The Babylonian Talmud

Temurah

 

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 2a

CHAPTER 1

MISHNAH. ALL PERSONS CAN EXCHANGE,1 MEN AS WELL AS WOMEN; NOT THAT ONE IS PERMITTED TO EXCHANGE,2 BUT THAT IF ONE DID SO, THE SUBSTITUTE IS SACRED,3 AND HE RECEIVES FORTY LASHES.4

GEMARA. [The Mishnah] contains a contradiction in itself. You say: ALL PERSONS CAN EXCHANGE, implying that it is [permissible to exchange in the first instance] and [then it says]: NOT THAT ONE IS PERMITTED TO EXCHANGE, implying, only after it has been done?5 - But how can you understand it that ALL PERSONS CAN EXCHANGE in the first instance! In that case, instead of bringing a contradiction from the Mishnah, you could rather bring it from the Scriptural verse, since it says: He shall not alter it nor change it!6 Rab Judah therefore said: What [the Mishnah] means is this: ALL PERSONS CAN EFFECT AN EXCHANGE,7 MEN AS WELL AS WOMEN;8 NOT THAT ONE IS PERMITTED TO EXCHANGE, BUT THAT IF ONE DID SO, THE SUBSTITUTE IS SACRED, AND HE RECEIVES FORTY LASHES.

What additional case is included by [the word] ALL?9 - It includes the case of an heir,10 and [the Mishnah] will not be in accordance with the view of R. Judah,11 for it has been taught:12 An heir can lay hands [on the head of a sacrifice];13 an heir can effect exchange [with his father's dedication]. This is the teaching of R. Meir; whereas R. Judah says: An heir cannot lay hands [on the head of a sacrifice] nor can an heir effect exchange [with his father's dedication]. What is R. Judah's reason? - We infer the case of a preliminary act in the dedication14 from the case of a final act in the dedication.15 Just as in the case of the final act, an heir cannot lay hands [on the head of a sacrifice], so in the case of the preliminary act, an heir cannot effect exchange [with his father's dedication]. And how do we know this in the case of laying on of hands itself?16 - Three times the expression his offerings17 is used: One [intimates that] 'his offering' [requires laying on of hands], but not that of a gentile. One [that] 'his offering', but not that of his fellow. And one 'his offering' but not his father's dedication.18 But as for R. Meir, who rules that an heir can effect exchange [with his father's dedication], surely 'his offering' is written?19 - He needs this in order to include partners in a sacrifice20 as requiring to perform laying on of hands. And [what does] R. Judah] [say to this]?21 - He does not hold that partners in a sacrifice must perform laying on of hands.22 What is the reason? Because their sacrifice is not designated.23 Or if you prefer [another solution] I may say that R. Judah may still be of the opinion [that partners in a sacrifice must perform laying on of hands] but he derives the cases both of the sacrifice of a gentile and a fellow's sacrifice24 from the one text.25 There is left over therefore one text, from which we derive that partners in a sacrifice must perform laying on of hands.26 And as to R. Meir, who rules that an heir can exchange [with his father's dedication] what is his reason? - He can tell you: [Scripture says:] And if he shall at all change,27 to intimate that an heir can change.

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(1) This unconsecrated animal for that consecrated animal.
(2) Since Scripture says: Nor chance it (Lev. XXVII, 10).
(3) Thus both animals become sacred.
(4) For violating the prohibitory law of 'nor change it'.
(5) Is the exchange effective, but not that it is directly permissible.
(6) Ibid.
(7) So that the substituted animal becomes sacred whilst the original animal retains its sanctity.
(8) Even the exchange by a woman renders the substituted animal sacred.
(9) Besides the MEN and WOMEN actually mentioned.
(10) Who exchanges a sacrifice which his father consecrated during his lifetime.
(11) Who holds that an heir cannot effect an exchange with his father's dedication.
(12) Men. 93a; 'Ar. 2a.
(13) If the father was unable to do so during his life-time.
(14) E.g., that of exchanging.
(15) I.e., that of laying on of hands on the animal's head, which act is prior to sacrificing it.
(16) That an heir cannot perform this.
(17) And if his offering be a sacrifice of a peace-offering (Lev. III, 1). And if his offering for a sacrifice unto the Lord be of the flock (Ibid. 6). And if he offer a lamb for his offering (Ibid. 7). And in each text the law of 'laying on of hands' is laid down.
(18) R. Judah therefore deduces from here that an heir cannot lay hands on his father's dedication.
(19) Thus intimating that an heir cannot lay hands on his father's dedication.
(20) If, for example, two or three people share one sacrifice, we apply to each partner the text 'his offering' and thus they all have to lay hands on the animal prior to killing it.
(21) If the text is interpreted for this purpose, how can he infer his ruling that an heir cannot lay hands?
(22) He is of the opinion that an offering brought by partners does not require the laying on of hands.
(23) As belonging specifically to any one of the partners. Consequently R. Judah can still maintain that the text 'his offering' excludes a father's dedication from the need of the laying on of hands.
(24) As being excluded from the laying on of hands
(25) The expression 'his offering' implies the exclusion of the sacrifice by an agent, whether Jew or gentile, from the law of laying on of hands. For it cannot be said to be solely for the purpose of excluding the sacrifice of a gentile from the laying on of hands, since this is already derived from another Biblical text as explained in Men. 93a.
(26) And there still remains a third text of 'his offering' to imply that laying on of hands is not required in connection with a father's dedication, since a father's sacrifice might naturally be regarded as one's own and consequently subject to the laying on of hands. There is need therefore for a special text to inform us that this is not so.
(27) Lit., 'changing he shall change'. The reduplicated expression enables us to infer that an heir's exchange of his father's sacrifice is effective.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 2b

We infer then the case of a final act in the dedication1 from the case of a preliminary act in the dedication.2 Just as in the case of the preliminary act, an heir can effect exchange [with his father's dedication], so in the case of the final act, an heir can lay on hands. And what will R. Judah do with the text: 'And if he shall at all change'?3 - It is to include [the exchange by] a woman, and as it is taught: Since the whole context [of exchanging] speaks only of the masculine gender, as it says: He shall not alter it nor change it,4 whence do you derive that the same applies to a woman? The text therefore states:5 'And if he shall at all change',6 in order to include a woman. And whence does R. Meir7 derive that a woman [can effect an exchange]? - He derives it from the waw ['and'].8 And [what does] R. Judah [say to this]? - He does not interpret the waw.9 Now according to the view both of R. Meir and of R. Judah, the reason [why the law of substitution applies to a woman] is because Scripture expressly included the case of a woman,10 but if it had not included it, I might have thought that when she exchanged she was not punishable [with lashes].11 Surely Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab and likewise a Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael taught: [Scripture says:] When a man or woman shall commit any sin that men commit;12 Scripture thus places woman on a par with man in respect of all the penalties mentioned in the Torah! - You13 might be under the impression14 this is the case only as regards a penalty which applies equally, both to the individual and the community, but there,15 since the penalty does not apply equally in all cases, for we have learnt: A community or partners cannot effect an exchange,16 therefore in the case of a woman also if she performed an exchange she would not be punishable [with lashes]. Hence we are informed [that this is not so].

Rami b. Hama asked: Can a minor effect an exchange? What kind of case do you mean? Shall I say, it is the case of a minor who has not yet reached the stage of [legal] vows?17 Surely there should be no question about this, for since he is unable [legally] to dedicate, how can he effect an exchange? - Rather the case is that of a minor who has reached the stage of [legal] vows.18 Do we say, seeing that a Master said: [Scripture could have stated:] When a man shall utter a vow of persons. Why then does it say: If a man shall clearly utter19 a vow? It is in order to include 'a doubtful person20 next to a man' in that his dedication is valid.21 Now do we say that since he can dedicate, he can effect an exchange? Or, perhaps, since a minor is not punishable,22 he cannot effect an exchange?23 And if you were to maintain that a minor can effect an exchange, since ultimately he comes into the category of being punishable,24 can a gentile effect an exchange? Should we say, since he can legally dedicate an animal for sacrifice, as it has been taught: [Scripture says:] A man, a man [of the house of Israel].25 What need is there for Scripture to repeat 'man'? It is in order to intimate that the gentiles can make votive freewill-offerings like the Israelites;26 [do we say that] they therefore can also effect an exchange? Or perhaps since [they] never come into the category of being punishable,27 [do we say that] when an exchange is performed by them [the animal] is not sacred? - Said Raba, Come and hear: For it has been taught, No secular use may be made of the dedications of gentiles, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to them.28 Nor are [these] subject to the law of piggul,29 nothar,30 and uncleanness. [Gentiles] cannot effect an exchange, nor can they bring drink-offerings,31 but the animal offering [of a gentile] requires [the accompaniment of] drink-offerings. These are the words of R. Simeon. R. Jose said: In all [these things]32 I favour the strict view.33 This34 applies only to things dedicated for the altar,35 but with things dedicated [for their value] to be used for Temple needs, the law of sacrilege applies. At all events [the Baraitha] says: [Gentiles] cannot effect an exchange.36 And what does Rami b. Hama [say to this]?37 - My inquiry does not refer to a case where a gentile dedicates [an animal] for his own atonement.38 My inquiry has reference to a case where a gentile dedicated an animal so that an Israelite may be atoned for [by its sacrifice]. Do we go by the person who consecrates39 or by the person for whom atonement is made?40 But why not solve this question from what R. Abbuha said? For R. Abbuha reported in the name of R. Johanan: [Only] he who dedicates must add a fifth,41 and he who is to procure atonement can effect an exchange,42 and if one separates [the priestly due] from his own [grain]

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(1) The laying on of the hands which is prior to the sacrificing of the animal.
(2) The exchanging of an unconsecrated animal for a consecrated one.
(3) Why the reduplicated expression, since he holds that an heir cannot effect exchange with his father's dedication?
(4) Lev. XXVII, 10.
(5) V. supra n. 4.
(6) The reduplicated expression when the one word 'he shall change' would have sufficed.
(7) Who needs the text 'and if he shall at all change' in order to include the case of an heir.
(8) As Scripture could have said simply, 'If he shall at all change, etc.' without the 'and'.
(9) The waw in ואם does not call for a special interpretation.
(10) Stating that the exchange is effective.
(11) I.e., that her exchange is not holy.
(12) Num. V, 6.
(13) The phrase 'it is necessary' is omitted with Sh. Mek.
(14) Var. lec. (v. Rashi): You might be under the impression that this is the case, viz., that a woman is placed on a par with man with reference only to a prohibition where an action is involved (e.g., the desecration of the Sabbath etc.) but in the case of a prohibition where no action is involved (as, for example, the exchanging of an unconsecrated animal for a consecrated one, where the words themselves constitute an action) I might have thought that she is not punishable with lashes, hence we are informed otherwise.
(15) With reference to exchanging.
(16) Infra 13a.
(17) I.e., if he is less than twelve years and a day. At that age, even if he knows to whom he vows and dedicates, his word is of no importance. From the age of thirteen years and a day, however, his vows and dedications are legal, even if he is not conscious of their significance.
(18) I.e., the age of twelve years and a day, when his vows and consecrations are subject to examination as to whether he realises their import.
(19) Heb. Ki yafli (Lev. XXVII, 2).
(20) Heb. Mufla.
(21) I.e., a boy near the age of religious majority.
(22) Till the age of thirteen years and one day.
(23) For Scripture says: He shall not alter it nor change it . . . . Then it and the exchange thereof shall be holy. We therefore say anyone to whom this prohibitory law and the penalty attached thereto apply, can perform an exchange, but as the prohibition and the penalty are not relevant to a minor, therefore his exchange is not valid.
(24) With the penalties mentioned in the Torah when he attains his religious majority.
(25) Lev. XVII, 8. E.V. 'whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel'.
(26) Naz. 62a; Men. 73b.
(27) As the Biblical commands and prohibitions do not apply to them.
(28) V. Lev. V, 15ff.
(29) A sacrifice rejected in consequence of improper intention in the mind of the officiating priest, to eat it beyond the prescribed time limit, v. Glos.
(30) Portions of the sacrifice left over beyond the legal time, v. Glos.
(31) They cannot offer drink-offerings for the altar without bringing a sacrifice at the same time, unlike an Israelite.
(32) Relating to sacrilege, piggul, etc.
(33) That sacrifices of gentiles are subject to the respective laws, the only exception being drink-offerings, which they cannot bring.
(34) The teaching of the first Tanna in the above Baraitha that says: Dedications of gentiles are not subject to the law of sacrilege.
(35) I.e., an animal sacrificed.
(36) Which solves the above query of Rami b. Mama regarding a gentile.
(37) Why does he inquire, since it is explicitly mentioned in the Baraitha.
(38) Lit., 'so that a gentile may be atoned for'. There is no doubt that in such a case the gentile cannot effect an exchange, since he does not come into the category of being punishable.
(39) And the consecrator being a gentile cannot effect an exchange.
(40) Who is an Israelite and punishable and therefore an unconsecrated animal can be substituted for it, both animals thus becoming sacred.
(41) Where a man dedicates his house or field, the owner, if he is desirous of redeeming it, must add a fifth. But if a stranger redeems it, Scripture does not make it incumbent upon the redeemer to add a fifth, v. Lev. XXVII, 15.
(42) Since the animal was consecrated for his benefit we regard it as his offering, because we go by the person for whom atonement is made.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 3a

for [the untithed grain of] his fellow,1 the power of disposing of it2 belongs to him [who separated].3 What does Rami b. Hama [say to this]?4 - There,5 [as the dedication] came through the agency of an Israelite, we go by him to whom atonement is made and thus both the beginning6 and the end7 are in the hand of an Israelite. But here,8 the question is: Do you require that both the beginning and the end should remain in the control of one who can effect an exchange,9 or not?10 The question remains undecided.

The Master said: 'No secular use may be made of dedications of a gentile, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to them'. [The ruling that] no secular use may be made of them is Rabbinical,11 and that the law of sacrilege does not apply to them is Biblical. What is the reason? - It is written: If a soul commit a trespass and sin through ignorance.12 We draw an analogy between [the word] 'sin' here and sin mentioned in connection with terumah;13 and with reference to terumah it is written: The children of Israel,14 [intimating] but not gentiles.15 'Nor are these subject to the law of piggul, nothar and uncleanness ; because in connection with uncleanness it is written: Speak unto Aaron and unto his sons that they separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel16 and that they profane not My holy name, etc.;17 and we infer that nothar [does not apply to the dedications of gentiles] by means of an analogy between the word 'profaned'18 and the word 'profaned' mentioned in connection with the law of uncleanness: with reference to uncleanness it is written: 'The children of Israel and that they profane not, etc.', and in connection with nothar it is written: Therefore everyone that eateth it shall bear his iniquity because he hath profaned the hallowed things of the Lord.19 And we derive the case of piggul20 by means of an analogy between the word 'iniquity'21 and the word 'iniquity' mentioned in connection with nothar; for in connection with piggul it is written: And the soul that eateth of it shall bear its iniquity.22 And in connection with nothar it is written: Therefore everyone that eateth it shall bear his iniquity for he hath profaned the hallowed things of the Lord,23 and so in connection with all [these cases24 we apply the text] 'the children of Israel'25 but not gentiles.

'Gentiles cannot effect an exchange', because it is written: He shall not alter it nor change it,26 and earlier in the context it is written: Speak unto the children of Israel and say unto them when a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons,27 [thus referring to the children of Israel and not to gentiles]. Another version: Gentiles cannot effect an exchange. What is the reason? There is an analogy between the exchange of an animal and the tithing of animals,28 and there is also an analogy between animal tithing and the tithing of grain;29 and in connection with the tithing of grain it is written: But the tithes of the children of Israel which they offer unto the Lord;30 'the children of Israel' but not gentiles.31

'Nor can they bring drink-offerings, but the animal offering of a gentile requires [the accompaniment of] drink-offerings.These are the words of R. Simeon.' Whence is this proved? - Our Rabbis have taught: [Scripture says:] All that are home born;32 a home born33 brings drink-offerings but the gentile does not bring drink-offerings. One might think that a burnt-offering of a gentile does not require drink-offerings! The text therefore states: After this manner.34

'Said R. Jose: In all these cases I favour the strict view'. What is the reason? - The words 'unto the Lord'35 are used [in connection with the dedications of gentiles].36

'This applies only to things dedicated for the altar, but with things dedicated [for their value] to be used for Temple needs, the law of sacrilege applies'. What is the reason? - Since when we derive the law of sacrilege on the basis of the analogy of 'sin' and 'sin'37 mentioned in connection with terumah,38 there must be some resemblance to terumah which is dedicated as such.39 But with things dedicated to be used for Temple needs, which are dedicated for their value, the case is not so.

Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab: In the case of every negative command mentioned in the Torah [the transgression of] which involves action is punishable with lashes, but if it involves no action, it is exempt [from lashes]. And is this a general rule, that a negative command [the transgression of which] does not involve an action is not punishable with lashes? But is there not the case of one who exchanges [an unconsecrated animal for a consecrated animal] which involves no action,40 and yet it is punishable [with lashes]? For we have learnt: NOT THAT ONE IS PERMITTED TO EXCHANGE, BUT THAT IF ONE DID SO, THE SUBSTITUTE IS SACRED AND HE RECEIVES FORTY LASHES! - Rab can answer you: This [our Mishnah] is the opinion of R. Judah who holds: A negative command [the transgression of] which involves no action is punishable with lashes. But how can you explain the Mishnah in accordance with the view of R. Judah, surely have we not explained the first clause [of the Mishnah] as not being in accordance with the view of R. Judah? For the Mishnah states: ALL PERSONS CAN EXCHANGE; [and it was asked]: What does hakkol [all] include? [And the answer was that] it includes the case of an heir, not in accordance with R. Judah!41 This Tanna [of the Mishnah] agrees with R. Judah on one point, [namely] that a negative command [the transgression of] which involves no action is punishable with lashes, but differs from him in another point, for whereas R. Judah holds that an heir cannot lay hands [on the head of his father's sacrifice] and that an heir cannot effect an exchange, our Tanna holds that an heir can lay hands [on the head of his father's sacrifice] and can effect an exchange.

R. Iddi son of R. Abin reported in the name of R. Amram, R. Isaac and R. Johanan: [R. Judah reported]42 in the name of R. Jose the Galilean: In respect of every negative command laid down in the Torah, if one actually does something [in transgressing it], he is punishable with lashes ' but if he does not actually do anything [in transgressing it] he is not punishable, except in the cases of one who takes an oath, exchanges [an unconsecrated animal for a consecrated animal], and curses his fellow with the Name,43 in which cases though he committed no action, he is punished [with lashes].

[The Rabbis] said in the name of R. Jose son of R. Hanina: In the case also of one who named44 terumah before bikkurim.45

Whence do we derive that one who takes an oath is punishable [with lashes]? - R. Johanan reported in the name of R. Meir:46 [Scripture says:] For the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain;47 thus intimating that the Heavenly tribunal

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(1) In order to exempt his neighbour's grain from tithes.
(2) Lit., 'the pleasure of (conferring) a benefit', i.e., the satisfaction one feels in obliging somebody.
(3) Rami b. Hama could thus solve his query from R. Abbuha's statement.
(4) So Sh. Mek. Cur. edd. 'he said to him'.
(5) In the case cited by R. Abbuha.
(6) The consecration of the animal.
(7) The sacrificing for atonement.
(8) With reference to Rami b. Hama's inquiry.
(9) I.e, an Israelite whose substitution makes the animal sacred. But where in the beginning the animal's dedication was through a gentile, although the atonement was for an Israelite, its exchange is not holy.
(10) And since the person for whom atonement is made is an Israelite who can effect an exchange, although the consecrator is a gentile, the exchange is sacred.
(11) For since the law of sacrilege does not apply to them, then necessarily the prohibition of making secular use of the dedications of a gentile can only be of a rabbinical character; and this leniency is indicated by the fact that other laws like piggul etc. do not apply to them.
(12) Lev. V, 15.
(13) V. Num. XVIII, 32. On terumah v. Glos. s.v.
(14) Ibid. 28.
(15) That the grain of a gentile is not subject to terumah.
(16) Thus excluding gentiles.
(17) Ibid. XXII, 2.
(18) Mentioned in connection with nothar.
(19) Lev. XIX, 8. And just as the laws of ritual uncleanness do not apply to the sacrifice of a gentile, since it says the children of Israel, so the law of nothar does not apply to the dedication of a gentile.
(20) That it does not apply to a gentile dedication.
(21) Used with reference to piggul.
(22) Ibid. VII, 18.
(23) Ibid. XIX, 8.
(24) Nothar, piggul and uncleanness.
(25) Because all are compared to the law of ritual uncleanness where Scripture explicitly mentioned the 'children of Israel'.
(26) Ibid. XXVII, 10.
(27) Ibid 2.
(28) V. infra 13a.
(29) V. Bk. 53b.
(30) Num. XVIII, 24.
(31) The same ruling which excludes a gentile therefore applies to animal tithing, as both kinds of tithing come under the term of ma'aser (tithe); and on the basis of this, by reason of the analogy mentioned above between an exchanged animal and a tithed animal, we derive the ruling that a gentile cannot effect an exchange.
(32) Num. XV, 13.
(33) I.e., a Jew.
(34) Num. XV, 13. The emphatic expression 'after this manner' intimates the indispensableness of bringing drink-offerings in connection with animal sacrifices.
(35) Lev. XXII, 18.
(36) For the words 'a man, a man' in this passage which are explained as including the consecrations of gentiles are followed by 'unto the Lord', thus intimating that gentile dedications are subject to the same laws as those of Israelites.
(37) V. supra 7.
(38) Num. XVIII, 22.
(39) And not merely for its value.
(40) One only pronounces the words: 'This unconsecrated animal shall be instead of that consecrated animal'.
(41) V. supra 2a.
(42) V. Mak. 16a; Shebu. 21a.
(43) Of the Deity. And although in all these instances no action is performed, the transgression is punishable with lashes, as will be subsequently explained.
(44) Not actually separating the terumah, for this would be an action but merely casting his eyes over a portion of the grain and saying that it should be terumah.
(45) 'The first fruits', the correct order of separating dues being first bikkurim and then terumah.
(46) In Shebu. 21a the name given is that of R. Simeon b. Yohai.
(47) Ex. xx, 7.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 3b

will not hold him guiltless but the earthly tribunal punish him [with lashes] and hold him guiltless.1 Said R. Papa to Abaye: Why not say that the meaning of the text is that the earthly tribunal will not punish him at all?2 - He replied to him: If this be the case, let Scripture state: He shall not hold him guiltless, and say no more; what is the need for the word 'the Lord'? In order to intimate: It is the Heavenly tribunal which will not hold him guiltless, but the earthly tribunal punish him [with lashes] and hold him guiltless. We find therefore [Biblical authority] for the case of a vain oath.3 Whence do we derive that [one is punishable with lashes] for a false oath?4 - R. Johanan himself5 said: [The expression] in vain [is stated] twice.6 If it7 has no bearing on the subject of a vain oath, apply it to the case of a false oath, as intimating that one is punishable [with lashes]. To this R. Abbuha demurred: How is a false oath to be understood? Shall we say, if he said: 'I will not eat and he did eat? But in that case he performed action!8 On the other hand where he said: 'I will eat', and he did not eat, would he be punishable [with lashes in such a case]? Has it not been stated:9 If he says, 'I swear that I will eat this loaf to-day' and the day passed and he did not eat, both R. Johanan and R. Simeon b. Lakish hold that he is not punishable with lashes. R. Johanan says: He is not punishable [with lashes] because it is a negative command [the transgression of] which involves no action, and for breaking a prohibitory law which does not involve an action one is not punishable [with lashes]; whereas R. Simeon b. Lakish says: He is not punishable with lashes because he can be given only a doubtful warning,10 and a doubtful warning cannot render one punishable [with lashes]! - Rather said R. Abbuha: Let the case of a false oath then be if he says: 'I have eaten' or 'I have not eaten'.11 And why is the case if he says: '[I swear] I have eaten' or '[I swear] I have not eaten' different?12 - Said Raba: The Torah plainly implies a false oath similar to a vain oath. Just as a vain oath refers to the past,13 so a false oath also refers to the past.14

R. Jeremiah cited the following in objection to R. Abbuha: If he says, 'I swear that I will not eat this loaf', 'I swear I will not eat it', 'I swear I will not eat it'15 and he ate it, he is punishable only on one count,16 and this is the 'oath of utterance'17 for which one is liable to lashes if it is wilfully broken, and to a sliding scale sacrifice18 if in error.19 Now what case does the expression 'This is' exclude?20 Is it not surely the case of one who says: 'I swear I have eaten' or 'I swear I have not eaten' that he is not lashed?21 - No. [This is what it means:] This is [an example of an oath of utterance] for which, if broken in error, one brings a sacrifice, but where he says: 'I swear I have eaten' or 'I have not eaten', he does not bring a sacrifice.22 And whose opinion is this? That of R. Ishmael who says: One is liable to bring [a sacrifice for an oath of utterance] only when the oath relates to the future.23 But [you may say that] he is punishable [with lashes];24 read then the second clause:25 'This is a vain oath for which one is punishable with lashes if it is wilfully broken, and if in error, one is exempt'.26 Now what case does [the word] 'This is' exclude? Is it not surely the case of one who says 'l swear I have eaten' or 'I swear I have not eaten', so that he is not punishable with lashes?27 - No. [It means this:] This is [a case of a vain oath] where if it is broken in error, one is exempted from bringing a sacrifice, but where one says 'I swear I have eaten' or 'I swear I have not eaten', he brings a sacrifice. And whose opinion is this? That of R. Akiba who says: One brings a sacrifice [for an oath of utterance] even if it relates to the past. But have you not explained that the first clause is the opinion of R. Ishmael?28 Rather [we must say,] since the second clause is the opinion of R. Akiba, therefore the first clause will also be the opinion of R. Akiba; and the first clause therefore will not exclude the case of one who says 'I have eaten' or 'I have not eaten'29 but will exclude the case of one who says 'I shall eat' or 'I shall not eat'.30 And what is the difference?31 - Where [it] speaks of the future,32 it excludes something relating to the future;33 but where it speaks of the future, would it exclude something relating to the past?34

'And one who exchanges'. Said R. Johanan to the Tanna:35 Do not read: 'And one who exchanges',36 because his very words37 constitute an action.38

'And he who curses his fellow with the Name'. Whence is this proved? - R. Eleazar reported in the name of R. Oshaia: The verse says: If thou wilt not observe to do etc.39 And it says: Then the Lord will make thy plagues wonderful.40 Now I do not know in what this 'wonder' consists.41 But when Scripture says:42 That the judge cause him to lie down to be beaten,43 this shows that [the] 'wonderful' [punishment]44 means [punishment with] lashes. But why not say that it45 refers even to a true oath?46 - It is explicitly stated:47 Then shall the oath of the Lord be between them.48 But why not say that this49 is only with the object of appeasing his neighbour,50 but that in reality he is punished [with lashes]?51 - You cannot say this. For is it not written: And shalt swear by his Name?52 But we need this text in order to derive the ruling of R. Giddal? For R. Giddal said: Whence do we derive that one may swear to observe the commandments,53 for it says: I have sworn and I will perform it that I will keep thy righteous judgments?54 - Is there not however another text, And to him shalt thou cling and swear by his Name?55 Then what does the text, ['If thou wilt not observe to do'] come to teach us? That one who curses his fellow with the Name is punishable [with lashes].56 But why not say that the text refers to one who pronounces the Lord's name for no purpose?57 - Is then one who curses his fellow with the Name less culpable than one who pronounces the Lord's name for no purpose? - Our question is really this: Why not say that for one who pronounces the Lord's name for no purpose the punishment of lashes will suffice, but if one curses his fellow with the Name, since he commits two [forbidden things], first in pronouncing the Lord's name for no purpose and then in vexing his fellow, therefore punishment with lashes should not be sufficient?58

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(1) By means of lashes his sin will be atoned.
(2) Since no action is involved in taking an oath, therefore no punishment at all is inflicted.
(3) That one is punishable with lashes. A vain oath means if one swears to that which is universally known to he otherwise, e.g. saying of a stone column that it is gold.
(4) If one swears to the opposite of the truth, e.g., 'I have eaten' when he has not.
(5) Without reporting it in the name of some other teacher.
(6) In the same verse Ex. XX, 7.
(7) The additional repetition of 'in vain'.
(8) And therefore it is only right that he should be punishable with lashes, for he ate and took an action in transgressing the oath.
(9) Pes. 63b; Mak. 15b; Shebu. 3b, 21a.
(10) One swears he will do a certain thing during the day when the actual moment of the offence (of omission) cannot be defined, so as to make the warning precede immediately. Here too when he is warned to eat the loaf of bread, he can say he has plenty of time and has no fear of the warning. And even if the day passed, he can still plead that he forgot both the oath and the warning. Consequently he is not liable to punishment with lashes.
(11) Referring to what has already taken place, so that no action is involved in the violation of the oath.
(12) That you include if he says 'I have eaten' and he did not eat as punishable with lashes and you exclude from punishment if he says 'I will eat' and he did not eat, since in both cases the transgressions do not involve an action. Sh. Mek. deletes the words 'I will eat and he did not eat' that follow.
(13) For if he swears concerning a column of stone that it is gold, this refers to the past, for in the past, before he took the oath, it was a stone, as it is now (Rashi).
(14) E.g., if he says: 'I swear I have eaten' or 'I have not eaten', whereas 'I will eat' refers to the future. And just as one is liable to lashes for the vain oath as explained above, similarly one is liable to lashes for a false oath.
(15) Uttering the same oath three times.
(16) For one oath cannot be superimposed on another.
(17) Of which Scripture says: Pronouncing with his lips to do evil or to do good (Lev. v, 4). It is an oath which neither benefits nor injures anybody.
(18) According to pecuniary conditions.
(19) V. Shebu. 27b.
(20) So that one is not liable to lashes if he offends wilfully.
(21) For although it is an 'oath of utterance' it is not punishable with lashes, since Scripture says 'to do evil or to do good', implying the future and excluding the past, e.g., 'I have eaten' etc. At all events, we have not yet found a definition of what constitutes a 'false oath' which we say above is punishable with lashes.
(22) For the Scriptural verse: 'To do evil or to do good' which refers to the future is mentioned in connection with the bringing of a sacrifice. But there would be the punishment of lashes where he says. 'I have eaten' as in the case of a vain oath.
(23) For Scripture says: To do evil or to do good (Lev. v, 4); v. Shebu. 25a.
(24) If he swears: 'I have eaten' or 'I have not eaten'.
(25) Of the Mishnah in Shebu. 27b.
(26) v. Shebu. 29a.
(27) This therefore contradicts the inference from the first clause above.
(28) Who says that a sacrifice is brought only when the oath has reference to the future. How then can you have the same Mishnah holding contrary opinions?
(29) So that if one says: 'I have eaten' or 'I have not eaten' one would certainly be bound to bring a sacrifice if he swore in error, since we accept the opinion of R. Akiba on this point.
(30) From the bringing of a sacrifice.
(31) That I exclude from the first clause the case of 'I will eat' from bringing a sacrifice and include the case of 'I have eaten' in the second clause as being bound to bring a sacrifice.
(32) 'I will not eat it', mentioned in the first clause.
(33) The case of 'I will eat' and he did not eat.
(34) E.g., 'I have eaten' or 'I have not eaten'. For fuller notes v. Shebu. (Sonc. ed.) 27b et seq.
(35) V. Glos. s.v. (b).
(36) As being one of the exceptions of a transgression involving no action for which one is lashed.
(37) 'This unconsecrated animal be exchanged for that consecrated animal'.
(38) For the unconsecrated animal becomes sacred.
(39) Deut. XXVIII, 58. The passage continues: That thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful name, the Lord thy God, i.e., that one should not utter the Deity's name in vain and similarly one who curses his neighbour with the Name, utters God's name in vain.
(40) In verse 59 which follows.
(41) What exactly is the nature of the punishment referred to when Scripture says והפלא, He will make . . . . wonderful.
(42) . Ibid. XXV, 2.
(43) Here the word 'beaten' is mentioned in connection with והפילו, the latter word being a similar expression to והפלא, And (the Lord) will make wonderful.
(44) Alluded to by the word.
(45) The Scriptural passage above: If thou wilt not observe to do etc.
(46) That one is warned not to utter the name of the Deity even with a true oath, under the penalty of lashes.
(47) That a true oath may be uttered with the Name.
(48) Ex. XXII, 10.
(49) That an oath is taken with the Name.
(50) So that he should not claim money from him.
(51) For taking an oath with the Name.
(52) Deut. VI, 13. Thus we see that it is permissible to swear with the Name.
(53) So that one cannot go back on one's word.
(54) Ps. CXIX, 106. And therefore there is need for the text: And shalt swear by His name to inform us that one may even utter the Name in an oath which is taken to observe commandments.
(55) Deut. X, 20. Therefore one of the texts is required in order to deduce the ruling that one can swear with the Name to observe the commandments, and the other, that it is permissible to utter the Name in connection with a true oath.
(56) Although no action is involved.
(57) But if one curses one's fellow with the Name, there is no punishment with lashes.
(58) That atonement with lashes alone is not adequate for the offence.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 4a

- You cannot say this, since it is written: Thou shalt not curse the deaf.1 Or if you prefer [another solution] I may say:2 There is no difficulty [if the text above]3 refers to one who curses his fellow [with the Name]; its warning4 in that case would be derived from here, since it is written: Thou shalt not curse the deaf.5 But if you say that it refers to one who utters the Lord's name for no purpose,6 whence is its warning derived?7 - But why not?8 But does not Scripture say: Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God and serve Him?9 - That text is only a positive admonition.10

'[The Rabbis] said in the name of R. Jose son of R. Hanina: In the case also of one who names terumah before bikkurim.' What is the reason of R. Jose son of R. Hanina? - The verse says: Thou shalt not delay to offer of the fulness of thy harvest and of the outflow of thy presses.11 'The fulness of thy harvest', this refers to the bikkurim;12 'the outflow13 of thy presses', this refers to terumah;14 and [Scripture] says: Thou shalt not delay.15

It was stated: If one named terumah before bikkurim there is a difference of opinion between R. Eleazar and R. Jose son of R. Hanina. One says he is punishable with lashes, while the other says he is not punishable with lashes. You may conclude that it is R. Jose son of R. Hanina who says that he is punishable [with lashes], since R. Jose son of R. Hanina says: Also one who names terumah before bikkurim is punishable [with lashes]. On the contrary, you may conclude that it is R. Eleazar who says that he is punishable [with lashes]. For we have learnt:16 If one has before him two baskets of tebel [untithed produce] and he says: The tithe of this [basket] shall be in that one, the first basket is considered tithed.17 [If he says:] The tithe of this one shall be in the other one, and the tithe of the other one in this one, the first is tithed,18 whereas the second is not tithed.19 [If he says:] Their tithes shall serve for another, he has named them.20 And it was stated: R. Eleazar says:21 He is punishable with lashes because he named the second tithes [of the one basket] before the first tithes of the other.22 This is proved.23 Then it is R. Jose son of R. Hanina who holds that he is not punishable with lashes.24 Must it then be said that there is a contradiction between the two rulings of R. Jose son of R. Ham'na?25 - No. R. Jose son of R. Ham'na

