The Babylonian Talmud

Temurah

 

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 18a

If to a guilt-offering,1 there is a traditional law that it goes to pasture,2 since according to tradition wherever a sin-offering is left to die, a guilt-offering in a similar case goes to pasture! - One may still say that we are referring to a sin-offering. The traditional law, however, refers to its death,whereas the Scriptural text only refers to the restriction upon offering it. But does not one depend On the other? For since it is condemned to die then automatically it is not offered?3 - Rather the traditional law refers to a sin-offering and the Scriptural text ['rak'] excludes the exchange of a guilt-offering [from death]. But is not this too a traditional law, for it is said: 'Wherever the law is that a sin-offering is left to die, a guilt-offering is left to pasture'? Rather the text ['rak'] is required for the case where he transgressed and offered, making him guilty of breaking a positive command.4

'R. Akiba says: There is no need [to derive the limitation from 'rak'] etc. It is offered but its exchange is not offered'. What need is there for the text?5 Is there not a traditional law in this connection?6 - Yes, that is so. Then what need is there for the Scriptural text? It is required for R. Huna's teaching.7 For R. Huna said: If an animal dedicated as a guilt-offering8 has been condemned to pasture9 [until it dies a natural death] and the owner killed it10 [without stating for what specific sacrifice], it is fit for a burnt-offering.11 Now R. Huna says: 'Which has been condemned to pasture', but if it has not been condemned to pasture, it would not be so.12 What is the reason? Scripture says: It,13 it remains in the same status.14

And according to the Tanna who derives [the cases of the young of peace-offerings etc.] from these Scriptural texts,15 why not derive this from the text: 'If it be a male or female'?16 - That17 text is required to teach the cases of the young of blemished animals and the exchange of blemished animals.18 But why not derive all these cases19 from this text?20 The phrase 'if it be' does not teach this according to him.21 And the Tanna who derives [the teaching concerning the young and exchange of a peace-offering etc.] from the text: 'If it be a male or female', what does he do with the text: 'Thou shalt take and go'? - Even22 [if you have to take them away] from their pastures.23 Another version: Even [if you have to take them away] from their threshing sledges.24

MISHNAH. R. ELIEZER SAYS: THE YOUNG OF A PEACE-OFFERING MUST NOT BE OFFERED AS A PEACE-OFFERING,25 WHEREAS THE SAGES SAY IT MAY BE OFFERED. SAID R. SIMEON: THERE IS NO DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM AS REGARDS THE YOUNG OF THE YOUNG OF A PEACE-OFFERING OR THE YOUNG OF THE YOUNG OF AN EXCHANGE THAT THEY ARE NOT OFFERED. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS THE CASE OF THE YOUNG [OF A PEACE-OFFERING], R. ELIEZER SAYING: IT MAY NOT BE OFFERED, WHEREAS THE SAGES SAY: IT MAY BE OFFERED. R. JOSHUA AND R. PAPIAS TESTIFIED REGARDING THE YOUNG OF A PEACE-OFFERING THAT IT IS OFFERED AS A PEACE-OFFERING. SAID R. PAPIAS: I TESTIFY THAT WE HAD A COW OF A PEACE-OFFERING AND WE ATE IT ON PASS OVER AND WE ATE ITS YOUNG AS A PEACE-OFFERING ON THE FESTIVAL.26

GEMARA. R. Ammi reported in the name of R. Johanan: What is the reason of R. Eliezer? - Scripture Says: And if [we'im] his offering be a sacrifice of a peace-offering,27 [and we interpret the im as] em ['mother'],28 thus excluding the young. Said R. Hiyya b. Abba to R. Ammi: If this is so [Scripture says]: If [im] he offer it for a thanksgiving,29 here too shall we [interpret the 'im'] as em, thus excluding the young? And if you say that it is so, has it not been taught: Whence do we derive that its young, its exchange and its substitution30 are all offered? The text states: 'If [im] he offer it for a thanksgiving' - in any case!31 - Rather said R. Hiyya b. Abba in the name of R. Johanan: This is the reason of R. Eliezer: [It32 is forbidden to be offered] lest we rear herds of them.33

SAID R. SIMEON: THERE IS NO DISPUTE etc. It was asked: How does [the Mishnah] mean: There is no divergent opinion that they are not offered, [all agreeing] that they are offered;34 or perhaps there is no dispute that [the second generation of offspring] are offered, [all agreeing] that they are not offered!35 - Said Rabbah: It is reasonable to suppose that [the meaning of the Mishnah] is: There is no divergent opinion that they are not offered, [all agreeing] that they are offered. What is the reason? R. Eliezer only disputes with the Rabbis in the case of the young [of a dedication],36 but as regards the young of the young of a dedication, it is a mere chance.37 R. Joshua b. Levi, however, says: There is no divergent opinion that they are offered, [all agreeing] that they are not offered. What is the reason? The Rabbis do not differ from R. Eliezer save in the case of the young [of a dedication] but in the case of the young of the young of a dedication, one can recognise from his action that he means to rear them.38

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(1) Some read here: The offspring of the exchange of a guilt-offering.
(2) If the reading is 'guilt-offering' above, then the Gemara could have answered that it is a male. The Gemara, however, wishes to find a different answer, as the answer concerning a male is already given (Tosaf.).
(3) Then what need is there for the word 'rak' to exclude the offering of the young of a sin-offering.
(4) Both in connection with a sin-offering and a guilt-offering there is a breach of a positive command if the offering actually took place, since the text says: 'Only thy holy things, etc.', referring to the exchange of a burnt-offering and a peace-offering, their offspring and their exchange, and the text continues: 'And thou shalt offer thy burnt-offering etc.' implying, but not other dedications as, for example, a sin-offering or a guilt-offering. This prohibition being derived by implication from a positive command is itself equivalent to a positive command (Rashi).
(5) To teach that a guilt-offering is not offered up.
(6) For wherever a sin-offering is condemned to die, a guilt-offering is condemned to pasture.
(7) Zeb. 5b.
(8) On account of its being lost at the time when the second guilt-offering was set aside in its place and had been offered up (R. Gershom).
(9) By the Temple authorities.
(10) The first guilt-offering now found and before it became blemished and unfit for the altar.
(11) For usually its money goes for a burnt-offering.
(12) Although the owner has procured atonement. Since, however, it had not yet been condemned to pasture and the owner killed it without saying for what particular sacrifice, it is entirely disqualified.
(13) Lev. V, 19.
(14) And it is still a guilt-offering and unfit to offer up in that capacity. Consequently it is disqualified.
(15) Quoted above, i.e.: 'Only thy holy things, etc.'.
(16) As interpreted above.
(17) 'If it be a male etc.'.
(18) That they are offered, and the cases of the young of an unblemished dedication and its exchange are derived from the text: 'Only thy holy things etc.'.
(19) The young of unblemished animals and blemished animals, the exchange of an unblemished animal and the exchange of a blemished animal, as being holy.
(20) 'If it be a male etc.' mentioned above, since we actually derive all these cases from this text.
(21) Therefore from the text 'a male' and 'a female' we infer the cases of the young of a blemished animal and the exchange of a blemished animal, and from the text, 'Only thy holy things' we infer the case of the young of an unblemished animal, and the case of the exchange of an unblemished animal we derive from the text, 'Thou shale take and go etc.', and 'thou shalt offer thy burnt-offering' (R. Gershom).
(22) The text, 'Thou shalt take and go' is not for the purpose of deriving the case of the young and exchange but for the dedicated animals themselves.
(23) If the Festival has arrived, he must not say that he will not trouble to collect the animals which are scattered on the pasture and that he will wait for another occasion to offer them, but he must take the animals as soon as possible and offer them.
(24) If the animals went by themselves into the threshing floor to thresh (for it is forbidden to do this deliberately, as this will be working a consecrated animal), he must take the animals away in order to bring them in the Temple.
(25) There being a Rabbinic enactment that it is condemned to die, since there are only five cases of sin-offering condemned to die.
(26) It is explained subsequently in the Gemara what Festival is meant.
(27) Lev. III, 1.
(28) אם with a change of vowel.
(29) Lev. VII, 12.
(30) E.g., if the animal were lost and he set apart another in its place, and the first animal was then found and both animals are before us.
(31) Including all the cases mentioned here and R. Eliezer does not differ.
(32) The young of a dedication.
(33) If you say that the young of a dedication has a remedy, he may detain the mother in order to give birth, and rear many herds from the offspring. There is therefore the danger that the animal may be shorn or worked. As regards the thanksgiving sacrifice, the Rabbis did not prohibit, for this kind of sacrifice is not so frequent as that of a peace-offering.
(34) For even R. Eliezer agrees that where there are two or more generations of offspring, people forget that they originally came from peace-offerings and therefore there is no fear that others will see that these are offered and will retain their peace-offerings in order to rear herds.
(35) Even the Sages agree here.
(36) As there is the fear that he will keep the mother in order to rear offspring and thus there is the danger of working and shearing dedicated animals.
(37) And it is unusual that he will detain the mother for such a long period.
(38) The very fact that he has retained the mother until the second generation proves that he is detaining them in order to rear them.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 18b

R. Hiyya1 taught in support of R. Joshua b. Levi: [Scripture says:] If he offer a lamb2 for his offering,3 implying that the first young is offered but the second young is not offered.4 It [a young of a peace-offering] is offered,5 but not the young of any other dedication. Now what young of [other] dedications [is excluded from being offered]? If of a burnt-offering and a guilt-offering, are they not male animals and not such as give birth to young? If of a sin-offering, is there not a traditional law that it is left to die? Said Rabina: [The exclusion refers to a] young [of a female animal] which came forth the tenth.6 What need is there for a text regarding the case of a young of an animal which came forth the tenth? Is this not derived from an analogy between 'passing' used in connection with tithe7 and 'passing'8 used in connection with a firstling?9 - The text10 is necessary. You might be inclined to assume that we cannot form an analogy between a case where there is an alternative and one where there is none.11 [The text, therefore] informs us that this is not so.12

R. JOSHUA AND R. PAPIAS TESTIFIED etc. And according to Raba who holds that after the lapse of one Festival one is guilty of the breaking of a positive command13 daily in not offering dedications, why was not the animal eaten on 'Azereth?14 - Said R. Zebid in the name of Raba: We must suppose that it was ill on Pentecost.15 R. Ashi says: The word hag [in the Mishnah] also means in reality the Festival of Weeks. And what will the other authority [R. Zebid] say [to this]?16 - Wherever the Tanna uses the term Pesach [Passover] he says 'Azereth.17 If so,18 then what is the point of the testimony [of R. Joshua]?19 - It is to exclude the teaching of R. Eliezer who holds that the young of a peace-offering is not offered as a peace-offering. Consequently he testifies that it is offered.

MISHNAH. THE YOUNG OF A THANKSGIVING OFFERING AND ITS EXCHANGE, THEIR YOUNG AND THE YOUNG OF THEIR YOUNG, UNTIL THE END OF ALL TIME, ARE CONSIDERED AS THANKSGIVING OFFERINGS,20 ONLY THEY DO NOT REQUIRE THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF LOAVES OF BREAD.21

GEMARA. Whence is this proved? Our Rabbis have taught: Why does it say: If he offer it for a thanksgiving?22 [Whence do we infer]23 that if one set aside a thanksgiving offering and it became lost and he separated another in its place, and the first was then found, and both [animals] are standing [before us], he can offer whichever he wishes and bring its bread? The text states: If for a thanksgiving he shall offer.24 One might think that the second animal requires the accompaniment of bread? The text, however, states: 'If he offer it', [the word 'it' implying that he brings] one [animal with the loaves of bread] but not two.25 Whence do we include [for offering] the case of the young [of a thanksgiving offering], exchanges and substitutions?26 The text states: 'If for a thanksgiving'. One might think that all these cases require the accompaniment [of loaves of bread]? The text states: With a sacrifice of thanksgiving,27 [implying that] the thanksgiving itself requires loaves of bread but its young, its exchange, and its substitution do not require the bringing of bread.

MISHNAH. THE EXCHANGE OF A BURNT-OFFERING, 28 THE YOUNG OF ITS EXCHANGE,29 ITS YOUNG AND THE YOUNG OF ITS YOUNG, UNTIL THE END OF TIME, ARE REGARDED As A BURNT-OFFERING: THEY REQUIRE FLAYING, CUTTING INTO PIECES AND TO BE ALTOGETHER BURNT. IF ONE SET ASIDE A FEMALE ANIMAL FOR A BURNT-OFFERING AND IT GAVE BIRTH TO A MALE, IT IS TO PASTURE UNTIL IT BECOMES UNFIT FOR SACRIFICE.30 IT IS THEN SOLD AND FOR ITS MONEY HE BRINGS A BURNT-OFFERING. R. ELIEZER31 HOWEVER, SAYS: THE [MALE] ANIMAL ITSELF IS OFFERED32 AS A BURNT-OFFERING.

GEMARA. Why is it that in the first clause33 [in our Mishnah above] the Rabbis do not differ,34 whereas in the latter clause35 the Rabbis do differ?36 - Said Rabbah b. Bar Hana: The first clause has been taught as a disputed opinion,37 being really the opinion of R. Eliezer. Raba says: You can even say that the first clause is in agreement with the Rabbis, for the Rabbis dispute with R. Eliezer38 only in the case of one who sets apart a female animal for a burnt-offering, since the mother is not offered [for a burnt-offering],39 but in the case of [the young of an] exchange [of a burnt-offering], where the mother40 is offered, even the Rabbis agree.41 But did R. Eliezer say [that the young of an exchange] is itself offered as a burnt-offering? Against this the following [is quoted] in contradiction: The exchange of a guilt-offering, the young of an exchange, their young and the young of their young until the end of time, are to go to pasture until they are unfit for sacrifice.42 They are then sold and the monies are applied for freewill-[offerings].43 R. Eleazar44 says: Let them die45 R. Eliezer46 Says: Let him buy burnt-offerings with their money.47 Now [he] only [brings an offering] for their money, but he must not bring the animal itself48 [as a burnt-offering]?49 - Said R. Hisda: R. Eliezer was arguing with the Rabbis from their own premises [as follows]: As far as I am concerned, I hold that even the young itself [of the exchange of a guilt-offering] is also offered as a burnt-offering. But according to your teaching, when you say that [it is not offered],50 at least admit that the surplus [of sacrificial appropriations]51 are applied to freewill-offerings of an individual.52 They [the Rabbis] however answer him: The surpluses are applied to freewill-offerings on behalf of the congregation.53

Raba says: R. Eliezer holds that the young itself is offered for a burnt-offering only in a case where one sets aside a female animal for a burnt-offering, because the mother has the name of a burnt-offering.54

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(1) Var. lec. R. Hanania. V. Sh. Mek.
(2) Keseb implying the young of the female flock mentioned in the preceding verse (Rashi).
(3) Lev. III, 7.
(4) Now this Baraitha must be according to the Rabbis, for according to R. Eliezer even the first young was not offered, and consequently supports the view of R. Joshua b. Levi. The prohibition here will only be of a Rabbinical character (the verse being adduced as mere mnemonic aid), for undoubtedly not to offer the second generation of offspring can only be a Rabbinical enactment, in case he keeps animals in order to rear herds (Tosaf.).
(5) For the text referred to a peace-offering.
(6) Then tithed.
(7) Whatsoever passeth under the rod (Ibid. XXVII, 32).
(8) And thou shalt set apart (Ex. XIII, 12).
(9) And in connection with a firstling no young is offered, as a firstling is a male animal.
(10) Lev. III, 7.
(11) As is the case with a firstling which is restricted to males, for it is not possible to have a young of a firstling.
(12) That we do draw the analogy between tithe and firstling.
(13) The text: And thither thou shalt come and thither ye shall bring your burnt-offerings (Deut. XII, 5 and 6), implying that one must bring one's offering on the very first Festival after its dedication; v. R.H. 6a.
(14) Pentecost, lit., 'the closing (festival)', Pentecost being regarded as the closing festival to Passover. On Passover itself it could not have been offered and eaten because as it was born on Passover possibly the necessary period of seven days had not elapsed before it could be eaten.
(15) And therefore it was eaten on the Feast of Tabernacles.
(16) Why not say that hag in the Mishnah actually means the Feast of Weeks?
(17) When referring to the Feast of Weeks, but does not call it hag. Since the Mishnah, however, says hag, then it must mean the Feast of Tabernacles. If, however, the Mishnah had referred to Pesach as the Hag (Feast) of Unleavened Bread, then it would have referred to 'Azereth as hag (Rashi).
(18) That hag means the Feast of Weeks or that it was ill and could not be brought as a sacrifice on the Feast of Weeks but that in reality the right period of bringing the offering was on the Feast of Weeks.
(19) If hag means the Feast of Tabernacles and it was not sick on the Feast of Weeks, the testimony of R. Papias teaches us something fresh, namely, it excludes Raba's teaching above. But if as you explain, the word hag actually means Pentecost or the reason why the young was brought and eaten on the Feast of Tabernacles was because it was sick and it could not be offered on the Feast of Weeks, what new point does he inform us?
(20) The limbs etc. are burnt on the altar and the flesh is eaten for a day and a night.
(21) As mentioned in Lev. VII, 12 and 13.
(22) Ibid. VII, 12. V. Sh. Mek. For Scripture could have said: If it be for a thanksgiving, ye shall offer etc. (R. Gershom).
(23) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(24) In any case, even a second animal is permitted to be offered up as a thanksgiving.
(25) The restriction, however, only refers to bread but not to the offering up of a second animal.
(26) Where the thanksgiving offering became lost and he set aside another in its place. Tosaf. observes that this is exactly the case mentioned above: If one sets aside a thanksgiving offering, etc. Wilna Gaon, however, adds that substitutions are included for offering even after the sacrificing of the first animal.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Where e.g., he exchanged a male for a burnt-offering.
(29) Where he exchanged a female for a burnt-offering and the exchange gave birth to a male.
(30) The reason why it is left to pasture is because the young's holiness came by virtue of the mother which is a female animal, a kind which is not fit for a burnt-offering. The mother herself being a female is certainly condemned to pasture.
(31) Var. lec. R. Eleazar, and so throughout.
(32) And is not left to pasture.
(33) In the case of the young of the exchange of a burnt-offering.
(34) But agree that these cases are to be considered as burnt-offerings.
(35) Where one separates a female animal for a burnt-offering and it gave birth to a male.
(36) The Rabbis maintaining that the animal is condemned to pasture but is not offered.
(37) It is a fact that even in the first clause in the Mishnah above in connection with the exchange of a burnt-offering and the young of an exchange, the Rabbis differ as they do in the latter clause, and hold that these are not regarded as burnt-offerings, the view of the Mishnah being that of R. Eliezer.
(38) And say that the animal is left to pasture.
(39) Being a female. Therefore they say its young is not offered.
(40) Not exactly the mother but the first dedication, the male burnt-offering, in virtue of which both the exchange and its young are holy, is offered, because it is a male animal. In the case, however, where one set aside a female animal for a burnt-offering, the first dedication was not fit for a burnt-offering.
(41) That it is considered a burnt-offering.
(42) The exchange of a guilt-offering is left to pasture, for wherever a sin-offering is left to die, a guilt-offering in similar circumstances is left to pasture, the exchange of a sin-offering being one of the five sin-offerings which is condemned to die.
(43) To purchase offerings with the money on behalf of the congregation.
(44) Far. lec. R. Eliezer.
(45) For he holds that a guilt-offering has the same law as a sin-offering in this respect.
(46) Var. lec. R. Eleazar.
(47) As a private sacrifice, but he cannot buy guilt-offerings. The same applies in the case of the young of the exchange of a guilt-offering, the young being sold after becoming blemished and a burnt-offering being bought with the money.
(48) I.e., the young of the exchange.
(49) Consequently we see that R. Eliezer (or according to var. lec. R. Eleazar) holds that since the mother is unfit for a burnt-offering, being a female, the young also cannot be offered as a burnt-offering. Why then does R. Eliezer say in the Mishnah of a female animal dedicated as a burnt-offering that its young, a male, can be offered as a burnt-offering?
(50) So Sh. Mek. Cur. edd.: That it is left to pasture. Bah: That its money is applied for a burnt-offering.
(51) I.e., the value of the young (R. Gershom).
(52) I.e., for a burnt-offering.
(53) I.e., one cannot buy a burnt-offering for an individual with the money.
(54) For since we find in connection with birds that a burnt-offering can also be a female, therefore although the animal set aside for a burnt-offering is a female, it retains the name of the burnt-offering. Moreover, when it is sold, a burnt-offering can be bought with the money i.e., it has the name of a burnt-offering (Rashi).

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 19a

But in the case of exchange1 of a guilt-offering, where the mother has not the name of a burnt-offering,2 [R.Eliezer] also agrees that [one can buy a burnt-offering] with its money but that [the animal] itself is not offered.

Abaye raised an objection: But does R. Eliezer indeed require that the mother should have the name of a burnt-offering? Has it not been taught: If one sets aside a female animal for a passover sacrifice, it is to pasture until unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and a Passover sacrifice [a male] is bought with its money. If it gave birth [before Passover], it [the young] is to pasture until it is unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and a passover sacrifice is bought with its money. If it remained over until after Passover,3 it is to pasture until it is unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and he brings a peace-offering4 with its money. If it [the female Passover sacrifice] gave birth,5 it is to pasture until it is unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and a peace-offering is bought with its money. R. Eliezer says: The [animal] itself is offered as a peace-offering.6 Now here is a case where the mother has not the name of a peace-offering and R. Eliezer says: He offers it as a peace-offering? - Raba said to him: The case after Passover is different, since what has not been used [of animals] dedicated for the Passover sacrifice is itself offered as peace-offerings.7 If this is so,8 let the dispute [between R. Eliezer and the Rabbis] be stated also in connection with the first clause above?9 - He said to him: 'Yes, that is so'.10 Abaye says: R. Eliezer does not differ [in the first clause above],11 since there we have it on tradition that [the purpose for] which an unused dedicated animal goes,12 its young is used in the same way.13 Now, after Passover, when an animal unused for a Passover sacrifice is considered a peace-offering, its young too is used as a peace-offering. But before Passover, for what purpose did he dedicate the mother? For the value of the Passover sacrifice.14 Therefore in the case of the young too it is used for the value of the Passover sacrifice.15

R. Ukba b. Hama raised an objection: But do we say that since the mother is used only for its money value, its young is also used only for its money value? Surely it has been taught: If one sets aside a female animal for the Passover sacrifice, it and its offspring pasture until unfit for sacrifice, and they are then sold, and a Passover sacrifice is bought with the money. R. Eliezer, however, says: The [animal] itself is offered as a Passover sacrifice. Now here the mother is dedicated for its value and R. Eliezer says that its young is offered as a Passover sacrifice and we do not apply to it the same rule as to its mother? - Said Rabina: We are dealing here with a case where he sets aside a pregnant animal.16 R. Eliezer holds the view of R. Johanan who says that if he left over [the embryo for a different dedication], the act is valid,17 for an embryo is not considered as the thigh of its mother. Therefore it is only the mother [being a female] which receives no bodily consecration, whereas its embryo receives bodily consecration.

Said Mar Zutra the son of R. Mari to Rabina: It also stands to reason that we are dealing [in the above Baraitha] with the case of a pregnant animal, since the Baraitha says: 'It and its offspring'.18 This is proved.

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(1) So Sh. Mek. omitting the word 'young of' in cur. edd.
(2) For the first animal, in virtue of which the exchange and its young are holy, was dedicated as a guilt-offering and sacrificed as such and was not a burnt-offering (Rashi).
(3) If e.g., he brought another male Passover sacrifice and this female Passover sacrifice remained over.
(4) For a Passover sacrifice at other times of the year can be brought as a peace-offering. The animal itself, however, cannot be brought as a peace-offering, since its holiness as a Passover sacrifice has been suspended and it is therefore also unfit for a peace-offering.
(5) After Passover.
(6) Although the mother has not the name of a peace-offering, since it was dedicated as a Passover sacrifice; v. Tosef. Pes. IX.
(7) Where e.g., one set aside a Passover sacrifice and he procured atonement through another, the one remaining over is offered as a peace-offering. Therefore this animal which remained over from Passover has the name of a peace-offering, the name of the Passover having disappeared from it, and there falls on it the name of a peace-offering. If, however, it is a female, it cannot be offered, since it comes in virtue of a Passover dedication. Its young, therefore, is offered as a peace-offering (Rashi).
(8) That the reason for R. Eliezer's view is because the mother has the name of a peace-offering.
(9) Where the female Passover sacrifice gave birth before Passover, and let R. Eliezer maintain that the young itself is offered as a peace-offering, since if he killed the mother at any time of the year it would be considered a peace-offering. Consequently the mother possesses the name of a peace-offering.
(10) That R. Eliezer holds in the first part of the above Tosef. that where the animal gave birth before Passover it is brought as a peace-offering.
(11) Where the animal gave birth before Passover, agreeing that the animal after becoming unfit for sacrifice is sold and a Passover sacrifice is bought with the money. The reason of R. Eliezer, however, in the second part of the Tosef. is not because the mother has not the name of a peace-offering but since, etc.
(12) If one set aside two animals for security's sake (in case one was lost) or if the animal which he set aside was lost, the owner procuring atonement by means of another animal, and the first animal was found. Therefore where one set aside a female for a burnt-offering, just as if one separates a burnt-offering and the owner procured atonement by means of another animal the second is offered as a burnt-offering, so the young of a female burnt-offering is treated in the same way, i.e., as a burnt-offering. In the case too of an unused guilt-offering which is left to pasture, the young of the exchange of a guilt-offering is also left to pasture. And as regards the Passover sacrifice after Passover, since an unused Passover lamb is brought as a peace-offering, the same law applies to its young. Further, in regard to a Passover sacrifice before Passover where there is a superfluous sacrifice, e.g., if he set aside two Passover sacrifices for security's sake, they are not fit for peace-offerings, since they are to be used ordinarily for the Passover. One of them is certainly superfluous and is not fit for a Passover sacrifice, since two Passover sacrifices cannot be offered. Since therefore they cannot be used for any purpose, the young too is not fit to be offered for any sacrifice but follows the mother which is holy only for the value of a Passover offering (Rashi).
(13) The same kind of dedication as its mother.
(14) The money obtained through selling the animal is used for a Passover sacrifice.
(15) But is not itself used as a Passover sacrifice.
(16) For the Passover sacrifice.
(17) If one dedicates a pregnant animal and leaves over the embryo for another dedication, this is regarded as valid; consequently we see that they are considered two separate bodies. Therefore even if he did not leave over the dedication of the embryo, it is not considered part of the body of the mother, and consequently its consecration as a Passover sacrifice has effect.
(18) Implying that both were in existence at the time of dedication, since the Baraitha does not say: If one sets aside a female animal for its Passover sacrifice let it go to pasture; if it gave birth to a male let it go to pasture, etc. This would have implied that it gave birth later, after the dedication.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 19b

R. Jose b. Hanina said: R. Eliezer admits1 that where one sets aside a female animal for a guilt-offering, its young is not offered as a guilt-offering. But surely this is obvious! For R. Eliezer refers only to a case where one sets aside a female animal for a burnt-offering, since its mother has the name of a burnt-offering;2 whereas where one sets aside a female for a guilt-offering, since the mother has not the name of a guilt-offering, even [R. Eliezer] agrees that it is not offered as a guilt-offering!3 If [R. Jose] had not informed us of this, I might have thought that the reason of R. Eliezer was not because the mother has the name of a burnt-offering but because the young is fit for offering, and this animal4 too is fit for offering.5 [R. Jose therefore] informs us that it is not so.6 If this is so,7 why does [R. Jose] inform us that its young is not offered as a guilt-offering? Why not rather inform us that its young is not offered as a burnt-offering,8 and the same would apply to a guilt-offering.9 - If [R. Jose] had informed us concerning a burntoffering, I might have thought that the young is not offered as a burnt-offering, since the mother was not dedicated for that holiness, but in the case of a burnt-offering, I might have said that [the young] is offered as a guilt-offering. [R. Jose] therefore informs us [that it is not so].

MISHNAH. IF ONE SETS ASIDE A FEMALE [ANIMAL] FOR A GUILT-OFFERING, IT MUST GO TO PASTURE UNTIL IT BECOMES UNFIT FOR SACRIFICE. IT IS THEN SOLD AND HE BRINGS A GUILT-OFFERING WITH ITS MONEY. IF, HOWEVER, HE HAS ALREADY OFFERED HIS GUILT-OFFERING,10 ITS VALUE11 [IS PUT INTO THE CHEST] FOR FREEWILL-OFFERINGS;12 R. SIMEON, HOWEVER, SAYS: IT IS SOLD WITHOUT [WAITING FOR] A BLEMISH.13

GEMARA. But why [wait] until [the guilt-offering] becomes blemished? Let it be sold, for since it is not fit for anything, that in itself constitutes a blemish? - Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab: The reason is this: Because we say, since consecration in respect of its value rests on it, there also rests [on it] bodily consecration.14

Said Raba:15 This proves16 that if one dedicates a male [animal]17 for its value, it receives bodily consecration.18

It has been stated: If one dedicated a male animal for its value, R. Kahana says: It receives the holiness of bodily consecration, whereas Raba says: It does not receive the holiness of bodily consecration. Raba, however, withdrew his opinion in favour of that of R. Kahana, on account of the explanation given [above] by Rab Judah in the name of Rab.19

R. SIMEON, HOWEVER, SAYS: IT IS SOLD [WITHOUT WAITING] FOR A BLEMISH. Said R. Hiyya b. Abin to R. Johanan: But why do we not say that since there rests on the animal a consecration for value, there also rests on it a bodily consecration? - R. Simeon follows the opinion expressed by him elsewhere where he says: Wherever an animal is not fit [for offering], a bodily consecration does not rest on it.20 For it has been taught: If a guilt-offering which should be a year old21 is brought at two years old,22 or a guilt-offering which should be two years old23 is brought at a year old, it is fit [for offering], only that the owners of the sacrifices are not credited as having fulfilled their obligation. R. Simeon, however, says: They are not holy at all.24 But is there not the case of [an animal] too young for sacrifice25 which is not fit for offering and yet R. Simeon holds that it is holy?26 - The case of [an animal] too young for sacrifice is different, because it is fit on the morrow.27 If this is so,28 the same argument ought to apply to a guilt-offering which should be two years old and is brought as a year old, since it will be fit in a year's time!29 Rather the reason of R. Simeon in the case of [an animal] too young for sacrifice must be because we derive it from the case of 'firstling', as it has been taught: R. Simeon b. Judah reported in the name of R. Simeon: An animal too young for sacrifice enters the shed in order to be tithed, and it is like a firstling: Just as a firstling is holy before its due time [for sacrifice]30 and is sacrificed in its due time,31 so [an animal] too young for sacrifice is holy before the prescribed time [for sacrifice] and is offered in its due time.32

The Rabbis have taught: If one consecrates a female [animal] for his burnt-offering,

____________________
(1) Although where one sets aside a female animal for a burnt-offering he holds that the young itself is offered as a burnt-offering.
(2) E.g., in connection with the burnt-offering of a bird.
(3) For we do not find a female as a guilt-offering. Therefore the name of a guilt-offering has no effect on it.
(4) The young of a guilt-offering.
(5) And therefore the young should be offered as a guilt-offering.
(6) And the reason is because the name of a burnt-offering is on its mother, whereas in the other case the name of a guilt-offering is not on its mother, since it is a female.
(7) That the reason of R. Eliezer is because of the name of its mother.
(8) Since the mother has not the name of a burnt-offering, for he called it a guilt-offering.
(9) I would have argued in the following manner: If for a burnt-offering, when the money value of the mother can be used for a burnt-offering, we still say that the young is not used as a burnt-offering, how much less is the young of a female guilt-offering used as a guilt-offering, since neither the mother nor its value can be used as a guilt-offering (Rashi).
(10) I.e., procures atonement through another guilt-offering.
(11) The value of the first guilt-offering.
(12) I.e., for public sacrifices.
(13) Since it is not fit for anything, the animal is regarded as possessing a genuine blemish, unlike the case of a female burnt-offering where R. Simeon requires an actual blemish, because the name of a burnt-offering is on it.
(14) In this respect, that it requires a blemish.
(15) Var. lec. Rabbah.
(16) Since we see that the animal requires a blemish before it is sold, although ordinarily the consecration for value is intended.
(17) As a burnt-offering or a guilt-offering.
(18) For if a female requires a blemish because we say miggo ('since' it is holy for its value etc.), how much more so is it the case where he consecrated for its value a male, an animal fit for sacrifice, that we say 'miggo' and it becomes consecrated as such (R. Gershom).
(19) That from the ruling in the Mishnah that the animal pastures, it is proved that we apply miggo.
(20) And it is sold without waiting for a blemish.
(21) E.g., the guilt-offering of a Nazirite and a leper, for 'lamb' mentioned in this connection always denotes an animal a year old.
(22) Which is really a ram.
(23) A guilt-offering for theft or trespass; v. Lev. V, 20ff.
(24) Since they cannot he used as guilt-offerings, they do not receive any holiness, the same reason applying in the Mishnah according to the view of R. Simeon.
(25) Less than seven days old. Lit., 'wanting time'.
(26) V. Hul. 81a where R. Simeon says: If one kills without the Temple court an animal which is fit to offer after the due time has elapsed, he is guilty of transgressing a prohibitory law.
(27) After a little while, whereas in the case of the Mishnah when the female animal is brought as a guilt-offering, it can never be fit for sacrifice.
(28) That because an animal is fit for sacrifice after a time, it is meanwhile considered holy.
(29) Why therefore does R. Simeon say in the Baraitha above that a two years' old guilt-offering, if it is brought a year old, does not receive holiness at all?
(30) Since it is holy in the womb.
(31) So Sh. Mek.; cur. edd.: after its time.
(32) Bek. 22a, 56a and 57b.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 20a

for his Passover sacrifice or for his guilt-offering, the [animal] can effect exchange.1 R. Simeon Says: [The female animal set aside] for his burnt-offering effects exchange,2 but that which he sets aside for his Passover sacrifice or guilt-offering cannot effect exchange,3 since there is no [animal] which can effect exchange except that which pastures until unfit for sacrifice.4

Said Rabbi: I do not approve of the opinion of R. Simeon with reference to a Passover sacrifice,5 since unused [money or animals] dedicated for the Passover is offered as peace-offerings.6 And why does he not Say: I do not approve of the opinion of R. Simeon in connection with a guilt-offering, since an unused guilt-offering is offered as a burnt-offering?7 - Rabbi holds the opinion of the Rabbis who say: The surpluses [of sacrificial appropriation] belong to the freewill-offerings of the congregation8 and the congregation cannot effect exchange.9 Now it is assumed that the reason why R. Simeon holds that a female set aside as a burnt-offering can effect exchange is because a female has the name of burnt-offering [in the case of a poor man who brings]10 a burnt-offering of a bird. According to this a cow set aside by a High Priest for his [sacrificial] bullock,11 should become holy and effect exchange, since we have the case of the cow of sin-offering?12 - The cow of sin-offering is regarded as a dedication for Temple repairs13 and a dedication for Temple repairs cannot effect exchange. Then if an individual sets aside a goat instead of a she-goat14 [for his sin-offering], let it become holy,15 since we find elsewhere the case of a 'ruler' who sets aside a goat for a sin-offering?16 Or, again, if a 'ruler' sets aside a she-goat instead of a goat [as a sin-offering], let it become holy, since elsewhere an individual sets aside a she-goat [for a sin-offering]? - These are two Separate persons [bodies].17 But if he sinned before he was a 'ruler', even if he set aside a goat in place of a she-goat, let it become holy [and effect exchange] since, if he sinned now, [after his appointment]18 he brings a goat?19 - Here,20 [it is different,21 for] since he did not sin [as a 'ruler'], he is not required to bring a goat. If so, here too,22 he does not [actually] bring a burnt-offering of a bird?23 - R. Simeon24 holds the opinion of R. Eleazar b. Azariah.25 For we have learnt: [If one says] 'Behold, I take upon myself to bring a burnt-offering',26 he brings a sheep,27 whereas R. Eleazar b. Azariah says: Or a turtle-dove or a pigeon.28

We have learnt elsewhere: If one dedicates his property [for Temple repairs] and there are animals29 among them fit for the altar [i.e., unblemished], males and females, R. Eliezer says: The males shall be sold as burnt-offerings and the females shall be sold as peace-offerings, and their money together with the rest of the property shall go for Temple repairs.30 R. Joshua, however, says: The males themselves are offered as burnt-offerings,31 the females are sold as peace-offerings, burnt-offerings32 are bought with their money and the rest of the property is applied for Temple repairs.

