) Lit., 'in the two'. The twilights of R. Judah and R. Jose respectively.
(32) In consequence of which she may have experienced a discharge at twilight when the one discharge is counted as two. How then could the possibility of zibah be ruled out?
(33) Of the expression 'she did examine', in Rabbi's approval of the ruling of the Sages.
(34) According to Rabbi who in this case disagrees with the Sages' ruling.
(35) It being possible that she experienced a discharge in R. Jose's twilight when one discharge is counted as two.
(36) Who on this point disagrees with the Sages.
(37) Cf. prev. n. but one.
(38) Lit., 'a difficulty of Rabbi on Rabbi'. According to the inference from the first clause R. Jose's twilight is regarded by him as right while according to the inference from the final clause it is doubtful whether it is day or night.
(39) Rabbi.
(40) That the possibility of a discharge at twilight is to be considered.
(41) Not to himself; sc. Rabbi did not express any opinion as to what view he accepted and with whom he agreed (as was previously assumed when the contradiction was pointed out) but merely explained the extent and limits of the dispute between the Sages and R. Judah b. Agra.
(42) In maintaining that the possibility (cf. p. 368, n. 14) may be disregarded.
(43) Thus ascertaining that there was no discharge at twilight.
(44) Which in their opinion is regarded as night.
(45) Cf. p. 368 n. 14. R. Jose, however, who holds his twilight to be a doubtful time, takes into consideration the possibility of a discharge in his twilight which would be regarded as two, one of which must be attributed to the passing, and the other to the incoming day.
(46) With what had been said supra that according to R. Judah b. Agra it is not certain whether the twilight of R. Jose is night or day.
(47) One that can be divided into three stains each of which is slightly bigger than the size of a bean.
(48) Which counts as two.
(49) Sc. one not bigger than a little more than the size of two beans, so that it can only be divided into two stains of the prescribed minimum.
(50) R. Jose.
(51) On the seventh day after menstruation.
(52) Lit., 'separated in cleanness'.
(53) Two and a half seasonal hours before nightfall.
(54) Though in the morning she made sure of her cleanness.
(55) Of course she would, and in consequence she would not be allowed to undergo immersion in the evening. Thus it follows that in the absence of an examination, the possibility of a discharge is considered. Similarly in the case of the stain under discussion, since no examination was held at twilight, the possibility of a discharge that must be counted as two must be taken into consideration.
(56) According to his first ruling supra the twilight of R. Jose is only a doubtful time while according to his present ruling it is definitely night.
(57) Both here and supra.
(58) Which inevitably lead to the conclusion (as stated supra) that, according to the first ruling, R, Judah b. Agra holds R. Jose's twilight to be a doubtful time, while according to his second ruling, it is definitely night.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 53b

and then begins the twilight of R. Jose,1 while the second Tanna holds that the twilight of R. Jose is absorbed in that of R. Judah.2

Our Rabbis taught: A woman who observes a bloodstain causes uncleanness to herself3 and to consecrated things retrospectively;4 so Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Eleazar ruled: She causes uncleanness5 to consecrated things but does not cause uncleanness to herself, since her bloodstain cannot be subject to greater restrictions than her observation.6 But7 do we not find that her bloodstain is subject to greater restrictions in regard to consecrated things? - Read rather thus: R. Simeon b. Eleazar ruled, Even to consecrated things she conveys no uncleanness,8 since her bloodstain should in no case be subject to greater restrictions than her observation.6

Our Rabbis taught: If a woman observed first a bloodstain and then9 she observed a discharge of blood she may for a period of twenty-four hours ascribe her stain to her observation;10 so Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Eleazar ruled: Only during the same day.11 Said Rabbi: His view seems more acceptable than mine, since he improves12 her position while I make it worse. 'He improves it'! Does he not in fact13 make it worse? - Rabina replied: Reverse the statement,14 R. Nahman said: You need not really reverse it, [the meaning being:] Since he improves her position in regard to the laws of zibah while I make her position worse as regards the laws of zibah.15