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(1) Lev. XIX, 14. Implying whether without the Name or with the Name, for which there is a prohibitory law. The texts therefore, 'If thou wilt not observe to do' and 'Then the Lord will make thy plagues wonderful' inform us that there is punishment of lashes for one who curses his fellow with the Name. Aliter: You cannot say that atonement with lashes alone is not sufficient in a case where one curses his fellow with the Name, for by means of an analogy in Sanh. 61a we compare the text ' Thou shalt not curse the deaf' with the text: Nor curse the ruler of thy people (Ex. XXII, 27) and just as in the case of the latter punishment of lashes is sufficient, so in the case of 'the humblest of thy people', i.e., the deaf, lashes are sufficient atonement. The Gemara also explains in Sanhedrin that we are dealing in the text with a case where the Name is uttered (Rashi).
(2) So Rashi.
(3) 'If thou wilt not observe to do'.
(4) in order that the transgression of a prohibition should entail lashes, a text giving the warning is first necessary.
(5) And we have explained that the text implies even with the Name. Therefore here we have the warning, and the punishment of lashes is derived from the text: If thou wilt not observe to do.
(6) And is therefore punishable with lashes.
(7) Where is the Biblical warning that it is forbidden to pronounce the Lord's name for no purpose?
(8) Can we not find a text giving the required warning?
(9) Deut. VI, 13 'which informs us that the Deity's name must be treated with respect.
(10) It is not therefore called a warning. Consequently we explain the text: If thou wilt not observe to do . . . then the Lord will make thy plagues wonderful as referring to the case of one who curses his fellow with the Name and not to a case of one who pronounces the Lord's name to no purpose.
(11) Ex. XXII, 28.
(12) And the reason why bikkurim is described as 'fulness' is because soon after the grain is full and ripened it is ready for bikkurim. Another reason (R. Gershom) is because bikkurim is given when the grain is still intact, prior to any separation.
(13) דמעך.
(14) Terumah is called dema' (mixture) because the mixing of secular grain with it, to the extent of one hundred and one times its quantity, neutralizes it.
(15) Meaning that the proper sequence of the setting aside of the various priestly dues must be observed.
(16) Dem. VII, 6.
(17) Although he had not actually made the separation.
(18) Because the tithe has been set aside on its behalf from the second basket.
(19) For the first basket is now exempt, and we cannot in turn set aside the tithe from it on behalf of the second basket which is still subject to tithe.
(20) We cannot say here that we are separating what is exempt from tithe on behalf of what is subject to tithe, for in both baskets the separation is viewed as taking place simultaneously and with one declaration.
(21) R. Eleazar's words refer to the first case where one names tithe of the second basket for the first basket and where it is ruled that only the first basket is exempted.
(22) For we hold that when he names tithe this includes also the second tithes. Thus the first basket was exempted from both the first and second tithes, whilst the second basket is still tebel, even in respect of the first tithe. There is therefore the penalty of lashes because he named the second tithes before the first tithes. For, although the text only speaks of delaying with reference to terumah and bikkurim, the same law applies to the correct sequence of the two tithes and also to terumah and tithes.
(23) That it is R. Eleazar who holds that one is punishable for changing the sequence of the priestly dues.
(24) Since it is R. Eleazar who says that he is punishable with lashes, therefore the Tanna who differs from him and holds that one is not punishable with lashes must be R. Jose son of R. Hanina.
(25) For he says above that one who names terumah before bikkurim is punishable with lashes.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 4b

was speaking of exempting [from lashes];1 and he says thus: Transgression of a negative command which does not involve an action is not punishable with lashes. [The Rabbis] said in the name of R. Jose son of R. Hanina: Also one who names terumah before bikkurim.2 And why is it that one who exchanges is punishable [with lashes]?3 [Assumedly] because with his very words4 he performs an action.5 Then the case of one who names terumah before bikkurim should also be punishable with lashes, since with his words he performed an action?6 - Said R. Abin: It is different there,7 for [the prohibition of not delaying the priestly dues] is a negative command that is remediable by a positive command,8 since it is written: Out of all your gifts ye shall offer every heave offering.9

R. Dimi was once sitting and repeating this tradition.10 Abaye asked him: And is it true that every negative command which is remediable by a positive command is not punishable [with lashes]? Is there not the case of one who exchanges [an unconsecrated animal for a consecrated animal] which is a negative command remediable by a positive command and is yet punishable with lashes? For we have learnt in our Mishnah: NOT THAT ONE IS PERMITTED TO EXCHANGE BUT THAT IF ONE DID SO, THE SUBSTITUTE IS SACRED AND HE RECEIVES FORTY LASHES. - [The case of one who exchanges is different, for]11 here are two negative commands12 and one positive command13 and one positive command cannot displace two negative commands.14 But is there not the case of one who violates [a woman] for which act there is one negative command15 and one positive command,16 and yet the positive command does not displace the negative command? For it has been taught:17 If one violates [a maiden] and then divorces her [after marriage],18 if he is an Israelite he takes her back and is not punished [with lashes];19 but if he is a priest, he is punished [with lashes]20 and he does not take her back!21 - You mention the case of priests. Their case is different, for the Divine Law22 invests them with added sanctity.23

This is a matter of dispute between Tannaim:24 And ye shall let nothing remain of it until the morning and that which remains of it until morning ye shall burn with fire.25 Scripture here has come to state a positive command26 following a negative command in order to inform us that one is not punishable with lashes on account thereof. So R. Judah.27 R. Jacob says: This comes not under this head,28 but the reason is because it is a negative command [the transgression of] which involves no action,29 and the transgression of a negative command in which no action is involved is not punishable with lashes. This implies [does it not] that R. Judah holds that it is punishable with lashes.30 And according to R. Jacob, what does the text: 'And that which remains of it until the morning ye shall burn with fire' come to teach? It is required for what we have learnt:31 The bones, the tendons and that which remains of the Paschal lamb are burnt on the sixteenth [of Nisan].32 If the sixteenth [of Nisan] fell on the Sabbath they are burnt on the seventeenth, because the burning of sacred things does not supersede either the Sabbath or Festivals. And Hezekiah said, and so taught a Tanna of the School of Hezekiah: What is the reason? Scripture says: 'That which remains of it until the morning ye shall burn with fire'; the text came to give a second morning33 for its burning.34

Said Abaye: Any act which the Divine Law forbids35 , if it has been done, it has legal effect;36 for if you were to think that the act has no legal effect, why then is one punishable [on account thereof with lashes]? Raba however said: The act has no legal effect at all, and the reason why one is punishable with lashes on account thereof is because one has transgressed a command of the Divine Law.

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(1) R. Jose b. R. Hanina's statement has reference to the first Tanna who holds that transgression of a negative command which does not involve an action is not punishable with lashes. R. Jose thereupon declares that the case also of one who named terumah before bikkurim is exempt from lashes for the same reason. This is contrary to the assumption held hitherto that R. Jose made him liable to lashes.
(2) Is also exempt from the punishment of lashes.
(3) As stated above, that the case of one who exchanges is an exception to the rule that the transgression of any negative law in order to merit punishment with lashes must involve an action, for here, in exchanging, no action is taken.
(4) 'Let this unconsecrated animal be instead of that consecrated animal'.
(5) The hullin (unconsecrated animal) becoming sacred.
(6) By naming it he invests the fruit with the holiness of terumah.
(7) In the case of the naming of terumah before bikkurim.
(8) A negative command the transgression of which must be repaired by a succeeding act. Now if he violates the prohibition by not naming the priestly dues in their right sequence, he can rectify the matter by setting aside the priestly due which has been omitted. In such a case, where a forbidden act can be repaired, there is no punishment of lashes.
(9) Num. XVIII, 29.
(10) That the reason why one is not punishable with lashes where one names terumah before bikkurim is because the prohibition is remediable by the positive command.
(11) So Sh. Mek.
(12) 'He shall not alter nor change it'.
(13) 'Then it and the exchange thereof shall be holy' (Lev. XXVII, 10).
(14) And therefore he who exchanges is punishable with lashes.
(15) He may not put her away all his days (Deut. XXII, 29).
(16) And she shall be his wife (ibid).
(17) Mak. 15a.
(18) Which is forbidden by the Scripture.
(19) For after committing the transgression he can always carry out the positive command by re-marrying her,
(20) Since he cannot take her back after divorcing her, as a priest is forbidden to re-marry a divorcee. Therefore he cannot repair the act and the positive command does not as a result displace the transgression.
(21) You have therefore here a difficulty for the one who maintains that a transgression of a negative command which is remediable by a positive command is not punishable with lashes.
(22) Lit., 'the merciful one'.
(23) The reason therefore is not because a positive command does not displace a negative command, but because we are stricter in the case of a priest than in that of an Israelite, and therefore a priest is liable to lashes.
(24) There is a difference of opinion among Tannaim as to whether or not the transgression of a negative command which involves no action is punishable with lashes.
(25) Ex. XII, 10.
(26) 'And that which remains, etc.'.
(27) Who therefore holds that transgression of a negative command which is remediable by a positive command is not punishable with lashes.
(28) This is not the real reason why one is exempt from lashes.
(29) Since to leave over the remains of the Paschal lamb entails no action.
(30) Hence we see that there is a difference of opinion among Tannaim as to whether transgression of a negative law which does not entail an action is punishable with lashes.
(31) Pes. 83a.
(32) But not on the fifteenth, for it is forbidden to burn holy things on festivals.
(33) The word 'morning' being mentioned twice in the same verse.
(34) The text therefore means as follows: One must not leave the remains of the Paschal lamb until the next morning, i.e., the fifteenth; but that which remains till the second morning, you shall burn it in fire, i.e., on the sixteenth which is the intermediate day of the festival.
(35) Lit., 'said, "do not"'.
(36) I.e., what has been done is valid.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 5a

An objection was raised: If one violates [a maiden] and then divorces her [after marriage], if he is an Israelite he must take her back and is not punished with lashes. Now if you say that since one has transgressed the command of the Divine Law one is punished with lashes, then here he, too, should be punished with lashes! This refutes Raba?1 - Raba can answer you: The case is different there,2 for Scripture says: 'All his days'3 [intimating that] all his days, [if he divorces her] he is required to take her back.4 And what does Abaye5 say to this? - If the Divine Law had not said: 'All his days' I might have thought that there exists a mere prohibition,6 but that if he wishes he can take her back, and if he wishes he need not.7 The text 'All his days' therefore teaches us [that this is not so].8 (Another version: They raised an objection: If one violates [a woman] and [marries her] and then divorces her, if he is an Israelite, he takes her back and is not punishable with lashes; but if he is a priest, he is punishable with lashes and he does not take her back. At all events it [the Baraitha] says: If he is an Israelite, he takes her back and he is punishable with lashes. This refutes Abaye? - The case is different there, since the Divine Law says: 'All his days', intimating that all his days [if he divorces her] he is required to re-marry her. And what does Raba [say to this]? - [Raba] can answer you: If the Divine Law had not said 'All his days', I might have thought that he would be punishable with lashes and that he must re-marry her, [for the law of one who violates a woman] is an unqualified negative command, since it is written: He may not put her away all his days. For this reason Scripture says: 'All his days', to make the law of one who violates [a woman] a negative command remediable by a positive command, for which there is no punishment of lashes.)9

But is there not the case of one who separates [terumah] from bad [grain] for good [grain], concerning which the Divine Law says: Of all the best thereof;10 [he must bring as terumah] 'the best thereof',11 but not from the inferior?12 And yet we have learnt: We may not separate terumah from the bad [grain] for the good, but if one did so,13 it is counted as terumah?14 Consequently we see [that a forbidden act] has a legal effect! Shall we say that this refutes Raba?15 - Raba can answer you: The case is different,16 for it will be as R. Elai. For R. Elai said: Whence do we deduce that if one separated [terumah] from bad [grain] for good [grain] it is counted as terumah? It says: And ye shall bear no sin by reason of it when ye have heaved from it the best of it.17 Now if the terumah18 is not holy, wherefore should he bear sin?19 Hence we infer that if one separates terumah from bad [grain] for good [grain] it is counted as terumah. And Abaye?20 - If the Divine Law had not said: 'And ye shall bear no sin' I might have thought what the Divine Law means is, 'Perform a mizwah21 in the best [way]',22 but if one did not do so, he is not called a sinner. [The text]23 therefore informs us [that this is not so].24 But is there not the case of one who separates from one species to serve as terumah for another species, concerning which the Divine Law says:25 All the best of the oil [and all the best of the wine],26 [intimating] that he must give the best [as terumah]27 for the one [species] and the best [as terumah]28 for the other? And we have learnt: One must not separate terumah from one species for another species, and if one did so, it is not counted as terumah.29 Consequently we see that a forbidden act has no legal effect. Shall we say that this refutes Abaye?30 - Abaye can answer you: The case is different there,31 since Scripture says: The first part of them,25 thus implying the first of this [species]32 and the first of that [species].33 And Elai said likewise: [The text says:] 'The first part of them' [intimating the first of this species and the first of that species].34 And Raba?35 - If the Divine Law had not stated 'the first part of them'36 I might have thought that [only] in the case of wine and oil, with reference to which the text says: 'The best', 'the best',37 we may not set aside one species for the other; but in the case of wine and corn, or corn and corn,38 where 'the best'39 is mentioned only once, we may separate one species for the other.40 The Divine Law therefore says: 'The first part of them', [to teach] that one must give 'the best' of one species and 'the best' of the other.41

Another version:42 But in the case of wine and corn in connection with which 'the best' is mentioned only once, [I might think that] one may separate from this [wine] for that [corn]. Scripture therefore says: The first part of them.

But is there not the case of devoted things, with reference to which Scripture says: [Notwithstanding, no devoted thing that a man may devote unto the Lord of all that he hath whether of man or of beast or of the field of his possession] shall be sold or redeemed.43 And we have learnt: Things devoted to priests44 are not subject to redemption but must be given to the priest.45 Consequently we see that [a forbidden act]46 has no legal effect.47 Shall we say that this refutes Abaye? - He [Abaye] will answer you: The case is different there, for the Divine Law says:48 'Every devoted thing most holy unto the Lord it is',49 intimating that it shall remain in its status.50

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(1) It is now assumed that the implication of the ruling that he must take her back is that the divorce is of no effect since he is in duty bound to re-marry her. Now this would be in order according to Abaye who holds that the punishment of lashes is determined by the validity of the act; since the divorce is of no legal effect, he is not flagellated. But according to Raba, who holds that the punishment is inflicted because of transgressing a Scriptural command, irrespective of the effect of the act, here, too, he should be flagellated (v. Tosaf.).
(2) In the Baraitha just quoted.
(3) Deut. XXII, 29.
(4) The Torah thus distinctly states that the divorce, even if effective, can never be of permanent character, as he is at all times in duty bound to take her back. The Torah is thus supplying a remedied action to the prohibition and consequently there are no lashes.
(5) According to Abaye, what need is there for a special text 'All his days' to inform us that one is in duty bound always to re-marry her and that therefore there is no punishment of lashes? Even without the text 'All his days', according to Abaye, there is no punishment of lashes, since he can take her back, his divorce having no permanent character.
(6) By divorcing her.
(7) That the re-marrying is optional.
(8) And that it is a definite duty to re-marry her, not a mere option, and that all his days he is required to take her back, should he send her away.
(9) The whole passage is omitted in Ms. M.
(10) Num. XVIII, 29.
(11) That he must separate from the best grain on behalf of the best grain.
(12) On behalf of the good grain, for it is forbidden to do so. This is a matter therefore for which there is a Scriptural prohibition, although there would not be the punishment of lashes in this case, since the prohibition is merely derived by implication from the positive precept.
(13) Lit., 'if he set aside terumah'.
(14) Lit., 'his terumah is terumah'. V. Ter. II, 6.
(15) Who holds that a forbidden act has no legal effect.
(16) In the case of terumah just mentioned.
(17) Num. XVIII, 32.
(18) Set aside from inferior grain for good grain.
(19) On account of the act of separation.
(20) Since he holds that a forbidden act has a legal effect, what need is there for the text 'And ye shall bear no sin, etc.', which implies that the setting aside of inferior grain as terumah for good grain has legal effect?
(21) A religious command.
(22) Separate from the very best grain for terumah.
(23) 'And ye shall bear no sin'.
(24) But that he actually is designated a sinner.
(25) Num. XVIII, 12.
(26) The word 'best' being repeated in connection with oil and wine.
(27) On behalf of its own species of oil but not for wine.
(28) On behalf of its own species of wine but not for oil.
(29) Ter. II, 4.
(30) Who says that a forbidden act has a legal effect.
(31) In the Mishnah just quoted.
(32) I.e., oil is to be separated for the same species.
(33) I.e., wine is to be separated for the same species; thus teaching that fruit cannot be set aside except for its own species. For this reason it is not counted as terumah; but elsewhere a forbidden act may have a legal effect.
(34) So Sh. Mek.
(35) Who holds that a forbidden act has no legal effect; what need, according to him, is there for the text 'the first part of them', to tell us this?
(36) ראשיתם So Rashi; cur. edd. have throughout 'first'.
(37) The word 'best' is repeated.
(38) I.e., wheat and barley, all of which come under the heading of corn (דגן).
(39) And all the best of the wine and the corn, Num. XVIII, 12
(40) V. Rashi and Sh. Mek. Cur. edd.: where we separate one for the other there are no lashes.
(41) I.e., that we cannot separate from one species of fruit or grain for another.
(42) Of Raba's reply.
(43) Lev. XXVII, 28.
(44) V. Num. XVIII, 14.
(45) 'Ar. 28b.
(46) I.e., the text: 'It shall not be sold, etc.'.
(47) For if it is redeemed, the redemption is of no avail, as stated.
(48) Lev. XXVII, 28.
(49) So lit.
(50) It does not pass from its sacred state through redemption.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 5b

But according to Raba1 the text 'it is' comes to exclude the case of a firstling. For it has been taught: With reference to a firstling, it says: Thou shalt not redeem,2 implying that it may be sold.3 In connection with a tithing animal, it says: It shall not be redeemed,4 and may neither be sold alive nor dead, neither unblemished nor blemished.5

But is there not the case of temurah6 concerning which the Divine Law says: He shall not alter it nor change it,7 and yet we learnt: NOT THAT ONE IS PERMITTED TO EXCHANGE BUT THAT IF ONE DID SO, THE SUBSTITUTE IS SACRED AND HE RECEIVES FORTY LASHES. Consequently we see that [a forbidden act] has a legal effect. This refutes Raba?8 - [Raba] can answer you: The case there9 is different, for Scripture says: 'Then it and the exchange thereof shall be holy', implying that it [the exchanged animal] must retain its sacred character. And Abaye?10 - If the Divine Law had not said: 'Then it and the exchange thereof [shall be holy'], I might have thought that the consecrated animal ceases [to be holy] and this one [the exchanged animal] enters into holiness. [Scripture] therefore informs us [that this is not so.]11

But is there not the case of a firstling of which the Divine Law says: But the firstling of a cow or the firstling of a sheep or the firstling of a goat thou shalt not redeem,12 and we have learnt:13 [Sacrifices rendered unfit for the altar]14 have redemption themselves15 and their exchanges,16 except in the case of a firstling or a tithing animal?17 Consequently we see that [a forbidden act] has no legal effect.18 This refutes Abaye?19 - He [Abaye] will answer you: The case is different there,20 for Scripture says: [Holy] they [are]21 intimating that they remain in their sacred status. And what will Raba do with the word 'they'?22 - It intimates that 'they' are offered up but not their exchanges.23 And whence does Abaye derive this ruling?24 - [He derives it from the text:] Whether it be an ox or sheep, to the Lord it is;25 'it' [the firstling itself] is offered up but not its exchange. And Raba?26 - It is indeed so that he does derive it27 from that text.28 Then what need is there for the text 'they are'? It teaches that if the blood of a firstling or a tithing animal became mixed up with things which are offered up,29 they are still offered on the altar.30 And whence does Abaye derive this ruling? - [He derives it from the text:] And shall take of the blood of the bullock and of the blood of the goat.31 Now is not the blood of the bullock more than the blood of the goat? This proves that things which are offered up do not neutralize one another. For it has been taught: 'And shall take of the blood of the bullock and of the blood of the goat', intimating that they must be mixed up.32 These are the words of R. Josiah. And Raba?33 - There34 he sprinkles the blood of the bullock separately and the blood of the goat separately, for he accepts the view of R. Jonathan.35

But is there not the case of a tithing animal in reference to which the Divine Law says:36 'It shall not be redeemed', and we have learnt: They have redemption themselves and their exchanges except in the case of a firstling or tithing animal?37 Consequently we see that a forbidden act has no legal effect!38 This refutes Abaye? - He [Abaye] will answer you: The case is different there,39 since we draw an analogy40 between the term 'passing'41 used in connection with an animal tithed and the term 'passing'42 used in connection with a firstling.43

But is there not the case of one who names terumah before bikkurim, concerning which the Divine Law says: Thou shalt not delay to offer of the fulness of thy harvest and of the outflow of thy press,44 and we have learnt: If one [names] terumah before bikkurim, although he is guilty of transgressing a negative command,45 his action is valid?46 This refutes Raba?47 - Raba will answer you: The case is different there,48 since Scripture says: Out of all your gifts ye shall offer every heave offering.49 And Abaye?50 - He needs [the words 'Out of all your gifts'] for [answering the question which] R. Papa put to Abaye: If this be the case,51 then even if he [the Levite, anticipated the priest] when [the grain was] in the pile, he should be exempt from the obligation of terumah?52 And [Abaye] answered him: To meet your query Scripture says: Out of all your gifts ye shall offer every heave offering.53 But why do you see fit to include the case of when [the grain was] in the pile,54 and to exclude the case of grain in the ear?55 - I include the case of [grain] in the pile because it comes under the title of corn, whereas I exclude the case of grain in the ear because it does not come under the title of corn.

But is there not the case of a widow married by a High Priest, concerning which the Divine Law says: A widow or a divorced woman, these shall he not take,56 and we have learnt: Wherever betrothal is valid and yet involves a transgression,57 the child has the legal status of the party which causes the transgression!58 - The case is different there since Scripture says: Neither shall he profane his seed among his people.59 And Abaye?60 - Let Scripture then say: 'Lo yahel'.61 Why 'lo yehalel'?62 One [profanation refers] to it [the child]63 and the other to [the woman] herself.64

But is there not the case of one who dedicates blemished animals for the altar, concerning which the Divine Law says: But whatsoever hath a blemish, that shall ye not offer.65 And it has been taught:66 If one dedicates blemished animals for the altar, although he infringes a negative command, the act is valid?67 This refutes Raba!68 - Raba can answer you: The case is different there, since Scripture says: 'For it shall not be acceptable for you',69 [intimating that] it is not acceptable but that its consecration is legal.70 And Abaye?71 - If Scripture had not stated: 'For it shall not be acceptable for you', I might have thought the case72 should be similar to that of one who transgresses a religious command, but that it [the animal] is fit [even to offer up]. [The text therefore] informs us [that it is not so].73

But is there not the case of one who dedicates unblemished animals for Temple repairs,74 concerning which the Divine Law says:

____________________
(1) Who says a forbidden act is not valid; what need has he for the phrase 'it is'?
(2) Num. XVIII, 17. Redemption is forbidden so that the owners should not treat it as unconsecrated, as regards shearing its wool and working it.
(3) If a blemish occurred in the firstling the owner may sell it as a firstling to a priest, since Scripture only forbids its redemption, but not its selling; v. Bek. 31b.
(4) Lev. XXVII, 28.
(5) Because we draw an analogy between ma'aser and dedications, just as in the latter both redemption and selling are forbidden, similarly in the former, i.e., a tithing animal, selling is also forbidden. Now I might have supposed that the law of the firstling animal would be the same as that of an animal tithed as regards its selling. Therefore the word הוא (it is) used in connection with dedications comes to exclude a firstling animal from the restriction of selling.
(6) An unconsecrated animal exchanged for a consecrated one.
(7) Ibid. 10.
(8) Who says that a forbidden act has no validity.
(9) Of temurah.
(10) According to his view that a forbidden act has a legal effect, what need is there for the text, Then it and the exchange thereof, etc.?
(11) But that both become consecrated.
(12) Num. XVIII, 17.
(13) Infra 21a.
(14) Having become blemished. The difference between a firstling and a tithing animal and other disqualified sacrifices is that the flesh of the latter may be sold by weight and in shops like ordinary flesh, and this is not considered an unbecoming treatment of sacrifices since all profits accrued thereby go to the Sanctuary. But in regard to the flesh of a firstborn or a tithing animal, since the benefit accrues to the owners - in the case of the firstborn to the priest and in the case of a tithing animal to the Israelite owners - we do not allow them to be sold in the shop and by weight, as not in keeping with the treatment becoming to sacred things.
(15) The money acquires holiness and the animal becomes hullin.
(16) In which a blemish occurred. They become hullin and the money of redemption acquires holiness, after redemption.
(17) Blemished firstlings and tithing animals are not redeemable and remain sacred. The redemption money therefore does not acquire holiness, v. infra 21a.
(18) In the case of a blemished firstling or a blemished tithing animal.
(19) Who holds that a forbidden act has a legal effect.
(20) The Mishnah just quoted.
(21) So lit. E. V. 'They are holy'; Num. XVIII, 17.
(22) Since he holds that a forbidden act is not valid, the redemption here of a firstling is of no legal effect. Consequently there is no need for the word 'they' to teach us the same thing.
(23) For they do not receive any holiness by substitution.
(24) That substitutes do not become sacred.
(25) So lit. E. V. 'it is the Lord's'. Lev. XXVII, 26.
(26) Since we derive the ruling excluding the substitute of the firstling from holiness from the text 'whether it be an ox etc.', what need is there for the text 'holy they are' to teach the same thing?
(27) That a substitute of a firstling is not sacred.
(28) 'Whether it be an ox'.
(29) E.g., blood of several sacrifices that have become mixed up.
(30) And the flesh is rendered permissible by the sprinkling, for things which are offered up do not neutralize one another. From here we apply the same ruling to all cases of things which are offered up. The meaning of the text 'holy they are' is therefore that they remain in their sacred status, even if the blood is mixed up with the blood of other sacrifices.
(31) Lev. XVI, 18. Scripture continuing: And put it upon the horns of the altar.
(32) Implying that the sprinkling is done from both the blood of the bullock and the goat after mixing.
(33) Since we derive the ruling that we may sprinkle the mixed blood of sacrifices from the text. 'And shall take from the blood of the bullock, etc.', what need is there for the words 'they are', used in connection with the law of a firstling?
(34) In the text: And shall take from the blood of the bullock, etc.
(35) Who says that we do not mix the blood of the bullock with the blood of the goat to sprinkle on the horns of the altar; v. Zeb. 81a.
(36) Lev. XXVII, 33.
(37) V. supra p. 25 notes. What is the difference between an animal tithed and a firstling on the one hand, and other sacrifices?
(38) For the Mishnah says it has no redemption.
(39) With reference to a tithed animal.
(40) Zeb. 9a.
(41) All that passes under the rod (Lev. XXVII, 32).
(42) That thou shall cause to pass (set apart); Ex. XIII, 12.
(43) And just as for a firstling there is no redemption (v. supra) so a tithed animal has no redemption. But elsewhere, Abaye maintains, it may be that a forbidden act has a legal effect.
(44) V. supra 3a, 4a and notes.
(45) 'Thou shalt not delay, etc.'.
(46) Lit., 'what he has done is done'. Ter. III, 6.
(47) So Sh. Mek.
(48) Where terumah was named before bikkurim.
(49) Num. XVIII, 29, intimating that although you have named first tithe before terumah you can still separate terumah; and the same applies to terumah and bikkurim.
(50) Since he holds that a prohibited act can have legal effect, what need is there for the text 'Out of all your gifts, etc.'?
(51) In Bez. 13b if a Levite anticipated a priest by taking his first tithes from the grain still in the ear before the priest secures his terumah (v. Glos.) although thereby he causes the priest a loss, for a priest in the normal way receives two portions for every hundred and now after the Levite has taken his first tithe, the terumah will be only for the remaining ninety, nevertheless the Levite is not required to make good the priest's loss. The reason is because Scripture says the Levite must give a tenth part from the tithe (Num. XVIII, 26) implying that he need give not only a tithe from the tithe but both tithe and terumah. If, however, the Levite anticipated the priest when the grain was stacked up in piles, i.e., when it became liable to both terumah and tithes, then the Levite must make up for the terumah when he separates his tithe. Thereupon R. Papa said to Abaye: If you exempt the Levite from giving terumah because of the text: A tenth part of the tithe.
(52) Why then is the Levite exempt from the obligation of terumah only when the grain is in ear?
(53) Terumah. I.e., that he must, in certain circumstances, set aside terumah as well as the tithe from the tithe.
(54) As requiring the Levite to give terumah.
(55) As not requiring the Levite to give terumah.
(56) Lev. XXI, 14.
(57) As a result, as e.g., in the case of a widow marrying a High priest.
(58) Lit., 'which is defective'. In this case, the widow or divorcee, and the child becomes a halal (profane, unfit for the priesthood) v. Kid. 66b. Consequently we see here that a forbidden act has a legal effect, for it says that the betrothal is valid. For if a prohibited act has no legal effect, should the betrothal be valid?
(59) Lev. XXI, 15, implying that such marriages produce halalim (unfit for the priesthood) but not mamzerim (illegitimate children). Consequently we see that the betrothal in this case is valid.
(60) Since he holds that a prohibited act has a legal effect, what need is there for the text: Neither shall he profane etc.
(61) Which would imply that it refers to the status of the child alone.
(62) יחלל the extra ל indicates a further teaching.
(63) That it becomes a halal.
(64) That she becomes profaned (חללה) and therefore if she is the daughter of a priest, she cannot eat her father's terumah. It is for this purpose that the text is necessary and not to teach that the betrothal is valid, despite the prohibition involved, as there is no need of an extra text to inform us of this, since in every case, according to Abaye, the ruling is that a forbidden act is valid.
(65) Lev. XXII, 20; which text is explained (infra) as meaning: Ye shall not consecrate.
(66) So Sh. Mek.
(67) And they are sacred to the extent of their value.
(68) Who holds that a forbidden act has no legal effect.
(69) Lev. XXII, 20. So Bah.
(70) To the extent of its value for the altar.
(71) Since he holds that a forbidden act has a legal effect, what need is there for this text?
(72) Of one who consecrates a blemished animal.
(73) That it cannot be offered up on the altar.
(74) But not for sacrifice on the altar.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 6a

[Anything too long or too short that mayest] thou offer for a freewill-offering,1 that is, for dedications for Temple repairs,2 and we have learnt: If one consecrates unblemished animals for Temple repairs, although he infringes a negative command,3 the act is valid? This refutes Raba?4 - Raba can answer you: From the same verse5 from which you include the case of blemished animals dedicated for the altar,6 you include the case of unblemished animals dedicated for Temple repairs.7

But is there not the case of one who steals, concerning which the Divine Law says: 'Thou shalt not steal',8 and we have learnt: If one steals9 wood and makes it into vessels or wool and makes it into garments, he pays [the value of the object] as it was at the time of the theft?10 This refutes Raba?11 - Raba can answer you: The case is different there, since Scripture says: That he shall restore [that which he took by robbery],12 intimating [that the restoration is to be] according to what he had robbed.13 And Abaye?14 - The text: That which he took by robbery15 is required in order to teach that he adds a fifth for his own robbery15 but not for that of his father.16

But is there not the case of one who takes the pledge,17 concerning which the Divine Law says: Thou shalt not go into his house to fetch his pledge18 and we have learnt: 'He [the creditor] returns the pillow at night and the plough in the day'?19 - This refutes Raba?20 - Raba can answer you: The case is different there,21 for Scripture says:22 Thou shalt surely restore [the pledge].23 And Abaye?24 - If the Divine Law had not stated 'thou shalt surely restore [the pledge]', I might have thought that he has only broken a prohibition,25 and if he wishes, he can restore the pledge, and if he wishes, he need not. The text therefore informs us [that it is not so].26

But is there not the case of pe'ah,27 concerning which the Divine Law says: Thou shalt not wholly reap the corner of thy field,28 and we have learnt:29 [The proper performance of] the command of pe'ah is to separate from the standing corn. If he did not separate from the standing corn, he separates from the sheaves. If he did not separate from the sheaves, he separates from the pile [of grain] before he evens it. If he has evened it,30 he tithes it and then gives pe'ah to him [the poor man]. In the name of R. Ishmael it was said: He also separates from the dough?31 This refutes Abaye?32 - Abaye can answer you: The case is different there,33 since Scripture says: Thou shalt leave,34 [and again] thou shalt leave35 as redundant.36 And Raba?37 - He can answer you:38 There is another case of 'leaving' similar to this. And what is it? It is the case of one who renounces ownership of his vineyard, for it was taught: If one renounces ownership of his vineyard and wakes in the morning and harvests it, he is bound to give peret,39 the defective grapecluster,40 the forgotten sheaf41 and pe'ah, but he is exempt from tithe.42

Said R. Aha the son of Raba to R. Ashi: And now that you have given all these [various] answers,43 wherein do Abaye and Raba really differ? - They differ in the case of stipulated usury44 and will be on the lines of R. Eleazar's [statement]. For R. Eleazar said: Stipulated usury can be reclaimed through the judges,

____________________
(1) Lev. XXII, 23.
(2) From which it is inferred that only blemished animals are fit to dedicate for Temple repairs, but not unblemished animals; v. infra 7b.
(3) V. infra 7b.
(4) Who says that a forbidden act has no legal effect.
(5) From the text: 'But for a vow it shall not be accepted'.
(6) Which we explained above as implying that they are not acceptable but are consecrated, at least for their money value, for the altar.
(7) As being forbidden to offer; and we thus compare the case of unblemished animals dedicated for Temple repairs to the case of blemished animals dedicated for the altar. Just as in the case of the latter, we say although there is a negative command the act is valid, so in the case of the former, though there is a negative command, the act is valid. But elsewhere, Raba maintains, a forbidden act has no legal effect.
(8) Lev. XIX, 13.
(9) Lit., 'he robbed', 'he took it openly by force'.
(10) I.e., for the wood or wool alone, as we say that he obtains the ownership of the garment or vessel by reason of the change which he has effected, in spite of the forbidden act of stealing; v. B. K. 93a
(11) Who says that a forbidden act has no legal effect.
(12) Lev. V, 23.
(13) But not according to its value at present, after being improved and changed.
(14) Who holds that a forbidden act has a legal effect. What need is there for the text: 'That which he took by robbery'?
(15) For the text occurs in connection with the taking of a false oath and making a confession following a robbery, for which there is the extra penalty of adding a fifth to the value of the theft.
(16) Even if he swore falsely concerning it.
(17) For a debt, without the consent of the debtor.
(18) Deut. XXIV, 10.
(19) B. M. 113a. The law applies even if he took the pledge without the warrant of the court. We see therefore that a prohibited act is valid, otherwise the pledge would not be the creditor's at all and he would have to restore the pillow even in the day (Tosaf.).
(20) Who says that a forbidden act has no legal effect.
(21) In the Mishnah just quoted.
(22) Deut. XXIV, 13.
(23) Since the text repeats 'thou shalt surely restore, etc.', which teaches that the law applies also to the case where the pledge was taken without the warrant of the court; v. Tosaf.
(24) Who holds that a forbidden act has a legal effect; what need is there for the text 'thou shalt surely restore the pledge'?
(25) By taking the pledge without warrant.
(26) That the restoration is in every case compulsory.
(27) The corner of the field which belongs to the poor.
(28) Lev. XXIII, 22.
(29) B. K. 94a.
(30) When it becomes subject to tithes and terumah.
(31) And the change of name from grain does not give him ownership so as to exempt him from pe'ah. The Rabbis, however, differ from R. Ishmael and hold that the change in the name makes it exempt from pe'ah; v. B.K. 94a.
(32) Who says that a forbidden act has a legal effect. The difficulty will arise if we accept the view of the Rabbis, for since he has not separated pe'ah from the standing corn, he transgresses a negative command. He ought then, according to Abaye, to be exempt from pe'ah, as a forbidden act is valid. The difficulty will even more certainly arise according to Abaye, if we adopt the view of R. Ishmael, for he goes even further than the Rabbis as regards the duty of giving pe'ah. V. Sh. Mek.
(33) With reference to pe'ah.
(34) Lev. XIX, 10.
(35) Ibid. XXIII, 22.
(36) The extra text therefore teaches us that although the grain has changed in his possession, he does not acquire possession of it, and is still bound to separate pe'ah and to leave it for the poor.
(37) Who holds that a forbidden act is not valid. What will he do with the additional text 'thou shalt leave'?
(38) The object of the extra text 'thou shalt leave' is to teach the following.
(39) Grapes fallen off during cutting, v. Pe'ah VIII, 3.
(40) Heb. 'oleloth; which belong to the poor, v. ibid 4.
(41) Which also belongs to the poor. And although in the normal way renunciation of ownership exempts from the duty of giving all these things to the poor, this kind of renunciation does not exempt, on account of the additional command 'thou shalt leave' mentioned in connection with peret, pe'ah, etc.
(42) For in connection with tithes there is no text 'thou shalt leave'.
(43) The Baraithas and the Mishnahs quoted above in the Gemara either as questioning Abaye's or Raba's dictum, as the case may be, and the replies of each of these teachers explaining that, although elsewhere they maintain their own view on the subject as to whether a forbidden act has a legal effect or otherwise, the case of the particular Baraitha or Mishnah adduced was different, inasmuch as there existed a text to render it an exception.
(44) Where the creditor arranges for a fixed amount as interest on loan. Abaye will hold that the action is valid and therefore the interest would not be reclaimed, in spite of transgressing the negative command relating to usury. Raba, however, will hold that the action has no legal effect and the interest therefore must be returned.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 6b

whereas the dust of usury1 cannot be reclaimed through the judges. R. Johanan, however, says: Even stipulated usury is not reclaimed through the judges.2 Thereupon he [R. Aha] said to him: But do they3 differ merely in opinion? Do they not differ in the interpretation of Scriptural texts? For R. Isaac said: What is the reason of R. Johanan? Scripture says: He hath given forth upon usury and hath taken increase: shall he then live? He shall not live,4 thus intimating that the taking of usury is a matter that affects life5 but is not subject to restoration.6 R. Aha b. Adda says: From here:7 Scripture says, 'But fear thy God',8 intimating that the taking of usury is a matter of fearing God but is not subject to restoration. Raba says: From here:7 [Scripture says:] He hath done all these abominations: he shall surely die: his blood shall be upon him.9 Now, lo, if he begat a son that is a robber, a shedder of blood.10 Lenders on interest are compared to shedders of blood. Just as shedders of blood cannot make restoration [of the lives lost], so lenders on interest are not required to make restoration [of interest]. And R. Nahman b. Isaac said: What is the reason of R. Eleazar?11 Scripture says: That thy brother may live with thee,12 thus intimating that he must return the interest so that he [the borrower] may live with you.