Said R. Hiyya b. Abba to R. Johanan: According to the opinion of R. Joshua, who said that the males are themselves offered as burnt-offerings, how can the females be offered as peace-offerings, seeing that their status is that of cancelled holiness?33

Another version: Said R. Hiyya b. Abba to R. Johanan: Since R. Joshua Says, The males are themselves offered as burnt-offerings, does this mean to say that he dedicated them in respect of bodily dedication? If so, why are the females sold for peace-offerings? Do not [the females] require to pasture? - He [R. Johanan] answered him: R. Joshua agrees with R. Simeon who says: Anything which is not fit [for offering] is not subject to bodily dedication.34 For we have learnt: R. SIMEON SAYS: IT SHALL BE SOLD WITHOUT [WAITING FOR] A BLEMISH. And we explained that the reason of R. Simeon is that since the female animal is not fit for a guilt-offering, it is not subject to bodily dedication. Here35 too36 since a female animal is not fit for a burnt-offering, it is not subject to bodily dedication.37 But does not R. Simeon's teaching refer only to a case where one sets aside a female animal for a guilt-offering

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(1) The animal substituted for it becomes holy.
(2) Because (i) it is not an obligatory sacrifice (R. Gershom) and also (ii) it has the name of a burnt-offering, since a bird can be a burnt-offering even though a female (Rashi).
(3) Since we do not find a female animal designated as a guilt-offering or a Passover offering.
(4) A female animal designated as a Passover or a guilt-offering is sold even without a blemish and therefore does not effect exchange; whereas a female animal designated as a burnt-offering, since the name of a burnt-offering is found in connection with a female bird, pastures until it becomes unfit and therefore effects exchange (Rashi).
(5) That it does not effect exchange.
(6) Consequently as a Passover sacrifice has some connection with peace-offerings and the latter can be females, therefore although this particular animal cannot be offered as a Passover sacrifice, we consider that it has the name of peace- offering and thus can effect exchange (Rashi). R. Gershom explains that we regard the Passover sacrifice as 'surplus' for the value of which we purchase a peace-offering, and thus it can effect exchange.
(7) We therefore find that this female guilt-offering is a burnt-offering and it would therefore be holy as such and effect exchange, like a female burnt-offering, for we have the case of a female burnt-offering in connection with birds (Rashi).
(8) Which are burnt-offerings.
(9) Therefore even if it were considered a burnt-offering, there could be no exchange.
(10) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(11) Which he brings on the Day of Atonement for his sin-offering.
(12) The red heifer referred to in the Torah as a sin-offering.
(13) The reason being that the animal is not dedicated for the altar.
(14) Where he is required to bring a she-goat or a sheep for a sin-offering; v. Lev. IV, 28, 32.
(15) And effect exchange.
(16) V. ibid. 22ff.
(17) Viz., an individual and a 'ruler', and therefore we do not draw a comparison between them, whereas here an individual can set aside a female animal for his burnt-offering and it becomes holy and effects exchange, because if he, the same person, wished he could renounce his property in order to become a poor man and thus be able legally to bring a female bird for his burnt-offering.
(18) V. Bah.
(19) And here the 'ruler' and the individual are the same person.
(20) In the case just mentioned.
(21) Although there is only one person here, the reason why he does not bring a goat is as follows.
(22) Where he sets aside a female animal for his burnt-offering.
(23) For a rich man who is required to set aside an animal for his burnt-offering cannot bring a bird which is a poor man's offering. Therefore a female animal set aside for a burnt-offering should not become consecrated as such and thus should not effect exchange.
(24) This then is the reason of R. Simeon with regard to a burnt offering.
(25) That the unspecified freewill-offering even of a rich man can be the burnt-offering of a bird. Consequently, a female animal dedicated as a burnt-offering has the name of a burnt-offering.
(26) Without defining the nature of the burnt-offering.
(27) Which is the lowest kind of burnt-offering that a wealthy man can offer.
(28) Men. 105b, B.K. 78b.
(29) This is the reading in Zeb. 103a.
(30) For R. Eliezer holds that dedications are usually for Temple repairs, even of things fit for the altar. Nevertheless, whatever is suitable for the altar must be given up to the altar.
(31) One does not ignore animals fit for the altar and dedicate them for Temple repairs. Consequently we assume that they were dedicated for the altar and they themselves are offered up.
(32) For usually one makes a dedication of a burnt-offering, which is the most important of sacrifices (Sh. Mek).
(33) Since the males are offered as burnt-offerings and the money of the female animals is for burnt-offerings, presumably he holds that he dedicated them all for burnt-offerings. But a female animal dedicated as a burnt-offering must pasture, as stated above, its holiness as a burnt-offering having been cancelled (supra 18a). How then can they be offered as peace-offerings?
(34) And similarly here the female animals are not fit to be offered as burnt-offerings and therefore they have no bodily holiness which would make it requisite for them to pasture until unfit for sacrifice, but they are sold.
(35) For this reading v. Sh. Mek.
(36) In the case of our Mishnah.
(37) And therefore they are not left to pasture but are sold for peace-offerings.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 20b

, since the mother has not the name of a guilt-offering,1 whereas in the case of a female set aside for a burnt-offering, where the mother has the name of a burnt-offering, even R. Simeon agrees [that it can receive dedication as such]? Moreover, we have heard from R. Simeon that [a female animal set aside] for his burnt-offering effects exchange!2 - He [R. Johanan] replied to him: R. Joshua will agree with the other Tanna who quotes R. Simeon. For it has been taught: R. Simeon b. Judah reported in the name of R. Simeon: He cannot effect exchange [with a female animal set aside] even for his burnt-offering.3

MISHNAH. THE EXCHANGE OF A GUILT-OFFERING,4 THE YOUNG OF AN EXCHANGE,5 THEIR YOUNG AND THE YOUNG OF THEIR YOUNG UNTIL THE END OF TIME, MUST GO TO PASTURE UNTIL UNFIT FOR SACRIFICE. THEY ARE THEN SOLD AND THEIR6 MONEY IS APPLIED TO A FREEWILL-OFFERING.7 R. ELIEZER, HOWEVER, SAYS: LET THEM DIE; WHILE R. ELEAZAR8 SAYS: LET HIM BRING BURNT-OFFERINGS WITH THE MONEY.9 A GUILT-OFFERING WHOSE OWNER DIED OR WHOSE OWNER OBTAINED ATONEMENT [THROUGH ANOTHER ANIMAL] MUST GO TO PASTURE UNTIL UNFIT FOR SACRIFICE. THEY ARE THEN SOLD AND THE MONEY OF THE OFFERING IS APPLIED TO A FREEWILL-OFFERING. R. ELIEZER, HOWEVER, SAYS: LET THE ANIMAL DIE; WHILE R. ELEAZAR8 SAYS: LET HIM BUY A BURNT-OFFERING FOR THE MONEY. BUT CANNOT A NEDABAH [FREEWILL-OFFERING] ALSO BE A BURNT-OFFERING? WHAT THEN IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OPINION OF R. ELEAZAR AND THAT OF THE SAGES?10 ONLY IN THAT WHEN THE OFFERING COMES AS AN OBLIGATION,11 HE LAYS HIS HAND ON IT AND HE BRINGS DRINK-OFFERINGS AND THE DRINK-OFFERINGS MUST BE PROVIDED BY HIM; AND IF HE12 IS A PRIEST, THE PRIVILEGE OF OFFICIATING AND ITS HIDE BELONG TO HIM;13 WHEREAS WHEN HE BRINGS A FREEWILL-OFFERING, HE DOES NOT LAY HIS HAND [ON IT],14 HE DOES NOT BRING DRINK-OFFERINGS WITH IT, THE DRINK-OFFERINGS ARE PROVIDED BY THE CONGREGATION, AND ALTHOUGH HE IS A PRIEST, THE PRIVILEGE OF OFFICIATING AND ITS HIDE BELONG TO THE MEN OF THE DIVISION15 [OFFICIATING IN THAT PARTICULAR WEEK].

GEMARA. It is necessary [for the Mishnah] to mention that in both cases16 [there is a difference of opinion]. For if we had been taught the case of a guilt-offering [whose owners had died or procured atonement through another animal], we might have thought that there R. Eliezer says that they17 die because we prohibit after atonement18 in virtue of having prohibited before atonement,19 but in the case of the exchange of a guilt-offering or the young of an exchange,20 I might have thought that he agrees with the Rabbis.21 And if we had been taught the case of the exchange of a guilt-offering, [I might have thought] that the Rabbis say there that the animal pastures,22 but in the case of a guilt-offering [whose owners had died or obtained atonement], I might have thought that they agree with R. Eliezer.23 It was therefore necessary [for the Mishnah] to mention both cases.24

R. Nahman reported in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: The dispute25 applies only26 after atonement has taken place,27 but before atonement28 all the authorities agree that [the young itself] can be offered as a guilt-offering.29 Said Raba: There are two arguments against this opinion. First, that a man cannot obtain atonement with something which he obtained as the result of a transgression.30 And, moreover, R. Hanania learnt31 in support of R. Joshua b. Levi: The first generation is offered but the second generation is not offered!32 Rather, if the statement was made, it was made in this form: R. Nahman reported in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: The dispute applies before atonement has taken place,33 but after atonement has taken place,34 all the authorities concerned agree that the animal itself35 is offered as a burnt-offering. But has not R. Hanania learnt [a teaching] in support of R. Joshua b. Levi?36 This remains a difficulty.

R. Abin b. Hiyya asked R. Abin b. Kahana: If one set aside a female [animal] for a guilt-offering, may its young be offered as a burnt-offering? (But why not solve this from the teaching of R. Joseph b. Hanina who said37 that R. Eliezer agreed?38 - He [R. Abin b. Hiyya] never heard this teaching.)39 What is the ruling? - He [R. Abin b. Kahana] replied to him: Its young is offered as a burnt-offering. But what answer is this? R. Eliezer only refers to the case of one who set aside a female for a burnt-offering, where the mother has the name of a burnt-offering,40 but in the case of a guilt-offering, where the mother has not the name of a burnt-offering,41 even R. Eliezer agrees!42 - He [R. Abin b. Kahana] replied to him: The reason of R. Eliezer43 is not because its mother has the name of a burnt-offering but because it [the young] is fit for offering,44 and here too [the young] is fit for offering.45

He raised an objection: THEIR YOUNG AND THE YOUNG OF THEIR YOUNG UNTIL THE END OF TIME etc. [R. ELEAZAR SAYS:] LET HIM BRING A BURNT-OFFERING WITH THEIR MONEY. [Now, he brings a burnt-offering] with their money.

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(1) For we do not find any case of a guilt-offering being a female.
(2) Consequently we see that it can receive bodily dedication so far as to be required to pasture before it is sold. We cannot therefore explain that R. Joshua will hold the opinion of R. Simeon.
(3) Since the animal has no bodily dedication. Thus it has to be sold as a peace-offering and is not left to pasture.
(4) Whether the exchange be a male or a female, it must pasture, as there is a traditional law that wherever in the case of a sin-offering it is condemned to die, in the case of a guilt-offering it is condemned to pasture until unfit for sacrifice.
(5) E.g., where he exchanged a female animal for his guilt-offering and it gave birth.
(6) So Wilna Gaon Glosses; cur. edd., 'its money'.
(7) A burnt-offering, as surpluses are devoted to that purpose.
(8) So Sh. Mek.
(9) V. supra 19b.
(10) The first teachers mentioned in the Mishnah.
(11) So Sh. Mek. 'When the duty lies on an individual to sacrifice; cur. edd. burnt-offering.
(12) The person owning the surpluses who set aside a guilt-offering and procured atonement through another animal while the first animal was condemned to pasture.
(13) Although he does not belong to the division of priests officiating in the Temple during that week, he is allowed to officiate and receive the usual priestly dues.
(14) Since a congregational sacrifice does not require laying on of hands, except in two instances.
(15) Of priests in the Temple.
(16) The case of the exchange of a guilt-offering and the one where the owners of a guilt-offering die, or had procured atonement by another animal.
(17) The animals.
(18) And only one animal is before us.
(19) And both animals are before us. We therefore fear that he might say that this one is for pasture and that for atonement, which is against the law. For since both animals are fit for guilt-offerings one animal cannot be specified as being condemned to pasture until the owner has atoned through the other animal. It is for this reason that, according to R. Eliezer, the animal is left to die even after atonement has taken place (R. Gershom).
(20) Since here one cannot prohibit, for the law to pasture applies both before and after atonement, the exchange of a guilt-offering being, according to traditional law, unfit for offering even before the sacrificing of the guilt-offering.
(21) That they go to 'pasture. There is need therefore in the Mishnah for R. Eliezer to inform us that even in these circumstances the animals die.
(22) Because there is no prohibition after atonement on account of what might happen before atonement.
(23) That the animal is condemned to die.
(24) Another version (R. Gershom and Sh. Mek.): If the Mishnah only stated in the first part the case of the exchange of a guilt-offering, I might have thought that the Rabbis dispute there and hold that the animal is left to pasture because of the fear of a substitution. For if you say that the exchange of a guilt-offering dies, we fear lest he substitute this animal for the guilt-offering itself and the guilt-offering will thus die. Consequently, the Rabbis say that the animal pastures until unfit for sacrifice so that if by mistake there is a substitution, he can always rectify the matter by again offering the right animal. But in the case stated in the second part of the Mishnah, where the owners of a guilt-offering died or obtained atonement by means of another animal, since there is no fear of substitution - there being only one guilt-offering - I might have thought that the Rabbis agree with R. Eliezer that the animal is condemned to die. And if the Mishnah had taught us only the case where the owners of a guilt-offering died, I might have said that R. Eliezer holds there that the animal dies, since there is no fear of substitution etc.
(25) With reference to the young of the exchange of a guilt-offering.
(26) V. Sh. Mek.
(27) After the owners have obtained atonement by means of the guilt-offering itself and this young of the exchange remained.
(28) If he has not yet obtained atonement with the guilt-offering and both animals are before us, the guilt-offering and the young of its exchange.
(29) Since both are males he can use either as a guilt-offering.
(30) I.e., a breach of the prohibitory law, 'He shall not alter it nor change it' involved (Lev. XXVII, 10). And although the exchange of a burnt-offering or peace-offering is offered up, the latter is not for the purpose of atonement.
(31) V. supra 18b.
(32) And the young of the exchange is considered the second generation, the exchange itself being considered a generation, having become holy through another dedication.
(33) R. Eliezer holds there that the young dies. For if you say that the young pastures, since what is bought for its money is offered, it might be substituted and itself offered as a guilt-offering. The Rabbis, however, will maintain that since the animal itself is not offered as a burnt-offering, there is no fear of substitution (Rashi).
(34) Where there is no fear of substitution, since the guilt-offering has already been sacrificed.
(35) The young of the exchange.
(36) That the second generation is not offered and the young of the exchange is the second generation.
(37) V. supra 19b.
(38) That where one set aside a guilt-offering, its young is not offered as a guilt-offering.
(39) He never learnt the ruling (R. Gershom). Sh. Mek. explains this phrase as meaning that he did not agree with the teaching.
(40) I.e., in connection with the burnt-offering of a bird.
(41) As a burnt-offering cannot be a female.
(42) That the young is not brought as a burnt-offering.
(43) Why he holds that if one sets aside a female animal for a burnt-offering the male young is offered as a burnt-offering.
(44) Therefore in the case of the young of the female burnt-offering, since the young is fit to be offered, it is used as a burnt-offering.
(45) The male young of a female burnt-offering is fit for a burnt-offering, since it is suitable to be offered.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 21a

implying. but he must not offer the animal itself as a burnt-offering?1 - We are dealing here2 with a case where e.g., it [the exchange] gave birth to a female animal.3 AND UNTIL THE END OF TIME, would it not give birth even to one male? - He said to him: I am giving you a forced answer of a Babylonian character.4 Where e.g., it gave birth until the end of time to females only. (But5 what answer could he have given him?6 - The reason there [why R. Eleazar says that only the money can be used for a burnt-offering] is because he may come to make a substitution.)7

MISHNAH. THE EXCHANGE OF A FIRSTLING AND AN ANIMAL TITHED, THEIR YOUNG AND THE YOUNG OF THEIR YOUNG UNTIL THE END OF TIME,8 THESE HAVE THE LAW OF A FIRSTLING AND AN ANIMAL TITHED,9 AND ARE EATEN BY THE OWNERS WHEN BLEMISHED.10 WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A FIRSTLING AND AN ANIMAL TITHED [ON THE ONE HAND] AND OTHER DEDICATIONS ON THE OTHER? ALL [BLEMISHED] DEDICATIONS ARE SOLD IN THE MARKET,11 KILLED IN THE MARKET, AND WEIGHED BY THE POUND, BUT NOT A FIRSTLING AND AN ANIMAL TITHED.12 THEY [OTHER DEDICATIONS] AND THEIR EXCHANGES ARE REDEEMED,13 BUT NOT A FIRSTLING AND AN ANIMAL TITHED.14 THEY [OTHER DEDICATIONS] COME FROM OUTSIDE THE HOLY LAND [TO THE HOLY LAND], BUT NOT A FIRSTLING AND AN ANIMAL TITHED.15 [IF] THEY16 HOWEVER CAME FROM [OUTSIDE THE HOLY LAND] UNBLEMISHED, THEY ARE OFFERED, IF BLEMISHED THEY ARE EATEN BY THEIR OWNERS17 WITH THEIR BLEMISHES. SAID R. SIMEON: WHAT IS THE REASON?18 BECAUSE A FIRSTLING AND AN ANIMAL TITHED HAVE A REMEDY WHEREVER THEY ARE,19 WHEREAS ALL OTHER DEDICATIONS, ALTHOUGH A BLEMISH HAS OCCURRED IN THEM, REMAIN HOLY.20

GEMARA. Said Raba son of R. 'Azza:21 In the West [Palestine] they asked: How is it if one causes a blemish to the exchange of a firstling and an animal tithed? Do we say that since they are not offered,22 he is not culpable?23 Or that perhaps since they are holy,24 he is culpable? Said Abaye to him: And why do you not ask: How is it if one causes a blemish to the ninth [animal] of the ten [taken in for tithing]?25 Why then do you not ask concerning the ninth [animal of the ten], because the Divine Law excludes it [having stated]: The tenth,26 thus excluding the ninth [animal]?27 Here28 too the Divine Law excludes it [by saying]: Thou shalt not redeem; they are holy,29 thus implying, 'they' are offered but their exchange is not offered.30

R. Nahman b. Isaac reported the [above passage] as follows: R. Aha31 son of R. 'Azza said: They asked in the West: How is it if one caused a blemish to the ninth [animal] of the ten? - Said [Abaye]32 to him: And why not ask, How is it if one caused a blemish in a firstling and an animal tithed? What then is the reason that you do not ask this concerning the exchange of a firstling and tithe? Because the Divine Law excludes these cases33 [by means of the text]: 'They are holy'. implying that 'they' are offered but their exchange is not offered;34 Similarly the case of the ninth [animal] of the ten is also excluded by the Divine Law [saying]: 'The tenth', thus excluding the ninth [animal].35

IF THEY, HOWEVER, CAME UNBLEMISHED etc. The following contradicts this: The son of Antigonus brought up firstlings from Babylon [to the Holy Land] and they were not accepted from him [to be offered]!36 - Said R. Hisda: There is no difficulty. This37 is the opinion of R. Ishmael, and that38 is the opinion of R. Akiba. For it has been taught: R. Jose reported three things in the name of three Elders.39

R. Ishmael says: One might say that a man can bring up second tithe and eat it in Jerusalem nowadays? Now we may argue thus: A firstling requires bringing to the [holy] place40 and [second] tithe requires bringing to the holy place. Just as a firstling is not eaten except when there is a Temple in existence,41 so [second] tithe should not be eaten except when there is a Temple in existence! No.42 If you can say this of the firstling,43 which requires the application of blood to and the burning of sacrificial portions44 on the altar, shall you say the same of [second] tithe which does not require this?45 Then you may reason thus: Firstfruits require bringing to the holy place46 and second tithe requires bringing to the [holy] place. Just as firstfruits are not eaten except when the Temple is in existence, similarly [second] tithe should not be eaten except when the Temple is in existence. [I can however reply:] You can argue so of firstfruits which require setting47 before the altar; but will you say the same of [second] tithe which does not require this? The text therefore states: Thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God the tithe of thy corn and of thy wine and of thine oil, and the firstlings of thine herds and of thy flocks.48 It thus compares [second] tithe with a firstling: just as a firstling is not eaten except when the Temple is in existence, so second tithe is not eaten except when the Temple is in existence. But why not go around with the argument49 and prove the case [of second tithe by analogy] from the common point?50 - Said R. Ashi: Because one can object: As to the point firstling and firstfruits share in common,51 it is that they both require the altar.52 Now what is [R. Ishmael's] view?53 Does he hold that with the first consecration54 he [Joshua] consecrated the land for the time being [as long as it was inhabited by Israel] and also for the future?55 Then there should be no difference between firstling and [second] tithe, both being suitable to be brought. And if [R. Ishmael] holds that with the first consecration he [Joshua] consecrated for the time being but not for the future,56 why not raise the question57 even concerning a firstling?58 - One can maintain that [R. Ishmael] holds that with the first consecration he [Joshua] consecrated the land for the time being but not for the future, but here59 he is thinking of a case where e.g., the blood of the firstling was sprinkled while the Temple was still in existence, and the Temple was then destroyed and the flesh of the firstling still remained. Since therefore if the blood was in existence, it would not be fit to be sprinkled,60 we therefore derive the case of the flesh [of the firstling]61 from the case of the blood [of the firstling].62

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(1) In spite of the fact that the young of an exchange is fit to be offered, R. Eleazar still maintains that the young itself cannot be offered. You cannot therefore argue here that because the young of the female guilt-offering is fit for sacrifice, therefore it may be offered.
(2) Where he brings a burnt-offering with the money.
(3) Thus it is not fit to be offered as a burnt-offering and therefore R. Eleazar says in the Mishnah that a burnt-offering is bought for its money.
(4) A criticism of the teachers of Babylon who were, metaphorically speaking, described as putting an elephant through the eye of a needle (R. Gershom).
(5) The following bracketed passage is supplied on the basis of Rashi; v. Wilna Gaon Glosses.
(6) Since he says that the answer he gave was a forced one, this implies that he knew of another answer. Now what was it?
(7) If he could bring the young of an exchange of a guilt-offering itself as a burnt-offering, he might make a mistake and bring it as the guilt-offering in place of the real guilt-offering.
(8) Lit., 'until the end of the world'.
(9) That they are not killed in the market where meat is sold, even after being blemished and redeemed.
(10) Without redemption, as is the case with a firstling and an animal tithed.
(11) Thus obtaining a higher price for the flesh, which benefits the Sanctuary, as then he is enabled to bring a better sacrifice for the money received.
(12) Since when they are blemished there is no need to bring another offering with the money. Consequently the higher price would only benefit private people i.e., the owners of the firstling or the tithed animal, and therefore we do not permit the abuse of consecrations for the sake of private profit.
(13) When blemished, and with the money another offering is purchased.
(14) Since if these animals become blemished they are not redeemed so as to render the wool and the working of them permissible. Also the money obtained is not holy, as there is no need to bring another offering in their place, only when blemished they are eaten by the owners themselves.
(15) Which are not directly brought from outside the Holy Land.
(16) A firstling and tithed animal.
(17) I.e., a priest in the case of the firstling and the owner in the case of a tithed animal.
(18) That a firstling or a tithed animal cannot come direct from outside the Holy Land to the Holy Land.
(19) To pasture until unfit for sacrifice and then eaten. Lit., 'from their place'.
(20) Since even if they became blemished, he is required to bring their money for the purpose of bringing offerings. Therefore as holiness remains in them even if blemished, the owners are required to bring to the Holy Land the unblemished dedications in order to offer them.
(21) Var. lec. R. Aba.
(22) Scripture saying in connection with a firstling: 'Thou shalt not redeem, they are holy' (Num. XVIII, 17), from which we infer that they are offered but not their exchange and the case of tithe we derive by means of an analogy from the firstling.
(23) For transgressing, there shall be no blemish therein (Lev. XXII, 21) interpreted as a warning against inflicting a blemish.
(24) Since Scripture says: Then it and the exchange thereof shall be holy (Lev. XXVII, 10).
(25) And calling it tenth, in which case it is holy but is not offered.
(26) Lev. XXVII, 32.
(27) Which in tithing was called 'the tenth' so that it is not offered. And since it is not offered, then obviously there is no penalty for inflicting a blemish upon it.
(28) Where one causes a blemish on a firstling.
(29) Num. XVIII, 17.
(30) And since they are not offered, therefore there is no guilt in inflicting a blemish.
(31) Var. lec. Raba.
(32) So Sh. Mek.
(33) From the guilt of causing a blemish to dedications.
(34) And since they are not offered, there is no penalty for causing a blemish on it.
(35) And there is no guilt in causing on it a blemish.
(36) There is thus a difficulty as regards the Mishnah which says that if unblemished firstlings were actually brought up from outside the Holy Land they are offered.
(37) The Mishnah.
(38) That firstlings from outside the Holy Land were not accepted to be offered.
(39) R. Ishmael, R. Akiba and Ben 'Azzai.
(40) V. Deut. XII, 11: Thither ye shall bring your burnt-offerings . . . and your tithes.
(41) Since the portions of sacrifices destined to be burnt must be burnt on the altar and the application of the blood requires an altar.
(42) This analogy is not conclusive.
(43) That it can be brought only when the Temple is in existence.
(44) Limbs and fat destined for the altar.
(45) And therefore being different it may perhaps be brought even without the Temple standing.
(46) 'And the heave-offerings of your hand' (ibid) is explained as referring to the firstfruits.
(47) Scripture saying, Thou shalt set it before the Lord thy God (Deut. XXVI, 20).
(48) Ibid. XIV, 23.
(49) What need is there for a special Scriptural text, And thou shalt eat, etc.?
(50) As follows: If you say that the analogy between firstfruits and tithe is not exact, since in the former there is no setting before the altar, then the case of firstling will prove that even without the setting before the altar it is necessary for the Temple to be in existence in order that the firstling can be brought, and the same therefore will apply to second tithe. Again, if you say that firstling is different because it requires the application of its blood to the altar, then the case of firstfruits will prove that although there is no application of blood, only when the Temple stands can they be brought, and the same therefore will apply to second tithe. Firstlings and firstfruits have therefore one point in common, i.e., the need of bringing them to a holy place and that the Temple must be standing, the same then will apply to second tithe, that it will be brought only when the Temple is standing.
(51) And therefore they require the Temple to be in existence before they can be brought. This is not the case with second tithe.
(52) In the case of firstfruits for the purpose of setting and in the case of firstling for the application of the blood.
(53) Who has no doubt that a firstling is not eaten except when the Temple stands, but who has a doubt concerning the second tithe.
(54) Of Palestine by Joshua.
(55) Even without a Temple, Jerusalem is a holy place.
(56) And so there is a doubt concerning second tithe.
(57) Whether in order to bring it the Temple must be in existence.
(58) Why therefore does he infer the case of the second tithe from firstling?
(59) Where R. Ishmael is sure of the case of firstling.
(60) Since Jerusalem was not holy after Temple times (Rashi).
(61) As regards eating it.
(62) And just as the blood cannot be sprinkled, the flesh too cannot be eaten.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 21b

and then we derive the case of second tithe1 from the case of firstling.2 But do we infer one case of dedication from another?3 Has not R. Johanan said:4 Throughout the Torah we can derive by inference one rule from another which has itself been derived by inference, save only in the field of dedications where we do not derive a rule from one which is itself derived? - Tithe [of grain] is [considered] hullin.5 This explanation will suffice for one who holds that that which is derived is the deciding factor.6 But what answer would you give according to the authority who holds that that from which it is derived is the deciding factor?7 - 'Flesh' and 'blood' in the case of firstling are considered one subject.8

R. Akiba says: One might think that a man can bring up a firstling from outside the Holy Land to the Holy Land when the Temple is standing and offer it? The text, however, states: And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God the tithe of thy corn and of thy wine and of thine oil, and the firstlings of thy herds and of thy flocks,9 thus implying that you may bring up a firstling to the Holy Land from the same place from where [second] tithe of grain is brought up,10 and that you cannot bring up a firstling to the Holy Land from the place from which you cannot bring up [second] tithe of grain.11

Ben 'Azzai says: One might say that a man may bring up the second tithe12 and eat it wherever he can see [Jerusalem]? One may argue13 [as follows]: A firstling requires bringing to a [holy] place and [second] tithe requires bringing to a [holy] place: just as a firstling is not eaten except within the wall [of Jerusalem],14 so [second] tithe is not eaten except within the wall [of Jerusalem]. [To this I can reply: ] How can you argue from a firstling which requires the application of blood to and the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar,15 to second tithe which does not require this?16 Scripture therefore says: 'Thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God the tithe of thy corn and of thy wine and of thine oil, and the firstlings of . . ., etc.', thus comparing second tithe with firstling as follows: Just as a firstling is not eaten except within the wall [of Jerusalem], similarly [second] tithe is not eaten except within the wall [of Jerusalem]. But what is [Ben 'Azzai's] difficulty that he should say: One might think etc.?17 - I will tell you. Since we have learnt: The difference between Shiloh and Jerusalem consists in this, that in Shiloh one may eat minor dedications and second tithe wherever one can see it, whereas in Jerusalem he may do so only within the wall, [and in both]18 dedications of the higher degree of holiness are eaten inside the enclosures of the Temple court, you might think that the second tithe should be eaten wherever one can see [Jerusalem].19 [Ben 'Azzai] needs therefore [to quote a text to] inform us [that it is not so].

Others say: One might think that a firstling whose year is passed has the same law as disqualified dedications and should be disqualified?20 Scripture, however, says: 'The tithe of thy corn, of thy wine and of thine oil', thus comparing firstling with second tithe [as follows]: Just as second tithe is not disqualified from one year to another,21 so a firstling [which is left] over from one year to another is not disqualified. And the Rabbis22 who interpreted the text above23 for another purpose, whence do they derive that one may bring a firstling [left over] from the first year to the other? - They derive this from [the Scriptural text]: Thou shalt eat it before the Lord thy God year by year,24 which teaches us that a firstling [left over] from one year to another is not disqualified.25 And how do the 'Others'26 interpret the text: 'Thou shalt eat it before the Lord thy God year by year'? - They need this text for what has been taught: One day from this year and a day from the next;27 this teaches us that a firstling may be eaten for two days28 and a night. And whence do the Rabbis derive that a firstling may be eaten for two days and a night? - The text says: It shall be to thee as the breast of the waving.29

CHAPTER 4

MISHNAH. THE YOUNG OF A SIN-OFFERING, THE EXCHANGE OF A SIN-OFFERING, AND A SIN-OFFERING WHOSE OWNER HAS DIED, ARE LEFT TO DIE. A SIN-OFFERING WHOSE YEAR IS PASSED OR WHICH WAS LOST AND FOUND BLEMISHED,30 IF THE OWNERS OBTAINED ATONEMENT [AFTERWARDS, THROUGH ANOTHER ANIMAL], IS LEFT TO DIE;31 IT32 DOES NOT EFFECT EXCHANGE;33

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(1) By means of the analogy as stated in the text: 'And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God, etc.'.
(2) Just as firstling is certainly not eaten in Jerusalem, since the Temple is not in existence, the same applies to second tithe.
(3) As, for example, here where we infer 'flesh' from 'blood' and again second tithe from the flesh of firstling.
(4) Zeb. 50a.
(5) Because it can he redeemed to become hullin i.e., unconsecrated grain, and eaten in all places (R. Gershom). Therefore when we compare second tithe with firstling, we are not really making analogy between dedications, as is the case when we inferred 'flesh' from 'blood'.
(6) Whether the subject is dedications or not. And since it is second tithe which is the subject learnt and derived from dedication, it is quite in order, because second tithe can be rendered hullin, as stated previously.
(7) I.e., here the blood of the firstling, as we learn second tithe from it, and this belongs to the category of dedications.
(8) And since this is the case, we are only making one inference I.e., second tithe from the blood and flesh of a firstling which are considered as one subject as regards dedications. Rashi comments that if we say that the holiness of the Land only applied for the time being and not for the future, why should R. Ishmael have a doubt concerning second tithe, for since there is no consecration for the future then there is no need for the Temple to be standing when bringing second tithe? Rashi therefore agrees with the text found in the Jerushalmi as follows: If R. Ishmael holds that the holiness of the Land extends to all times, then the enquiry should be even concerning a firstling, whether it is a condition that the Temple should be in existence before bringing it. And if he holds that the holiness of the Land does not extend for all time, then he should not inquire even concerning second tithe! One may still say that he holds that the holiness of the Land extends to the future as well, and the reason why he is certain about a firstling is because he is thinking of a case where e.g., he killed a firstling before the Temple was destroyed etc. and the inference is: Just as the blood requires an altar, so the flesh of the firstling cannot be eaten except where there is an altar, and then we proceed to derive the case of second tithe from that of firstling.
(9) Deut. XIV, 23.
(10) I.e., from the Holy Land itself.
(11) I.e., outside the Holy Land. Thus the Baraitha above which says that the firstlings brought up by the son of Antigonus to the Holy Land were not accepted, follows the view of R. Akiba, whereas our Mishnah is in accordance with R. Ishmael, who does not expound the cited verse after the manner of R. Akiba.
(12) In the time when the Temple stood. (R. Gershom).
(13) That it should not be eaten.
(14) Since dedications are disqualified if eaten outside Jerusalem.
(15) And therefore is only eaten within the wall of Jerusalem.
(16) And therefore one might think that so long as one can see Jerusalem even outside its wall, it may be eaten. Rashi has a different version from the text in the Gemara: Firstling is different, since there is a distinction in the period in which it may be eaten i.e., only two days and a night, and a distinction as regards those permitted to eat i.e., only the priests, whereas second tithe can be eaten at all times and by everyone, priests or non-priests.
(17) Why should one imagine that he may eat second tithe wherever he can see Jerusalem even outside its walls?
(18) I.e., Shiloh and Jerusalem.
(19) This therefore was Ben 'Azzai's difficulty regarding the Baraitha: I can understand the rule that dedications of the minor degree of holiness should be eaten within the walls of Jerusalem, since there is an application of blood to be made on the altar. But why should second tithe not be eaten in any place where he can see Jerusalem?
(20) From being offered, since Scripture says with reference to firstling: 'Year by year'.
(21) For one redeems it and brings it any time
(22) The three Elders; R. Ishmael, R. Akiba and Ben 'Azzai.
(23) 'And thou shalt eat the tithe of thy corn and of thy wine and of thine oil, etc.' quoted above.
(24) Deut. XV, 20.
(25) For the words 'year by year' imply two years.
(26) Who derive by means of the analogy between firstling and second tithe that a firstling older than a year is not disqualified.
(27) Where he killed a firstling according to the law at the end of its first year.
(28) Even if the second day belonged to the fresh year.
(29) Num. XVIII, 18. Like the breast and shoulder of the peace-offering which are eaten two days and a night.
(30) Prior to the owners obtaining atonement through another animal.
(31) And even the Rabbis who say later that a sin-offering is not condemned to die except when found after the owners had obtained atonement, here agree that the animal dies, since there are two unfavourable conditions: First, it was lost and found blemished, and secondly, the owners obtained atonement through another animal after it was found, thus showing deliberately that they did not wish to procure atonement with the lost animal (Rashi).
(32) The animal which was found.
(33) Since it is not consecrated bodily but only for its value (R. Gershom).

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 22a

IT IS FORBIDDEN [RABBINICALLY] TO DERIVE BENEFIT FROM IT, BUT THE LAW OF SACRILEGE DOES NOT APPLY TO IT.1 IF, HOWEVER, THE OWNERS2 HAVE NOT YET OBTAINED ATONEMENT,3 IT4 MUST GO TO PASTURE UNTIL IT BECOMES UNFIT FOR SACRIFICE. IT5 IS THEN SOLD IMMEDIATELY AND ANOTHER IS BOUGHT WITH THE MONEY.6 IT7 , EFFECTS EXCHANGE,8 AND THE LAW OF SACRILEGE APPLIES TO IT.9

GEMARA. Why does not [the Mishnah] state them [the five sin-offerings which are left to die] all together?10 - The Tanna is sure [of the three cases] in the first part [of the Mishnah],11 but is not sure [of the two other cases] in the latter part [of the Mishnah]. What need is there to state [this whole Mishnah] in [Tractate] Me'ilah and here in Temurah?12 - [The Tanna in the Mishnah] states here the rule of exchange [with reference to the five sin-offerings], and since he states the rule of exchange [here], he also states the rule of sacrilege,13 and [since he states the law of sacrilege in Temurah, he also states in Me'ilah the law of exchange].