R. Zera enquired of R. Assi: Do stains16 necessitate an interval of cleanness17 or not? The other remained silent, answering him nothing at all. Once he18 found him19 as he was sitting at his studies and discoursing as follows: 'She may for twenty-four hours ascribe her stain to her observation. This is the ruling of Rabbi. In connection with this Resh Lakish explained that it applied only where she has examined herself,20 while R. Johanan explained: Even though she did not examine herself'.21 'Thus it follows', he18 said to him,19 'that22 stains necessitate an interval of cleanness'. 'Yes', the other19 replied. 'But did I not ask you this question many a time and you gave me no answer at all? It is likely that you recalled the tradition23 in the rapidity of your reviewing?'24 - 'Yes', the other replied, 'in the rapidity of my reviewing I recalled it'.

MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN OBSERVED A DISCHARGE OF BLOOD ON THE ELEVENTH DAY25 AT TWILIGHT,26 AT THE BEGINNING OF A MENSTRUATION PERIOD AND AT THE END OF A MENSTRUATION PERIOD,27 AT THE BEGINNING OF A ZIBAH PERIOD AND AT THE END OF A ZIBAH PERIOD,27 ON THE FORTIETH DAY AFTER THE BIRTH OF A MALE28 OR ON THE EIGHTIETH DAY AFTER THE BIRTH OF A FEMALE,29 [THE DISCHARGE HAVING BEEN OBSERVED] AT TWILIGHT IN ALL THESE CASES,30 BEHOLD WOMEN IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES31 ARE IN A STATE OF PERPLEXITY.32 SAID R. JOSHUA: BEFORE YOU MAKE PROVISION FOR THE FOOLISH WOMEN33 COME AND MAKE PROVISION FOR THE WISE ONES.34

GEMARA. AT THE BEGINNING OF A MENSTRUATION PERIOD AND AT THE END OF A MENSTRUATION PERIOD! Is it35 not rather the beginning of a menstruation period and the end of a zibah period?36 - R. Hisda replied: It is this that was meant: IF A WOMAN OBSERVED A DISCHARGE OF BLOOD ON THE ELEVENTH DAY AT TWILIGHT a time which is THE BEGINNING OF A MENSTRUATION PERIOD AND THE END OF A ZIBAH PERIOD, or on the seventh day of her menstruation when it is THE END OF A MENSTRUATION PERIOD AND THE BEGINNING OF A ZIBAH PERIOD.

SAID R. JOSHUA: BEFORE YOU MAKE PROVISION FOR THE FOOLISH WOMEN etc. But are these