But then wherein do Abaye and Raba [really] differ? - On the question whether a change13 enables one to obtain ownership.14 Another version: The difference will be15 in the various answers [given above].16 [Still] another version: The difference17 will be in the matter of stipulated usury. According to Abaye he [the debtor] does not return the interest whereas according to Raba he is required to return the interest.18 But does not Abaye also hold that we reclaim stipulated usury through the judges? For Abaye said: If one claims four zuz from his fellow as interest, and the latter gave the lender in his shop for it a garment to the value of five [zuz], we recover four [zuz] from him and the remaining [zuz] we say he gave as a gift. Raba says however: We recover from him five [zuz]. What is the reason? The whole [sum] came to him as interest.19 - Rather then the difference of opinion between Abaye and Raba is in whether a change confers ownership.20

Our Rabbis taught: [Scripture says:] Whatsoever hath a blemish, that ye shall not offer.21 Now what does the text teach us? If it means that ye shall not kill, is this not stated below?22 Why then does the text state: 'Ye shall not offer'? It means, Ye shall not dedicate. Hence [the Sages] said: He who dedicates blemished animals for the altar23 is guilty on all five counts; for transgressing the prohibitory laws with reference to offering,24 to dedicating,25 killing,26 sprinkling and burning wholly or partly.27 They [the Sages] said in the name of R. Jose: [He is guilty] also [on account of the prohibition of] the receiving of the blood.

The Master said: 'If it means, Ye shall not kill, is not this mentioned below?' Where is this stated? - It has been taught: Blind or broken or maimed ye shall not offer these unto the Lord.28 What does Scripture teach us here? If it means not to dedicate,29 this is already stated above.30 Then what does Scripture mean by 'Ye shall not offer'? [That] ye shall not kill. [The text:] Nor make an offering by fire of them29 refers to the burning [of the sacrifices on the altar].31 From this I could only prove the burning of the whole sacrifice [as being prohibited]. Whence, however, will you deduce that the same applies to a part [of a sacrifice]? Because the text states: Of them.32 Whence will you deduce the prohibitory law for the sprinkling of the blood [of blemished animals]? The text states: Upon the altar.33 [The succeeding words:] 'Unto the Lord' include the case of a scapegoat.34 But do [the words]: 'Unto the Lord' come to include [something additional]? Has it not been taught:35 Now36 if you expound the word korban [offering], am I to understand it to include the case of animals dedicated for Temple repairs,37 which are described as korban as for instance when it says: We have therefore brought the Lord's korban?38 The text, however, states: And hath not brought it unto the door of the tent of the meeting.39 [We therefore argue as follows]: In respect of whatever is fit for the door of the tent of the meeting,40 one may become liable on account of the prohibition of slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple court; but in respect of whatever is not fit for the door of the tent of the meeting,41 one cannot become liable on account of the prohibition of slaughtering consecrated animals outside the Temple court. Shall I therefore exclude these42 but not the Red Heifer43 and the scapegoat, since they are fit for 'the door of the tent of the meeting'?44 Therefore the text states: 'Unto the Lord'; [the law concerning slaughtering outside the Temple court applies] only to those designated as 'unto the Lord',45 but these46 are excluded, for they are not designated 'unto the Lord'!47 - Said Raba: There we go according to the context [and48 here we go according to the context]. There,49 since the text, 'Unto the door of the tent of the meeting' includes,50 therefore the text, 'Unto the Lord' in that connection excludes.51 Here, however, as the text 'by fire' excludes,52 therefore the text, 'Unto the Lord' in that connection includes.53

The reason then why a blemished scapegoat is not brought is because Scripture says, 'Unto the Lord'. But if Scripture had not included [the case of a scapegoat] by means of the text, 'Unto the Lord', I might have thought that it was permissible to bring a blemished scapegoat. But consider: The lot54 designates only such as are fit 'for [the Lord]'?55 - Said R. Joseph: This represents the opinion of Hanan the Egyptian. [For it has been taught:] Hanan the Egyptian said: Even if there was blood56 in the cup,57 he brings another [goat]58 to pair with it.59 Granted that you can understand from Hanan the Egyptian that there is no rejection,60 can you Understand that there is no casting of lots? Perhaps he brings two new goats and casts lots?61 Rather said R. Joseph: This62 will represent the view of R. Simeon, for it has been taught: If one [of the two animals] died, he brings the other without casting lots.63 Raba says: [The text]64 is not required save for the case where e.g., [the scapegoat] became blemished on that day65 and he redeemed it for another [animal].66

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(1) I.e., indirect usury, e.g., when a man sells his field and says to the buyer that if he pays him at once he wants so much but if at a later date, he demands a larger sum. Therefore because he waits for the money, the buyer pays more, and this is called the 'dust of usury'.
(2) Raba will therefore agree with R. Eleazar and Abaye with R. Johanan, for here there is no special text in virtue of which one or the other of these Amoraim can say that the case is different.
(3) Abaye and Raba.
(4) Ezek. XVIII, 13.
(5) That he shall not live who takes usury.
(6) Therefore even according to Raba who holds that a forbidden act has no legal effect, here the act will be valid, because of the text.
(7) Where the Scriptural text makes the case of usury different, so that even Raba can agree that the forbidden act here is valid.
(8) Lev. XXV, 36. The text occurs in connection with the law of usury.
(9) Ezek. XVIII, 13.
(10) Ibid. XVIII, 10. The passage, Now etc. is omitted in Raba's statements in B.M. 61a.
(11) Who holds that stipulated usury is reclaimed through the judges.
(12) Lev. XXV, 36.
(13) By transgressing a Scriptural command.
(14) Abaye and Raba differ as to whether a change wrought in a thing brings about ownership, e.g., one who stole wood and made it into a vessel or wool and made it into a garment. According to Abaye the action is valid, for he acquires ownership and therefore he only pays the price of the wood or wool; whereas according to Raba the act is not valid, for he does not acquire ownership of the article and therefore must return the garment or the article. And when in the Gemara above we raise a difficulty for Raba from the relevant Mishnah: If one steals etc., do not reply that the case is different from the Mishnah because of a text, but answer that Raba will hold according to one Tanna in B.M. 61a who says that a change in an object does not confer ownership, whereas Abaye holds with another Tanna there who holds that a change does confer ownership. For other interpretations v. Rashi.
(15) Between Abaye and Raba,
(16) There will not actually be a difference in any specific case except in the kind of explanation each of these teachers will give in answer to the Baraitha or Mishnah as quoted above in the Gemara. Abaye, who says a forbidden act has a legal effect will explain any particular Baraitha or Mishnah which appears to contradict this according to his view, and Raba, who holds that a prohibited act has no legal effect, will explain any particular Baraitha or Mishnah according to his point of view.
(17) Between Abaye and Raba.
(18) As the action is not valid.
(19) We therefore see that even according to Abaye the interest is recovered.
(20) V. supra p. 33. n. 11.
(21) Lev. XXII, 20.
(22) That a blemished animal must not be killed for the altar. The Gemara explains this subsequently.
(23) Burnt them wholly on the altar.
(24) Blemished animals.
(25) The word 'dedicating' is omitted by Sh. Mek. and by Rashi, in Hul. 80b, where the passage is cited.
(26) Blemished animals.
(27) Whether he burnt the whole or part of the animal, he is guilty of breaking the prohibitory law of burning a blemished animal on the altar.
(28) Lev. XXII, 22.
(29) Blemished animals for the altar.
(30) But whatsoever hath a blemish that ye shall not offer (ibid. 20).
(31) This is the prohibition of burning.
(32) The continuation of the text, 'Nor make, etc.'.
(33) The continuation of the text 'Of them'.
(34) That he who dedicates it blemished is guilty of breaking the prohibition 'Ye shall not offer'. Lit., 'the goat that is sent away'.
(35) Zeb. 113a and infra 13a.
(36) The Baraitha opened as follows: One might think that if one kills hullin (an unconsecrated animal) inside a Temple court one is guilty of excision? Scripture, however, says: Korban (offering) Lev. XVII, 4, thus implying that guilt is only incurred in connection with a korban. Now if you expound, etc.
(37) That if one killed them outside the Temple court he would be liable to the penalty of excision.
(38) Num. XXXI, 50. And the offerings mentioned here were for the Sanctuary, as it speaks of jewels of gold, chains, bracelets, etc.
(39) Lev. XVII, 4.
(40) I.e., to be offered up on the altar.
(41) I.e., dedications for Temple repairs because they are blemished.
(42) Dedicated animals for Temple repairs.
(43) Lit., 'the cow for expiation'.
(44) For they are unblemished, as both a red heifer and a scapegoat must be unblemished for their several purposes.
(45) Actually offered up on the altar.
(46) The red heifer and the scapegoat.
(47) We therefore see that the text, 'Unto the Lord' implies exclusion and yet above you say the text 'Unto the Lord' is intended to include.
(48) So Sh. Mek.
(49) In connection with slaughtering outside the Temple court.
(50) All unblemished animals to incur guilt for slaughtering them outside the Temple court.
(51) It can only be to exclude something and we therefore exclude the cases of the scapegoat and the red heifer.
(52) That only in respect of an offering which is burnt is there liability for dedicating a blemished animal, and that in respect of a sacrifice which is not burnt and is dedicated in its blemished state, one does not incur any guilt for its dedication. I might therefore have thought that a scapegoat, since it is not burnt, is in the same category.
(53) The case of a scapegoat, so that if one dedicates it in its blemished state one is guilty of transgressing the prohibitory law of 'Ye shall not offer it'.
(54) Which determines which goat was to be offered on the altar, and which the scapegoat, which was sent to Azazel.
(55) I.e., the two animals must be unblemished. For since we do not know on which will fall the lot 'for the Lord' and on which 'for Azazel', then necessarily both must be fit, as either may be destined 'for the Lord'.
(56) Of the goat 'for the Lord',
(57) The sprinkling of the blood not having yet taken place and the scapegoat was either lost or became blemished.
(58) For a scapegoat.
(59) With the slaughtered goat. This obviously must be without casting lots, since he cannot do so as the animal 'for the Lord' has already been slaughtered. Now just as according to Hanan one can bring a second animal for the scapegoat without casting lots, so it might be assumed he can bring it in a blemished condition. The special text therefore, 'Unto the Lord' is necessary to inform us that this is not so.
(60) That although the goat 'for the Lord' has been already slaughtered, since the sprinkling had not yet taken place, it is not denied as having suffered a disability in the process of the ritual, thus becoming rejected from the altar. We can consequently proceed with the selection of another animal for the scapegoat. The first Tanna, however, will hold that the blood is poured out, since there was a break in the ritual.
(61) Perhaps the casting of lots still takes place in the following manner. He brings two fresh animals and casts lots as to which shall be 'for the Lord' and which for the scapegoat. The animal which is designated 'for the Lord' he leaves to pasture until blemished, and the other one, on which the lot for Azazel has fallen, he brings and pairs it with the slaughtered goat. Now since he must cast lots, the second animal, in order to become a scapegoat, must be unblemished.
(62) The view that without the text 'Unto the Lord' I might have thought that a scapegoat could be brought even in a blemished state.
(63) Yoma 40a, 63b, I might therefore have thought since lots are not required in these circumstances, there is no need that the scapegoat should be unblemished. The Scriptural text 'Unto the Lord' therefore teaches us that it is not so.
(64) 'Unto the Lord'.
(65) After the lots had been cast.
(66) Which was also blemished and there would be a penalty for the dedication.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 7a

You might argue that we can well understand why at the outset [we require both animals to be unblemished] because we do not know which one will be designated 'for the Lord'. But here, since the animal designated 'for the Lord' is recognised, there is no punishment of lashes.1 The text ['Unto the Lord' mentioned above] therefore informs us [that it is not so].2

The Master said: 'It is reported in the name of R. Jose son of R. Judah: [There is] also [the case of the prohibitory law relating to] the receiving of the blood'. What is the reason of R. Jose son of R. Judah? Scripture says: That which hath its stones bruised or crushed or torn or cut etc. [ye shall not offer unto the Lord];3 this refers to the receiving of the blood mentioned by R. Jose son of R. Judah.4 And according to the first Tanna,5 what need is there for this text: 'Ye shall not offer'? - It is necessary for the case of the sprinkling of the blood of a blemished animal.6 But do we not deduce this from the text: Upon the altar?7 - This8 is simply Scripture's manner of speaking.9 But may it not also be, according to R. Jose son of R. Judah, Scriptures manner of speaking?10 - Yes, it is so.11 Then whence does he deduce the prohibition in respect of receiving the blood?12 - He derives [this ruling] from the following: 'Neither from the hand of a foreigner shall ye offer';13 this refers to the receiving of the blood [mentioned by R. Jose son of R. Judah]. And what does the first Tanna do with this text, 'Neither shall ye offer'? - He needs it for this: It may occur to you to think that since the Noahides14 were only commanded concerning the loss of limbs,15 it is therefore immaterial whether the sacrifice is for their altar16 or ours.17 [The text]18 therefore informs us [that this is not so].

Another version: R. Jose son of R. Judah says: '[There is] also [the prohibition relating to] the receiving of the blood'. What is the reason? - Since Scripture says: 'That which hath its stones bruised or crushed etc. ye shall not offer unto the Lord', this refers to the receiving of the blood and the prohibition of sprinkling19 is derived from the text, 'Upon the altar'. And according to the Rabbis, why not also derive the prohibition of sprinkling from the text, 'Upon the altar'? - In fact they do. Then what does the text, 'Ye shall not offer' stated in connection with the text, 'Bruised or crushed' come to teach? - It is required to teach us the case of a private bamah.20 And according to R. Jose son of R. Judah, do we not require the text21 to teach us the case of a private bamah? - Yes, it is so, Then whence does he derive [the prohibition of] offering with reference to the receiving of the blood? - He derives it from the text, 'Neither from the hand of a foreigner shall ye offer', this meaning the receiving of the blood. And the Rabbis?22 - There is need for the text. You might think that since the Noahides are only commanded concerning the loss of a limb for their own bamah,23 we too may therefore accept from them [a permanently blemished animal].24 The text, 'Of any of these' therefore informs us that we do not accept.25 To this Resh Lakish demurred:26 Perhaps this27 is stated only in connection with the case of an unblemished animal which became blemished,28 in which case there is a transgression, but if it is an originally blemished animal, it is then a mere palm-tree!29 - Thereupon R. Hiyya b. Joseph said to him: [Scripture says:] 'Too long or too short'30 in the section31 and these are originally blemished animals.32 He [Resh Lakish] said: Perhaps we have learnt this33 only with reference to substitutes,34 for we have learnt: There is a restriction in the law regarding substitutes which does not apply to original sacrifices, in that holiness can attach [as substitute] to an animal permanently blemished!35 - R. Johanan replied to him: Have you not heard what R. Jannai said: At the college a vote was taken and it was decided: He who dedicates a blemished animal for the altar is guilty on five counts.36 Now if [this passage] deals with substitutes, then there are six, for there is also the prohibition of exchanging?37 - What then? Do you maintain that he deals with a case of an animal originally blemished? Then why should there be the punishment of lashes, since it is merely a palm-tree? - He replied, There is nothing irreverential about a palm-tree [as] it is a kind of wood. But in dedicating an originally blemished animal, there is something irreverential [as regards consecrations], since he ignores unblemished animals and dedicates blemished ones, and therefore he is guilty.

Another version: He [R. Hiyya] said to him [Resh Lakish]: Even so the act is irreverential.38 For the dedication of a palm-tree, as there is nothing in its class [fit for the altar] there is no punishment of lashes. But the case is otherwise with reference to a blemished animal, since there exists in the class of animals [those fit for the altar], and he is therefore punishable with lashes.39

Said Raba: Now that you say that the reason why [one who dedicates] a blemished animal incurs the punishment [of lashes] is because the act is irreverential,40 then even if one dedicates it [a blemished animal] for the value of its drink-offerings, one should incur the punishment [of lashes]. [Raba's41 is a point at issue among Tannaim.]

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(1) For breaking the prohibitory law of 'Ye shall not offer' if the scapegoat were dedicated in a blemished state.
(2) To include the case of a blemished scapegoat as infringing the prohibition of 'Ye shall not offer'.
(3) Lev. XXII, 24.
(4) Deduced from the repetition of the phrase, 'Ye shall not offer'
(5) R. Jose's disputant, who does not hold that there is an infringement of a prohibitory law in receiving the blood of a blemished dedicated animal.
(6) In order to teach us that there is an infringement of a prohibitory, law in doing so.
(7) Ibid. XXII, 22.
(8) The text, 'Ye shall not offer'.
(9) As a summing up of the law relating to blemishes, and we do not infer some special ruling therefrom.
(10) Alluding to the text, 'Ye shall not offer', quoted above.
(11) It is Scripture's way of speaking.
(12) If this text, 'Ye shall not offer' is not to be specially interpreted.
(13) Ibid. XXII, 25.
(14) I.e., Gentiles who are the descendants of Noah.
(15) That only such a defect disqualifies a sacrifice for their altar, but a mere blemish is no disqualification.
(16) I.e., which a Gentile had erected to offer upon it to God.
(17) That we may offer up a blemished animal belonging to a Gentile on our altar so long as it is not short of a limb.
(18) 'Neither shall ye offer'.
(19) Of a blemished animal.
(20) That it is forbidden to offer up a blemished animal on one. Bamah is a high place.
(21) 'Ye shall not offer' occurring in connection with the text 'Bruised or crushed etc.'.
(22) Who differ with R. Jose what need have they for this text?
(23) For they are not forbidden to offer up a blemished sacrifice on their bamah.
(24) To offer up on our altar.
(25) For a Gentile's blemished animal is compared with our own. Just as in our case, we do not offer up a blemished animal on the altar, even without the loss of a limb, so we do not accept for sacrifice a permanently blemished animal from the Gentiles.
(26) Referring to the Baraitha above which says that one who dedicates blemished animals for the altar is guilty of transgressing five negative commands.
(27) That the punishment of lashes is inflicted for transgressing the prohibition of 'Ye shall not offer'.
(28) As one might be under the impression that since it was once holy, the fact that it subsequently became blemished should not disqualify it from being offered up on the altar.
(29) He could not possibly have imagined that it would be fit for the altar except for its money value, and therefore one might think that there would not be any punishment of lashes.
(30) Lev. XXII, 23.
(31) Dealing with the various permanent blemishes which render an animal unfit.
(32) Concerning which Scripture says, 'Ye shall not offer' which indicates as explained above, that one is guilty in dedicating these blemished animals.
(33) Which says that there is a penalty for dedicating.
(34) Where the substituted animal is blemished.
(35) For this reason there is the penalty of lashes, but if he dedicated an animal originally blemished, there may perhaps be no penalty for the dedication, unless he later offered it up.
(36) I.e., he breaks five negative commands.
(37) 'Nor change it'.
(38) Where one dedicates an animal which became blemished. There is therefore a degradation of holy things.
(39) For dedicating something which is not fit.
(40) To dedicate an animal which has become blemished.
(41) So Sh. Mek. Cur. edd. It has been taught like Raba.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 7b

[Scripture says:] That mayest thou offer for a freewill-offering:1 this refers to dedications for Temple repairs. Now I have here mentioned only the case2 of a freewill-offering.3 Whence do we derive that the same applies to a vow?4 Scripture says: And for a vow.5 One might think [that the blemished animals vowed for offering are fit] even for the altar? The text, however, states: 'And for a vow it shall not be accepted', thus referring to dedications for the altar.6 I here mentioned only the case of a freewill-offering.7 Whence can we derive that it is the same with reference to a vow?8 The text states: A freewill-offering'.9

Rabbi said: [Scripture says:] 'It shall not be accepted', the text thus speaks of accepting its body [for sacrifice on the altar].10 But is not this opinion precisely that of the first Tanna? Must we not say that they differ11 in this: The first Tanna holds that even if he dedicates the blemished animal for the value of drink-offerings, he also incurs the punishment of lashes, whereas Rabbi says: The punishment only applies to the acceptance of the body,12 but not if the dedication is for the value of a drink-offering? It stands proved.13 But why then is the word 'that'14 inserted? - It is needed to intimate what has been taught: Scripture says, That mayest thou offer for a freewill-offering, thus intimating: that you may offer as a freewill-offering [for Temple repairs], but you may not offer unblemished animals as a freewill-offering [for Temple repairs]. Hence the Rabbis say: He who dedicates unblemished animals15 for Temple repairs is guilty of transgressing a positive command.16 And whence do we derive that one is guilty of transgressing a negative command? Because it says: 'And the Lord spake unto Moses saying',17 thus teaching us that the whole section is regarded as having the force of a prohibitory law. This is the teaching of R. Judah. Said Rabbi to Bar Kappara: How do you understand this?18 He replied to him: Because of the word 'saying',19 which indicates that a negative command has been said in connection with these statements.20 The School of Rabbi says: The word 'saying' means, tell21 [the children of Israel] a negative command.22

It is stated: If one burns on the altar the limbs23 of blemished animals, Raba says: He transgresses the prohibitory laws of burning the whole and burning a part.24 Abaye says: There is no punishment of lashes for a comprehensive prohibition.25

They raised an objection: He who dedicates blemished animals for the altar is guilty on five counts,26 This refutes Abaye?27 - Said R. Kahana:28 It refers to different individuals.29 But if it [the Baraitha] refers to different individuals, [why then does the Baraitha say,] 'He incurs etc.'? Is not 'they incur' required? Then obviously the Baraitha refers to one individual. Shall we say that this refutes Abaye? - Abaye can answer you: Exclude [from the Baraitha] the prohibition for burning part [of the blemished animal on the altar] and include [the prohibition for] receiving the blood [of the blemished animal]. [You say] the receiving of the blood; this prohibition is maintained only by R. Jose son of R. Judah,30 but not by the Rabbis?31 - This is a difficulty.

Another version: Since the latter part [of the Baraitha]32 is the opinion of R. Jose son of R. Judah,33 the first part will be the opinion of the Rabbis.34 Shall we say this refutes Abaye? This is a final refutation.

MISHNAH. PRIESTS HAVE POWER TO EXCHANGE [AN ANIMAL] BELONGING TO THEMSELVES35 AND ISRAELITES ALSO HAVE POWER TO EXCHANGE AN ANIMAL BELONGING TO THEMSELVES. PRIESTS HAVE NOT THE POWER TO EXCHANGE A SIN-OFFERING,36 A GUILT-OFFERING36 OR A FIRSTLING.37 SAID R. JOHANAN B. NURI: WHAT IS THE REASON WHY [PRIESTS] HAVE NOT THE POWER TO EXCHANGE A FIRSTLING?38 R. AKIBA SAID TO HIM: A SIN-OFFERING AND A GUILT-OFFERING ARE PRIESTLY GIFTS AND A FIRSTLING IS ALSO A PRIESTLY GIFT. JUST AS IN THE CASE OF A SIN-OFFERING AND GUILT-OFFERING [PRIESTS] HAVE NO POWER TO EXCHANGE THEM,39 SO IN THE CASE OF A FIRSTLING [PRIESTS] HAVE NO POWER TO EXCHANGE IT. SAID R. JOHANAN B. NURI: IT IS RIGHT THAT PRIESTS SHOULD HAVE NO POWER TO EXCHANGE A SIN-OFFERING AND A GUILT-OFFERING BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO CLAIM ON THESE [OFFERINGS] WHILE THESE ARE ALIVE. WILL YOU, HOWEVER, SAY THAT THE SAME APPLIES TO A FIRSTLING ON WHICH [THE PRIESTS] HAVE A CLAIM WHEN IT IS ALIVE?40 R. AKIBA THEREUPON REPLIED TO HIM: HAS NOT SCRIPTURE ALREADY SAID: THEN IT AND THE EXCHANGE THEREOF SHALL BE HOLY?41 NOW WHERE DOES THE HOLINESS ARISE?42 IN THE HOUSE OF THE OWNERS.43 SIMILARLY EXCHANGE IS NOT EFFECTED EXCEPT IN THE HOUSE OF THE OWNERS.44

GEMARA. We have learnt elsewhere: An unblemished firstling may be sold alive,45 but a blemished firstling whether alive or slaughtered; and [the priest] may also betroth a woman with it.46 Said R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: This47 was taught only for nowadays,48 since a priest has a claim upon it.49 But in Temple times, since an unblemished firstling is destined to be offered up, we may not sell it alive unblemished.50 Raba raised an objection to R. Nahman: An unblemished firstling may be sold alive. [It says,] 'alive', implying, but not slaughtered. Now to what period does this refer? Shall I say that this refers to nowadays?51 Is there an unblemished animal that may be slaughtered [nowadays]?52 Then obviously you must say that the term 'alive' refers to Temple times53 and yet it says: An unblemished firstling may be sold alive.54 - No! One can still maintain that it refers to nowadays, for does it state: One may sell it unblemished alive, but not slaughtered?55 It wishes to inform us of this very thing, that a firstling [nowadays] may be sold unblemished alive.56

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(1) Lev. XXII, 23; referring to a blemished animal.
(2) That a blemished animal can become holy for Temple repairs.
(3) E.g., where he says: 'Behold this animal shall be dedicated for Temple repairs'.
(4) If one says: 'I vow to dedicate an animal for Temple repairs',that it is a duty to set aside the animal even if blemished.
(5) And we interpret the text thus: That mayest thou offer for a freewill-offering and also for a vow.
(6) For the term 'accepted' can only mean for the purpose of offering up on the altar.
(7) If one said, 'I vow to dedicate this blemished burnt-offering', such dedication is not fit for the altar, as being not 'accepted', for this kind of dedication is mentioned next to the text, 'It can not be accepted'.
(8) That one cannot say in connection with a blemished animal: 'Behold, this is for the altar'.
(9) The meaning of the text will therefore be as follows: The freewill-offering which you may dedicate for Temple repairs and the blemished animal vowed for Temple repairs are not acceptable for the altar.
(10) That it must not be offered up.
(11) Between the first Tanna and Rabbi.
(12) I.e., sacrifice on the altar.
(13) That Raba's ruling above is a matter of dispute between Tannaim.
(14) That (אותו) mayest thou etc. Since you say that the words 'vow' and 'freewill-offering' are linked together as meaning that a blemished animal either as vow or freewill-offering is not acceptable for the altar, the word 'that' which possesses a restrictive meaning, is not needed (Wilna Gaon).
(15) Which are fit for sacrifice on the altar.
(16) The prohibition derived by implication from the positive command that mayest thou, and which has the force only of a positive command.
(17) Lev. XXII, 17.
(18) How do you gather that the section has the force of a prohibitory law?
(19) לאמר
(20) The word לאמר is split into לא אמר 'he said, not'.
(21) אמר.
(22) לא which with the previous word forms לאמר.
(23) The pieces, in accordance with the law of a burnt-offering.
(24) Derived from the text, 'Nor make an offering by fire', for when we burn the whole, this also includes a portion of it.
(25) The prohibition comprises both the burning of the whole and a part, and in such a case there is only punishment on one count only (v. Rashi).
(26) I.e., he breaks five prohibitory laws, the Baraitha enumerating as two prohibitions the burning of the whole, and a part of the burnt-offering.
(27) Who holds that there is only one prohibitory law for burning the whole on the altar.
(28) V. Sh. Mek.
(29) In the case where one person burns the whole of an animal and another burns a part of an animal, each is separately liable to one count of lashes for his own particular transgression. Where, however, one person is the offender he would not be liable on the count of burning a part.
(30) Who adds in the Baraitha the case of receiving the blood as yet another prohibitory law.
(31) Who do not agree with R. Jose, and there would thus not be five prohibitions.
(32) Which speaks of the receiving of the blood.
(33) V. supra 6b.
(34) Who hold that there is no prohibitory law against receiving the blood of a blemished dedicated animal. We cannot therefore include in the Baraitha receiving the blood as a prohibitory law. In order therefore to make up the five prohibitions, we must include burning a part of the burnt-offering as a prohibitory law, which will be at variance with the view of Abaye.
(35) Which they set aside for themselves, and if they substituted an unconsecrated animal for them, then the animal and the substitute become sacred.
(36) Which an Israelite gave to a priest for a sacrifice. If a priest exchanged this the exchange is not valid, since he has no share in the animal except from the time it is burnt and onwards, and we learn later in this chapter that a man cannot cause a substitution of a thing which is not his.
(37) Which an Israelite gave to him.
(38) Since the whole belongs to the priest and the firstling is given to him while alive, the Israelite not being atoned for therewith.
(39) For we are sure that they do not legally acquire possession of them until the time of the burning of the sacrifices.
(40) The case of a firstling is different and there should therefore be power to exchange it, the priest having a claim on it while it is alive.
(41) Lev. XXVII, 10; thus comparing the substitute with dedication itself.
(42) In connection with things dedicated.
(43) But it does not take place at all in the house of a priest and therefore a priest has not the power to exchange a firstling.
(44) I.e., in the house of an Israelite in whose possession the holiness of a firstling arises and therefore if an Israelite exchanged a firstling, the substitute is sacred, but not if a priest made the exchange.
(45) Ma'as. Sh. I, 2; B.K. 12b.
(46) For it is considered his money.
(47) That a priest can sell it alive.
(48) When the Temple is no longer in existence, and the firstling is consequently not destined for the altar.
(49) Alive, for even nowadays a firstling belongs to the priest.
(50) For a priest has no claim on it except from the time when the parts of the sacrifice are burnt on the altar.
(51) The buyer waiting till a blemish occurs to the animal in order to be able to eat it.
(52) For it would be slaughtering sacrifices outside the Temple wall.
(53) When, however, it may not be sold slaughtered, for it is an abuse of holy things to make an ordinary transaction with its flesh.
(54) We therefore see that one may sell an unblemished firstling alive in Temple times, contrary to the opinion of R. Nahman.
(55) For us to infer that we are not dealing with the present time, since nowadays there can be no unblemished slaughtered firstling.
(56) For it might have occurred to you to think that the priest has no claim on it until the firstling is blemished. It is not, however, the object of the Mishnah that we should deduce therefrom that we may not sell a slaughtered firstling, as we are dealing with the present time and nowadays there is no unblemished slaughtered firstling.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 8a

He raised [a further] objection: With reference to a firstling it is said: Thou shalt not redeem1 implying but it may be sold.2 Now with what case are we dealing? Shall I say that [the Baraitha] refers to nowadays? Read the second part [of the text]: Thou shalt sprinkle their blood upon the altar!3 Now is there in existence an altar nowadays [for sacrifice]? Then obviously [it] refers to Temple times. Of what then does it speak? Shall I say of a blemished firstling? Read the second part [of the text]: Thou shalt sprinkle their blood upon the altar and shalt burn their fat.3 Now if we are dealing with a blemished firstling, is it fit for sacrifice? Then we must be dealing with an unblemished firstling, and it says, 'but it may be sold'!4 - But is this an argument?5 The first part [of the text]6 refers to a blemished [animal]7 and the latter part of the text8 refers to an unblemished [firstling]!