Said Resh Lakish: A sin-offering whose year is passed is regarded14 as if it stood in a cemetery15 and it is left to pasture. We have learnt: AND [ONE] WHOSE YEAR IS PASSED AND WHICH WAS LOST AND FOUND BLEMISHED, IF THE OWNERS OBTAINED ATONEMENT [AFTERWARDS THROUGH ANOTHER ANIMAL], IS LEFT TO DIE. Shall we say this refutes Resh Lakish?16 - Resh Lakish can answer you: The first part [of the Mishnah]17 refers to the case where the sin-offering was lost and found blemished.18 If19 so, read the latter part [of the Mishnah]: IF HOWEVER THE OWNERS HAVE NOT YET OBTAINED ATONEMENT, IT MUST GO TO PASTURE UNTIL UNFIT FOR SACRIFICE. Now if the Mishnah refers to a blemished animal, is it not already unfit?20 - Said Rabbah: [The Mishnah] should read as follows: 'Or21 it was lost and found blemished with a transitory blemish, if after the owners have obtained atonement, it is condemned to die;22 if, however, before the owners have obtained atonement, let it go to pasture until unfit for sacrifice with a permanent blemish and then sold'.23 Said Raba: There are two arguments against [this answer]. First, if so,24 the Mishnah ought to have said, 'Let him keep it' [the animal with the transitory blemish];25 and, moreover, for what purpose does the Mishnah mention a sin-offering whose year is passed?26 Raba therefore said: This is meant [by the Mishnah]: 'If the sin-offering passed its year and was lost,27 or if it was lost and found blemished,28 if after the owners have obtained atonement [through another animal], it is left to die; if before the owners have obtained atonement,29 let it go to pasture until unfit for sacrifice30 and then be sold'.31 And there is need to mention the condition of its being lost, both in connection with a blemished sin-offering and where [a sin-offering] passed its year. For if it mentioned the condition of its being lost only where the sin-offering passed its year, I might have thought there,32 because it is of no use for anything,33 the condition of being lost helps [to condemn it to die], whereas in the case of a blemished sin-offering, where if it were not for the blemish it would be fit, I might have said that the condition of being lost does not help [to condemn it to die].34 And if it [the Mishnah] had mentioned the condition of being lost in connection only with a blemished sin-offering, I might have said that there the condition of being lost helps [to condemn it to die], since it is not fit to be offered;35 whereas in the case of the sin-offering which passed its year and which is fit for offering,36 I might have said that the condition of being lost does not help [to condemn it to die]. It is therefore necessary [to mention the condition of being lost in both cases]. But did Raba say this?37 Has not Raba said: A sin-offering lost at night38 has not the name [legally] of a lost sin-offering?39 It is not the same.40 A sin-offering lost at night is not fit to offer either itself or its value,41 whereas here,42 granted that it is not itself fit for offering, its value is fit for offering.43

We have learnt elsewhere: The second [goat] goes to pasture until unfit for sacrifice and it is then sold and its money is devoted to the purchase of a freewill-offering, since a congregational sin-offering is not condemned to die.44 This implies that in the case of an individual sin-offering45 it is condemned to die. And R. Johanan explained: Animals [dedicated for sacrifices] are removed for ever from sacred use,46 and the atonement is through the second [animal] of the second pair. Now the first goat [of the first pair]47 is like the case of a sin-offering whose year is passed.48 The reason therefore why it is not condemned to die is because it is a congregational offering, but if it were an individual offering it would be condemned to die!49 - Raba can answer you: The case where animals are removed from sacred use is one thing, and the case of an animal which was lost is another. What is the reason? - If sin-offerings were lost, his mind is on them, in case they may be found;50 whereas where the sin-offerings are removed from sacred use, they can never be fit again for offering.51

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(1) If the owners benefited from it in any way, they are exempt from bringing a sacrifice for the unlawful use of a sacred thing (v. Lev. V, 15ff.) since neither it nor its money is devoted to anything holy.
(2) Of a sin-offering older than a year or a sin-offering found blemished after being lost.
(3) I.e., as long as the owners did not desire to procure atonement through another animal.
(4) Viz., the animal which has passed its year.
(5) Viz., the animal which was lost and found.
(6) Since the owners have not yet been atoned for.
(7) A sin-offering which is condemned to pasture.
(8) Since whatever is condemned to pasture effects exchange, as it is consecrated bodily.
(9) Since its value is devoted for a holy purpose.
(10) In one clause, instead of dividing them into two clauses, stating three cases i.e., a young of a sin-offering, the exchange of a sin-offering and a sin-offering lost and found blemished, in one section, and two other cases in a later section.
(11) That they are condemned to die even where the owners have not obtained atonement through another animal.
(12) The whole of this Mishnah being also taught in Tractate Me'ilah, III, 1.
(13) V. Marginal Gloss for the reading adopted here.
(14) Wherever it may be.
(15) Where a priest cannot enter, owing to ritual uncleanness, to kill it.
(16) Who rules that it pastures, implying even after the owners have obtained atonement, since he makes no distinction.
(17) Which says that it is condemned to die.
(18) But not with reference to a sin-offering older than a year.
(19) V. Sh. Mek. for the reading here, omitting the words preceding in cur. edd.
(20) Why then does the Mishnah say that it pastures until blemished? Consequently the Mishnah, when it says that the animal pastures, refers to the case of a sin-offering which has passed its year, and therefore the earlier part of the Mishnah which says that if the owners have obtained atonement the animal is condemned to die, also refers to a sinoffering which has passed its year. Now this is different from the opinion of Resh Lakish above.
(21) V. Sh. Mek. for this reading.
(22) The Mishnah consequently, according to Rabbah, does not refer to the case of a sin-offering whose year is passed.
(23) Therefore although we are dealing with a blemished animal, the Mishnah is in order when it speaks of pasturing until blemished, meaning with a permanent blemish, since a dedication with only a transitory blemish may not be sold.
(24) That we are dealing here with an animal possessing a transitory blemish.
(25) Until it receives a permanent blemish. Why does the Mishnah say that it should pasture?
(26) Since none of the rulings in the Mishnah have reference to it, for even if the owners have obtained atonement through another animal, it is not condemned to die, it effects exchange and is subject to the law of sacrilege. (V. Sh. Mek.).
(27) Thus having two unfavourable conditions even though found in an unblemished state.
(28) Here also there are two unfavourable conditions, being lost and blemished.
(29) Where the owners do not wish to obtain atonement through another animal.
(30) The sin-offering older than a year which is lost and found unblemished. The other which was found blemished is sold immediately (Sh. Mek.).
(31) And the ruling of Resh Lakish above that even if the owners have obtained atonement the animal older than a year is left to pasture, refers to the case where it was not lost and thus there is only one unfavourable condition, i.e., older than a year.
(32) Where the animal found was in a blemished condition.
(33) For any offering, since it is blemished.
(34) I might therefore have said that it is a mere defect in the animal, and since it was found before the owners obtained atonement through another animal, it is only condemned to pasture.
(35) For any sacrifice, being a blemished animal.
(36) For other sacrifices. Rashi explains that in all the cases in which we require two unfavourable conditions in order to condemn the sin-offering to die, we suppose that the animal was found before the owner has obtained atonement, but if the animal was found after the owner's atonement, even without the unfavourable condition of being lost, the animal is condemned to die.
(37) That where the sin-offering is disqualified before it was lost, i.e., if it is older than a year, the condition of being lost helps to condemn the animal to death.
(38) And the owner of which set aside another animal in its place.
(39) Since it is unfit to be offered at night and it was found the next day. It therefore pastures until unfit for sacrifice, if the owners obtain atonement through the other animal. Now here too in the case of a sin-offering whose year is passed, since it is unfit for sacrifice, the condition of being lost should not help to condemn it to die.
(40) The case of an animal lost by night is not on a par with a case of a sin-offering older than a year which was lost.
(41) Since a sacrifice cannot be offered at night.
(42) In a case of a sin-offering older than a year.
(43) Before it was lost.
(44) V. Yoma 64a which says that if one of the two goats required on the Day of Atonement died before the lots were cast, the High priest brings another goat and joins it to the survivor. If, however, the lots had been cast, he brings two fresh goats and casts lots and says: If the goat destined 'unto the Lord' died, then the goat upon which the lot of 'unto the Lord' has now fallen becomes the atonement sacrifice, and if the goat destined 'for Azazel' died, then the goat upon which the lot has now fallen 'for Azazel' is sent to Azazel and the second etc.
(45) In similar circumstances.
(46) Even without a physical disqualification.
(47) Removed from sacred use when its companion died.
(48) Which is also removed from sacred use.
(49) Although the condition of being lost is absent, it is condemned to die because the owner has obtained atonement through another animal. Consequently we see there is no need for two unfavourable conditions for the animal to be condemned to die, unlike the opinion of Raba above.
(50) And therefore the condition of being found blemished is required in addition to the condition of being lost, before the animal can be condemned to die.
(51) And therefore in the case of an individual as in the Mishnah above, where the animal is removed from being offered at all, it is condemned to die.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 22b

The text [says above]: 'Raba said: A sin-offering which had been lost at night1 has not the name [legally] of a lost sin-offering'. In accordance with whom is this opinion? Shall I say according to the Rabbis? If so, why does Raba mention the condition of being lost at night; the same applies even if it were lost by day,2 since the Rabbis say that a lost sin-offering, [found] when [the animal] set aside [in its place had not yet been offered],3 is condemned to pasture?4 Rather it is according to the opinion of Rabbi;5 [for Raba holds] that Rabbi's ruling only applies to a sin-offering which was lost by day, but with regard to a sin-offering which was lost by night, even Rabbi agrees that it goes to pasture.6 Or if you prefer [another solution] I may say: One may still hold that it is according, to the opinion of the Rabbis, and we are supposing here that the sin-offering was lost and was only found when the owners obtained atonement,7 the opinion of the Rabbis that a sin-offering which was lost when the owners obtained atonement is condemned to die only applying when the loss first occurred8 by day, but where the loss first occurred by night, it is not so.

Said Abaye: We have a tradition, 'Lost but not stolen, lost but not robbed',9 How is the case of a sin-offering which was lost to be understood? - Said R. Oshaiah: It means even a single [animal which became mixed up] with his herd,10 and even one [which became mixed up] with another.11 R. Johanan says: If the sin-offering [ran] behind the door.

The question was asked: What is meant [by R. Johanan's view]? Shall we say that [the law of a lost sin-offering only applies where the sin-offering is] behind the door, since no-one can see [the animal], but if the sin-offering ran outside [into the wilderness],12 since there are others who can see it, it has not the law of a lost sin-offering; or perhaps [a sin-offering] behind the door, though if [the owner] turns his face, he can see it, has yet the law of a lost [sin-offering], then all the more so is this the case with a sin-offering which ran outside, where he does not see it [at all]? - Let it stand undecided.

Said R. Papa: We have a tradition: If the sin-offering has been lost to [the owner] but not to the shepherd, it has not the law of a lost [sin-offering]; and this is certainly the case13 where [the sin-offering] has been lost to the shepherd but not to [the owner]. How is it if the sin-offering has been lost to him [the owner] and to the shepherd but one from quite another place14 recognised it? - Let it stand undecided.

R. Papa asked: How is it if [the sin-offering] was lost [when the blood of its companion was] in the cup?15 To whom is this question addressed? Shall I say to Rabbi? but does he not hold that a lost [sin-offering, found] when [the animal] set aside [in its place had not yet been offered], is condemned to die?16 Rather his [R. Papa's] inquiry will be addressed to the Rabbis, as follows: Do we say that the ruling of the Rabbis, that a lost sin-offering [found] when [the animal] set aside [in its place had not yet been offered] is condemned to pasture,17 only applies before the blood was received in the cup, but here they hold that whatever is ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it had been sprinkled [and therefore it is condemned to die]; or perhaps that so long as the blood has not yet been sprinkled, it is like the case where a lost sin-offering [was found] when [the animal] set aside [in its place had not yet been offered] and it is condemned to pasture?

Some there are who say: One might indeed say that [R. Papa's inquiry] is addressed to Rabbi,18 and his inquiry will be where e.g., he received the blood in two cups and one of them was lost.19 And according to the authority who holds that one cup removes the other [cups of blood] from sacred use,20 the question cannot arise.21 It can arise, however, according to the authority who holds that one cup [of blood] renders [the blood in] the other [cups] remainder.22 Do we say that this only applies where both [cups] are present, since he can sprinkle whichever [cup] he wishes, but here [it was lost];23 or perhaps there is no difference?24 - Let it remain undecided.

MISHNAH. IF ONE SET ASIDE A SIN-OFFERING AND IT WAS LOST AND HE OFFERED ANOTHER INSTEAD OF IT, IF THEN THE FIRST [ANIMAL] IS FOUND, IT IS LEFT TO DIE.25 IF ONE SET ASIDE MONEY FOR HIS SIN-OFFERING AND IT WAS LOST AND HE OFFERED A SIN-OFFERING INSTEAD OF IT, IF THEN THE MONEY WAS FOUND, IT GOES TO THE DEAD SEA.26 IF ONE SET ASIDE MONEY FOR HIS SIN-OFFERING, AND IT WAS LOST AND HE SET ASIDE OTHER MONEY INSTEAD OF IT, IF HE DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF PURCHASING A SIN-OFFERING WITH IT UNTIL THE [FIRST] MONEY WAS FOUND, HE BRINGS A SIN-OFFERING FROM BOTH [SUMS],27 AND THE REST OF THE MONEY IS USED FOR A FREEWILL-OFFERING. IF ONE SET ASIDE MONEY FOR HIS SIN-OFFERING AND IT WAS LOST AND HE SET ASIDE A SIN-OFFERING INSTEAD OF IT, IF HE DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF OFFERING IT UNTIL THE MONEY WAS FOUND, AND THE SIN-OFFERING WAS BLEMISHED, IT IS SOLD AND HE BRINGS A SIN-OFFERING FROM BOTH [SUMS],28 AND THE REST IS USED AS A FREEWILL-OFFERING. IF ONE SET ASIDE A SIN-OFFERING AND IT WAS LOST AND HE SET ASIDE MONEY INSTEAD OF IT, IF HE DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF PURCHASING A SIN-OFFERING UNTIL HIS SIN-OFFERING WAS FOUND IN A BLEMISHED STATE, IT IS SOLD AND HE BRINGS A SIN-OFFERING FROM BOTH [SUMS], AND THE REST IS USED FOR A FREEWILL-OFFERING. IF ONE SET ASIDE A SIN-OFFERING AND IT WAS LOST AND HE SET ASIDE ANOTHER SIN-OFFERING INSTEAD OF IT, IF HE DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER IT UNTIL THE FIRST SIN-OFFERING WAS FOUND AND BOTH WERE BLEMISHED, THEY ARE TO BE SOLD AND HE BRINGS A SIN-OFFERING FROM BOTH [SUMS]. AND THE REST IS USED FOR A FREEWILL-OFFERING. IF ONE SET ASIDE A SIN-OFFERING AND IT WAS LOST AND HE SET ASIDE ANOTHER INSTEAD OF IT, IF HE DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF OFFERING IT UNTIL THE FIRST SIN-OFFERING WAS FOUND AND BOTH ANIMALS WERE UNBLEMISHED, ONE OF THEM IS OFFERED AS A SIN-OFFERING AND THE SECOND IS CONDEMNED TO DIE. THIS IS THE TEACHING OF RABBI. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAY: THE LAW OF A SIN-OFFERING WHICH IS CONDEMNED TO DIE ONLY APPLIES WHERE IT IS FOUND AFTER THE OWNERS OBTAINED ATONEMENT, AND THE MONEY DOES NOT GO TO THE DEAD SEA29 EXCEPT WHERE FOUND AFTER THE OWNERS HAVE OBTAINED ATONEMENT. IF ONE SET ASIDE A SIN-OFFERING AND IT IS BLEMISHED,30 HE SELLS IT AND PURCHASES ANOTHER FOR ITS MONEY; R. ELEAZAR SON OF R. SIMEON SAYS: IF THE SECOND ANIMAL WAS OFFERED BEFORE THE FIRST WAS KILLED,31 IT IS CONDEMNED TO DIE, SINCE THE OWNERS HAVE [ALREADY] OBTAINED ATONEMENT.32

GEMARA. The reason why [the sin-offering is condemned to die]33 is because the other [sin-offering] was offered instead of it, but if the other [sin-offering] was not offered instead of it, it is only condemned to pasture. Whose opinion does this represent? It is that of the Rabbis who hold that a lost [sin-offering found] when [the animal] set aside [instead of it had not yet been offered] is condemned to pasture. Then read the subsequent clause [of the Mishna]: IF ONE SET ASIDE MONEY FOR A SIN-OFFERING AND IT BECAME LOST AND HE SET ASIDE OTHER MONEY INSTEAD OF IT, [IF HE DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF PURCHASING A SIN-OFFERING WITH IT],34 HE BRINGS A SIN-OFFERING WITH BOTH SUMS AND THE REST IS USED FOR A FREEWILL-OFFERING. Now the reason is because he brings a sin-offering from both [sums],35 but if he brought [a sin-offering] from one [of the sums of monies] the second is taken to the Dead Sea; and this will be the opinion of Rabbi, who says that a lost [sin-offering found] when [the animal] set aside [in its place had not yet been offered] is condemned to die! - The first part of the Mishnah will thus be the opinion of the Rabbis and the latter part that of Rabbi! Now there is no difficulty according to R. Huna,36 for R. Huna reported in the name of Rab:

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(1) This is presumed to mean that the sin-offering was only lost by night and was found at dawn. Therefore it was not lost at a period where there can be atonement, for one cannot offer another animal by night in its place.
(2) And was found, the owners obtaining atonement through the other animal.
(3) Before the first was found.
(4) Since the Rabbis hold that a sin-offering is only condemned to die when it is found after the owners have obtained atonement.
(5) Who says that it shall die.
(6) Since even if the sin-offering is before us, we cannot offer it at night and therefore it has nor the legal name of a lost sin-offering.
(7) It was lost in the night and it was not found again until atonement had been obtained by another animal.
(8) Lit., 'essence of the loss was by day'.
(9) Only such an animal is condemned to die, and if the animal is restored to its owner it is condemned to pasture and its value is used for a freewill-offering.
(10) Although he can see all of them, but since he only recognised it after atonement had been obtained, it is regarded as a lost sin-offering.
(11) Which was hullin.
(12) And became mixed up with animals belonging to others and these others did not recognise the sin-offering. Nevertheless, since the others saw the sin-offering, although not recognising it, the latter is not regarded as a lost sin-offering.
(13) That it is not regarded as a lost sin-offering.
(14) Lit., 'in the end of the world'.
(15) He killed the animal which he set aside in place of the lost sin-offering and received its blood in a cup, and while the blood was still in the cup the first animal was found.
(16) How much more so is this the case here where the animal set aside was actually killed, and when one can say that whatever is ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it had been sprinkled, and therefore we should regard the sin-offering as lost when atonement took place (Rashi).
(17) Even if the owners obtained atonement subsequently through another animal.
(18) The inquiry not referring to two animals but to one animal whose blood was received in two cups.
(19) While the blood of the other was being sprinkled.
(20) A sin-offering whose blood was received in four cups and he made the four applications of blood to the four corners of the altar from one cup, the remainder of the cup being poured out at the bottom of the altar and the remaining blood of the cups into the sewer; v. Yoma 57b.
(21) Since here the sin-offering is certainly disqualified, whereas there, all the cups of blood being before us, the sacrifice is a proper one; for although the blood of three cups is poured into the sewer, there were four applications of the blood to the altar. In the case here, however, since one cup of blood was lost and since if the cup was before us it would have been removed from sacred use and, in addition, there is the unfavourable condition of being lost, the sacrifice is unfit, and it is similar to the case of a sin-offering which passed its year and was lost. Sh. Mek. brings another version which explains that the sacrifice itself does not become unfit here, since he can make the necessary applications of blood from the second cup. The inquiry here, however, is whether the cupful of blood which was found after being lost is poured into the sewer or poured out at the bottom of the altar, and according to the authority who says, one cup removes the other cups from sacred use, the case is certainly the same here, and it is poured into the sewer.
(22) And therefore it is poured out at the bottom of the altar, in accordance with the law of blood left over.
(23) And therefore the fact of being lost helps to remove it from sacred use and the sacrifice becomes unfit. The bracketed words are inserted with Sh. Mek.
(24) Even if it is lost, the other cup is not disqualified.
(25) Even if it was found unblemished, since only when it was found before the atonement of the owners had taken place do we require two unfavourable conditions to condemn the animal to die.
(26) The rule being that wherever a sin-offering is condemned to die, the money also is cast into the Dead Sea.
(27) He mixes the money together, and since he brings a sin-offering from both it is not regarded as a sin-offering whose owners had obtained atonement, whereas if he brought a sin-offering from one sum, then the sanctity of the other sum is removed and the case is like the money of a sin-offering whose owners had procured atonement through another sin-offering. Lit., 'from these and these' (Rashi).
(28) But if it was found unblemished, it is offered and the money goes to the Dead Sea, since the owners have obtained atonement through another (Rashi).
(29) Even if there was atonement through one sum of money after the other was found, since it was found before the atonement.
(30) While it was being killed it was discovered to be blemished (R. Gershom).
(31) In the house of the buyer as hullin.
(32) Although it was hullin, since it is a sin-offering whose owners have obtained atonement through another animal.
(33) In the case where one set aside a sin-offering which was lost and another was offered in its place, and the first was then found.
(34) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(35) Where one cannot say that the owners were atoned for through another.
(36) As quoted infra.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 23a

All1 the authorities agree that if he selected one2 [on his own accord]3 and offered it,4 the second [sin-offering] dies.5 [The latter part of the Mishnah here] can therefore be explained as referring to a case where e.g., he [deliberately] selected one [heap of the monies for a sin-offering] and offered it, and [the Mishnah] will thus be according to all the authorities concerned [even the Rabbis]. But according to R. Abba, who reported Rab as saying: All6 the authorities concerned agree that where the owner obtained atonement through the sin-offering which was not lost, the lost sin-offering is condemned to die, and the difference of opinion arises only where [the owner] obtained atonement through the lost sin-offering, Rabbi holding that [the sin-offering] set aside instead of the lost one has the same law as the lost sin-offering,7 whereas the Rabbis hold that it has not the same law as the lost sin-offering,8 - are we to say that [the Tanna of] the early part [of the Mishnah] states the law anonymously in agreement with the Rabbis and in the latter part of the Mishnah it states the law anonymously according to Rabbi! [Yes, the first part of the Mishnah agrees with the opinion of the Rabbis and the latter part agrees with the opinion of Rabbi.]9 Now what does the Tanna of the Mishnah inform us?10 That Rabbi and the Rabbis differ. Surely the Mishnah explicitly mentions later this difference of opinion between Rabbi and the Rabbis [as follows]: IF ONE SET ASIDE A SIN-OFFERING AND IT WAS LOST AND HE SET ASIDE ANOTHER INSTEAD OF IT, THE FIRST THEN BEING FOUND AND BOTH WERE UNBLEMISHED, ONE OF THEM IS OFFERED AS A SIN-OFFERING AND THE SECOND IS CONDEMNED TO DIE. THIS IS THE TEACHING OF RABBI. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAY: THE LAW OF A SIN-OFFERING WHICH IS CONDEMNED TO DIE ONLY APPLIES WHERE IT IS FOUND AFTER THE OWNERS HAVE OBTAINED ATONEMENT, AND THE MONEY DOES NOT GO TO THE DEAD SEA EXCEPT WHERE FOUND AFTER THE OWNERS OBTAINED ATONEMENT. [The latter part of the Mishnah]11 informs us that [the previous clauses in the Mishnah]12 are matters of dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis.13

[To turn to] the main text: R. Huna reported in the name of Rab: All the authorities agree that if he selected one [sin-offering] and offered it, the second is condemned to die. The dispute between them refers only to the case where the owner comes to consult [the Beth din],14 Rabbi holding that no remedy was devised for dedications,15 and that we say: Obtain atonement through the sin-offering which was never lost and let the sin-offering which was lost die; whereas the Rabbis hold that a remedy was devised for dedications, and that we say to the owner: Go and obtain atonement through the sin-offering which was lost, and the sin-offering which was never lost is condemned to pasture.16

R. Mesharsheyah raised an objection: But was no remedy devised for dedications? Has it not been taught: Why does the text state: They shall eat?17 This teaches [us] that if there was only a little quantity [of the meal-offering] the priests may eat hullin and terumah with it in order that it may make a satisfying meal.18 What is the point of the expression, 'They shall eat it'? In order to teach us that if the quantity was large,19 the priests must not eat hullin or terumah with it, in order that the meal-offering should not make an over-sated meal. Is not [this Baraitha] even according to the opinion of Rabbi?20 No, it is according to the Rabbis.21

But R. Abba reported in the name of Rab: All the authorities concerned agree that where the owners obtained atonement through the sin-offering which was never lost, the lost sin-offering is condemned to die. The dispute between them, however, is where [the owner] obtained atonement through the sin-offering which was lost, Rabbi holding that the sin-offering set aside instead of the lost sin-offering has the law of the lost sin-offering, whereas the Rabbis hold that it has not the law of the lost in-offering.

We have learnt: The second [goat] pastures until unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and its money is used for a freewill-offering, since a congregational sin-offering is not condemned to die.22 Now this implies that a sin-offering belonging to an individual is condemned to die. And Rab said: Animals [destined for sacrifice] are not removed from sacred use;23 and [consequently] when he procures atonement he does so through the second [goat] of the first pair. Now this latter [pair]24 is like that which is set aside instead of a lost sin-offering; and yet the reason25 is because the goat belongs to the congregation; but if it belonged to an individual it would be condemned to die.

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(1) Even the Rabbis, who hold that a sin-offering which was lost and found after another had been set aside in its place but before the latter was offered, is condemned to pasture.
(2) Of the two sin-offerings standing before us, the one lost and found and the other appointed in the place of the first.
(3) Without coming to consult the Beth din as to which animal he should offer.
(4) Even if the one selected was the lost sin-offering and the owner obtained atonement therewith.
(5) Even if it was the sin-offering which was never lost, since he thus showed deliberately that he was not concerned with it. For the Rabbis dispute only where the owner comes to consult the Beth din, thus showing that he is seeking a remedy, e.g., where he set aside a sin-offering and it was lost and then the first was found and he comes before us to consult as to what he should do. According to Rabbi we say to him, 'Obtain atonement through the sin-offering which was never lost', and the lost sin-offering is condemned to die, whereas according to the Rabbis we say to him, 'Obtain atonement through the lost sin-offering', and the other one is condemned to pasture.
(6) V. p. 166, n. 4.
(7) Just as where the owner obtained atonement through the sin-offering which was never lost, the law is that the lost sin-offering is condemned to die, so if he was atoned for through the lost sin-offering, the one which was never lost is condemned to die.
(8) When therefore the Mishnah says that the sin-offering is brought from both sums together, thus implying that if the owners procured atonement by means of one sum, even that which was lost, the other sum which was not lost goes to the Dead Sea, this is the opinion of Rabbi.
(9) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(10) By stating the law anonymously in one part of the Mishnah according to the Rabbis and in another according to Rabbi.
(11) The clause which speaks of both sin-offerings standing before us, where it is stated explicitly that there is a dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis in the matter.
(12) Where one sin-offering was offered before the first was found and where one set aside money for the lost money of a sin-offering etc.
(13) One clause stating the law anonymously in accordance with the view of the Rabbis and the other clause stating the law anonymously according to the view of Rabbi.
(14) As to which sin-offering he should offer, and thus he did not do anything deliberately to show which animal he intends to offer.
(15) For we do not care if the second animal dies.
(16) And the Mishnah therefore means as follows: One of the sin-offerings is offered in order that the second shall die, i.e., that the sin-offering which was never lost should be sacrificed and the lost one be condemned to die. This is the teaching of Rabbi, whereas the Rabbis say that a sin-offering is not condemned to die in a case where he comes to consult the Beth din, for we say: 'Go and obtain atonement through the lost sin-offering', thus avoiding condemning a dedication to die. Where, however, the owner has already procured atonement, the lost sin-offering certainly dies, as there is no remedy in consulting, and the same law applies if the sin-offering is found even before atonement took place, if the owner did not consult the Beth din.
(17) With reference to the remainder of a meal-offering. And the remainder thereof shall Aaron and his sons eat; in the court of the tent of meeting they shall eat it (Lev. VI, 9).
(18) There is no difficulty about bringing hullin into the Temple court, since he can eat hullin outside first and then continue with the meal-offering in the Temple court. Or, as Tosaf. explains, there is no restriction in merely bringing an object into the Temple court so long as no service is performed with it.
(19) The priest having many remainders of meal-offerings.
(20) Since no particular teacher is mentioned. We can therefore infer from here that a remedy was devised for dedications, since the Baraitha says here that hullin must not be eaten with large remainders of meal-offerings for fear of the latter becoming disqualified through being left over.
(21) Who hold that we do devise a remedy for dedications.
(22) V. supra 22a and notes.
(23) And the first animal was not removed from sacred use on account of the death of its companion.
(24) Set aside in place of the first goat of the first pair which died.
(25) Why the second goat of the second pair pastures.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 23b

Does not [this Mishnah] represent even the opinion of the Rabbis?1 - No. It represents that of Rabbi.2

We have learnt: IF ONE SET ASIDE A SIN-OFFERING AND IT WAS LOST AND HE OFFERED ANOTHER INSTEAD OF IT, IT IS CONDEMNED TO DIE. Now the reason is because he offered it [and afterwards the first sin-offering was found], but if he did not offer it [before the first animal was found], it pastures irrespective of whether the atonement then took place through the lost sin-offering or atonement took place through the sin-offering which was never lost, and irrespective of whether he selected one [of the sin-offerings] or did not select. Shall we say that this refutes both [Amoraim]?3 - [The Tanna in the Mishnah] states what he is certain about4 but does not state what he is not certain about.5

We have learnt: IF ONE SET ASIDE MONEY FOR A SINOFFERING AND IT WAS LOST AND HE SET ASIDE OTHER MONEY INSTEAD OF IT, IF THE FIRST MONEY WAS THEN FOUND, HE BRINGS A SIN-OFFERING FROM BOTH [SUMS], AND THE REST IS USED FOR A FREEWILL-OFFERING. Now the reason is because [the owner] obtains atonement from a sin-offering brought from both [sums], but if he brought a sin-offering from one [sum], he takes the other to the Dead Sea, irrespective of whether atonement took place through the lost money, or the money which was never lost, and irrespective of whether he selected one [heap of the money] or he did not select.6 Shall we say this refutes the two [Amoraim]?7 - Here too [the Tanna of the Mishnah] states what he is certain about,8 but he does not state what he is not certain about.9

Said R. Ammi: If one sets aside two heaps of money for security's sake,10 he can obtain atonement for one of them and the other is then used for a freewill-offering. Whose opinion does this represent? Will you say the opinion of Rabbi? Surely it is obvious that the second [heap of money] is used for a freewill-offering, since Rabbi [says the money must go to the Dead Sea] only in the case where one sets aside money for what is lost, but he would agree that when the setting aside is for security's sake [it must be used for a freewill-offering]. Shall I say then that it is the opinion of the Rabbis? But surely it is obvious that the monies are used for freewill-offerings! It is a conclusion from minor to major [as follows]: Seeing that if one sets aside [money instead of the money] for a lost sin-offering, the Rabbis hold that it has not the law of the lost sin-offering, can there be a doubt where the setting aside is for security's sake? - Rather he had [to state it] according to the opinion of R. Simeon.11 You might have said that R. Simeon does not hold that there can be a freewill-offering [of an animal which was once a sin-offering].12 [R. Ammi] therefore informs us that a freewill-offering [can take the place of a sin-offering]. But how can you say that R. Simeon holds that there is no freewill-offering in place of a sin-offering? Have we not learnt: There were thirteen horn-shaped [offering] boxes in the Temple and on them were inscribed [respectively] the words, New shekels,13 Old shekels,14 Bird sacrifices,15 Pigeons for a burnt-offering,16 Wood,17 Frankincense,18 Gold for kapporeth.19 And six [horn-shaped] offering boxes were for the freewill-offerings [of the congregation].20 And it has been taught with reference to this [Mishnah]: The statement, 'six boxes for a freewill-offering' means for burnt-offerings which come from the sacrificial surpluses,21 and the skins do not belong to the priests.22 This is the teaching of R. Judah. R. Nehemiah - some say R. Simeon - said to him: If so,23 the interpretation of Jehoaida the Priest is nullified, since we have learnt: The following exposition24 was made by Jehoaida the Priest: [Scripture says]: It is a guilt-offering, he is certainly guilty before the Lord,25 this includes everything which comes from the surpluses of sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, thus enjoining that burnt-offerings shall be brought with their money, the flesh to be used for the Name [of God]26 and the skins for the priests.27 Consequently we see that R. Simeon holds that there can be a freewill-offering [replacing a sin-offering]?28 - It is necessary [for R. Ammi to give us his ruling in connection with R. Simeon]. For you might think. that R. Simeon holds that there can be a freewill-offering29 only in one30 row,

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(1) Since it is stated anonymously. Hence we can deduce that a sin-offering set aside has the law of a lost sin-offering, since atonement is obtained through the first goat, the companion of the one lost. And the one belonging to the second pair, which along with its companion was not lost but was set aside, if belonging to an individual is condemned to die, even according to the opinion of Rabbi. The Rabbis therefore must have a different reason for their view than that given by R. Abba (Rashi).
(2) And therefore in a case of an individual the animal dies, but according to the Rabbis the animal would only pasture, since the animal set aside has not the law of the lost animal.
(3) R. Huna and R.Abba.
(4) The thing about which he is absolutely certain, and therefore he only mentions the case where atonement took place before the sin-offering was found and in which the animal is condemned to die, since he is sure of this. You cannot, however, deduce from this case that where the offering had not taken place and the sin-offering was found, it pastures, since sometimes it pastures and sometimes it is condemned to die, e.g., according to R. Huna where he selected one sin-offering, even the lost one, the other is condemned to die, whereas if the owner came to consult the Beth din as to which animal is to be offered, the one remaining over is only condemned to pasture. And according to R. Abba whether he selected one of the animals for sacrifice or came to consult, if atonement was procured with the sin-offering which was never lost, the lost one is condemned to die, whereas if atonement was procured through the lost sin-offering, the other is condemned to pasture.
(5) Where e.g., the sin-offering was found before atonement took place, when according to R. Huna, the animal dies if he did not consult the Beth din, or according to R. Abba, the animal dies if the owner obtained atonement through the animal which was never lost, since where the sin-offering was found before atonement, it can either pasture or die, according as to whether a certain condition was present, whereas in the former case, viz., where the sin-offering was found after atonement, the animal is condemned to die without any distinction (Rashi).
(6) And the presumption was that this is the opinion of all the authorities concerned even the Rabbis. Therefore the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis must be different from that given both by R. Huna and R. Abba.
(7) R. Huna and R. Abba.
(8) E.g., where he brings a sin-offering from both monies. This is a good remedy not requiring any condition. You cannot, however, deduce that where he brings a sin-offering from one of the heaps of money, the money goes to the Dead Sea, since sometimes it goes to the Dead Sea and sometimes it is used for a freewill-offering, according to the condition set forth respectively in the views of R. Huna and R. Abba.
(9) E.g., if he brought a sin-offering from one heap of the coins, the Tanna has to introduce a certain condition, according to the opinion of R. Huna, viz., whether he selected one heap or not, and according to R. Abba, whether it was the lost money or the other. Since therefore the bringing of a sin-offering from one heap of money does not determine absolutely that the other goes to the Dead Sea, the Tanna does not trouble to mention it in the Mishnah.
(10) So that if one heap was lost, atonement can be procured through the other.
(11) Who says (supra 15b) that the five sin-offerings are condemned to die and does not hold at all that any of these pasture so that their money could be used for freewill-offerings.
(12) And just as there is none in the case of the animal, so there is none brought with the money of a sin-offering.
(13) One who did not bring his shekel payment in Adar could bring it the whole year round and he put it into this offering box.
(14) One who did not bring his shekel during the year brought it the following year and put it into this box. The walls, towers and other requirements of the city were built with this money.
(15) Those who required a ceremony of atonement e.g., a woman after childbirth, a leper, etc. brought money and put it into this box for the bringing of bird sacrifices and could partake of a sacrificial meal in the evening in the confident belief that priests had emptied the box and brought the necessary sacrifices.
(16) He who offered young pigeons for a burnt-offering put the money for this purpose into this box.
(17) One who offered wood for the altar put the money for it into this box.
(18) The person who gave frankincense put the money for it into this box.
(19) 'Covering'; one who wished to make offerings of gold foil for the sacred vessels put the money for it into this box. Aliter: 'bowl'; one who wished to offer gold for a sacred vessel, e.g., a bowl, placed it in this box.
(20) Burnt-offerings; v. Shek. VI, 5.
(21) Of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings.
(22) But they are sold again and burnt-offerings are bought with the money.
(23) That the skins do not belong to the priests.
(24) Heb. Midrash.
(25) Lev. V, 19. The first part of the text implies that it was eaten by the priest, while the latter part implies that it belonged to the Lord. How do you reconcile this? (R. Gershom.)
(26) To be burnt wholly on the altar.
(27) Thus both parts of the verse are applicable.
(28) Why therefore does R. Ammi need to inform us that R. Simeon holds that a freewill-offering can replace a sin-offering?
(29) From the surpluses of sin-offerings and guilt-offerings.
(30) I.e., where one heap of coins was set aside for a sin-offering and on the lambs becoming cheap there was a surplus from the money.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 24a

but in two rows1 it is not so. R. Ammi therefore informs us [that it is not so].2

Said R. Hoshaiah: If one sets aside two sin-offerings for security's sake, he obtains atonement through [either] of them and its companion is left to pasture. Now whose opinion does this represent? Shall I say that of the Rabbis? Surely if where one sets aside [a sin-offering for one] which was lost, the Rabbis hold it has not the law of a lost sin-offering;3 is there then a question as regards the case [of one setting aside a sin-offering] for security's sake?4 Then it is the opinion of R. Simeon? But has not R. Simeon said: Five sin-offerings are left to die?5 Rather6 it must be the opinion of Rabbi,7 for the ruling of Rabbi only applies [where a sin-offering is set aside for] one lost; but where the setting aside is for security's sake, the case is not so.8

We have learnt: IF ONE SET ASIDE A SIN-OFFERING AND IT IS BLEMISHED, HE SELLS IT AND BRINGS ANOTHER INSTEAD OF IT, WHEREAS R. ELEAZAR SON OF R. SIMEON SAYS: IF HE OFFERED THE SECOND ANIMAL BEFORE THE FIRST WAS KILLED [FOR HULLIN], IT IS CONDEMNED TO DIE, SINCE THE OWNERS HAVE [ALREADY] OBTAINED ATONEMENT. Now it is to be assumed that R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon agrees with the opinion of Rabbi,9 [which proves that Rabbi's ruling applies] even in the case [of the setting aside] for security's sake.10 - No. Perhaps R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon agrees with his father who says that the five sin-offerings are condemned to die.11

We have learnt:12 Because a congregational sin-offering is not condemned to die.13 Now this implies that [a sin-offering] belonging to an individual [in similar circumstances] is left to die. And Rab explained: Animals [destined for sacrifice] are not removed from sacred use,14 and when he procures atonement, he does so through the second [goat] of the first pair; now this [second goat of the second pair] is a case of something being set aside for security's sake,15 and yet [as implied in this Mishnah] a sin-offering belonging to an individual is left to die!16 - Rab follows the opinion expressed elsewhere,17 where he said: It is a [proper performance of the] duty to use the first.18

R. Shimi b. Ziri recited before R. Papa: If [a sin-offering] was still lost when another was set aside [in its place],19 according to Rabbi [the sin-offering found before atonement] is left to die, whereas according to the Rabbis it is left to pasture. If [a sin-offering] was still lost when atonement was obtained [by the owners], according to the Rabbis it is left to die, whereas according to Rabbi it is left to pasture. He [R. Papa] said to him: But can we not draw a conclusion from minor to major?20 If in the case where a sin-offering is still lost when another is set aside [in its place! where the Rabbis say it is left to pasture, Rabbi says that it is left to die, how much more so is this the case of a sin-offering which is still lost when atonement has been obtained, where according to the Rabbis it is left to die, that according to Rabbi it is left to die? - Rather recite [the passage] thus: If [a sin-offering] is still lost when another is set aside in its place, according to Rabbi the animal is left to die, whereas according to the Rabbis it pastures. If [a sin-offering] was still lost, however, when atonement was obtained, it is the opinion of all the authorities concerned that it is condemned to die.