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(1) Hence it is uncertain whether it still belongs to the day or to the following night.
(2) And since in his opinion the examination must extend over all the twilight of the latter it obviously covers also the twilight of the former, so that the examination took place in both twilights.
(3) Sc. if she was in the process of counting her clean days she must start anew (Tosaf.).
(4) To the time the article on which the stain was found had been washed.
(5) Retrospectively.
(6) In the latter case the uncleanness is retrospective for twenty-four hours only, while in the former it would go back to the time the article had been washed.
(7) Since R. Simeon b. Eleazar agrees with Rabbi in the case of consecrated things.
(8) Retrospectively.
(9) Within twenty-four hours.
(10) Sc. her uncleanness does not extend retrospectively to the time the article had been washed but begins at the time the stain was found.
(11) Sc. only where the stain was observed on the same day as the discharge of the blood may the former be ascribed to the latter (cf. prev. n.); but if the stain was discovered in the daytime while the blood was not observed until after sunset, though this took place within twenty-four hours, the former cannot be ascribed to the latter.
(12) This is discussed presently.
(13) By reducing the period of twenty-four hours.
(14) Reading, 'my view seems more acceptable etc.'.
(15) According to Rabbi who for a period of twenty-four hours ascribes the stain to the observation of the blood the woman is deemed to have been unclean on the day of her observation as well as on the previous day. If, therefore, she were to observe some blood on the next day following she would be regarded as a confirmed zabah, while according to R. Simeon who ascribes a stain to blood observed during the same day only the woman would be deemed unclean on one day only and could not become a confirmed zabah unless blood was observed on the two following days also (R. Han.).
(16) According to Rabbi who attributes a stain to an observation of blood if the latter took place within twenty-four hours, and does not regard the woman's uncleanness as having begun at the time the article (on which the stain was found) had been washed,
(17) Sc. must the woman have examined herself between the time the article had been washed and the discovery of the stain? (Tosaf.).
(18) R. Zera.
(19) R. Assi.
(20) Near the time of discovering the stain, within twenty-four hours; but if twenty-four hours have passed between the examination and the discovery of the stain the woman is deemed unclean retrospectively from the time of the examination (Tosaf.).
(21) Sc. near the examination between which and the discovery of the stain an interval of twenty-four hours had been allowed to pass. Despite this interval the woman's uncleanness is not retrospective since less than twenty-four hours have passed between the time the article had been washed and the discovery on it of the stain. As the uncleanness in such a case is not retrospective to the time of the washing of the article, it is equally not retrospective over the twenty-four hours' period (Tosaf.). Cf. Tosaf. Asheri.
(22) According to both Resh Lakish and R. Johanan.
(23) Lit., 'it came to thee'.
(24) Cf. Jast,
(25) After the termination of a menstruation period. Any issue of blood within the eleven days is deemed to be zibah.
(26) A time which is neither certain day nor certain night, so that it is doubtful whether the issue was one of zibah or one of menstruation. If the time were certain day the issue (cf. prev. n.) would be zibah and if it were certain night (when a new menstruation period commences) it would be menstrual.
(27) This is discussed in the Gemara infra.
(28) All discharges of blood from the eighth to the fortieth day after the birth of a male is regarded as clean and after that begins the menstruation period of seven days followed by the zibah one of eleven days.
(29) From the fifteenth to the eightieth day after the birth of a female all discharges of blood are clean and after the eightieth day the menstruation period followed by that of zibah (cf. prev. n.) begins.
(30) Cf. prev. n. but three.
(31) Lit., 'these'.
(32) Lit., 'erring', as regards the counting of the clean and unclean days prescribed in the various cases mentioned; because they are unable to determine on which of the 'two days involved they had observed the discharge.
(33) Those of the type just mentioned.
(34) Women who observed their discharges in the day or the night when no doubt arises. This is further explained in a Baraitha cited infra.
(35) The twilight of THE ELEVENTH DAY.
(36) Since the zibah period which began after the seventh day of the menstruation period terminated at the conclusion of the eleventh day when a second menstruation period begins.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 54a

FOOLISH WOMEN? Are they not merely IN A STATE OF PERPLEXITY?1 - Rather read: Women who are in a state of perplexity. For2 it was taught: [If a woman is alternately] unclean on one day and clean on the next,3 she may perform her marital duty4 on the eighth day,5 the night following being included,6 and on four nights out of every eighteen days.7 If, however, she observed any issue in the evening,8 she performs her marital duty on the eighth day9 only.10 [If she is alternately] unclean11 for two days and clean for two days, she may perform her marital duty on the eighth,12 the twelfth,13 the sixteenth14 and the twentieth.15 But why is she not allowed to perform her marital duty on the nineteenth?16 - R. Shesheth replied: This17 proves that the 'gluttony'18 of which we have learnt19 is forbidden. R. Ashi20 replied: Granted that the eleventh day21 requires no safeguard,22 the tenth day23 at any rate does require a safeguard.24 If she is alternately unclean for three days and clean for three days, she may perform her marital duty on two days25 and may never again perform it.26 If she is alternately unclean for four days and clean for four days she performs her marital duty on one day,27 and may never again perform it.28 If she is alternately unclean for five days and clean for five days, she performs her marital duty on three days29 and may never again perform it.28 If she is alternately unclean for six days and clean for six days she performs her marital duty on five days30 and may never again perform it.28 If she is alternately unclean for seven days and clean for seven days, she may perform her marital duty during a quarter of her lifetime, [seven days]31 out of each twenty-eight days.32 If she is alternately unclean for eight days and clean for eight days, she may perform her marital duty on fifteen days33 out of every forty-eight days.34 But is not the number35 fourteen?36 - R. Adda b. Isaac replied: This proves that the days of her menstruation in which she observes no discharge37 are reckoned in the counting38 prescribed for her zibah;39 for the question was raised:

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(1) V. supra p. 373, n. 6.
(2) The following series of rules applies to the WISE ONES of which R. Joshua spoke.
(3) Sc. is discharging blood every alternate day.
(4) If the discharge never occurs in the night.
(5) Counting from the one on which her first discharge was observed. On the eighth day her cleanness is established beyond any possible doubt since her unclean period of menstruation terminated with the seventh, and the eighth is one of her alternate clean days.
(6) Lit., 'and its night with it', since (cf. Prev. n. but one) she never discharges any blood in the night.
(7) Again counting from the day of the first discharge (cf. prev. n. but one). As she never discharges on three consecutive days she can never become a major zabah (who must allow seven clean days to pass before she can attain cleanness). When she discharges on the ninth day (one of the alternate unclean days) she, as a minor zabah (the discharge having taken place within the eleven days of the zibah period which began on the eighth), must allow one clean day (the tenth) to pass and may perform her marital duty in the night following it. Observing a discharge on the eleventh day (one of the alternate unclean days) she allows the twelfth day to pass and performs her duty in the night that follows. Similarly she may perform her marital duty on the nights following respectively the fourteenth and the sixteenth. By the time eighteen days have passed with the sunset of the eighteenth day she has, in addition to the eighth day and night following it, the four nights that follow respectively the tenth, twelfth, fourteenth and sixteenth day. The night following the eighteenth day is again one in which performance of marital duty is permitted, but it belongs to the next cycle. On the nineteenth, the seven days of menstruation begin again and the cycle is repeated.
(8) Of the alternate unclean days.
(9) After her first discharge, sc. the day and the night preceding it. On the day she is definitely clean since her discharge does not appear until evening, and in the previous night she is also clean since with the day preceding it (the seventh) her unclean menstruation period had come to an end.
(10) During the first seven days she is unclean as a menstruant and in the night following the eighth (one of the alternate unclean nights) she is unclean as a minor zabah (the zibah period having commenced on the eighth) and must consequently allow one day, the ninth, to pass. On the night following the ninth (another of the alternate unclean nights) she is again unclean as a minor zabah and must again allow a day, the tenth, to pass, and so on until the termination of eighteen days when a new cycle of the same number of days begins in which again she is allowed marital duty on the eighth day and the night preceding it only.
(11) The discharge making its appearance (as is also the case in all the following rulings) in the evenings.
(12) Which (with the night preceding) is the second of the two alternating clean days and (unlike the first of these two days) follows the immersion on the seventh day of the unclean seven days of the menstruation period.
(13) The preceding night included, On the ninth and the tenth (two of the alternating unclean days) she is (since these days are within her zibah period) a minor zabah and must in consequence allow the eleventh also to pass, performing immersion in the evening of that day and thus attaining cleanness on the twelfth.
(14) Including also the night preceding it. On the thirteenth and fourteenth (cf. prev. n. mut. mut.) she is a minor zabah, the fifteenth is the day she must allow to pass and in the evening of which she performs immersion and attains cleanness by the sixteenth.
(15) Cf, prev. n. mut. mut. The uncleanness on the twenty-first and twenty-second is already part of a menstruation period and belongs to the next cycle.
(16) The day following the eleventh day of the zibah period, which (as stated infra 72b) need not be passed before cleanness is attained.
(17) The prohibition of marital intercourse on the nineteenth.
(18) Lit., 'glutton'.
(19) Infra 72a: If a woman observed a discharge on the eleventh day of her zibah period, and performed immersion on the twelfth, and, after intercourse, again observed a discharge, her husband (who had not the patience to allow the twelfth day to pass) is described by Beth Hillel as a glutton.