R. Mesharsheya raised an objection: If the child of a priestess became mixed up with a child of her slave,9 when the children grow up they free one another;10 both may eat terumah;11 they take their share simultaneously at the threshing floor;12 their firstling13 is left to pasture until blemished14 and it is eaten blemished by their owners. Now with what case15 are we here dealing? Shall I say that we are dealing with a firstling of nowadays? For then what is the difference between [a firstling] belonging to ourselves16 and [a firstling] belonging to them,17 since [a firstling] belonging to ourselves also requires a blemish to be eaten?18 Then you must admit that we are dealing with a firstling in Temple times.19 Now if you say that the priest has a claim on a firstling [alive],20 there will be no difficulty.21 But if you say that he has no claim on a firstling alive, then let the Temple treasurer come and take it?22 - One can still say that we are dealing with a firstling of nowadays.23 And as regards the difficulty you raise as to why [a firstling] belonging to ourselves is different from [a firstling] belonging to them, [the answer is] we give ours to the priest in its blemished condition,24 but with [a firstling] belonging to them, since there is an element of priesthood,25 priests are excluded from claiming [this firstling].26

Another version: [Now if we are dealing with a firstling of] nowadays, why mention firstlings belonging [to persons] of uncertain priesthood?27 Even firstlings belonging to ourselves also are left to pasture [until blemished]? Then obviously we are dealing with a firstling of Temple times. Now if we are referring to a blemished firstling, why do we say, let them be left to pasture until blemished? Are they not already blemished? Then obviously we are dealing with unblemished firstlings; and only these28 may not sell;29 [but persons who are certainly priests may sell]?30 - It may still be that we are dealing with firstlings of nowadays. What is your difficulty? That even [firstlings] belonging to ourselves should also be left to pasture! [The answer is:] We cannot disregard the priest,31 for there exists no uncertainty of the priesthood, but these persons of uncertain [priesthood] can put off the priest, each one saying to the priest. 'I am a priest', 'I am a priest'.32

An objection was raised. R. Simeon said: [Scripture says:] And the cattle thereof.33 This excludes a firstling animal and an animal tithed34 in it [the city]. 'The spoil of it'; this excludes the money of the second tithes.35 Now with what case are we dealing? Shall I say that we are dealing with nowadays? For is the law of an apostate city in force [nowadays]? Have we not learnt: We do not practise the law of an apostate city except where there is in existence a Beth din of seventy-one?36 Then obviously we are dealing with Temple times. And in what condition [was the firstling]?37 If it was blemished, is this not the same as the text, 'The cattle thereof'?38 Then obviously we are dealing with an unblemished firstling. Now there will be no difficulty if you say that the priest has a claim on the firstling alive.39 But if you say the priest has no claim on a firstling alive, what need is there for the text 'The cattle thereof'?40 Why not derive this from the text, 'The spoil of it', from which we can deduce, But not the spoil of heaven?41 - One can still maintain that we are dealing with a blemished animal,42 and as regards the difficulty you raise that this is the case covered by the text, 'The cattle thereof',43 [the answer is] this implies, Whatever is eaten in the manner of 'The cattle thereof',44 excluding the cases of the firstling and animals tithed, for they are not covered by the words, The cattle thereof'. For we have learnt in a Mishnah: All dedications rendered unfit for sacrifice may be sold in the market and by the pound,45 with the exception of a firstling and an animal tithed, for their benefit belongs to the owners.46

An objection was raised. [Scripture says:] And committed a trespass against the Lord.47 This includes sacrifices of minor grades of holiness,48 which are considered the money of the owners.49 These are the words of R. Jose the Galilean. Ben Azzai says: [This text comes] to include peace-offerings.50 Abba Jose the son of Dosai says: R. Jose the Galilean only refers to a firstling.51 Now what period are we dealing with? Shall I say that of nowadays? Surely the case [of the firstling referred to by Abba Jose] is compared with peace-offerings?52 Then obviously we are dealing with Temple times. Now what are the circumstances? Shall I say that we are dealing with a case of a blemished firstling? Surely the case [of a firstling referred to by Abba Jose] is compared with peace-offerings?53 Then you must say that you are dealing with the case of an unblemished firstling.54 Deduce therefore from here that a priest has a claim on a firstling [alive].55

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(1) Num. XVIII, 17; that the redemption money should become holy and the firstling become hullin.
(2) And it is eaten in a sacred condition, i.e., must not be killed to be sold in a market or weighed by the pound; v. supra 5b, B.K. 13a, Bek. 32a.
(3) Num. XVIII, 17.
(4) We therefore see that an unblemished firstling in Temple times may be sold, contrary to the opinion of R. Nahman.
(5) That the two parts of the text must necessarily deal with an unblemished firstling.
(6) 'Thou shalt not redeem'.
(7) And we may therefore deduce therefrom that a firstling may be sold.
(8) 'Thou shalt sprinkle etc.'.
(9) And it is not known which is the child of the priestess and which is the child of her slave.
(10) Each one writes: 'If I am the master and you are the slave: Behold you are a free man', and both may marry a daughter of an Israelite.
(11) So long as they had not freed one another, for in any case each can say: 'If I am a priest then I eat terumah in my own right, and if I am a slave, then give me terumah as the slave of a priest', for the slave of a priest is permitted to partake of terumah.
(12) When they are both together they are given terumah, but one of them by himself does not receive terumah without the other present, in case the recipient is the slave, and this Tanna holds that we do not give terumah to the slave of a priest unless the master be present, for fear lest the slave might eventually claim a higher pedigree for himself, i.e., that of being a priest.
(13) Animal born in the pen of the mixed-up offspring.
(14) And are rendered unfit for sacrifice.
(15) Of their firstling required to pasture until blemished.
(16) To persons who are certainly priests.
(17) To the mixed-up offspring, as mentioned in the Bariatha above.
(18) For even in our case, even a person who is certainly a priest cannot eat a firstling nowadays unless it is blemished.
(19) A firstling therefore which belongs to us, i.e., to a genuine priest, is given to the priest for sacrifice, whereas theirs i.e., a firstling belonging to the mixed-up offspring must pasture until blemished. For although even a priest is required to carry out the law of a firstling, here the firstling must be left to pasture, because in the case of any other priest who set aside a firstling, there is no loss, as he himself offers it up and eats the flesh, but in the case mentioned by the Baraitha above, if the firstling is offered up, then no-one can eat it, since one of the offspring is not a priest but a slave and only a priest can eat a firstling unblemished in Temple times. Therefore the Baraitha above says a firstling must be left to pasture until blemished, for each one can say to the priest who claims, 'I am a priest and shall eat the firstling'.
(20) I.e., that he may sell it alive in its unblemished state even in Temple times.
(21) Therefore he can retain the firstling, saying, 'perhaps I am a priest and I have therefore a prior claim, and do not wish to give it to another priest, but shall wait till I am able to eat it'.
(22) And give it to a genuine priest, since the priest has no claim on the firstling till it is brought to the altar. This shows that even in Temple times the priest has a claim on the unblemished firstling, for we are undoubtedly dealing here with an unblemished animal, since the Baraitha says it is left to pasture, etc., which contradicts R. Abbuha.
(23) And therefore the firstling is left to pasture, for it is unfit for sacrifice and the priest has a claim upon it while it is alive.
(24) For although blemished and permissible to be eaten by non-priests, it must be given to the priests, otherwise it would be stealing the priestly due.
(25) In the case mentioned in the Baraitha above, where one of them is certainly a priest.
(26) And it is not stealing what is due to the priest, for each one of the mixed-up persons can claim, 'I am a priest' and since there is a doubt concerning money, the claimant must bring the necessary evidence to prove his case.
(27) As in the case in the Baraitha above, where there was a mixing-up between the offspring of a priestess and her slave.
(28) Persons of uncertain priesthood, as mentioned in the Baraitha above.
(29) The firstling.
(30) We therefore see that a priest may sell an unblemished firstling alive in Temple times, contrary to the opinion of R. Nahman in the name of R. Abbuha above.
(31) We have no option but to surrender a Firstling even blemished, otherwise it would be robbing the priestly due.
(32) And therefore they retain the firstling.
(33) Deut. XIII, 16; in connection with an apostate city which is totally destroyed on account of its inhabitants worshipping idols.
(34) The text 'And the cattle etc.' implies that one's own cattle is destroyed where there is no part which belongs to heaven (the Sanctuary), unlike the case of a firstling and tithes.
(35) This will represent the view of the teacher who maintains that the second tithe is money which belongs to heaven; v. Sanh. 112b.
(36) And as there is no Beth din of such a character in existence to-day, the law of an apostate city is inoperative.
(37) Or the tithed animal.
(38) Where the animal belongs entirely to a person and heaven has no share in it. Here, too, where a priest eats the firstling and an Israelite his tithe, there is no element which belongs to heaven.
(39) Therefore the exclusion of a firstling is derived from the text 'The cattle thereof' and not from the text 'The spoil of it', since it is not altogether the spoil of heaven, as the priest has a claim upon it.
(40) To exclude the case of a firstling and tithes from the law of an apostate city.
(41) Since therefore we exclude the case of a firstling and an animal tithed from the text 'The cattle thereof', this proves that the priest has a claim on the firstling. This will therefore raise a difficulty for the ruling of R. Nahman in the name of R. Abbuha, for we see here that an unblemished firstling may be sold in Temple times.
(42) In which there is no share for heaven and which therefore should be burnt in fire.
(43) Why therefore do we exclude the case of a firstling and an animal tithed?
(44) Where the animal belongs entirely to the owner.
(45) In order to fetch more money and we do not consider this degrading holy things.
(46) Therefore for the extra benefit in favour of the owners, we do not allow selling in the market and by the pound of a firstling, v. Bek. 32a, Bez. 28a. Hence a firstling and tithed animal are spared in an apostate city.
(47) Lev. V, 21.
(48) That if one deposited dedications of a minor grade of holiness with his neighbour, and the latter denied the deposit, took a false oath and subsequently confessed, he has to pay the principal plus a fifth as a fine, also to bring an offering on account of the false oath.
(49) And we can therefore apply the text mentioned in this connection: 'And lie unto his neighbour'.
(50) Which are certainly considered his money, but the case is not the same with regard to an animal tithed, for one cannot sell it either alive, slaughtered, unblemished or blemished.
(51) Where a priest deposited his firstling with another, the latter denying the deposit, taking an oath and then confessing. He pays the principal together with the fine of a fifth and brings a trespass-offering, the reason being because a priest can sell a firstling alive unblemished and it is therefore considered his money (R. Gershom).
(52) And the peace-offering cannot be brought nowadays.
(53) For as regards a firstling and a priest, we can make a distinction between an unblemished and a blemished animal, as in the former case one might say that the priest has no claim on it until the time of offering it up on the altar, whereas in the latter case the priest might claim it immediately, as the animal is unfit for sacrifice. But with reference to a peace-offering, one cannot say that the owner has a claim on the animal from the time of its burning and therefore there is no distinction between an unblemished and a blemished peace-offering, in each case the owner having a claim on it alive.
(54) And we impose a trespass-offering for one who denied a deposit of the firstling with a false oath. We see therefore that it is regarded as the priest's money.
(55) And therefore we can apply the text, 'And lie unto his neighbour', the firstling being considered his own money. Hence we see that an unblemished live firstling may be sold in Temple times, contrary to the opinion of R. Abbuha reported by R. Nahman above.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 8b

Said [Rabina]:1 One may still say that we are dealing with an unblemished firstling2 and we are alluding here to a firstling outside the Holy Land,3 and [the Tanna of this Baraitha] is R. Simeon who Says: If unblemished firstlings came from outside Palestine they may be offered up.4

An objection was raised: R. JOHANAN B. NURI SAID TO HIM: GRANTED THAT ONE HAS NO POWER TO EXCHANGE A SIN-OFFERING AND A GUILT-OFFERING SINCE [PRIESTS] HAVE NO CLAIM ON THEM WHILE [THE ANIMALS] ARE ALIVE, CAN WE SAY THAT THE SAME APPLIES TO A FIRSTLING WHERE [THE PRIEST] HAS A CLAIM ON IT WHILE IT IS ALIVE? Now what case is here referred to? Shall I say it is the case of a blemished animal? But [the Mishnah] compares a firstling with a sin-offering and a guilt-offering?5 Then you must say that the case is that of an unblemished animal, and it states: THEY HAVE A CLAIM ON THE FIRSTLING ALIVE!6 - Said Rabina: Here too7 the case is of a firstling outside Palestine,8 and [the Tanna of this Mishnah] is R. Simeon who says: If they came unblemished, they are offered up.

Shall we say that Tannaim differ on that point?9 [For it was taught:] 'With a firstling in the house of the owners there can be effected an exchange, but there can be no exchange effected when in the house of a priest. R. Simeon b. Eleazar Says: Since it comes into the house of a priest, there can be no exchange effected'. But is not this10 the identical opinion of the first Tanna? Then must you not say that the first Tanna means this: In the house of a priest the priest alone can effect the exchange but not the owner, and consequently we see that the priest has a claim on the firstling?11 - No. The difference of opinion here is the same as the difference of opinion between R. Johanan b. Nuri and R. Akiba. The first Tanna will hold the view of R. Johanan b. Nuri12 whereas R. Simeon will hold the view of R. Akiba.13

Said R. Hisda: They have taught this14 only with regard to a case of a priest selling to a priest, but a priest is forbidden [to sell] to an Israelite. What is the reason? Lest an Israelite should go and cast a blemish on it [the firstling] and bring it to a [Sage] and say: 'A priest gave me this firstling with its blemish'.15 But can a Sage permit it in such circumstances?16 Has not Rab said:17 One may not sell a firstling belonging to an Israelite unless the priest be present with him?18 - Said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua: The reason why it is forbidden [for a priest to sell] to an Israelite19 is because this appears similar to the case of a priest who assists in the threshing-floor.20

Mar Zutra once visited R. Ashi. They21 said to him: 'Let the Master partake of something'. They set meat before him. They said to him: 'Let the Master eat it because it is healthy22 for it comes from a firstling'. He [Mar Zutra] asked them: 'How did you get this?'23 They answered him: 'A certain priest sold it to us with its blemish'. He said to them: 'Do you not hold with what R. Huna the son of R. Joshua said: 'Because24 this appears similar to the case of a priest who assists in the threshing-floor'? - They replied to him: 'We do not hold this opinion, since we have indeed bought [the firstling]'.25 He said to them: And do you not hold what we have learnt: How long is an Israelite required to look after a firstling?26 In the case of small cattle, thirty days and in the case of large cattle, fifty days. If the priest said to the Israelite, 'Give it to me within this period', the Israelite must not give it to him. And R. Shesheth said:27 Now what is the reason?28 Because it appears similar to the case of a priest who assists in the threshing floor!29 - They replied to him: 'There,30 the thing is obvious,31 whereas here, we do indeed buy it'.

Another version: They replied to him [Mar Zutra]: There,32 he does not give any money but here,33 money was paid. Perhaps you will still say that the priest lowers the price to him,34 thinking to himself, 'When the Israelite has another firstling, he will give it to me'. No,35 for he will rather reflect

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(1) So Sh. Mek.; cur. edd. Abaye.
(2) And there is no difficulty as regards R. Nahman's opinion, for the reason why the priest has a claim on the firstling alive is as follows.
(3) Which usually is not destined for sacrifice even in Temple times. It is however compared with a peace-offering, since if one desires, it is fit to be offered up.
(4) I.e., only if they are brought, but they are not to be brought directly. Now since we must not directly bring these unblemished animals to be offered up, therefore they are considered his own money and he can sell them alive, but a firstling of a priest which is destined for sacrifice may not be sold according to R. Abbuha, as the priest has no claim on it alive.
(5) And the sin-offering etc. referred to are unblemished animals, for the Mishnah states that the priest has no claim on them while alive, but has a claim after they are slaughtered. Hence we see that we are dealing with animals which are fit for sacrifice.
(6) Contrary to the view of R. Abbuha reported by R. Nahman above.
(7) In the Mishnah just quoted.
(8) Therefore the firstling is considered his own money and he has the power to make a substitute, but with a firstling of the Holy Land which is destined for sacrifice you cannot make a substitute, since he has no claim on it alive, as R. Abbuha holds.
(9) Whether a priest has a claim on an unblemished live firstling in Temple times or not.
(10) That no exchange can be effected with a firstling in a priest's possession.
(11) And since the priest has the power to effect an exchange he can also sell it, unlike the opinion of R. Abbuha. R. Simeon, however, says that the priest cannot effect an exchange with a firstling in his possession and therefore he may not sell it, the reason being because he has no claim on it alive, which is the opinion of R. Abbuha. We see therefore that these two Tannaim differ as regards R. Abbuha's ruling reported above.
(12) Who says that a priest can effect an exchange with a firstling because he has a claim on it alive, since as we have explained above, the Mishnah deals with a firstling outside Palestine, which is usually not destined for sacrifice.
(13) That although the priest has a claim on the firstling alive, he cannot effect an exchange, as we infer from an analogy (v. Rashi, first version).
(14) That an unblemished firstling alive may be sold even in Temple times.
(15) Whereas in the case of a priest selling to a priest one cannot say this, since a priest who brings a firstling to show it to an expert is required to bring witnesses that a blemish befell it of itself, as priests are suspected of maiming firstlings in order to eat them.
(16) Even if there is a permanent blemish, can the expert permit the use of the firstling without the priest being in attendance?
(17) Bek. 36a: 'Rab Judah'.
(18) For fear lest if the Israelite learnt from the expert that the blemish was a permanent one and that there was thus no fear of holy things being eaten without the Temple walls, he will eat it and will disregard the fact that he would be robbing the priest of his due. Therefore a priest is required to be present with the Israelite and the latter cannot then say, 'A priest gave me this firstling with its blemish', for we say to him, 'Produce the priest who gave it to you', and so long as he does not do so, we do not allow the use of the firstling. Another explanation (R. Gershom): If you permit a priest to sell a firstling to an Israelite, the Israelite might detain the firstling among the herd till a blemish occurs to it and he then say: 'A priest has sold me this firstling with its blemish', thus evading his duty to the priest.
(19) An unblemished firstling; for all the authorities concerned agree that a blemished firstling may be sold (Wilna Gaon). Now a firstling of nowadays is usually sold at a lower price, for the purchaser is compelled to wait till the animal is blemished before he can eat it.
(20) To winnow or bind the sheaves. Now this is forbidden, for it looks as if the priest is helping in order to receive the reward of terumah. Similarly, if a priest sells an unblemished firstling to an Israelite at a lower price (and still more if he makes him a present of it), it appears as if he does so in order to receive all the future firstlings born in the herd of the Israelite.
(21) Those waiting on him.
(22) More fat than other flesh (R. Gershom).
(23) Seeing you are not priests.
(24) That the reason why a priest may not sell an unblemished firstling to an Israelite is because etc.
(25) And have not received it as a gift. Consequently we do not consider that it is on a par with the case of a priest who assists in the threshing-floor.
(26) To rear it before giving it to the priest.
(27) V. Bek. 26b.
(28) Why cannot an Israelite give the firstling to the priest within the period specified above.
(29) It might appear that the reason why the priest is taking the firstling from the Israelite before the time of its tending expires, thus relieving the Israelite of further trouble with the animal, is because the priest expects him to give him future firstlings. We see therefore that there is a Mishnah holding this reason in the case of assisting in the threshing-floor.
(30) In the case of a priest who asks for the firstling from the Israelite before the time for its tending has terminated.
(31) That it is in consideration for letting him have future firstlings.
(32) In the case of the priest who relieves the Israelite of the firstling, before the specified period mentioned above.
(33) In the case of the firstling whose flesh was placed before Mar Zutra to eat.
(34) In order that the Israelite might give future firstlings to this priest and not to any other.
(35) He will not do so.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 9a

that a young pumpkin [now] is better than a full-grown pumpkin [to-morrow].1

MISHNAH. ONE CAN EFFECT AN EXCHANGE WITH SMALL CATTLE FOR OXEN AND WITH OXEN FOR SMALL CATTLE; WITH SHEEP FOR GOATS AND WITH GOATS FOR SHEEP; WITH MALE [ANIMALS] FOR FEMALE [ANIMALS] AND WITH FEMALE [ANIMALS] FOR MALE [ANIMALS]; WITH UNBLEMISHED ANIMALS] FOR BLEMISHED ANIMALS AND WITH BLEMISHED [ANIMALS] FOR UNBLEMISHED [ANIMALS], SINCE SCRIPTURE SAYS:2 HE SHALL NOT ALTER IT NOR CHANGE IT, A GOOD3 FOR A BAD4 OR A BAD5 FOR A GOOD. WHAT KIND IS MEANT BY 'A GOOD FOR A BAD?6 BLEMISHED ANIMALS WHOSE DEDICATION WAS PRIOR TO THEIR BLEMISH.

GEMARA. Whence is this proved?7 - Our Rabbis have taught: Scripture says, 'Beast for beast'; 'hence8 we infer that one can effect an exchange with small cattle for oxen and with oxen for small cattle; with sheep for goats and with goats for sheep; with male [animals] for female [animals] and with female [animals] for male [animals]; with blemished [animals] for unblemished [animals] and with unblemished [animals] for blemished [animals]. One might think that this is so even if they had a permanent blemish prior to their dedication? The text therefore States: 'He shall not alter it nor change it, a good for a bad or a bad for a good'. What kind is meant by 'a good for a bad'? Blemished animals whose dedication was prior to their blemish [but9 not where the blemish was prior to their dedication]. How is this implied [in the Scriptural text]?10 - Said Abaye: Let Scripture say, 'He shall not alter it nor change it, a good for a bad or a bad for it'.11 What need is there for the second text, 'a good'? Deduce therefore from here that only if the animal is originally 'good'12 the exchange takes effect.13 , but the exchange takes no effect in respect of an animal originally 'bad'.14 Raba says: Both the expressions 'a good' are indeed superfluous.15 [Scripture] might simply have written: 'He shall not alter it nor change it16 for a bad or a bad for it'?17 What need is there then for both the expressions 'a good'? One 'a good' teaches us that even if one exchanges a good [animal] for a good [one], there is the punishment of lashes for substituting, and the other 'a good' teaches us that exchange takes effect only when the animal was 'good' originally, but where it was originally 'bad', exchange takes no effect. And whence will Abaye [derive18 that it is forbidden to exchange a good for a good]?19 - He holds that it is derived a minori. If where 'a good' [an unblemished hullin] is exchanged for 'a bad' [a blemished animal], in which case an improve is effected,20 the punishment of lashes is inflicted, how much more so should there be the punishment of lashes if one exchanges 'a good' for 'a good', which are alike [in holiness]! And Raba?21 - An offence established by inference [from minor to major] is not punishable.22 And Abaye? - He can answer you thus: This23 is no conclusion from [minor to major, but24 is merely an intimation of a thing];25 for is the case of 'a good' [an unblemished consecrated animal] worse than the case of 'a bad' [blemished animal]?26

Our Rabbis taught: 'He shall not alter it'27 [for hullin]28 belonging to others.29 'Nor change it' [for hullin] belonging to himself. But let it write [simply]: 'He shall not alter it' and there will then be no need for the expression 'nor change it'? If it had written so, I might have said that where [the intention is for the original animal] to lose its holiness and the [substituted one] to acquire holiness,30 there is the punishment of lashes, but in the case of exchanging [the consecrated animal for his own hullin], where [if he wishes] he can consecrate both,31 I might have thought there is no punishment of lashes. [Scripture] therefore informs us [that it is not so].32

As to the expression, '[for hullin] belonging to others', how is this to be understood? Shall we say [that it means] his own consecrated animal and hullin belonging to another? But can he consecrate [hullin in such circumstances]?33 The Divine Law says: When a man shall sanctify his house to be holy unto the Lord.34 Just as his house is his own possession, so everything35 must be in his possession! Again if the case then is of a consecration belonging to another and his own hullin,36 can one cause the substitution37 of a thing which is not his? - One can still maintain that the case is of a consecrated animal belonging to another person and his own hullin and when e.g., the owner of the consecrated animals says: 'Whoever wishes to exchange with this animal may come and do so'.38

MISHNAH. ONE CAN EFFECT AN EXCHANGE WITH ONE [HULLIN] FOR TWO [CONSECRATED ANIMALS],39 AND WITH TWO [HULLIN] FOR ONE [CONSECRATED ANIMAL]; WITH ONE [HULLIN] FOR A HUNDRED [CONSECRATED ANIMALS] AND WITH A HUNDRED [HULLIN] FOR ONE [CONSECRATED ANIMAL]; R. SIMEON, HOWEVER, SAYS: NO EXCHANGE CAN BE EFFECTED EXCEPT WITH ONE [HULLIN] FOR ONE [CONSECRATED ANIMAL], FOR IT SAYS: 'THEN IT AND THE EXCHANGE THEREOF SHALL BE HOLY', THUS TEACHING US THAT JUST AS 'IT' [THE CONSECRATED ANIMAL] IS ONLY ONE,40 SO [ITS SUBSTITUTE] ALSO MUST BE ONLY ONE.

GEMARA. Whence is this proved? - Our Rabbis taught: [Scripture says:] 'Beast for beast'. Hence we infer41 that one can effect an exchange with one [hullin] for two [consecrated animals] and with two [hullin] for one [consecrated animal]; with one [hullin] for a hundred [consecrated animals] and with a hundred [hullin] for one [consecrated animal]. R. Simeon, however, says: One cannot effect exchange except with one [hullin] for one [consecrated animal], since it Says: 'Beast for beast', [implying] but not beast for beasts or beasts for beast. They42 said to him: We find [in the Scriptures] that beasts are also called behemah,43 since it says: And also much cattle [behemah].44 And what does R. Simeon say to this? - Many animals are described as behemah rabah [much], but not simply as behemah.45

But is R. Simeon's reason46 because of the expression 'beast'? Is not the reason of R. Simeon because of the expression 'it', [his reasoning being] just as 'it' is only one, so its [substitute] must be only one?47 - At first, R. Simeon said to them that his reason was based on the text, 'Then it and the exchange thereof'. When he saw, however, that the Rabbis interpreted the text 'beast for beast', he said to then,: 'I also can derive the reason for my ruling from the same source

Said Resh Lakish: R. Simeon agrees48 that one can effect an exchange repeatedly.49 What is the reason? - For where has the holiness of the first dedicated animal gone?50 But R. Johanan says: Just as one cannot effect an exchange with two hullin for one [consecration], so one cannot effect an exchange repeatedly [with the same animal].

There is a teaching in agreement with R. Johanan; there is a teaching in agreement with Resh Lakish. 'There is a teaching in agreement with R. Johanan': Just as one cannot effect an exchange with one hullin for two [consecrations], so one cannot effect an exchange repeatedly. There is a teaching in accordance with the opinion of Resh Lakish: One might have thought that just as R. Simeon holds that one cannot effect an exchange with two [hullin] for one [consecrated animal], so one cannot effect an exchange repeatedly. The text therefore states: 'Then it and the exchange thereof', implying, even for a hundred [animals of hullin].51

R. Abin asked: How is it according to the authority who says52 that one cannot effect an exchange repeatedly, if he set aside a guilt-offering with which to obtain atonement and made an exchange for it,

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(1) The priest would rather sell the firstling for its equivalent value, for fear that if he were to reduce its price, he may after all not gain anything by it, as he may not receive the future firstlings. The additional gain of the moment will appeal to him more than the uncertain prospects of future gain.
(2) Lev. XXVII, 10.
(3) An unblemished animal of hullin (unconsecrated) must not be substituted.
(4) A blemished consecrated animal. We therefore see that the law of substitute applies to consecrated blemished animals.
(5) Thus 'a bad' i.e., a blemished hullin may be exchanged for 'a good' i.e., an unblemished consecrated animal. This shows that substitution has effect on a blemished animal.
(6) Which are subject to the law of substitute.
(7) The various rulings mentioned in the Mishnah.
(8) From the repetition of the word 'beast'.
(9) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(10) That there is a difference as regards the law of exchange where the blemish occurs before dedication.
(11) And we could infer: Or a bad hullin could not be exchanged either for 'a good' or for 'a bad' consecrated animal.
(12) Unblemished when consecrated, a blemish occurring to it subsequently.
(13) The substitute becoming sacred.
(14) I.e., blemished when consecrated.
(15) For the purpose of deducing that a permanent blemish prior to consecration does not permit of an exchange taking effect.
(16) Which would have implied 'a good' i.e., an unblemished animal, since the text later on says 'for a bad' i.e., a blemished one.
(17) 'A bad' (unconsecrated blemished animal) must not be exchanged for it i.e., 'a good' (unblemished) or a bad (blemished) consecrated animal.
(18) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(19) Since according to him there is only one superfluous 'a good'.
(20) As a better animal is being substituted for the dedicated blemished animal.
(21) Since there is an a minori conclusion, what need is there for an extra 'a good'?
(22) But it must be stated positively and therefore the text is required to derive the case of one exchanging 'a good' for 'a good'.
(23) The ruling that it is forbidden to exchange 'a good' for 'a good'.
(24) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(25) It is naturally implied and there is no need for a specific interpretation.
(26) If it is forbidden to substitute an unblemished animal for a blemished one it is obvious that the same applies if the animal for which substitution is made is 'a good' (unblemished one), for Scripture is only concerned that no exchange should be made with something which is holy.
(27) לא יחליפנו
(28) So R. Gershom.
(29) The word חילוף indicates that the exchange concerns two people.
(30) Although the exchange does not succeed in removing holiness from the unblemished consecrated animal, he is nevertheless punished with lashes, for his intention was to release it from its sanctity.
(31) So R. Gershom. The passage about 'others' is subsequently explained in the Gemara.
(32) That even if the substitution was for his own animal of hullin, he incurs the punishment of lashes.
(33) Where it does not belong to him.
(34) Lev. XXVII, 14.
(35) In order to receive holiness.
(36) And he said: This hullin of mine shall be a substitute for that man's dedication.
(37) Lit., 'cause to seize'.
(38) In such circumstances the Biblical text informs us that the substitute is sacred although there is a prohibitory law against the act.
(39) By saying: This animal shall be exchanged for these two dedications.
(40) Since the text says: 'It', thus alluding to only one.
(41) Because the word behemah (beast) is repeated (Sh. Mck.).
(42) The disputants of R. Simeon.
(43) The term used in the text denoting beast.
(44) Jonah IV, 11.
(45) The word behemah therefore by itself denotes only one animal.
(46) Why he holds in the Mishnah that exchange can only be effected with one hullin for one consecrated animal.
(47) As stated in the Mishnah.
(48) Although he holds in the Mishnah that exchange cannot be effected except with one hullin for one consecrated animal.
(49) The same dedicated animal can be exchanged again and again with different animals. Lit., 'one has power to exchange and again to exchange'.
(50) So that another animal should be able to receive holiness, even up to a thousand, since Scripture declares: 'Then it and the exchange thereof shall be holy'.
(51) The substitutions are sacred.
(52) V. infra 13b.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 9b

and it became blemished and he redeemed it for another1 [which became lost], and he obtained atonement through another guilt-offering, and [the lost animal was then found] and it was [automatically] transformed into a burnt-offering?2 What is the ruling as regards making an exchange for it?3

Said Abaye: What is [R. Abin's] inquiry? If it [the inquiry] is concerning two bodies and one kind of holiness,4 why not put the question without stating that he obtains atonement?5 If the inquiry is concerning two kinds of holiness and one body,6 why not put the question without stating that the first animal became blemished?7 - And R. Abin?8 - His question is really in the form of one inquiry arising out of another [as follows]: And if you will adopt the opinion that there can be no [exchange] in a case of two bodies and one kind of holiness, since [an animal] has already been once exchanged in that holiness, what of two bodies and two kinds of holiness?9 - Let it stand undecided.

Another version: R. Abin inquired, According to the opinion of R. Johanan who holds that one has no power to exchange repeatedly [the same dedicated animal], if he set aside a guilt-offering with which to obtain atonement and exchanged it, and after [the first animal] became blemished he redeemed it for another, what is the ruling as regards exchanging again [this second guilt-offering]?10 Or,11 if he obtained atonement through another guilt-offering]12 and the [first guilt-offering] was transformed into a burnt-offering,13 what is the ruling as regards changing it again?14

Said Abaye: What is [R. Abin's main inquiry]? If as regards [the exchange] of another kind of holiness but in the same body, then there is no need to mention that he redeemed it [for another].15 If as regards [the exchange] of another body in the same kind of holiness,16 then there is no need to mention the atonement through another guilt-offering. And R. Abin? - His [question] is really one inquiry arising out of another: If [the guilt-offering] became blemished and he exchanged it and redeemed it for another, what is the ruling as regards exchanging it again? Do we say that there is no further exchange only with regard to the first guilt-offering but with a separate body [animal], though it remains in the same kind of holiness [of a guilt-offering], there can again be an exchange? Or, perhaps, all animals in the same kind of holiness cannot be exchanged again? And if you will adopt the opinion, that since this other body remains in the same holiness, there can be no further exchange, then if he obtained atonement through another guilt-offering and the first guilt-offering was transformed into a burnt-offering, what is the ruling as regards exchanging it again? Do we say that we hold that one cannot exchange again only with reference to the same body [animal] in the same kind of holiness,17 but the same body possessing another kind of holiness can be changed again? Or, perhaps, although there is another kind of holiness, since it is the same body, there can be no exchange again? - Let it remain undecided.

Said R. Joshua b. Levi:18 One adds a fifth19 for the first dedication but not for the second dedication.20 Said R. Papa: What is the reason of R. Joshua b. Levi? Scripture says: And if he that sanctified it will redeem his house then he shall add the fifth part of the money,21 the text saying, 'he that sanctified', implying, but not one who causes holiness [to an animal through another dedicated animal].22 R. Abin inquired: If one set aside a guilt-offering to obtain atonement and [after] it became blemished [he redeemed it for another animal], added a fifth and obtained atonement through another guilt-offering,23 and [the first guilt-offering] was transformed into a burnt-offering,24 what of adding a fifth to it?25 - Said Abaye: What is [R. Abin's] main inquiry?26 If the inquiry is [as regards adding a fifth for the redemption] of two bodies and one kind of holiness, then why not make the inquiry without mentioning that he obtained atonement?27 And if the inquiry is [as regards] two kinds of holiness and one body, then why not formulate an inquiry without mentioning that [the first animal] became blemished?28 And R. Abin? - His inquiry is really one question arising out of another. If you will adopt the opinion that there is no fifth added [when redeeming] in the case of two bodies and one kind of holiness, since a fifth has already been once added in that holiness, what is the ruling as regards two bodies and two kinds of holiness? - Let it stand undecided.

Another version: R. Abin inquired: If one set aside a guilt-offering to obtain atonement through it and after it became blemished, he redeemed it for another, [what29 is the ruling as regards] adding a fifth?30 [Or,]31 if he obtained atonement through another guilt-offering, and [the first animal being found] was transformed into a burnt-offering,32 what is the ruling as regards adding a fifth?33 - Said Abaye: Which is the main inquiry [of R. Abin]? If his inquiry relates to another kind of holiness but in the same body, then what need is there to mention that the [first] guilt-offering became blemished [and he redeemed it for another]? If it relates to [another] body in the same holiness, [then34 what need is there to mention that he was atoned for through another guilt-offering]? And R. Abin? - His inquiry is really one question arising out of another question [as follows]: If it became blemished and he redeemed it for another, what is the ruling as regards adding a fifth?35 Is it only in redeeming the first guilt-offering that one does not add a fifth but in the case of [another]36 body, although it remains in the same kind of holiness, one adds37 a fifth [in redeeming it, if blemished]?