R. ELEAZAR SON OF R. SIMEON SAID etc. Our Rabbis have taught: We must not flay an animal from the feet on holy days;21 likewise we must not flay from the feet a firstling or dedications unfit for sacrifice22 [even on a weekday]. Now there is no difficulty in understanding why [this is forbidden] on a holy day; it is because he takes excessive trouble [in preparing something] which is not suitable for him [on that day].23 But who is the Tanna who holds that [this is forbidden] with reference to a firstling? - Said R. Hisda: It is Beth Shammai who say that a firstling retains its holiness. For we have learnt: Beth Shammai say, One must not include24 an Israelite with a priest [in connection with the eating of a firstling].25 Who is the Tanna who forbids this in the case of dedications which became unfit for sacrifice? - Said R. Hisda: R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon. For it has been taught: If there were two sin-offerings before [the owner] one unblemished and the other blemished, the unblemished sin-offering is offered and the blemished sin-offering26 is redeemed. If the blemished one was killed before the blood of the unblemished sin-offering was sprinkled, it is permitted [to be eaten]; if after the blood of the unblemished sin-offering was sprinkled, it is forbidden [to be eaten].27 R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon however says: Even if the flesh of the blemished sin-offering is in the pot and the blood of the unblemished sin-offering was then sprinkled, it28 is taken forth to the fire-house.29

But why does not R. Hisda explain [both parts30 of the Baraitha just quoted] according to Beth Shammai?31 - [The reason is] perhaps the teaching of Beth Shammai applies only to a firstling since its dedication [commences] from the womb,32 but the case is different with dedications unfit for sacrifice. But why does not [R. Hisda] explain [both parts of the Baraitha above] according to the opinion of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon?33 - [The reason is that] perhaps the teaching of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon applies only to dedications unfit for sacrifice, since they are capable of redemption,34 but the case of a firstling is not so.35 But does not R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon hold what we have learnt: All dedications unfit for sacrifice [after being redeemed] are killed in the market,36 sold in the market, and weighed by the pound? Now we see from this that since you permit him [to sell them in the market] he will increase [the redemption money in order] to sell [them later at a higher price; so here37 also if you permit him to flay the firstling from the feet, he will increase the redemption money]!38 Said R. Mari the son of Kahana: The improvement in the value of the skin spoils the flesh.39 It was said in Palestine in the name of R. Abin:40 Because it appears as if he performed work with dedications.41 R. Jose b. Abin said: It is forbidden lest he rear [many] herds of dedications rendered unfit for sacrifice.42 [

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(1) I.e., where two heaps were set aside for security's sake and where he obtained atonement through one; I might in that case have thought that the other heap is removed from sacred use altogether.
(2) And that the other heap of money is used for freewill burnt-offerings.
(3) And if the lost sin-offering is used, the other is condemned to pasture.
(4) That the surviving animal pastures.
(5) In all cases 'and one of them is where the owners obtained atonement through another animal.
(6) R. Hoshaiah saying that the remaining sin-offering is condemned to pasture.
(7) Who holds that if a sin-offering was set aside in place of one which was lost, and the first was found before atonement, but the second sin-offering was still offered, the offering which was lost was condemned to die. But where the owner set aside two sin-offerings for security's sake and obtained atonement through one of them, the other would not be condemned to die.
(8) And the other animal is only condemned to pasture.
(9) Who holds that a sin-offering set aside in place of a lost sin-offering has the law of a lost sin-offering. We therefore see that even where there is no case of a lost sin-offering, as here in the Mishnah, where the first sin-offering was not lost but became blemished, and he set aside another in its place, it is also condemned to die (Rashi).
(10) The same will therefore apply where one sets aside two sin-offerings for security's sake, that the surviving animal is condemned to die, which is unlike the opinion of R. Hoshaiah.
(11) In every case, even where a sin-offering was not lost, wherever the owners obtain atonement through one sin-offering the other is condemned to die.
(12) V. supra 15a, 16a, 22b and notes.
(13) Referring to the goats brought on the Day of Atonement.
(14) And the first goat of the first pair is not removed from holiness by reason of the death of its companion.
(15) Since it was not set aside instead of a lost animal, as only the goat for Azazel died but not the goat 'unto the Lord'. The setting aside was therefore for security's sake on behalf of the second goat in the first pair.
(16) That the animal set aside i.e., the second goat of the second pair which is left over, dies, which is unlike the opinion of R. Hoshaiah!
(17) Yoma 64a.
(18) I.e., the one which had been originally set aside. This ruling is mentioned in connection with a Passover offering which had been set aside and then lost, and another was set aside in its place after which the first was found; in which case the owner may sacrifice, on the view of the Rabbis, whichever he chooses for the Passover. R. Jose, however, says that it is incumbent upon him to sacrifice the first animal. Now Rab agrees with R. Jose, consequently on this view the setting aside of a second animal for one that had been lost was not necessarily for a dedication but eventually to condemn it to die; whereas in the case of setting aside two sin-offerings for security, since if he had wished at the beginning he could have obtained atonement through the surviving animal, the setting aside at the beginning was not with the purpose of condemning it to die (Rashi).
(19) And eventually atonement took place through the other.
(20) That in the latter case the animal should be condemned to die even according to Rabbi.
(21) So as to keep the skin intact in order to make a pair of bellows therewith. When the skin was flayed with a knife, the process was from the throat to the tail.
(22) Which had been redeemed and killed.
(23) Viz., for the bellows.
(24) Lit., number'.
(25) Which a priest killed when it was in a blemished state. Consequently we see that although it was blemished it retained its holiness, and therefore it is forbidden to flay it from the feet, as this is similar to the performance of work in connection with dedications.
(26) I.e., one which became blemished before the setting aside of the second sin-offering. Now these two offerings were brought for one sin and a blemish occurred in the first and the second was set aside in its place.
(27) Since it is like the case of a sin-offering whose owners have obtained atonement through another animal.
(28) The flesh of the blemished animal.
(29) Consequently we see that although it has ben redeemed and killed, it remained holy and is described as a sin-offering whose owner has obtained atonement. Similarly as regards flaying an unfit sacrifice mentioned in the Baraitha above, although it was redeemed and killed, it remains holy.
(30) That referring to a firstling and that referring to unfit dedications.
(31) For it is natural to suppose that just as Beth Shammai hold a strict view with reference to a firstling, they also adopt a similar attitude with reference to dedications which were rendered unfit for sacrifice. Why then does R. Hisda explain the first part of the Baraitha as being the view of Beth Shammai and the latter part, viz., that which refers to unfit dedications, as being the view of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon?
(32) As it does not require a special dedication in order to receive holiness, unlike the case of ordinary dedications.
(33) Mentioned in the Baraitha just quoted: 'If there were two sin-offerings etc.', from which we learn that a blemished sin-offering still retains its sanctity even after redemption and killing.
(34) The redemption money being holy and the animal becoming hullin.
(35) Since Scripture says: 'Thou shalt not redeem' (Num. XVIII, 17) and if he did so, the redemption money does not receive any holiness.
(36) We therefore see that they do not retain their holiness after having been redeemed and killed.
(37) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(38) And hasten to redeem it, since in the end he sells the skin at a higher price. Why therefore does R. Eleazar hold in a Baraitha that we must not flay dedications rendered unfit for sacrifice from the feet?
(39) Whatever gain there is as regards the skin remaining intact is lost as regards the flesh, and there is really no profit eventually, since for fear of spoiling the skin he cuts into the flesh, and thus he is no longer able to sell it so well.
(40) The reason why it is forbidden to flay a firstling etc. from the feet.
(41) That he is making a bellows on the animal while the skin is still attached to the animal. It is not, however, actually work since, strictly speaking, no work can legally be performed with dedications after the animal's death, only that it seems like work.
(42) If you permit him to flay the skin of unfit dedications from the feet, he may detain them and not kill them until smiths come his way. He might therefore be led to rear herds of unfit dedications and use their shearings or work with them, all of which is forbidden even after their redemption.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 24b

CHAPTER 5

MISHNAH. WHAT DEVICE DO WE USE WITH REFERENCE TO A FIRSTLING?1 HE SAYS IN RESPECT OF A PREGNANT ANIMAL WHICH WAS GIVING BIRTH FOR THE FIRST TIME: IF WHAT IS IN THE INSIDE OF THIS [ANIMAL] IS A MALE, LET IT BE A BURNT-OFFERING. IF IT THEN GAVE BIRTH TO A MALE, IT IS OFFERED AS A BURNT-OFFERING.2 [IF HE SAID:] IF IT IS A FEMALE, LET IT BE A PEACE-OFFERING, THEN IF IT GAVE BIRTH TO A FEMALE, IT IS OFFERED AS A PEACE-OFFERING. [IF HE SAID:] IF IT IS A MALE, LET IT BE A BURNT-OFFERING, AND IF A FEMALE [LET IT BE] A PEACE-OFFERING, THEN IF IT GAVE BIRTH TO A MALE AND A FEMALE, THE MALE IS OFFERED AS A BURNT-OFFERING AND THE FEMALE IS OFFERED AS A PEACE-OFFERING.3 IF IT GAVE BIRTH TO TWO MALES,4 ONE OF THEM SHALL BE OFFERED AS A BURNT-OFFERING AND THE SECOND SHALL BE SOLD TO PERSONS UNDER OBLIGATION TO BRING A BURNT-OFFERING5 AND ITS MONEY BECOMES HULLIN. IF IT GAVE BIRTH TO TWO FEMALES, ONE OF THEM IS OFFERED AS A PEACE-OFFERING AND THE SECOND IS SOLD TO PERSONS UNDER OBLIGATION TO BRING PEACE-OFFERINGS AND THE MONEY BECOMES HULLIN. IF [THE ANIMAL] GAVE BIRTH TO A TUMTUM6 AND A HERMAPHRODITE, R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL SAYS: NO HOLINESS ATTACHES TO THEM.

GEMARA. Said Rab Judah: One is permitted to make a blemish in a firstling before it is born.7 We learnt: [WHAT8 DEVICE DO WE USE WITH REFERENCE TO A FIRSTLING?] HE SAYS [IN RESPECT OF A PREGNANT ANIMAL WHICH WAS GIVING BIRTH FOR THE FIRST TIME]: IF WHAT IS IN THE INSIDE OF THIS ANIMAL IS A MALE, LET IT BE A BURNT-OFFERING. Now this implies only a burnt-offering9 but not a peace-offering,10 and yet you say that he is able to release it altogether from its holiness? - Rab Judah can answer you thus: [The Tanna of the Mishnah] refers to the period when the Temple stood, whereas I refer11 to nowadays when [a firstling] is not fit to be offered. But if your ruling applies to nowadays, what need is there to teach it? - You might have said that we should prohibit, in case the greater part of the head goes forth12 and he then makes a blemish in it.13 But why not say that it is so?14 - Even so, this is better,15 since otherwise he may come to shear and work [the animal].16

[IF HE SAID:] IF IT IS A FEMALE, LET IT BE A PEACE-OFFERING. But is a female [animal] sacred in respect of the law of a firstling?17 - The latter clause18 of the Mishnah refers to a dedicated animal.19

IF IT GAVE BIRTH TO TWO MALES etc. It was asked, If the reference is to a dedicated animal, then let the young which was dedicated as a burnt-offering be a burnt-offering and the other [young when born] retain the holiness of its mother?20 - This latter clause21 refers to an animal of hullin.

IF IT GAVE BIRTH TO A TUMTUM OR A HERMAPHRODITE etc.

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(1) To prevent it coming into the possession of the priest and to enable the owner to carry out with it his own obligations.
(2) A firstling only becomes holy when it emerges from the womb, and since prior to this another holiness took effect on the embryo, the holiness of a firstling no longer attaches to it.
(3) V. Gemara.
(4) The holiness of a burnt-offering attaches to both animals, since he said that if the offspring be a male it shall become a burnt-offering.
(5) The reason being that his vow only referred to one animal and therefore one of the animals must be sold for a burnt-offering, for anything which is fit for the altar must be offered on the altar.
(6) One of doubtful sex.
(7) Lit., 'comes forth into the lighted space of the world'.
(8) V. Sh. Mek.
(9) Since it is burnt wholly on the altar, it is permissible to change the holiness of a firstling for this holiness.
(10) Since its holiness is of a less stringent character and therefore it is forbidden to use a device to change holiness of a firstling. How much more so then must it be forbidden to maim a firstling deliberately and deprive it of all holiness!
(11) When I say that it is permissible to maim a firstling in the inside of its mother.
(12) And it immediately became holy.
(13) Thus causing a blemish to a dedication. Rab Judah therefore informs us that we do not prohibit the infliction of a blemish, since he will be careful to cause the blemish only when a small part of the head has emerged and before the greater part comes forth from the womb.
(14) That on account of this fear we should prohibit the causing of a blemish to a firstling.
(15) To permit the causing of a blemish before it becomes holy in order that the priest may not be compelled to detain it till it becomes blemished.
(16) If he does not maim it, then there is the fear that he might transgress the law relating to a firstling. Var. lec. (v. Rashi and Sh. Mek.): Even so the causing of the loss of a limb (and thus making it blemished before the greater part of the animal has gone forth from the womb) is preferable.
(17) That the owner needs to use an artifice in order to obtain exemption from the law of the firstling.
(18) If it is a female, etc.
(19) If it was a sin-offering and it became pregnant and he wishes to use an artifice to avoid having its young condemned to death, the law being that the offspring of a sin-offering is condemned to death. He can therefore change the embryo for another dedication, since the holiness of a dedication only comes at birth but not previously.
(20) Why then is the second male animal sold for the purpose of a burnt-offering?
(21) Referring to the birth of two males.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 25a

1 R. Simeon b. Gamaliel holds: The offspring of dedications become holy at birth,2 for if we were to think that they are holy from [the time of their existence] inside their mother, why should not holiness attach to them [tumtum etc.] since they receive the holiness of their mother?3 But in fact this proves that the offspring of dedications become holy at birth.4

And the [following] Tanna holds that the offspring of dedications are holy from [the time of their existence] in the inside of their mother. For our Rabbis have taught: If it had been said only. A firstling shall not sanctify.5 I might have thought that a firstborn [of man] must not make dedications.6 The text therefore adds: 'No man shall sanctify it',7 implying that it [the firstling animal] he must not sanctify [for another dedication] but a firstborn [of man may] make dedications. But I might still have said that he [a firstborn] must not sanctify [a firstling for another dedication] but others may do so. The text therefore states: 'Among the beasts' [saying in effect]: My concern is with a beast.8 One might think that he cannot sanctify it [the firstling] even while it is in the inside of the animal [for another dedication]? The text therefore states: 'As a firstling to the Lord', implying, when it becomes 'a firstling to the Lord'9 you must not sanctify it [for another dedication], but you may sanctify the firstling [for another dedication] while it is in the inside of the animal. One might have thought that the same applies to the young of all dedications?10 The text therefore states: 'Howbeit', thus intimating a division.11 Consequently we see that [this Tanna] holds that the young of dedicated [animals] are holy [from the time] that they commence to exist in the inside of their mothers.12

Said R. Amram to R. Shesheth: If one says of a firstling at the moment that the greater part of it was emerging from the womb:13 'Let it be a burnt-offering', is it a burnt-offering14 or a legal firstling?15 Is it a burnt-offering, since every portion which came forth [from the womb] is wholly burnt on the altar, or is it a legal firstling as every portion which came forth [from the womb] retains its original sanctity?16 Another version: Is [the firstling] a burntoffering, since this is a [stringent]17 holiness and therefore has effect on it, or is it a legal firstling, since its holiness commences from the womb?18 - He said to him: Why do you inquire? Is this not identical with the inquiry of Ilfa [as follows]: If one says in connection with leket19 when the greater part [of the produce] has been plucked:20 Let it be hefker,21 is it leket or is it free?22 Is it leket, since its holiness is derived from heaven,23 or is it ownerless, since poor and rich acquire possession thereof? - And Abaye explained: What is this query?24 Whose word do we obey? That of the Divine Master or of the pupil?25 Similarly here also, whose word do we obey?26

MISHNAH. IF ONE SAYS: THE YOUNG OF THIS [PREGNANT ANIMAL]27 SHALL BE A BURNT-OFFERING AND IT [THE ANIMAL ITSELF] SHALL BE A PEACE-OFFERING, HIS WORDS STAND.28 BUT IF HE SAYS [FIRST]: IT [THE ANIMAL] SHALL BE A PEACE-OFFERING29 [AND THEN], AND ITS YOUNG SHALL BE A BURNT-OFFERING,30 [ITS YOUNG] IS REGARDED AS THE YOUNG OF A PEACE-OFFERING.31 THIS IS THE TEACHING OF R. MEIR. R. JOSE SAYS: IF HE INTENDED [TO SAY] THIS32 AT FIRST,33 SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MENTION BOTH KINDS [OF SACRIFICES] SIMULTANEOUSLY,34 HIS WORDS STAND;35 BUT IF AFTER HE ALREADY SAID [INTENTIONALLY]: THIS SHALL BE A PEACE-OFFERING, HE CHANGES HIS MIND AND SAYS: ITS YOUNG SHALL BE A BURNT-OFFERING, [ITS YOUNG] IS REGARDED AS THE YOUNG OF A PEACE-OFFERING.36

GEMARA. Said R. Johanan: If one set aside a pregnant sin-offering and it gave birth, if he wishes he can obtain atonement through it [the animal itself], and if he wishes, he can obtain atonement through its young.37 What is the reason? - R. Johanan holds that if he left over [the young]38 the act is valid,39 and an embryo is not regarded as part of the thigh of its mother. The case therefore is like one who sets aside two sin-offerings for security's sake, where if he wishes, he can obtain atonement through it [the one animal], and if he wishes, through the other.40 R. Eleazar raised an objection: IT SHALL BE A PEACE-OFFERING AND ITS YOUNG SHALL BE A BURNT-OFFERING, [ITS YOUNG] IS REGARDED AS THE YOUNG OF A PEACE- OFFERING. Now if we assume that if he left over [the young] the act is valid, why does it say: ITS YOUNG IS REGARDED AS THE YOUNG OF A PEACE-OFFERING? Should it not say: 'Its young is a peace-offering'?41 - Said R. Tabla: Ask no question from this [Mishnah],42 since Rab said to the Tanna:43 Recite [as follows]: 'Its young is a peace-offering'.44

An objection was raised: If one says to his [pregnant] bondwoman, 'Be thou a slave but thy child shall be free', if she was pregnant she obtains [freedom] in his behalf.45 Now this creates no difficulty if you hold that if one left over [the young]46 the action is not valid, and that an embryo is considered as the thigh of its mother; for this reason she obtains [freedom] in his behalf, since it is on a par with the case of one who freed a half of his slave,47 and this will represent the opinion of Rabbi,48 as it has been been taught:

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(1) Omitting with Wilna Gaon: 'But why does not holiness attach to them', cf. cur. edd. Since this clause refers even to the offspring of dedications, why should not at least the holiness of their mother rest on them (Rashi).
(2) And when they are born they are already unfit and hence cannot receive any holiness at all.
(3) From the time when they begin to develop little by little in the inside of their mother, they should be holy.
(4) And the whole Mishnah will be the opinion of R. Simeon.
(5) Referring to the text (Lev. XXVII, 26): Howbeit the firstling among the beasts which is born as a firstling unto the Lord, no man shall sanctify it; the Heb. בכור denotes equally firstborn and firstling of an animal.
(6) Taking 'bekor' to denote a firstborn of any kind.
(7) The text therefore will mean this: Howbeit the bekor i.e., the firstborn of a man, that which is born a firstling unto the Lord, he shall not sanctify it, implying that the firstborn may not sanctify a firstling for another dedication.
(8) I refer here only to the firstling of a beast which 'bekor' here denotes, and thus state that no man may consecrate it for another dedication.
(9) I.e., at birth, after the sanctification by the womb, but as long as it is in the inside of the animal it is hullin.
(10) That one is permitted to change it for another dedication when inside the animal.
(11) This is the regular force of the word א ('howbeit'). The division here indicated is between the case of a firstling and that of other dedications. Only in the case of a firstling may one make dedication prior to the animal becoming a legal firstling but not in the case of other dedications in the inside of an animal, for since the mother is holy, with every portion which forms in the womb the offspring receives the holiness of the mother.
(12) Unlike the view of the Tanna in the Mishnah.
(13) While still inside the animal, at the time when the holiness of a firstling takes effect.
(14) Being wholly burnt on the altar.
(15) Since the holiness of a firstling rests on all firstlings that leave the womb. Which holiness is more stringent so as to have a prior effect on it and cancel the other?
(16) That of a firstling.
(17) V. R. Gershom.
(18) The holiness of a firstling takes effect on all firstlings from the time of leaving the womb without a special dedication.
(19) The gleanings from a field which are due to the poor.
(20) And the gleanings have actually become leket.
(21) 'Ownerless'. And free alike for the rich as for the poor.
(22) Which takes effect hefker or leket? Now there can be no question that if he made the produce free for everyone before the greater part of it was plucked, there would be no need to carry out the law of leket, since leket only applies to what is looked after and eaten.
(23) A divine decree.
(24) As both leket and hefker came together, surely leket is the more important law to observe.
(25) And the Master, God, has decreed that it is leket.
(26) Surely that of the Divine Master, and therefore the law of the firstling operates first.
(27) Of hullin.
(28) The young becomes a burnt-offering and its mother a peace. offering, since the holiness of the young animal came first.
(29) This implies the dedication of the animal and what is inside it. Its offspring is therefore important enough to be dedicated independently and it is like one dedicating two animals for peace-offerings.
(30) This is of no avail as he is not able to change the form of dedication.
(31) As R. Meir holds that we accept the first statement. And here the principle of holiness commencing only at birth does not apply, as this only refers to a case where the animal became pregnant subsequent to dedication, but where one dedicates a pregnant animal, the embryo is considered apart from its mother and is able to receive holiness on its own account.
(32) Its young shall be a burnt-offering and the mother a peace-offering.
(33) Although he made a mistake and said: It shall be a peace-offering and its young a burnt-offering.
(34) Since one has to mention one sacrifice before the other.
(35) Since he really did not intend that both shall be peace-offerings,and therefore the mother is a peace-offering and the young is a burnt-offering.
(36) His latter statement being of no consequence, since he meant at first that both should be peace-offerings.
(37) We only apply the principle of the young of a sin-offering being condemned to die in a case where one dedicated an animal and it became pregnant afterwards, but where he dedicated a pregnant sin-offering, the embryo can receive holiness independently, apart from its mother, and thus he can procure atonement through whichever animal he chooses.
(38) Where he says that the offspring should be hullin and the mother shall be a sin-offering. Therefore even where he did not leave over the embryo, i.e., did not declare it hullin, its holiness is still not derived through its mother.
(39) Lit., 'it is left over' as regards holiness, i.e., the young remains hullin.
(40) And the sin-offering which he does not use is condemned to pasture.
(41) Since it is holy on its own account, and not because of its mother. The Mishnah therefore in saying: It is regarded as the young of a peace-offering, implies that its holiness is due to its mother and therefore in the case also where one set aside a pregnant sin-offering, it is regarded as the offspring of a sin-offering, the law of which is that it is condemned to die.
(42) Lit., 'except from this'.
(43) V. Glos. s.v. (a).
(44) We see therefore that the reading in our Mishnah is not a correct one, and no question can be raised from it.
(45) And the child goes out free; v. Git. 23b.
(46) And the mother and its young are not regarded as two separate entities.
(47) Where the slave acquires possession of that half, and so here the bondwoman is privileged to secure the freedom of her child.
(48) So .Sh. Mek.; cur. edd. R. Meir.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 25b

If one frees a half of his slave,1 he goes out free, since his letter of manumission and his right of possession come simultaneously. But if you hold that if one left over [the young] the act is valid,2 and that an embryo is not considered as the thigh of its mother, why then does she [the bondwoman] obtain freedom in behalf of her child?3 Has it not been taught: We approve the teaching that a slave can obtain a letter of manumission for his fellow-slave from the hand of one who is not his master,4 but not from the hand of one who is his master?5 You can therefore deduce from this that if one left over [the young], the act is not valid. Shall we say this refutes R. Johanan's ruling above? - It is a refutation. Must it be said that the opinion whether, if one left over the young the act is valid, is a point at issue between Tannaim? For it has been taught: If one says to his [pregnant] bondwoman, 'Be thou free but thy child shall be a slave', the child acquires her status [and is free]. This is the teaching of R. Jose the Galilean; whereas the Sages say: His words stand,6 because it says: The wife and her children shall be her master's.7 But how is the Scriptural text interpreted in support of the Rabbis?8 - Said Raba. The text is adduced in support of the opinion of R. Jose the Galilean who states that, the child follows her status, since it says: 'The wife and her children shall be her master's', implying that as long as the wife belongs to her master the child is her master's, [but if the wife does not belong to her master, the child is not her master's].9 Now does this not mean that [these Tannaim] differ in this, that R. Jose the Galilean holds that if one left over [the young], the act is not valid;10 whereas the Rabbis hold that the act is valid? - R. Johanan can answer you: All the authorities concerned hold that if one left over [the young] the act is valid, and the reason here11 is because Scripture explicitly says: 'The wife and her children shall be her master's'.12 Then assuredly [the matter13 would be a point at issue] between the following Tannaim: If one killed a sin-offering14 and found therein a live embryo four months old, it was taught in one [Baraitha]: It is only eaten by the males of the priesthood, for one day and a night, and within the curtains. And another [Baraitha] taught: It is eaten by any man, in any place, and at all times. Now does not this mean that they differ in this, that the first Tanna15 holds that if one left over [the young] the act is valid,16 whereas the latter Tanna17 holds that if one left over [the young], the act is not18 valid!19 - R. Johanan can answer you: All the authorities concerned hold20 that if he left over [the young] the act is valid.21 These Tannaim, however, differ in this, one Master holding that the offspring of dedications are holy only when they emerge into existence but not earlier, whereas the other Master holds that the offspring of dedications are holy already inside their mother.22 And if you prefer [another solution], I may say there is no contradiction.23 Here,24 [we are dealing) with a case where he dedicated [a sin-offering] and it subsequently became pregnant,25 and there,26 with a case where it became pregnant and was subsequently dedicated.27

To this28 Raba demurred: How do we know that the reason of R. Johanan29 is because if one left over [the young] the act is valid? perhaps the reason of R. Johanan really is that a man can obtain atonement with the increment of dedicated animals?30 - Said R. Hamnuna:31 R. Eleazar, a pupil of R. Johanan, was in the presence of R. Johanan32 and he [R. Johanan] did not give him that answer,33 and yet you say that the reason of the ruling of R. Johanan is because a man can obtain atonement with the increment of dedications.

BUT IF AFTER HE HAD ALREADY SAID [INTENTIONALLY]: THIS SHALL BE A PEACE-OFFERING AND HE CHANGED HIS MIND, etc. Surely this is obvious, that [its young] is regarded as the offspring of a peace-offering! For can he change his mind whenever he wishes?34 - Said R. Papa: This clause is required only for the case where one statement35 followed the other in the same breath.36 You might have said that two statements following each other immediately are considered as one statement and that this man was really reflecting [aloud]. [The Mishnah] therefore teaches us [that it is not so].

MISHNAH. [IF ONE SAYS:] BEHOLD, THIS ANIMAL [OF HULLIN] SHALL BE THE EXCHANGE OF A BURNT-OFFERING, THE EXCHANGE OF A PEACE-OFFERING,37 IT IS THE EXCHANGE OF A BURNT-OFFERING. THIS IS THE TEACHING OF R. MEIR.38 R. JOSE SAYS: IF HE ORIGINALLY INTENDED THIS,39 SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MENTION BOTH NAMES [OF SACRIFICES] SIMULTANEOUSLY, HIS WORDS STAND.40 BUT IF AFTER HE HAD ALREADY SAID: THIS SHALL BE AN EXCHANGE OF A BURNT-OFFERING, HE CHANGED HIS MIND AND SAID: AN EXCHANGE OF A PEACE-OFFERING, IT IS THE EXCHANGE OF A BURNT-OFFERING.