(20) Maintaining that 'gluttony' is not forbidden,
(21) Of the zibah period (the eighteenth in the cycle).
(22) Sc. allowing one clean day to pass after it before cleanness is attained.
(23) The seventeenth in the cycle which is also one of the two alternating unclean days.
(24) Cf. prev. n. but one. As the day following it (the eleventh of zibah or the eighteenth in the cycle) is an unclean one, the next clean day (the nineteenth in the cycle) must be allowed to pass as a safeguard. Hence it is that marital intercourse cannot in this case be permitted before the twentieth.
(25) The eleventh and twelfth after her first discharge. On the first seven days she is unclean as a menstruant, on the eighth and the ninth (two of the alternating three unclean days) being within the eleven days of the zibah period, she is unclean as a minor zabah, and the tenth must be allowed to pass as a safeguard against these days.
(26) Since after the twelfth day she will never attain cleanness. The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth (three of the alternating three unclean days) will be unclean days within her zibah period that subject her to the restrictions of a major zabah who cannot attain cleanness before seven clean days have passed, but (owing to these three alternating unclean days) she will never experience a full period of seven clean days.
(27) The eighth, the first day after her first unclean menstruation period, which is the last of the second group of four clean days.
(28) Cf. prev. n, but one mut. mut.
(29) The eighth, ninth and tenth (immediately following the first menstruation period) being the last three of the first group of five clean days.
(30) The eighth to twelfth. Cf. prev. n. mut. mut.
(31) That follow the unclean seven days of the menstruation period.
(32) Made up as follows: Seven unclean days of menstruation, seven days of cleanness (in which marital intercourse is permitted), seven days of uncleanness in which the woman becomes a major zabah and seven days that must be counted after the confirmed zibah; and so on with each cycle of twenty-eight days.
(33) The tenth to the sixteenth (seven days), the twenty-sixth to the thirty-second (seven days) and the forty-eighth (7 + 7 + 1 = 15 days). Cf. foll. n.
(34) Composed as follows: Eight unclean days (the last of which being the first of the eleven days of zibah turns the woman into a minor zabah); one day (the first of the second group of eight days) that must be allowed to pass by a minor zabah before cleanness is attained, and seven clean days in which marital intercourse is permitted; two days (the first of the third group of eight days) of zibah (being the last two of the eleven days of the first zibah period) and six days of the second menstruation period; one day (the first of the fourth group of eight days) completing the seventh day of menstruation, and seven days in which marital intercourse is permitted; eight days of uncleanness (the fifth group of eight days during the first three of which she becomes a major zabah); seven days (the first of the sixth group) that serve as the number of days prescribed for a major zabah and one day (the last of the sixth group and the forty-eighth day in the cycle) in which marital intercourse is permitted.
(35) Lit. 'behold they are', the days on which marital intercourse is permitted.
(36) Since the forty-eighth day should be excluded. It is now assumed that in the sixth group of eight days five clean days only are available for the prescribed counting, since the first three days of the group completed a menstruation period that began on the fifth day of the fifth group, and, since seven clean days have not yet passed, the forty-eighth, as the day following it, should be equally forbidden for marital intercourse.
(37) As is the case with the first three days of the sixth group in which she was clean.
(38) Sc. of the seven days.
(39) Since the counting thus begins with the first day of the sixth group of eight days it terminates (cf. prev. n.) on the seventh. On the eighth day, the forty-eighth of the cycle, the woman having attained cleanness and undergone immersion on the preceding night, marital intercourse is permitted.