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(1) Which in turn became the second guilt-offering.
(2) For the law is that an animal dedicated for a guilt-offering whose owner has otherwise obtained atonement, is usually destined to be used as a communal burnt-offering.
(3) Do we say that as an exchange took place for the first guilt-offering, there cannot be another exchange made for the second guilt-offering now found, for it would be like making a number of exchanges for the same animal, which according to the view of the authority on whose behalf we are propounding this question, is not permissible; or, since the second guilt-offering is another animal altogether and it receives a different kind of holiness, do we say that there can therefore be an exchange made, for in the case of the first animal it was a guilt-offering which was exchanged and we are considering now the exchange of a burnt-offering.
(4) And the question will then be: Shall we say that since there is another body i.e., a different animal, therefore it can be exchanged or, perhaps, since there is the same holiness, there can be no further exchange.
(5) Let R. Abin state his inquiry as follows: One separated his guilt-offering and exchanged it and the first animal became blemished and was redeemed for another. What of exchanging this last animal? Shall we say since it is a different body, i.e., a different animal, there can therefore be a second exchange, or perhaps since the last animal comes in place of the first and has the same kind of holiness, both being a guilt-offering, there can be no exchange again.
(6) I.e., where one set aside a guilt-offering and exchanged it, and the first animal was lost and he obtained atonement through another guilt-offering, and the first guilt-offering was then found and is now regarded as a burnt-offering. Here we have, with reference to the first animal, one body with two kinds of holiness, and the question is, since there is here only one body, can exchange be effected again.
(7) And was subsequently redeemed, for the inquiry can be formulated without these conditions.
(8) What exactly is the nature of his inquiry which calls for all the circumstances which he enumerates.
(9) When e.g., the second guilt-offering was lost and he obtained atonement through a different animal, the second guilt-offering becoming a burnt-offering after being found. What of the second guilt-offering as regards exchanging? Do we say since it was brought in virtue of the first, there can therefore be no exchange, or, as it is a different animal with a different kind of holiness, there can be exchange?
(10) Do we say that as it was brought in the place of the first guilt-offering, as the first animal has once been exchanged, there can be no further exchange, or else, as it is a different animal, there can be a further exchange?
(11) V. Sh. Mek.
(12) Where the first animal did not become blemished and was not redeemed but was lost and the owner brought a second guilt-offering.
(13) According to the law.
(14) This burnt-offering. Now according to this version there will not be any reference to two kinds of holiness and two bodies, and there will really be here two inquiries (Rashi.)
(15) It would be sufficient to formulate the inquiry as follows: He set aside a guilt-offering which he exchanged, the first animal became lost and he obtained atonement through another guilt-offering. The first guilt-offering was then found and automatically became a burnt-offering, and the question was as regards making exchange again with the same animal which has now received another kind of holiness.
(16) Whether there can be a further exchange of the second animal possessing the same kind of holiness as the first, i.e., when the guilt-offering was exchanged, became blemished and was redeemed for another.
(17) The same animal all the time, without a change to a different kind of holiness.
(18) B.M. 54b.
(19) When redeeming a dedication.
(20) When e.g., the first animal became maimed and he redeemed it for another, this second animal being described as a second dedication. A substitute animal would be a second dedication.
(21) Lev. XXVII, 15.
(22) As in the case of a substitution, where the animal exchanged is not itself dedicated and only becomes holy by reason of exchange.
(23) The first guilt-offering was then found.
(24) In accordance with the rule that if an animal has been dedicated for a guilt-offering and the owner has obtained atonement through another, the original animal is changed into a burnt-offering.
(25) Would it be regarded as a second dedication, although it is the same animal, so that if it became blemished, there would be no need to add a fifth.
(26) For the present, R. Abin's words have no reference to the case of two bodies and two kinds of holiness, but he divides his inquiry into two parts, the first part being where there are two bodies and one kind of holiness, and the other, where he obtained atonement through another guilt-offering, i.e. where the first guilt-offering was not maimed but was lost and the owner obtained atonement through another guilt-offering. The first guilt-offering was then transformed into a burnt-offering and we have, as a result, two kinds of holiness but in one body (Rashi). Therefore Abaye's query is: What is etc.
(27) Through another guilt-offering. He need only state that the first guilt-offering became blemished, he redeemed it for another and added a fifth in redeeming, since there can be no redemption of an unblemished animal which is fit for the altar. The second animal in turn became blemished and the inquiry will therefore be as follows: Do we say that since the second animal possesses the same kind of holiness as the first, there cannot be the addition of the second fifth in redeeming, as it is a second dedication? Or, perhaps, since they are two separate bodies (animals) he adds a fifth when he redeems the second blemished guilt-offering? R. Joshua's dictum will therefore only apply in the case where one dedicated a blemished animal for Temple repairs and redeemed it for another blemished animal, no change being brought about, as both are blemished. In redeeming therefore the second animal, we say it is a second dedication and therefore a fifth is not added when redeeming. But in our case, where we redeem a blemished guilt-offering for an unblemished one which is fit for the altar, we consider this second animal a first consecration, since the first guilt-offering was only useful for its value alone, whereas the second animal is suitable for the altar. It is therefore a fresh consecration, requiring the addition of a fifth should it become blemished and be redeemed (Rashi).
(28) Before it became lost, and the case here is where the guilt-offering became lost, and he set aside another guilt-offering and obtained atonement through it. The first animal then becomes a burnt-offering. What is then the ruling? Do we say it is a second dedication, since the owner obtained atonement through another and this first animal is considered as subsidiary to it and, consequently, if it became blemished, there will be no need for the adding of a fifth in redeeming, or not?
(29) V. Wilna Gaon Glosses.
(30) If the second animal became blemished and was redeemed.
(31) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(32) In accordance with the law.
(33) If it became blemished and was redeemed.
(34) Inserted with Z.K.
(35) If it became blemished and he redeemed it.
(36) Inserted with Z.K.
(37) V. Sh. Mek.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 10a

Or perhaps, all [dedications] of the same holiness do not require the addition of a fifth?1 And if you will say that since this [other] body [animal] remains in the same holiness, there is no addition of a fifth, then if [the owner] obtained atonement through [a guilt-offering] and the first [automatically] was transformed into a burnt-offering,2 what is the ruling? [Do we say that] one does not add a fifth only in the case of the same body possessing the same holiness, but where there is another holiness,3 it is not so? Or, perhaps, since it is the same body,4 one is not required to add a fifth? - Let it remain undecided.

Rami b. Hama inquired: Is the consecrator required to add a fifth [when redeeming], or is the one who is atoned for required to add a fifth?5 - Said Raba: Scripture says, And if he that sanctified it will redeem his house:6 'He that sanctified', but not the person who is atoned for.

Rami b. Hama inquired: Can a consecrator effect an exchange, or the one for whom atonement is obtained? - Said Raba: [Obviously the person for whom atonement is made has power of effecting exchange, for if only the consecrator has power of effecting exchange],7 then we find that a congregation or partners have power of effecting exchange when, e.g., they charge an agent to dedicate?8 And moreover R. Nahman reported: Huna informed me: It has been taught, Scripture says: And of his offering unto the Lord for his separation, beside that his hand shall get.9 Now is the offering of a nazirite according to his pecuniary means?10 How then are we to explain this? The words, 'His offering unto the Lord for his separation' refer to where he is able to set aside [the prescribed offering] from his own [means]. The words, 'Beside that his hand shall get refer to where others set aside [the prescribed offering].11 For what practical ruling?12 Shall I say with reference to atonement?13 Surely it is obvious that he obtains atonement [with another sacrifice] seeing that they give it to him as a gift! Then must you not say that it is with reference to making exchange, and [the Baraitha above] means this: [Just as when he set aside an offering from his own means only he alone has power of effecting exchange],14 so if others set aside [an offering] on his behalf he alone can effect exchange?15 Deduce therefore from here that we go by the person for whom atonement is made!16 - No. One can still maintain that [the Baraitha above] refers to atonement, and as to your difficulty, do not [the others who set aside the offering] give it to him as a present? Had the Divine Law not included this in the text 'beside that his hand shall get', I might have thought that it is a Divine decree that [the nazirite] can obtain atonement only with an offering brought from his own means but not from that [set apart] by others, [although it is given to him as a gift]. The text ['beside that etc.'] therefore informs us [that it is not so]. What is the decision in the matter? - Come and hear: For R. Abbuha reported in the name of R. Johanan: He who dedicates [and wishes to redeem his dedication] must add a fifth. The exchange of one for whose atonement [an animal is dedicated] is sacred. If one separates [the priestly due] from his own [grain] for [the untithed grain] of his neighbour the right of disposal belongs to him [who separates].17 What is the reason? Scripture says: All the tithes of thine increase . . . . and hast given it, etc.18

MISHNAH. WITH LIMBS [OF HULLIN] NO EXCHANGE CAN BE EFFECTED FOR [DEDICATED] EMBRYOS,19 NOR WITH EMBRYOS [OF HULLIN] FOR [DEDICATED] LIMBS;20 NOR WITH EMBRYOS AND LIMBS [OF HULLIN] FOR WHOLE [DEDICATED ANIMALS];21 NOR WITH WHOLE [ANIMALS OF HULLIN] FOR THEM. R. JOSE SAYS: WITH LIMBS [OF HULLIN] EXCHANGE CAN BE EFFECTED FOR WHOLE [DEDICATED ANIMALS],22 BUT NOT WITH WHOLE [ANIMALS OF HULLIN] FOR THEM.23 SAID R. JOSE: IS IT NOT THE CASE IN RESPECT OF DEDICATIONS,24 THAT IF ONE SAYS: 'THIS FOOT SHALL BE A BURNT-OFFERING, THE WHOLE [ANIMAL] BECOMES A BURNT-OFFERING? SIMILARLY, IF ONE SAYS, 'THIS FOOT SHALL BE INSTEAD OF THIS [WHOLE DEDICATED ANIMAL]', THE WHOLE [ANIMAL] SHOULD BECOME A SUBSTITUTE IN ITS PLACE.

GEMARA. It was stated: Bar Padda says, Dedication has no effect on embryos,25 whereas R. Johanan says: Dedication has effect on embryos. And R. Johanan26 follows the opinion he expressed elsewhere. For R. Johanan said: If one dedicates a pregnant sin-offering and it gave birth, if he wishes, he may obtain atonement through it [the mother], and if he wishes, he may obtain atonement through its offspring.27 [And both statements of R. Johanan] are necessary. For if he had made only the first statement,28 [I might have said] that here, where he dedicated

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(1) Although the second guilt-offering is a different animal.
(2) V. Sh. Mek.
(3) Where, as here, the animal becomes a burnt-offering.
(4) The same animal, although now possessing a different holiness.
(5) For the rule is that only the owner adds a fifth in redeeming but not a stranger. Now if one set aside an offering on behalf of one's neighbour and it became blemished, who is considered the owner in respect of adding a fifth? Is the consecrator considered the owner and therefore the person for whom atonement is made does not require to add a fifth, as he is regarded as a stranger, or is the person for whom atonement is made considered the owner?
(6) Lev. XXVII, 15.
(7) V. Sh. Mek.
(8) For then it becomes a private offering to which exchange is applicable, and we have learnt that a congregation or partners are not competent to effect an exchange. Hence we can deduce from this that we go by the person for whom atonement is made, and in the case of a congregation or partners it is the congregation or partners who are making the exchange and consequently in this ease no exchange will be effected.
(9) Num. VI, 21.
(10) Like the ease of the sacrifice of higher or lower value, for the sacrifice of a nazirite is fixed and specified.
(11) Where he is unable at the moment to bring a sacrifice and meanwhile others separate one on his behalf.
(12) Is there need for the text to inform us concerning others setting aside an offering on his behalf.
(13) To teach us that one can obtain atonement by means of an offering which others have set aside.
(14) But not another.
(15) He can effect exchange but not the others.
(16) For we see that although others have set aside the offering, only the owner, for whose benefit it was, can effect exchange.
(17) V. supra 2b notes.
(18) Deut. XXVI, 12. Thus a person who gives and separates the tithes has the right to give them to the priest he chooses, and the privilege is not in the hands of the person on whose behalf the grain is tithed. We see, however, from R. Abbuha that the person for whom atonement is made can effect exchange and this is the answer to Rami b. Hama's query above.
(19) If a person said: 'Let the foot of this animal be exchanged for a dedicated embryo inside this animal', dedication has no effect on the limb.
(20) If one said: 'Let the embryo in the inside of this hullin be exchanged for the foot of this dedicated animal', the embryo is not holy.
(21) If, for example, one said: 'Let this embryo or limb be exchanged for this whole dedicated animal', there is no exchange.
(22) If one says: 'Let the foot of this animal of hullin be exchanged for this dedicated animal', the exchange takes effect in regard to the limb and it spreads to the entire animal. Thus the whole animal becomes sacred and is offered up.
(23) For a limb of a dedicated animal has not the power to effect exchange.
(24) At the beginning when one dedicates.
(25) If one dedicates an embryo inside an animal, it is not holy to be offered up, and if he offered it up when it was born without a special dedication from its birth, he brings hullin to the Temple court. If, therefore, he separates a pregnant sin-offering, we do not consider it as a case of two sin-offerings set aside for security, for the embryo is sanctified by virtue of its mother and not on its own account, and therefore is regarded as the offspring of a sin-offering which is left to die. Similarly, as regards the matter of dedication, the embryo is regarded as the offspring of a dedication and not as a separate dedication.
(26) Who holds that dedication has effect on embryos.
(27) For we say that the offspring of sin-offerings is left to die only in the case where one set apart a sin-offering which became pregnant and gave birth, it being a Sinaitic law that the offspring in such circumstances is condemned to die (v. infra 21b). But where he set apart a pregnant sin-offering, the embryo is regarded as a different animal and therefore holiness attaches to it independently of its mother. We regard this as a case of one who sets apart two sin-offerings for security in which case he can obtain pardon with whichever one he chooses, the other being left to pasture. We thus see that holiness attaches to an embryo and no special dedication is required after its birth.
(28) That dedication has effect on an embryo.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 10b

the embryo by itself, a dedication has effect on it, but there, where he dedicated the mother, it [the embryo] is included [in the dedication of the mother], and therefore it [the embryo] is not holy on its own account. And if he made only the second statement,1 [I might have said] that there he dedicated it [the mother] and all connected with it [the embryo], but here where he dedicated it [the embryo], since it is not [emerged] outside, it is not holy.2 [Both statements of R. Johanan] are therefore necessary.

Another version: What does [R. Johanan] inform us?3 That if one left over [the embryo]4 , his act is valid5 , and that an embryo is not considered as the thigh of its mother.6 But what need is there for the two statements [of R. Johanan]?7 - [Both] are necessary. For if the statement had been made in connection with this case only,8 [I might have said] that there, where the mother herself is fit [for dedication], since holiness attached to it [the mother], it also attached to the embryo. But in the other case,9 [I might have said] that it was not so. [R. Johanan] therefore informs us [otherwise].10 And if R. Johanan had stated the law only in this case,11 [I might have said] that there the reason was because he expressly dedicated the embryo, but here12 the case is otherwise. [Both statements of R. Johanan are therefore] necessary.

R. Zera was once sitting and repeating this tradition [of Bar [Padda]. R. Jeremiah raised an objection to R. Zera.13 What device does one adopt14 in connection with a firstling? If a pregnant animal was giving birth for the first time, one can say: 'Whatever is in the inside of this animal shall become a burnt-offering'. If now the animal gives birth to a male it is a burnt-offering.15 Consequently we see that an embryo is holy on its own account!16 - He [R. Zera] replied to him: This was taught with reference to a consecration for its value.17 But is a consecration for its value strong enough to release from the holiness of a firstling? - Yes. And we have learnt likewise: All dedications which have received a permanent blemish prior to their dedication and were redeemed, are subject to the law of the firstling18 and the priestly gifts.19 Now the reason why they are subject to the law of the firstling is because they were redeemed, but if they were not redeemed, they would be exempt from the law of the firstling. Consequently we see that a consecration for its value is strong enough to release the holiness of a firstling.20

He raised an objection: If one says, 'Whatever is in the inside of this animal shall be a burnt-offering', [the mother] may be shorn for its wool but must not be worked, because the embryo within is thereby weakened!21 - He said to him: Here22 too it is a case of consecration for its value. But is a consecration for its value strong enough to forbid [shearing and work of an animal]? - He replied to him: Yes. And we have learnt likewise: They23 become hullin as regards shearing and working.24 Now the reason is because they were redeemed, but before they were redeemed they must not be worked. Consequently we see that a consecration for its value makes it forbidden to work [the animal].

He [R. Jeremiah] raised an objection to him [R. Zera]. Our Mishnah says: WITH LIMBS [OF HULLIN] NO EXCHANGE CAN BE EFFECTED FOR [DEDICATED] EMBRYOS, NOR WITH EMBRYOS FOR LIMBS.25 Now it says that one has no power to exchange with them [the embryos],26 but they [the embryos] can indeed become holy!27 - He [R. Zera] replied to him: [Our Mishnah] is dealing with dedicated offspring which are already holy. If we are dealing with dedicated offspring, it is only in the inside of their mother that they do not effect exchange. We infer then that outside [their mother] they do effect exchange. But have we not learnt: One cannot effect exchange with the offspring of a dedicated animal?28 - [The Mishnah above] will represent the opinion of R. Judah who holds29 that an animal's offspring effects exchange. If [the first part of our Mishnah above] is the opinion of R. Judah, it is only exchange which cannot be effected [with limbs],30 but they [limbs] are indeed dedicated.31 But has not R. Judah stated: Limbs do not become holy?32 - The case here33 is where he dedicated a limb the removal of which results in death.34

He [R. Jeremiah] raised an objection to him [R. Zera]: One can dedicate limbs and embryos but one has no power to exchange [them].35 - Here36 also we are dealing with offspring of dedications. If the case is that of offspring of dedications, why does the Baraitha say above: 'one can dedicate', for are they not already holy? -

____________________
(1) If one set apart a pregnant sin-offering etc. as stated above.
(2) Requiring a special dedication when it emerges from the inside of its mother.
(3) In the case where one dedicates a sin-offering etc.
(4) For another kind of holiness, v. infra 19a.
(5) E.g., if one says: 'This shall be a sin-offering and its embryo a burnt-offering', his words are valid. Or, if he says: 'The mother shall be a sin-offering and its embryo hullin', it is hullin. Lit., 'it is left over'.
(6) According to Bar Padda, however, an embryo is not considered something apart, and where one dedicated the mother and left over the embryo for another kind of holiness, it does not receive holiness and is regarded as an offspring from a sin-offering which is left to die. And if one says that the embryo should be hullin his words are nugatory. According to the authority who holds that an embryo inside a dedicated animal is holy, holiness attaches immediately, while according to the other authority, holiness only commences when the embryo is born.
(7) Can we not infer this from the other case mentioned by R. Johanan, when he says that dedication has an effect on an embryo, thus teaching us that the animal and its embryo are considered as independent on one another in respect of dedication?
(8) Where one separates a sin-offering.
(9) Where one dedicates an embryo.
(10) That holiness rests on an embryo.
(11) Concerning where one dedicates an embryo.
(12) Where one separates a sin-offering.
(13) Infra 24b.
(14) To evade the duty of giving a firstling to the priest, so as thus to derive the benefit for himself.
(15) He carries out his obligation if he is required to bring a burnt-offering, for the holiness of a firstling only commences when it leaves the womb of its mother. Consequently the dedication for a burnt-offering preceded the holiness of a firstling.
(16) Unlike the opinion of Bar Padda who says that an embryo possesses no holiness on its own account.
(17) Where he sells it and buys a burnt-offering for the money. But the embryo itself is not consecrated as such and is sold unblemished.
(18) If they are female animals and gave birth for the first time after their redemption.
(19) V. infra 33a.
(20) For since a permanent blemish was prior to the consecration, the consecration at the outset was only for the value.
(21) For working with the mother enfeebles the embryo, Tosef. III. Consequently we see that holiness has effect on an embryo, unlike the view of Bar Padda above.
(22) In the passage just cited.
(23) This passage is the second clause of the Mishnah cited above: All dedications where a permanent blemish, etc., the latter clause therefore says that they i.e., these blemished dedications etc.
(24) So that it is permitted to shear and work them.
(25) And the Mishnah goes on to say: NOR WITH WHOLE ANIMALS [OF HULLIN] FOR DEDICATED EMBRYOS.
(26) For in connection with exchanging, Scripture says 'beast' but not an embryo.
(27) For if embryos cannot become holy, it is obvious that one has no power to exchange whole animals of holy with them, since they are hullin.
(28) Born after its mother's dedication, and the status of one exchanged with the young is not altered. We must then be dealing with a case where one consecrated directly an embryo, which is regarded as a first dedication. Hence we see that dedication has effect on an embryo, unlike the opinion of Bar Padda.
(29) Infra 11a, 12a, 14a.
(30) Of hullin for whole dedicated animals, so that holiness should spread to the entire animal the limbs of which are being substituted.
(31) One can dedicate limbs, so that if one consecrated a limb of an animal, holiness spreads to the entire animal. For the first Tanna of the Mishnah must share this opinion, since R. Jose, his disputant in the Mishnah, retorts: IS IT NOT THE CASE WITH REFERENCE TO DEDICATIONS etc., thus implying that the first Tanna agrees with him that if one dedicated a limb the whole animal becomes holy, and it is R. Simeon who opposes R. Jose later in the Baraitha, saying that at the beginning the consecration of one limb makes the whole animal a burnt-offering, but the case of exchanging is different, as it has no effect on limbs.
(32) Later in the Baraitha, R. Judah says that holiness does not spread to the whole animal where their limbs are dedicated.
(33) Where we deduce from the Mishnah that the entire animal becomes holy if one limb is dedicated.
(34) Lit., 'on which the soul depends'; e.g., if he dedicated a foot from the joint upwards, the removal of which would render the animal trefah (v. Glos.). Here, even R. Judah, the Baraitha says later, agrees that in such circumstances the whole animal becomes sacred.
(35) Infra 15a. We therefore see that dedication has an effect upon embryos, unlike the opinion of Bar Padda.
(36) In the case of the Mishnah just quoted.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 11a

What is meant is this:1 One can dedicate limbs,2 and can effect exchange for them,3 but one can effect no exchange with limbs for them [dedicated animals].4 And embryos which were dedicated while they were inside their mother cannot be exchanged.5

Now if the case [in the Mishnah just quoted] refers to offsprings of dedications, it is only in the inside of their mothers that they do not effect an exchange, but outside [their mother]6 they do effect exchange. But have we not learnt: Offspring [of dedicated animals] do not effect an exchange? - This7 is the opinion of R. Judah.8 If it is the opinion of R. Judah, then how can limbs become holy,9 for R. Judah does not hold that if one says: 'The foot of this animal shall be a burnt-offering' the whole becomes a burnt-offering? - He replied to him: Here10 also the case11 is one of the dedication of a limb [the loss of] which renders the animal trefah.

Must it be said that Tannaim differ [on that point]?12 [For it was taught:] If one13 slaughtered a sin-offering and found a four months' old14 [embryo] alive inside, one [Baraitha] states: It is only eaten by the males of the priesthood,15 within the hangings of the court, and for one day [and a night];16 while another [Baraitha] taught: It is eaten by all people, it is eaten everywhere [in the Temple court] and [is eaten at all times].17 What [does this mean]? Is it not that there is a difference of opinion among Tannaim, one Master holding that dedication has effect on embryos,18 and the other Master holding that dedication has no effect on embryos?19 - No.20 These Tannaim [of the Baraitha above] differ on this point, one Tanna21 holding that the offspring of dedications are holy at birth,22 while the other Tanna23 holds that [the offspring of dedications] are holy even in the inside of their mother. Or if you prefer [another solution] I may say: Both [Baraithas quoted above] are the teaching of one Tanna.24 One of these Baraithas25 deals with a case where one dedicates an animal and then it becomes pregnant,26 and the other,27 where he dedicates it in a pregnant condition.28

We have learnt:29 R. Eliezer says, Kil'ayim,30 trefah31 and a foetus extracted by means of the caesarean section, a tumtum32 and a hermaphrodite do not themselves become holy nor cause holiness.33 And Samuel said: The expression, 'Do not themselves become holy' means as regards becoming a substitute,34 and the expression, 'Nor cause holiness' means to effect an exchange.35 And it has been taught: Said R. Meir:36 Since they37 do not become holy, how can they cause holiness? You cannot find a case38 except where one dedicated an animal and then it became trefah,39 or where one dedicated an embryo40 and it was then extracted through the caesarean section. Consequently we see that an embryo can become holy [contrary to the opinion of Bar Padda above]! - To this the answer was given: As regards an unblemished [embryo] in the inside of an unblemished animal, even Bar Padda also agrees that it becomes hullin.41 They42 only differ as regards an unblemished [embryo] in the inside of a blemished animal. Bar Padda holds since the mother is not holy as such,43 it [the embryo] is also not holy, whereas R. Johanan holds: These44 are two independent animals; the mother is indeed not holy but the embryo is.

Another version: But the cases of kil'ayim, tumtum and a hermaphrodite you can only explain with reference to the offspring of dedication and in accordance with the opinion of R. Judah who used to say that one can effect an exchange with an offspring [of dedications]. Now only these are not consecrated as such, but other embryos become holy, [unlike the opinion of Bar Padda]! - Said Abaye: Regarding an unblemished [embryo] in the inside of an unblemished animal, all the authorities agree that it [the embryo] is holy as such. The point at issue is with reference to an embryo in the inside of a blemished animal, Bar padda, holding that since the mother is not holy as such, except for its value, the embryo also is not holy as such [except for its value], whereas R. Johanan says: An embryo is not considered the thigh of its mother, and although its mother is not holy as such, the embryo nevertheless is holy as such.

SAID R. JOSE: IS IT NOT THE CASE WITH REFERENCE TO DEDICATIONS THAT IF ONE SAYS: 'THIS FOOT SHALL BE etc.

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(1) The words 'One can dedicate' of the Mishnah just quoted do not refer at all to embryos.
(2) Separate limbs and parts of the animal.
(3) The limbs of the same animal permit of exchange with another animal, for the consecration of one limb renders the whole animal holy, since one cannot effect exchange for one consecrated limb. For even R. Jose in our Mishnah above only says that one has power to exchange limbs of hullin for whole dedicated animals but not the whole animal for a dedicated limb and certainly not limbs of hullin for dedicated limbs.
(4) And the latter part of the Mishnah quoted which says: 'But one has no power to effect exchange' informs us that one has no power to exchange limbs for whole animals, so that if e.g., one says: 'Let the limb of this animal be a substitute for this whole dedicated animal' it is not holy. This is a restriction which applies to dedications, for if one dedicated a limb, the whole animal becomes holy, whereas if one says: 'Let this limb be a substitute for this whole animal' there is no substitute.
(5) E.g., the offspring of a dedicated animal, although they are holy, cannot be exchanged for an animal so long as they are inside the animal. This will be in accordance with the opinion of R. Judah who holds that an offspring can effect an exchange, for according to the Rabbis, even if the offspring were outside their mother's body, they could not effect an exchange.
(6) After their birth.
(7) The Mishnah just explained.
(8) Who holds that the offspring of a dedicated animal can effect exchange.
(9) For the first clause in the Mishnah just explained above says that one can consecrate limbs and effect exchange with them, thus implying that holiness spreads to the entire animal, otherwise there could be no substitution for limbs.
(10) In the Mishnah just quoted.
(11) Sh. Mek. The case here is where he dedicated a limb, the loss of which results in death, v. p. 71, n. 7.
(12) Whether dedication has effect on embryos.
(13) Infra 25b.
(14) For if it is five months old, it has finished its months of pregnancy in the case of small cattle and is not rendered permissible through the slaughtering of its mother, according to R. Meir, who holds that if an animal has concluded its normal months of pregnancy it requires a separate shechitah.
(15) According to the law of a sin-offering. At present we interpret the Baraitha as dealing with a case where one separates a pregnant animal. For if pregnancy followed dedication, all the authorities concerned will agree that since the consecration of the embryo was through its mother, it is regarderd as hullin, as the offspring of dedications are only holy at their birth and not while inside the animal.
(16) So Sh. Mek.
(17) So Sh. Mek. For any length of time.
(18) In their own right. When the animal is dedicated while pregnant it becomes holy immediately and is not subject to the law of the offspring of dedication.
(19) Except by virtue of the mother and is subject to the law of other offspring of dedications which are holy at birth.
(20) The Baraitha above is not a case at all of setting apart a pregnant animal but of dedicating an animal which subsequently became pregnant.
(21) The last one, mentioned above in the difference of opinion.
(22) But not while inside the animal.
(23) The first Tanna, mentioned above in the Baraitha.
(24) And all the authorities concerned agree that dedication has effect on embryos immediately, in accordance with the opinion of R. Johanan.
(25) Which says that the embryo is not holy as a sin-offering.
(26) It is therefore like an offspring of dedications which is sacred at birth.
(27) Which says that the embryo has the law of a sin-offering.
(28) It therefore becomes holy immediately and has not the law of the offspring of dedications.
(29) Yeb. 83b, Bek. 42a, etc.
(30) A hybrid.
(31) An animal afflicted with an organic disease, v. Glos.
(32) An animal whose genitals are hidden or undeveloped.
(33) This passage is explained subsequently.
(34) So that if they are hullin and were substituted for a dedicated animal, they do not become sacred; and though the law of exchange has effect on permanent blemished animals, it has no effect on these cases. This is certainly the case, that they are not holy, if one actually consecrated them.
(35) If they are holy, there can be no exchange effected with them so as to cause holiness to another animal of hullin.
(36) Sh. Mek,. 'Rabbi'.
(37) Kil'ayim, etc.
(38) That they should be holy.
(39) The animal is holy, for its consecration was prior to its defect.
(40) Holiness attaching to it immediately.
(41) Agreeing with R. Johanan, the case of consecrating an embryo and then extracting it through the caesarean section being the same as the case of an unblemished embryo in the inside of an unblemished animal.
(42) Bar Padda and R. Johanan.
(43) Because it is blemished.
(44) The mother and its embryo.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 11b

Our Rabbis have taught: Are we to suppose that if one says: 'This foot shall be a burnt-offering' the whole animal becomes a burnt-offering? The text states: All that any man giveth of it unto the Lord shall be holy:1 'Of it2 unto the Lord', but not the whole of it [the animal] 'unto the Lord'. I might think that it [the animal] becomes hullin, therefore the text states: 'It shall be holy'.3 How is one to act?4 It must be sold for the requirements of burnt-offerings, and its money is hullin except for the value of its limb. This is the teaching of R. Meir and R. Judah. R. Jose and R. Simeon, however, say: Whence do we derive that if one says, 'The foot of this animal shall be a burnt-offering', the whole animal becomes a burnt-offering? Because [Scripture] says, 'All that any man giveth of it [shall be] unto the Lord';5 when it further says, 'It shall be holy' this includes the whole of it [the animal].6

The Master said: 'It shall be sold for requirements of a burnt-offering'. But does not he [the purchaser] bring an animal [for a burnt-offering] with the loss [of limb]?7 - Said 'Raba: It is a case where he [the purchaser] says: 'I undertake to bring a burnt-offering which can live'.8

Said R. Hisda: R. Judah9 agrees where [he dedicated] a part [of the animal the removal of which] renders the animal trefah.10 Raba says: A part [the removal of which] renders the animal nebelah.11 And R. Shesheth says: A part [the removal of which] kills the animal. What is the practical difference between R. Hisda and Raba? - The difference is whether a trefah can live. R. Hisda holds according to the one who says that a trefah cannot live,12 whereas Raba will hold according to the one who says that a trefah can live.13 And what is the practical difference between Raba and R. Shesheth? - The difference between them is as regards the ruling of R. Eleazar. For R. Eleazar says: If the thigh of an animal was removed and the hollow [thereof], it [the animal] is nebelah.14 Raba will agree with R. Eleazar,15 whereas R. Shesheth will not agree with R. Eleazar.16

They raised an objection. 'Said Rabbi: I favour the opinion of R. Judah17 where [the dedication] is a part of the animal [the removal of which] will not result in death, and the opinion of R. Jose18 where the dedication is of a part [of the animal the removal of which] results in death'. Now can we not infer from this that [R. Jose differs] with R. Judah [even in connection with the removal of a vital limb]? - There is no difficulty as regards the words: 'I favour the opinion of R. Judah19 where [the dedication] is of a part [of the animal] the removal of which will not result in death,'20 since R. Jose does differ in this.21 But from the words: 'And the opinion of R. Jose where the dedication is of a part [of the animal the removal of which] will result in death', cannot we infer from this that22 R. Judah differs?23 Shall we say this refutes all?24 - No. The statement is defective25 and must be read thus: The teaching of R. Jose is acceptable to R. Judah regarding a part [of the animal the removal of which] results in death, for even R. Judah does not differ with R. Jose save in regard to the dedication of a part [of the animal the removal of which] does not result in death, but in regard to the [dedication of] a part [the removal of which] results in death, he agrees with him.26

Raba inquired: What of the bird?27 [Shall we say,] Scripture says 'beast,'28 and this is not a 'beast'? Or perhaps shall we note that Scripture says korban ['offering']28 and a bird is also an offering?29 Let it remain undecided.

Raba inquired: If one dedicated a limb for its value,30 what of holiness as such31 resting on it? Does one say, since one limb is dedicated the whole becomes holy for value,32 and since there rests upon the animal the holiness for its value, there also rests on it dedication as such?33 Or perhaps we use a single miggo34 but not a double miggo! - But why cannot Raba solve [the inquiry] from his own teaching?35 For Raba said: If one dedicated a male36 [a ram] for its value,37 it is dedicated as such?38 - There,39 he dedicated the whole animal,40 but here,41 he only dedicated one limb. What therefore is the ruling? - Let it stand undecided.

[Abaye42 inquired of Rabbah:] If one dedicated a limb, what of the shearing?43 - Why not solve it from what has been taught: [Scripture said:] Nor shear the firstling of thy sheep,44 thus implying that you may shear where the firstling belongs to thee and to others [gentiles]?45 - There,46 no holiness rested on it at all,47 but here, holiness rested on it [the limb].

Another version: There,48 he has not the power to dedicate it,49 whereas here,50 he has the power to dedicate[the rest of the animal].

Abaye inquired of Rabbah: If one dedicated the skin of an animal, what of working [the animal]?51 - Come and hear: If one says, 'Whatever is in the inside of this animal shall be a burnt-offering', shearing is permitted, but work [with it] is forbidden on account of the weakening of the embryo within!52 - He replied to him: When [the Baraitha just quoted] states 'but work with it is forbidden', it means Rabbinically.53 If so, the shearing too should be forbidden?54 - He said to him: Work [with the embryo] which weakens it, the Rabbis prohibited, but shearing, the Rabbis did not prohibit.

Abaye inquired of R. Joseph: If it [the mother] is a peace-offering and its embryo is hullin55 and he slaughtered [the mother] within [the Temple court], what is the ruling?56 According to the one who holds that offspring of dedications are holy at birth and not before, have we here a case of [slaughtering] hullin in the Temple court57 or not?