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(1) He possesses that half.
(2) So that if he freed the mother and left over the child, the latter is left over for service. Consequently we see that they are regarded as two bodies.
(3) It is like the case of a slave who receives a letter of manumission on behalf of his fellow slave, both belonging to the same master, since the possession of the slave is the possession of the master, and consequently it is considered as if really the letter had not left the hand of the master (Rashi).
(4) Since in relation to this man, the slave has the right of possession and can become an agent for the other slave.
(5) Both belonging to the same master since the slave has no rights of possession.
(6) And the child remains a slave.
(7) Ex. XXI, 4.
(8) Since the text appears in reality to confirm the opinion of R. Jose the Galilean, that the status of the offspring is like that of the mother.
(9) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(10) But it is regarded as the thigh of its mother and therefore the child is free like the mother.
(11) Why R. Jose the Galilean holds that the child has the status of the mother.
(12) It is a divine decree, and not because the child is regarded as the thigh of its mother.
(13) Whether if one left over the young the act is a valid one or otherwise.
(14) The first impression was that the circumstances here are where the animal was dedicated when pregnant.
(15) Who regards the embryo as a sin-offering.
(16) So Bah. And since it is regarded as a separate animal, even if he did not leave it over, holiness attaches to it in the womb (Rashi).
(17) Who considers the embryo as hullin.
(18) So Bah. Cur. edd. reverse; v. also Rashi.
(19) Since it is not regarded as an independent animal but only as the thigh of its mother, like that of any other offspring. This holiness of the offspring, however, only commences after birth, but not as here when it is found in the inside of its mother, for we hold the opinion that the holiness of the offspring of dedicated animals commences at birth but not earlier.
(20) If he dedicated a pregnant sin-offering.
(21) And therefore even if he did not leave over the young, the embryo is holy like the sin-offering.
(22) And therefore the embryo is regarded as a sin-offering.
(23) Between the two Baraithas mentioned above.
(24) The Baraitha which says that the embryo has the law of hullin.
(25) And all the authorities concerned hold that the offspring of dedications become holy only at birth.
(26) The Baraitha which says that the embryo has the law of a sin-offering.
(27) And we hold that if he left over the young in respect of dedication, the act is valid and the young is important enough to be dedicated on its own account. These Tannaim therefore in reality do not differ at all (Rashi).
(28) To the refutation of R. Johanan from the Baraitha: If one says to a bondwoman etc. as stated above.
(29) Why he says that if he set aside a pregnant sin-offering and it gave birth, if he wishes he can obtain atonement through its mother or its young.
(30) Although its sanctity is derived from the mother, the young of a sin-offering is not condemned to die, since a man may obtain atonement with the increment of a consecrated animal as here, where the young is a gain to dedications, the law of a young of a sin-offering being condemned to die only applying where he refused to obtain atonement except through the mother.
(31) You cannot maintain that R. Johanan's reason is not because he holds that if one left over the young the act is valid.
(32) When he quoted the Baraitha in contradiction to R. Johanan's teaching.
(33) If the reason of R. Johanan's ruling was as you say, why did not R. Johanan reply that his reason was because a man may obtain atonement with the improvement of a consecrated animal?
(34) Surely he cannot be allowed to change his dedications at will.
(35) Viz., 'and its young shall be a burnt-offering'.
(36) Lit.,' within the time required for an utterance', i.e., as long as it takes a master to greet his pupil or a pupil his master.
(37) And we are dealing with a case where both the peace-offering and a burnt-offering were before him when he effected the exchange.
(38) For R. Meir maintains that we hold to the first statement.
(39) I.e., that the animal of hullin should be the exchange of both, although he did not say: Behold this is the exchange of a burnt-offering and a peace-offering (R. Gershom).
(40) The animal pastures until blemished, and when it is sold an exchange of a burnt-offering is purchased for half of its money, and an exchange of a peace-offering is bought for the other half of the money.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 26a

GEMARA. R. Isaac the son of Joseph reported in the name of R. Johanan: All the authorities concerned agree that if one says, 'Let this1 take effect', and afterwards, 'Let this2 take effect', it is the opinion of all that we hold to the first statement. [If he says:] 'Let not this take effect unless this other takes effect', all agree that both are holy. The dispute, however, is only e.g., in the case stated by the Mishnah: The exchange of a burnt-offering, the exchange of a peace-offering, R. Meir holding that since he ought to have said,3 The exchange of a burnt-offering and a peace-offering, and he said, The exchange of a burnt-offering, the exchange of a peace-offering, it is like the case of one who says, 'Let this take effect' and afterwards, 'Let this take effect'.4 R. Jose, however, holds: [The man5 thinks that] if he said: The exchange of a burnt-offering and a peace-offering, the result would be that it is holy but is not offered.6 R. Jose therefore informs us [that his words stand].7

Our Rabbis have taught: If one says, This animal shall be half the exchange of a burnt-offering and the other half the exchange of a peace-offering, the whole animal is offered as a burnt-offering. This is the teaching of R. Meir.8 The Sages, however, say: Let it pasture until it becomes blemished. It is then sold and with the half of its money an exchange of a burnt-offering is purchased and with the other half of its money an exchange of a peace-offering. R. Jose says: If he originally intended this, since it is impossible to mention both names [of sacrifices] simultaneously, his words stand. But is not the opinion of R. Jose identical with that of the Rabbis? - The whole [of the first part of this Baraitha] is taught by R. Jose.9

Another [Baraitha] taught: An animal, half of which is a burnt-offering and the other half a sin-offering, is offered as a burnt-offering. This is the teaching of R. Meir. R. Jose says: Let it die.10 And both [these Tannaim] hold alike that if one says [first]: A half of the animal shall be a sin-offering and [then] the other half shall be a burnt-offering, [the animal] is condemned to die. [You say], 'They hold alike'. Now whose opinion does this mean to represent? That of R. Meir!11 But surely this is obvious!12 - You might have said that if we had not been informed of this,13 I might have thought that the reason of R. Meir is not because of the rule: 'Hold to the first statement', but the reason [really] is because a sin-offering which has been mixed up with another dedication is offered,14 and therefore even if he said [first]: A half of the animal shall be a sin-offering and then a half shall be a burnt-offering, it is offered. [The Baraitha] therefore informs us that it is not so.15

Another [Baraitha] taught: If one says, Half of this animal shall be a burnt-offering and the [other] half shall be a peace-offering, it is holy but is not offered.16 It [the animal] effects exchange17 and its exchange has the same status.18 Now whose opinion does this Baraitha represent? That of R. Jose!19 Surely it is obvious that the animal is holy but is not offered! - [The Baraitha] requires to mention the case of its exchange,20 for you might have said: Granted that the animal itself is not offered, still its exchange is offered.21 [The Baraitha] therefore informs us as follows: Why is the case [of the animal itself] different so that it is not offered? Because of suspended holiness.22 Its exchange also is such in virtue of a suspended holiness.23

R. Johanan said: If an animal belonged to two partners and one dedicated his half and then proceeded to purchase the other half and dedicated it, [the animal] is holy but is not offered;24 it effects exchange and its exchange

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(1) I.e., the exchange of a burnt-offering.
(2) The exchange of a peace-offering.
(3) If he meant that the animal should receive the exchange of a pace-offering and a burnt-offering.
(4) All agreeing that under such circumstances we hold to the first statement.
(5) Who is effecting the exchange.
(6) But is condemned to pasture. In this he made a mistake and used the word exchange in connection with peace-offering as well as burnt-offering, in order that the animal should be offered.
(7) Since he really intended that both should be an exchange, this being on a par with a case where one says: This should not take effect without the other taking effect.
(8) For we hold to the first statement, and since a half is holy, the whole animal becomes holy. And although R. Meir holds (supra 18a) that if one dedicated a foot of an animal the whole animal does not receive holiness, the case here is different where a half of the animal is dedicated, since it is a section of the animal without which it cannot live.
(9) I.e., the Baraitha informs us that R. Jose is described as the 'Sages'.
(10) We hold also to the last statement when the two statements of a person contradict. And since he is not obliged to bring a sin-offering, the animal is condemned to die, like a sin-offering whose owners procured atonement through another animal (R. Gershom). Tosaf. comments that in circumstances where one is not required to bring a sin-offering, if he says: Let this animal be a sin-offering, his words are of no avail and that we are dealing here with a case where one says: Let half of this animal be exchanged for a burnt-offering and the other half be exchanged for a sin-offering, R. Jose holding that the animal dies, since the holiness of both sacrifices rests on the animal, and as one dedication is that of the exchange of a sin-offering, the animal is condemned to die.
(11) I.e., even R. Meir, who holds in the first part of this Baraitha that the animal is offered, on this occasion must inevitably hold that it is condemned to die.
(12) Since he says that we hold to the first statement and since the man said here first that the half should be a sin-offering, it must certainly be left to die, as he is not obliged to bring a sin-offering.
(13) That the animal is condemned to die.
(14) Where there are two separate dedications mixed up in the animal, and although both have effect on it, since there is mixed up in the animal a dedication which makes it fit to be offered, we ignore the other dedication which makes it unfit to be offered (Rashi).
(15) That if he said first: A half shall be a sin-offering etc., the animal is condemned to die.
(16) It is sold and for half of its money a burnt-offering is bought, and for the other half a peace-offering (R. Gershom).
(17) Being a male and therefore fit to be a burnt-offering (R. Gershom).
(18) Of being holy but not fit to be offered.
(19) Who holds that his words stand.
(20) That it is not offered but sold after becoming blemished, a burnt-offering being bought with half the money and a peace-offering with the other half.
(21) Since in accordance with the exchange he did not mention either the word peace-offering or burnt-offering, but simply said: Let this animal be for that (R. Gershom). Tosaf. explains that the intention was not that the exchange should be half a burnt-offering and half a peace-offering, but that the animal should be a complete exchange, either for half of a burnt-offering or for the half of a pace-offering, for although one may not exchange a whole animal for a limb of a dedicated animal, the case is different where the exchange is effected for a half of a dedicated animal.
(22) Having two names as regards dedication (R. Gershom).
(23) And therefore the exchange cannot be in a better position than the original animal from which it draws his holiness.
(24) Since when at first he dedicated his half, the animal was not fit to be offered at the altar, for half of an animal by itself cannot be offered, and the holiness of the other half, since it was not his, could not spread to the rest of the animal.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 26b

has the same status. You can deduce from this1 three things: You can deduce from this that animals2 [dedicated for sacrifices] can be removed for ever from sacred use.3 You can also deduce from this that the holiness of animals dedicated for their value4 can be removed.5 You can also deduce from this that a removal from sacred use at the beginning [of a dedication]6 is valid for ever.7

Said Abaye: All the authorities concerned agree [even R. Jose] that if he says: A half of an animal shall be a burnt-offering and the other half an animal tithed, all are agreed that it is offered as a burnt-offering.8 What is the ruling, however, if he says: A half of an animal shall be an exchange and half of an animal tithed?9 Is the animal offered as an exchange, since it [the exchange] applies to all dedications, or is it perhaps offered as an animal tithed, since [the animal] before the tenth and the succeeding [one] are consecrated?10 - Let it remain undecided.

MISHNAH. [IF ONE SAYS:] BEHOLD THIS [ANIMAL] IS TAHATH [INSTEAD OF] THIS, BEHOLD THIS IS HALIFATH [IN PLACE OF] THIS, BEHOLD THIS IS TEMURATH [THE EXCHANGE OF] THIS, [EACH OF THESE] IS THE CASE OF A VALID EXCHANGE. [IF HOWEVER ONE SAYS:] THIS SHALL BE REDEEMED11 FOR THIS, IT IS NOT THE CASE OF A [VALID] EXCHANGE.12 AND IF THE DEDICATED ANIMAL WAS BLEMISHED, IT BECOMES HULLIN13 AND HE IS REQUIRED TO MAKE UP [THE HULLIN] TO THE VALUE [OF THE DEDICATED ANIMAL].14

GEMARA. Does this mean to say that the [word] tahath15 has the meaning of occupying the place of?16 This is contradicted [by the following]: As regards dedications for Temple repairs, if one says: Halifath this,17 temurath this, he has said nothing.18 [If, however, one says:] Tahath this, [this is] redeemed for this, his words stand.19 Now if we suppose that the [word] 'tahath' has the meaning of occupying the place of, what is the difference between the first and second clause [of the Baraitha]?20 - Said Abaye: The [word] 'tahath' is used in the sense of occupying the place of and in the sense of redeeming. In the sense of occupying the place of, as Scripture says:21

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(1) R. Johanan's ruling.
(2) This is the reading in Bah.
(3) And although subsequently they became fit to be offered, they are forever forbidden to be offered, on account of the previous suspension from sacred use.
(4) As, for example, here whore he dedicates a half of the animal; such dedication could only have been for its value.
(5) For one might have thought that the suspension of holiness only applies to animals dedicated for the altar. We therefore see from R. Johanan's teaching that it is not so.
(6) As, for example, here where from the very commencement of the consecration there was a suspension from holiness. For there is a difference of opinion (in Suk. 33a), one authority maintaining that where a dedicated animal was originally fit to be offered and the holiness was then suspended and finally the animal became fit again for sacred use, the animal is removed forever from sacred use, but where the suspension of holiness occurred at the very beginning of its consecration, if it became fit again, it may be used for sacred purposes.
(7) Lit., 'is a suspension'.
(8) Even if he meant these dedications from the beginning, as his latter statement is of no account, since an animal tithed does not become holy except by passing through the shed and being numbered as the tenth. The same law applies if one says: Half the animal shall be a burnt-offering, the other half shall be an exchange, the latter statement having no effect, since there is no animal present for which an exchange might be effected (Rashi). Tosaf. remarks that even if he says that the whole animal shall become tithed, his words are of no avail, and therefore explains that the circumstances here are where a man causes his flock to pass under the rod and as the tenth animal emerges from the shed he says: Let half of it be a burnt-offering and the rest tithed. All the authorities concerned will agree that the animal in such circumstances becomes a burnt-offering, as a dedication for a burnt-offering is a more important consecration than the dedication for animal tithing, since the latter consecration requires the passing under a rod and numbering before the animal can receive any holiness. Tosaf. also proceed to ask, seeing that the law of tithe is a divine decree, how can a dedication like that of a burnt-offering suspend it, and explain that we are dealing here with a case where he called the animal a burnt-offering when only a small part of the animal emerged from the shed, whereas animal tithe requires that the greater part of it shall emerge before holiness can take effect.
(9) His statements in both instances have a certain irregularity since as regards tithe one cannot say: Let this be tithe except when the animal is passing through the shed to be numbered, and in the case of exchange one cannot say: Let this be an exchange unless there is an animal with which a substitute might be effected.
(10) If, for example, he called the ninth the tenth, and the eleventh the tenth, the three animals are holy, i.e., the ninth, tenth and the eleventh.
(11) Lit., 'made hullin'.
(12) And his words are of no consequence, since an unblemished dedicated animal cannot become hullin.
(13) And the other animal takes its place.
(14) If the hullin is less in value than the dedication, since otherwise the consecration would be penalised. According to one explanation given later in the Gemara, this is only a Rabbinical requirement.
(15) Used in connection with exchanging. Lit., 'under'.
(16) I.e., that it becomes consecrated according to the law of exchange.
(17) If one set before him an animal of hullin and said: This shall be halifath (in place of) this dedication for Temple repairs.
(18) Since he used the language of temurah, which does not apply to dedications for Temple repairs.
(19) The dedicated animal thus becoming hullin, and this one entering into its place, since even unblemished dedications for Temple repairs can be redeemed.
(20) Why does the first clause in the Baraitha say that his words are of no consequence while the other clause says that his words stand, for since tahath is used in the sense of exchanging and there is no exchange in connection with repairs for Temple purposes, the Baraitha should have stated in the second clause also that his words are of no consequence.
(21) Lev. XII, 23.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 27a

But if the bright spot stay tahteha in its place;1 and [in the sense] of redeeming, as it says: For [tahat] the brass I will bring gold.2 [This being the case, the matter was left in the hand of the Sages.]3 With regard to dedications for the altar which can effect exchange, ['tahath'] has the meaning of occupying the place of, whereas with regard to dedications for Temple repairs which do not effect exchange, ['tahath'] has the meaning of redeeming.4

Raba said: Even in connection with dedication for the altar [the word 'tahath' sometimes] has the sense of redeeming, as e.g., where the dedicated [animal] was blemished.5 Said R. Ashi: Even in connection with a blemished dedicated animal [tahath sometimes] has the sense of redeeming and sometimes has the sense of occupying the place of, [as follows]: [If he placed] his hand on a dedicated [blemished] animal,6 the animal becomes hullin,7 [but if he placed] his hand on an animal of hullin,8 it becomes dedicated.9

Abaye inquired: What is the ruling if there were two dedicated blemished animals before him and two unblemished animals of hullin, and he says, Let these be tahath [in place of] these?10 Did11 he intend to substitute them [the former], or did he intend to redeem them [with the Iatter]?12 And if you say that where there exists a legitimate way, a man will not abandon what is permitted and do what is forbidden,13 what is the ruling if he had two dedicated animals before him, one of which was blemished, and two animals of hullin, one of which was blemished, and he said, Let these be tahath [instead of] these? Did he mean: The unblemished in place of the unblemished, in the sense of being substituted,14 and the blemished animal of hullin in place of the dedicated blemished animal, in the sense of being redeemed?15 Or perhaps the unblemished animal of hullin in place of the blemished dedicated animal, and the blemished animal of hullin in place of the unblemished dedicated animal and, in both cases, there is a punishment of lashes?16 And if you say that wherever there exists a legitimate way, a man will not do what is forbidden, and therefore he means to redeem and there is no punishment of lashes, what is the ruling if there were three dedicated animals before him, one of which was blemished, and three unblemished animals of hullin, and he says, Behold these shall be instead of these?17 Do we say, since [when he says] 'these two unblemished animals instead of the unblemished animals', he means they are to be substituted,18 so [when he says] 'the unblemished animal of hullin instead of the dedicated blemished animal' [he also means], they are to be substituted? Or perhaps here too [we apply the principle that] wherever there exists a legitimate way, a man will not do what is forbidden, and therefore in the latter case,19 he meant to redeem? And if you say that here too, since nevertheless there is no presumption against this man as regards prohibitions,20 [we say that a man] would not abandon what is permitted and do what is forbidden, R. Ashi inquired: What is the ruling if one had four dedicated animals before him, one of which was blemished, and four unblemished animals of hullin, and he says: Let these be instead of these? Here [in this case] since there is certainly a presumption against the man as regards prohibitions,21 do we say that he is therefore punishable four times with lashes,22 or perhaps although there is a presumption against him as regards prohibitions, [do we say that a man] will not abandon what is permitted and do what is forbidden and therefore the last animal23 was meant to be redeemed? - Let it stand undecided.

AND IF THE DEDICATED ANIMAL WAS BLEMISHED, IT BECOMES HULLIN etc. Said R. Johanan: Its becoming hullin is an ordinance of the Biblical law,24 whereas his being required to make up [the hullin] to the value [of the dedication] is an ordinance of the Rabbinical law.25 Resh Lakish, however, says that his having to make up [the hullin] to the value [of the dedicated animal] is also according to the Biblical law. Now with what kind of case are we dealing here? Shall we say that this refers to overreaching?26 But will Resh Lakish ho]d in such a case that he must make up [the hullin] to the value of a dedicated animal in accordance with Biblical law? Have we not learnt: To the following overreaching does not apply: Slaves, bonds, immovable properties, and dedications? [Shall we say] then that this refers to the cancellation of the sale?27 But will R. Johanan hold in such a case that he is required to make up the value of a dedication according to the Rabbinical law?

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(1) תחתיה, 'standing in its place'; this is exactly what happens in the case of exchange, the dedicated animal remaining holy.
(2) Isa. LX, 17. In place of the brass which they stole, I will bring gold. And this is what redeeming does, transferring the holiness of this animal to the other.
(3) The Sages were therefore to decide where 'tahath' had the meaning of redeeming and where it had the meaning of occupying the place of. The bracketed words are inserted with Sh. Mek.
(4) Therefore in the Baraitha above, since it deals with dedications for Temple repairs, tahath has the meaning of redeeming.
(5) Raba explaining the clause in the Mishnah: And if the dedicated animal was blemished, it becomes hullin, as referring also to the first clause: Behold this is tahath (instead of) this (R. Gershom).
(6) And says: This animal of hullin shall be tahath (instead of) this dedicated animal (R. Gershom).
(7) Since he certainly intended to redeem the dedicated animal.
(8) And says: This animal of hullin shall be tahath (instead of) this dedicated animal. By placing his hand on the hullin, he shows that he meant to effect exchange, for if he intended to redeem, he would have placed his hands on the dedicated animal.
(9) Since one cannot effect exchange even with a blemished dedicated animal. The dedicated animal therefore remains holy in accordance with the law of exchange.
(10) And he did not place his hand either here or there.
(11) This is the reading in Rashi and is mentioned in Wilna Gaon Glosses.
(12) The same inquiry could have been made with reference to one dedicated blemished animal and one unblemished animal of hullin where he says: Let this be tahath (instead of) this. But since later on the inquiry particularly refers to two animals, the case of two animals is also mentioned here. R. Gershom and the text in cur. edd. have the following reading: Do we say that he means to substitute (i.e., to effect exchange with these animals and there will thus be two transgressions of the prohibitory law), or perhaps where there exists a way which is permissible, a man would not abandon that which is permitted and do what is forbidden (and consequently he means here to redeem the dedicated animal with the animals of hullin, the latter thus becoming holy in place of the former).
(13) Since in connection with exchange there is the prohibition of 'nor change it', and therefore we say that his intention was to redeem.
(14) One animal must have been meant to effect exchange, since one dedicated animal is unblemished, and we have learnt above that unblemished dedications for the altar are meant to be used as exchange.
(15) Since it cannot be meant in the sense of exchanging, as one cannot effect exchange when both animals are blemished (bad), since Scripture speaks only of 'bad for good' or 'good for bad', but not when both are bad.
(16) The prohibition of 'nor change it'.
(17) For although we have said above that a man will not abandon what is permitted and do what is forbidden, there is still ground for inquiry in this case, since one can maintain that we follow the majority, and as two of the unblemished dedicated animals were certainly meant to be exchanged, the third blemished dedicated animal can also be regarded as being for the same purpose, i.e., exchange, although thereby there is the infringing of a prohibition.
(18) As an exchange.
(19) Where he says 'the unblemished animal shall be instead of the blemished dedicated animal'.
(20) Since the breaking in a particular case of three prohibitions and not two, causes a man to be suspected in that connection.
(21) Since there were three unblemished dedicated animals, he could not have intended to redeem.
(22) As we maintain that the blemished dedicated animal was also meant for exchange.
(23) I.e., the blemished dedicated animal.
(24) Like the law of dedications which became unfit for the altar, and which are redeemed.
(25) Since Scripture says: 'Ye shall not wrong one another' (Lev. XXV, 14) implying, one another, thus excluding hekdesh (consecrated property) from the laws of overreaching.
(26) Where hekdesh was overreached only by a sixth and the difference in the value between the hullin and hekdesh must be returned.
(27) Where the overreaching was more than a sixth.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 27b

Has not R. Jeremiah with reference to immovable properties of hullin, and R. Jonah with reference to dedications, both reported in the name of R. Johanan that only the law of overreaching does not apply to them but the law of a cancelled sale does apply to them?1 - One can still say that the reference is to the cancellation of the sale2 and reverse [the names].3 But how can you say that the names [shall be reversed]? This would be quite right according to the authority of [R. Jonah] who holds that [R. Johanan] refers to dedications,4 and therefore all the more does the rule apply to immovable properties.5 But according to the authority [of R. Jeremiah] who holds that [R. Johanan] refers only to immovable properties but that to dedications the law of cancellation of the sale does not apply, how can you reverse [the names of the disputants]?6 - R. Jeremiah can answer you: There is no need for you to reverse [the names].7

Must we say that R. Jonah and R. Jeremiah differ with regard to Samuel's dictum, for Samuel said: 'If hekdesh8 of the value of a maneh9 was redeemed for the value of a perutah,10 it is a valid act',11 R. Jonah not accepting Samuel's dictum whereas R. Jeremiah does accept Samuel's dictum? - No. Both Masters12 agree with Samuel, R. Jonah holding that Samuel's dictum only refers to a case where the act has been done but that it is not permissible in the first instance, whereas R. Jeremiah holds that is is permissible even in the first instance. And if you prefer [another solution], I may say: One still need not reverse [the names even according to R. Jonah], and as regards the difficulty you raise from the Mishnah which says: To the following [overreaching does not apply], dedications etc., this will be in accordance with the opinion of R. Hisda. For R. Hisda said: [What is the meaning of the Mishnah]: 'To the following overreaching does not apply'? [It means:] They do not come under the law of overreaching,13 since in their case money, even less than the amount which constitutes overreaching,14 has to be returned.

Said 'Ulla: [The Mishnah]15 only refers to where two people made the assessment, but where three made the assessment, even if a hundred came [afterwards],16 there is no redress. But it is not so! Has not R. Safra said: The principle that two are on a par with a hundred only applies to the giving of evidence, but with regard to making an assessment,it is the opinion of all the authorities that we go by the views [expressed].17 And, moreover, even if there were three against three,18 do we not follow the latter set, since hekdesh always has the preference!19 - 'Ulla holds: Our Mishnah when it says: HE IS REQUIRED TO MAKE UP TO THE VALUE OF THE DEDICATION, means in accordance with Rabbinic law, and with reference to a Rabbinic requirement, the Rabbis adopted the lenient view.20

MISHNAH. [IF ONE SAYS:] BEHOLD THIS ANIMAL SHALL BE INSTEAD21 OF A BURNT-OFFERING, [THIS SHALL BE] INSTEAD OF A SIN-OFFERING,22 HE HAS SAID NOTHING. [BUT IF HE SAYS:] INSTEAD OF THIS23 SIN-OFFERING AND INSTEAD OF THIS BURNT-OFFERING,24 [ OR] INSTEAD OF THE SIN-OFFERING AND INSTEAD OF THE BURNT-OFFERING WHICH I HAVE IN THE HOUSE, AND HE HAD IT IN THE HOUSE, HIS WORDS STAND. IF HE SAYS CONCERNING AN UNCLEAN ANIMAL OR A BLEMISHED DEDICATED ANIMAL: BEHOLD THESE SHALL BE A BURNT-OFFERING, HE HAS SAID NOTHING. [BUT IF HE SAYS:] BEHOLD THEY SHALL BE FOR25 A BURNT-OFFERING, THEY ARE SOLD AND THE BURNT-OFFERING IS BOUGHT WITH THEIR MONEY.

GEMARA. Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab: The Mishnah26 is not the opinion of R. Meir, for if it were the opinion of R. Meir he holds that a man does not utter words for no purpose.27

BEHOLD THESE SHALL BE FOR A BURNT-OFFERING, THEY ARE SOLD AND A BURNT-OFFERING IS BOUGHT WITH THE MONEY. Now the reason is because it is an unclean animal or a blemished animal, since they are not fit [for the altar] and therefore they do not require a blemish [before selling], but if one set aside a female animal for a guilt-offering or a burnt-offering, a blemish is required [before selling].28 Rab Judah reports in the name of Rab: Our Mishnah will thus not be the opinion of R. Simeon.29 For we have learnt: R. Simeon says, It shall be sold even if without a blemish.30 [

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(1) That if the overreaching was more than a sixth the sale is annulled. There will thus be a contradiction according to R. Jonah between the two opinions of R. Johanan.
(2) I.e.,where the overreaching of hekdesh was more than a sixth.
(3) In the dispute between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish above and say: R. Johanan holds that he is required to make up the value in accordance with the Biblical law, whereas Resh Lakish holds that it is according to the Rabbinical law.
(4) That the sale is annulled where the overreaching was more than a sixth, although Scripture says: 'One another', and thus excludes hekdesh.
(5) That the sale is annulled. It is therefore right that we reverse the names of the disputants so that it is R. Johanan who will maintain that the money has to be made up according to the Biblical law.
(6) And maintain that R. Johanan holds that the money must be made up to the value of the dedication according to the Biblical law, since there will thus be a contradiction between the two opinions of R. Johanan.
(7) According to him there is really no need for reversing the names, but according to R. Jonah there will be need to reserve the names of the disputants.
(8) That which is dedicated for a sacred purpose.
(9) A weight of silver or gold, as much as a hundred shekel coins.
(10) A small coin.
(11) Lit., 'it is legally redeemed'.
(12) R. Jonah and R. Jeremiah.
(13) We are not dealing at all, however, with the annulling of a sale, and therefore there is no difficulty as regards the opinion of R. Jeremiah and R. Jonah.
(14) Scripture meaning as follows: In the cases of overreaching of 'one another', there is a difference between less than a sixth and a sixth, refunding not being obligatory in the former case but only in the latter. But with reference to hekdesh, even less than a sixth is returned. This is therefore what Resh Lakish means when he says that he is required to make up to the value of the dedication according to the Biblical law; whereas R. Johanan explains the Mishnah in the sense that there is no redress for overreaching, i.e., in the case of a sixth.
(15) Which says that the private individual must refund to hekdesh whatever loss might be incurred in redeeming.
(16) And valued the dedication at a higher figure.
(17) If the estimate was more favourable to hekdesh.
(18) The last three repudiating the assessment of the former.
(19) And we follow the view of the latter three.
(20) So that if three persons made the assessment, even if three others came afterwards and gave an estimate more favourable to hekdesh, we keep to the first estimate.
(21) Heb. tahath (v. preceding Mishnah).
(22) There being neither a sin-offering nor burnt-offering before him.
(23) A sin-offering being in front of him.
(24) A burnt-offering being in front of him.
(25) Implying its value, since if he meant to offer the animals themselves he would have said: 'These are burnt-offerings'.
(26) Which states that if one says: 'Instead of a sin-offering, instead of a burnt-offering', his words are of no consequence.
(27) Where, for example, a man dedicated the value of a child less than one month old, since the man knows that there is no fixed estimation for a child of that age, and so evidently he meant its value as sold in the market, for a person does not make an utterance without meaning something. And here, too, he means the animal he has in his house, or perhaps his intention was a consecration for its value (sh. Mek.).
(28) Since it is fit to be offered as a peace-offering which can be a female.
(29) V. supra 19b.
(30) Another version: But if he said concerning a female animal: 'Behold this shall be a burnt-offering', it is consecrated as such and is sold after becoming blemished and can effect exchange, since it is itself fit for a peace-offering. This is unlike the opinion of R. Simeon b. Judah who says (supra 20b) that even if he dedicated it for a burnt-offering, it cannot effect exchange for the animal does not become holy in itself, since he does not hold miggo (v. Rashi and R. Gershom).

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 28a

CHAPTER 6

MISHNAH. ALL [ANIMALS] FORBIDDEN FOR THE ALTAR RENDER [OTHERS]1 UNFIT, HOWEVER FEW [THE FORMER MAY BE].2 [SUCH CASES ARE] AN ANIMAL WHICH COVERED [A WOMAN] AND [AN ANIMAL] THAT WAS COVERED [BY A MAN], MUKZEH,3 NE'EBAD,4 A [HARLOT'S] HIRE, THE PRICE [OF A DOG], KIL'AYIM,5 TREFAH AND THE FOETUS EXTRACTED BY THE MEANS OF A CAESAREAN SECTION. WHAT IS MEANT BY MUKZEH? THAT WHICH HAS BEEN SET ASIDE FOR IDOLATROUS USE; IT [THE ANIMAL ITSELF] IS FORBIDDEN,6 BUT WHAT IS UPON IT,7 IS PERMITTED.8 AND WHAT IS MEANT BY NE'EBAD? THAT WHICH HAS BEEN USED FOR IDOLATRY; BOTH IT [THE ANIMAL ITSELF] AND THAT WHICH IS UPON IT, ARE FORBIDDEN.9 IN BOTH CASES, HOWEVER,10 [THE ANIMAL] MAY BE EATEN.11

GEMARA. It has been said: ALL [ANIMALS] FORBIDDEN FOR THE ALTAR RENDER [OTHERS] UNFIT HOWEVER FEW [THE FORMER MAY BE]. [Now what does the Mishnah inform us?]12 That [the animals forbidden for the altar] are not neutralised in any larger number [of animals]. But have we not learnt this in a Mishnah? If any dedicated animals became mixed up with the sin-offerings which are condemned to die,13 or with an ox condemned to be stoned, even one in ten thousand [which are forbidden], all are condemned to die?14 And we raised the question: What does the Mishnah mean by the word 'even'?15 [And it was answered:] It means this: If any of the sin-offerings which are condemned to die became mixed up with dedicated animals, or an ox condemned to be stoned [became mixed up], even one in ten thousand,16 all are condemned to die.17 - It is necessary.18 You might think that there,19 since the animals are prohibited from being used profitably, there is no neutralisation,20 whereas here,21 since the animals are permitted to be profitably used,22 I might have thought that they are neutralised in any larger number. [Our Mishnah therefore] informs us [that it is not so].23

But have we not also learnt the cases [of an animal] which covered [a woman] and [an animal] that was covered [by a man]:24 [If dedications] became mixed up with [an animal] of hullin which covered [a woman] and [an animal of hullin] which was covered [by a man]. they all pasture until blemished. They are then sold and with the money of the best among them25 he brings an offering from the same kind?26 - Said R. Kahana: I recited this tradition27 in the presence of R. Shimi b. Ashi. He said to me: One [Mishnah]28 deals with hullin29 and the other30 [Mishnah] deals with dedicated animals.31 And it was necessary [to teach both cases]; for if we had been taught only the case of dedicated [animals].32 [we might have thought] that the reason33 was because the forbidden animals are rejected as unseemly,34 whereas in the case of hullin,35 we might have thought that [the forbidden animals] are neutralised.36 But have we not also learnt this37 with reference to hullin? The following are forbidden and render forbidden other hullin,38 however minute in quantity: Forbidden wine,39 idols, birds [brought] by a leper,40 hides pierced at the heart,41 the hair of a Nazirite,42 the firstborn of an ass, meat and milk [boiled together],43 an ox condemned to be stoned, the heifer whose neck was broken, hullin which was killed in the Temple court, and the goat sent away [to Azazel]these are forbidden44 and render other hullin forbidden, however small in quantity.45 - It was necessary [to teach both Mishnahs], for if we had been informed only [of the Mishnah] there,46 we might have thought that the reason47 was because [the cases mentioned] are prohibited for general use, but here we might have thought they are neutralised in greater numbers; and if we had been informed only here,48 [we might have said that the reason was] because it is loathsome to use [the animals] for the altar, but for private use, we might have thought that even things which are forbidden to be profitably used are neutralised in the greater numbers. [Our Mishnah] therefore informs us [that it is not so].49

And whence do we derive that the case of [an animal] that covered [a woman] and [an animal] which was covered [by a man] are forbidden for the altar? - Our Rabbis have taught: [Scripture says:] Of the cattle,50 this excludes51 the cases of [an animal] which covered [a woman] and [an animal] which was covered [by a man]. But can we not derive this from an analogy?52 If a blemished animal with which no sinful act has been done is forbidden for the altar, how much more should [an animal] that covered [a woman] and [an animal] which was covered [by a man] be forbidden for the altar? Let the law concerning one who ploughs with an ox and an ass [together] decide, since a sinful act has been done with it and yet it is allowed for the altar!53 The case of ploughing with an ass and an ox together is, however, different since there is no punishment of death incurred, whereas in the cases of [an animal] that covered [a woman] and [an animal] which was covered [by a man] the punishment of death is incurred.54 Then take away [the argument]55 you have brought56 and say that [you can rely upon the above analogy]57 for the case of an animal with which a sinful act has been done according to the testimony of two witnesses;58 but whence do we learn the case where a sinful act had been done according to the testimony of only one witness,59 or where the owners confessed?60 Said R. Simeon: I will bring forward an analogy [as follows]:61 If in the case of a blemished animal, where [the testimony] of two witnesses does not disqualify the animal from being eaten, the testimony of one witness disqualifies it from being offered [on the altar],62 then in the cases [of an animal] that covered [a woman] and [an animal] which was covered [by a man], where the testimony of two witnesses disqualifies the animal from being eaten,63 how much more should the testimony of one witness disqualify the animal from being offered on the altar? The text therefore states 'of the cattle', to exclude the cases of an animal that covered [a woman] and [an animal] which was covered [by a man]. But have you not just inferred this from an analogy?64

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(1) With which they have become mixed up, unfit for being offered on the altar if the former are not recognised. In all the cases mentioned later in the Mishnah, it may always be that it will not be possible to recognise the forbidden one, except in the case of trefah which is always recognisable. Yet here too the case may arise where the gullet of the animal was pierced, the skin healed up and then it became mixed up with other animals (R. Gershom). Also the trefah here mentioned may refer to the offspring of a trefah (Rashi).
(2) Even if one animal forbidden for the altar became mixed up with a thousand other animals, all of them become unfit for the altar, since we cannot identify the forbidden one.
(3) Lit., 'set aside'. Explained later in the Mishnah.
(4) Lit., 'served'. Explained in the Mishnah.
(5) The offspring of a ewe which copulated with a he-goat.
(6) For the altar.
(7) Its ornaments and their value.
(8) As offerings for the altar.
(9) For the altar.
(10) I.e., mukzeh and ne'ebad.
(11) For private use, since a living thing cannot be forbidden.
(12) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(13) Implying that one of the dedicated animals became mixed up with many sin-offerings which are condemned to die.
(14) Zeb. 70b.
(15) For since the cited Mishnah implies that one dedicated animal became mixed up with a large number of sin-offerings condemned to die, then surely the dedicated animals are all the more condemned to die if the number was one fit animal as against ten thousand unfit ones?
(16) I.e., one forbidden animal among ten thousand fit ones for the altar.
(17) And we do not say that the forbidden animal is neutralised by the greater number of fit animals. What need then is there for our Mishnah to teach us the same?
(18) For our Mishnah to state that the forbidden animals are not neutralised in any larger number!
(19) The cited Mishnah referring to the cases of sin-offerings which are condemned to die and an ox condemned to be stoned, of which no use whatever may be made.
(20) As these forbidden animals are considered of great importance.
(21) Our Mishnah.
(22) An animal which covered a woman and which was covered by a man may be eaten by a private person, for the case dealt with here is where the evidence of covering is given by one witness, there being no punishment of stoning in such circumstances.
(23) And on the other hand if the Tanna had informed us here in our Mishnah that there is no neutralisation, I might have thought that here, since these animals are rejected for the altar, there is no neutralisation in any larger number and the animals pasture until blemished and are then eaten. But in the case of something which is forbidden even for a private person, as in the cases mentioned in the cited Mishnah, I might have thought that there would be neutralisation. We are therefore informed there that all the dedications which became mixed up are condemned to die, and that even in the case of a private person there is no neutralisation, since the Mishnah does not say there that a dedication shall pasture until blemished and be eaten by private people after redemption (v. Rashi and Zeb. 71b).
(24) That there is no neutralisation.
(25) The greatest in value among the animals, since we cannot identify the offering.
(26) If the offering which became mixed up was a peace-offering, then a peace-offering is brought, and if a burnt-offering, then a burnt-offering is brought, since the rights of hekdesh are superior, v. Zeb. 71a. Consequently we see from here that there is no neutralisation in the larger number.
(27) Of there being two Mishnahs teaching the same thing.
(28) Our Mishnah.
(29) I.e., the mixing up of the forbidden animal took place when the other animals were hullin and he proceeded to dedicate them after the mixing.
(30) In Zeb. 72a.
(31) The mixing up of the forbidden animal with the dedicated animals.
(32) When the mixing up was with dedicated animals.
(33) Why there is no neutralisation in the greater number.
(34) Animals covered or that have been covered are rejected as unseemly for the altar.
(35) Since these animals of hullin are not rejected as unseemly for the altar when they became mixed up, as there was no share for the altar among them, and therefore when subsequently they were dedicated for the altar, it is quite in order, as they have already been neutralised (Rashi). In Zeb. the Talmud asks why then not state only the Mishnah in Temurah referring to hullin and then there would be no need for the Mishnah in Zebahim? And it answers that the reason is because the Mishnah in Zeb. informs us of something fresh, viz., that there is a remedy as regards dedications, i.e., that he sells etc., unlike the case in the Mishnah of Temurah where there is no remedy (v. Rashi).
(36) That there is neutralisation in the greater number.
(37) That there is no neutralisation in any larger number, even with actual hullin in the case of living things and important prohibitions (Rashi).
(38) When mixed up.
(39) Wine used for idolatrous libation.
(40) Which were let loose into the open field and from which it was prohibited to benefit.
(41) These were forbidden, because the heart had been cut out for idolatrous purposes.
(42) Which was burnt under the pot boiling the peace-offering.
(43) If the meat then became mixed up with even a thousand other pieces, they are all forbidden to be used in any way.
(44) To be profitably used.
(45) The prohibited thing may be; v. 'A.Z. 74a.
(46) In Zeb.
(47) Why there is no neutralisation.
(48) The Mishnah of Temurah.
(49) That they are not neutralised.
(50) Lev. I, 2.
(51) The word 'of' implying but not all cattle may be brought as a sacrifice.
(52) A conclusion from minor to major, so that there is no need for a Scriptural text.
(53) The same will therefore apply to the case of an animal that covered or was covered. There is thus need for a special text to render them unfit for the altar.
(54) Therefore one can employ the above a minori argument and dispense with the special text.
(55) From the ploughing with an ox and an ass together.
(56) Since it is no question, for the reason just mentioned.
(57) The conclusion from the minor to the major, quoted above.
(58) That the animal is forbidden for the altar, since it is condemned to die.
(59) In which case the animal is not condemned to die but is forbidden for the altar.
(60) In which case the animal is exempted from death. In these cases surely a text is necessary.
(61) And there is no need for a Scriptural text.
(62) Since the expert says it is a permanent blemish, it is disqualified from being offered on the altar.
(63) Since it is stoned to death.
(64) Then why bring the Scriptural text?