Talmud - Mas. Nidah 54b

May the days succeeding childbirth1 on which the woman observes no discharge2 be reckoned in the counting prescribed for her zibah?3 R. Kahana replied, Come and hear: If a woman4 observed a discharge on two days, and on the third day she miscarried but was unaware what she miscarried, behold this is a case of doubtful zibah and doubtful birth5 and6 she must bring a sacrifice7 which may not be eaten8 while the days succeeding her childbirth9 on which she observes no discharge are reckoned in the counting prescribed for her zibah.10 R. Papa retorted: There11 the case is quite different,12 since it might be assumed11 that she gave birth to a male child,13 so that all the extra seven days that we impose upon her14 may well be reckoned in the counting prescribed for her zibah.15 Said R. Huna son of R. Joshua to R. Papa: Is there11 only the doubt of having given birth to a male child, and is there no doubt as to the possibility of the birth of a female child?16 But the fact is that17 you may well infer from here that they18 may be reckoned.19 This is conclusive.

If a woman is alternately unclean for nine days and clean for nine days she may have marital intercourse on eight days out of every eighteen days.20 If she is alternately unclean for ten days and clean for ten days, the days in which she is permitted marital intercourse are the same in number as the days of her zibah.21 And the same22 applies to cycles of a hundred23 and so also to cycles of a thousand.24

CHAPTER 7

MISHNAH. THE BLOOD OF A MENSTRUANT AND THE FLESH OF A CORPSE CONVEY UNCLEANNESS WHEN WET AND WHEN DRY. BUT THE ISSUE, PHLEGM AND SPITTLE OF A ZAB, A DEAD CREEPING THING, A CARCASS AND SEMEN CONVEY UNCLEANNESS WHEN WET BUT NOT WHEN DRY. IF, HOWEVER, ON BEING SOAKED, THEY ARE CAPABLE OF REVERTING TO THEIR ORIGINAL CONDITION THEY CONVEY UNCLEANNESS WHEN WET AND WHEN DRY. AND WHAT IS THE DURATION25 OF THEIR SOAKING?26 TWENTY-FOUR HOURS IN LUKEWARM WATER.27 R. JOSE RULED: IF THE FLESH OF A CORPSE IS DRY, AND ON BEING SOAKED CANNOT REVERT TO ITS ORIGINAL CONDITION, IT IS CLEAN.28

GEMARA. Whence are these rulings29 deduced? - Hezekiah replied: From Scripture which says, And of her that is sick with her impurity,30 her impurity31 is like herself, as she conveys her uncleanness so does her impurity convey similar uncleanness. Thus we find the law concerning wet blood,32 whence the deduction concerning dry blood? - R. Isaac replied: Scripture said, Be,33 it shall retain its original force.34 But might it not be suggested that this35 applies only to blood that was wet and then dried up; whence, however, the deduction that it applies also to blood that was originally36 dry? And, furthermore, with reference to what we have learnt, 'If a woman aborted an object that was like a rind, like earth, like a hair, like red flies, let her put it in water and if it dissolves she is unclean', whence is this37 deduced? - 'Be'38 is an inclusive statement.39 If [it be argued:] As she causes couch and seat to convey uncleanness to man and to his garments40 so should her blood also cause couch and garment to convey uncleanness to man and his garments. [it can be retorted:] Is then her blood capable of using a couch or a seat?41 - But according to your argument42 [it could also be objected]: Is a leprous stone43 capable of using a couch or a seat that a text should be required to exclude it?44 For it was taught. 'It might have been presumed that a leprous stone should cause a couch and a seat to convey uncleanness to man and to his garments, this being arrived at logically, for if a zab who does not convey uncleanness by means of entry45 causes couch and seat to convey uncleanness to man and to his garments, how much more then should a leprous stone, which does convey uncleanness by means of entry,46 convey uncleanness to couch and seat to convey it to man and his garments, hence it was specifically stated, He that hath the issue,47 implying only 'he that hath the issue' [is subject to the restriction]48 but not a leprous stone'. Now the reason49 is that Scripture has excluded it, but if that had not been the case it would have conveyed the uncleanness, would it not?50 - A reply may indeed be forthcoming from this very statement,51 for did you not say. 'He that hath the issue52 [is subject to the restriction] but not a leprous stone'? Well here also Scripture said, Whereon she sitteth,53 only she but not her blood.