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(1) Lev. XXVII, 9.
(2) Taken in the partitive sense.
(3) That limb, and since that limb is holy, he can no longer kill the animal as hullin.
(4) Since there is a blending of hullin and dedication in the animal.
(5) This is how the verse is rendered by R. Jose and R. Simeon.
(6) As being holy, because the holiness spreads to the entire animal.
(7) The limb belongs to the seller who dedicated it. Therefore it is found that the purchaser is not offering up a whole burnt-offering while he vowed to offer up a whole animal.
(8) And even if there was a loss of that limb which had already been dedicated, since even without the limb the animal can live, his vow was fulfilled. But if the dedication was of a limb the removal of which would kill the animal, then holiness spreads to the whole animal, even according to R. Judah.
(9) Who holds elsewhere that only the limb which is dedicated is holy.
(10) That in such circumstances holiness spreads to the whole animal.
(11) An animal that has died a natural death without shechitah.
(12) The difference of opinion is mentioned in Hul. 42b. Consequently since the animal cannot live, then he dedicated something the removal of which results in the death of the animal, and therefore he holds that R. Judah will agree in such a case.
(13) It is not therefore something the removal of which will result in the death of the animal. And R. Judah will maintain his opinion in the case of a trefah.
(14) Although it is still alive it causes ritual uncleanness like nebelah, for it is considered as already dead.
(15) And therefore if one dedicated the thigh and the region around, it is something the removal of which results in death, and the holiness spreads to the whole animal.
(16) And therefore he says: With the part that kills at once, and not with a thing the removal of which will not kill the animal outright, but will leave it struggling for a while.
(17) Who says above that the dedication of one limb does not render the whole animal holy.
(18) Who says above that the dedication of one limb makes the entire animal holy.
(19) Implying but not that of R. Jose.
(20) V. Sh. Mek.
(21) Where the loss of a limb does not result in death.
(22) V. Sh. Mek.
(23) And holds that even in such a case the dedication of one limb does not make the whole animal holy.
(24) I.e., R. Hisda, Raba, and R. Shesheth.
(25) There is a clause missing in the passage cited in the name of Rabbi.
(26) R. Jose, that the dedication of one vital limb makes the entire animal holy.
(27) According to R. Jose who holds that the consecration of a limb spreads to the whole animal, what if one consecrated a limb, e.g., a leg of a bird; does holiness spread to the whole bird or not?
(28) In the cited verse, 'if it be a beast whereof men bring on offering (korban) unto the Lord' (Lev. XXVII, 9).
(29) Like a turtle-dove, pigeon, etc.
(30) But not for dedication as such.
(31) Does the animal eventually become holy itself, and offered as a burnt-offering?
(32) The dedication in value for one limb having spread to the dedication in value for the whole animal.
(33) We go further and say, since the whole animal is dedicated for its value we extend it so that we consider it dedicated as such. For since the animal is unblemished and is fit for a burnt-offering, what is the difference whether we sell it and for the money purchase a burnt-offering or we use the animal directly as a burnt-offering?
(34) Lit., 'since' i.e., we have to argue thus: 'Since' one limb is dedicated for its value, therefore we regard the whole animal as dedicated for its value, and 'since' the animal is dedicated for its value, we consider it also as dedicated as such.
(35) That holiness as such certainly rested on it.
(36) The reason why Raba mentioned a male is because we are dealing with a burnt-offering, which cannot be other than a male.
(37) In order to purchase a burnt-offering for the money.
(38) It became dedicated as such and cannot be sold, for since the animal itself is fit for a burnt-offering, we use it as a burnt-offering.
(39) With reference to Raba's ruling.
(40) And therefore there is one miggo. i.e., since it is dedicated for its value, we say that holiness spreads to the body itself.
(41) With reference to Raba's inquiry.
(42) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(43) There is no question about working it, for it is certainly forbidden, since work weakens the limb.
(44) Deut. XV, 19.
(45) So here too in the case of Abaye's inquiry, since there is hullin and dedication in the animal, the shearing should be permitted.
(46) In connection with a firstling, in which a Jew and a non-Jew were partners.
(47) The law of a firstling not applying in this instance.
(48) With reference to the firstling.
(49) Since the gentile has a share in the firstling.
(50) Where he dedicates a limb of an animal.
(51) There is no question about shearing, as the skin is not weakened thereby, whereas working the animal does weaken the skin. The inquiry can be even according to R. Jose, for although if one dedicated a foot the whole animal becomes holy, the reason may be because a foot can be offered up, unlike the skin (sh. Mek).
(52) And here too there is a weakening of the skin and therefore work should be forbidden.
(53) Whereas our inquiry here as regards the dedication of the skin is whether it is forbidden Scripturally, so as to incur the penalty of lashes.
(54) Rabbinically, in the case of the embryo.
(55) If one dedicated a pregnant animal without its embryo, when according to all the authorities concerned, the embryo is not holy.
(56) Is the embryo forbidden because he slaughtered hullin in the Temple court. Tosaf. suggests that this inquiry can be solved from the Baraitha, supra 11a, where it says: 'If one slaughtered a sin-offering and found a four months' old embryo alive', implying that there is no prohibition here of slaughtering hullin in the Temple court. Sh. Mek. however, comments in this connection that there may be a difference between an embryo which has not completed its months of pregnancy, as in the case of the Baraitha, and an embryo which has completed its months of pregnancy, which is the case of our inquiry here.
(57) Since he did not dedicate the embryo, for he dedicated the animal before its pregnancy and therefore the embryo remains hullin until its birth.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 12a

He [R. Joseph] said to him [Abaye]:1 Can we apply here the text: If the place be too far for thee, then thou shalt kill?2

Abaye inquired of R. Joseph: If it [the mother] is hullin and its embryo is a peace-offering3 and one slaughtered it [the mother] without [the Temple court], does he incur the penalty for slaughtering dedicated animals without [the Temple court] or not? - He replied to him: Can we apply here the text: Even that they may bring them unto the Lord?4

Another version: He [R. Joseph] replied to him: [If the animal] is fit for the tent of meeting,5 one incurs a penalty for slaughtering it outside [the Temple court, but6 for an animal which is not fit for the tent of meeting,7 there is no penalty incurred for slaughtering without the Temple court].

MISHNAH. [ANYTHING WHICH HAS BECOME SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF TERUMAH THROUGH] AN ADMIXTURE CAN AFFECT A [SECOND] MIXTURE ONLY IN PROPORTION.8 [DOUGH] LEAVENED [THROUGH TERUMAH] CAN AFFECT [ANOTHER DOUGH] ONLY IN PROPORTION.9 DRAWN WATER CAN DISQUALIFY A MIKWEH10 ONLY IN PROPORTION. WATER OF PURIFICATION BECOMES RITUALLY FIT11 ONLY WITH THE PUTTING OF ASHES [IN THE WATER].12 A GRAVE AREA13 CANNOT CREATE A GRAVE AREA.14 [THE SEPARATION OF] TERUMAH CANNOT BE REPEATED.15 AN EXCHANGE CANNOT BE USED TO EFFECT ANOTHER EXCHANGE.16 THE OFFSPRING OF A DEDICATED ANIMAL CANNOT EFFECT AN EXCHANGE. R. JUDAH SAYS: THE OFFSPRING OF A DEDICATED ANIMAL CAN EFFECT AN EXCHANGE.17 THEY SAID TO HIM: A DEDICATED ANIMAL CAN EFFECT EXCHANGE, BUT NEITHER THE OFFSPRING OF A DEDICATED ANIMAL [NOR18 AN EXCHANGE] CAN EFFECT EXCHANGE.

GEMARA. Whose opinion is here19 represented? R. Hiyya b. Abba reported in the name of R. Johanan: It will not be that of R. Eliezer. For we have learnt: If a se'ah of terumah has fallen into less than a hundred se'ah of hullin,20 [the admixture becoming forbidden to non-priests], and something fell from the mixture into another place [of hullin] , R. Eliezer says: The mixture is considered certain terumah,21 whereas the Sages say: The [first] mixture can affect the [second] only in proportion.22

[DOUGH] LEAVENED [THROUGH TERUMAH] CAN AFFECT [OTHER DOUGH] ONLY IN PROPORTION. R. Hiyya b. Abba reported in the name of R. Johanan: The Mishnah will not be the opinion of R. Eliezer.23 For we have learnt: If leaven of hullin and of terumah fell into dough and there was in neither a sufficient quantity to leaven [the dough] but both were capable of leavening when combined, R. Eliezer says: We go by the last [leaven],24 whereas the Sages say: Whether the forbidden thing [terumah] fell first [into the dough] or last, a quantity capable of leavening is always required [in order that the dough should] become forbidden.

DRAWN WATER CAN DISQUALIFY A MIKWEH ONLY IN PROPORTION. Whose opinion is here represented? - R. Hiyya b. Aba reported in the name of R. Johanan: It is that of R. Eliezer b. Jacob. For it has been taught:25 R. Eliezer b. Jacob said: If a mikweh contains twenty-one se'ah of rain-water, one can bring26 nineteen se'ah27 and open a sluice [near it],28

____________________
(1) One does not incur the penalty for slaughtering hullin in the Temple court.
(2) Deut. XII, 21; from which text we derive in Kid. 57b that it is forbidden to slaughter hullin in the Temple court, for we interpret the text as follows: You may kill hullin away from the Temple court, but you may not kill hullin near the Temple court. Here you cannot apply the text, for you cannot kill the animal except in the Temple court, for it is a peace-offering and therefore the embryo is not regarded as hullin in the Temple court.
(3) And according to the authority who says that dedication has effect on an embryo, is there excision on account of the embryo, its mother having been slaughtered without the Temple court?
(4) Lev. XVII, 5, stated in connection with the prohibition of bringing dedications without the Temple court. For one is guilty of bringing dedications without the Temple court only with regard to an animal fit for an offering, but not an embryo which is not fit at present for an offering.
(5) And one offers it without the Temple court.
(6) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(7) And here it is hullin and can only be brought outside the tent of meeting. Therefore the text is not applicable.
(8) If, for example, a se'ah of terumah fell into a se'ah of hullin so that the mixture became subject to terumah and if subsequently one se'ah of this mixture fell into hullin, the second mixture is subject to the law of terumah only in proportion of the terumah contained in the first mixture.
(9) If, for example, terumah the size of an egg has leavened hullin also the size of an egg and then there fell from the mixture the size of an egg into some other dough, if half an egg is capable of leavening the dough, then the latter is forbidden, but if not, it is permitted, for we say that in the egg that fell into the dough there was only half an egg of terumah.
(10) Ritual bath.
(11) Lit., 'become waters of purification'.
(12) Which was there already, but if he first put the ashes in the vessel and then the water, the water is disqualified because, when he put in the ashes, there was no water in the vessel.
(13) Beth ha-Peras, a field in which a grave has been ploughed up; v. Keth. (Sonc. ed.) p. 154, n. 6.
(14) If the plough passes over and beyond it.
(15) I.e., once terumah has been separated from the heap, it cannot be separated again. Lit., 'there is no terumah after terumah'.
(16) A substitute which is sacred cannot itself be exchanged for another animal, so as to cause holiness to the latter.
(17) One can exchange an animal for the offspring and the substitute becomes holy.
(18) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(19) In the Mishnah which says that anything which has become subject to the law of terumah etc.
(20) For if it fell into one hundred se'ah of hullin, the terumah would be neutralized.
(21) So that if a se'ah from the admixture fell into other hullin there must be a hundred se'ah beside it in order to neutralize the terumah.
(22) We require a hundred times the proportion of terumah in the se'ah which fell into the second mixture and not more. If e.g., in the beginning there fell one se'ah of terumah into twenty-four se'ah of hullin, each se'ah of the mixture contains one twenty-fourth of terumah, i.e., one log. Now if a se'ah of this mixture fell into other hullin, seventy-seven log of hullin combine with the twenty-three log of hullin contained in the se'ah which fell in order to neutralize the terumah (Rashi).
(23) For according to R. Eliezer there is no need that the forbidden thing should be capable of leavening, and the forbidden thing, i.e., terumah, together with what is permissible, i.e., hullin, both combine in order to render the dough forbidden.
(24) Which causes the leavening, and if the forbidden thing fell last, the admixture is prohibited. And according to our Mishnah too, although from the first dough leavened exclusively by terumah, there fell into the second dough only a sufficient quantity to leaven the second dough, and hence the greater part of the leaven came from hullin, the second dough is still forbidden, because R. Eliezer holds that the product of combined causes i.e., of terumah and hullin joined together is forbidden (Rashi). Rashi adds that even if the terumah fell first but it was not removed, and both the terumah and the hullin leavened the dough, the latter is forbidden, because it is a product of combined causes. Tosaf. however, explains that the case dealt with by the Mishnah is where the leaven of terumah the size of an olive and hullin the size of an olive fell separately into a dough of hullin and leavened the latter, there being neither in the hullin by itself nor in the terumah by itself a sufficient quantity to leaven.
(25) Tosef. Mik. IV.
(26) Lit., 'fill with the shoulder'.
(27) Of drawn water to make up the minimum required of forty se'ah.
(28) Since to pour from a bucket directly into a mikweh which contains less than forty se'ah of rain water would disqualify the water, even if only three log, but he makes a cavity into which he pours water from the bucket and the water flows from this cavity into the mikweh.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 12b

and [the collected waters] are clean ritually,1 for collected drawn waters are rendered clean by the greater part [in the mikweh being rain-water] and by being conducted through a channel.2 We can infer from this that according to the opinion of the Rabbis [drawn waters are not rendered clean] by the greater part [of rain-water] and by being conducted through a channel.3 Then the ruling which when Rabin came he reported in the name of R. Johanan: Collected water which has been drawn entirely through a channel is ritually clean, will represent neither the opinion of the Rabbis nor that of R. Eliezer? - Rather said R. Papa: [The words IN PROPORTION] mean according to the number of the vessels, and it [the Mishnah] is the opinion of Joseph b. Honi. For it has been taught: If three4 log of collected water fell into a mikweh,5 if [the waters] came from two or three vessels or even from four or five vessels, they disqualify the mikweh. Joseph b. Honi says: If the waters came from two or three vessels,6 they disqualify the mikweh, but if from four or five vessels,7 they do not disqualify the mikweh.

THE WATERS OF PURIFICATION BECOME RITUALLY FIT etc. Whose opinion is here represented? - R. Hiyya b. Abba reported in the name of R. Johanan: It is not the opinion of R. Simeon.8 For it has been taught: If one puts the ashes [into the vessel] first before the water, it [the water of purification] is disqualified, whereas R. Simeon says: It is fit. What is the reason of R. Simeon? - Since it is written: And for the unclean they shall take the ashes ['afar] of the burning of the purification from sin [and the running water shall be put thereto].9 And it has been taught: R. Simeon says, Now is it 'afar [dust]?10 Is it not efer [ashes]?11 The text departs from the natural expression12 in the matter in order to permit of a gezerah shawah.13 We read here 'afar14 and we read there 'afar.15 Just as there16 the 'afar is placed upon the water, so here17 also the 'afar is placed upon the water. And just as here18 if the dust19 is placed in the vessel before the water the ritual is fit, so there20 if he placed the dust before the water, it [the water] is ritually fit.21 And whence do we derive this [in connection with waters of purification]?22 - There are two Scriptural texts. It first says: And [running water] shall be put thereto,23 from which we see that ashes are put first in the vessel, and then the text continues: Running water . . . in a vessel.24 How [do we reconcile these texts]? If he wishes [he puts] 'afar25 at the bottom [of the vessel],26 and if he wishes, he puts 'afar on top [of the water].27 And what is the reason of our Tanna?28 - He can answer you: The latter part of the verse29 is to be strictly interpreted,30 and [the text]: 'And [running water] shall be put thereto teaches us that one must mix [the ashes and the water together].31 But why do you see fit to say that the latter part of the verse is to be strictly interpreted? perhaps the first part of the text is to be strictly interpreted,32 [and the text, 'in a vessel' teaches us that33 the waters must be fresh in the vessel]?34 - You cannot interpret the text in this way: Just as we find with regard to all other cases35 that which makes [the water] ritually fit36 is placed on top,37 so here38 that which makes [the water of purification] ritually fit is put on top.39

A GRAVE AREA CANNOT CREATE A GRAVE AREA etc. Our Mishnah will not represent the opinion of R. Eliezer. For we have learnt: R. Eliezer says: A grave area creates a grave area,40 [whereas41 the Sages say: A grave area does not create a grave area].42 According to the Rabbis, up to how much?43 - When R. Dimi came [from Palestine] he reported in the name of Resh Lakish who reported in the name of R. Simeon b. Abba:

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(1) Fit to immerse therein.
(2) This is therefore what the Mishnah means by the expression in this connection of ONLY IN PROPORTION, since collected drawn water does not disqualify a mikweh when it is conducted through a channel, unless there is twenty se'ah of this in the mikweh.
(3) Since you say that the Mishnah is the view of R. Eliezer and not that of the Rabbis, and since the Mishnah gives a lenient ruling in this connection for the very language DRAWN WATER ONLY IN PROPORTION proves that the object of the Mishnah is to be lenient in the matter - we can conclude that the Rabbis, in differing with R. Eliezer, adopt a stricter view.
(4) Tosef. Mik. III.
(5) Not by being conducted through a channel.
(6) So that a whole log of drawn water fell at once into the mikweh.
(7) So that there was no whole log of drawn water which fell at once into the mikweh.
(8) For according to R. Simeon, if one puts the ashes first into the vessel before the water, the water is ritually permitted.
(9) Num. XIX, 17. In connection with the waters of purification.
(10) Which is mixed with the waters of purification.
(11) אפר.
(12) I.e., the word 'ashes'.
(13) An analogy established on the basis of verbal congruities in the text, v. Glos. s.v.
(14) With reference to the waters of purification.
(15) With reference to the waters of jealousy given to a woman suspected of faithlessness.
(16) In connection with the waters of jealousy, since Scripture says: And of the dust . . . and put it into water (Num. V, 17).
(17) With reference to the waters of purification. This procedure is at the outset the proper performance of the ritual.
(18) In connection with the waters of purification.
(19) Really the ashes.
(20) With reference to the waters of jealousy.
(21) we thus see that according to the opinion of R. Simeon in connection with the waters of purification, if one puts first the ashes into the vessel before the water, the water is ritually fit.
(22) That the putting of ashes before the water into the vessel does not disqualify the water.
(23) Ibid. XIX, 17. Implying that the ashes are already in the vessel and the water was then added.
(24) Implying that the water was poured directly into the vessel and not on the ashes, and that if the ashes were put first in the vessel prior to the water, the water would not be ritually fit for the purpose.
(25) The word here really means 'ashes'.
(26) And then the water is poured on the ashes.
(27) It is permissible either way.
(28) I.e., the first Tanna who disputes with R. Simeon. This Tanna holds that if one should put the ashes first and then the water into the vessel, the water is not ritually fit. Now what may be his reason?
(29) 'Running water . . . in a vessel'.
(30) As implying that the water must be put direct into the vessel, and if he put the ashes first, then the water does not cleanse ritually.
(31) The object of the text is not to teach us that if he first put ashes in the vessel and then the water, the water cleanses, but to warn us that after putting the ashes in the water he must mix them well with his finger so that the water below may come on top.
(32) The text: 'And (running water) shall be put thereto', thus implying that the ashes were put first in the vessel.
(33) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(34) That he draws the water in the vessel direct and fresh from a fountain and the water is not poured into it from another vessel.
(35) E.g., with reference to the waters of jealousy.
(36) I.e., the ashes.
(37) For all the authorities concerned agree that it is the proper performance of the ritual to put the water first into the vessel.
(38) In connection with the waters of purification.
(39) Therefore inevitably the latter part of the text 'running water in a vessel' is interpreted in the exact sense, and the first part of the text refers to the need for effective mixing of the water and the ashes.
(40) All the four fields surrounding a grave area if ploughed become unclean, for the dust of the grave area causes uncleanness (Rashi). Tosaf, however, explains R. Eliezer's teaching as follows: If one ploughs a grave area and beyond it to another field, the latter becomes a grave area. If this second field in turn was ploughed and beyond it, the latter field becomes a grave area. Similarly from the third to the fourth, all making each other a grave area.
(41) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(42) Oh. VII, 2.
(43) According to the Sages, how far does uncleanness extend to other fields.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 13a

Three fields1 and two furrows' length.2 How much is a furrow's length? A hundred cubits, as it has been taught:3 He who ploughs a grave creates a beth ha-peras4 the length of a furrow. And how much is the length of a furrow? A hundred cubits.

[THE SEPARATION OF] TERUMAH CANNOT BE REPEATED etc. Our Mishnah is the opinion of R. Akiba. For we have learnt: If partners separated terumah one after the other, R. Eliezer says: The terumah of both of them is valid;5 whereas R. Akiba says: The terumah of both of them is not valid.6 The Sages however say: If the first of the partners separated terumah according to the right quantity,7 then the terumah of the second one is not valid. But if the first one did not separate terumah according to the right quantity,8 then the terumah of the second [partner] is valid.9

AN EXCHANGE CANNOT BE USED TO EFFECT ANOTHER EXCHANGE etc. What is the reason? Since Scripture says: 'And the exchange thereof',10 implying, but not the exchange of an exchange.

THE OFFSPRING OF A DEDICATED ANIMAL CANNOT EFFECT AN EXCHANGE. Since Scripture says: 'It'10 implying, it can effect exchange but not the offspring of a dedicated animal.

R. JUDAH SAYS: THE OFFSPRING OF A DEDICATED ANIMAL EFFECTS AN EXCHANGE. For Scripture says: Shall be,10 thus including the offspring of a dedicated animal. And the Rabbis?11 [The object of the text is] to include [an exchange] in error as [possessing the same validity as a] deliberate [exchange].12

MISHNAH. BIRDS AND MEAL-OFFERINGS DO NOT EFFECT EXCHANGE,13 SINCE [THE LAW OF] EXCHANGE ONLY APPLIES TO AN ANIMAL.14 A CONGREGATION OR PARTNERS CANNOT EFFECT EXCHANGE, SINCE IT SAYS: HE SHALL NOT ALTER IT NOR CHANGE IT,15 THUS IMPLYING16 THAT AN INDIVIDUAL CAN EFFECT EXCHANGE BUT A CONGREGATION OR PARTNERS CANNOT EFFECT EXCHANGE. ONE CANNOT EFFECT EXCHANGE WITH [OBJECTS]17 DEDICATED FOR TEMPLE REPAIRS.18 SAID R. SIMEON:19 NOW IS NOT TITHE20 [ALREADY] IMPLIED?21 FOR WHAT PURPOSE THEN IS TITHE SPECIALLY MENTIONED?22 IT IS IN ORDER TO MAKE A COMPARISON WITH IT AND TO TEACH US THAT JUST AS TITHE IS A PRIVATE OFFERING, [SO ALL EXCHANGE OF DEDICATIONS MUST BE A PRIVATE OFFERING] THUS EXCLUDING CONGREGATIONAL OFFERINGS.23 AND JUST AS TITHE IS A DEDICATION FOR THE ALTAR, [SO EXCHANGES CAN BE EFFECTED ONLY WITH DEDICATIONS FOR THE ALTAR] THUS EXCLUDING OFFERINGS DEDICATED FOR TEMPLE REPAIRS.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis have taught: One might think that one can effect exchange with dedications for Temple repairs? The text however says: Korban24 [offering] implying that [exchange only applies] to what is called korban, thus excluding dedications for Temple repairs which are not called korban. And are not [dedications for Temple repairs called korban]? Has it not been taught:25 If26 you interpret the word korban, I can understand it as including even dedications for Temple repairs27 which are called korban, since it says: And we have brought the Lord's offering etc.?28 The text however states: And bringeth it not unto the door of the tent of meeting.29 [We therefore say as follows:] In respect of anything which comes to the door of the tent of meeting, one is guilty [of the transgression] of slaughtering dedicated animals without the Temple court, but in respect of anything which does not come to the door of the tent of meeting, one is not guilty [of the transgression] of slaughtering dedicated animals without the Temple court.30 Consequently we see that [dedications for Temple repairs], are called korban!31 - Said R. Hanina: This offers no difficulty. This32 is the opinion of R. Simeon and that33 is the opinion of the [Rabbis].34 According to R. Simeon, dedications for Temple repairs are called korban and according to the Rabbis they are not called korban. And are not [dedications for Temple repairs called it korban]? Surely it is written: And we have brought the Lord's korban [offering]?35 - [Dedications for Temple repairs] are called the Lord's offering, but they are not called an offering for the Lord.36

Our Rabbis have taught: He shall not search whether it be good or bad.37 Now why is this mentioned?38 Has not Scripture already said: He shall not alter it nor change it, a good for a bad or a bad for a good, etc.?39 Because it says: 'He shall not alter it nor change it', implying either a private offering or a congregational offering, either a dedication for the altar or a dedication for Temple repairs, and [that which is brought obligatorily].40 [In order to avoid this interpretation] Scripture says: 'He shall not search'.41 Said R. Simeon: Now was not tithe implied? And for what purpose was tithe specially mentioned? In order to teach you that just as tithe42 is a private offering, a dedication for the altar, something which comes obligatorily and something which does not come through a partnership, so all [animals exchanged] must be a private offering, a dedication for the altar, something which comes obligatorily

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(1) The field actually containing the grave which was ploughed and the field on the one side of the grave area and on the other side, i.e., either east and west or north and south, as it is not customary to plough on all the four sides of a field but only east and west or north and south.
(2) I.e., the field containing the grave is entirely unclean but the other two fields, either on the east and west or north and south are only unclean to the extent of two furrows' length. For the Rabbis have estimated that this is the distance the plough in the field is capable of moving the bones into another field.
(3) Tosef. Oh. XVII.
(4) A grave area.
(5) For both have a share in it. Lit., 'the terumah of both is terumah'.
(6) Even of the first one, for since the second proceeded to tithe again, he shows thereby that he was not satisfied with the tithing of his partner. Therefore the tithing of the first partner was not with the consent and approval of the second partner. The same applies to the tithing of the second.
(7) One in fifty.
(8) E.g., if he was niggardly in his tithing, giving less than one in fifty, i.e., one in sixty.
(9) Whereas according to R. Akiba in either case the terumah is not valid, and our Mishnah too, as it does not specify whether the terumah was given generously by the first partner or otherwise, must be the view of R. Akiba.
(10) Lev. XXVII, 10.
(11) What will they do with the text 'shall be'?
(12) If one intends to effect an exchange for a black animal and he exchanged the dedicated animal in error for a white one, the exchange is valid, unlike the case of dedication, where if one intended to dedicate a black animal and he dedicated in error a white one, the dedication is not valid.
(13) One cannot make an exchange for a dedicated bird or meal-offering.
(14) Since Scripture says: And if he shall at all exchange beast for beast.
(15) Ibid.
(16) The word 'he' etc.
(17) Supra 31a. Another version is: Dedications for Temple repairs.
(18) Since in connection with 'exchange' Scripture says korban ('offering') and dedications for Temple repairs are not described as korban.
(19) R. Simeon holds that a dedication for Temple repairs is called korban and therefore there is need for a text to exclude dedications for Temple repairs from the law of exchange.
(20) Animals tithed.
(21) In the word 'beast' used in connection with the law of exchange.
(22) As being capable of effecting exchange.
(23) Partners are also excluded, since partners are exempt from the law of tithing animals.
(24) And if it be a beast whereof men bring an offering (korban), Lev. XXVII, 9.
(25) Supra 6b.
(26) In connection with slaughtering and offering without the Temple court, the word korban is expounded as meaning that there is no penalty of excision incurred for slaughtering hullin in the Temple court. The passage then continues: If you etc.
(27) Usually blemished animals unfit for the altar, which yet are described as korban.
(28) Num. XXXI, 50.
(29) Lev. XVII, 4.
(30) And dedications for Temple repairs are usually such animals which are unfit for the door of the tent of meeting.
(31) Unlike the view in the Mishnah.
(32) The Baraitha just quoted.
(33) The Mishnah.
(34) Another version has here the name of Rabbi, who will hold that the name of korban does not apply to dedications for Temple repairs. Our Mishnah will therefore be entirely the opinion of R. Simeon and the reason why dedications for Temple repairs do not effect exchange will not be because of the word korban but as R. Simeon explains subsequently in the Mishnah.
(35) Num. XXXI, 50. We see therefore that the word korban applies also to objects other than dedications for the altar.
(36) This would have implied an offering in the ordinary sense, i.e., a sacrifice for the altar.
(37) Lev: XXVII, 33.
(38) The passage refers to animal tithe.
(39) Lev. XXVII, 10, in connection with the law of exchange, thus implying that all dedications including animal tithe effect exchange.
(40) All these effect exchange. Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(41) The reason therefore why the text again mentions the law of exchange in connection with animal tithe is in order to compare all other exchanges to animal tithe, as R. Simeon explains.
(42) For which exchange is effected.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 13b

and something which does not come through a partnership.1 Rabbi says: And for what purpose now is tithe specially mentioned?2 In order to infer the cases of [one which became tithe through] a change of name3 and the exchange of actual tithe.4 [And further] to teach you that that which becomes tithe through a change of name is offered up,5 whereas the exchange of actual tithe is not offered up;6 that which becomes tithe through a change of name is redeemed,7 whereas the exchange of actual tithe is not redeemed;8 an exchange of actual tithe has effect both on what is fit [unblemished], and what is not fit [blemished],9 whereas a change of name [of tithe] has effect only on what is fit.10 The question was asked:11 Because the Divine Law includes the case of that which became tithe through a change of name, should it therefore be inferior [in holiness]?12 - Yes, for we say what [the Law] has included is included, but what it has not included, is not included. And whence do you derive this?13 - Said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua: Because it14 is made the subject of a fresh statement, and therefore we do not go beyond the anomalous feature.15

Said R. Nahman b. Isaac to Raba: According to R. Simeon who says: [Exchange is effected with] something which comes obligatorily, is it only an obligatory burnt-offering that can effect exchange but not a freewill burnt-offering? - He answered him: A freewill burnt-offering also; since he took upon himself [to offer it up],16 it can effect exchange, and [R. Simeon's teaching]17 is necessary only for the case of a burnt-offering which comes from surpluses [of sacrificial appropriations].18 Now what is his view? If he holds with the authority who says that the surpluses go for freewill gifts of the congregation, then actually exchange cannot be effected, since a congregation cannot effect exchange! - Then R. Simeon will hold with the authority who says that the surpluses go for freewill gifts of individuals.19 Now from whom have we heard this opinion? From R. Eliezer.20 But have we not heard him explicitly [state] that exchange is effected?21 For it has been taught: A burnt-offering which came from the surpluses can effect exchange. This is the teaching of R. Eliezer! - R. Simeon agrees with him on one point and differs from him on another. [He22 agrees with him on one point, that surpluses are applied to gifts for individuals],23 and differs from him on another point, for R. Eliezer holds: A burnt-offering brought from surpluses can effect exchange, whereas R. Simeon holds it cannot effect exchange. If so,24 as regards the inquiry of R. Abin:25 If he set apart a guilt-offering with which to obtain atonement and made an exchange for it, and [the26 first animal then became blemished and he redeemed it for another which became lost], and he obtained atonement through another guilt-offering, and the lost animal was then found and was [automatically] transformed into a burnt-offering, what is the ruling as regards making an exchange with it [the burnt-offering]? Whose opinion does this inquiry presuppose? It can hardly be that of R. Simeon, for you say that R. Simeon holds that a burnt-offering which comes from surpluses cannot effect exchange! - R. Abin's inquiry is thus: If you can find a Tanna who holds R. Simeon's opinion who says that one cannot exchange repeatedly and holds also R. Eliezer's opinion who says that a burnt-offering which comes from the surpluses can effect exchange, what of exchanging it again? With reference to two bodies [different animals] and one kind of holiness,27 what is the ruling? And if you adopt the opinion that one kind of holiness cannot28 [effect exchange again], what is the ruling in the case of two kinds of holiness and one body?29 Let this question remain.30

CHAPTER 2

MISHNAH

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(1) Since Scripture says 'shall be to thee', thus excluding partners.
(2) Subject to the law of exchange, since all dedications are included in the law of exchange. For Rabbi holds that for declaring a private offering subject to the law of exchange there is no need for a special mention of tithe, since Scripture says, 'he shall etc.' in the singular. That the dedication must be one for the altar is also inferred from the word korban mentioned in connection with the law of exchange. We therefore see that Rabbi holds that dedications for the Temple repairs are not called korban. Also as regards R. Simeon's exception from the law of exchange of the case of a burnt-offering brought from the surpluses of sacrificial appropriations because dedications must be something which come obligatorily, Rabbi will maintain that surpluses can go for communal offerings. The ruling also concerning partners and congregations not being able to effect exchange can be inferred from the text, He shall not alter, etc., since it is couched in the singular number (Rashi).
(3) Where e.g., one called the tenth animal the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, the law being that both are holy and are offered up as peace-offerings. We derive this from the text: 'And all the tithe'. The animal is therefore not actually tithe but has been named tithe in error.
(4) Where one put a hullin alongside tithe and said that the first shall be exchanged for the latter, the exchange in this case having effect. There is need for the special mention of tithe, for otherwise I might have said that there is no exchange in this case, as the rendering of an animal tithe by a change of name is itself an anomaly and therefore one cannot go beyond it (Rashi).
(5) V. Bek. 61a.
(6) V. supra 5b.
(7) For it is a peace-offering and a peace-offering is redeemed when blemished.
(8) Since Scripture says: 'Then both it and the change thereof shall be holy, it shall not be redeemed'.
(9) Like tithe which has effect on blemished animals so far as to restrict the killing of them in the market place and weighing the flesh by the pound.
(10) To receive holiness, like other dedications which do not receive holiness where the blemish was prior to the dedication.
(11) Lit., 'they said'.
(12) Why then does not holiness have effect on a blemished animal in this connection? There is all the more reason that the case of tithe through change of name should be more strict and take effect even when the animal is blemished.
(13) That we do not include anything beyond what the Torah actually includes.
(14) The tithe through change of name.
(15) And therefore we do not go any further to include any other case.
(16) Although he said 'Let this, etc.'.
(17) That exchange must be something which comes obligatorily.
(18) Where e.g., one separated money for a sin-offering or a guilt-offering and some of it was left over and with this money we purchased a burnt-offering.
(19) The owners themselves bring a burnt-offering as a gift but not to carry out an obligation.
(20) Who holds that surpluses are applied to gifts for individuals.
(21) What case therefore does R. Simeon exclude in respect of the law of exchange?
(22) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(23) The text therefore is required to exclude this case from the law of exchange.
(24) That according to R. Simeon a burnt-offering coming from surpluses cannot effect exchange.
(25) V. supra 9a and notes.
(26) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(27) I.e., if one separated a guilt-offering in order to obtain atonement and exchanged it and then it became blemished and was redeemed for another. The second animal, although another body, possesses the same kind of holiness as the first, i.e., the holiness of a guilt-offering.
(28) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(29) I.e., if one were atoned for through another guilt-offering and the first lost guilt-offering was then found and transformed into a burnt-offering. Thus here there are two kinds of holiness with the same body.
(30) תיבעי is the term of the Jerusalem Talmud and has the same meaning as תיקו, in the Babylonian Talmud.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 14a

. THERE ARE [LAWS RELATING] TO THE SACRIFICES OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHICH DO NOT APPLY TO CONGREGATIONAL SACRIFICES AND [LAWS RELATING] TO CONGREGATIONAL SACRIFICES WHICH DO NOT APPLY TO THE SACRIFICES OF INDIVIDUALS. FOR SACRIFICES OF AN INDIVIDUAL CAN EFFECT EXCHANGE WHEREAS CONGREGATIONAL SACRIFICES CANNOT EFFECT EXCHANGE; SACRIFICES OF AN INDIVIDUAL CAN BE BOTH MALES AND FEMALES, WHEREAS CONGREGATIONAL SACRIFICES CAN BE ONLY MALES;1 RESPONSIBILITY REMAINS2 FOR THE SACRIFICES OF INDIVIDUALS3 AND4 THEIR DRINK-OFFERINGS, WHEREAS RESPONSIBILITY DOES NOT REMAIN FOR CONGREGATIONAL SACRIFICES NOR FOR THEIR DRINK-OFFERINGS, ALTHOUGH RESPONSIBILITY REMAINS FOR THEIR DRINK-OFFERINGS WHEN THE SACRIFICE IS OFFERED UP.5 THERE ARE [LAWS RELATING] TO CONGREGATIONAL SACRIFICES WHICH DO NOT APPLY TO THE SACRIFICES OF INDIVIDUALS, FOR CONGREGATIONAL SACRIFICES SUPERSEDE THE SABBATH AND [THE LAWS] OF RITUAL UNCLEANNESS6 WHEREAS SACRIFICES OF INDIVIDUALS DO NOT SUPERSEDE EITHER THE SABBATH OR [THE LAWS] OF RITUAL UNCLEANNESS. SAID R. MEIR: BUT ARE THERE NOT THE CASES OF THE OFFERING OF THE BAKED CAKES OF A HIGH PRIEST7 AND THE BULLOCK FOR THE DAY OF ATONEMENT8 WHICH ARE SACRIFICES OF INDIVIDUALS AND YET SUPERSEDE THE SABBATH AND [THE LAWS] OF RITUAL UNCLEANNESS? THE MATTER THEREFORE DEPENDS ON [WHETHER] THE TIME [FOR THE OFFERING UP] IS FIXED.9

GEMARA. SACRIFICES OF AN INDIVIDUAL CAN EFFECT EXCHANGE etc. But is this a general rule? Is there not the case of birds which are a sacrifice of an individual and yet they do not effect exchange? - [The Mishnah]10 speaks only of animals. But is there not the case of the offspring of a dedicated animal which is a sacrifice of an individual and yet does not effect exchange? - This view represents the opinion of R. Judah who says: The offspring of a dedicated animal effects exchange. But is there not the case of a substitute itself which is a sacrifice of an individual and a substitute cannot effect an exchange?11 - [The Mishnah] only refers to the principal sacrifice.12 And now that you have arrived at this explanation,13 you can even say that [the Mishnah] will be in agreement with the opinion of the Rabbis,14 for [the Mishnah] only refers to the principal sacrifice.15

SACRIFICES OF AN INDIVIDUAL CAN BE BOTH MALES AND FEMALES. But is this a general rule?16 Is there not the case of a burnt-offering which is a sacrifice of an individual and can only be a male and not a female? - There is the case of the burnt-offering of a bird,17 for it has been taught: Unblemished condition and male sex [for purposes of sacrifice] are required only of cattle but unblemished condition and male sex are not required of birds. But is there not the case of a sin-offering which is a sacrifice of an individual and is a female-and not a male? - There is the goat offered by a prince, which is a male. But is there not the case of a guilt-offering which is a sacrifice of an individual and is a male and not a female?18 - We19 mean [in the Mishnah]20 a sacrifice which can be brought equally by an individual and a congregation,21 whereas a guilt-offering can be brought only by an individual but not by a congregation. And if you prefer [another solution] I may say: Does the Mishnah say [there are laws which relate] to all sacrifices? It says [there are laws which relate] to sacrifices.22 And what are these? peace-offerings; and [it tells us] that if one wishes to bring a female [animal] one may do so and if one wishes to bring a male [animal] one may do so.