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 28b

- Said R. Ashi: Because there is an objection to the basis of the analogy [as follows]: The case of a blemished animal is different, since its blemish is visible. Can you however say the same as regards the case of [an animal] which covered [a woman] and [an animal] which was covered [by a man] whose blemish is not visible? And since its blemish is not visible, it should be fit for the altar. The text therefore states: 'Of the cattle', to exclude the cases of [an animal] that covered [a woman] and [an animal] which was covered [by a man]. [The words:] Even of the herd,1 exclude ne'ebad.2 But can we not learn this from an analogy?3 If in the cases of a [harlot's] hire and the price [of a dog], whose overlayings are permitted,4 they [the animals themselves] are forbidden for the altar, in the case of ne'ebad whose overlayings are forbidden,5 how much more should the animal itself be forbidden for the altar?6 Or is it not the reverse7 [as follows]: If in the case of a [harlot's] hire, and the price [of a dog], which themselves are forbidden for the altar, yet their overlayings are permitted, in the case of ne'ebad which is permitted for the altar,8 how much more so should its overlayings be permitted? If so,9 you do away with the Scriptural text: Thou shalt not desire the gold and silver that is on them, nor take it into thee?10 I will explain the text: 'Thou shalt not desire the gold and the silver that is on them', as referring to a thing without life, but in the case of a living being [i.e., an animal], since it is permitted [for the altar], its overlayings should also be permitted.11 The text therefore states: 'Even of the herd,'12 in order to exclude the case of ne'ebad.13

To this R. Hanania demurred: The reason14 then is because the Scriptural text made a limitation, but if the text had not made a limitation, the overlayings would be permitted. But is it not written: And you shall destroy their names,15 implying everything made for them?16 - That is for the purpose of substituting a name for the idols. When [the idolaters] call a place Beth-Galia,17 [Israelites should call] it Beth Karia,18 Penei Hamolekh [they should call] Penei Keleb,19 'Ain Kol20 [they should call] 'Ain Koz.21 And why not reverse the exclusions [from the texts as follows]: 'Of the cattle' excludes ne'ebad and 'even of the herd' excludes the cases of [an animal] that covered [a woman] and [an animal] that was covered [by a man]? - In the one case22 we exclude something which is associated with the subject of the text, and in the other, we also exclude something which is associated with the subject of a text. With regard to [the feminine term] 'behemah' [cattle]23 it is written: And if a man lie with a behemah [beast], he shall surely be put to death,24 and with regard to [the masculine term] 'bakar' [herd] it is written: Thus they changed their glory with the similitude of an ox that eateth grass.25

'Of the flock'26 excludes mukzeh;27 'and of the flock' excludes the goring ox28 [from the altar]. Said R. Simeon: If Scripture [excludes the case] of roba',29 what need is there for [the exclusion of] the goring ox?30 And if Scripture [excludes the case of] the goring ox, what need is there for [the exclusion of] the case of roba'? - Because there is a law applying to roba' which does not apply to the gorer [and31 there is a law applying to the gorer which does not apply to roba']. There is a law as regards roba' that the unintentional act is on a par with the intentional act, unlike the case of the gorer.32 There is a regulation applying to the gorer that [the owner of the ox] pays indemnity,33 unlike the case of roba'. There is need therefore [for Scripture] to mention [the exclusion] of roba' and the gorer.34

And the following Tanna derives this35 from here [as follows]: For it has been taught as regards roba' and nirba' [etc.], if one dedicated them they are like dedicated animals in which a transitory blemish occurred before their dedication and which require a permanent blemish in order to redeem them, since it says: Because their corruption is in them, there is a blemish in them.36 But how can you derive that from the text?37 - A clause is missing [in the Baraitha] which should read as follows: Whence do we infer that they are forbidden [for the altar]? Because Scripture says: 'Because their corruption is in them, there is a blemish in them'. And a Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael taught: Whenever the term hashhatha [corruption] is used [in the Scriptures] it refers to lewdness38 and idolatry.39 'Lewdness', as it Says: For all flesh had corrupted its way, etc.,40 and 'idolatry', as it says: Lest ye corrupt yourselves and make you a graven image the similitude of any figure.41 [We thus argue:]42 Wherever a blemish disqualifies [an animal for the altar], 'lewdness' and 'idolatry' also disqualify them.43

And how does the Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael expound the texts, Of the cattle, of the herd and of the flock?44 - These [texts] are required by him in order to exclude the following cases: A sick, old or evil-smelling animal.45 Now the former Tanna [quoted above] who derives the cases of roba' and nirba' as unfit for the altar from those texts,46 whence does he derive the cases of a sick, old and evil-smelling animal [as being forbidden for the altar]? - He derives these from [the texts]: 'And if of the flock, of the sheep, or of the goats.47 And what will the Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael do with these texts?48 - It is the way of Scripture to speak in such a manner.49

WHAT IS MEANT BY MUKZEH? THAT WHICH HAS BEEN SET ASIDE FOR IDOLATROUS USE ETC. Said Resh Lakish: Mukzeh is forbidden only if it had been set aside for seven years,50 since it says: And it came to pass that the Lord said unto him: Take thy father's young bullock even a second bullock of seven years old.51 But there [in the text], was it only a case of mukzeh? Was it not also a case of ne'ebad?52 Said R. Aha son of R. Jacob: It was designated for idolatry but they did not actually use it [as an idol]. Raba says: One can still maintain that they actually used it [the bull, as an idol],53 but there it54 was an innovation, as R. Aba b. Kahana explained. For R. Aba b. Kahana said: Eight things were permitted that night [as follows]: [The killing of an animal] outside [the tabernacle, the killing] at night,55 [the officiating by] a non-priest,

____________________
(1) Lev. I, 2.
(2) That an animal which has been used for an idolatrous purpose is forbidden for the altar. We infer this from 'of', taken in a partitive sense.
(3) A conclusion from the minor to the major that ne'ebad is forbidden for the altar. What need then is there for a Scriptural text?
(4) If after he had given the harlot an article he overlayed it with gold or silver etc, the overlay may be brought to the Temple for the covering of the altar.
(5) Scripture saying: Thou shalt not desire the gold and silver etc. (Deut. VII, 25).
(6) Granted that the animal cannot be prohibited for private use, since a living thing cannot be forbidden, nevertheless it should be unfit for the altar, seeing that its overlayings are forbidden even for private use. What need therefore is there for a Scriptural text?
(7) If there existed no text, then I might have reversed the analogy.
(8) Since there is no explicit Scriptural text which prohibits (Rashi).
(9) That the overlaying of an idol used also as an idol is permitted to be used.
(10) Deut. VII, 25. One cannot therefore reverse the analogy and say that the overlayings of a ne'ebad may be used for a sacred purpose. We therefore might have inferred from the analogy above that a ne'ebad is forbidden for the altar, and therefore a Scriptural text is not required to exclude a ne'ebad.
(11) And therefore I can reverse the analogy and derive that a ne'ebad is fit for the altar and that its overlayings are also permitted to be used.
(12) 'Of', implying a restriction and limitation.
(13) That it is forbidden for the altar. And since the animal is forbidden to be offered, the overlayings are also forbidden, even for private use, as we apply here the text: 'Thou shalt not desire the gold and silver that is on them' (Rashi and Tosaf.).
(14) Why the overlayings of a ne'ebad are forbidden to be used.
(15) Deut. XII, 3.
(16) Lit., 'in their name'.
(17) Lit., 'the high house'. '
(18) A House of Heaps (ruins), in derogation. It is a cacophemistic change of name.
(19) A contemptuous change of name, from 'face of molekh' to 'face of a dog'.
(20) Lit., 'the eye of all'.
(21) Koz means a thorn, another contemptuous change of name.
(22) Lit., 'there'.
(23) We find the word behemah in connection with the case of an animal that covered a woman and an animal which was covered by a man, while in connection with idolatry we find the word bakar (herd) used.
(24) Lev. XX, 15.
(25) Ps. CVI, 20. The term used there is the masculine 'shor' (ox).
(26) Lev. I, 2.
(27) That which is set aside for idolatrous purposes.
(28) Which killed a man according to the evidence of one witness, where the animal is not stoned to death.
(29) An animal which covered a woman, from being offered on the altar.
(30) Since both are alike in this, that both animals are stoned to death on the testimony of two witnesses.
(31) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(32) Only an ox which gores on its own accord is condemned to be stoned to death, but not an ox of the arena which is forced by others to gore.
(33) For killing a man, although the ox is stoned to death.
(34) That they are unfit for the altar.
(35) That roba' and nirba' (that which covered or had been covered) are forbidden for the altar.
(36) Lev. XXII, 25.
(37) What bearing has the text just quoted on roba' and nirba'?
(38) Illicit sexual relations.
(39) And roba' and nirba' are cases of 'lewdness' and mukzeh, and ne'ebad are cases relating to idolatry.
(40) Gen. VI, 12.
(41) Deut. IV, 16.
(42) Comparing the earlier part of the text: 'Because their corruption etc.' with the latter part: 'There is a blemish in them'.
(43) From being offered on the altar.
(44) Since he derives the exclusion of roba' etc. from the text: 'Because their corruption, etc.'.
(45) As being unfit for the altar.
(46) 'Of the cattle etc.'.
(47) An entirely different verse, Lev. I, 20.
(48) 'And 1f of the flock, etc.' just quoted.
(49) That no special interpretation is meant in the way of excluding any cases from being offered.
(50) And after the conclusion of seven years the animal is to be offered to the idols.
(51) Judg. VI, 25. Having fattened it for seven years. We therefore see that this is the usual period for fattening before it is used for idolatrous purposes.
(52) Since Scripture says: And throw down the altar of Baal (Judg. VI, 25) which means the altar which was built for the bullock which was Baal (R. Gershom).
(53) And yet you cannot derive any law from this particular incident.
(54) The whole incident of Gideon here.
(55) Scripture saying: He did it by night (Ibid. 27).

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 29a

[without] a ministering vessel,1 ministering with vessels of asherah,2 the wood of asherah,3 mukzeh and ne'ebad.

R. Tobi b. Mattenah reported in the name of R. Josiah: Where in the Torah is mukzeh intimated?4 Since it says: Shall ye observe to offer unto Me,5 intimating that every dedication requires special observation.6 To this Abaye demurred: If this is so, if one brought a lean lamb without having kept it under observation, is it really the case that it is not fit to be offered on the altar? He [R. Tobi] replied to him [Abaye]: I mean [the text says]: 'Shall ye observe to offer unto Me', 'unto Me' implying but not to another lord. What is meant by another lord to whom offering is made? It is idolatry.7

Raba son of R. Adda reported in the name of R. Isaac: Mukzeh remains forbidden only until it has been used for some work.8 'Ulla reported in the name of R. Johanan: Until the animal is handed over to the ministers of the idol [to be eaten].9 Beha10 reported in the name of R. Johanan: Until they feed the animal with vetches set aside for idolatry.11 Said R. Abba to Beha: Do you12 and 'Ulla differ? - He replied to him: No. 'Ulla himself means that it is fed13 with vetches set aside for idolatry. R. Abba said: Beha knew how to explain this teaching. Had he not, however, gone14 there [Palestine], he would not have known how to explain it, for it was the Land of Israel which was the cause.15 Said R. Isaac to him: Beha belonged to both Babylon16 and the Land of Israel.17

R.18 Hanania of Trita19 recited in the presence of R. Johanan: Mukzeh remains forbidden only until some act has been done with it. He taught this and also explained: What is meant by some act? - Such as shearing its wool or doing some work with it.

WHAT IS MEANT BY NE'EBAD etc. Whence is this proved?20 Said R. Papa: Since Scripture says: From the well-watered pastures of Israel;21 this intimates,22 from what is legitimate for Israel.23 Now if you were to assume that they24 are forbidden for private use, what need is there for a [special] Scriptural text25 to exclude them from the altar?26 But is it the case that wherever a thing is forbidden for private use there is no need for a Scriptural text?27 Is there not the case of trefah which is forbidden for private use and yet a Scriptural text excludes it from being offered on the altar? For it has been taught: [Even of the herd28 excludes ne'ebad.29 Perhaps it is not so, and the object of the text is to exclude trefah?] When Scripture however says further on: Of the herd,30 which there is no need to repeat, it must be in order to exclude the case of trefah from the altar!31 - [Both] texts32 are necessary. For you might think that the text33 refers to a case where the animal became trefah and then it was dedicated,34 but where the animal was dedicated and then it became trefah, I might have thought that it is legitimate [for the altar].35

But we do not derive this36 from the following. [It says:] Whatsoever passeth under the rod,37 thus excluding the case of trefah which cannot pass?38 - That text39 is also necessary. You might have thought that [the former text] refers only to an animal which was at no time fit for the altar, having been born a trefah in the inside of its mother; but in a case where it was fit at one time [for the altar], and it was born40 and then became trefah, I might have thought that it is legitimate for the altar. [The text]41 therefore teaches us [that it is not so].42

MISHNAH. WHAT IS MEANT BY A [HARLOT'S] HIRE? IF ONE SAYS TO A HARLOT: TAKE THIS LAMB FOR YOUR HIRE, EVEN IF THERE ARE A HUNDRED LAMBS, THEY ARE ALL FORBIDDEN [FOR THE ALTAR]. SIMILARLY, IF ONE SAYS TO HIS FELLOW: HERE IS A LAMB AND ASSIGN YOUR [NON-ISRAELITISH] MAIDSERVANT FOR MY SERVANT, R. MEIR43 SAYS: IT [THE LAMB] IS NOT REGARDED AS [HARLOT'S] HIRE, WHEREAS THE SAGES SAY: IT IS REGARDED AS [HARLOT'S] HIRE.

GEMARA. The Master says: EVEN IF THERE ARE A HUNDRED LAMBS THEY ARE ALL FORBIDDEN. How is this meant? Shall I say that she took a hundred animals for her hire? Surely it is obvious that they are all forbidden [for the altar]! What is the difference whether there be one or a hundred [lambs]?44 - No; it is necessary45 in a case where she took one lamb as her hire46 and he gave her a hundred; all are then forbidden, since they all come by reason of the hire.47

Our Rabbis have taught: If he gave her,48 but he had no intercourse with her, if he had intercourse with her, but did not give her, her hire is legitimate [for the altar]. In the case where he gave her but did not have intercourse with her, do you call this her hire? And, moreover, the case where he had intercourse with her but did not give her, [you say that her hire is legitimate]. But what did he give her? - What is meant is this: If he gave her and then had intercourse with her, or if he had intercourse with her and then gave her [a lamb for] her hire, it is legitimate [for the altar]. But should not the law of [harlot's] hire take effect retrospectively?49 - Said R. Eleazar:

____________________
(1) I.e., one consecrated for the purpose of ministry.
(2) With the same vessel that he ministered to Asherah (a tree or grove worshipped as a god), he ministered to the Name.
(3) With which he burnt the offering.
(4) Misunderstood by Abaye as meaning: Where is it intimated that an animal must be kept in an enclosed space for some time to be looked after before it can be offered on the altar?
(5) Num. XXVIII, 2.
(6) To be designated and looked after before being offered.
(7) R. Tobi therefore says: Whence in the Torah is mukzeh, an animal designated for idolatry, forbidden?
(8) Whereby its designation for the idolatrous altar is annulled. This is Rashi's second interpretation which he prefers. The first interpretation is: Mukzeh is forbidden only when some work has been done with it, but previous to this there is no prohibition for the altar.
(9) After which it will no longer be offered on the altar.
(10) The name of an Amora.
(11) To fatten them for the idolatrous priests.
(12) V. Sh. Mek.
(13) Lit., 'he rubs for it'.
(14) Var. lec. 'come up from'.
(15) For the air of the Land of Israel made people wise.
(16) Lit., 'from here and here'.
(17) And had the advantage of studying in both countries and his wisdom was not due only to his being a student from the Land of Israel.
(18) V. Marginal Gloss.
(19) In Babylonia.
(20) That mukzeh and ne'ebad are permitted to be eaten privately.
(21) Ezek. XLV, 15. The verse refers to the bringing of sacrifices.
(22) That an offering can be brought.
(23) To be eaten.
(24) Mukzeh and ne'ebad.
(25) 'Of the herd, of the flock', the former text including ne'ebad and the latter excluding mukzeh.
(26) Lit.,'the Most High'. Since we can exclude mukzeh and ne'ebad as regards offering them on the altar from the text: 'From the well-watered pastures' inasmuch as they are forbidden to Israel! The fact therefore that the special Scripture texts are required proves that mukzeh and ne'ebad are permitted to be eaten privately.
(27) To render it unfit for the altar.
(28) Lev. I, 2. The bracketed passage is inserted with Sh. Mek.
(29) That an animal which is used as an idol is forbidden for the altar.
(30) Lev. I, 3.
(31) And since the second text certainly excludes the case of trefah, therefore the first text must exclude ne'ebad. We see therefore that although trefah is forbidden to be eaten there is a special Scripture text to exclude it from the altar (Rashi).
(32) 'From the well-watered' and 'of the herd etc.'.
(33) 'From the well-watered pastures etc.'.
(34) In which case, since it was trefah and forbidden to be eaten before the dedication, it is unfit for the altar.
(35) The text therefore 'of the herd etc.' excludes trefah from being offered on the altar, even where the trefah occurred subsequently to the dedication (Rashi).
(36) That where one dedicated an animal and it afterwards became trefah, it is forbidden for the altar.
(37) Lev. XXVII, 32.
(38) Since it implies that although the animal entered the shed to be tithed it was not trefah, if it became trefah, i.e., if its legs were broken from the ankle upwards after entering the shed, so that it cannot pass under the rod, it is excluded from being offered on the altar (R. Gershom).
(39) 'All that passeth etc.'
(40) Lit., 'came into the air space of universe'.
(41) 'All that passeth'.
(42) And where the animal became trefah after its birth and was dedicated, it was also forbidden for the altar. And the text, 'of the herd' excludes the case of the animal which became trefah after dedication (Rashi).
(43) Var. lec. 'Rabbi'.
(44) As they are all a harlot's hire and forbidden for the altar.
(45) For the Mishnah to say that even a hundred animals are forbidden.
(46) The man only promised her one lamb.
(47) And we do not say that they were given to her as a present.
(48) A lamb as hire.
(49) In the case where he gave her a lamb before he had intercourse with her, why should not the lamb be considered her hire? For, since at the time of the intercourse the lamb is alive, and he had intercourse with her on the strength of promising it, then wherever the lamb is to be found, it should be regarded as the hire of a harlot. Now there is no difficulty in the case where he had intercourse with her and then gave her a lamb, for one might say that since the animal was not assigned to her at the time of the intercourse, it was not forbidden for the altar and should he regarded as a present (Rashi).

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 29b

[We are dealing with a case] where she offered [the lamb] before [intercourse]. How are we to understand this? Shall we say that he gave her immediate possession [of the lamb]?1 Surely it is obvious that it is legitimate for the altar,2 since so far he has had no intercourse with her!3 Shall we then suppose that he said: Do not acquire ownership of it [the lamb] until the time of intercourse?4 But can she in such conditions offer it, Seeing that the Divine Law says: And when a man shall sanctify his house to be holy unto the Lord,5 [and we infer] just as 'his house'6 is in his possession,7 So all things must be in his possession?8 - No. It is necessary9 where he said: '[The lamb] shall not be acquired by you until the time of intercourse, but if you need it,10 let it be acquired by you from now'.11

R. Oshaia asked: What is the ruling if she dedicated the lamb before [the intercourse]? - But why not solve this from the teaching of R. Eleazar, since R. Eleazar said [above]: Where she offered [the lamb] before [the intercourse]? Now [he says] that where she offered it, it is legitimate [for the altar] because it is not in existence at the time of the intercourse, implying that where she dedicated it, [since the animal is in existence at the time of the intercourse],12 it is forbidden [for the altar]?13 - This itself is the inquiry of R. Oshaia:14 [Do we say that] where she offered it, since it is not in existence at the time of the intercourse, the animal is legitimate [for the altar], but where she dedicated it at the time of the intercourse, the animal is forbidden [for the altar],15 or perhaps since we have learnt: The word of mouth is in dedication what delivery is in private transaction,16 [if she] dedicated it, it is legitimate [for the altar], and all the more is it legitimate [for the altar] if she offered it?17 - Let it remain undecided.

[The Master said:]18 'If he had intercourse with her and then he gave her her hire, it is legitimate for the altar'. But has it not been taught: If he had intercourse with her and he gave her a lamb, even after twelve months,19 the hire is forbidden [for the altar]? - Said R. Hanan son of R. Hisda: There is no difficulty. Here20 we suppose that he said to her: 'Submit to intercourse for this lamb,'21 and there22 that he said to her: 'Submit to intercourse for a lamb', without specifying.23 [And24 if he said to her: 'Submit to intercourse] for this animal', is the animal forbidden for the altar? Is not meshikah25 still wanting?26 - We are dealing with a non-Israelitish harlot who does not acquire possession by meshikah.27 And if you prefer [another solution] I may say that we are even dealing with an Israelitish harlot,28 where e.g., the animal is standing in her courtyard.29 If so, surely he gave it to her at the beginning?30 [And, moreover, surely the animal is forbidden in such a case!]31 - We suppose that he assigned to her the animal as security and said to her: 'If I give you your money on a certain day, well and good. And if not, the [whole] lamb will be your hire'.32

Said Rab: The law of [harlot's] hire applies to a male33 and to all forbidden relations, except the hire of his wife when she is a niddah.34 What is the reason? It is written: 'A harlot',35 and a niddah is not a harlot. Levi, however, says: Even of his wife when a niddah. What is the reason? It is written: An abomination,36 and this is also an abomination. But as to Levi, is it not written: 'A zonah [harlot]'?37 - He can answer you: [It is to intimate] zonah but not zoneh.38 And whence will Rab infer [the limitation of] zonah but not zoneh? - He would derive it from the dictum of Rabbi. For it has been taught: Rabbi said, Hire is forbidden only when it comes to him through a transgression.39 But the hire of his wife when a niddah,40 or payments for her loss of time,41 or if she [the harlot] gave him a lamb for hire - these are legitimate [for the altar]. And although there is no proof for it in the Bible,42 there is an indication of it,43 [Scripture saying:] And in that thou givest hire, and no hire is given unto thee, thus thou art contrary.44 And what does Rab do with the text: 'An abomination'?45 - He needs it for the teaching of Abaye. For Abaye said: The hire of a heathen harlot is forbidden for the altar. What is the reason? Here it is written: 'An abomination', and there Scripture says: For whosoever shall commit any of these abominations.46 [We therefore argue,] just as there the reference is to forbidden relations where betrothal has no effect, similarly here [in the case of a harlot] we are dealing with a case where betrothal has no legal effect. And a priest who has intercourse with her is not punished with lashes for [having intercourse with] a zonah. What is the reason? Since Scripture says: And he shall not profane his seed,47 implying such seed as is attributed to him, to the exclusion of a heathen women whose seed is not attributed to him.48 The hire of an Israelitish harlot is legitimate [for the altar]. What is the reason? Because betrothal has effect with her. And a priest who has intercourse with her is punishable [with lashes] for [having intercourse with] a zonah. What is the reason? Because his seed is attributed to him.49 Raba, however, says: In both cases50 her hire is forbidden for the altar, and a priest who has intercourse with her is punishable [with lashes] for [having intercourse with] a zonah. What is the reason? We infer one from the other:51 Just as in the case of an Israelitish harlot there is a negative command,52 similarly there is a negative command in connection with a heathen harlot. And just as the hire of a heathen harlot is forbidden [for the altar], similarly the hire of an Israelitish harlot is also forbidden [for the altar].

An objection was raised: The hire of either a heathen harlot or an Israelitish harlot is forbidden [for the altar]. Shall we say that this refutes Abaye?53 - Abaye can answer you: This54 will represent the view of R. Akiba who holds that betrothal takes no effect in relationships involving the infringement of a negative command.55 [But56 does not the Baraitha say in a later clause, as e.g., a widow for a High Priest and a divorcee or one who has performed halizah for a common priest, her hire is forbidden?]57 This is what [the Baraitha] informs us, that [in the case of any harlot with whom betrothal takes no effect] as is the case with a widow [for a High Priest], the hire is forbidden.58

And according to Raba, why does [the Baraitha] say: 'As e.g., the case of a widow for a High Priest'?59 - [The Baraitha means:] It is like the case of a widow [for a High Priest]: Just as a widow for a High Priest is not punishable with lashes until she is warned, similarly with a harlot there is no prohibition until he said to her: 'Here is [the hire]',60 thus excluding the teaching of R. Eleazar. For R. Eleazar said: If an unmarried man had intercourse with an unmarried woman without the intention thereby of making her his wife, he makes her a harlot. Where, however, she is already a harlot, even if he gave her a lamb [without giving the reason, Raba also agrees that] it is forbidden for the altar.

Another version: [The Baraitha] above refers to forbidden relations, where betrothals take no effect.61 But does not the latter clause say: As e.g., a widow for a High Priest, a divorcee or one who has performed halizah for a common priest, her hire is forbidden? Now in these cases betrothals take effect!62 - [The Baraitha] will represent the opinion of

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(1) When he presented it to her.
(2) Even if she did not hurry to offer it, as the law of hire does not here apply at all (R. Gershom).
(3) When he gave it to her.
(4) And she hurried to offer it before there was intercourse.
(5) Lev. XXVII, 14.
(6) Which he wishes to dedicate.
(7) Must be his to dedicate.
(8) In order to be able to dedicate them. And here since the lamb only becomes hers at the time of intercourse, how can she legitimately offer it beforehand?
(9) For the Baraitha above to say that the hire is legitimate for the altar.
(10) To be eaten or sacrificed on the altar.
(11) We therefore regard it as a case of being in her possession to dedicate, since she can use it if she is in need. And since he said to her that the lamb is only hers at the time of intercourse, the Baraitha therefore needs to inform us that it is not a hire if she hurried and offered it before the act of intercourse.
(12) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(13) What therefore is R. Oshaia's inquiry about?
(14) R. Eleazar's teaching itself is a matter of doubt with R. Oshaia.
(15) As it is in existence at the time of intercourse.
(16) And one cannot withdraw from his word.
(17) Before the intercourse.
(18) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(19) After intercourse.
(20) In the Baraitha which says that the lamb is forbidden for the altar.
(21) And since he gave it to her at the time of intercourse, the law of hire has effect immediately on the animal and even if she did not receive it till twelve months later, it is forbidden for the altar (v. Sh. Mek.).
(22) In the Baraitha which says that the animal is legitimate for the altar.
(23) A particular lamb. What he therefore sends her afterwards is merely a present but not a harlot's hire.
(24) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(25) A method of acquisition, drawing into one's possession the object to be acquired, v. Glos. s.v.
(26) Since payment alone does not confer possession and therefore she does not acquire it at the time of intercourse.
(27) V. Bek. 13a.
(28) And it can be explained that from the time that intercourse took place she possessed the animal.
(29) And one's courtyard can effect possession for a person.
(30) Before the intercourse, if the animal was placed in her courtyard. Why then does the Baraitha say that he had intercourse with her and then gave the lamb to her?
(31) V. Marginal Gloss. This appears to have been the reading in Rashi.
(32) Therefore when the day came and he did not give her the money, the animal is regarded as having been hers from the time of the act of intercourse. Nevertheless the Baraitha rightly says: 'And then he gave her the animal', since it was not hers till that particular day arrived. The Baraitha therefore needs to inform us that in such circumstances the animal is forbidden for the altar.
(33) If he had intercourse with a male and gave him a hire, the animal is forbidden to be offered.
(34) A woman during her menstruation period.
(35) Deut. XXIII, 19.
(36) Ibid.; Scripture saying: 'For the abomination of the Lord thy God etc.' And intercourse with a niddah is also an abomination, for it is mentioned in connection with illicit relations and with reference to all these relations the Bible says: For all these abominations (Lev. XVIII, 27).
(37) And a niddah is not a harlot (zonah).
(38) The male committing lewdness. I.e. , that if she gave him a hire, it is legitimate for the altar.
(39) When there is no legitimate aspect to the act of intercourse.
(40) Since she becomes permissible for him after the period of menstruation.
(41) But not for the act of cohabitation.
(42) That it is legitimate to be offered.
(43) That the hire given to a male is not included in the law.
(44) Ezek. XVI, 34. Hence what she gives him is not hire (Rashi).
(45) Since he does not use it for Levi's teaching.
(46) Lev. XVIII, 29.
(47) Lev. XXI, 15.
(48) The seed from a non-Jewess is called her child but not his.
(49) Since the harlot is an Israelitish woman, the children are his, i.e., Jewish.
(50) Whether the harlot be an Israelitish or heathen woman.
(51) The case of a heathen harlot from the case of an Israelitish harlot and vice versa.
(52) 'Neither shall he profane etc.'
(53) Who holds that the hire of an Israelitish harlot is permissible for the altar.
(54) The Baraitha just quoted.
(55) And since there is the negative command: 'Neither shall he profane' in connection with an Israelitish harlot, her hire is forbidden.
(56) The bracketed passage is inserted passage is inserted with Bah.
(57) And these examples are presumably adduced as instances where the betrothal takes effect and yet the hire is forbidden though the relationships involve no infringement of a negative command!
(58) The text in the Gemara is in disorder. V. Commentaries.
(59) Since according to him every harlot's hire is forbidden. Why therefore specifically mention the case of a widow for a High Priest?
(60) According to Raba, however, the first intercourse does not make her into a zonah, and consequently unless he tells her 'this is your hire', what he gives her is considered a mere gift.
(61) And therefore even the hire of an Israelitish harlot is forbidden.
(62) And yet the hire is forbidden.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 30a

R. Eleazar, who said: If an unmarried man has intercourse with an unmarried woman without the intention thereby of making her his wife, he makes her a harlot.1 If [the Baraitha] represents the opinion of R. Eleazar, why take the case of a widow for a High Priest?2 Why not take the case of an unmarried woman? - It was necessary to take the case of a widow [for a High Priest]. [For otherwise] you might think that since this3 is the typical case4 the [other cases] are not forbidden. [The Baraitha] informs us [that it is not so].

IF ONE SAYS TO HIS FELLOW: HERE IS THIS LAMB FOR YOU etc. But is not a bondwoman permitted for a slave?5 - Said R. Huna: [The Mishnah means] for himself,6 and the reason why it Says, MY SLAVE is because it is a more refined expression to use. If this is so, what is the reason of R. Meir?7 - Said Samuel son of R. Isaac:8 One can still say that the Mishnah actually means, MY SLAVE, and it refers to a Hebrew slave. If this is so, what is the reason of the Rabbis, since a bondwoman is permitted for a Hebrew slave? - The case here is where he does not possess a wife and children. For it has been taught: If a Hebrew slave does not possess a wife and children, his master cannot hand over a Canaanitish slave to him,9 but if he possesses a wife and children, his master can hand over a Canaanitish slave to him.

MISHNAH. AND WHAT IS MEANT BY THE PRICE OF A DOG?10 IF ONE SAYS TO HIS FELLOW, HERE IS THIS LAMB INSTEAD OF [THIS] DOG.11 AND LIKEWISE IF TWO PARTNERS DIVIDED [AN ESTATE] AND ONE TOOK TEN LAMBS AND THE OTHER NINE AND A DOG, ALL THOSE TAKEN INSTEAD OF THE DOG ARE FORBIDDEN [FOR THE ALTAR],12 BUT THOSE TAKEN WITH A DOG ARE LEGITIMATE [FOR THE ALTAR]. THE HIRE OF A DOG13 AND THE PRICE OF A HARLOT14 ARE LEGITIMATE [FOR THE ALTAR], SINCE IT SAYS: [FOR EVEN] BOTH [OF THESE]15 'BOTH' BUT NOT FOUR.16 THEIR ISSUE17 ARE LEGITIMATE [FOR THE ALTAR SINCE IT SAYS]: [BOTH OF THESE,] IMPLYING THEY18 BUT NOT THEIR ISSUE.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis have taught: 'A mekir of a dog',19 this refers to that taken in exchange for a dog. And likewise it says:20 Thou sellest thy people for naught and hast not set high their price.21

And why not say [that mekir means] the hire [of a dog]?22 - The text 'both' implies, but not three.23 But did we suggest the hire and the price of a dog; what we suggested is that [it means] the hire and not the price? - If so, let Scripture say: Thou shalt not bring the hire of a harlot and a dog. Since Scripture says: The hire of a harlot or the price of a dog, you can prove from here [that it means the price but not the hire of a dog].

PARTNERS WHO DIVIDED [THEIR ESTATE] AND ONE TOOK etc. But why not take out [one lamb] for the dog, and all the remaining [lambs] should then be legitimate [for the altar]? - We are dealing here with a case where the value of the dog was greater than the value of any one [of the corresponding lambs] and this additional amount is distributed over all [the corresponding lambs].24

THE HIRE OF A DOG AND THE PRICE OF A HARLOT ARE LEGITIMATE etc. Said Raba of Parzakia25 to R. Ashi:

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(1) And therefore the hire is forbidden, whereas Abaye will hold the opinion of the Rabbis who dispute with R. Eleazar.
(2) In the latter clause of the Baraitha.
(3) The case mentioned by R. Eleazar.
(4) If the case of an unmarried man who had intercourse with an unmarried woman had been taken, I might have regarded it as typical, and said that only where there is no prohibition as regards intercourse is the hire forbidden, but where intercourse is prohibited hire is not forbidden, and therefore in the case of a widow for a High Priest etc. the hire is not forbidden. The Baraitha therefore takes as example the case of a widow for a High Priest, etc.
(5) Why therefore do the Rabbis hold in our Mishnah that the lamb is a harlot's hire?
(6) I.e., the Israelite. And as regards himself, he is forbidden to have intercourse with a bondwoman.
(7) Who says in the Mishnah that it is not a harlot's hire. V. Bah.
(8) Var. lec. b. Nahmani.
(9) Because Scripture says: If he came in by himself, he should go out by himself (Ex. XXI, 3). R. Meir, who says that it is not a harlot's hire, does not however agree to this and holds that even if the Hebrew slave has no wife and children, his master can hand over a Canaanitish slave to him.
(10) V. Deut. XXIII, 19.
(11) The lamb is forbidden for the altar as 'price of a dog'.
(12) Since one can describe each lamb as the equivalent and price of the dog.
(13) If one gave a lamb to his neighbour in order to allow him to abuse his dog.
(14) The price obtained for selling a harlot.
(15) Deut. XXIII, 19.
(16) And there are no other cases where the lamb is forbidden in such circumstances. Now to add the cases of hire of a dog and price of a harlot would be to make four cases.
(17) Sc. of the lamb received as harlot's hire or price of a dog.
(18) The emphasis is on 'these'.
(19) 'The price of a dog'.
(20) Ps. XLIV, 13.
(21) The term used is mehir. We therefore see that mehir means 'the price'.
(22) For this reading cf. Rashi and Wilna Gaon.
(23) And by adding the case of hire of a dog there would be three cases of abomination.
(24) Where not one of the corresponding lambs is of equal value to the dog, some of the additional value of the dog is extended to each of the opposite lambs. E.g., suppose that each of the corresponding lambs was worth a denar, making altogether ten denars and each of the nine lambs with the dog was worth a denar minus a ma'ah (v. Glos.), the dog thus being worth one denar plus nine ma'ah. Then nine of the opposite lambs are regarded as possessing something of the value of the dog, while the tenth lamb just corresponds to what is left of it. The Jerushalmi explains this as follows: If the ten lambs are each worth four zuz and a tenth, making a total of forty-one zuz, and the dog is worth five zuz, then the nine remaining lambs with it are worth thirty-six zuz or four zuz each, one tenth of a zuz less than each of the others. Hence each lamb in one set is the equivalent of each of the nine opposite lambs plus the tenth of a zuz, and this tenth is the equivalent of a portion of the dog and therefore causes them all to be forbidden for the altar as 'the price of a dog'.
(25) Farausag, near Nehardea.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 30b

Whence do we derive what the Rabbis taught that the term harlotry1 does not apply to animals?2 - He said to him: If that were so, Scripture would not omit to say: 'The hire of a harlot and a dog'.