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(1) Which took place in zibah that immediately ceased.
(2) But is nevertheless Pentateuchally unclean.
(3) So that at the conclusion of seven days, and the due performance of immersion, she is exempt from the restrictions that are imposed upon a zabah.
(4) During the eleven days of her zibah period.
(5) Since it is possible that she gave birth to a proper child and that no bleeding accompanied it, in which case it is a valid birth and no zibah. It is equally possible that the birth was not that of a proper child and that it was accompanied by a flow of blood, in which case it is a proper zibah and no valid birth. It is also possible that the birth was a proper one and that it was accompanied by bleeding in which case it is both a valid birth and a proper zibah. It is equally possible that there was neither proper birth nor bleeding so that there was neither zibah nor valid birth.
(6) Adopting the most restrictive course in order to meet all possible circumstances,
(7) In case the birth was a valid one.
(8) Since it is possible that the birth was not valid, that in consequence no sacrifice was required, and that the bird that was mistakenly killed in the manner prescribed for a sacrifice was, therefore, nebelah,
(9) During the first fourteen days of which, since it is possible that the birth was that of a female, the woman is unclean even though no discharge was observed,
(10) To the restrictions of which she is subject on account of the possibility that the miscarriage was accompanied by bleeding. Thus it has been shown that the days succeeding childbirth on which no discharge is observed are reckoned in the counting prescribed for a zabah.
(11) In the case just cited by R. Kahana where uncertainties exist,
(12) From that discussed supra 54a where no doubtful factor is involved,
(13) After the birth of whom a woman is unclean for seven days only.
(14) A total of fourteen days as a precaution against the possibility that the birth was that of a female child.
(15) Had it, however, been certain that the birth was that of a female child (similar to the certainty supra 54a) the days succeeding birth could not be reckoned in the counting prescribed for a zabah.
(16) Of course there is. The birth of the latter is as possible as the birth of the former and the possibility, therefore, exists that the woman is unclean for fourteen days.
(17) Lit., 'but not'.
(18) The days succeeding a childbirth during which no discharge is observed.
(19) In the seven days prescribed for a zabah.
(20) In the first group of nine days she is a menstruant during the first seven days and a minor zabah on the last two days; and in the second group of nine days she allows the first day to pass (as prescribed for a minor zabah) while in the remaining eight days, being fully clean, she is permitted marital intercourse. The same process is repeated in every cycle of eighteen day.
(21) During the first ten days she is a menstruant for seven days and a zabah during the last three days, while during the second group of ten days she counts the prescribed seven days and has three days left in which she is clean and permitted marital intercourse. The three latter days are thus equal in number to the three days of her zibah.
(22) That the number of days in which marital intercourse is permitted is equal to the number of the days of zibah.
(23) The woman is menstrual during the first seven days of the first hundred and is a zabah during the remaining ninety-three days, while the first seven days of the second hundred are counted as the days prescribed after the zibah and in the remaining ninety-three days she is permitted marital intercourse.
(24) Cf. prev. n. mut. mut.
(25) Sc. the maximum time.
(26) To cause them to be regarded as CAPABLE OF REVERTING TO THEIR ORIGINAL CONDITION.
(27) But if they do not resume their original freshness unless soaked for a longer time or in warmer water they convey uncleanness when wet only.
(28) V. Gemara.
(29) That the blood of menstruation conveys uncleanness by contact and carriage.
(30) Lev. XV, 33, emphasis on 'her' and 'impurity'.
(31) Sc. menstrual blood.
(32) Which is its natural state when discharged from the body.
(33) Her issue . . be blood (Lev. XV, 19).
(34) Lit., 'in its being it shall be'.
(35) Retention of its original force.
(36) Sc. when it was discovered. Cf. the cited Mishnah that follows.
(37) That subsequent solution renders the originally dry object unclean.
(38) Her issue . . . be blood (Lev. XV, 29).
(39) Covering all the objects mentioned.
(40) Sc. she does not merely convey to them an uncleanness of a degree next to, and lower than her own but one, that of 'father of uncleanness', which is on a par with hers. Only a 'father of uncleanness' can effect the uncleanness of a man.
(41) Of course not. The analogy, therefore, cannot be drawn.
(42) That since blood cannot use a couch or a seat it cannot cause it to be a 'father of uncleanness'.
(43) Cf. Lev. XIV, 34ff.
(44) From the restriction of causing a couch and a seat to become 'fathers of uncleanness'.
(45) If a clean person enters with a zab into the same house the former does not thereby become unclean.
(46) Cf. Lev. XIV, 46.
(47) Lev. XV, 4.
(48) Of causing couch and seat to convey uncleanness to man and his garments.
(49) Why a leprous stone was excluded from the restriction (cf. prev. n.).
(50) Though it is not capable of using couch or seat.
(51) Lit., 'and from it'.
(52) Lev. XV, 4.
(53) Lev. XV. 23. emphasis on 'she'.

 

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