RESPONSIBILITY REMAINS FOR SACRIFICES OF AN INDIVIDUAL etc. Whence is this proved?23 - For our Rabbis have taught: [Scripture says:] Everything upon his day.24 this teaches us that the additional offerings may be [offered up] all day.25 The text, 'upon his day' teaches us that if the day passed and he did not offer them, he is not responsible for them.26 One might think that one is not responsible for their drink-offerings although he offered up the sacrifice? The text, however, states: And their meal-offering and their drink-offerings,27 [their meal-offerings and drink-offerings]28 even by night and their meal-offerings and drink-offerings even on the morrow.29 Resh Lakish says: [We derive this] from here: Scripture says, Beside the Sabbaths of the Lord.30 And both [texts]31 are necessary. For if the Divine Law had Only written: 'Besides the Sabbaths of the Lord', I might have thought that the drink-offerings may be only offered by day32 but not by night. Therefore Scripture says: 'And their meal-offering and their drink-offerings' - And if the Divine Law had written only. 'Their meal-offering and their drink-offerings' and had not written. 'Besides the Sabbaths of the Lord', I might have thought that the drink-offerings are only offered by night33 and not by day.34 But wherein lies the difference?35 - Because in respect of dedication, the night follows the day.36 Therefore [both texts] are necessary. But are drink-offerings offered by night? Surely it has been taught: I can only infer from the text37 that such things as it is customary to offer up by night, e.g., limbs, fat-pieces, are [brought to the altar, burnt]38 with the setting of the sun and consumed all through the night. Things, however, which it is customary to offer by day, e.g., the fistful of the meal-offering, frankincense and drink-offerings, whence do I know that he may bring them to the altar and burn them with the setting of the sun. 'With the setting of the sun' say you? Did you not just say things which it is customary to offer by day?39 - Say therefore: Before the setting of the sun. - Whence do we derive that these can be consumed all through the night? The text states: This is the law of the burnt-offering;40 this implies something additional.41 Now in any case the above passage mentions 'the drink-offerings' as something which is offered by day?42 - Said Rami b. Hama: There is no difficulty; here,43 the reference is to dedication,44 and there,45 to offering.46 Said Raba to him: If [the drink-offerings] indeed can become dedicated47 [by night] they can be offered [by night]. For it has been taught: 'This is the general rule: Whatsoever is offered by day is rendered holy only by day; whatsoever is offered by night is rendered holy only by night; whatsoever is offered both by day and night is rendered holy by day and night'! Rather said R. Joseph: Delete 'drink-offerings' [from the Baraitha above].48 When R. Dimi went up [from Babylon to Palestine] he found R. Jeremiah sitting and lecturing in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: Whence do we deduce that drink-offerings which accompany a sacrifice49 can only be offered by day? The text states: And for your drink-offerings and for your peace-offerings;50 and we say: Just as peace-offerings [are offered] by day, so drink-offerings [are offered] by day. He [R. Dimi] said: If I could have found [a messenger]51 I would have written a letter and sent it to R. Joseph [in Babylon]

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(1) For the majority of such sacrifices are burnt-offerings and a burnt-offering must be a male animal. A congregation also do not bring peace-offerings, save lambs on Pentecost and these are males. Also their sin-offerings are he-goats.
(2) Lit., 'one is responsible',for the whole time until they are offered.
(3) Some of these offerings have a fixed time for their sacrifice and even if their time is passed the offering is not void, e.g., the sacrifice of a leper after the eighth day from his cleanliness, or that of a woman after childbirth. In the case, however, of congregational sacrifices which have appointed times, if their time has passed the sacrifices are void.
(4) Lit., 'and one is responsible for'.
(5) If the sacrifice was offered up at the correct time and the drink-offerings did not accompany the sacrifice, they can be brought within a period of ten days.
(6) They can be brought even in a state of ritual uncleanness.
(7) V. Lev. VI, 13. These have the law of the daily sacrifice which supersedes the Sabbath and ritual uncleanness; v. Men. 50b.
(8) Brought by Aaron, v. Lev. XVI, 3.
(9) The superseding of the Sabbath and ritual uncleanness is determined not by whether a sacrifice is of an individual or congregation, but whether there exists a set time for the particular sacrifice.
(10) which states that a sacrifice of an individual effects exchange.
(11) One cannot say: 'Let that animal be in place of this exchange' in order to acquire holiness.
(12) The first animal dedicated and not to one consecrated as a result of this dedication.
(13) That the Mishnah refers to the principal sacrifice.
(14) Who differ from R. Judah and hold that the offspring of a dedicated animal cannot effect exchange.
(15) And the offspring of a dedication, not being the principal dedication, is not included in the rule mentioned in the Mishnah.
(16) For the moment the Mishnah's statement is understood as meaning that all sacrifices of individuals can be males as well as females.
(17) We have here an example of a burnt-offering which can even be a female.
(18) For in connection with it Scripture says a sheep or a ram but not a ewe.
(19) V. Sh. Mek.
(20) By the statement SACRIFICES OF AN INDIVIDUAL CAN BE BOTH MALES AND FEMALES.
(21) Then we say that such a type of sacrifice which can be brought by the individual as well as by the congregation; when however an individual brings it, it can come both from males and females.
(22) Implying that there are some sacrifices which do come from females and males.
(23) That there is no compensation for the bringing of congregational sacrifices, should there be a postponement for some reason.
(24) Lev. XXIII, 37. The text refers to the additional offerings of the festivals.
(25) Provided that they are offered up before the daily sacrifice of the evening.
(26) There is no compensation.
(27) Num. XXIX, 18.
(28) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(29) If he offered up the sacrifice in its time, he can bring the drink-offerings within a period of ten days, because Scripture uses the plural 'their drink-offerings', thus intimating that drink-offerings may be offered at other times as well (R. Gershom).
(30) Lev. XXIII, 38. Scripture says: To offer an offering made by fire, a burnt-offering and a meal-offering, a sacrifice and drink-offerings everything upon his day, 'and this is followed by the words, Beside the Sabbaths etc. And we adopt here the interpretation based on textual proximity as follows: Drink-offerings etc. everything upon his day, besides etc., i.e., besides those Sabbaths followed by a Festival where it was forgotten to offer the drink-offerings on the Sabbath, for then they can be offered on the following day on the Festival.
(31) Besides the Sabbaths of the Lord and Their meal-offering and their drink-offerings.
(32) Since Scripture says: Everything upon his day followed by the text, Besides the Sabbaths of the Lord, i.e., that the drink-offerings of the Sabbath can be offered up on the following day on the Festival.
(33) But the drink-offerings of the day may be brought at night.
(34) Which follows the night, i.e., the morrow.
(35) Why should we have said that Scripture implies that the drink-offering can only be brought by night and not on the following day, seeing that Scripture makes no distinction?
(36) For Scripture says: Shall be eaten on the same day that it is offered. He shall not leave any of it until the morning (Lev. VII, 15). We therefore see that all the night is still called 'day' in respect of dedication.
(37) Viz., It is the burnt-offering because of the burning upon the altar all the night, (Lev. VI, 2), from which we infer one can place it on the altar with the setting of the sun and it goes on burning all the night.
(38) Inserted with Sk. Mek.
(39) How then can we speak of them as being offered with the setting of the sun?
(40) Lev. VI, 2.
(41) Since Scripture in this text makes no distinction and includes all things which go up on the altar to be burnt.
(42) Unlike what is stated in the text that drink-offerings are offered even by night.
(43) The text above 'their drink-offerings', from which we infer that drink-offerings may be offered by night.
(44) Implying that if one placed drink-offerings in a sacred vessel at night they are sanctified and cannot become hullin again.
(45) The Baraitha above.
(46) Which can only take place by day.
(47) As the result of placing them in sacred vessels.
(48) Which included drink-offerings as being offered by day.
(49) And which became hallowed with the killing of the sacrifice, thus becoming part of the sacrifice.
(50) Num. XXIX, 39.
(51) V. Rashi and Sh. Mek.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 14b

to say that he should not delete the case of drink-offerings [from the above Baraitha],1 and yet there is no contradiction.2 Here,3 we are dealing with drink-offerings which accompany a sacrifice,4 while there5 we are dealing with drink-offerings which are brought by themselves.6 And if he had found [someone] could he have written the letter? Did not R. Abba the son of R. Hiyya b. Abba report in the name of R. Johanan: Those who write the traditional teachings7 [are punished]8 like those who burn the Torah,9 and he who learns from them [the writings] receives no reward. And R. Judah b. Nahman the Meturgeman10 of Resh Lakish gave the following [as exposition]: The verse says: Write thou these words11 and then says: For after the tenor of these words,11 thus teaching you that matters received as oral traditions you are not permitted to recite from writing and that written things [Biblical passages] you are not permitted to recite from memory.12 And the Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael taught: Scripture says, 'Write thou these words', implying that 'these' words you may write but you may not write traditional laws!13 - The answer was given: Perhaps the case is different in regard to a new interpretation.14 For R. Johanan and Resh Lakish used to peruse the book of Aggadah15 on Sabbaths16 and explained [their attitude] in this manner: [Scripture says:] It is time for the Lord to work, they have made void thy law,17 explaining this as follows: It is better that one letter of the Torah18 should be uprooted than that the whole Torah should be forgotten.

Said R. Papa: Now that you say that drink-offerings which are brought by themselves19 are offered even by night, if drink-offerings happen to be at hand by night, we can dedicate them by night20 and offer them [by night]. Said R. Joseph the son of R. Shema'ia to R. Papa: There is a Baraitha which supports [your dictum]: 'This is the general rule, Whatsoever is offered by day is only dedicated by day, and whatsoever is offered by night is dedicated by night'.

Said R. Adda b. Ahaba:21 And the rise of the morning dawn disqualifies drink-offerings like22 the limbs [of the daily evening sacrifice].23

When R. Dimi came [from Palestine] he reported that R. Johanan said in the name of R. Simeon b. Jehozadok: [Scripture says:] These things ye shall do unto the Lord in your set feasts:24 this refers to the obligatory sacrifices which are brought on holy days;25 beside your vows and your freewill-offerings24 teach concerning vows and freewill-offerings that they are offered on the Intermediate Days26 of the Festival; for your burnt-offerings:24 now of what kind of burnt-offering does the verse speak? If of a freewill burnt-offering, is it not already written, 'your freewill-offerings'? And if of a burnt-offering which was vowed, is it not already written, 'your vows'? [The text]27 therefore can only refer to the burnt-offerings of a woman brought after childbirth and the burnt-offering of a leper.28 And for your meal-offerings:24 now of what kind of meal-offering does the verse speak? If of a freewill meal-offering, is not this already written?29 And if of a meal-offering which was vowed, is not this already written?30 [The text] therefore can only refer to a sinner's meal-offering and a meal-offering of jealousy.31 And for your drink-offerings and for your peace-offerings24 implies an analogy between drink-offerings and peace-offerings [as follows]: Just as peace-offerings are offered by day so drink-offerings [which accompany a sacrifice] are offered by day. 'And for your peace-offerings' includes peace-offerings of a Nazirite.32

Said Abaye to him: And why not say that the text33 includes peace-offerings of the Passover,34 for if the text includes peace-offerings of a Nazirite, they are sacrifices which are the subject of a vow or a freewill dedication,35 and we have learnt: 'This is the general rule, Whatsoever is the subject of a vow or a freewill dedication, may be offered on a private bamah36 and whatsoever is not the subject of a vow or a freewill dedication must not be offered on a private bamah'.37 And it has been taught: 'Meal-offerings and offerings in connection with a Nazirite may be offered on a private bamah'.38 This is the teaching of R. Meir. - Delete39 from here40 the case of a Nazirite.41 But is there an authority who holds that a Nazirite is not the subject of a vow or a freewill-offering? Lo, it is written: And it came to pass after forty years that Absalom said to the King, [pray thee let me go and pay my vow which I vowed unto the Lord in Hebron. For thy servant vowed a vow, etc.42 Now does this not refer to the sacrifice?43 - No, it refers to the vow itself.44 'The vow itself' - was it made in Hebron? Was it not made in Geshur?45 Said R. Aha, some say Rabbah son of R. Hanan: Absalom only went in order to bring sheep from Hebron.46 So indeed it stands to reason. For if you say that he went to Hebron to offer up, would he leave Jerusalem and go to offer up in Hebron? - Then what do you say? That he went to bring sheep from Hebron? Then why does it say: 'Which I vowed unto the Lord in Hebron'? It ought to say 'from Hebron'! - One can still say that he went to offer in Hebron,47 and as regards your difficulty as to why he left Jerusalem and came to offer in Hebron, why not raise this same difficulty with reference to Gibeon which was a holy place?48 This however is the explanation: Once it has become permissible to offer on the bamahs, he can offer wherever he wishes.49

It says: 'After forty years'. Forty years from what? - R. Nehorai reported in the name of R. Joshua: Forty years from when [the Israelites] asked for a king. For it has been taught: The year in which the Israelites asked for a king was the tenth year of Samuel's leadership.

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(1) That drink-offerings are indeed offered by day.
(2) With the text cited above: 'Their meal-offering and drink-offering, which was explained above as meaning that drink-offerings may be offered by night.
(3) In the Baraitha above which includes the case of drink-offerings as being offered by day.
(4) The offering up of a sacrifice rendered the drink-offerings sacred so that they cannot be offered by night, like the sacrifice itself.
(5) The text, 'Their meal-offering etc.'.
(6) Which were not hallowed by the killing of the sacrifice but were dedicated after the sacrifice had been offered up. In such a case, drink-offerings may be offered for ten days, including the nights.
(7) Halachahs, v. Glos.
(8) V. R. Gershom.
(9) For it is forbidden to retain oral traditions which have been committed to writing, since they belong to the Oral Law (Rashi). Another explanation of Rashi: These writings are not saved on Sabbath in case of fire.
(10) Lit., 'interpreter'; his Amora who expounded his lectures, v. Glos. s.v. Amora.
(11) Ex. XXXIV, 27.
(12) Tosaf. asks how then do we recite psalms, and answers that we are only particular as regards the Pentateuch. Furthermore the restriction only applies when we are desirous of acting on behalf of others.
(13) How therefore could R. Dimi have written down the oral tradition with reference to drink-offerings?
(14) The analogy quoted above: 'And just as peace-offerings are offered by day etc.' (R. Gershom). Another explanation (Rashi): Any new interpretation which reconciles conflicting Baraithas. Sh. Mek. adds: Another version: The answer was given. The Rabbis rely on what they learn, but since there is forgetfulness, they reduce to writing and when the occasion arises they look into the book.
(15) Homiletic literature.
(16) In order that the Aggadahs might not be forgotten.
(17) Ps. CXIX, 126. When a thing is done in the name of God it is sometimes necessary to nullify the Law. The reason for the prohibition of reducing to writing oral tradition has so far not been satisfactorily explained. For a full discussion of the problem, as well as an attempt to explain the term halachahs mentioned in this connection, v. Kaplan, J. The Redaction of the Talmud, pp. 261ff.
(18) I.e., the passage: 'For after the tenor of these words' which prohibits the committing to writing of oral traditions.
(19) Even though dedicated in connection with a sacrifice, they were not offered at the same time as a sacrifice.
(20) By placing them in a sacred vessel.
(21) Referring to R. Papa's ruling above that drink-offerings dedicated by night must be offered by night.
(22) So Rashi.
(23) Which is disqualified at the approach of dawn. Another explanation of R. Adda's ruling (R. Gershom) is as follows: Referring to the Baraitha above which says the limbs and joints go on being consumed all night, R. Adda says: The approach of the time for the bringing of the daily morning sacrifice disqualifies the limbs if they are not consumed by then. But only the actual offering up of the morning sacrifice disqualifies, as then it is already day, but not the mere preparations on the altar for the morning sacrifice.
(24) Num. XXIX, 39.
(25) E.g., the festive sacrifice, the offering of appearance before God and the additional festival offerings.
(26) But not on the Festival itself, as vows and freewill-offerings cannot be brought on a festival.
(27) 'For your burnt-offerings'.
(28) Which are also offered on the Intermediate Days of the Festival (R. Gershom).
(29) In the words, 'your freewill-offerings'.
(30) In the words,'your vows'.
(31) Brought in connection with a woman suspected of infidelity.
(32) These also are offered on the Intermediate Days of the Festival (R. Gershom). Scripture cannot here mean to include freewill peace-offerings, since the text has already said 'your vows'. And if the text is for the purposes of analogy, let Scripture say 'and for peace-offerings'. Why 'and for your peace-offerings?' (Rashi).
(33) 'And for your peace-offerings'.
(34) If there was a large company for the paschal lamb so that it would not suffice for all present, peace-offerings were brought with it; and Abaye would learn that if these were set aside for that purpose on the fourteenth of Nisan but were not offered up, they could be offered on the Intermediate Days. For, according to Abaye, there is no need for Scripture to include the case of peace-offerings of a Nazirite, as this can be inferred from the text, 'for your freewill-offerings and your vows', for Naziriteship is the subject of a vow and freewill dedication, whereas peace-offerings in connection with the passover are obligatory sacrifices.
(35) For a man can vow to be a Nazirite and after completing the period of Naziriteship he brings his peace-offering.
(36) A temporary and improvised altar.
(37) Meg. 9b.
(38) Zeb. 117b. We consequently see that a Nazirite is the subject of a vow etc. Otherwise one could not offer sacrifices of a Nazirite on a private bamah.
(39) Var. lec. insert: Said R. Joseph (v. Sh. Mek.).
(40) From the cited Baraitha.
(41) So that although a Nazirite is the subject of a vow and a freewill dedication, this does not apply to the sacrifices which a Nazirite has to bring later on, these being obligatory, for the vow of a Nazirite at the outset only has reference to wine and the sacrifices come later automatically.
(42) II Sam. XV, 7.
(43) Implying that he will go to Hebron and pay his vows there. Now Absalom was a life Nazirite and every year he shaved himself and brought the appropriate sacrifice. Since he went to offer his sacrifice in Hebron where there were private bamahs, we can infer that a Nazirite is the subject of vows and freewill-offerings.
(44) The word Hebron in the text means this: I will go to the place of a large bamah i.e., Gibeon and there pay my vows which I made at Hebron. But the text does not mean that Absalom actually fulfilled his vows in Hebron.
(45) Since Scripture says: 'For thy servant vowed a vow while I abode at Geshur'.
(46) The sheep there being large and fat and his intention being subsequently to offer them in Gideon on a large bamah. The text therefore does not mean that the vow was made in Hebron, only that he obtained the sheep at Hebron.
(47) For a Nazirite can offer his sacrifice on a private bamah.
(48) For in that place there was an altar which Moses made. Why not go there?
(49) Absalom therefore went to Hebron and saw the sheep, and being there, he decided to offer in the same place (Wilna Gaon). The Rabbis who differ from R. Meir, however, hold that a Nazirite is not the subject of vows and therefore Absalom went to Hebron for the sheep but the actual offering was in Gibeon, on a large bamah (Tosaf). R. Dimi therefore who includes peace-offerings in connection with a Nazirite, agrees with the Rabbis who hold that a Nazirite is not the subject of vows and the Baraitha quoted above is the opinion of R. Meir.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 15a

Samuel himself1 ruled ten years,2 there was one year in which both Saul and Samuel ruled3 and two years in which Saul himself ruled4 and thirty-six5 years in which David reigned.6

MISHNAH. A SIN-OFFERING OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHOSE OWNERS HAVE PROCURED ATONEMENT7 IS LEFT TO DIE,8 WHEREAS THAT OF A CONGREGATION9 IS NOT LEFT TO DIE.10 R. JUDAH, HOWEVER, SAYS: [IT IS] LEFT TO DIE.11 R. SIMEON SAID: WHAT DO WE FIND WITH REGARD TO THE OFFSPRING OF A DEDICATED ANIMAL, THE SUBSTITUTE OF A SIN-OFFERING AND A SIN-OFFERING WHOSE OWNERS DIED?12 [THAT THE RULES CONCERNING] THESE APPLY ONLY TO AN INDIVIDUAL BUT NOT A CONGREGATION. SIMILARLY [THE RULES CONCERNING] THE SIN-OFFERING WHOSE OWNERS HAVE PROCURED ATONEMENT AND [A SIN-OFFERING] WHOSE YEAR HAS PASSED13 APPLIES ONLY TO AN INDIVIDUAL BUT NOT A CONGREGATION.14

GEMARA. Our Rabbis have taught: Why does [Scripture] say: And if he bring [a lamb] for a sin-offering?15 Whence do we derive that if one dedicated a sin-offering and it became lost and he separated another animal in its place and the first animal was then found, and both are standing before us, whence do we derive that he may bring whichever one he chooses?16 The text states: 'And if he bring a sin-offering'. One might think that he may bring both of them. The text however states: 'He shall bring it',17 implying one18 but not two. And what becomes of the second sin-offering? - Said R. Hamnuna: It has been taught: R. Judah says, It is left to pasture, whereas R. Simeon says: It is left to die.19 But does indeed R. Judah hold that it is left to pasture? Have we not heard R. Judah to hold that IT IS LEFT TO DIE?20 - Reverse [the names in the above Baraitha] as follows: R. Judah says: It is left to die, whereas R. Simeon says: It is left to pasture. But does indeed R. Simeon hold that is is left to pasture? Did not R. Simeon say: Five sin-offerings are left to die?21 - Rather you need not at all reverse [the names of the Baraitha above] and there is no difficulty.22 There,23 [we are dealing] with a case where [the first sin-offering] was lost when the second animal was separated [for a sin-offering],24 and here,25 we are dealing with a case where [the first sin-offering] was lost at the time of the atonement [by means of the second animal].26 And if you prefer [another solution] I may say, In both cases we suppose [the first sin-offering] was lost at the time of the separating [of the second animal]27 and yet there is no difficulty.28 This29 is the opinion of R. Judah according to Rabbi,30 and that31 is the opinion of R. Judah according to the Rabbis.32 But33 is there an authority who holds that a congregational sin-offering whose owners procured atonement is left to die?

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(1) Without Saul after the death of Eli.
(2) In the tenth year of Samuel's ruling they asked for a king (Rashi).
(3) Saul following Samuel's advice.
(4) Without Samuel's guidance, although he was still alive, for Samuel died only four months before Saul.
(5) So Rashi. The text has thirty-seven.
(6) We have therefore thirteen years for Samuel and Saul after the death of Eli until David, and David reigned thirty-six years, up to the rebellion of Absalom. We have thus forty-nine years. Deduct from this nine years for Samuel's leadership before the Israelites asked for a king, and we find that when Absalom revolted it was forty years since the Israelites had asked for a king; v. Nazir 5a.
(7) If the animal became lost and atonement was obtained by means of another animal.
(8) For it is a Sinaitic tradition that there are five sin-offerings, of which this is one, which are left to die.
(9) Who were atoned for with another sin-offering.
(10) As according to the view of the first Tanna this tradition only refers to the sin-offerings of an individual but not to that of a congregation.
(11) Since the tradition applies even to a congregational sin-offering.
(12) Of the five sin-offerings which are condemned to die, three cannot belong to a congregation, namely, the offspring of a sin-offering, for a congregation cannot bring a female animal; the substitute of a sin-offering, since a congregation cannot effect an exchange; and finally the case where the owners of a sin-offering die, this law not applying to a congregation, as explained later in the Gemara.
(13) Which is older than one year, the period assigned for a sin-offering.
(14) Although it is possible to have a congregation bringing these two kinds of sin-offerings.
(15) Lev. IV, 32. What need is there for the words: 'And if he bring'? Scripture could have said: If a lamb be his offering.
(16) For a sin-offering.
(17) The latter part of the verse: 'And if he bring a lamb for a sin-offering'.
(18) Animal to be brought as a sin-offering.
(19) Since it is a case of a sin-offering of an individual whose owners have already procured atonement.
(20) Even in the case of a congregational sin-offering, and how much more so then in the case of a sin-offering of an individual.
(21) V. our Mishnah; and R. Simeon states there distinctly that all the five cases affect only individuals and one of them is the case of the sin-offerings whose owners have procured atonement.
(22) As regards the conflicting views of R. Judah in the Mishnah and in the Baraitha.
(23) In the Baraitha where he says that the sin-offering is condemned to pasture.
(24) Before its offering. Since then he can bring either, the second animal is only condemned to pasture.
(25) In the Mishnah.
(26) Since therefore the owners have procured atonement through the second animal, the first animal is left to die.
(27) The first animal was found, however, before atonement was procured by means of the second animal.
(28) V. p. 104, n. 10.
(29) In the Mishnah which says that it is left to die.
(30) Who holds (infra 22b) that if the first offering is lost at the time of the separation of the second animal, although it is found before atonement is obtained by means of the second animal, the latter is left to die.
(31) The Baraitha which says that the sin-offering is left only to pasture.
(32) Who differ from Rabbi and hold that the law of a sin-offering being left to die only applies after the owners had procured atonement by means of the second animal.
(33) The question refers to the Mishnah where R. Judah says that even a congregational sin-offering is condemned to die.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 15b

Has it not been taught: Likewise,1 R. Jose said: The children of the captivity that were come out of the exile offered burnt-offerings, twelve bullocks, ninety-six rams, seventy-seven lambs, twelve he-goats, for a sin-offering, all this was a burnt-offering unto the Lord.2 But can a sin-offering be brought as a burnt-offering?3 - Said Raba: [It means] like a burnt-offering [in this respect]. Just as a burnt-offering must not be eaten, so that sin-offering was not to be eaten. For R. Jose used to say: They brought the twelve he-goats4 for the sin of idolatry. And Rab Judah reported in the name of Samuel: On account of the idolatry which they committed in the time of Zedekiah. Now, assuming that the one5 who holds that a congregational sin-offering whose owners procured atonement is left to die, also holds that a sin-offering whose owners have died is left to die, is there not here6 a case where the owners have died7 and yet the sin-offering is offered!8 - Said R. Papa: Even according to the one who holds that a congregational sin-offering whose owners have procured atonement is left to die, a congregational sin-offering whose owners have died is not left to die, for 'a congregation does not die'.9

Whence does R. Papa derive this? Shall we say because Scripture says: Instead of thy fathers shall be thy children?10 If this be so, the same should apply to [the sacrifice] of an individual?11 - Rather this is the reason why [the law of] the owners of [a sin-offering] who died does not apply to a congregation, because [we make an inference] from the case of the goats brought on Festivals and New Moons, since the Divine Law says: Bring them from the offerings of the Temple Treasury. Now perhaps the owners of this money have died?12 Must you therefore not admit that a congregation does not die? And if you prefer [another solution] I may say: When these sin-offerings [goats] were offered13 they were offered on behalf of those still alive,14 since Scripture says: But many of the priests and Levites and chiefs of the fathers who were ancient men, that had seen the first house, when the foundation of this house was laid before their eyes, wept with a loud voice and many shouted aloud for joy.15 Perhaps [the survivors] were only a minority?16 - You cannot say this, since [the text continues]: So that the people could not discern the noise of the shouting from the noise of the weeping of the people.17 But how could they bring [a sacrifice for idolatry]? Were they not wilful [sinners of idolatry in the days of Zedekiah]? - Said R. Johanan: It was a special decision.18 So indeed it stands to reason.19 For should you not say so, there is no difficulty as regards [the twelve] bullocks and [the twelve] goats, for this corresponds with the twelve tribes.20 But as regards [rams]21 and lambs, with reference to whom [were they brought]? You must say therefore that this was a special decision [and here, too, it was a special decision].22

We have learnt elsewhere: When Joseph b. Jo'ezer of Zereda and Joseph b. Johanan of Jerusalem died the grape-clusters [the scholars] came to an end.23 What is the meaning of eshkoloth [grapeclusters]?24 - A man in whom all is contained.25 R. Judah reported in the name of Samuel: All the 'grape-clusters' who arose from the days of Moses until Joseph b. Jo'ezer learnt Torah like Moses our Teacher.26 From that time onward, they did not learn Torah like Moses our Teacher. But did not Rab Judah report in the name of Samuel: Three thousand halachoth were forgotten during the period of mourning for Moses? - Those laws which were forgotten were forgotten, but those which were learnt27 they learnt like Moses our Teacher. But has it not been taught: After the death of Moses, if those who pronounced unclean were in the majority,28 they [the Rabbis] declared [the object] unclean, and if those who pronounced clean were in the majority, they [the Rabbis] declared [it] clean?29 - Their acumen30 diminished, but what they had learnt31 they learnt like Moses our Teacher.32

It has been taught: All the 'grape-clusters' who arose in Israel from the days of Moses until the death of Joseph b. Jo'ezer of Zereda were free from all dofi [taint].33 From that time onward some matter of taint was found in them.34 But has it not been taught: There is the story of a certain hasid35 who groaned [from a pain] in his heart, and when the doctors were consulted they said that there was no remedy for him unless he sucked hot milk from [a goat36 every morning]. They brought a goat and bound it to the feet of his bed and he used to suck milk from it. Next day his friends came to visit him. When they saw the goat they exclaimed: 'A robber in arms is in the house37 and shall we go in to visit him?' [They38 left him immediately. When he died] they sat down and made investigation and found no other sin in him except that of [the keeping of] the goat. He [the hasid] too at his death said: 'I myself know that I have not sinned except in the keeping of this goat, having thus transgressed the teaching of my colleagues'. For the Sages taught: One must not rear small cattle in the Land of Israel. And it is also an established fact with us that wherever the Talmud speaks of a certain hasid it refers either to R. Judah b. Baba or R. Judah b. Ila'i. Now [these] Rabbis39 lived many generations after Joseph b. Jo'ezer of Zereda.40

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(1) Tosaf. explains that the Baraitha cited here is with reference to Lev. V, 10 where it says: And he shall offer the second for a burnt-offering. The Baraitha states that just as a burnt-offering must not be eaten, so this sin-offering must not be eaten. Thereupon the Baraitha proceeds: Likewise, etc.
(2) Ezra VIII, 35.
(3) Since the text says here that twelve sin-offerings were all brought as a burnt-offering.
(4) Corresponding to the twelve tribes. A goat for a sin-offering is brought for the sin of idolatry of which a congregation has been guilty and it is burnt outside the camp.
(5) R. Judah in the Mishnah.
(6) In the text just quoted.
(7) The owners having died during the seventy years of captivity in Babylon.
(8) In spite of the fact that the owners were dead.
(9) I.e., the relevant law does not apply to a congregation,
(10) Ps. XLV, 17. I.e., that the children take the place of the fathers and the sin-offering is offered up, for it is not considered as being ownerless.
(11) Where a man dies, his son in his place should be considered the owner of the sin-offering.
(12) And therefore the sin-offerings have no owners and should be condemned to die.
(13) For the sin of idolatry in the days of Ezra.
(14) From those who worshipped idolatry in the days of Zedekiah.
(15) Ezra III, 22. I.e., those who had not seen the first Temple, rejoiced now aloud.
(16) A minority of the Israelites, and for a minority we do not offer the same sacrifice as for a majority but as for individuals. Since then twelve goats were offered on behalf of the twelve tribes, these must have been meant for the first people mentioned in the text who had died, and we can therefore infer that the law of a sin-offering whose owner died does not apply to a congregation.
(17) We therefore see that those who wept were in a majority over those who rejoiced and the weepers belonged to the first people mentioned in the text who had died (Rashi).
(18) And not to be taken as a precedent.
(19) That it is a special decision.
(20) Since the congregational offering for idolatry is a bullock for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering.
(21) V. Bah.
(22) The bringing of a sacrifice for wilful idolatry. The bracketed words are inserted with sh. Mek.
(23) V. Sot. (Sonc. ed.) p. 249, n. 4.
(24) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(25) Heb. ish she-hakol bo, a play on the word eshkoloth; universality of the knowledge of the Torah (v. Sh. Mek.). Rashi explains the phrase as denoting one having the knowledge in Torah, fearing God and practising benevolence.
(26) Scrupulous and exact in the knowledge of the laws and regulations.
(27) Lit., 'those they had on tradition'.
(28) R. Gershom explains that this refers to the laws which were forgotten during the period of mourning for Moses.
(29) We therefore see that there were differences of opinion with reference to many laws soon after the death of Moses.
(30) Lit., 'heart', and they could not recall the laws by means of discussion. Therefore there were differences of opinion with reference to them and the laws were settled by going according to the decision of the majority.
(31) V. p. 107, n. 11.
(32) Scrupulously and correctly.
(33) For the moment the word דופי is understood as meaning 'taint' of sin.
(34) They were not so upright.
(35) A pious man.
(36) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(37) Small cattle cannot be looked after as they go and feed in other fields, thus an owner of small cattle is guilty of robbing another man's pasture; v. B.K. 80a.
(38) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(39) I.e., R. Judah b. Ila'i and R. Judah b. Baba, and it says here that no sin was found in them.
(40) Consequently there was no taint of sin found among the leaders, even after the period of Joseph b. Jo'ezer.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 16a

Said R. Joseph: [The word dofi here means] dispute, [e.g., the dispute] relating to 'laying on of hands'.1 But does not Joseph b. Jo'ezer himself differ with reference to the law of laying on of hands?2 - When he differed it was in his latter years, when his mental powers3 declined.

The [above] text [stated]: 'Rab Judah reported in the name of Samuel: Three thousand traditional laws were forgotten during the period of mourning for Moses'. They said to Joshua: 'Ask';4 he replied: It is not in heaven.5 They [the Israelites] said to Samuel: 'Ask'; he replied: [Scripture says:] These are the commandments,6 implying [that since the promulgation of these commandments] no prophet has now the right to introduce anything new.