We have learnt to the same effect:3 Whence do we infer that the hire of a dog and the price of a harlot are legitimate [for the altar]? Because it says: 'Both' - but not four.4 Their issue are legitimate for the altar, since it says: 'Both of them', implying they, but not their issue.

Said Raba: The issue of a beast which was used for buggery [while pregnant] is disqualified [for the altar], for mother and young have been abused. The issue of a beast which gored [while pregnant] is disqualified for the altar, for mother and young have gored. The issue of a beast which was designated for idolatry5 or used for idolatry6 [while pregnant] is legitimate [for the altar]. What is the reason? Its mother was designated for idolatry and its mother was used [as such].7 Some there are who say: Even the issue of a beast which was designated or used for idolatry [while pregnant] is also disqualified [for the altar]. What is the reason? Its full appearance is welcome to him.8 R. Ahadboi b. Ammi in the name of Rab reported: If one betrothed with the dung of an ox condemned to be stoned, the act is valid.9 [If one betrothed however] with the dung of the calves set aside for idolatry, the act is not valid. What is the reason? I may say it is intimated in Scripture and I may say that reason tells us so. I may say that reason tells us so, since for purposes of idol worship its full appearance is welcome to him,10 whereas in the case of an ox condemned to be stoned, its full appearance is not welcome to him.11 I may say it is intimated in Scripture. With reference to idolatry it is written: Lest thou be a cursed thing like it,12 thus intimating that whatever comes from it13 is like it and forbidden; whereas with reference to an ox condemned to be stoned, it is written: And its flesh shall not be eaten14 - 'its flesh' is forbidden, its dung is permitted.15

MISHNAH. IF HE GAVE HER [A HARLOT] MONEY AS HIRE IT IS LEGITIMATE [FOR THE ALTAR, BUT IF HE GAVE HER] WINE, OIL, FLOUR AND ANYTHING SIMILAR WHICH IS OFFERED ON THE ALTAR, IT IS DISQUALIFIED FOR THE ALTAR. IF HE GAVE HER DEDICATED [ANIMALS] THEY ARE LEGITIMATE [FOR THE ALTAR]. IF HE GAVE HER BIRDS [OF HULLIN]16 THEY ARE DISQUALIFIED,17 FOR ONE MIGHT HAVE REASONED [AS FOLLOWS]: IF IN THE CASE OF DEDICATED ANIMALS, WHERE A BLEMISH DISQUALIFIES THEM, [THE LAW] OF [THE HARLOT'S] HIRE AND PRICE [OF A DOG] DOES NOT TAKE EFFECT, IN THE CASE OF BIRDS, WHERE A BLEMISH DOES NOT DISQUALIFY, IS IT NOT ALL THE MORE REASON THAT THE LAW OF [THE HARLOT'S] HIRE AND PRICE [OF A DOG] SHOULD NOT TAKE EFFECT? THE TEXT THEREFORE STATES: FOR ANY VOW,18 IN ORDER TO INCLUDE THE CASE OF A BIRD.19 THE ISSUE OF ALL ANIMALS WHICH ARE DISQUALIFIED FOR THE ALTAR ARE LEGITIMATE FOR THE ALTAR. R. ELEAZAR SAYS: THE ISSUE OF A TREFAH HOWEVER MAY NOT BE OFFERED ON THE ALTAR.20 R. HANINA B. ANTIGONUS SAYS: A RITUALLY CLEAN ANIMAL WHICH SUCKLED FROM A TREFAH IS DISQUALIFIED FROM THE ALTAR. ONE MAY NOT REDEEM ANY DEDICATED ANIMAL WHICH BECAME TREFAH, SINCE WE ARE NOT ALLOWED TO REDEEM DEDICATED [ANIMALS] IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM TO DOGS TO EAT.21

GEMARA. Our Rabbis have taught: If he gave her [a harlot] wheat [as hire] and she made it into flour, olives and she made them into oil, grapes and she made them into wine, one [Baraitha] taught: They are forbidden [for the altar], and another [Baraitha] taught: They are legitimate [for the altar.]

Said R. Joseph: Gurion who came from Asporak22 recited: Bath Shammai forbid, whereas Beth Hillel permit. Beth Hillel hold, [Scripture says]: 'Them', implying but not their issue; 'them' but not their products.23 Beth Shammai however hold: 'Them' implies but not their issue, and the word 'even' includes their products.24 But do not Beth Hillel see that is is written 'even'? - The 'even' is according to the opinion of Beth Hillel indeed a difficulty.

Our Rabbis have taught: [Scripture says:] In the house of the Lord thy God,25 this excludes the case of the red heifer which does not come to the House.26 This is the teaching of R. Eleazar. The Sages, however say: This includes beaten gold plates [as forbidden for overlaying].27 Whose opinion is that of the Sages? Said R. Hisda: It is that of R. Jose b. Judah. For it has been taught: If he gave her gold as hire, R. Jose b. Judah said: One must not use it to make beaten gold plates even for the space behind the Holy of Holies.28

IF HE GAVE HER DEDICATED [ANIMALS] THEY ARE LEGITIMATE etc. And why should not [the law of] a [harlot's] hire and price of a dog take effect with dedicated animals a minori?29 If in the case of birds, where a blemish does not disqualify them [from being offered, the law of] 'hire' and 'price' have effect,30 in the case of dedicated animals where a blemish disqualifies them, is there not all the more reason that [the law of] 'hire' and 'price' should have effect? The text therefore states: For any vow,31 thus excluding what has already been vowed.32 Now the reason33 is because a Scriptural text excludes them [the dedications], but if a Scriptural text had not excluded them, I might have thought that if he gave a harlot dedicated animals the law of 'hire' and 'price'34 would apply to them, but can a man forbid what does not belong to him?35 - Said R. Oshaiah: We are dealing with a case where he assigns her as hire a share in his Passover lamb and it is the opinion of Rabbi.36 For it has been taught: [Scripture Says:] And if the household be too little for the lamb,37 give him to live from the lamb38 sufficient for food but not for a purchase.39 Rabbi, however, says: Even sufficient for a purchase; if he had not the wherewithal, he can assign a share for others together with himself in his Passover lamb and his festival offerings, the money being hullin; for it was on such a condition that Israel dedicated their Passover lambs.40

THE ISSUE OF ALL ANIMALS WHICH ARE DISQUALIFIED FOR THE ALTAR etc. Said Rab: The issue of all animals which are disqualified for the altar are legitimate [for the altar]. And with reference to this it was taught that R. Eliezer forbids. R. Huna b. Hinena reported in the name of R. Nahman: The difference of opinion refers only in the case where they were pregnant and in the end were used for buggery, R. Eliezer holding that an Embryo is considered as the thigh of its mother,41 whereas the Rabbis hold that an embryo is not considered as the thigh of its mother. But where they were used for buggery and afterwards they became pregnant, it is the unanimous opinion of all the authorities that they [the issue] are legitimate [for the altar].

Raba says: The difference of opinion only refers to the case where they were used for buggery and afterwards became pregnant, R. Eliezer holding that a produce of combined causes42 is forbidden, whereas the Rabbis hold that a product of combined causes is permitted. But where they were pregnant and then were used for buggery, it is the opinion of all the authorities concerned that they are forbidden [for the altar].

Raba follows the opinion expressed by him elsewhere. For Raba says: The issue of a beast which was used for buggery while pregnant is disqualified [for the altar], for both mother and young have been abused. The issue of a beast which gored while pregnant is disqualified [for the altar], for both mother and young have gored.

Another version: R. Huna b. Hinena reported in the name of R. Nahman: The difference of opinion refers only where they were used for buggery while they were consecrated, R. Eliezer43 holding that this is a degrading thing,44 whereas the Rabbis hold that it is not so. But where they were used for buggery as hullin, since there is a change in status,45 it is the opinion of all the authorities concerned that they [the issue] are legitimate [for the altar]. Raba reported in the name of R. Nahman: The difference of opinion is the same even if they were used for buggery as hullin, R. Eliezer holding that it is a degrading thing, whereas the Rabbis hold that since there was a change [in status] they are legitimate [for the altar]. But where they were used for buggery while consecrated, it is the opinion of all the authorities concerned that they are forbidden for the altar.

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(1) Heb. zenuth.
(2) Since the Mishnah says that 'the hire of a dog' is permitted for the altar.
(3) That 'harlotry' does not apply to animals.
(4) And if we were to include the price of a harlot and the hire of a dog there would be four cases and not two.
(5) Mukzeh, v. supra 28a.
(6) Ne'ebad, v. supra 28a.
(7) But not its issue.
(8) To the idol worshipper, as it seems to lend more dignity to the act.
(9) Lit. , 'she is betrothed'.
(10) The dung makes the animal look fatter and therefore it is forbidden to be used.
(11) Since it is condemned to die, and therefore the betrothal is valid.
(12) Deut. VII, 26.
(13) E.g., its dung.
(14) Ex. XXI, 28.
(15) And therefore the betrothal with it is a valid act.
(16) Like pigeons.
(17) From being used any more for the altar.
(18) Deut. XXIII, 19 in connection with the law of harlot's hire and price of a dog. The word 'any' amplifies.
(19) That the law of the harlot's hire and price of a dog has effect on them.
(20) But all will agree that it is permitted for private use, since it is not part of the body of its mother (Rashi). Tosaf., however, maintains that it is forbidden even for private use.
(21) As this would be degrading dedications.
(22) Not identified, but probably in Asia; v. Neubauer p. 386.
(23) Where he gave her grapes and she made wine, etc.
(24) As being subject to the law of harlot's hire and price of a dog.
(25) In connection with the law of hire (Deut. XXIII, 19).
(26) Since every rite in this connection is performed on the Mount of Olives. It may therefore be brought from hire.
(27) To cover the altar.
(28) This was an area of eleven cubits at the back of the Temple, of less stringent holiness. Rashi says that e.g., he gave her stones as hire to build a wall in that part of the Temple court.
(29) A conclusion from the minor to the major.
(30) As we include this from the text, 'For any vow'.
(31) Ibid.
(32) I.e., dedicated objects, and the man cannot forbid something which does not belong to him.
(33) Why the law of 'hire' and 'price' do not apply to dedications.
(34) 'Price' is irrelevant here but mentioned as a current phrase.
(35) Sh. Mek.; cur. edd 'but it is not (his) money'.
(36) We are concerned with the kind of dedication which is in his possession.
(37) Ex. XII, 4.
(38) Interpreting the text in the following manner: And if the household is diminished in resources, there being no means for the necessary things required for the Paschal lamb. מהיות משה, 'Let him have the means from the lamb', i.e., to buy wood with which to roast the lamb, by taking money from others and sharing the animal with them.
(39) As, for example, to buy a garment with the money obtained by inviting others to share in the Paschal lamb, since such an article has no connection with the Paschal offering.
(40) On the understanding that if he required something even unconnected with the Passover lamb, he should be permitted to invite others to share the offering.
(41) Therefore the offspring itself was abused.
(42) One of which was forbidden. Now here, although the issue is brought about by the male, a permissible element - no prohibition attaching to the father of the offspring - since the mother which is also a cause of the offspring is prohibited, therefore the offspring is forbidden (Rashi).
(43) Who holds that the issue is forbidden.
(44) For since they are dedications, it is unseemly to use them later for the altar after being abused.
(45) Viz., from hullin to dedications.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 31a

THE ISSUE OF A TREFAH etc. According to the authority who holds that a trefah can give birth,1 we can explain [the Mishnah here] as referring to a case where e.g., it became trefah and afterwards became pregnant, and the point at issue is that R. Eliezer holds that a product of combined causes2 is forbidden, whereas the Rabbis hold that the product of combined causes is permitted. According to the authority who holds that a trefah cannot give birth,3 it can be explained as referring to a case where e.g., it became pregnant and afterwards became trefah, and the point at issue is that R. Eliezer4 holds that an embryo is considered as the thigh of its mother, whereas the Rabbis hold that an embryo is not considered as the thigh of its mother.

Said R. Huna: The Sages5 agree with R. Eliezer that the young bird from the egg of a bird that became trefah is forbidden [for the altar]. What is the reason? [The Sages] differ from R. Eliezer only in the case of the issue of a trefah, since it develops from the air,6 whereas in the case of a young bird from the egg of a bird that became trefah, since it develops from the body of the bird, even the Rabbis agree.7 Said Raba to R. Huna: We have the confirmation of your opinion as follows: A tarwad8 -full of worms that come from a living person [who then died], R. Eliezer declares to be ritually unclean9 whereas the Sages declare them clean.10 Now the Rabbis differ [with R. Eliezer] only as regards worms [of a human body], since they are considered merely as a discharge, but in the case of an egg, since it is part of the body of the bird, even the Rabbis would agree.11 Said Abaye to him: But it is not logically the reverse? R. Eliezer only differs from the Rabbis in the case of a worm, since a man even when alive is described as a worm, as it is written: How much less man that is a worm, and son of man that is a maggot;12 [but in the case of a young bird]13 even R. Eliezer would admit14 [it is fit for the altar].15 And, moreover, it has been explicitly taught: R. Eliezer agrees with the Sages in the case of [a young bird from] an egg from a bird that became trefah, that it is legitimate for the altar! - He [Raba] replied to [Abaye]: If it has been taught,16 it has been taught.17

R. HANINA B. ANTIGONUS SAYS: A RITUALLY CLEAN ANIMAL etc. What is the reason? Shall we say because it becomes fat from it? If this is so, if he feeds it with vetches set aside for idolatry, is it really forbidden?18 - [Rather it is as] R. Hanina of Trita recited in the presence of R. Johanan: You suppose for instance that it sucked hot milk [from a trefah] every morning,19 since it can live for twenty-four hours.20

ONE MAY NOT REDEEM ANY DEDICATED ANIMAL WHICH BECAME TREFAH etc. Whence is this derived? - Our Rabbis have taught: [Scripture says: Thou mayest kill and eat flesh:21 ] 'thou mayest kill' [implies] but no shearing; 'and eat', but not for thy dogs; 'flesh', but not milk.22 Hence we infer that one must not redeem dedications in order to give them to dogs to eat. Another version: The text, 'Thou mayest kill and eat flesh' [implies] that the permission to eat commences only from the time of killing and onwards,23 because he [the Tanna] here holds that it is permitted to redeem dedications in order to give them to dogs to eat.

CHAPTER 7

MISHNAH. THERE ARE [REGULATIONS] WHICH APPLY TO DEDICATIONS FOR THE ALTAR24 WHICH DO NOT APPLY TO DEDICATIONS25 FOR REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE, AND THERE ARE [REGULATIONS] WHICH APPLY TO DEDICATIONS FOR THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE WHICH DO NOT APPLY TO DEDICATIONS FOR THE ALTAR. FOR DEDICATIONS FOR THE ALTAR EFFECT EXCHANGE, THEY ARE SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF PIGGUL,26 NOTHAR27 AND RITUAL UNCLEANNESS;

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(1) There is a controversy on this matter in Hul. 57b.
(2) The mother alone being forbidden but not the father. We cannot say here that the point at issue will be whether an embryo is to be regarded as the thigh of its mother, for since it became trefah before pregnancy it cannot be regarded as the thigh of its mother, as it possesses an element which is permissible, viz., from its sire (Rashi).
(3) So Sh. Mek.; cur. edd., cannot live.
(4) Who forbids the issue for the altar.
(5) Who say in the Mishnah that the issue of a trefah may be offered on the altar.
(6) The embryo of an animal is not attached to the latter's body but develops on its own and hangs, so to speak, in the air; whereas an egg, so long as it is not completed, is attached to the body and is completed inside the bird (Rashi). Another interpretation given by Rashi: An embryo of an animal grows and develops after it sees the light of day, i.e., after birth, whereas an egg does not develop any more after birth, thus proving that it is part of the body of the bird and can only grow when joined to it.
(7) That the bird which comes from the egg is forbidden for the altar.
(8) A spoon, pointed at the top and round at the end.
(9) I.e., to impart uncleanness by contact or through overshadowing, because a limb separated from a human being has the same law as a limb from a corpse (Rashi).
(10) Since it was separated when the person was alive, it is regarded as mere dust and is not considered as part of the body.
(11) That the bird from it is forbidden for the altar.
(12) Job XXV, 6.
(13) Inserted with Bah.
(14) Var. lec. (given in curr. edd. in square brackets): 'But with reference to an egg, the young bird is developed after the deterioration of the egg, and after deterioration the egg is mere dust, and therefore even R. Eliezer agrees.'
(15) Since it is an entirely different body which was not inside the trefah.
(16) That it is permissible for the altar.
(17) And there is nothing more to be said.
(18) For it says (supra 29a) that only mukzeh is forbidden in such circumstances.
(19) All its days.
(20) From this milk alone without any other food. This proves that the growth and development of the animal was due to its sucking from a trefah, and therefore it is forbidden for the altar; whereas an animal which was given to eat vetches set aside for idolatry, since it cannot exist without other food in the twenty-four hours, is permitted for the altar. If, however, an animal ate vetches set aside for idolatry, all its life, it would also be forbidden (Tosaf).
(21) Deut. XII, 15.
(22) Milking would be work, which is forbidden.
(23) Thus excluding milk or the shearing as forbidden, these being benefits derived while the animal is alive. Now since we do not interpret the text 'and eat' as excluding the food for dogs, we can therefore infer that it is allowed to feed dogs with redeemed dedications. From this Baraitha we see that there is a difference of opinion among Tannaim as to whether we may give dogs to eat from redeemed dedications.
(24) Unlike dedications for the repairs of the Temple, because these, in the first place, are not called 'a sacrifice', and secondly, because they are only holy for their value.
(25) I.e., their value.
(26) A sacrifice rejected in consequence of an improper intention in the mind of the officiating priest.
(27) A sacrifice which was left over after the appointed time set aside for its eating.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 31b

THEIR ISSUE AND MILK ARE FORBIDDEN1 AFTER THEIR REDEMPTION;2 IF ONE KILLS THEM WITHOUT [THE TEMPLE COURT] HE IS GUILTY [OF A TRANSGRESSION]3 AND WAGES ARE NOT PAID FROM THEM4 TO ARTISANS,5 WHICH IS NOT THE CASE WITH DEDICATIONS FOR TEMPLE REPAIRS. THERE ARE [REGULATIONS] WHICH APPLY TO DEDICATIONS FOR THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE [WHICH ARE NOT FOUND ELSEWHERE], SINCE UNSPECIFIED DEDICATIONS6 GO TO THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE, DEDICATION FOR THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE TAKES EFFECT ON ALL THINGS,7 THE LAW OF SACRILEGE8 APPLIES TO THEIR PRODUCTS,9 AND THERE IS NO BENEFIT TO BE DERIVED FROM THEM FOR THE PRIEST.10

GEMARA. Now is this a general rule, that all dedications for the altar effect exchange? Is there not a case of birds which are dedicated for the altar, and we have learnt: Meal-offerings and birds do not effect exchange? - [The Mishnah] speaks only of beasts. But is there not the case of the offspring [of a dedicated animal] which is a dedication for the altar, and we have learnt: The offspring [of a dedicated animal] does not effect exchange? - Our Mishnah represents the opinion of R. Judah who holds that the offspring can effect exchange. But is not the exchange itself a dedication for the altar, and we have learnt: One exchange cannot effect another exchange? - [The Mishnah] refers to original dedications.11 Now that you have arrived at this conclusion, you may even say that the Mishnah above will be in accordance also with the opinion of the Rabbis [the disputants of R. Judah], since it only refers to original dedications.

AND WAGES ARE NOT PAID FROM THEM TO ARTISANS etc. We infer that we do pay from the dedications for the repair of the Temple.12 [Whence do we derive this?]13 Said R. Abbahu: Since Scripture says. And let them make Me [a sanctuary],14 [intimating] from what is Mine.15

THERE ARE [REGULATIONS] WHICH APPLY TO DEDICATIONS FOR THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE;16 UNSPECIFIED DEDICATIONS GO FOR THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE. Who is the Tanna who holds that unspecified dedications17 go for the repairs of the Temple?18 - R. Hiyya b. Abba reported in the name of R. Johanan: It is not R. Joshua.19 For we learnt: If one dedicated his estate and he had among them animals fit for the altar, males and females, R. Eliezer says: The males are to be sold for the purpose of being used as burnt-offerings20 and the females are to be sold for the purpose of being used as peace-offerings and their monies, with the rest of the estate, are devoted to the repairs of the Temple.21 R. Joshua, however, says: The males are themselves offered as burnt-offerings and the females are sold for the purpose of peace-offerings.22 Burnt-offerings are purchased with their monies and the rest of the estate is devoted to the repairs of the Temple. And this23 will differ from the opinion of R. Adda b. Ahabah [reporting Rab].24 For R. Adda b. Ahabah reported in the name of Rab: In the case of a herd consisting altogether of male animals even R. Eliezer agrees,25 since a man will not ignore dedications for the altar and make dedications for the repair of the Temple. The point at issue, however, is with reference to a herd where half were male [animals] and the other half female [animals]. R. Eliezer holds: A man does not divide his vow,26 and since the female animals are not meant for burnt-offerings,27 therefore even the male [animals] are also not meant for burnt-offerings. R. Joshua, however, says: A man does divide his vow.28

Another version is current as follows: R. Adda b. Ahabah reported in the name of Rab: If he dedicated animals only, even R. Eliezer admits,29 since a man does not ignore dedications for the altar and make dedications for the repairs of the Temple. The point at issue, however, is where there is other property with them [the animals]. R. Eliezer holding that one does not divide his vow, and since therefore the rest of the estate is not for dedications for the altar, the animals [of the estate] are also not for the altar; whereas R. Joshua says: A man does not divide his vow.

Now according to the latter version [of R. Adda b. Ahabah's teaching], it is in order to state [above]: Their monies, together with the rest of the estate, go for the repair of the Temple. It is for this reason that it says 'together with the rest of the estate, go for the repair of the Temple'.30 But according to the first version [of R. Adda's teaching],31 let R. Eliezer say: They [the monies] shall go to the repairs of the Temple?32 - Do in fact read so:33 And their monies go for the repair of the Temple.

DEDICATIONS FOR THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE TAKE EFFECT ON ALL THINGS. What does this include34 - Said Rabina: It includes the shavings [of a tree]35 and sproutings.36

SACRILEGE APPLIES TO THEIR PRODUCTS. What does this37 include? - Said R. Papa: It includes the milk of dedicated animals38 and the eggs of turtle-doves, as we learnt: With regard to milk of dedicated animals and eggs of turtle-doves, one may not benefit from them nor does the law of sacrilege apply to them. This only refers to dedications of the altar, but as regards dedications for repairs of the Temple. [e.g.,] if one dedicated a hen,39 the law of sacrilege applies to its eggs; [if one dedicated the value of] a she-ass [for the repairs of the Temple], the law of sacrilege applies to its milk.40 And even according to the authority who holds that the law of sacrilege applies to the products of dedications for the altar, this only refers to products which are fit for the altar,41 but to products which are not fit for the altar the law of Sacrilege does not apply.

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(1) If their mother became blemished.
(2) Scripture saying 'flesh', thus excluding milk. The case of the issue is where the pregnancy took place before redemption and the birth after redemption, but where the pregnancy took place after redemption, it would be permissible. But in the case of dedications for the repairs of the Temple, even if the pregnancy took place before redemption, it would be permissible, for the consecration was for their value and therefore the holiness is not so stringent.
(3) In connection with the killing without the confines of the Temple.
(4) From the money assigned for dedications for the altar.
(5) For helping to build something in the Temple. Wages are paid, however, from dedications for the repairs of the Temple.
(6) Where it is not specified whether for repairs of the Temple or for the altar.
(7) Even upon unclean animals, stones or wood.
(8) The unlawful use of sacred things.
(9) If one dedicated an animal, the value of which goes for the repairs of the Temple, its milk must not be used or if one dedicated a hen, its eggs must not be used unlawfully, unlike the case of the milk and eggs belonging to dedications for the altar.
(10) V. Marginal Gloss. Cur. edd.: 'to the owners'. Whereas with dedications for the altar in the majority of cases the flesh is eaten by the priests. and even in the case of a burnt-offering the skin is used by the priest.
(11) The first dedication and not an exchange which is the second dedication arising from an exchange with the first.
(12) Since I might have thought that one can, only use money set aside for Temple repairs for the purchase of stone and wood, which are actually used in the building and repairing of the Temple, but that it is forbidden to pay workmen with this money and it becomes hullin if used in that manner. There would then have to be a special fund donated for this purpose wherewith to pay workmen.
(13) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(14) Ex. XXV, 8.
(15) And is set aside for the sanctuary, i.e., from the monies dedicated for the building of the Temple.
(16) For reading v. Sh. Mek.; cur. edd., 'The Master said'.
(17) Implying even a dedicated animal (Rashi).
(18) v. Sh. Mek.
(19) Var. lee.: It is R. Eliezer.
(20) Since unblemished dedications can never be excluded from being offered on the altar.
(21) For R. Eliezer holds that unspecified dedications go for the repair of the Temple even in the case of animals, except those which are fit for the altar.
(22) We see consequently that according to R. Joshua anything fit for the altar is generally intended to be used for the altar unlike the opinion stated in the Mishnah; v. supra 20a.
(23) The interpretation of the Mishnah just given, that it will be according to the opinion of R. Eliezer and not of R. Joshua.
(24) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(25) That the dedications were meant for the altar.
(26) Half for one kind of dedication and the other half for a different kind of dedication.
(27) For burnt-offerings must be males.
(28) Males for burnt-offerings and females for the value of burnt-offerings, since he cannot offer females for peace-offerings without redemption (Rashi). Thus we see that according to R. Adda, even R. Eliezer will maintain that unspecified dedications are for the altar, the case however being different here in the Baraitha for the reason explained.
(29) That unspecified dedications are for the altar. For although there are female animals, since all are fit for the altar, we may suppose that they are meant for the altar. Male animals are therefore offered as burnt-offerings and female animals are sold and with the money burnt-offerings are bought, as we can say that he dedicated them all for the altar.
(30) As we are dealing with the case where there is other property in addition to animals.
(31) That in a herd where half were male animals and the other half were female animals, R. Eliezer holds that a man does not divide his vow, half for the altar and half for the Temple repairs, and even where there is no other estate and one can maintain that everything was meant for the altar (Rashi).
(32) Why does it then say: 'They (their monies) and the other property etc.', since often there is no other estate according to this version.
(33) For reading v. Wilna Gaon Glosses.
(34) The word ALL.
(35) If a man dedicated the value of a tree for the repairs of the Temple, there is sacrilege in respect of the shavings.
(36) Which come up in the winter and are used as manure.
(37) The products spoken of in the Mishnah.
(38) Their value goes for the Temple repairs.
(39) For Temple repairs one would not consecrate something which is fit for the altar and a hen is not fit for the altar.
(40) Although the animal is unclean, the holiness of the dedication for the repair of the Temple attaches to it as if it were a clean animal.
(41) The offspring of a dedicated animal (Rashi). Tosaf. explains that the term 'products' refers to the blood of sacrifices and the passage means this: And even according to the authority who holds that the law of sacrilege applies to 'products', i.e., the blood of a sacrifice, this only refers to blood which is fit to be sprinkled, but to 'products' like milk of dedicated animals and eggs of turtle-doves, the law of sacrilege does not apply.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 32a

MISHNAH. NEITHER DEDICATIONS FOR THE ALTAR NOR DEDICATIONS FOR THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE MAY BE CHANGED FROM ONE HOLINESS TO ANOTHER.1 WE MAY DEDICATE THEM2 WITH A VALUE-DEDICATlon,3 AND WE MAY DECLARE THEM HEREM.4 IF THEY5 DIE,6 THEY ARE BURIED.7 R. SIMEON SAYS: DEDICATIONS FOR THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE, IF THEY DIED, THEY ARE REDEEMED.8

GEMARA. Said R. Huna: If one designated9 dedications for the altar for dedications as priestly property,10 his action is of no consequence.11 What is the reason? Scripture says: Every devoted thing is most holy unto the Lord,12 intimating that every devoted thing that comes from what is most holy13 belongs to the Lord.14 An objection was raised: If one designated dedications for repairs to the Temple, whether for dedication for the altar or for dedication as priestly property, his action is of no consequence.15 If one designated dedications for priestly property, whether for dedication for the altar or for dedication for the repairs of the Temple, his action is of no consequence.16 Now this implies that if one designated dedications for the altar17 by dedicating them as priestly property, his action is valid.18 Shall we say that this refutes R. Huna? - R. Huna can answer you: When [the Tanna] leaves over this case,19 it is for the purpose [of teaching] that if he designated dedications for the altar for the repairs of the Temple, his action is valid,20 but if for dedication as priestly property, his action is of no consequence.21 But why not state this case,22 together with others [in the Baraitha above]?23 - He [the Tanna in the Baraitha] mentions a case which has both aspects,24 but does not state a rule which has not both aspects.25

We have learnt: WE MAY DEDICATE THEM WITH A VALUE-DEDICATION, AND WE MAY DECLARE THEM HEREM. Now does not the expression VALUE-DEDICATION refer to the dedication for the repairs of the Temple and the expression 'WE MAY DECLARE THEM HEREM' mean as priestly property?26 - No. In both cases the reference is to dedications for the repairs of the Temple,27 and [the Mishnah teaches that] it is immaterial whether he expresses this in the language of 'dedication' For the repairs of the Temple or in the language of herem for the repairs of the Temple.28 But it is not so! For it has been taught: We may dedicate them29 with a value-dedication for the repairs of the Temple, and we may declare them herem as priestly property.30 And, moreover, it has been [explicitly] taught: If dedications for the altar are dedicated as priestly property, the act is valid.31 Shall we say that this refutes R. Huna? - It is a refutation. But does not R. Huna adduce a Scriptural text?32 - Said 'Ulla:33 Scripture [could have] said: 'A devoted thing' and it says 'every devoted thing'.34 But did 'Ulla say this? Did not Ulla say: If one designated a burnt-offering for the repairs of the Temple, there is nothing to prevent the offering of a sacrifice except that we must wait

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(1) E.g., to offer a burnt-offering in place of a peace-offering, or vice versa. Similarly, if one dedicated something for the repair of the Temple, one must not change this for a dedication for the altar or vice versa.
(2) Dedications for the altar.
(3) If e.g., one said with reference to a burnt-offering: 'Let this animal (i.e., its value) be for the repairs of the Temple', the dedication is assessed and the money is given to the Temple treasurer. This applies to a neder, i.e., where he said: 'I vow to dedicate a burnt-offering', for since he is responsible if it became lost or died, therefore the whole animal belongs to him, and if he subsequently dedicated it for the repairs of the Temple, he must give the whole value of the dedication to the Temple treasurer. But in the case of a nedabah, i.e., where he said: 'This animal is to be a freewill-offering', since if it died or if it became lost, he is not responsible for it, if he therefore subsequently dedicated it for the repairs of the Temple, he only gives the Temple treasurer a small amount, in consideration for the right he has to receive a small sum from an Israelite friend for allowing the latter's grandson, a priest, to offer the animal and receive the skin of the burnt-offering (Rashi).
(4) 'Devoted' (v. Lev. XXVII, 28), consecrated for a sacred use. Here, too, if the animal is a neder, he gives the full value to the priest and if nedabah he gives a small amount as consideration to the priest (R. Gershom).
(5) The dedications for the altar.
(6) Even after becoming blemished but before redemption.
(7) And they cannot be redeemed and given as food to the dogs. And even according to the authority who holds that we may give redeemed blemished dedications to the dogs as food, this only applies when they become trefah, since they can be set before us and appraised, but not when they are dead. Or IF THEY DIE means where he killed the animal before their redemption. There cannot therefore be any further redemption nor eating of them, since setting down and appraising are necessary (v. Gemara). Consequently they are buried.
(8) As these are not included in the law of being required to be presented to the priest and appraised by him. V. Lev. XXVII, 12-13.
(9) Lit., 'he attached them'.
(10) Declaring them herem. Unspecified herem are meant for the priests. The reason why it mentions priestly property is because at times herem goes for the repairs of the Temple, as e.g., where he declares, 'Let this be herem for the repairs of the Temple'.
(11) He does not give the priest the value of the dedication nor a consideration, i.e., the smaller amount (Rashi and R. Gershom).
(12) Lev. XXVII, 28.
(13) I.e., dedications for the altar which were declared herem.
(14) But not to the priests.
(15) Because an object dedicated for the repair of the Temple cannot itself be released from the purpose of its consecration (Rashi).
(16) Since he has no share in them, not even the right of disposal, since he can only give them to the priests of that particular division.
(17) Where there is a right of disposal.
(18) And he gives a consideration to the priests.
(19) Of dedications for the altar, which is not explicitly mentioned in the Baraitha.
(20) And he gives for the repairs of the Temple the value of a dedication.
(21) Since there is a definite Scriptural text: 'Every devoted thing, etc', excluding this case as explained above.
(22) Of dedications for the altar declared as priestly property.
(23) Where the action is of no consequence.
(24) I.e., dedications for the repair of the Temple, in regard to which his action is of no consequence, whether he designated them for the altar or as priestly property, dedications for the repairs of the Temple applying here in two instances as being of no avail.
(25) Since in regard to dedications for the altar only if they were designated as priestly property is the action of no avail, as R. Huna teaches, whereas if they were designated for repairs of the Temple, the action would be valid.
(26) Unlike the opinion of R. Huna above.
(27) The value of the dedications is given to the Temple treasurers.
(28) But if dedications for the altar have been declared herem for priests, the act is of no consequence.
(29) Dedications for the altar.
(30) That the value belongs to the priests, as the property of the priests, and not to the Temple treasurer.
(31) Lit., 'what he did is done'.
(32) 'Every devoted thing is most holy unto the Lord'. How is then the text to be interpreted?
(33) This Scriptural text will not be in accordance with the opinion of R. Huna.
(34) This is in order to intimate that herem takes effect on all things, even upon most holy things.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 32b

for the approach of the Temple treasurer [as representatives of the owners]?1 - [The Baraitha above]2 means Rabbinically3 and the Bible text refers to sacrilege.4

[You say] in respect of sacrilege? But what need is there for a Bible text5 for this purpose? Is it not written in this connection, 'It is most holy'? - And suppose Scripture does say so, has not R. Jannai taught: The law of sacrilege is not explicitly mentioned in the Torah, except in the case of a burnt-offering, since it says: If a soul commit a trespass and sin through ignorance in the holy things of the Lord,6 which means such dedications as are exclusively to the Lord; but that the law of sacrilege applies to a sin-offering and guilt-offering is derived only from the teaching of Rabbi, as it has been taught: Rabbi says, The text: All fat is the Lord's,7 this includes the emurim8 of dedications of a minor grade as subject to the law of sacrilege.9 Now here too we may ask, what need is there for a Bible text, for does it not say in connection with sin-offering and guilt-offering, 'Most holy'?10 We see then that although Scripture says, 'Most holy' in that connection, there is need for a text to include them under the law of sacrilege; and the same applies to herem, that although the text says in that connection, 'Most holy' there is need for a special text to include them under the law of sacrilege.

The text [stated above]: 'If one dedicated a burnt-offering, there is nothing to prevent the offering of a sacrifice, except that we must wait for the approach of the Temple treasurers'. An objection was raised: If one dedicated a burnt-offering for the repairs of the Temple, one must not kill it until it is redeemed!11 - It12 is a Rabbinical enactment. It also stands to reason, since the latter clause [of the Baraitha] says: If he transgressed and killed it,13 the action is valid. Now if it were from the Torah, why is the act valid?14 Then what will you say? That it is a Rabbinical enactment? If so, read the latter clause: 'And if he unlawfully used the burnt-offering,15 he has transgressed twice the law of sacrilege'.16 Now if it were only a Rabbinical enactment why are there two transgressions of the law of sacrilege?17 - The Baraitha means as follows: And it is capable of involving one in two transgressions of sacrilege.18

AND IF THEY DIED THEY ARE BURIED etc. Said R. Johanan: According to the Rabbis [of the Mishnah] both dedications for the altar and dedications for the repairs of the Temple are included in the law requiring the sacrifice to be presented19 and appraised.20 Resh Lakish, however, says: According to the Rabbis, dedications for repairs of the Temple were included in the law of being presented and appraised, whereas dedications of the altar were not included in the law of being presented and appraised. And both21 admit that according to R. Simeon, the dedications for the repairs of the Temple were not included in the law of being presented and appraised, whereas dedications for the Temple were included in the law of being set down and appraised.22 And [both]21 admit that according to all the authorities concerned,23 an animal blemished from the beginning [before dedication], is not included in the law of being presented and appraised.24

We have learnt: R. SIMEON SAYS, DEDICATIONS FOR THE REPAIRS OF THE TEMPLE WHICH DIED ARE REDEEMED. Now this is quite correct according to R. Johanan who says that, according to the Rabbis, both [dedications for the altar] and [dedications for the repair of the Temple] are included in the law of being presented and appraised. There is need therefore for R. Simeon to explain that dedications for the repairs of the Temple which died are redeemed.25 But according to Resh Lakish, what need is there for R. Simeon to explain this? Let him say: If they die, they are redeemed?26 - Resh Lakish can answer you: R. Simeon did not know what the first Tanna [in the Mishnah] meant.27 And this is what he said to him: If you refer to dedications for the altar,28 I agree with you;29 if you refer to dedications for the repairs of the Temple, if they die they are redeemed.30

It has been taught according to R. Johanan: Scripture says, And if it be any unclean beast of which they may not bring an offering,31 the text refers to blemished animals which were redeemed. You say that the text refers to blemished animals, perhaps it is not so and it refers to an unclean animal? When, however, it says: And if it be of an unclean beast, then he shall redeem it according to thy estimation,32 the case of an unclean animal is thus already mentioned.

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(1) Who gives the necessary permission to kill the burnt-offering without redemption, but no money is given to the Temple treasurer. Now since the holiness in respect of repairs of the Temple has no effect on dedications for the altar, how much less does herem take effect on dedications for the altar, since R. Huna above, who holds that dedications for the repairs of the Temple take effect on dedications for the altar, yet maintains that herem for priests has no effect on dedications for the altar. How much more then will 'Ulla, who holds that dedications for the repair of the Temple have no effect on dedications for the altar, maintain that herem will have no effect on dedications for the altar. This will therefore refute 'Ulla's opinion above where he interprets the text 'every devoted thing, as teaching that herem has effect even on the most holy things, i.e., dedications for the altar (R. Gershom).
(2) Which left over the case of dedications for the altar which were designated as herem, implying that the action is valid.
(3) But, according to the Torah, there is only the waiting for the Temple treasurer, for 'Ulla's explanation above is only according to Rabbinical requirement, the text adduced in this connection being a mere support for the Rabbinical enactment.
(4) The main purpose of the text 'every devoted thing' is, however, to include the case of herem for priests as being subject to the law of sacrilege, interpreting the text thus: 'Every devoted thing belongs to the Lord', i.e., if one used it unlawfully there is sacrilege.
(5) 'Every devoted thing'.
(6) Lev. V, 15.
(7) Lev. III, 16.
(8) The sacrificial parts burnt on the altar.
(9) And from Rabbi's text R. Jannai also infers the cases of the most holy dedications as liable to the law of sacrilege, since Scripture says, 'All fat' (v. Rashi).
(10) Lev. VI, 18 and VII. 1, resp.
(11) I.e., as stated above, if it is a neder he gives their full value to the Temple treasurer, and if a nedabah he gives a consideration (R. Gershom).
(12) The Baraitha which says, 'One must not kill, etc.'.
(13) Without redemption.
(14) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(15) Either the animal itself or its wool.
(16) Once on account of dedications for the altar and again on account of its being an object dedicated for its value for the repairs of the Temple.
(17) Since the holiness for the repairs of the Temple only attaches to it according to a Rabbinical enactment.
(18) If the subsequent dedication for the repairs of the Temple were by enactment of the Torah, then there would be two transgressions of the law of sacrilege.
(19) Before the priest. Lit., 'made to stand'.
(20) By the priest. And since this cannot be done after death, therefore they are not redeemed but buried, and this applies to all kinds of dedications.
(21) R. Johanan and Resh Lakish.
(22) And the Mishnah when it says: Dedications for the repairs of the Temple are burnt, means only dedications for the repairs of the Temple but not dedications for the altar.
(23) The Rabbis and R. Simeon.
(24) Referring to dedications for the altar, since as regards dedications for repairs for the Temple, it is immaterial whether the blemish occurred before the dedication or after the dedication, for this dedication has effect even on wood and stone (Rashi and Tosaf.).
(25) For otherwise if he had not stated, 'If they died, they are buried', I might have thought that it refers to both dedications, since the Rabbis also deal with both forms of dedication.
(26) And I should have known that he refers only to dedications for the repairs of the Temple, since the Mishnah is not concerned with dedications for the altar, whether as regards their redemption or their burial.
(27) To what kind of dedication the Rabbis alluded.
(28) That the dedication requires to be presented and appraised.
(29) And therefore they are buried.
(30) As these are not included in the law of being presented and appraised.
(31) Lev. XXVII, 11.
(32) Ibid. 27.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 33a

How therefore do I explain the text: And if it be any unclean beast of which they may not bring an offering unto the Lord?1 It refers to blemished animals [which were redeemed]. One might think that they may be redeemed on account of a transitory blemish. The text, however, states: 'Of which they may not bring an offering', thus referring to a sacrifice which is not offered at all,2 to the exclusion of this3 which is not offered to-day but to-morrow [maybe]. And the Divine Law says the sacrifice requires to be presented and appraised.4

R. Giddal reported in the name of Rab: What is the reason of Resh Lakish in saying that according to the Rabbis dedications for the altar are included in the law of being presented and appraised, whereas dedications for the repairs of the Temple are not included in the law of being presented and appraised? Because Scripture says: And the priest shall value it whether it be good or bad.5 Now what is the kind of dedication where there is no difference between 'good' [an unblemished animal] and 'bad' [a blemished animal]? You must admit that it is dedications for the repairs of the Temple and Scripture says 'it', thus excluding dedications for the altar.6 And what will the text 'it' exclude according to the opinion of R. Johanan? - It excludes an animal blemished from the beginning.7 And according to the Tanna of the School of Levi who says that even an animal blemished from the beginning is included in the law of being presented and appraised - for Levi taught: All sacrifices are included in the law of being presented and appraised, even an animal blemished from the beginning. And Levi himself taught the same in his Baraitha:8 Even a beast and even birds9 - [what then does the word 'it' exclude?]10 - It is indeed a question.

Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab: What is the reason of R. Simeon in saying that dedications for the altar are included in the law of being presented and appraised, whereas dedications for the repairs of the Temple are not? Because Scripture says: 'And the priest shall value it whether it be good or bad'.11 Now what is the kind of dedication in which there is a difference between 'good' [an unblemished animal] and 'bad' [a blemished one]? You must admit it is dedications for the altar, and Scripture says, 'it', thus excluding the case of dedications for the repairs of the Temple. If so,12 the text should read 'between good and bad'?13 - This remains a difficulty.

An objection was raised: If they die unblemished they are buried,14 if blemished they are redeemed. This refers only to dedications for the altar.15 But dedications for repairs of the Temple,16 whether they are unblemished or blemished, are buried. R. Simeon, however, says: In the case of both dedication for the altar and dedication for the repairs of the Temple, if unblemished they are buried,17 if blemished they are redeemed. Shall we say that this refutes R. Johanan from the first clause?18 - R. Johanan can answer you: We are dealing here with an animal which became blemished from the beginning.19 It also stands to reason.20 For if you say that the case is where their dedication preceded their blemish,21 why does not R. Simeon dispute in that connection?22 Hence you must [must you not] say that the case here is of an animal blemished from the beginning.23 But then are we to say that this refutes Resh Lakish?24 Resh Lakish will explain [the Baraitha]25 as dealing with a case where their dedication was prior to their blemish.26 If so, let R. Simeon dispute with reference to it?27 - Resh Lakish reverses [the names of the authorities in the Baraitha] and asks a question from another Baraitha28 [as follows]: If they die, whether unblemished or blemished, they are buried. This applies29 to dedications for the repairs of the Temple, but dedications for the altar are redeemed.30 R. Simeon says: If [they died] unblemished they are buried, if blemished they are redeemed.31 Shall we say that R. Johanan can be refuted from the latter clause of the teaching [of the former Tanna]?32 - R. Johanan can answer you: We are dealing here with an animal blemished from the beginning.33 It stands to reason.34 For if you say that it is a case of where their dedication preceded the blemish, why does not R. Simeon dispute with reference to it?35 Shall we say that this refutes Resh Lakish?36 - Resh Lakish will answer you: We are dealing here with a case where their dedication preceded their blemish.37 But why does not R. Simeon differ with reference to it?38 - Resh Lakish can answer you: R. Simeon does indeed differ.39

Said R. Jeremiah to R. Zera: According to Resh Lakish, who says that according to the Rabbis dedications for the altar are not included in the law of being presented and appraised, since [the Baraitha above] states with reference to dedications for the altar

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(1) The reading in Tosaf.
(2) I.e., an animal with a permanent blemish.
(3) An animal with a transitory blemish.
(4) Since immediately after Scripture says: 'Then he shall present it before the priest and the priest shall value it'. And this text certainly refers to dedications for the altar, since a permanent blemish is required for redemption, for if it refers to dedications for the repairs of the Temple, what difference is there between an unblemished and a blemished animal, as even an unblemished animal is redeemed in such circumstances? Consequently we see that dedications for the altar are also included in the law of being presented and appraised according to the view of the Rabbis in the Mishnah. For this Baraitha is the opinion of the Rabbis and an anonymous view in the Sifra is that of R. Judah, the disputant of R. Simeon. Thus the Baraitha will be according to the opinion of R. Johanan alone. Now from here we learn the law of dedications for the altar, according to the Rabbis, and from the Mishnah we learn the law of dedications for the repairs of the Temple. For since R. Simeon said in the Mishnah that dedications for repairs of the Temple are redeemed, this implies that according to the Rabbis they are buried (Rashi).
(5) Lev. XXVII, 12. Implying both unblemished and blemished as being on a par.
(6) And the text, 'And the priest shall value it' will not therefore refer to the previous v. 12, since the latter deals with dedications for the altar.
(7) Prior to the dedication. R. Johanan certainly holds that the text, 'Whether it be good or bad' refers to dedications for the repairs of the Temple. Nevertheless the text, 'And the priest shall value it' refers both to the text, 'Of which they do not offer', which we explained above as dealing with dedications for the altar and to the later text, 'Whether it be good etc.', which deals with dedications for the repairs of the Temple. And the text 'it' excludes an animal blemished from the beginning from being dedicated for the altar. And, according to Resh Lakish, there is no need to exclude the case of an animal blemished from the beginning from the law of being presented and appraised, since according to his opinion, the Rabbis hold that dedications for the altar are not, included in the law of being presented and appraised, even if the dedication preceded the blemish, and how much more so is this the case with an animal blemished from the beginning.
(8) Levi compiled a collection of Baraithas.
(9) E.g., geese and hens which are not fit for the altar (Rashi). He causes them to be invested with the holiness of the repairs for the Temple, as they have not any bodily holiness for the altar (Tosaf.).
(10) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(11) V. n. 4, p. 241.
(12) If the text deals with the dedications for the altar.
(13) Which would have implied that there is a difference between good and bad. The text, Whether it be good or bad, however, implies that whether blemished or unblemished they are both alike.
(14) Even those which are not included in the law of being presented and appraised. Where they died unblemished, the Rabbis gave them an advantage, since they were fit for the altar.
(15) Presumably because they are not included in the law of being presented and appraised.
(16) Which are included in the law of being presented and appraised.
(17) Since they possessed the advantage of being fit for the altar.
(18) Of this Baraitha, which states that according to the Rabbis dedications for the altar are redeemed.
(19) And therefore they are redeemed, whereas in the case of dedications for the repairs of the Temple, they are buried since there is no difference between an animal blemished before dedication or after dedication.
(20) That the Baraitha is dealing with an animal blemished from the beginning.
(21) And the Baraitha says, according to the Rabbis, that they are redeemed, the reason being as Resh Lakish explains, because dedications for the altar are not included in the law of being presented and appraised.
(22) And say: Dedications for the altar are buried, since according to R. Simeon it is the opinion of all that dedications for the altar are included in the law of being presented and appraised (R. Gershom).
(23) Since therefore R. Simeon does not dispute on this point we can infer that the Baraitha is dealing with an animal blemished from the beginning, and therefore according to the Rabbis, dedications for the altar are redeemed and dedications for the repairs of the Temple are buried, and according to R. Simeon, even dedications for the repairs of the Temple are also redeemed, since these are not included in the law of being presented and appraised.
(24) We see that the Baraitha deals with the case of an animal blemished from the beginning and we can therefore say that the reason why the Rabbis hold that the animals are redeemed is because the blemish preceded the dedication, but if the dedication preceded the blemish, then even the Rabbis will hold that they are buried. This would be unlike the opinion of Resh Lakish who holds that dedications for the altar are not included in the law of being presented and appraised.
(25) Where the Rabbis say: And blemished animals are redeemed.
(26) And the reason of the Rabbis is because dedications for the altar were not included in the law of being presented and appraised.
(27) I.e., dedications for the altar, and say that they are burnt according to the view of Resh Lakish? Why then does R. Simeon say that dedications for the altar as well as dedications for the repair of the Temple are redeemed?
(28) Heb. Mekilta, the name by which the Halachic Midrash on Exodus is now known.
(29) The teaching of the former Tanna that blemished animals are buried.
(30) Not being included in the law of being presented and appraised.
(31) Referring to dedications for the altar, concerning which the first Tanna says that they are buried.
(32) Where he says: But dedications for the altar are redeemed, whereas according to R. Johanan, since being presented and appraised are required, they are buried.
(33) Which is not included in the law of being presented and appraised, and therefore is redeemed. And dedications for the repairs of the Temple are buried, since in that case there is no difference whether a blemish occurred previous to dedication or after.
(34) That the case is as explained.
(35) And say two things: Dedications for the repairs of the Temple are redeemed and dedications for the altar are buried. Since therefore he only differs as regards dedications for the repairs of the Temple, holding that they are redeemed, and is silent with regard to dedications for the altar which according to the Rabbis are redeemed, this proves that we are dealing with animals blemished from the beginning, i.e., before dedication (Rashi).
(36) Since if we interpret the Baraitha as dealing with animals blemished from the beginning, we can infer from the words of the Rabbis that where the blemish occurred after dedication, dedications for the altar are buried, whereas according to Resh Lakish, the Rabbis hold that the dedications for the altar are not included in the law of being presented and appraised, and therefore should be redeemed.
(37) And therefore the Rabbis say that dedications for the altar are redeemed.
(38) And say that dedications for the altar are buried.
(39) R. Simeon not only differs with the Rabbis with reference to dedications for the repairs of the Temple, maintaining that they are redeemed, but also with reference to dedications for the altar, holding that they are buried, since they require being presented and appraised in accordance with the interpretation of Resh Lakish.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 33b

that blemished animals are redeemed and we explained this [as being a case] where dedications preceded their blemish, may we infer from here that we may redeem [disqualified] dedicated animals in order to give them for food to dogs?1 - [No,] the case here2 is where he transgressed and killed them [before redemption]3 as it has been taught: As regards animals in which a blemish occurred and which he killed, R. Meir says: They shall be buried,4 whereas the Sages say they are redeemed.5

Said R. Jeremiah to R. Zera: According to R. Simeon, who says that dedications for the repairs of the Temple were not included in the law of being presented and appraised, why are unblemished dedicated animals buried?6 - It is because they are fit to be offered,7 as it has been taught: If one caused unblemished animals to be invested [with the holiness of] dedications for the repairs of the Temple, when they are redeemed [for their value] they can only be redeemed in order to be used on the altar, since everything which is fit for use on the altar is never released from the lien of the altar.

Said R. Papa to Abaye [or according to another version, to Raba]: According to R. Johanan who explains [the Baraitha above] as dealing with the case of an animal blemished from the beginning,8 which would imply that all the authorities [in the Baraitha] hold that an animal blemished from the beginning is not included in the law of being presented and appraised - is it indeed not [included]? Have we not learnt: All dedicated animals whose permanent blemish preceded their dedication, if redeemed are subject to the law of the firstling and the priestly gifts;9 they become hullin to be shorn and worked after their dedication; their issue and milk are permitted after their dedication;10 if one kills them without [the Temple court] he does not incur any guilt; they do not effect exchange; and if they die, they are redeemed.11 And Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab:12 This13 is the teaching of R. Simeon who says that dedications for the altar are included in the law of being presented and appraised, whereas dedications for the repairs of the Temple are not,14 as we have learnt: R. Simeon says, Animals dedicated for the repairs of the Temple, if they die are redeemed; but R. Simeon admits that a dedicated animal blemished from the beginning is redeemed. What is the reason? Scripture says, 'it',15 the word 'it' excluding the case of a dedicated animal blemished from the beginning. The Sages, however, say: Even a dedicated animal blemished from the beginning is also included in the law of being presented and appraised!16 - He [Abaye]17 said to him [R, Papa]: Whose opinion do the Sages represent? That of the Tanna of the School of Levi.18 If so, why does Rab say above: 'This is the opinion of R. Simeon' and nothing more? Should he not have said: This is the opinion of R. Simeon and [the Rabbis] who differ from him?19 - He [Abaye] answered him: The reason why he [Rab] does not state this is because he holds the opinion of Resh Lakish who says that, according to the Rabbis, dedications for the repairs of the Temple are included in the law of being presented and appraised, whereas dedications for the altar are not,20 the first clause [of the cited Mishnah] saying: And if they die they are redeemed;21 while the latter clause [of the Mishnah says]: If they22 die they are buried.23 And if you prefer [another solution] I may say: Rab holds the opinion of R. Johanan;24 and as for your difficulty that [Rab] should have stated: 'This is the teaching of R. Simeon and [the Rabbis] who differ from him', read here: This is the opinion of R. Simeon and the Rabbis who differ from him.25

MISHNAH. AND THE FOLLOWING ARE THE THINGS WHICH ARE TO BE BURIED:26 IF A DEDICATED ANIMAL HAD AN UNTIMELY BIRTH IT IS TO BE BURIED;27 IF A DEDICATED ANIMAL HAD AN AFTERBIRTH IT28 IS TO BE BURIED.29 AN OX WHICH WAS CONDEMNED TO BE STONED;30 THE HEIFER WHOSE NECK WAS BROKEN; THE BIRDS [BROUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURIFICATION] OF A LEPER;31 THE HAIR OF A NAZIRITE;32 THE FIRSTBIRTH OF AN ASS;33 [A MIXTURE OF] MEAT AND MILK; AND HULLIN WHICH WERE KILLED IN THE TEMPLE COURT. R. SIMEON HOWEVER SAYS: HULLIN WHICH WERE KILLED IN THE TEMPLE COURT ARE TO BE BURNT.34 AND LIKEWISE [SAYS R. SIMEON] AN ANIMAL OF CHASE WHICH WAS KILLED IN THE TEMPLE COURT [IS ALSO BURNT].35 AND THE FOLLOWING ARE TO BE BURNT: LEAVENED BREAD ON PASSOVER IS TO BE BURNT; UNCLEAN TERUMAH; 'ORLAH;36 MIXED SEEDS IN THE VINEYARD;37 THAT38 WHICH IT IS CUSTOMARY TO BURN39 IS TO BE BURNT AND THAT WHICH IT IS CUSTOMARY TO BURY40 IS TO BE BURIED. WE MAY BURN41 THE BREAD AND OIL OF [UNCLEAN] TERUMAH.42 ALL DEDICATED ANIMALS WHICH WERE KILLED [WITH THE INTENTION OF BEING EATEN] BEYOND THE ALLOTTED TIME OR BEYOND THE ALLOTTED PLACE43 ARE TO BE BURNT.

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(1) For since we say that dead animals which are not fit for an Israelite to eat are redeemed, we can only infer that the redemption is meant for dogs. Now according to R. Johanan who explains the Baraitha as referring to a case of an animal blemished from the beginning, before dedication, it does not matter to us if the animal is redeemed for dogs to eat, as no physical holiness is possessed by an animal in such circumstances.
(2) In the Baraitha which says: 'If they died'. This does not actually mean that they died and thus became unfit for Jewish consumption.
(3) They are therefore redeemed and are fit to be eaten.
(4) In accordance with the opinion of R. Simeon who says that dedications for the altar are included in the law of presentation and valuation, and since this cannot be carried out now, after being killed, the animal is buried.
(5) Since they were not included in the law of presentation and valuation.
(6) For since the law of being presented etc. does not apply to them, they should be redeemed.
(7) And therefore a greater stringency was imposed on them.
(8) And for this reason R. Simeon does not differ from the Rabbis in the Baraitha, agreeing that dedications for the altar are redeemed.
(9) The shoulder, cheeks and maw.
(10) Even if the pregnancy took place before their redemption and they were born after the redemption.
(11) Bek. 14a.
(12) With reference to the Mishnah just cited.
(13) The statement that they are redeemed.
(14) And a dedicated animal blemished from the beginning is like an animal dedicated for the repairs of the Temple.
(15) Contained in a Scriptural verse (Lev. XXVII, 12) and the priest shall value it, etc.
(16) We see therefore that, according to the Sages, a dedicated animal blemished from the beginning is included in the law of presentation and valuation, contrary to the opinion of R. Johanan. This creates no difficulty according to Resh Lakish, since he explains the Baraitha above as dealing with a case of an unblemished animal which became blemished after dedication. We can therefore say that a dedicated animal blemished from the outset is on a par with a dedication for the repairs of the Temple, for although he dedicated it for the altar, nevertheless it is like a dedication for the repairs of the Temple, being holy only for its value and it is included in the law of presentation and valuation according to the Rabbis (Rashi).
(17) Or, according to the other version, Raba.
(18) but not of the Rabbis who differ from R. Simeon.
(19) Since the Rabbis who dispute with him also agree that a dedicated animal blemished from the beginning, is not included in the law of presentation and valuation.
(20) And therefore the whole Mishnah from Bek. could not have been explained as representing the views of the Rabbis.
(21) And this opinion will be held even by the Rabbis, since the case dealt with there is of an animal which was blemished from the beginning.
(22) Viz., dedicated animals whose dedication preceded their blemish.
(23) This opinion, according to Resh Lakish, would not be held by the Rabbis. The Mishnah thus will not be altogether the opinion of the Rabbis and therefore Rab could not have taught: This is the opinion of R. Simeon and those who differ with him.
(24) That both dedications for the altar and dedications for the repairs of the Temple require to be presented and appraised, except for the case of an animal blemished from the outset, and both the first and second clauses of the Mishnah in Bek. will thus represent the opinion of the Rabbis as well as of R. Simeon.
(25) So Sh. Mek.; cur. edd., 'say indeed so'.
(26) Because they are forbidden to be used in any way.
(27) Viz., the untimely birth.
(28) The afterbirth.
(29) Because we maintain that there can be no afterbirth without an embryo.
(30) For killing a man.
(31) This refers to the bird which was killed for purification, but the other bird after being sent away, may even be eaten.
(32) Who became ritually unclean and had to commence afresh to count the period of his Nazirite vow. But the hair of a clean Nazirite who completed the period of his vow is burnt under the pot where his sacrifices boiled.
(33) Whether its body or its hair.
(34) For if we say that they are buried, there is a danger that since one cannot tell whether they are holy or hullin, it may be said that in all cases of disqualified dedications it is permissible to bury them, whereas the law is that disqualified dedications are burnt.
(35) For although one cannot mistake such an animal for a consecrated animal, as it cannot be dedicated for the altar, we still burn it if it was killed in the Temple court on account of an animal of hullin which is burnt in similar circumstances.
(36) The fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting is called 'orlah (uncircumcision), and the law of burying is inferred from kil'ayim (v. Rashi).
(37) V. Deut. XXII, 9.
(38) This sentence refers to 'orlah and the mixture of seeds in a vineyard.
(39) I.e., foods.
(40) I.e., liquids.
(41) To derive a benefit therefrom.
(42) Although the case of unclean terumah is mentioned above together with homes, leavened bread on Passover, as being burnt, the Mishnah informs us here that in the case of terumah we may derive a benefit from it.
(43) Or if the blood was intended to be received or sprinkled beyond the allotted time etc.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 34a

A GUILT-OFFERING OFFERED BY ONE IN DOUBT [AS TO WHETHER HE HAS COMMITTED A SINFUL ACT] IS TO BE BURNT.1 R. JUDAH, HOWEVER, SAYS: IT IS TO BE BURIED. A SIN-OFFERING OF A BIRD THAT IS BROUGHT FOR A DOUBT2 IS BURNT.3 R. JUDAH, HOWEVER, SAYS: IT IS CAST INTO THE SEWER.4 ALL THINGS REQUIRING TO BE BURIED MUST NOT BE BURNT, AND ALL THINGS WHICH REQUIRE TO BE BURNT MUST NOT BE BURIED.5 R. JUDAH SAYS: IF ONE WISHES TO BE STRINGENT WITH HIMSELF, TO BURN THINGS WHICH ARE BURIED, HE IS PERMITTED TO DO SO. THEY SAID TO HIM: IT IS NOT ALLOWED TO CHANGE.

GEMARA. Tobi6 raised an objection to R. Nahman: We have learnt: THE HAIR OF A NAZIRITE IS BURIED. This contradicts the following: If one weaves the size of a sit7 from the wool of a firstling animal8 in a garment, the garment is to be burnt; [if one weaves] from the hair of a Nazirite and [from the hair of the] firstbirth of an ass in a sack,9 the sack is to be burnt10 - He [R. Nahman] said to him [Tobi]: Here,11 we are dealing with a [ritually] unclean Nazirite,12 and there,13 we are dealing with a [ritually] clean Nazirite.14 He [Tobi] said to him [R. Nahman]: You have accounted for the disagreement between the case of [the hair of] a Nazirite [mentioned in our Mishnah] and the case of [the hair of] a Nazirite [mentioned in the other]. But you have still to account for the difference between the teaching concerning the firstbirth of an ass [in our Mishnah] and the teaching concerning the firstbirth of an ass [mentioned in the other]? He [R. Nahman] was [at first] silent and said nothing at all to him, but [thereupon] he said to him: Have you heard Something with reference to this matter? - He [Tobi] replied to him: Thus said R. Shesheth: Here,15 we are dealing with a sack,16 and there,17 with hair.18 It has also been stated: Said R. Jose son of R. Hanina: Here we are dealing with a sack and there we are dealing with hair. R. Eleazar says: Here19 we are dealing with a [ritually] clean Nazirite20 and there21 we are dealing with a [ritually] unclean Nazirite.22 He [R. Nahman] asked him: Why should not the forbidden hair be neutralized in the larger size of the sack?23 - Said R. Papa: We suppose that he wove [the figure of] a bird.24 If [he indeed wove the figure of] a bird, why cannot he pull out [the forbidden hair]?25 - Said R. Jeremiah: [The cited Mishnah] represents26 the view of R. Judah, who holds that if one wishes to be stringent with himself so as to burn the things which only require to be buried, he is permitted to do so. He said to him: We ask why you should not pull out [the forbidden hairs] from the sack27 and you explain [the cited Mishnah] as representing the view of R. Judah!28 - This is what I mean: If it is possible to pull out [the forbidden hair] it is better,29 but if not,30 [the cited Mishnah]31 may be explained as representing the opinion of R. Judah who says that if he wishes to be stringent with himself so as to burn things which only require to be buried, he is permitted to do so.

AND THE FOLLOWING ARE TO BE BURNT. The Master said: LEAVENED BREAD ON PASSOVER IS BURNT. The Tanna [of our Mishnah] states here anonymously the opinion of R. Judah who said: The removal of unleavened bread is only through fire.

UNCLEAN TERUMAH, 'ORLAH, MIXED SEEDS IN THE VINEYARD. [THAT WHICH IT IS CUSTOMARY etc.]. How is this explained? Food for burning and liquids for burial.32

A SIN-OFFERING OF A BIRD etc. It has been taught: Said R. Judah, A sin-offering of a bird which is brought in virtue of a doubt, is cast into the sewer. He cuts it, limb by limb, and throws it into the sewer and it rolls and goes down to the Brook of Kidron.

ALL THINGS WHICH ARE BURIED MUST NOT BE BURNT etc. What is the reason?33 Because the ashes of things which are buried are forbidden [to be used], whereas the ashes of things which are burnt are permitted [to be used].34 But are the ashes of things which are buried forbidden [to be used]? Has it not been taught: The blood of a niddah35 and the flesh of a corpse which has crumbled36 are ritually clean? Now does this not mean 'clean' and permitted [to be used]?37 - No, it means 'clean' but forbidden [to be used].

R. Phinehas raised an objection: The crop and the plumage of the burnt-offering of a bird whose blood has been squeezed38 are not subject to the law of sacrilege.39 Now does this not mean that they are not subject to the law of sacrilege and are permitted [to be used]?40 - No, it means that they are not subject to the law of sacrilege but are forbidden to be used. But are the ashes of things consecrated permitted to be used? Has it not been taught: The ashes of all things which are burnt41 are permitted to be used42 save the ashes of asherah,43 and the ashes of consecrated objects are always forbidden. (And the reason44 why the Tanna in the Baraitha here does not state both cases together45 is because asherah can be made void by a heathen46 whereas consecrated objects can never be made void.) At any rate the Baraitha states that the ashes of consecrated objects are always forbidden? - Said Rami b. Hama: The case here47 is where e.g., a fire broke out [of itself] among consecrated wood, seeing48 that there was nobody who could be guilty of sacrilege for the ashes to become hullin.49 R. Shmaya says: The Baraitha50 above refers to the ashes which are separated51 and which are always forbidden [to be used]. For it has been taught: [Scripture says:] And he shall put it,52 meaning 'he shall put it' quietly;53 'he shall put it'54 - the whole of it [the handful]: and 'he shall put it' - that he must not scatter it.55

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(1) If he killed it, and before the sprinkling of the blood it became known to him that he had not sinned. It is therefore like a disqualified sacrifice, the law of which is that it is to be burnt. But if he did not become aware that he had not sinned, it may be eaten, as is the case with other guilt-offerings (Rashi).
(2) As to whether the embryo of a woman who had an untimely birth was of such a nature as to require her to bring the usual sin-offering after childbirth. For, since the sin-offering of a woman after childbirth is a bird, she can bring it even if there is a doubt concerning the untimely birth, as it does not matter if the sprinkling is performed on behalf of a doubtful case, since in any case the sin-offering is not eaten for fear that the untimely birth was not a genuine embryo and therefore the bird would be hullin, which by reason of the pinching of its neck, has become nebelah (v. Glos.).
(3) As is the case with other disqualified dedications.
(4) For since the bird is tender it decays and the flow of the water in the sewer is not obstructed.
(5) Lest one might find them and forget the reason for their burial and eat them.
(6) For reading v. Sh. Mek.
(7) The distance between the tip of the thumb and that of the index finger when held apart.
(8) Which is forbidden to be used, being from a dedicated animal.
(9) In connection with wool, the Baraitha uses the word 'garment' and in connection with hair, it uses the word 'sack', which in both cases are the appropriate terms.
(10) 'Orlah III, 3. This is contrary to our Mishnah.
(11) Our Mishnah which speaks of burying the hair of a Nazirite.
(12) Rashi says here that the reason is because Scripture does not mention that burial is required in the case of the hair of an unclean Nazirite, as it does with reference to a clean Nazirite. Tosaf., however, (Nazir 45a) raises the question how we know that the hair of an unclean Nazirite is buried.
(13) In 'Orlah.
(14) Since Scripture mentions burning: And put it in the fire (Num. VI, 18).
(15) The Mishnah which speaks of burning.
(16) Where he wove the hair of a Nazirite or of the firstbirth of an ass into a sack. Now if you say the sack is only buried, someone may come and derive benefit therefrom, seeing that it is not destroyed until after a time.
(17) Our Mishnah which speaks of burying.
(18) Where the hair was not woven into any article. And both Mishnahs refer either to an unclean or clean Nazirite.
(19) In 'Orlah.
(20) And therefore the hair is burnt as Scripture enjoins in Num. VI, 18.
(21) Our Mishnah.
(22) And therefore the hair of a Nazirite is buried. And in both cases we are dealing with the weaving of the forbidden hair in the sack (Rashi).
(23) Since the statement: 'If one weaves the hair of a Nazirite into a sack' implies something small in a large thing.
(24) From the forbidden hair of the Nazirite in the sack, thus making the sack more valuable by decorating it. The hair is therefore not neutralized in the larger size of the sack and the sack is consequently burnt.
(25) And why not therefore bury the sack and not burn it?
(26) We assume for the moment that we adopt a stringent attitude and for this reason the Mishnah says that the sack is burnt (Rashi).
(27) Since there is here a remedy.
(28) Where there is a way out, does R. Judah hold that one may burn things which only require burial?
(29) That the sack should not be burnt (R. Gershom). Tosaf. comments here that the passage does not refer at all to the question of neutralizing the forbidden hair, but has reference to the incongruity between the Mishnah in 'Orlah and our Mishnah above.
(30) The Wilna Gaon Glosses have the version ואמינא לך which in an abbreviated form is וא ל 'but I tell you'.
(31) Which speaks of burning, contrary to our Mishnah above.
(32) As liquids cannot be burnt.
(33) That things which are buried must not be burnt.
(34) If therefore he burns things which are to be buried, he might use the ashes which are forbidden.
(35) A menstruant woman.
(36) And became dust. Now these things require to be buried.
(37) We therefore see that the ashes of things which are buried are permitted to be used.
(38) On the wall of the altar, the ritual in connection with a burnt-offering having been carried out.
(39) These are things which are buried.
(40) So that one may directly dig them up and use them. We therefore see that the ashes of buried things are permitted.
(41) E.g., leaven on passover, 'orlah, etc.
(42) In order to wash clothes therewith (Rashi).
(43) Trees used as objects of idolatry.
(44) The Gemara proceeds to explain the Baraitha just quoted before completing the question.
(45) Those of asherah and consecrated objects by saying: Save for the ashes of asherah and consecrated objects, instead of: 'Save for the ashes of asherah, and the ashes of etc.', seeing that both are forbidden.
(46) A heathen can nullify objects of idolatry belonging to a heathen.
(47) In the Baraitha where it says that the ashes of consecrated objects are forbidden.
(48) For reading v. sh. Mek.
(49) But if a man deliberately burnt consecrated wood, the ashes became hullin, by the unlawful use of consecrated property.
(50) The Baraitha which says that the ashes of consecrated objects are forbidden.
(51) The handful of ashes taken away by the priest every morning and which he puts near the altar.
(52) Le;. VI, 3.
(53) I.e., not throw the ashes but put them near the altar, in an orderly manner, since Scripture does not say 'he shall cast it'.
(54) Since the Torah could have said: 'And he shall put' without the objective suffix 'it' (R. Gershom).
(55) This is an obvious inference, after the previous interpretations. We therefore see that these ashes require to be hidden away and, this being the case, it is forbidden to benefit from them. But other ashes of consecrated objects are permitted to be used.

 


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