Said R. Isaac the Smith: Also the law relating to a sin-offering whose owners have died7 was forgotten8 during the period of mourning for Moses. They [the Israelites] said to Phinehas: 'Ask'; he replied to them: 'It is not in heaven'.9 They said to Eleazar: 'Ask'. He replied: 'These are the commandments', implying [that since the promulgation of these commandments] no prophet has now the right to introduce anything new.

Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab: When Moses departed [this world] for the Garden of Eden he said to Joshua: 'Ask me concerning all the doubts you have'.10 He replied to him: 'My Master, have I ever left you for one hour and gone elsewhere?11 Did you not write concerning me in the Torah: But his servant Joshua the son of Nun departed not out of the tabernacle?12 Immediately the strength [of Moses] weakened13 and [Joshua] forgot14 three hundred laws and there arose [in his mind] seven hundred doubts [concerning laws]. Then all the Israelites rose up to kill him.15 The Holy One, blessed be He, then said to him [Joshua]: 'It is not possible to tell you.16 Go and occupy their attention in war, as it says: Now after the death of Moses the servant of the Lord, it came to pass that the Lord spake;17 and it further says; [Prepare you victuals for within three days, etc.].18

It has been taught: A thousand and seven hundred kal wahomer19 and gezerah shawah20 and specifications of the Scribes21 were forgotten during the period of mourning for Moses. Said R. Abbuha: Nevertheless Othniel the son of Kenaz restored [these forgotten teachings] as a result of his dialectics, as it says: And Othniel the son of Kenaz, the brother of Caleb, took it;22 and he gave him Achsah his daughter to wife.23 And why was her name called Achsah? - Said24 R. Johanan: Because whosoever saw her was angry with his wife.25 And it came to pass as she came unto him that she moved him to ask of her father a field. And she alighted [watiznah] off her ass.26 What does the word wa-tiznah mean? Raba reported in the name of R. Isaac: She said to him: Just as an ass when it has no food in its trough immediately cries out,27 so a woman when she has no wheat in her house cries out immediately, [as it says: And Caleb said unto her: What wouldst thou?].24 And she answered, Give me a blessing for thou hast given me a south land,28 implying a house dry29 [devoid] of all goodness [money]; give me also springs of water,30 meaning a man in whom is Only Torah.31 And he gave her the upper springs [gulloth] and the nether springs.30 He said to her: 'One to whom all the secrets of the upper and nether worlds are revealed,32 need one ask food from him?'33 But was Caleb the son of Kenaz?34 Was he not the son of Jephunneh?35 - The meaning of the word Jephunneh is that he turned36 from the counsel of the spies. But still was he [Caleb] the son of Kenaz? Was he not the son of Hezron, since it says: And Caleb the son of Hezron begat Azubah?37 - Said Raba: He [Caleb] was a stepson of Kenaz.38 [This can also be proved,39 since it says: Caleb the son of Jephunneh the Kenezite,40 but does not say the son of Kenaz.]41 A Tanna taught: Othniel is the same as Jabez.42 He43 was called Othniel because God answered him,44 and Jabez because he counselled45 and fostered Torah in Israel. And what was his [real] name? Judah the brother of Simeon. And whence do we derive that God answered him? - Since it says: And Jabez called on the God of Israel saying, Oh that thou wouldst bless me indeed and enlarge my border, and that thine hand might be with me, and that thou wouldst keep me from evil that it may not grieve me! And God granted him that which he requested.46 'Oh that thou wouldst bless me indeed' with Torah; 'and enlarge my border' with pupils; 'that thine hand might be with me', that my studies may not be forgotten from my heart; 'and that thou wouldst keep me from evil', that I may meet friends like myself; 'that it may not grieve me', that the evil inclination may not have power over me so as to prevent me from studying: If thou doest so it is well, but if not, I shall go with my 'grief' to the grave. Immediately, 'God granted him that which he requested'.47 You find a similar example: The poor man and the man of medium wealth meet together,48 the Lord lighteneth both their eyes.49 When the pupil questions his teacher and says to him: 'Teach me Torah', if he teaches him, the Lord enlightens the eyes of both of them,50 and if not, 'the rich and poor meet together, the Lord is the maker of them all:51 He who made this one wise can make him a fool, and He who has made this one a fool can make him wise.52 This is the teaching of R. Nathan. R. Judah the Prince says: 'If thou wouldst bless me indeed', by multiplying and increasing; 'and enlarge my border', with sons and daughters; 'and that thine hand might be with me', in business; 'and thou wouldst keep me from evil', that I have no head-ache, ear-ache nor eye-ache; 'that it may not grieve me', that the evil inclination may not have power over me so as to prevent me from studying: If thou doest so, it is well, but if not, I will go with my 'grief' to the grave. 'And God granted him that which he requested'.

Likewise53 you say: The poor man and the man of medium wealth have met together, the Lord lighteneth both their eyes;54 when the poor man goes to the donor and says, 'Assist me',if he assists him it is well, but if not, 'the rich and the poor meet together, the Lord is the maker of them all': He who made this one rich can make him poor, and He who made this one poor can make him rich.

SAID R. SIMEON: WHAT DO WE FIND AS REGARDS etc. Our Rabbis taught: R. Simeon says, Five sin-offerings are left to die - an offspring of a dedicated animal, the substitute of a sin-offering, a sin-offering whose owner has died, a sin-offering whose owner has procured atonement, and a sin-offering whose year is passed. Now you cannot apply [the law of] the offspring of a dedicated animal to a congregation because a congregation does not bring a female animal [for an offering]. You cannot also apply [the law of] the substitute of a sin-offering to a congregation because a congregation cannot effect exchange. You cannot also apply [the law of] a sin-offering whose owner has died to a congregation because 'a congregation does not die'. With regard to the cases of a sin-offering whose owner has procured atonement or whose year is passed, we do not as yet know.55 Shall we say then that these have the same rule in the case both of a congregation and an individual? I will tell you. Let the cases which are not explicitly stated56 be derived [by analogy] from the cases explicitly stated57 [as follows]: Just as the cases explicitly stated apply to an individual and not to a congregation, so the cases regarding the owners of a sin-offering who have procured atonement and a sin-offering whose year has passed only apply to an individual and not to a congregation.

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(1) The laying of hands on the animal previous to a sacrifice on a Festival, which was the very first subject over which there was a difference of opinion, the School of Shammai holding that it was permissible and the School of Hillel that it was not permissible. This controversy took place after the time of Joseph b. Jo'ezer.
(2) Hag. 16a. V. (Sonc. ed.) p. 105, n. 1. We therefore see that even in Joseph b. Jo'ezers time there were already differences of opinion relating to certain laws.
(3) Lit., 'heart'.
(4) Through the holy spirit, that these forgotten laws should be taught anew (R. Gershom).
(5) Deut. XXX, 12. The whole Torah has already been given.
(6) Num. XXXVI, 13.
(7) Var. lec.: Have obtained atonement.
(8) Whether the animal was left to die or to pasture.
(9) Bah omits from 'It is not' to 'he replied'.
(10) On any points of law.
(11) I.e., I have no doubts.
(12) Ex. XXXIII, 11.
(13) I.e., he took offence at Joshua's remark, which implied he had no longer need of him.
(14) He was punished for causing this weakness of Moses.
(15) Until he should tell them the laws.
(16) These laws, since the Torah is not in heaven.
(17) Josh. I, 1.
(18) Ibid. II. The bracketed words are inserted with Bah; v. also Sh. Mek.
(19) Conclusion from minor to major.
(20) Analogies based on verbal congruities.
(21) Numerical tabulations, (e.g., thirteen things were taught with reference to nebelah of a clean bird, five are not in a position to give temurah, etc). employed by the Rabbis as an aid to remembering the laws.
(22) I.e., Kiryath Sefer (Lit., 'the city of the book') and explained as meaning that Othniel won back the store of traditional teachings lost during the mourning period for Moses.
(23) Josh. XV, 17.
(24) Inserted with Sh. Mek.
(25) Because she was very beautiful, the word עכסה being derived from the word כעם which means 'anger'.
(26) The continuation of the previous text.
(27) The word ותצנח is explained here as being derived from צוח 'To cry out', 'shout'.
(28) Ibid. 18-19.
(29) The word נגב 'south' is here derived from the root נגב meaning 'to be dry'.
(30) Josh. XV, 18-19.
(31) I.e., aman to whom the Torah is geluyah (revealed), a play on the word gulloth (springs).
(32) V. Bah; cur. edd. read: Let him seek food from him who dwells with the upper and nether worlds.
(33) Var. lec. 'of me', hence render: 'need he seek food of me, surely he will not be in want'.
(34) For the Gemara above cites the text which says that Othniel the brother of Caleb was the son of Kenaz, thus implying that Kenaz was the father of Caleb.
(35) Since Scripture says (Josh. XIV, 13) Caleb the son of Jephunneh and does not say the son of Kenaz.
(36) יפונה and פנה 'turn from' having verbal similarity.
(37) I Chron. II, 18. This is explained in Sot. 12a to mean that he married Miriam who was forsaken on account of an illness. Since he therefore married her for heaven's sake, Scripture accounts it as if he had begotten her.
(38) And Othniel was his brother on the maternal side.
(39) That Caleb was not the son of Kenaz, his father being Hezron.
(40) Josh. ibid.
(41) Now if Caleb's father was Kenaz, why does not the text say, 'the son of Kenaz'? This therefore proves that Kenaz only brought him up but did not beget him. The bracketed passage is inserted with Rashi and Sh. Mek; V. Wilna Gaon Glosses.
(42) In I Chron. II, 55 it says: And the families of the Scribes which dwelt at Jabez, these are the Kenites, and in Judg. I,16: And the children of the Kenites, etc. and went, etc. This must have been Othniel, Later on it says: And Judah went with Simeon his brother, referring to Othniel mentioned previously in the text (Wilna Gaon Glosses).
(43) For this reading v. Sh. Mek.
(44) עתניאל combining the words ענה with אל.
(45) יעבץ and יעץ 'advising', having some verbal similarity.
(46) I Chron. IV, 10.
(47) Showing that if one devotes himself to the study of the Torah all his petitions are fulfilled.
(48) 'Poor' is interpreted in the sense of one who is devoid of the knowledge of Torah and the expression, 'A man of medium wealth' is interpreted as one who only possesses a moderate knowledge of the Torah. When therefore the poor man asks the other to teach him, it is incumbent on the latter to do so just as God carried out the wish of Othniel (R. Gershom).
(49) Prov. XXIX, 13.
(50) For even the teacher requires enlightenment from God.
(51) Prov. XXII, 2.
(52) God now starts to make them afresh, a fool or a wise man.
(53) This Tanna explains the text with reference to money and the need for assisting a person in want, as God did with Othniel (R. Gershom). Rashi explains 'likewise' as meaning that if one seeks and petitions for sustenance, heaven will fulfil his wishes.
(54) Both will become rich (R. Gershom).
(55) Lit., 'we have not learnt', whether they apply to a congregation.
(56) As to whether they apply to a congregation, the cases being a sin-offering whose owners procured atonement and a sin-offering whose year is passed.
(57) I.e., in the cases of offspring of a dedicated animal, a sin-offering whose owners died, and a substitute of a sin-offering.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 16b

But can we form an analogy between a case where there is an alternative and a case where there is none?1 - Said Resh Lakish: Four sin-offerings were specified to the Israelites [on Sinai to be left to die]2 and the rule was extended to five.3 Now if you suppose that these were congregational sin-offerings, are three of them4 ever brought by a congregation?5 Then you must admit that we form an analogy between the cases not explicitly stated and those explicitly stated.

R. Nathan says: Only one sin-offering was specified to the [Israelites on Mount Sinai]6 and the rule was extended to all the five sin-offerings.7 But8 [if that is so] let us see in what class they learnt it,9 whether in that of the sin-offerings of an individual or of a congregation?10 - There were two forgettings.11 And consequently they12 were in a difficulty. If13 you should think that the rule14 applies to the sin-offering of a congregation, can these15 be brought by a congregation?16 Then it is proved from here that we form an analogy between the cases not explicitly stated17 and the cases explicitly stated: Just as in the cases explicitly stated the sin-offering is brought by an individual and not by a congregation, so in the cases not explicitly stated the sin-offering is brought by an individual and not by a congregation.18

MISHNAH. IN SOME WAYS [THE LAW RELATING TO] DEDICATIONS CARRIES GREATER WEIGHT THAN [THAT RELATING TO] EXCHANGE, AND IN SOME WAYS [THAT RELATING TO] EXCHANGE CARRIES GREATER WEIGHT THAN [THAT RELATING TO] DEDICATIONS. IN SOME WAYS [THE LAW RELATING TO] DEDICATIONS CARRIES GREATER WEIGHT THAN [THAT RELATING TO] EXCHANGE, FOR DEDICATED ANIMALS CAN EFFECT EXCHANGE WHEREAS ONE SUBSTITUTED CANNOT EFFECT EXCHANGE.19 A CONGREGATION OR PARTNERS CAN DEDICATE BUT CANNOT EFFECT EXCHANGE. WE CAN DEDICATE EMBRYOS AND LIMBS,20 BUT WE CANNOT EFFECT EXCHANGE WITH THEM. [THE LAW RELATING TO] EXCHANGE CARRIES GREATER WEIGHT THAN [THAT RELATING TO] DEDICATIONS, SINCE EXCHANGE21 HAS EFFECT ON A PERMANENTLY BLEMISHED ANIMAL22 AND IT DOES NOT BECOME HULLIN

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(1) The reason why in the three first cases the sinofferings are not left to die in the case of a congregation is because there cannot be an offering in such circumstances, for they can never occur in connection with a congregation. There is therefore no alternative, whereas in the other two cases the offering can be brought both by an individual and a congregation.
(2) The fifth was to be left to pasture.
(3) Because they forgot during the period of mourning for Moses which one was to be left to pasture.
(4) For the cases of a sin-offering being left to die apply either all to a congregation or all to an individual.
(5) Viz., an offspring of a dedicated animal, a substitute of a sin-offering, and a sin-offering whose owners died.
(6) To be left to die, and the other four cases of sin-offerings were only to be left to pasture. It was, however, forgotten which were meant to die and which to pasture.
(7) I.e., all five were to be left to die.
(8) Before R. Nathan can complete his observation, he is interrupted with a question why it was necessary to condemn the four to die out of doubt.
(9) Viz., the sin-offering which was to be left to die.
(10) Let us see to what class this sin-offering which was to be left to die was remembered as belonging. If it was remembered as being the sin-offering both of a congregation and an individual, then let us say that a sin-offering whose owners procured atonement and a sin-offering whose year is passed are left to die because of doubt, whereas in the other three cases, which are entirely different, as they could not occur in connection with a congregation, there could be no doubt that there is no death for the sin-offerings. And if the case of a sin-offering being left to die was remembered only in connection with the offering of an individual, then let us say that these three sin-offerings, substitute and offspring of a dedicated animal etc., since they can be brought only by an individual, are left to die, but about the other two sin-offerings there can be no doubt, for they are entirely different (Rashi).
(11) The class in which the sin-offering that was to die was placed at Sinai (viz., congregational or individual) and also which of the five sin-offerings was to die.
(12) Those who lived in the days of Joshua and forgot those laws regarding sin-offerings.
(13) R. Nathan now continues to explain R. Simeon's teaching in the Mishnah.
(14) Of the sin-offering left to die.
(15) The four sin-offerings which are left to pasture.
(16) For this can never happen. Since therefore it is remembered that there were five sin-offerings which were either to be left to pasture or die, they were stated as regards an individual, in which circumstances all the five sin-offerings can occur.
(17) A sin-offering whose owners procured atonement and whose year had passed.
(18) This then is the reason for R. Simeon's opinion. The Rabbis however hold that four cases of sin-offerings were imparted from Sinai to be left to die. Therefore wherever we find that a sin-offering applies to an individual and a congregation, then it applies, and where not, it does not apply.
(19) So that if one says concerning an animal consecrated through being a substitute that it should in turn confer holiness on another animal by means of exchange, a further exchange does not take place.
(20) This is the view of R. Judah (supra 10a).
(21) So with Sh. Mek.
(22) So that if one substitutes a blemished animal for an unblemished dedicated animal, holiness attaches to the former to the extent that it does not become hullin.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 17a

SO AS TO BE SHEARED [OF ITS WOOL] AND WORKED.1 R. JOSE SON OF R. JUDAH SAYS: AN EXCHANGE IN ERROR IS PUT ON A LEVEL WITH AN INTENTIONAL [EXCHANGE], BUT A DEDICATION IN ERROR IS NOT PUT ON A LEVEL WITH AN INTENTIONAL [DEDICATION]. R. ELEAZAR2 SAYS: KIL'AYIM,3 TREFAH, A FOETUS EXTRACTED BY MEANS OF A CESAREAN SECTION, A TUMTUM AND A HERMAPHRODITE, NEITHER BECOME SACRED NOR CAN THEY CAUSE DEDICATION.

GEMARA. What is the reason of R. Jose son of R. Judah?4 Scripture says: Shall be holy,5 thus including the case of an exchange in error as on a level with an intentional [exchange]. How is [an exchange] in error being on a level with an intentional [exchange] to be understood? - Said Hezekiah: Where he has a [mistaken] opinion that it is permissible to exchange. Now in the case of exchange he is punishable [with lashes]6 whereas in the case of dedications he is not punishable [with lashes].7

Another version: In the case of exchange, the substitute is holy,8 whereas in the case of dedications, there is no holiness. R. Johanan9 says: Where he intended making an exchange with a burnt-offering and he made the exchange with a peace-offering,10 [or where he intended making an exchange with a peace-offering and he made the exchange with a burnt-offering].11 Now in the case of exchange the animal becomes holy, whereas in the case of dedications it is not holy.

Another version:12 Where he intended saying a black [ox]13 and he said a white [ox]. In the case of exchange, he is punishable [with lashes],14 whereas in the case of dedications, he is not punishable [with lashes].15 Resh Lakish says:16 Where he thought17 that the one animal can be quit of holiness18 while the other [the exchanged animal] enters into holiness. Similarly with reference to dedications, where he thought that if a blemish shows itself in dedicated animals they are eaten without redemption.19 - Now in the case of exchange20 he is punishable [with lashes],21 whereas in the case of dedications he is not punishable [with lashes]. R. Shesheth says: Where he says, 'I shall enter this house, dedicate and exchange with full knowledge [of what I am doing]', and then he entered, exchanged and dedicated without knowing it.22 Now as regards the exchanging, he is punishable [with lashes],23 whereas as regards the dedications, he is not punishable with lashes.24

R. ELEAZAR SAYS: KIL'AYIM, TREFAH etc. Said Samuel: They are neither holy as regards exchange,25 nor can they confer holiness through exchange [on others].26 It was taught, Rabbi27 said: But since they are not holy themselves, how can they confer holiness? This is possible only in the case where one dedicated an animal28 and it afterwards became trefah,29 or dedicated an embryo [in its mother's womb] and it was extracted through the cesarean section. But with regard to kil'ayim, tumtum and a hermaphrodite, you cannot explain these cases except with reference to embryos of dedicated animals.30 And this accords with the view of R. Judah who said: An offspring of a dedicated animal can effect exchange!31 Said Raba:32 What is the reason of R. Eleazar? - They are like an unclean animal. Just as an unclean animal is not offered and bodily consecration cannot attach to it,33 so these [are not offered] and no bodily consecration attaches to them. Said [R. Adda b. Ahaba] to Raba:34 But is there not the case of a blemished animal which is not offered and yet there attaches to it bodily consecration?35 - A blemished animal belongs to the category [of animals] which are offered up.36 If this is so,37 what of trefah which also belongs to a category which is offered?38 Rather said Raba:39 It resembles an unclean animal. Just as an unclean animal is disqualified on account of the condition of its body, so all these cases40 are disqualified on account of the condition of the body,41 thus excluding the case of a blemished animal which is disqualified in virtue of a [mere] deficiency.42

Said R. Adda to Raba: Are there not the cases of anything too long or too short43 mentioned in the Scriptural passage and these are disqualifications of the [whole] body?44 Rather said Raba:45 It must be like an unclean animal [as follows]: Just as in the case of an unclean animal there is none [offered] in the same category [and it is not subject to the law of exchange], so in all cases where there is none [offered] in the same category [the law of exchange is not applicable], thus excluding a blemished animal, since there are [other animals offered] from the same category. Will you perhaps object that a trefah too has [other animals which are offered] from the same category?45 [I answer that] it [a trefah animal] is not on a par with the case of a blemished animal. An unclean animal is forbidden to be eaten and a trefah is also forbidden to be eaten, to the exclusion of a blemished animal which is permitted to be eaten. Said Samuel: If one has dedicated a trefah, a permanent blemish is required in order to redeem it.46 Can you not prove from here that one may redeem dedicated animals in order to give dogs to eat?47 - Rather say: It is dedicated in that it is left to die.48 R. Oshaia however says: It is only like dedicating wood and stones.49

We learnt: We must not redeem dedicated animals which became trefah because we must not redeem dedicated animals in order to give dogs to eat. The reason50 is therefore because they became trefah; but if they were trefah at the beginning51 we may redeem them?52 - Perhaps this Tanna [of the Mishnah] holds: Wherever [the animal] is not fit [for offering] there does not rest upon it bodily dedication.53

Come and hear: R. ELEAZAR SAYS, KIL'AYIM, TREFAH, A FOETUS EXTRACTED BY MEANS OF A CESAREAN SECTION, A TUMTUM AND A HERMAPHRODITE ARE NEITHER HOLY NOR CAN THEY CONFER HOLINESS. And54 Samuel said: 'They are not holy' [means] to receive holiness of an exchange. 'Nor can they confer holiness' [means] to effect exchange. And it has been taught: Said Rabbi, But since they are not holy themselves, how can they confer holiness [on others]?55 You cannot therefore explain this except as referring to where one dedicated an animal and it afterwards became trefah.56 [Now the reason is because the animal was dedicated first and then it became trefah], but if it was a trefah from the beginning [before the dedication], bodily consecration would not attach to it!57

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(1) But it has the law of dedications whose consecration was prior to the blemish, when only the eating of it is permissible, whereas in the case of originally dedicated animals, if the blemish came before the dedication, the animal becomes hullin after redemption and may be shorn and worked.
(2) Var. lec.: R. Eliezer.
(3) V. supra 11a and notes.
(4) Who says in the Mishnah that an exchange in error is on a par with an intentional exchange, unlike the case of a dedication.
(5) Lev. XXVII, 33.
(6) Since Scripture says: 'shall be holy', thus including the case of exchange even in error.
(7) For we do not find the punishment of lashes except in regard to a wilful act preceded by a warning. But if one wilfully consecrated a permanently blemished animal, he is guilty of breaking five prohibitory laws as stated in Chap. I.
(8) According to this version there is no punishment of lashes in connection with an exchange if effected in error.
(9) So with Sh. Mek. Cur. edd.: Resh Lakish and R. Johanan.
(10) Explaining in what circumstances an error in exchange is on a par with an intentional exchange.
(11) V. Sh. Mek. for the correct reading of this passage.
(12) Giving the circumstances of an exchange in error which is unlike the case of dedications.
(13) 'Which first left my house shall be exchanged in place of this animal'.
(14) If he makes use of it. For Scripture by the text 'shall be' reveals that an exchange even in error is valid.
(15) If the animal is blemished and unfit for the altar.
(16) So Sh. Mek; cur. edd. R. Johanan.
(17) So Bah; cur. edd. 'said'.
(18) He knew that exchanging was forbidden but he thought the first dedicated animal became hullin after the exchanging, as if it had become blemished (Rashi).
(19) He knew that dedicated animals are forbidden to be eaten by non-priests but imagined that, if blemished, they could be eaten without redemption.
(20) Where he was under the impression that the first animal became hullin after being exchanged.
(21) For one is punishable with lashes in the case of exchanging even if in error.
(22) Being an absent-minded man who sometimes forgot what he said (Rashi). Tosaf. explains as follows: 'When I enter this house this animal shall be an exchange for this and that animal shall be dedicated with my full knowledge'. He entered, exchanged and dedicated without saying anything at all when he entered or thinking of what he had said previously. Therefore the exchange and the dedication took place without him knowing it.
(23) For Scripture says that an exchange in error is on a level with an intentional exchange.
(24) And if he dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, he is not punishable with lashes, for it was a mistaken dedication.
(25) Exchange takes no effect on these animals, for although exchange takes effect upon a blemished animal, rendering it consecrated as such, nevertheless these cases mentioned in the Mishnah are different. There is certainly no consecration as such in the cases of trefah, kil'ayim, etc., as they are only holy for their value, like wood or stones and do not require redemption.
(26) If they themselves are holy, one cannot exchange an animal for them.
(27) So Sh. Mek; cur. edd. 'R. Meir'.
(28) Holiness taking effect on it.
(29) The Mishnah therefore informs us that although it is holy, it cannot effect exchange.
(30) Which were consecrated in virtue of their mother before pregnancy. They are then obviously holy, like the limb of the mother. In these cases the Mishnah informs us that they do not effect exchange.
(31) With other offspring of dedicated animals. There is therefore need for a Mishnah to inform us with reference to tumtum etc. that although they are holy through their mother they cannot effect exchange, in spite of the fact that R. Judah holds elsewhere that the offspring of a dedicated animal effects exchange.
(32) So Sh. Mek.; cur. edd. 'R. Papa'.
(33) It can be consecrated only in respect of its monetary value.
(34) So Sh. Mek.
(35) By means of exchange, if the dedication was prior to the blemish. This animal too whose dedication came before it became trefah should effect exchange, and if it became trefah when hullin should also become holy if exchanged for a dedicated animal.
(36) I.e., other unblemished animals, and therefore it receives consecration as such through exchange. An animal which was extracted by means of the cesarean section is almost a species by itself and is not in the category of ordinary animals. The other four cases, kil'ayim, tumtum, etc. also do not belong to the category of animals which are offered up and, according to Tosaf., almost belong to a different species.
(37) That the reason why exchange takes effect on a blemished animal is because it belongs to a category of animals which is offered up.
(38) I.e., of other animals which are not trefah and therefore should be subject to the law of exchange.
(39) That the reason why a blemished animal is different from the cases mentioned in the Mishnah is that etc.
(40) Tumtum, etc.
(41) The cases of kil'ayim, tumtum etc. are totally disqualified bodily and there is no dedication of the animal at all.
(42) But not the condition of the whole body.
(43) Lev. XXII, 23.
(44) 'Too short' or 'too long' are bodily disqualifications.
(45) The reason why a blemished animal is subject to the law of exchange. (12) And therefore should be exchanged.
(46) If one wishes to redeem it, for Samuel holds that it is capable of dedication as such.
(47) And we learn (infra 31a) that one cannot redeem dedicated animals in order to give dogs to eat, but they are left to die and then buried.
(48) But it is holy bodily, and even after redemption it must not be shorn or worked. And even if blemished, it is not redeemed in order to be given to the dogs to eat.
(49) It is not called a dedication at all and therefore can be redeemed to be given to the dogs to eat, no permanent blemish being required to make redemption permissible.
(50) Why we must not redeem a dedicated animal that has become trefah.
(51) Before its dedication.
(52) We therefore see that if one dedicated a trefah it can be redeemed in order to give dogs to eat, unlike the view of Samuel.
(53) Since therefore there is no holiness as such in connection with trefah, it may be redeemed.
(54) Supra on this page of the Gemara and v. notes.
(55) V. supra p. 118, and notes.
(56) V. p. 118, and notes.
(57) Unlike the view of Samuel above.

Talmud - Mas. T'murah 17b

- Samuel can answer you: R. Eleazar holds:1 Wherever [the animal] is not [offered],2 bodily consecration does not attach to it.3

CHAPTER 3

MISHNAH. THE FOLLOWING ARE DEDICATIONS WHOSE YOUNG AND EXCHANGES ARE IN THE SAME CLASS AS THEMSELVES: THE YOUNG OF PEACE-OFFERINGS AND THEIR EXCHANGES, THEIR YOUNG4 AND THE YOUNG OF THEIR YOUNG, TILL THE END OF TIME,5 ARE REGARDED AS PEACE-OFFERINGS REQUIRING LAYING ON OF HANDS,6 DRINK-OFFERINGS AND THE WAVING OF THE BREAST AND SHOULDER.

GEMARA. Since it states: THE YOUNG AND THE YOUNG OF THEIR YOUNG, what need is there for the UNTIL THE END OF TIME? - Our Tanna [of the Mishnah] heard R. Eleazar state that the young of a peace-offering is not offered as a peace-offering.7 Thereupon our Tanna said to him: Not only do I not agree with you with regard to their young.8 but I even do not agree with you with regard to the young born until the end of time.9

Whence do we derive this? - Our Rabbis have taught: [Scripture says:] A male:10 this includes the young. Now have we not here an inference from minor to major; if an exchange which is not reared in holiness is offered,11 how much more should the young [of a dedication] which is reared in holiness be offered? The case of exchange is different, since it applies to all dedications,12 whereas the rule of the young does not apply to all dedications,13 [and since it does not apply to all dedications, therefore the young is not offered].14 The text therefore states, 'A male', thus including the young [as being offered]. [The text] A female,15 this includes exchange. I have so far only the young of unblemished16 animals17 and the exchange of unblemished animals. Whence do we derive the cases of the young of blemished animals and the exchange of blemished animals [as being offered]? Scripture says: If it [be a male],18 this includes the young of blemished animals, and the words 'if it be [a female]' include the exchange of blemished animals. Said R. Safra to Abaye: perhaps I can reverse [this]?19 - From the same text ['A female'] that we include the exchange of unblemished animals [as being offered], we include the exchange of blemished animals.20 He said to him: Am I asking you to reverse the interpretation of the expression 'if it be' which is next to 'a male' and the interpretation of the expression 'if it be' which is next to 'a female'? I mean this: Reverse the whole verse. Say as follows: The expression 'a male' includes the case of exchange21 and the expression 'a female' includes the young!22 - He replied to him: The word 'walad' ['the young'] has a masculine implication,23 whereas the word 'temurah' ['exchange'] has a feminine implication.24

For what practical purpose?25 - Said Samuel: In order to be offered and according to the opinion of R. Eleazar.26 For you might have thought that R. Eleazar only holds that [the young] is regarded as a burnt-offering because the name of a burnt-offering is applied to its mother,27 but these young [of a blemished peace-offering] are not offered. He28 therefore informs us [that it is not so]. Bar Padda says:29 In order that they be left to pasture and [this is] according to all the authorities concerned.30 It was stated also:31 Raba says. In order to be offered and according to the opinion of R. Eleazar. R. Papa says: In order to be left to pasture and according to all the authorities concerned.

But the following Tanna derives this32 from here:33 [Scripture says:] 'Only thy holy things':34 this refers to exchanges; 'which thou hast': this refers to the young [of dedications]; 'thou shalt take and go': one might think [from this text] that he brings the offspring into the Temple and refrains from giving them water and food in order that they may die?35 The text therefore states: And thou shalt offer thy burnt-offerings, the flesh and the blood,36 to teach us that you must deal with an exchange as you deal with a burnt-offering,37 and that you must deal with the young of peace-offerings and their exchange as you deal with the peace-offerings themselves.38 One might think that [the young and exchange] even of all dedications [are offered]? The text, however, states: Rak39 ['only']. This is the teaching of R. Ishmael. R. Akiba says: There is no need [to derive the limitation from 'rak'], for it says: 'It is a guilt-offering',40 implying 'it' is offered but its exchange is not offered.41

The Master said: 'Thou shalt take and go. One might think from this text that he brings the offspring into the Temple, etc.' But how could you have inferred this,42 seeing that tradition mentions five sin-offerings as left to die,43 thus implying that these44 are offered? - You might have thought that the five sin-offerings are left to die everywhere, whereas these45 are left to die only in the Temple. [Scripture] therefore informs us [that it is not so].

The Master said: 'One might think [that the young and exchange] of all dedications [are offered]? The text, however, says: Rak [only]'. Now to what young [are we alluding here]? If to the [young of a] burnt-offering, it is a male and is not capable of giving birth! If to the young of a sin-offering, there is a traditional law that it is condemned to die.

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(1) So Sh. Mek.; cur. edd.: perhaps this Tanna also.
(2) Not fit to offer on the altar.
(3) And therefore if the animal were trefah at the outset, bodily holiness does not attach to it. Samuel himself, however, will agree with the Rabbis that in the case of trefah, the animal receives bodily holiness and therefore it cannot be redeemed unless permanently blemished, in order to be given to dogs to eat.
(4) Viz., the young of peace-offerings and the exchange of the peace-offerings.
(5) Lit., 'until the end of the world'.
(6) The laying on of the hands prior to the killing of the animal.
(7) But is condemned to die.
(8) Since I hold that it has the same status as its mother.
(9) Since even then I hold that the young has the law of its mother.
(10) Lev. III, 1. What need is there for the words 'a male', 'a female'? It would have been sufficient if Scripture bad said: 'If he offer it from the herd', which would have implied male and female.
(11) This is derived from the expression 'a female', as stated subsequently in the Gemara.
(12) By an individual.
(13) Since a burnt-offering and a guilt-offering are males.
(14) Wilna Gaon Glosses.
(15) Lev. III, 1.
(16) V. Wilna Gaon Glosses.
(17) Since the mother is unblemished and therefore the young has the same law.
(18) The word אם ('if it be') which has an inclusive meaning.
(19) And say that the words 'If it be (a male)' include an exchange of blemished animals, and the words 'If it be (a female)' include the young of blemished animals.
(20) Therefore from the words 'if it be' which are next to the words 'a female', we derive the case of an exchange of blemished animals but not from the words 'if it be' next to the words 'a male'.
(21) And its phrase 'if it be' will include the exchange of blemished animals.
(22) And its phrase 'if it be' will include the young of blemished animals.
(23) And therefore we include it from the text 'a male'.
(24) Therefore we include it from the text 'a female'.
(25) Are the offspring of blemished animals holy, since their mother is not fit to be offered.
(26) Who says in the Mishnah (infra 18a) that if one set apart a female animal for a burnt-offering and it gave birth,its offspring is offered as a burnt-offering, although its mother is not fit for a burnt-offering. Here too in the case of the young of blemished offerings, although the mother is not fit for the altar, the young is offered.
(27) Although the mother itself is not offered, the holiness of a burnt-offering is not eliminated, since there is a case of a burnt-offering which is a female, viz., a burnt-offering of a bird.
(28) The Tanna of the Baraitha above.
(29) The object of the Mishnah when it says that the offspring of a peace-offering is considered as a peace-offering is as follows.
(30) Even according to the Rabbis who differ from R. Eleazar. They will admit that the young are sacred at least as regards pasturing and that they are not hullin.
(31) As to what extent the offspring of a blemished peace-offering is holy.
(32) The rule of the young of peace-offering being like the mother.
(33) Naz. 25a; Bek. 24b.
(34) Deut. XII, 26.
(35) And thus he would be carrying out the injunction 'take and go'.
(36) Ibid. 27 following the verse 'only thy holy things etc.'.
(37) To sprinkle its blood and burn it entirely.
(38) I.e., in respect of laying on of hands, drink-offerings and the waving of the breast and shoulders.
(39) One of the words which has a restrictive meaning.
(40) Lev. V, 19.
(41) Thus excluding the exchange of other dedications from being offered.
(42) That the offspring and exchange of other dedications die, so as to require the text: And thou shalt offer thy burnt-offering, etc.
(43) Two of which are an offspring of a sin-offering and the exchange of a sin-offering.
(44) The young of peace-offerings and their exchange.
(45) The young of a peace-offering and its exchange.

 

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